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Relational Processing is Fundamental to the Central Executive and is Limited

to Four Variables

Article · July 2013

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16

Relational processing is fundamental

to the central executive and is limited to
four variables
Graeme S. Halford, Steven Phillips, William H. Wilson,
Julie McCredden, Glenda Andrews, Damian Birney,
Rosemary Baker and John D. Bain

In this chapter we want to address two broad questions. The first is: What sort of information is
processed by the central executive? And the second question is: What limits the information pro-
cessing capacity of the central executive?
In answer to the first question we propose that the central executive is specialized to some
extent to process relational information. Although there has been a considerable amount of
research on executive functions (Zelazo et al. 2003) they are not well defined, and it is not clear
whether the various functions reflect distinct cognitive processes (Bowman and Pallier 2006;
Blair 2006) or how central they are to working memory (Birney in preparation). With this caveat
in mind, we will make a cautious attempt to define some of the processes that are common to
executive functions, drawing on relational knowledge theories (Goodwin and Johnson-Laird
2005; Halford et al. 1998; Phillips et al. 1995).
Executive functions that are used in problem-solving require a cognitive map, or mental model,
of the structure of the task. This mental model has to represent relations between the entities in
the task, because relations are the defining property of structure. In its most basic form, it has to
represent the links between the current situation, a set of actions or operators, and a goal or out-
come. This representation has to be created by the central executive in such a way that it is accessible
to other cognitive processes so that it can be used to plan actions, to select the best actions to
achieve particular goals in given circumstances, to make inferences, and to perform the many
functions of higher cognition. Controlled planning and strategy development require representa-
tion of structure to determine which actions or operators will achieve specific goals in particular
situations. Goals must be maintained in such a way that relations between the current state,
actions and goal states are explicitly represented. Switching between rules is a comparison of rela-
tions, and requires choosing the best one to achieve a particular goal. Inhibitory control involves
relational processing because inhibition of any process requires that an alternative be repre-
sented, and a representation of the relation between alternatives is needed. Relational complexity
has been shown to fit data from some tasks that are usually attributed to inhibitory control
(Andrews et al. 2003). Inferences require representation of relations between variables.
One powerful reasoning process is analogical reasoning. Analogy can be said to be at the core of
executive functions (Grafman and Litvan 1999) because analogy is fundamental to higher cognitive
processes (Binet and Simon 1905/1980; Halford 1990, 1993; Hofstadter 2001; Piaget 1950), and
mental models, which are important to some theories of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird 1983;
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262 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991; Polk and Newell 1995) are essentially analogs. Analogy is a struc-
tural correspondence between two cognitive representations, one called a source, the other a target,
both being comprised of representations of relations (Gentner 1983; Gentner et al. 2001; Holland
et al. 1986).
The structural correspondence between source and target permits a possible mechanism for
representation of variables, which are also basic to higher cognition. Analogical mappings align
representational entities using corresponding slots in relations, which effectively function as
variables. For example, the relation older-than(-,-) has two slots, one for an older entity and one
for a younger entity. These can be instantiated in a variety of ways such as older-than (Tom, John),
older-than (Frank, Peter), older-than (Tom, Paul). In the proportional analogy, Tom is to Frank as
John is to whom?, the common relation allows the slots for the older entity to be aligned (Tom =
Frank), and similarly for the slots for the younger entity (John = Peter), so as to discover the solution
to the problem. To perform this set of relational manipulations, the central executive needs to:
1. Represent relations,
2. Mark slots and assign fillers,
3. Align the instances of the common relation,
4. Use the alignment to find the missing element as the solution.
Therefore ability to process relations is at the core of analogical reasoning and of many other
higher cognitive processes.

