Fire Service Manual

Volume 2
Fire Service Operations

Natural Gas Incidents

HM Fire Service Inspectorate Publications Section

London: TSO
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ISBN 0 11 341226 6

Cover and part-title photographs:

North Wales Fire Service (Acetylene Cylinder Incidents)
Transco (Natural Gas Incidents)

Printed in the United Kingdom for The Stationery Office

ID147968 8/03 C40 5673
Natural Gas Incidents
Preface
This section replaces chapter 2 of the Manual of
Firemanship part 6b. It contains new material
written to reflect the enormous changes which
have taken place in the gas industry since 1967
when the first natural gas was piped ashore from
the North Sea to mainland Britain. In the inter-
vening years the demand for gas has increased
many times and many power stations now use it
in huge quantities as the fuel for the generation
of electricity.
The transmission of gas by the National Transmis-
sion System and, at lower pressure, by the Local
Transmission System is a largely unseen technical
and engineering achievement.
One end of the gas distribution system (beach).
(Photograph: Transco)
By definition, fuels are of particular interest to the
firefighter and careful study of this Manual will
provide a sound theoretical knowledge of the sub-
ject and a base from which safe and effective oper-
ational techniques can be developed.
For the purpose of this book Natural Gas is defined
as:
"a flammable gas consisting mainly of
methane found in the earth's crust"
It excludes liquefied petroleum gases which has
been covered in Fire Service Manual Volume 2
Fire Service Operations - Petrochemical Incidents.
The other end of the gas distribution system (burner).
(Photograph: G. Cooper)
Natural Gas Incidents 111
The guidance provided in this Manual represents a 027 INCIDENT COMMAND 2
knowledge resource intended to support the devel- 048 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND
opment of people in accordance with the CONTROL
Emergency Fire Service role maps and the ODPM 057 DEALING WITH TRANSPORT
development modules. This will support and INCIDENTS
inform the Fire Service in: 058 DEALING WITH FIRE INCIDENTS
059 DEALING WITH HAZMAT
1 Applying practices to maximise the health, INCIDENTS
safety and welfare of personnel and others 076 ANALYSE TRAINING NEEDS
in the built or natural environment. 077 DESIGN CONTENT AND
2 Making and applying decisions based on DELIVERY OF TRAINING AND
the assessment of risk. DELIVERY PROGRAMMES
3 Making best use of sources and availability 079 DESIGN AND DEVELOP
of information during natural gas incidents. MATERIALS AND LEARNING AIDS
4 Applying Fire Service or other legislation. 080 PRODUCE MATERIALS AND
LEARNING AIDS FOR TRAINING
This document is knowledge based and offers AND DEVELOPMENT
guidance on methods employed to deal with inci- 086 INVESTIGATE THE SCENE OF FIRE
dents involving natural gas while reflecting issues OR EXPLOSION
concerning the selection, use, capabilities and lim-
itations of personal and operational equipment.
Further reading
The relevant units of the role maps are:
1 Fire Service Manual - Volume 1 -
FF 3: SAVE AND PRESERVE Fire Service Technology, Equipment and
ENDANGERED LIFE Media - Physics and Chemistry for
FF 4: RESOLVE OPERATIONAL Firefighters.
INCIDENTS
FF5: PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 2 Fire Service Manual - Volume 2 -
FROM THE EFFECTS OF Fire Service Operations - Incident
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS Command.

CM 2: Lead and support people to resolve 3 Fire Service Manual - Volume 2 -

operational incidents
SM 5: Provide information to support decision
making
SM 8: Determine solutions to minimise
hazards and risks identified by
inspections and investigations to
inform future practice
SMI3: Lead, monitor and support people to
resolve operational incidents
Fire Service Operations - Petrochemical
Incidents.
4 Dynamic management of risk at
operational incidents. A Fire Service
guide
ISBN 0-11-341221-5.

The relevant development modules drawn from

the ODPM database are:

006 HEALTH, SAFETY AND RISK

MANAGEMENT
008 INCIDENT COMMAND 1 INITIAL
RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT

1V Fire Service Manual

Natural Gas Incidents

Contents
Page

Preface
Chapter 1 "From beach to burner"
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Gas Processing Facility 1
1.2.1 General 1
1.2.2 Firefighting on site 2
1.3 Reception Centres 2
1.3.1 General 2
1.3.2 Firefighting on site 2
1.4 Natural gas - its properties (and some comparisons) 3
1.4.1 Pseudonyms 4
1.4.2 Placarding for bulk transport 4

Chapter 2 The National Transmission System (NTS)

2.1 Transport and storage of gas 5
2.2 Transmisssion Network 5
2.3 Gas Compressor Stations 5
2.4 Distribution 6
2.5 Storage of Natural Gas 6
2.5.1 Demand for Natural Gas 6
2.5.2 Gas storage methods 6
2.6 Liquefied Natural Gas properties 11
2.6.1 Firefighting 11
2.7 High Pressure Storage Vessels (HPSVs) 12
2.8 Odorisation of Fuel Gases 12
2.8.1 General 12
2.8.2 Tertiary Butyl Mercaptan (TBM) 13
2.8.3 Operational Information 13

Chapter 3 Domestic Gas Supplies

3.1 General 15
3.1.1 Conection to the gas main 15
3.1.2 The Meter Box 15
3.2 Gas Escapes 15
3.2.1 General 15
3.2.2 Escapes of gas in buildings 17
3.3 Gas Detection Instruments (Explosimeters) 17
3.3.1 General 17

Natural Gas Incidents V

3.4 Gas Escapes in open air 18
3.4.1 General 18
3.4.2 Action by the Fire Service 19
3.4.3 Meteorological Forecasts 19
3.4.4 Aides-Memoires 19
3.4.5 Dealing with gas escapes which are burning 20

Chapter 4 Cylinders of compressed gas 3

4.1 General 23
4.1.1 Cylinders of Compressed Natura Gas (CNG) 23
4.1.2 Dealing with fire 24
4.2 Direct or indirect heating of cylinders of CNG 24
4.2.1 General 24
4.2.2 Failure of CNG cylinders (RIDDOR) 24

Chapter 5 Landfill sites and spoil tips 27

5.1 General 27
5.2 Fires in rubbish tips 29

Chapter 6 Natural gas and the generation of electricity 31

6.1 General 31
6.1.1 A typical CCGT station 31
6.1.2 Alternative fuel supplies 31
6.1.3 Firefighting on CCGT sites 32
6.1.4 Combined Heat and Power plants (CHP) 32
6.1.5 Small Scale CHP systems 33
6.1.6 Operational considerations 33

Chapter 7 Natural gas as a fuel for vehicles 35

7.1 Introduction 35
7.2 Fuel storage on Natural Gas Vehicles (NGVs) 35
7.2.1 Cylinders of CNG 35
7.2.2 Tanks of CNG 36
7.2.3 Refuelling CNG vehicles 37
7.2.4 Fire involving CNG refuelling facilities 37
7.3 Incidents involving Natural Gas Powered Vehicles (NGVs) 38
7.3.1 General information 38
7.3.2 Action at incidents 40

Appendices 43
1 Considerations for Incident Commander (Gas cylinders heated or involved in fire) 45
2 Basic Risk Assessment 46
3 Some significant dates in the development of gas as a fuel 48
4 Glossary of Terms 49

Acknowledgements 53

V1 Fire Service Manual

Natural Gas Incidents

Chapter 1 - 'From beach to burner'

1.1 Introduction The gas processing facility is the site which

Natural gas from the North Sea was first brought
ashore in commercial quantities in 1967 and with
it a revolution in the gas industry began. The
chemical composition of the 'new' gas which is
predominantly methane (CH4) is totally different
from the 'old' town gas which was largely manu-
factured from coal and consisted mainly, of carbon
monoxide (CO). The burning characteristics of the
two gases are totally different and prior to the
nationwide changeover to natural gas all premises
using gas had to be visited so that burners suitable
for the new gas could be fitted to each gas appli-
ance. It was a mammoth operation.
"blends or purifies gas, removes from gas any of
its constituent gases or separates from gas any oil
or water".
The product received from the gas production
facilities (usually offshore platforms), vary widely
in their chemical composition, even between sam-
ples taken from adjacent fields, and the treatment
it receives reflects this.
The following serves as an example of the product
received at one gas processing facility and the
treatment it receives. There will be variations
between this and the other six sites.

