1.

 PNB v. CA, 222 SCRA 134, 5/17/1993

 Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines does not provide an interpretation
of what a "week" is explicitly, according to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
On the other hand, in the case of Concepcion v. Andueta, the term "week" was
construed to mean a period of time consisting of seven (7) days in a row.

In addition, the Supreme Court has decided that the rule is that statutory
provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with, and that even the smallest of violations will invalidate the
notice and render the sale at the very least voidable.

2. Manolo P. Fule v. The Honorable CA, G.R. No. L-79094, 6/22/1988

 The Supreme Court held that under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory, while affirmative phrases
are merely directory. This decision was made in accordance with the precedent
set in the case McGee vs. Republic. In addition to this, the word "must" is used,
which further underlines the obligatory nature of the statement, and indicates
that it is of the utmost importance, functioning to impose an obligation that can
be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176).

In addition to this, it is a sacred law that penal statutes, regardless of whether

they are substantive, remedial, or procedural, are to be sternly applied against the
government and liberally applied in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No.
L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

3. Colgate-Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Pedro M. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-14787,

1/28/1961
 The Supreme Court held that the rule in statutory construction that "general
terms may be restricted and limited by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language, which indicates the
statute's object and purpose" is only applicable in situations in which, with the
exception of one general term, all of the items in an enumeration belong to or
fall under one specific class.

When employed in conjunction with particular recitals, the rule of construction

that states that generic and unlimited phrases are constrained and limited by
those recitals does not necessitate the complete rejection of general terms. Its
sole purpose is to facilitate the process of determining what the legislative body
had in mind, and it is meant to be interpreted in conjunction with the other rules
of construction.
4. Purita Bersabal v. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador, G.R. No. L-35910, 7/21/1978
 According to the Supreme Court, when it comes to statutes, the term "may" is
almost always permissive and merely serves to confer discretion on those who
are subject to it. According to Dizon v. Encarnacion, the word "shall" is an
imperative, which means that it operates to impose an obligation that can be
enforced. On the other hand, the word "may" is not an imperative.

The implication is that the Court is incapable to decide the case other than on the
basis of the evidence and records that have been transmitted to it, or on the
basis of the foregoing in addition to memoranda and/or briefs, with oral
argument that has been properly submitted and/or made on request.

5. Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. The Honorable IAC, G.R. No. L-72005,
5/29/1987
The Supreme Court decided that the rule, which is based on logic, is that courts
should not distinguish situations in which the law does not distinguish between
things. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. This is a corollary of
the idea that the natural and general significance of the words and phrases used
in a statute should normally be attributed to the general terms and phrases used
in the same.

According to the rule, a broad term or phrase must not be broken down into its
component portions and each component distinguished from the others in order
to provide sufficient justification for the term's exemption from the application of
the law. In other words, there shouldn't be any exceptions to the rules laid out in
a statute if there aren't any of those exceptions mentioned. For the reason that
courts are not permitted to make distinctions when the law does not make any
distinctions. They should, as an alternative, administer the law not in accordance
with how they believe it should be, but rather in accordance with how it actually
is, and without regard to the consequences.