Neuroscience evidence of relational processing

Recent results from neuroscience support our claim that relational processing is basic to the
functions of the central executive. The prefrontal cortex is generally thought to support executive
functions such as working memory, preparatory set, and inhibitory control (Fuster 1997).
A number of reviews have also highlighted functional differences within this region. For example,
Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) have provided a broad classification of brain regions and memory
types, allocating working memory to bilateral regions in frontal, as well as parietal and temporal
lobes. Tekin and Cummings (2002) describe the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as being mainly
involved in tasks like planning ahead, regulating actions according to the environmental stimuli,
shifting behavioral sets appropriately, and temporal ordering of recent events. In addition,
Ridderinkhof et al. (2004) assign performance monitoring to medial frontal cortex and subsequent
adjustment to lateral and orbitofrontal cortex. Most relevant for our purposes is the review by Robin
and Holyoak (1995), proposing that the frontal lobes also specialize in relational processing.
A number of brain imaging studies have investigated changes in activity on tasks that exercise
relational processing capacity (Andrews and Halford 2002), including fluid intelligence tests
(Duncan et al. 2000), mathematical operations (Prabhakaran et al. 2001), transitive inference
(Goel et al. 2004; Heckers et al. 2004; Nagode and Pardo 2002), Raven’s Progressive Matrices
(Christoff et al. 2001; Kroger et al. 2002; Prabhakaran et al. 1997); and pair recognition (Phillips
and Niki 2002, 2003). Differences in regional activity that are correlated with changes in the amount
of relational processing have repeatedly been observed in prefrontal, parietal and temporal lobes.
Phillips and Niki (2002, 2003) have interpreted their results in terms of maintaining the role or
positional information that affords access (i.e., an index) to a relational set. Frontal and parietal lobe
activity often coactivate in relationally difficult tasks, but repetitive transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (rTMS) revealed differences in terms of maintenance (parietal and prefrontal) and retrieval
(prefrontal only) (Koch et al. 2005). Whereas frontal and parietal regions often coactivate in relation-
ally difficult tasks, rTMS has revealed differences in terms of their working memory functions.
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LIMITS TO THE COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 263

The picture emerging from such brain imaging studies is one where prefrontal, parietal and tem-
poral regions contribute to various components of relational processing. Tentatively, prefrontal
regions are involved in the retrieval and monitoring of relational information, the parietal
regions are involved in the maintenance of relational structures (i.e., the explicit dimensions over
which the relations are defined), and the temporal regions are involved in the formation of bind-
ings between related items.
The neuroscience evidence we have considered in this brief review supports the claim that the
frontal lobes are involved in processing relations, and evidence is accumulating of involvement of
specific regions within the prefrontal cortex. Given that the frontal lobes are involved in executive
functions, this supports the claim that relational processing is an important function of the central
executive. There is also evidence that specifically links frontal processing to the complexity of
relations. We will consider this evidence after we outline our proposals on relational complexity.

Limits to the cognitive complexity of the central executive

Our second major claim is that the information processing capacity of the central executive is
limited in the complexity of the relational structures that it can process. A number of cognitive
complexity metrics have been proposed, and those that were designed to account for cognitive
development have been reviewed by Halford (2002). There are two metrics that are being used in
contemporary research. The first is the cognitive complexity and control (CCC) metric (Frye and
Zelazo 1998) that has been employed in cognitive development, and the second is the relational
complexity (RC) theory (Halford et al. 1998) that has been employed in child and adult cognition,
and in animal cognition. These metrics developed in parallel and have significant common
ground.
Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory (Zelazo and Frye 1998) proposes that complex-
ity can be defined by the number of levels in a hierarchy of rules. For example, preschoolers can
adequately represent simple ‘if-then’ rules, allowing effective representation of relations between
antecedent and consequent conditions, but it is not until about five years that children can
embed rules under higher order rules, thereby forming a hierarchy of rules. However the com-
plexity of a rule hierarchy can also be accounted for by the complexity of relations, because each
additional level of a hierarchy entails another variable. Halford et al. (1998) have accounted for the
complexity of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, which entails a hierarchy of goals, in terms of relational
complexity. Thus CCC theory can be subsumed within RC theory, described below.
Relational Complexity (RC) theory (Andrews and Halford 2002; Halford et al. 1998) argues that
task complexity is a function of the number of related variables required to be processed in parallel.
Each argument or slot of a relation corresponds to a variable. For example, the binary relation
‘larger-than’, with instances such as larger-than (elephant, horse), larger-than (dog, mouse), has
two arguments or slots. Each slot can be filled in a variety of ways, as these examples illustrate,
and therefore constitutes a dimension or variable. Relations vary in the number of dimensions
that they entail. An n-ary relation is a set of points in n-dimensional space, so a unary relation
represents one dimension, a binary relation links elements in two dimensions, and so on.
Relational complexity theory proposes that more complex relations impose higher processing
loads, and that humans are limited in the complexity of relations that can be processed in any
one representation. We suggest that due to these limitations, humans try to reduce the complex-
ity of a task using two main cognitive heuristics, as follows.
Conceptual chunking involves recoding concepts into less complex relations. For instance,
speed as a function of distance/time is a ternary relation but can be reduced to a unary represen-
tation, e.g., speed (80kph). This strategy reduces processing load but relations between chunked
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264 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