Town gas is no longer manufactured. It has been

replaced by Natural Gas, a fossil fuel harvested
from huge reserves found principally beneath the
North Sea from where it is collected and piped
ashore. Constant exploration and improving rates
of recovery from the reserves mean that the supply
of gas from the North Sea will continue for the
foreseeable future.
Other components of the product as it is received
1.2 Gas Processing Facility
1.2.1 General

Gas from the many offshore gas fields and oil-

fields is treated at one of seven gas processing
facilities. On the east coast they are at St Fergus
(N.E. Scotland), Teeside, Easington (E. Yorkshire),
Theddlethorpe (Lincolnshire) and Bacton
(Norfolk). On the west coast gas is processed at
Barrow (Cumbria) and Burton Point (Cheshire).
Each facility covers an area of hundreds of
hectares and is often adjacent to similar sites oper-
ated by other gas producers.

Natural Gas Incidents 1


2. CONDENSATE (continued) % 1( 1 )(d) visits and exercises cannot be overempha-
PROPANE 2.86
UNDECANES 2.61
others to 100%
3. SEA WATER
MONO ETHYLENE GLYCOL
(added at the gas production facility as an anti
freeze to prevent ice forming in the pipeline).
On arrival at the gas processing facility the prod-
uct passes through an array of pipework known as
the "slugcatcher" where most of the liquids are
recovered. A refrigeration process, sometimes
using liquid propane as the refrigerant, then cools
the product to temperatures as low as -43° C in an
"inlet separator" to remove the final traces of con-
densate, sea water and glycol.
The glycol is piped back to the offshore installa-
tion for re-use. The condensate is piped a few
miles inland to a rail terminal, where it is taken to
an oil refinery for conversion into substances used
by the chemical and plastic industries.
Naturally occurring low level radioactive materials
can be found in the untreated gas and condensate
but it is considered that these do not present a sig-
nificant hazard.
Gas processing facilities do not normally store the
gas they process, and after a final filter to remove
traces of sand the gas is passed by pipeline to a BG
Transco reception terminal.
1.2.2 Firefighting on site
All of the sites are subject to the Control of Major
Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH) and the
COMAH Safety Report will outline the processing
undertaken on site and list the hazardous sub-
stances held on site. The greatest risk is generally
considered to be an accidental release of flamma-
ble gas to atmosphere but it is for each brigade
with a gas processing facility on their ground to
make individual risk assessments and to establish
2 Fire Service Manual
close links with the management. The value of
sised.
Emergency plans held at COMAH sites are com-
prehensive and will of course vary between sites,
but water/foam monitors, deluge systems and high
flow hydrants will almost always be found as will
a works fire brigade. Gas detection equipment,
both portable and fixed will provide early warning
of leaks and emergency shutdown (ESD) valves
are provided to isolate plant. In extreme circum-
stances it will often be possible for the gas content
of the plant to be vented to open air, but such dras-
tic action cannot be undertaken lightly or rapidly.
Advice about the control of fire water run off from
COMAH sites to prevent environmental damage is
contained in HSE guidance note EH 70 published
in 1995. Many of the control methods suggested in
the note will be found at these gas processing facil-
ities and these include bunds, lagoons, catch-pits
and drain covers.
1.3 Reception Centres
1.3.1 General
Seven Transco Reception Terminals take gas from
their nearby gas processing facilities and prepare it
for release into the National Transmission System
(NTS) and its journey through the network of pipes
to the end user. On arrival at the terminal the gas is
filtered, analysed and its volume measured.
Particular attention is paid to its calorific value and
should this be below 39 Mega Joules/metre3
(MJm3) the gas is blended with a richer supply
until the required calorific value is obtained.
The plant, on sites which can cover 80 hectares, is
controlled from a central control room and
although gas is not stored on site, the quantity of
gas within the pipework at any time is sufficient to
require compliance with the COMAH regulations.
1.3.2 Firefighting on site
As with any complicated industrial or chemical
plant, safe and successful firefighting can only be
undertaken with the assistance and guidance of
technical staff from the plant. Fire brigades with
Figure 1.1
Part of a typical gas
processing facility.
(Photograph: Transco)

Figure 1.2
A typical reception
centre.
(Photograph: Transco)

Reception Terminals on their ground will need to chemical compositions of natural gas can vary.
establish sound relationships with management Despite these differences the physical performance
and conduct regular 1(1 )(d) visits and exercises. of natural gas supplied to the customer conforms
to a uniformly high standard.
1.4 Natural gas - its properties (and
some comparisons)
Because of the differences in product supplied for
processing from the many gas and oil fields the

Natural Gas Incidents 5

Typically natural gas supplied to the consumer will European names for Natural Gas and Methane
consist of:

% Language NATURAL GAS METHANE

METHANE CH4 92.37 Dutch (NL) AARDGAS METHAAN

ETHANE C2H6 3.25 French (F) Le GAZ NATUREL le METHANE
NITROGEN N2 2.60 German (D) ERDGAS METHAN
PROPANE C3H8 0.87 Spanish (E) GAS NATURAL METANO
CARBON DIOXIDE CO2 0.40 Italian (I) GAS NATURALE METANO
BUTANES C4H10 0.24 Danish (DK) YORD GAS METHAN
PENTANE C5H12 0.22

VAPOUR DENSITY (air = 1.) 1.4.2 Placarding for bulk transport

HYDROGEN 0.07
NATURAL GAS 0.55
CARBON MONOXIDE 0.97
PROPANE (LPG) 1.5

FLAMMABLE LIMITS %(by volume in air)

HYDROGEN 4.0 - 75
NATURAL GAS 3.8-15
CARBON MONOXIDE 12.5-75
PROPANE (LPG) 2.2-10

Figure 1.3 Hazard Warning plate. UK Hazard

SPONTANEOUS IGNITION TEMPERATURE °C Information System (UKHIS) for compressed Natural Gas
or compressed Methane gas.
HYDROGEN 580
NATURAL GAS 480 - 650
CARBON MONOXIDE 570
PROPANE (LPG) 466

TOXICITY

HYDROGEN Non-toxic Asphyxiant

NATURAL GAS Virtually non-toxic
CARBON MONOXIDE Toxic
PROPANE (LPG) Toxic

1.4.1 Pseudonyms Figure 1.4 ADR system for compressed Natural Gas or
compressed Methane gas.
Methane, the principal constituent of natural gas,
is also known as:

