Pre pare d by:

API LADO, KE NT IVAN

BLANCO, VI NCE YAN N I
BE LITA, JE MARI E
The Scholastic Ethics
St. Thomas Aquinas, founder of
scholasticism, is often described as a
natural law theorist. While natural law
is a significant aspect of his moral
philosophy, it is a subject of considerable
dispute and misunderstanding.

01
I. NATURAL LAW

According to Aquinas, every law is ultimately derived

from what he calls the eternal law. The “eternal law” re-
fers to God’s providential ordering of all created things
to their proper end. We participate in thatdivine order
in virtue of the fact that God creates in us both a desire
for and an ability to discern what is good (he calls this
ability the “light of natural reason”). Aquinas added that
“it is this participation in the eternal law by the rational
creature that is called the natural law”

02
NATURAL LAW
Natural law is but an extension of the eternal law. For by it
God ordains us to final happiness by implanting in us both a
general knowledge of and inclination for goodness. Natural
law is not an external source of authority. Nor is it a general
deontic norm from which more specific precepts are inferred.

Natural law is a fundamental principle that is weaved into

the fabric of our nature. As such, it illuminates and gives us a
desire for those goods that facilitate the kind of flourishing
proper to human beings..
03
According to Aquinas, human beings have an innate habit whereby
they reason according to what he calls “first principles”. First principles
are fundamental to all inquiry. They include things like the principle of
non-contradiction and law of excluded middle. These principles are in-
demonstrable in the sense that we do not acquire them from some prior
demonstration.

The natural law functions in a way that is analogous to the aforemen-

tioned principles. According to Aquinas, all human actions are governed
by a general principle or precept that is foundational to and necessary
for all practical reasoning: good is to be done and evil is to be avoided.
This principle is not something we can ignore or defy. Rather, it is an ex-
pression of how practical thought and action proceed in creatures such
as ourselves.
04
II. CARDINAL VIRTUES
Aquinas offers several definitions of virtue. According to one very
general account, a virtue is a habit that “disposes an agent to
perform its proper operation or movement”.

A cursory glance at the second part of the Summa

Theologiae would reveal a host of virtues that are indicative of
human goodness. But there are essentially four virtues from which
Aquinas’s more extensive list flows. These virtues are prudence,
justice, temperance, and courage. Aquinas refers to these virtues
as the "cardinal" virtues. They are the principle habits
on which the rest of the virtues hinge (cardo).

05
1. PRUDENCE
As Thomas Hibbs explains: “prudence involves not simply the subor-
dination of particulars to appropriate universals, but the appraisal
of concrete, contingent circumstances”. From this perspective, good
decisions will always be responsive to what our situation requires.
Thus, we cannot simply consult a list of moral prescriptions in deter-
mining what we should do. We must also “grasp what is pertinent
and to assess what ought to be done in complex circumstances”.

06
Aquinas argued that prudence is an intellectual aptitude
that enables us to make judgments that are consonant with
our proper end, which is the human good. Prudence illu-
minates the course of action deemed most appropriate
for achieving our antecedently established telos through
three acts: counsel, judgment, and command. Appetitive
excellences are necessary to make good choices, but in-
tellectual excellences are also needed to deliberate and
choose well with respect to what is ultimately good for us.

07
Prudence is a cardinal virtue that depends on virtues of the ap-
petite, such as memory, intelligence, docility, shrewdness, rea-
son, foresight, circumspection, and caution. Without these virtues,
we may commit cognitive errors and act for the sake of goods
that are contrary to our nature. To make reliable judgments about
what is really good, our passions need some measure of restraint.

08
2. TEMPERANCE
Temperance is a moral virtue that denotes a moderation of
physical pleasures, such as eating, drinking, and sex. It serves
to restrain what Aquinas calls “concupiscible passion” - the
appetite to desire pleasing and avoid harmful things. It is a
restrained desire for physical gratification.

09
Aquinas argues that temperance is not about desiring phys-
ical pleasure less, but rather creating a sense of moderation
with respect to what is pleasurable. He believes that bodily
pleasure can be an integral part of a rational life, as it safe-
guards the good of reason and facilitates a more enduring
kind of satisfaction.

Temperance is a cardinal virtue that includes chastity, sobri-

ety, abstinence, humility, meekness, clemency, and studious-
ness. Humility restrains the immoderate desire for what one
cannot achieve, while meekness, clemency, and studiousness
restrain certain appetitive drives.
10
3. COURAGE
Aquinas argued that temperance and its subsidiary virtues
restrain the strong appetite, while courage and its subsidi-
ary virtues modify the irascible appetite, which is the desire
for something difficult to attain or avoid. Fear can discour-
age us from adhering to reason’s instruction, but only when
it prevents us from facing what we ought to endure does it
become inimical to reason. Courage is the virtue that mod-
erates those appetites that prevent from undertaking more
daunting tasks.

11
Courage is necessary to restrain our fears and combat unreason-
able zeal to overcome them. Without it, we will be governed by ir-
rational fear or recklessness, making us vulnerable to harm. With-
out courage, we will be governed by irrational fear or recklessness

Courage is a cardinal virtue that requires endurance, confidence,

magnificence, patience, and perseverance. It requires one to be able
to stand immovable in the midst of dangers, endure pain and suffer-
ing, confront obstacles, display magnificence, and have patience and
perseverance. It also requires one to be confident in their own strength,
the strength of others, or the promises of God. Finally, it requires pa-
tience and perseverance to not be broken by stress or sorrow, nor be
wearied or discouraged due to the exigencies of their endeavors.

12
4. JUSTICE
The virtue of justice governs our relationships with others,
denoting a sustained or constant willingness to extend what
they deserve. Aquinas’ account of justice has two sets of
distinctions: legal and particular justice, and commutative
and distributive justice.

13
The purpose of legal justice is to govern our actions accord-
ing to the common good. Aquinas argued that everyone who
is a member of a community stands to that community as a
part to a whole. This means that whatever is good for one-
self will also be good for the community of which one is a
part. This focus is what falls under the purview of legal jus-
tice.

14
Aquinas acknowledges that legal justice is not entirely dif-
ferent from the virtues we previously considered, such as
courage, temperance, and prudence. However, these vir-
tues differ logically from legal justice in that they have spe-
cific objects of their own. Legal justice aims to make us
good citizens, while the other virtues aim to make us good
people. Aquinas insists that temperance can do more than
just modify our sexual drives, as it can direct us to pre-
serve the common good in our actions. Legal justice must
govern all acts of virtue to ensure that they achieve their
end in a way that is commensurate with the good of others.

15
Aquinas argued that particular justice is necessary to fulfill the de-
mands of justice, as it directs us not to the good of the community
but to the good of individual citizens. He agreed that general justice
can direct us to the good of others, but only indirectly, by providing us
with general precepts to help preserve the common good. However,
Aquinas argued that the proximate concern of particular justice is
not the common good, but the good of individuals. In fulfilling its pur-
pose, particular justice is a means of preserving community welfare.

16
Aquinas identifies two species of justice: commutative and
distributive justice, which seek to preserve equality between
persons by giving each person what is due. Commutative
justice concerns the “mutual dealings” between individual
citizens, while distributive justice concerns the way collective
goods and responsibilities are apportioned among people
in a social community. Aquinas also believes that a person
should be paid an amount comparable to the value of what
he sells.

17
THAN K YOU

18