variables become inaccessible. For example, questions such as ‘How would speed change if we
were to cover the same distance in a third of the time?’ can no longer be answered under the unary
representation of speed. Therefore conceptual chunking cannot be used when the interaction
between variables needs to be made explicit.
Segmentation involves dividing tasks into less complex subtasks that can be processed serially.
For example, segmentation occurs in comprehension of English when sentences are parsed into
constituents that are processed sequentially. While segmentation reduces processing load, rela-
tions between variables in different segments will not be accessible in the representations of the
segments, and some overarching representation is needed.
Together, conceptual chunking and segmentation permit complex, hierarchical structures to be
handled by processing one level at a time (Wilson et al. 2001). Taking into account the human
tendency to use these strategies, we have devised a set of principles, called the Method for
Analysis of Relational Complexity (MARC), for measuring the complexity of any given cognitive
task. The most important MARC principle is that variables can be chunked or segmented only if
relations between them do not need to be processed.
Using MARC principles to define complexity, we have investigated how performance on various
cognitive tasks changes as complexity increases. Relational complexity effects have been observed
in studies involving adults. The domains included comprehension of relative clause sentences
AU: Please update
(Andrews et al. in press), the n-back task (Zielinski 2006), and reasoning on the knights and
author references
knaves (Birney and Halford 2002), latin square (Birney et al. 2006), Tower of Hanoi (Loveday
1995) and categorical syllogisms tasks (Zielinski et al. submitted).
Our conclusion from this section is that limitations to working memory can be well defined by
the complexity of relations that can be processed. It remains, however, to provide a reasonably
definitive assessment of working memory capacity, and it is to this that we turn next.

Quantifying processing capacity

The study by Halford et al. (2005) was designed to determine limits to human information pro-
cessing capacity, using the relational complexity metric. There have been theoretical estimates of
working memory capacity (Hummel and Holyoak 2003; Miller 1956), there is a review by Cowan
(2001), and there is an estimate of the capacity of visual short-term memory (Luck and Vogel 1997;
but see also Davis and Holmes 2005). However there did not appear to have been an empirical
determination of the number of variables humans can process, and this is vital to the central
executive.
Empirical determination of processing capacity required that chunking and segmentation
strategies for overcoming capacity limitations be constrained within the experiment, based on
the MARC principles above. We found that this could be achieved by using statistical interactions
for the problem domain, because these problems cannot be decomposed into subproblems
(e.g., we cannot interpret main effects without taking account of the interactions in which they
participate).
We therefore developed a problem domain where participants were asked to interpret graphical
presentations of two-, three- and four-way interactions based on fictitious data on one of six
everyday topics (e.g., cars, cakes, houses). Participants were presented with a set of verbal descrip-
tions corresponding to graphical depiction of two-, three- and four-way interactions (an example
is shown in Figures 16.1 and 16.2). The graphs were very carefully designed so that the configura-
tions of bars were consistent across problem types, so that height differences could be discerned
visually, and so that simplification strategies would be unlikely to be used. To optimize expertise
for the task, participants were 30 academic staff and graduate students from Psychology and
Computer Science, who had experience in interpreting the type of data presented.
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QUANTIFYING PROCESSING CAPACITY 265

(a) People prefer fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs carrot).

Left half (black)

greater
The diference between fresh and frozen is for chocolate cakes than for carrot cakes.
smaller
Right half (gray)
greater
The diference between fresh and frozen is for chocolate cakes than for carrot cakes.
smaller
Liking

fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen

choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot

(b) People prefer fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs carrot)
and the type (iced vs plain).

The difference between fresh and frozen increases from chocolate cakes to carrot cakes.
greater
This increase is for iced cakes than for plain cakes.
smaller
Liking

fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen

choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot
iced iced iced iced plain plain plain plain

Figure 16.1 Example problems (8 bars). Graphs were presented in blue and yellow, represented
here by black and gray, respectively. (a) 2 × 2-way. Answers: smaller, greater. (b) Three-way. Answer:
smaller. Adapted from Figure 1 in Halford, GS, Baker R, McCredden , JE and Bain, JD (2005) How
many variables can humans process? Psychological Science, 16( 1), 70–76.
 266
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1/30/07
5:33 PM

(a) People prefer fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs carrot) and the type (iced vs plain).

The difference between fresh and frozen increases from chocolate cakes to carrot cakes.

Left half (black)

Page 266

greater
This increase is for iced cakes than for plain cakes.
smaller
Right half (gray)
greater
This increase is for iced cakes than for plain cakes.
smaller
RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Liking
fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen
choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot
iced iced iced iced plain plain plain plain iced iced iced iced plain plain plain plain
 (b) People prefer fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs carrot), the type (iced vs plain) and the richness (rich vs low-fat).
16-Osaka-Chap16

The difference between fresh and frozen increases from chocolate cakes to carrot cakes.