MARSH GAS
METHYL HYDRIDE
FIRE DAMP

4 Fire Service Manual

Natural Gas Incidents
Chapter 2 - The National
Transmission System (NTS)
2.1 Transport and storage of gas
The Public Gas Transporter (PGT), Transco oper-
ates a nation-wide gas distribution network con-
sisting of about 271,000kms of iron, steel and
polyethylene pipes almost all of which are laid
underground. Other companies are expected to
build networks in the future to enable them to be
licensed as a PGT.
2.2 Transmission Network
About 6,000km of the Transco network operates at
pressures of up to 85 bar and it is this part which is
known as the National Transmission System
(NTS). Made from high quality steel, constructed
and laid to very high standards the pipes can be up
to 1.2m in diameter. Pressure changes within the
system are closely monitored so that an accurate
assessment of the pipe's fatigue life can be made.
More than 120 offtake installations take the NTS
supply directly to very large users of gas such as
power stations and industrial consumers as well as
to the Local Distribution Zones (LDZ) transmis-
sion systems, which continue the distribution
network.
The entire NTS is monitored and controlled from
a central operations room and in an emergency
more than four hundred remotely operated valves
can be actuated to isolate any section of the
network.
2.3 Gas Compressor Stations
Gas within the NTS can travel at speeds of 40 kph
and to maintain flow, particularly at times of high
demand, pressure can be boosted by any of the
twenty two compressor stations strategically sited
on the system.
The stations can be remotely or locally operated,
and are often unattended. Sophisticated security
systems, both passive and active, are installed to
protect the sites which often cover an area of about
one hundred hectare
Unless life is known to be at risk, operational
crews are advised not to enter the site without
the assistance of TRANSCO staff
Outside normal working hours, Transco staff are
on standby rota and can normally attend a site
within thirty minutes
Each compressor is driven by an industrialised jet
engine and together they are housed as an inde-
pendent unit. When the engines are running they
are, externally, deceptively quiet, but inside the
building, despite the use of double skinned
acoustic insulation, noise levels can exceed 120
decibels. In the unlikely event of firecrews being
requested to enter the building when the turbine
and compressor are running, ear protection must
be used. Normally, in the event of an incident in
the building and the operation of the automatic fire
detection/suppression system, the engine will be
stopped, gas supply isolated, and the plant ventilat-
ed. Fuel for the engines is taken from the NTS.
Although incidents requiring the attendance of the
Fire Brigade are rare, the value of well conducted
1(1 )(d) inspections will be obvious. Particular
points of interest for the visit will include:
location and approach to site and PDA
entry to site (Contact telephone numbers)
rendezvous points
control points and centres
liaison with staff
on-site response
Natural Gas Incidents 5
 water supplies (Surrounding risks)
venting stack
fixed installations
The station's staff usually work weekday shifts and
an appointment to visit the site should be made
with the Transmission Operations Manager at the
station.
Fire protection of the jet engine and its associated
equipment is provided by a high pressure water
fog/nitrogen cylinder system. Sensors which can
detect a range of physical conditions within the
engine house actuate the system.
Unlike many AFD systems which require two or
more sensors to detect a fire situation before the
extinguishing medium is released, this system will
actuate on the operation of a single detector head.
2.4 Distribution
After re-pressurisation at the compressor station the
gas re-enters the NTS and continues it journey.
From the high pressures of the NTS, the gas passes
via pressure reducers, (known in the industry as
governors), to the Local Transmission System (LTS)
of the Local Distribution Zones (LDZ).
The maximum gas pressure within the LTS is 42 bar
and within the LDZs gas pressure is reduced to suit
operational and consumer demands until it reaches
domestic users at a pressure of 75 mbar (max).
NTS 85 bar LTS 42 bar
(max) (max)
LTS HIGH PRESSURE 42 bar - 7 bar
INTERMEDIATE
PRESSURE 7 bar - 2 bar
MEDIUM
PRESSURE 2 - 75mbar
LOW PRESSURE 75mbar max
6 Fire Service Manual
Since about 1980 most gas pipelines in the low,
medium and intermediate pressure stages have
been laid using the familiar yellow polyethylene
pipe but many kilometres of steel and ductile iron
remains, some in service, some abandoned. A
feature of the local distribution system are the
numerous valves, which are fitted to isolate or
divert gas supply. These are usually manually
operated but it is sometimes possible for parts of
the system to be remotely isolated at their off-
take from the NTS. Such isolation is a lengthy
process.
2.5 Storage of Natural Gas
2.5.1 Demand for Natural Gas
Demand for natural gas varies widely both season-
ally and during a twenty four hour period. Figure
2.2 indicates the seasonal period.
2.5.2 Gas storage methods
Because it is not possible to rapidly increase the
production of gas from offshore production facili-
ties to cope with these wide variations, gas is
stored at sites throughout the country ready to be
injected into the supply network at times of high
demand.
The methods of storage include:
(a) Line Pack (using the NTS as a
storage resource)
The capacity of the NTS and LTS varies in
direct proportion to its pressure and high
demand causes its pressure and hence its
capacity to drop. Opportunity is taken at
times of lower demand following a peak
to "pack" gas into the network. As the
pressure rises within the network so does
the volume of gas stored within it.
 Figure 2.1 (left) Annual pattern of gas demand
Winter demand (Graph courtesy of Transco)
for gas can be
six times the
demand in
summer
Figure 2.2 (below) Daily pattern of gas demand
(Graph courtesy of Transco)

winter summer

6am 12 noon 6pm Midnight 6am

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Annual patterns of gas demand Daily pattern of gas demand

Telescopic section (Lift)

Rises and falls with contents

Air
Piston rises
and falls Weighted
with contents Lever Roller
guide The largest
Natural gas holder
gas contains
(when full)
Water/
15m bar 280,000 m3
Tar max ..
anti- (mbar)
freeze The smallest
Rubbing mixture. 1500 m 3
Natural plate Note
gas seal different
75 m bar max levels
(mbar) Side of
holder

Typical capacity 225,000m3 @ 75m bar

Figure 2.3 Waterless seal, used by non-telescopic gas Figure 2.4 Water seal, used by telescopic gas holders.
holders.

(b) Low Pressure Gas Holders type. Together they hold about 27.5 million
There are about five hundred of these large m3 of gas and, despite in some cases being
familiar structures throughout the country about one hundred years old, they remain
the vast majority being of the "water seal" vital to the distribution network at times of

Natural Gas Incidents 7


Figure 2.5 The less common, rigid, waterless seal type
high demand. The largest gasholder is in
Glasgow and it holds enough gas to supply
40,000 houses for a day.
When the holder is empty its telescopic
sections known as "lifts" sit inside each
other and as gas is introduced at very low
pressure (about 75 mbar) the lifts rise in
sequence the inner-most first. When all the
lifts are fully exposed the gasholder is full.
Gas is prevented from escaping from the
overlap of the lift sections by use of a water
cup seal at the circumference of the lift.
See Figure 2.4.
The pressure inside the gasholder is in the
region of 75 mbar and most gas-holders
have been fitted with equipment to boost the
pressure of the gas as it leaves the holder.
A less commonly found type of gasholder
uses a waterless seal to contain gas within
8 Fire Service Manual
a rigid, non-telescopic structure. A piston
acting as a false roof and supported by gas
pressure separates the gas from the air in
the upper, empty, part of the gasholder. The
piston rises and falls as the amount of gas
being stored varies. A gas tight seal is
maintained between the circumference of
the piston and the sides of the gasholder by
a tar and rubbing plate. Figure 2.3 shows
the most commonly used type of seal.
(c) Salt caverns
Two sites, Seal Sands, Teeside and
Hornsea, East Yorkshire store gas about
1,800m below ground in caverns which
were left following the extraction of salt.
Hornsea, with a huge capacity of over
322.4 million m3 of gas is by far the larger
site and when full holds about 9% of the
total stored gas capacity available to the
NTS. (See Figure 2.7.)
Seal Sands, with a storage capacity of
1.83 million m3 is used only to supplement
gas supplies to the Teeside area.
(d) Gas field storage
A depleted gas field 29 km off the
Humberside coast has been extensively
developed to hold 82 per cent of the UK's
stored gas. When full the Rough Field site
holds 2.8 billion m3 of gas, which can be
supplied to the NTS at up to 42 million m3
a day. This is the equivalent of 10% of the
national demand on the coldest winter day.
(See Figure 2.8.)
(e) Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) storage
When liquefied, natural gas occupies
only 1/630th of the volume it requires in
the gaseous state at standard conditions
of temperature and pressure (15° C/
1013 mbar).
Liquefaction of the gas is therefore an
extremely effective method of storing and
transporting the maximum amount of the
substance in the least
possible volume.
 St Fergus
Aberdeen