This increase is greater for iced cakes than for plain cakes.
greater
There is a change in the size of the increase for rich cakes than for low-fat cakes.
1/30/07

smaller
5:33 PM

Liking
Page 267

fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen fresh frozen
choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot choc choc carrot carrot
iced iced iced iced plain plain plain plain iced iced iced iced plain plain plain plain
rich rich rich rich rich rich rich rich low-fat low-fat low-fat low-fat low-fat low-fat low-fat low-fat

Figure 16.2 Example problems (16 bars). Graphs were presented in blue and yellow, represented here by black and gray, respectively. (a) 2 × 3-way.
Answers: greater, greater. (b) Four-way. Answer: smaller. Adapted from Figure 2 in Halford, GS, Baker R, McCredden , JE and Bain, JD (2005) How many
variables can humans process? Psychological Science, 16(1), 70–76.
QUANTIFYING PROCESSING CAPACITY
267
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268 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Table 16.1 Number of participants answering neither, one, or both problems of each type
correctly (n = 30)

Problem type
Score 2 × 2-way 3-way 2 × 3-way 4-way
Both correct 30 26 23 13

One incorrect 0 4 7 13
Both incorrect 0 0 0 4

In the experiment, the verbal description of an interaction containing two possible directions
for the interaction (greater or smaller) was presented at the top of the screen. A graph was then
displayed below the text, initially using equal bar heights, while the participant read the verbal
description and came to terms with how the descriptor variables mapped onto the corresponding
bar labels in the graph. When the participants were ready, they pressed two keys which caused the
graph to be transformed into a full figure, illustrating the interaction.
The experiment was designed to compare processing loads when task complexity increased,
while holding memory load constant. Thus, two two-way interactions were compared with a three-
way interaction (both using 8 bars) as shown in Figures 15.1a and b, and two three-way interactions
were compared with a four-way interaction (both using 16 bars), as shown in Figures 15.2a and b.
Each participant received two problems of each type for each of these two main comparisons.
Solution times were recorded for the problem-solving phase (i.e., while the bars were unequal
length). In addition, participants rated their confidence level for each answer.
Table 16.1 shows that as the complexity of the interaction increased, the number of partici-
pants answering one or more problems correctly decreased. Figure 16.3 shows that as task com-
plexity increased, speed and confidence also both decreased, particularly between the 2 × 3-way
and four-way problems. A supplementary experiment showed that performance on a five-way
problem was no better than chance.
Overall, the results showed that a four-way interaction is difficult even for experienced adults
to process without external aids. A soft limit to capacity to process information was indicated by
the decline from three- to four-way interactions, with five-way being performed no better than
chance. Our findings suggest that a structure defined on four variables is at the limit of human
processing capacity, as a four-way interaction requires four variables to be integrated within a
single concept. Representations based on four variables would coordinate well with visual and
short-term memory capacities of four items, and are consistent with predictions from symbolic
connectionist models, to be considered in a later section.

Neuroscience evidence for relational complexity

There is some evidence that specifically links relational complexity to processing in the frontal
lobes. Waltz et al. (1999) contrasted two levels of relational complexity in participants with either
prefrontal or anterior temporal lobe damage. The tasks used were transitive inference and modi-
fied Raven’s Progressive Matrices. In the one-relation condition, premises were presented in
order, such as ‘Sam taller than Nate, Nate taller than Roy.’ This task can be segmented by process-
ing one premise at a time, the order (Sam, Nate) being determined first, with Roy being concate-
nated to it, creating the ordered triple (Sam, Nate, Roy). This requires one binary relation to be
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NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY 269

100 5
Solution tim
Confidence
80 4
Mean solution time (secs)

Mean confidence rating

60 3

40 2

20 1

0 0
2 × 2-way 3-way 2 × 3-way 4-way
Problem type
Figure 16.3 Mean solution times and confidence ratings as a function of problem type. Adapted
from Figure 3 in Halford GS, Baker R, McCredden JE and Bain JD (2005) How many variables can
humans process? Psychological Science, 16(1), 70–76.