Kirriemuir
Terminals

Compressor Stations

Regulators
Glenmavis Bathgate LNG Storage sites

Wooler

Moffat

Bishop Auckland
To Ballylumford Teesside

To Dublin

Barrow
Transco LDZs Carnforth Hornsea

Scotland
Easington
North and Yorkshire Scunthorpe

North West Warrington Partington

Burton Hatton Theddlethorpe
East of England
West Midlands Point Kings Lynn
Alrewas Bacton
Wales and South West .Peterborough
Wisbech
North London Churchover
Huntingdon Diss
South of England To Zeebrugge
Cambridge
Wormington
Dynevor Arms Chelmsford
Aylesbury
Peterstow

Isle of Grain
Avonmouth
Lockerley

Wytch Farm-

Figure 2.6 Map of TRANSCO Local Distribution Zones (LDZs) and network. (Map courtesy of TRANSCO)

For ALL gas emergencies, call National Gas Administrative matters are dealt with by regional
Emergency number 0800 111 999 networks. For more information, see Transco
website: www.transco.uk.com

Natural Gas Incidents 9

 Figure 2. 7 Above
ground, Hornsea.
(Photograph: Transco)

Figure 2.H Rough

Field off the
Humherside coast.
(Photograph: Transco)

10 Fire Service Manual

 Five storage sites (Glenmarvis, Portington,
Avonmouth, Dynevar Arms and the Isle of
Grain) take gas from the NTS, liquefy it
and stored it at -162°C in huge tanks each
with a capacity of 21,000 tonnes.

Despite a thermal insulation barrier 5m

thick, external ambient temperature and
pressure change cause "boil off" of the
liquid and this is recycled back into the
local transmission system.

One full tank of LNG contains the equiva-

lent of 25 million m3 of gas and seven such
tanks could supply enough gas to sustain
the entire country for one day.
Figure 2.9 Isle of Grain (Photograph: Transco)
2.6 Liquefied Natural Gas properties

2.6.1 Firefighting

Liquefied Natural Gas leaking from a container or

pipe work presents a challenge to the firefighter.
Its density will vary as it gains heat and vaporises,
from a liquid a little less than half the weight of
water to a gas much lighter than air.

This, together with its wide explosive range, will

create a situation where contact with any source of
ignition will result in the instant ignition of the
entire gas cloud. As it burns it will release about
twice as much heat as a similar amount of petrol.

Firefighting and control techniques employed

must be compatible with the properties of lique-
fied natural gas and reflect the very high risks a
leak or fire will present to firefighters attending
the incident.

Natural Gas Incidents 11

Figure 2.10 High Pressure Storage Vessels used to store gas ready for instant release into the
distribution network at times of high demand. The frame of an empty low-pressure gas holder
is in the background. (Photograph: G. Cooper)
Detailed guidance on dealing with LNG incidents
can be found in Fire Service Manual, Volume 2,
"Petro-Chemical Incidents" Chapter 7 - Liquefied
Natural Gas.
2.7 High Pressure Storage Vessels
(HPSVs)
Often known colloquially as "bullets", HPSVs take
gas from the NTS or the LTS at times of low
demand and store it ready for release into the LTS
at time of high demand. Charging and discharging
is remotely controlled from the Regional Control
Centre.
Typically a storage site will consist of up to six
HPSV(s) mounted horizontally on concrete
piers. Each cylinder measures about 70m long
and 3.7m in diameter and when fully charged
to 42 bar the six will contain a total of 175,000 m3
of gas.
There are many such sites around the country
and although all are securely fenced many will be
unattended much of the time. Fixed firefighting
equipment is not normally provided.
12. Fire Service Manual
2.8 Odorisation of Fuel Gases
2.8.1 General
All commonly used fuel gases (natural gas, butane
and propane) are flammable and in most cases
explosive in air at concentrations below the normal
combustion level at which they are used.
Additionally, as they displace the air in the space
they are entering, they create an increasingly
asphxiant atmosphere.
Because naturally they have little or no smell,
these hazards can be insidious and to minimise the
risk of gas escapes, remaining undetected fuel
gases are given a distinctive smell.
The odorant used to impart a smell to natural gas
is TERTIARY BUTYL MERCAPTAN (TBM) and
this gives the distinctive sulphur smell, which has
been associated with gas since the days it was pro-
duced from coal. This smell is used internationally
to "mark" fuel gases although it may be derived
outside the UK from substances other than TBM.
TBM is added to the gas in sufficient amounts to
ensure the gas is detectable by an "average nose"
when it is at 20% of its lower explosive limit.

In its pure, undiluted form it is very smelly,

sufficiently so to make most people vomit if it
is inhaled!

2.8.2 Tertiary Butyl Mercaptan (TBM)

Figure 2.11 Hazard Warning plate. UK Hazard
Fact File Information System (UKHIS) for Tertiary Butyl
Mercaptan (TBM).
Tertiary Butyl Mercaptan (TBM)

In Bulk Form
A colourless to pale yellow liquid with a strong
unpleasant odour.

Hazards
Highly flammable liquid
Flash Pt-31°C
Boiling Pt 55 °C
Auto ign temp 247 °C
Decomposes at 450 °C
Vapour density 2.0
Figure 2.12 ADR system. Tertiary Butyl Mercaptan
Insoluble in water (TBM).

UN No 1993
ADR/RID Class 3 operating at a pressure of 7 bar or more. This will
significantly reduce sulphur emissions from gas-
Firefighting fired power stations and other large industrial
EAC 3WE
users.
Hazard identification 33
Wear BA: use foam, dry powder or CO2 to extinguish
fire
Additionally, at chemical works where the gas is
DO NOT USE WATER used as a feedstock, it will no longer be necessary
Water spray can be used to cool containers to remove the sulphur smell prior to its use.

First Aid 2.8.3 Operational Information

Wash skin
Remove contaminated clothing with soap and water
In case of inhalation, remove from exposure; keep
warm; rest
Irrigate thoroughly if TBM enters eyes. If discomfort
persists, seek medical advice
If ingested, seek medical advice

TBM is stored in bunded tanks of up to

Until recently all gas was odorised before it 22,000 litres capacity and is injected into
entered the NTS but the introduction of the Gas the gas network by pumps controlled by
Safety Management Regulations (GS(M)R) has sophisticated telemetry. Standards of
allowed it to be unodorised when in a pipeline containment and engineering are high,

Natural Gas Incidents 13

 but in the event of a spill, all sources of
ignition should be removed and the area
evacuated. If the spill is not contained
within the bund, use sand or earth to
contain it.
USE CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE
CLOTHING AND BA.

If contained within the bund, the liquid

should be pumped into a closed container
if this is possible. If not, use an absorbent
material to collect the spilt liquid and place
into a sealable container.

Odorant smell can be destroyed by incineration or

by diluting with a solution of hydrogen peroxide
or sodium hypochlorite in water containing a
detergent.

It is important to remember:

THE ABSENCE OF A 'GASSY' SMELL

DOES NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE
THE ABSENCE OF GAS

The leak may be from the National

Transmission System, (up to 85 bar) or the
High Pressure System of the LTS which
operates at pressures above 7 bar.

The odour given to gas is intended to be

distinctive, but despite this, it can be
confused with other smells amongst which
may be smells from animal product works,
landfill sites, rotting vegetables, farm
slurry, newly creosoted wood, vapour
from liquid fuels, vent pipes from sewers,
hydrocarbon product pipelines etc.

The odour threshold forTBM is 1 part per

billion.

14 Fire Service Manual

Natural Gas Incidents
Chapter 3 - Domestic Gas Supplies
3.1 General
3.1.1 Connection to the gas main
Domestic property is generally supplied with gas
from a service main laid underground outside the
property. It is preferred, where possible, to lay the
service main beneath the footpath and a simple 'T'
junction takes the gas pipe underground to each
individual property where it surfaces, usually to a
meter box. Increasingly these are being fitted
externally.
3.1.2 The Meter Box
Immediately inside the box, (which is provided
with a door, lockable with a standard triangular
key), is the emergency control valve together with
its operating lever (see Figure 3.1 (a)). The normal
operating position of the lever (i.e. gas is being
supplied to appliances within the building) is when
it is in line with the supply pipe.
If the lever is missing, hand tools (pliers, a spanner
or a wrench) can be used to move the square head
to the valve which the lever is normally fitted to. A
line is cast or engraved across this valve and the
valve is closed when the line is across the pipe. If
it is in line with the pipe gas will flow.
When the emergency control valve is in its open
position, gas flows through the valve via a flexible
steel pipe to a filter/governor and into the meter
where its volume is measured. The filter cleans the
incoming gas and the governor maintains it at a
constant pre-set pressure, matched to the require-
ments of the appliances within the property. After
metering, the gas supply system becomes the
responsibility of the owner/occupier of the proper-
ty. (See Figure 3.1.)
In some older installations the inlet is connected to
the meter by a lead pipe secured by wiped joints.
In a fire situation the lead may melt and allow gas
to escape.
3.2 Gas Escapes
3.2.1 General
Regulation 7( 1) of the Gas Safety (Management)
Regulations 1996 (GS(M)R) requires British Gas
plc (BG) to provide a continuously manned tele-
phone service (contactable within the UK by the
use of one telephone number) to enable people to
report an escape of gas from a network or from a
gas fitting supplied with gas from the network. The
regulation includes as an "escape of gas" the actu-
al or suspected emission of carbon monoxide from
gas appliances and a fire or explosion where gas is
suspected to have been involved.
The GS(M)R also requires the gas transporter/
emergency service provider to attend the emer-
gency, "with competent operatives with sufficient
knowledge, appropriate for all foreseeable emer-
gency situations".
TRANSCO RESPONDS TO ALL REPORTS
OF A GAS ESCAPE. IT WILL REPAIR
LEAKS IN THE SUPPLY PIPEWORK UP
TO AND INCLUDING THE METER. IF THE
LEAK IS BEYOND THE METER ON THE
CUSTOMER'S SIDE IT WILL MAKE THE
SITUATION SAFE.
Natural Gas Incidents 15
 Figure3. / Diagram of
a typical gas meter and
Lockable cabinet
lockable cabinet.

Governor/filter -
. Gas flow into
property
Start of
customer's
responsibility
End of public gas
Flexible steel transporter's (PGT)
inlet pipe responsibility
Gas flow Dials

Emergency _
control valve

Service pipe

Handle in vertical
(operating) position

Engraved or cast
line in vertical
(operating) position

Emergency control
valve Gas flow
To stop flow of gas stopped
move handle to the Lever in Figure 3.1 (a) Gas
horizontal position horizontal
meter and lockable
position
Gas flow cabinet in situ.
(Photograph: Transco)

The standard advice given to the public about

actions to take in the event of a gas leak is:

DON'T TURN ELECTRIC SWITCHES CALL NOW

ON OR OFF FOR AN EMERGENCY AT ANY TIME
DON'T SMOKE CALL FREE 0800-111-999
DO TURN OFF THE GAS SUPPLY AT MINICOM/TEXTPHONE PROVIDED
THE METER FOR VERY DEAF AND HARD OF
DO OPEN DOORS AND WINDOWS TO HEARING CUSTOMERS
GET RID OF THE GAS 0800-37-17-87