processed at each step. In the two relations condition, premises were presented in scrambled
order, such as ‘Beth taller than Tina, Amy taller than Beth.’ In this case, the premises have to be
considered jointly to determine the order of the three elements. Processing ‘Beth taller than Tina’
only shows that Beth goes into first or second condition, and ‘Amy taller than Beth’ must be
processed to determine that Amy is first and Beth second. Neither premise alone is sufficient to
uniquely determine the ordinal position of an element. Using both premises to construct the
ordered triple monotonically taller (Amy, Beth, Tina) entails processing a ternary relation, which
entails a higher level of complexity.
Waltz et al. (1999) found a double dissociation, so that prefrontal patients were impaired in
processing complex relations, but were unimpaired in recall from semantic memory, whereas
anterior temporal lobe damage was associated with impairment in semantic memory but not
with impairment in relational processing. Furthermore, the groups did not differ in IQ, indicat-
ing that the effects reflected prefrontal involvement in processing complex relations, rather than a
general factor of task difficulty.
Using a similar modification of Raven’s task to that used by Waltz et al. (1999), Christoff et al.
(2001) observed greater activity in middle frontal gyrus (Brodmann area 10) for the two-relation
condition than for the one or zero relation conditions, in a contrast analysis of fMRI (functional
magnetic resonance imaging) data. Other studies (Kroger et al. 2002; Prabhakaran et al. 1997) found
similarly increased activity in this and other prefrontal regions, as well as in the parietal lobes.
Christoff and Gabrieli (2000) proposed a hierarchical model of the prefrontal cortex in relational
processing, consisting of three functions: storage (ventrolateral); manipulation (dorsolateral); and
evaluation (frontopolar). That is, processes in dorsolateral PFC operate on relations stored in
ventrolateral PFC, and processes in frontopolar PFC evaluate the results of those operations.
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270 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Further evidence for changes in cortical activity with changes in relational complexity has been
found. Contrasts of activity during retention of binary (two roles) versus unary (one role) indexed
lists revealed greater parietal and prefrontal activity for a variety of materials (Phillips and Niki
2002). Activity during the retention period for two binary lists was greater than for two unary
lists for a region in the superior parietal lobule, dorsal to the occipitoparietal sulcus.

Developmental studies
The relational complexity metric has also been applied to a number of topics in cognitive develop-
ment. Andrews and Halford (2002) conducted complexity analyses of tasks from six content
domains: transitive inference, class inclusion, comprehension of relative clause sentences, cardi-
nality, hypothesis testing and hierarchical classification. These analyses suggested that the tasks
that cause difficulty for young children entail ternary relations, whereas the tasks mastered by
young children are less complex. These complexity analyses were supported by a large-scale
empirical study involving 241 children aged from 3 to 8 years. Children completed tasks in the six
content domains, and relational complexity was manipulated in five of these. The items differed in
complexity (binary- and ternary-relational) but were comparable in all other respects. Significant
effects of relational complexity were observed in each domain. The ternary-relational items were
more difficult, and were mastered later in development than the binary-relational items.
Comparable ages of attainment were observed for tasks at the same complexity level in different
domains. All tasks loaded on a single factor and factor scores were correlated with age (r = 0.80)
fluid intelligence (r = 0.79) and working memory capacity (Listening span, r = 0.66). These
results suggest that cognitive development is constrained by children’s capacity to process complex
relations.
The relational complexity metric has been used to integrate findings from different paradigms
and to resolve some long-standing paradoxes within the developmental literature. For example,
category induction is attained by three years of age (Gelman and Markman 1987), when children
can infer that a property attributed to one instance of a category is more likely to belong with other
members of the same category than with members of a different category, independent of appear-
ance (Deak and Bauer 1996; Gelman and Markman 1986, 1987; Gelman and O’Reilly 1988; Lopez
et al. 1992). By contrast, children have difficulty making valid inferences about hierarchically
structured categories until they are five years or older (Hodkin 1987; Inhelder and Piaget 1964;
Winer 1980). For example, if they are shown a display depicting three bananas and five apples
and are asked, ‘Are there more apples or more fruit?’, children under five or six years typically say,
‘More apples’. This apparent paradox has been resolved by relational complexity analysis. When
both category induction and hierarchical classification were assessed using a common methodology
(property inference tasks), the earlier development of category induction was shown to be due to
its complexity being binary-relational, whereas hierarchical classification is ternary-relational.
This was confirmed by the finding that hierarchical classification assessed using the property infer-
ence procedure corresponded in age of attainment to other ternary-relational tasks, transitivity and
class inclusion assessed using the traditional procedure (Halford, Andrews and Jensen 2002).
The theory has generated many predictions beyond those that can be determined intuitively.
Theory of mind provides an example. Theory of mind is typically assessed using false belief and
appearance reality tasks, both of which are difficult for children younger than four to five years
(Wellman et al. 2001). Relational complexity analyses indicated that these tasks are ternary-relational,
therefore a structural complexity effect was predicted by Halford (1993). This has since been con-
firmed (Andrews et al. 2003). These authors devised binary-relational items that were closely
matched in other respects to standard false belief and appearance-reality items. Mastery of these
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WORKING MEMORY BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 271