16 Fire Service Manual

Experience shows that the vast majority of calls
reporting gas leaks are made to the BG telephone
number. On the few occasions such calls are made
to the fire service, it is usual for an attendance to
be sent and for Brigade Control to pass the details
of the call to the BG free phone number.
The priorities applied by the gas emergency ser-
vice provider in all cases of dealing with a report-
ed gas escape are:
(a) to safeguard life
(b) to safeguard property
(c) to find and secure all gas escapes
(d) to complete a final investigation before
leaving the site.
3.2.2 Escapes of gas in buildings
If the fire brigade is first to arrive on site, priority
should be given to saving life and property. It is
likely that actions to achieve this will fall into three
categories (but not necessarily in this order).
(a) Evacuation
if the occupier's safety is at risk
if persons have been overcome by gas or
products of combustion
if gas concentration exceeds 20% LFL
(assuming a gas detector is readily available).
Evacuation could involve more than one property
and may extend to include a neighbourhood.
Consideration will need to be given to the welfare
of the evacuees, the involvement of the police and,
possibly, the local authority.
(b) Isolation
In most cases isolation of the gas supply to a domes-
tic property will simply involve finding the meter
and moving the emergency control valve lever to the
closed (i.e. lever at right angles to the pipe) position.
At other premises the means of isolation may not be
so obvious and a 'competent person'* may have to
identify and isolate the source of supply.
If it is remote from the gas-filled area, it may also
be advisable to turn off the main electrical isola-
tion switch of an evacuated or unoccupied build-
ing. This should not be done if it delays evacuation
or if the concentration of gas above and below the
switch exceeds 70% LFL.
Other potential ignition sources which need to be
considered include:
electrical equipment (if the electricity has
not been isolated)
static electricity
sparks from tools, footwear torches etc.
smoking materials
battery operated equipment
portable heating equipment
(e.g. LPG powered)
open fires/furnaces
nearby vehicles
(c) Ventilation
The object of ventilation is to reduce the percent-
age of gas within premises to an amount as far
below the lower flammable limit (LFL) as possi-
ble. Obviously 0% is the aim. The lower flamma-
ble limit for commonly found fuel gases are:
Natural gas 3.8%
butane gas 1.9% in air
propane gas 2.2%
Window and doors at all levels should be opened
to encourage as much air movement as possible,
and particular attention should be paid to the
extremities of the building, the upper levels for
natural gas (lighter than air), and the lower levels
(including basements) for heavier than air gases
such as butane and propane. Consideration should
be given to the use of suitable air movement equip-
ment (e.g. PPV fans) if this is available and can be
safely positioned in clean air to achieve the desired
effect.
3.3 Gas Detection Instruments
(Explosimeters)
3.3.1 General
Most gas engineers will have immediate access to
gas detection and monitoring equipment and, when
Natural Gas Incidents 17
correctly used, these will indicate the gas concen-
tration as a percentage of gas in air or as a per-
centage of the LFL of the gas.
Many fire brigades have purchased such instru-
ments and these are often held as "non mobile
equipment" until specifically requested. Success-
ful and safe use of the equipment requires skill and
practice by the operator and the use of a detector
suitable for the gas involved. Reference is some-
times made to "family" gases in connection with
this equipment. The three families of gases are:
1st family TOWN (coal) gas
2nd family NATURAL gas
3rd family LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM
GAS (butane/propane)
The detection equipment must be either designated
or specified, and if appropriate, calibrated for the
type of gas, which is suspected to be involved. It is
not safe to use an instrument intended to detect the
gas of one "family" to measure a concentration of
gas of another "family". Any instrument used
should be within its specified service life and most
types require re-calibration at fixed intervals to
ensure accuracy.
The probe of the instrument should be positioned
to sample the part of the compartment likely to
have the highest concentration of the type of gas
that is involved. For a lighter than air gas, this will
be at high level, whilst for heavier than air gases
this will be at floor or basement level. It should be
remembered that ceilings and floors are not usual-
ly designed to be gas tight, and if there are voids
behind them concentrations of gas may be found in
that void or compartment.
Physical senses, such as smell and hearing, should
not be ignored but must never be relied upon to
declare an area safe. If the gas is stenched the con-
centration of the odorant is calculated to allow it to
be smelt at very low concentrations, but the smell
can be destroyed by combustion or by diluted sodi-
um hypochlorite. Many people have a poor sense
of smell, sometimes unknowingly. Additionally,
where gas is leaking from pipes at pressures above
7 bars it is unlikely to be odorised and clearly the
use of gas detection equipment is essential if an
accurate assessment of the situation is to be made.
18 Fire Service Manual
Escaping gas can often be heard, particularly at
pressures above the low and medium pressure
ranges. In the intermediate and high pressure
ranges, the noise generated by a gas escape will
often be sufficient to require the use of ear defend-
ers by crews working in the vicinity of the leak.
3.4 Escapes of gas in open air
3.4.1 General
In general pipelines fail because of:
breaks (usually caused by mechanical
damage)
leaks (often from joints and flanges)
malicious damage
Failure of the pipeline and the subsequent gas
escape can result in one or more of the following:
(i) blast
(ii) debris scatter of material from the
immediate area of the leak
(iii) noise which can be extreme even from
medium pressure lines
(iv) fire
(v) asphyxiation risk
(vi) gas cloud
In the gas industry, it is the size of the break in the
pipeline that determines the difference between a
"leak" and a "break". A break will be a failure,
which is at least the same size as the diameter of
the pipe. If smaller it is considered to be a leak. In
the event of a break or large leak in the NTS
pipeline or the intermediate and high-pressure
pipes of the LTS, debris from the area of the leak
may be scattered with considerable force over a
wide area. Fortunately very high-pressure mains
are usually laid in predominately rural areas and
the likelihood of personal injury is considered to
be remote.
Whilst leaks and breaks in low and medium pres-
sure lines are unlikely to carry a risk from debris
scatter, the risks of fire and asphyxiation remains.
Gas from an escape can travel in any direction usu-
ally following the path of least resistance. Whilst
natural gas is much lighter than air and its
preferred route is upwards, underground fissures,
ducts, voids and cellars can provide a conduit for it
to travel some distance from the point of origin.
Sewers, service tunnels and railway installations,
although usually deeper than the gas distribution
system, could also become affected by gas from a
break or leak.
3.4.2 Action by the Fire Service
In carrying out a risk assessment, in addition to
testing for an explosive atmosphere, which should
always be carried out in such circumstances, if
suitable equipment is available, the oxygen level
should also be established.
N.B. There may be occasions, subject to a suitable
risk assessment being carried out, when a low
pressure leak can be effectively stopped using
gaffa tape and Environmental Agency Plug and
Dyke equipment, as a temporary measure.
The low vapour density of natural gas will aid its
dispersal into the atmosphere and the speed with
which this will happen is dependent on many fac-
tors including air turbulence. This a factor not only
of wind strength, but also the nature of the terrain
over which the wind blows with features such as
trees or buildings increasing what is known as the
"roughness factor". It is at its lowest on level
grassy plains and increases as air flows through
areas of trees and hedges until the roughness fac-
tor is at its peak in city centres.
Insolation (exposure to sun rays) or lack of rays at
night must also be included in the equation, which
can predict gas cloud densities and dispersal dis-
tances in a set of known circumstances. Very often
a plan giving risk contours for the area around a
gas processing facility is included in the site safe-
ty report of COMAH sites.
3.4.3 Meteorological Forecasts
An expert and localised weather forecast can be
obtained from the Meteorological Office by
request from a fire brigade using the CHEMET
procedure. On receipt of a CHEMET pro forma
(usually from Brigade Control) a weather forecast-
er will provide an immediate verbal assessment of
wind speed and direction and also an estimate of
the likely plume dispersion characteristics.
This will be followed, usually within twenty min-
utes, by fax giving further information and a map
of the "area at risk". Met Office forecasters are not
qualified to comment on the behaviour of individ-
ual chemicals and their report will assume a neu-
trally buoyant gas, although other qualified experts
may use the information provided by the Met
Office to supply a more specific report.
3.4.4 Aides-Memoires
Points to be considered.
EVACUATE THE AREA (consider the
likely dispersal route of the escaping gas)
LIAISE WITH POLICE Maintain close
contact throughout incident.
REQUEST ISOLATION OF THE SUPPLY
(it may be that the sophisticated control
systems of the higher pressure mains have
detected the leak/break and that supply has
already been isolated but do not assume
this.
REMOVE SOURCES OF IGNITION
Stop passing traffic. Sterilise the area.
CONSIDER THE USE OF WATER
SPRAY In still conditions this may provide
turbulence to help disperse the gas. It may
Natural Gas Incidents 19
 Internal distribution in domestic properties is gen-
erally in steel or copper pipes.

3.4.5 Dealing with gas escapes which are

burning
The priorities when attending incidents at which
escaping gas is alight are:

to effect any rescues and/or evacuation;

to isolate the leak from its supply of gas;
and
to protect the surrounding area from
radiated heat whilst this is being done.

In some instances, especially where high capacity

mains are involved, it may be necessary for the
supply of gas to be stopped both upstream and
downstream of the escape. This principle of extin-
guishing the fire by stopping the supply of fuel
applies to all burning gas incidents (not just natur-
al gas).

20 Fire Service Manual

Once the supply of gas is stopped the flame will
become increasingly "lazy" as the pressure in the
pipeline falls. In large diameter mains this will
take time and cooling must continue until the
pipeline is cool and the area has been declared gas
free following a survey with gas detection equip-
ment.

Many lessons about dealing with incidents involv-

ing escaping burning gas can be learnt from a
study of the actions taken by the crews who
responded to reports of an "explosion and fire" at
a site containing many gas installations including
three large gasholders.

Gas distribution engineers principally use maps to

locate gas mains. Marker plates, about the size of
a hydrant plate, are used but not extensively. For
historical reasons, the colour of the plates can vary
throughout the country. Figure 3.2 Gas valve marker. (Photograph G. Cooper)

Figure 3.3
Gas pipeline marker.
The pole is to aid
identification of the
site from the air.
(Photograph G Cooper)

Natural Gas Incidents 21

On arrival at the scene, the Officer in Charge
parked his appliances a little distance from the
fire-ground and conducted his reconnaissance on
foot. It appeared to him that all three gas-holders
were alight and he immediately requested a make-
up often pumps and two aerial appliances.
Minutes later the centre of the three gas-holders
suffered a catastrophic failure at roof level. An
enormous fireball of gas/air mixture rolled
upwards into the night sky as the entire contents
instantly escaped. As it emptied, the gas-holder
rapidly deflated (as it was designed to) until when
in its empty, housed, position the fire burnt itself
out. The switchboard in Brigade Control was inun-
dated with over seven hundred calls and clearly,
despite it being 0400 hours, the fireball had been
seen by many people across a wide area.
About this time it was learnt that terrorist action
was considered to be the likely cause of the
incident. With the fire in the central holder
Noteworthy points which led to a successful con-
clusion of this incident:
The initial reconnaissance and risk
assessment was carried out by the initial
incident commander while the PDA
remained outside the immediate area of
the incident.
Close co-operation was quickly established
between the brigade and Transco engineers.
This continued throughout the incident.
The surrounding area was efficiently
evacuated.
The inner and outer cordon system of
control worked well.
22 Fire Service Manual
extinguished, it was possible to see that only
one fire remained. Flame was issuing from a hole
about 200mm in diameter 15m, from ground level
in one of the remaining gas-holders and later
examination showed that it had been punctured by
shrapnel. The top of the third gas-holder was badly
scorched probably by radiated heat from the fire-
ball but fortunately it was not alight.
Liaison with the police confirmed that evacuation
of the area surrounding the site was in hand. Close
co-operation with gas engineers was established
and arrangements were made for the gas-holders to
be emptied although it was explained that this
would take time. A five pump water relay was laid
from a 300mm main to supply ground monitors
which had been strategically placed at the scene.
Some thirteen hours after the initial call, the
burning gas-holder came to rest on its base and
shortly after the fire extinguished itself.
To avoid congestion on the fireground
oncoming vehicles reported initially to a
RVP close to the incident. They waited
there until called forward.
The ability of Brigade Control to cope
with a major incident and simultaneously
handled many 999 calls.
The use of high capacity ground monitors
(able to be remotely controlled or pre-set)
reduced the time crews were exposed to
risk.
The crews had visited the site for 1(1 )(d)
visits and exercises and the benefit of
these helped to bring the incident to its
successful conclusion.
Natural Gas Incidents

Chapter 4 - Cylinders of compressed gas

4.1 General

4.1.1 Cylinders of Compressed Natural

Gas (CNG)
(excluding those used in conjunction
with road vehicles)

Natural Gas is available from most commercial

suppliers as a compressed gas in cylinders.
Traditionally the cylinders are marked to conform
to BS 349:1979 which requires CNG cylinders to
be painted in a neutral colour with a red shoulder
to indicate the primary nature of the contents as
being flammable. Sometimes the secondary nature
of CNG, its non-toxicity, is indicated by a green
band below the red shoulder. The body of cylinders
of methane gas are usually painted red.

The 1979 BS was replaced in 1997 by BS.EN 1089

part 3 which requires both methane and CNG Figure 4.1 The British Standard which covers the
cylinders to be provided with a red shoulder but it marking of cylinders of compressed gases is not
mandatory. The diagram illustrates the identification
does not specify a colour for the body of the cylin-
pattern used by the two largest suppliers of compressed
der. Observance of the colour coding system is not
gases: natural gas (left) and methane (right).
mandatory and, to date, the compressed gas indus- (See text for a full explanation.)
try has made little progress towards implementing
the 1997 standard.
Cylinders vary in exact size and pressure accord-
Operational crews are advised to use the colour
ing to the supplier. Portable cylinders are about one
markings on cylinders as a guide only.
metre high and standard cylinders are about 1.4m
high. The pressure of a full cylinder is usually
It is a legal requirement* that all cylinders of
between 172-230 bar. Gas flow from the cylinder
industrial compressed gas are labelled (which
is controlled by a screw valve opened and shut by
can include stencilling) to identify the contents
a hand wheel or a key (often square headed).
and that safety information is provided. Such
data should be regarded as the authoritative
It is common practice for the main outlet of cylin-
source of information regarding the contents of
ders containing a flammable gas to be fitted with a
the cylinder.
left handed thread to reduce the risk of it being
connected to an incorrect supply line. This impor-
* (Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road
tant safety feature also includes the left hand
Regulations 1996. (CDG Road))
threaded securing nut being notched at the edge of

Natural Gas Incidents 23


GAS CONNECTION
Indicates
left-hand
thread and
that cylinder
contains
flammable
gas
Figure 4.2 Drawing showing a left-hand threaded
connector to cylinders containing a flammable gas.
the flats of the nut. In most cases a cylinder, when
in use, will be fitted with a pressure regulator to
reduce the pressure of the gas to suit the pipe work
and equipment it is supplying. The regulator incor-
porates a safety relief valve to protect the final
stage of the regulator and the pressure gauge. It
will not protect the cylinder and cannot be relied
on to protect the downstream pipe work.
For convenience of storage and handling, cylinders
are sometimes delivered and kept in a cylinder
bank frame and these can hold up to eighteen
cylinders. Users of large quantities of CNG will
often have gas delivered by "tube trailer" and up to
eight cylinders, each to the length of the trailer of
an articulated lorry, can be carried horizontally on
the trailer.
4.1.2 Dealing with fire
The recognised advice that, other than when life is
directly at risk, burning gas should not be extin-
guished applies equally to fires involving CNG. If
the fire is fuelled from a cylinder some distance
from the fire it will often be possible to turn off the
cylinder valve or, if fitted, an intermediate valve
safely. If this is not possible the flame should
be left burning and fire-fighting concentrated on
protecting the surrounding risk and if necessary
cooling the cylinder.
.24 Fire Service Manual
4.2 Direct or indirect heating of
cylinders of CNG
4.2.1 General
When heated, the contents of a cylinder of gas will
expand and the pressure within the cylinder will
rise. Safety devices such as pressure relief valves,
fusible plugs and bursting discs are not normally
fitted to industrial cylinders of CNG or methane
and it is inevitable that if heating continues the
internal pressure of the gas will rise until the cylin-
der bursts. This will happen with considerable
force and debris and remains of the cylinder will
be scattered over a wide area.
Where cylinders are directly involved in fire, set
up an initial 200m hazard zone. Every effort
should be made from a safe distance to cool them.
If necessary, a cooling branch should be lashed to
a secure object or a ground monitor employed and
left to cool the cylinder. When the source of heat
has been extinguished and when the cylinder is
cool it can be approached. A wetting test could be
used to check if the cylinder is hot.
An indication that it is not cool could be the pres-
ence of steam from cylinder when the cooling jet is
briefly "knocked off" or that the cylinder dries off
quickly when cooling water supply is stopped. If
available, a thermal imaging camera may be used
to give an indication of the temperature of the
cylinder. (See Appendix 1.)
4.2.2 Failure of CNG cylinders
(RIDDOR)
The failure of any closed vessel operating above
atmospheric pressure (e.g. a gas cylinder) consti-
tutes a failure as described in Part 1 (2) of
Regulation 2 ( 1 ) Dangerous Occurrences of the
Reporting of Injury Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulation 1995 (RIDDOR). It is a
requirement that such a failure is reported to the
Health and Safety Executive, by the person in
control of the premises or in connection with the
work going on at which the dangerous occurrence
happened.
Where a cylinder has been exposed to fire, but has
not failed and has undergone an adequate period of
cooling, it should be removed from service,
labelled and placed to one side in a secure com-
pound. The owner of the cylinder, who is usually
the supplier of the gas should be informed, and
arrangements made for its collection.

Natural Gas Incidents 25

Natural Gas Incidents

Chapter 5 - Landfill site and spoil tips

5.1 General danger of asphyxiation especially where

Lives have been lost and explosions have been
caused by gases, which are naturally generated in
landfill sites and spoil tips. The sites, which often
contain huge quantities of domestic and industrial
waste, can appear to be innocuous especially when
they have been grassed over.
gases collect in low lying areas, trenches or
shafts.
production of hydrogen sulphide (H2S),
a highly toxic gas which smells of rotten
eggs and is often associated with decaying
animal matter.