binary-relational items was demonstrated by three-year-olds, whereas mastery of the ternary-

relational items occurred later (four to five years).
Ternary-relational scores in the domains of transitivity, class inclusion, hierarchical classification
and cardinality accounted for a high proportion of the variance in theory of mind scores, before
and after controlling for age and performance on the binary-relational items in the same
domains. Combined with the relational complexity effects, these results provide support for the
role of relational complexity as a contributor to children’s theory of mind.
Predictions about children’s balance scale reasoning were also made ahead of data. It was predicted
(Halford 1993) that two-year-olds would give correct judgments about a beam balance outcome
when the decision could be based on weight information alone or distance information alone,
because these are binary-relational. However children would not integrate weight and distance
information until they could process ternary relations. These predictions were confirmed by
Halford, Andrews, Dalton et al. (2002).
The above review demonstrates an accumulating body of research indicating that the capacity
to process complex relations increases with age during childhood. Evidence obtained so far suggests
that child cognitive development progresses through four levels of complexity. Unary relations are
processed at a median age of one year. Children of this age appear to understand class membership,
for example, dog (Fido). Binary relations, such as larger (elephant, mouse), are attained by about
11/2–2 years of age. Ternary relations are processed at a median age of five years. Quaternary rela-
tions such as proportion (e.g., 2/4 = 4/8) emerge later, at around 11 years. That complexity effects are
observed in a wide range of content domains indicates that the relational complexity metric is
domain general in its application. There is also evidence for cross-domain consistency within
individuals during early and middle childhood (Andrews and Halford 2002). The literature is
consistent with an interpretation of the attainments of younger children, including some that
have been regarded as precocious, as reflecting less complex processes than those of older children
(Halford and Andrews 2006).

Working memory boundary conditions

The limitations of the central executive do not apply to all tasks, and it is essential to distinguish
those cognitive processes that are subject to capacity limitations from those that are not. Lack of
criteria for this can only lead to confusions and intractable issues. Three factors that distinguish
cognitive tasks that are not capacity limited are automaticity, modularity and implicit processing.
Automaticity develops through extended practice under constant mapping conditions (Hasher
and Zacks 1979; Logan 1979; Logan 2005; Shiffrin and Schneider 1977) and is a well-known way
of reducing processing loads. While constant mapping conditions of practice are maintained,
tasks will be relatively free of capacity limitations, though the limitations will recur if mappings
become varied.
Modular processes are also known not to impose processing loads on working memory.
Modular processes are distinguished by the fact that they tend to be rapid, automatic, relatively
unmodifiable, domain-specific and informationally encapsulated (Anderson 1992; Fodor 1983;
Pylyshyn 1999). The distinction between implicit and explicit processes (Karmiloff-Smith 1992)
is also relevant to identification of capacity limitations, because implicit processes tend to make
low processing demands. They typically reflect a relatively early stage of development of acquisi-
tion of a concept, and are characterized by lack of strategic modifiability, so that performance
tends to follow established or stereotyped procedures (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 1993). The
implicit–explicit distinction bears some correspondence to the distinction between associative
and relational processes (Phillips et al. 1995).
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272 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Symbolic processes and neural net representation of relations

We conceptualize the central executive as being specialized for processing relations, so we aim to
demonstrate that relations can be represented in a neural network framework, along with processes
for operating on the representation. There are two major approaches to neural net modeling of
relational knowledge and, while there is some controversy, the common ground between the
approaches provides useful insight into basic requirements for relational processing, and also
provides possible explanations for capacity limitations in the central executive.
One approach to modeling relational knowledge uses role-filler bindings (Hummel and Holyoak
2003; Shastri and Ajjanagadde 1993). With this approach, loves (John, Mary) would be represented
by binding John to the agent role of loves, and Mary to the patient role. This has limitations when
multiple relational instances are to be represented (Halford et al. 1998, Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.3;
but see also Doumas and Hummel 2005).
The other major approach is to use symbol-argument bindings (Halford et al. 1998). That is, to
represent loves (John, Mary), we bind the relation symbol loves simultaneously to John and to Mary.
Structural alignment is used to maintain correspondence between instances, so if we have a second
instance loves (Tom, Wendy), the two instances of loves are aligned, as are John and Tom, Mary and
Wendy.
Bindings are implemented in two main ways. One way is based on synchronous activation
(Hummel and Holyoak 2003; Shastri and Ajjanagadde 1993). Shastri and Ajjanagadde make units
representing a role oscillate in phase (i.e., synchronously) with units representing the filler bound to
that role, and out of phase with units representing other roles and fillers. This is a form of role-filler
binding (see Figure 16.4).
Binding by simultaneous oscillation supports capacity limitations as follows, given that:
◆ a neural substrate is envisaged for this model
◆ biological neurons have a maximum rate at which they can oscillate (fire)
◆ cognition requires an (unspecified) minimum oscillation frequency, or cognitive responses
become too slow, and
◆ oscillation frequencies must be sufficiently different, in order to be discriminable.
This means there must be a limited number of frequency ‘slots’ at which bound concepts can
oscillate. This limits the number of concepts that can be represented simultaneously in a syn-
chronous oscillation system.
The other approach to binding is based on a product operation, such as the tensor product,
or outer product (Halford et al. 1998; Smolensky 1990) or circular convolution (Plate 1995). In the
Structured Tensor Analogical Reasoning (STAR) model (Halford et al. 1998; Wilson et al. 2001;
Wilson et al. 1995) the relation symbol and arguments are each represented by vectors, and the
binding is represented by the outer product of these vectors. Thus the relational instance

Lover

Beloved

John

Mary
Figure 16.4 Illustrating synchronous oscillation binding for the binary relation loves (John, Mary).
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INTEGRATION WITH RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY METRIC: REPRESENTATIONAL RANK 273

Components of access
vector for relation axis
Binding units

vMary

vloves
Each vector component is
connected to a plane of binding
units, as illustrated for just one
vJohn component of vJohn.

Figure 16.5 Tensor product symbol-arguments binding for the binary relation loves ( John, Mary).

loves (John, Mary) would be represented by vloves ⊗ vJohn ⊗ vMary, as shown in Figure 16.5. More
generally, the relational instance r(a1,…, an) would be represented in a tensor product space Vr ⊗
V 1 ⊗ … ⊗ V n. Thus one axis of the tensor represents the relation symbol, and each of the
remaining axes corresponds to an argument (role) of the relation (see Figure 16.5). Thus there is
a natural correspondence between the mathematical properties of a relation and its representa-
tion in symbol-argument tensor product neural nets. At the neural network level, there is a group
of units for each tensor axis (relation symbol or argument) connected to a group of binding
units, as shown in Figure 16.5. Representations of relational instances can be superimposed. For
example, loves (John, Mary) and loves (Cathy, Tom) would be represented as vloves ⊗ vJohn ⊗ vMary +
vloves ⊗ vCathy ⊗ vTom. This adds considerably to the power of the representation. Both synchro-
nous oscillation and tensor product models capture the basic properties of higher cognition
(Halford et al. 1998; Shastri and Ajjanagadde 1993).
In a more practical system, there would be many more than four vector components in each
vector.
Tensor product binding supports capacity limitations as follows: the number of binding units
in a tensor product network grows exponentially with the rank of the tensor product, that is, the
number of concepts involved – three in loves (John, Mary), four in gives (John, Mary, chocolates).
Given that there is a limit to the number of binding units that can be allocated to the tensor
product network, there is a limit on the rank of the tensor product network, or its equivalent in a
biological neural system. This limits the number of concepts that can be represented simulta-
neously in a tensor product binding system.
These symbolic neural net models have been demonstrated to have some properties of higher
cognition, including determining the truth value of a proposition (Halford et al. 1998, Section 4.2.2;
Humphreys et al. 1989), processing higher-order relations (Halford et al. 1998, Section 4.2.5),
increased processing load with higher relational complexity (Halford et al. 1998, Section 5.2),
and analogical reasoning (Gray 2003; Halford et al. 1994).

Integration with relational complexity metric: representational rank

In this section we want to integrate the relational complexity metric with simpler levels of
processing that do not entail processing relations. We do this by defining the concept of represen-
tational rank.
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274 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

In general, representational rank can be defined as the number of identifiable components bound
into a structured representation, such that the components satisfy the constraints imposed by the
structure. An example would be a cognitive representation of the binary relations ‘more-than’
and ‘less-than’ defined on a finite set of positive integers, such as > (3, 2), > (5, 4) and < (2, 5), < (3, 7).
There are constraints between the components, so that for the relation ‘>’, the integer in the first
position (first slot) of each pair must be greater than the integer in the second position (with a
corresponding constraint for ‘<’). There is further constraint so that, for example, given (3, 2), the
relation must be ‘>’. Each instance, such as > (3, 2), of a binary relation has three components, ‘>’, ‘3,’
and ‘2’ so this representation would be Rank 3. Representational rank is one more than the arity of a
relation, so a binary relation is Rank 3, a ternary relation is Rank 4, and so on.
The representational rank metric comprises levels 0 to 6, as shown in Figure 16.6. An elemental
association between an input and output, without any internal symbol, has rank 0. At the next level
are representations that have an internal representation, but these are rank 1 because the repre-
sentation functions in a holistic fashion. Even if there is more than one element in the representa-
tion, the elements are not composed into a structure. A good example of this level of processing
would be the representations in the hidden layer of many three-layered net models. The units of
the hidden layer represent a property that is computed from two or more input units, modified
by connection weights, but no compositions of the hidden layer units are defined. For example,
there is nothing equivalent to the relational representations shown in Figures 16.4 or 16.5 for
symbolic neural net models. Ranks 2–6 correspond to unary to quinary relations, respectively.
Figure 16.6 shows Ranks 0 to 6, with a schematic illustration of the symbolic connectionist repre-
sentation based on tensor product theory of relational representations. Also shown are examples
of the concepts belonging to each rank.
The representational rank metric has been applied to various cognitive tasks in order to make
predictions about human capacity to deal with these tasks. Rank 0 can be performed by all ani-
mals with nervous systems, and tasks that can be identified with Rank 1 can be performed by
many species of vertebrates (e.g. Fagot et al. 2001) and even some invertebrates (Giurfa et al.
2001). Apes have been demonstrated to perform Rank 3 tasks such as the binary-relational
match-to-sample task and proportional analogies (Halford et al. 1998; Thompson et al. 1997)
but only humans have been demonstrated to perform ranks 4–6. The norms for cognitive devel-
opment indicate that Ranks 3, 4, and 5 are attained at median ages of 2, 5, and 11 years, respec-
tively (Andrews and Halford 2002; Halford 1993), while Rank 6 is believed to be attained by a
minority of adults.
Both the symbolic model of relations and the representational rank metric provide a way of
investigating the representation and manipulation of relations in human working memory,
and they have generated a considerable amount of empirical work that we have briefly reviewed.
The model of executive functions based on relational processing gives some conceptual under-
pinning to this complex and diverse set of processes. Relational processes correspond to estab-
lished mathematical concepts, and conceptual complexity can be defined by the arity, or number
of arguments bound into a relational representation. Objective rules for complexity analyses are
defined in the Method for Analysis of Relational Complexity. The representational rank metric
provides a way of ordering cognitive functions according to their conceptual complexity, such
that the lower ranks will evolve and develop earlier than the higher ranks. The representational
rank metric has potential to bring more order to our conceptualisation of human problem-
solving and reasoning.
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INTEGRATION WITH RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY METRIC: REPRESENTATIONAL RANK 275

Cognitive process Neural net Representational Typical cognitive

specification rank tasks

Input Output
layer layer

No internal Conditioning
representation 0 Linear transitivity of choice
(elemental association)

totally interconnected
layers

Input Hidden Output

layer layer layer

colour Conditional discrimination

Computed, nonstructural 1 Prototype
representation Circular transitivity of choice
(configural association) shape

totally interconnected
layers

Argument
(Tail-wagging quadruped)

Unary relation ℜ Match-to-sample

(dog) 2 Identity-position integration
Category label distinct from category

Binding units

ℜ
(loves)
Arg-2
(Jenny)
Binary relation Arg-1 Relational match-to-sample
(Joe) 3 Mastery of A not-B task
Complementary categories

Arg-2

Ternary relation Arg-1

Transitive inference
Arg-3 4 Hierarchial categories
Concept of mind

ℜ Arg-4

Arg-3

Proportion
Quaternary relation Arg-1 5
Balance scale
Arg-2

ℜ Arg-5

Arg-4

Quinary relation Arg-1 Arg-3 Certain cases of:

6 doubly centre-embedded sentences
Arg-2
Tower of Hanoi

Figure 16.6 Representational ranks with cognitive processes, schematic neural nets and typical
cognitive tasks.
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276 RELATIONAL PROCESSING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

Summary and conclusion

In this chapter we have outlined the following propositions:
◆ The central executive processes relational information that is used in planning, reasoning, and
language comprehension.
◆ Cognitive complexity can be defined by the number of variables that have to be related in a
single representation.
◆ Humans are generally limited to relating four variables in a cognitive representation, though a
minority of adults can relate five variables.
◆ Complex tasks can be performed by conceptual chunking and segmentation, thereby making
the best use of limited processing capacity.
◆ Tasks that are automatic, or modular, or depend on implicit processing, impose lower loads
and are not subject to the capacity limitations outlined above.
◆ There is mounting neurocortical evidence for frontal-parietal activity in representing and
processing relations and this activity seems to be related to relational complexity.
◆ The representational rank metric integrates all levels of cognitive complexity into seven levels
from subsymbolic (Rank 0) to the highest levels of symbolic representation (Rank 6).

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