As decomposition takes place within the tip, air
trapped underground is replaced by carbon dioxide
(up to 80%) and hydrogen (up to 20%). With time,
microbial activity increases and the gas content
changes, with methane becoming the major gas
present (up to 65%). Carbon dioxide may make up
the remainder although the exact composition will
vary according to the contents of the tip.
The decomposition process can continue for
decades and the hazards that may result can
include:
Gases produced in these sites can travel under-
ground considerable distances to beyond the
boundaries of the site and often the first indication
of this are reports of a bad smell. Explosions in
properties normally in the basement or void
beneath the ground floor, can follow. To prevent
dangerous concentrations of gas building up in
vulnerable properties ventilation equipment is
often installed and a porous "French trench", filled
with porous shingle, may surround the building
allowing gases that are lighter than air to vent
before they reach the footings of the building.

a build-up of flammable gases

Figure 5.1 Drawing

showing use of a
"French Trench " to
Property
protect the basement being
of a property from protected Gas venting to
atmosphere
explosive gases
migrating from a
Floor
nearby source.
Basement or
under-floor void
(ventilated) Gas
migrating
from tip
Footings
Soil Soil

Previous page
is blank Natural Gas Incidents 27
 Figure 5.2 "Porous
pipes " ready to be
buried in a tip to
transport flammable
gases of decomposition
to a vent stack. The
pipes are made from
plastic and the inlet
holes can be seen at
the base of the ridges.
(Photograph: G Cooper)

Figure 5.3 A typical

flame stack used to
discharge flammable
gases collected from a
tip. The gas can be
automatically ignited
and burns with a pale
blue flame which can
be difficult to see in
daylight.
The incoming pipes
from the tip can be
seen on the right.
(Photograph: G. Cooper)

28 Fire Service Manual

A longer-term solution to the problem of gas
migration is for porous pipes to be laid throughout
the tip, which is then covered with a layer of clay.
The pipes gather the gas from the site and it is
moved by fans connected to one end of the
pipework to a flue provided at the other end from
where it is discharged to open air. Should the
amount of gas being discharged fall within its
flammable limits, it is ignited and burns with a
characteristic pale blue flame which often can only
be seen in dark conditions. Developments in the
future may lead to the gas being used more pro-
ductively (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
Despite great improvement in the management of
waste sites, numerous abandoned tips remain
together with the hazards they present. Operational
crews should respond with care to incidents on
such sites, especially if there are reports of people
or animals being overcome. Clearly, toxic and/or
asphyxiant gases could have been responsible for
the casualties and brigade and civilian fatalities
have occurred in just such circumstances.
A Case Study
Black Damp
Operational crews responded to a report of "young
girls overcome in a shaft". On arrival at the scene
it was found that the girls had gained entrance to
the drift shaft+ from the roof of a building, which
blocked the shaft. Firefighters subsequently
became aware of fumes and rigged in BA. The
girls were found in a small cavity in the shaft
which had been filled with spoil and rubbish from
the disused colliery. A firefighter working in the
shaft collapsed, and as he slumped to the ground
his face-mask became dislodged.
He and three young girls perished in the "black
damp" fumes.
passage following a seam of coal
carbon dioxide in mines, shafts, etc. also
known as "choke damp"
5.2 Fires in rubbish tips
Modern methods of waste tip management have
resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of
incidents Brigades attend at these sites. When fires
do occur, they are usually deep seated and exten-
sive, although they rarely present a direct hazard
to third parties.
It is likely that the initial actions of the first atten-
dance will be to contain the fire whilst discussions
take place with the site's manager. Deep-seated
fires in rubbish tips are difficult to extinguish
without the co-operation of other agencies.
Use of a thermal imaging camera may reveal the
extent of the fire although the sheer depth of rub-
bish can influence the effectiveness of the camera.
Fire-fighting will require large quantities of water
and for this to be applied effectively, the burning
material must be exposed. Mechanical plant will
be needed to expose the fire.
Consideration may need to be given to allowing
the fire to burn under controlled conditions.
Environmental issues must be considered. Run off
water from fire-fighting jets will inevitably find its
way into water courses, as only the most modern
sites are sealed at the bottom and sides of the tip
(usually with a layer of clay or plastic) to prevent
the contents of the tip leaking into the subsoil.
In many cases there is no alternative to protracted
and crew intensive fire-fighting operations aided
by mechanical diggers. The longer term and
expensive option is for the tip to be capped with an
impervious layer in an attempt to reduce the
amount of air available to fire.
Natural Gas Incidents 29
30 Fire Service Manual
Natural Gas Incidents
Chapter 6 - Natural gas and the
generation of electricity
6.1 General
One significant advantage that natural gas has over
other fossil fuels is that its products of combustion
contain lower amounts of many of the substances
which are considered to be harmful to the environ-
ment. Boilers in some existing power stations are
being converted from other fuels to burn natural
gas, and gas turbines have long been used to pro-
vide, almost instantly, large quantities of electrici-
ty at times of peak national demand. The turbine,
often an industrialised aircraft jet engine, is cou-
pled directly to the generator and the exhaust gases
from the engine are vented to atmosphere.
Gas turbines are generating increasing amounts
of electricity and many new power stations now
operate combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) to
produce electricity with high levels of efficiency.
6.1.1 A typical CCGT station
Natural gas from the National Transmission sys-
tem (NTS) reaches the power station through a
600mm diameter pipeline 17km long. As it enters
the station, which covers an area of about 11
hectares, it passes into a "slam shut" valve, which
can be remotely operated to isolate the site from
the gas supply. Additionally, it will automatically
operate should conditions within the pipeline or at
key areas of the plant vary from pre-determined
parameters.
The gas is warmed to 137oC to improve its com-
bustion characteristics, is cleaned, and supplied to
two (some plants have three or four) industrial gas
turbines. Each gas turbine is directly coupled to a
generator. The jet engine produces vast amounts of
exhaust gases at a temperature of 550°C and this is
taken to a heat recovery boiler to produce steam
at a temperature of 512°C. The steam from each
boiler is collected to power a single steam turbine
and generator. The combined output of the three
generators (two gas turbine and a steam turbine) is
688MW but, with favourable air temperature and
pressure which improves combustion, it can be as
high as 700M W. The output is sufficient for a town
of about one million people and it is fed into the
National Grid at 400kV level.
Generators with an output in excess of 200MW at
both CCGT and the more traditional power sta-
tions are usually cooled by hydrogen gas. Despite
its well known hazards this gas is used because its
high specific heat capacity and thermal conductiv-
ity make it a particularly effective cooling agent.
Generators with an output of less than 200MW
output are usually air cooled.
Hydrogen is stored in bulk as a compressed gas in
cylinders and typically kept in an isolated brick
built roofless compound. The gas flows in a closed
loop cooling circuit built to the highest mechanical
and electrical standards.
6.1.2 Alternative fuel supplies
The contract between the gas supplier and the
operator of the power station often stipulates that
the supply of gas can be interrupted at short notice.
This usually happens in winter and, to allow the
plant to continue operating, an alternative fuel, gas
oil, is kept on site. A bunded 3.7 million litre tank
stores enough gas oil to supply the station for 24
hours and this can be replenished from a nearby
fuel storage depot.
CCGT stations achieve efficiency levels of about
55%, which can be as much as 20% higher than
many older stations. Forty people work at the site
although at night is it operated by a shift of four.
Natural Gas Incidents 3 1
 Flow diagram of a typical small scale
combined heat and power unit
Low pressure Exhaust
inlet from outlet
Low pressure 120°C
radiators etc Silencer
outlet to boiler
90°C 80ºC

Heat exchange

Lubricating
oil tank

Engine coolant 95°C

Exhaust gases 500°C

Gas engine and Electricity

cooling manifolds generator

Air inlet Fuel/air

Air outlet filter supply Air inlet

Pressure regulator
Gas supply

Gas inlet with Valve

emergency stop Control unit
valve often in a
vandal-resistant box With telemetry to remote
control room

Figure 6.1 Flow diagram of a typical small scale combined heat and power (CHP) unit.

6.1.3 Firefighting on CCGT sites fire/gas detection and a CO2 fire

(many points will apply equally to CHP suppression system.
operations) Water for firefighting is often stored on
site.
As with any technically advanced plant, firefight- Gas oil storage tanks are usually protected
ing can only be enhanced if it is undertaken with by a fixed foam pourer with an associated
the help and co-operation of the management of foam generating system.
the plant. The value of regular exercises and/or Many CCGT sites are remotely located.
l(i)(d) visits to such sites cannot be overempha- Much of the site is automatically and/or
sised. remotely operated.

Typical features of such sites include:
Many sections of the plant can be isolated
from the gas supply. Operation of the "slam
shut" valve will isolate the site. Gas is not
stored on site.
Many parts of the plant are individually
enclosed and protected by automatic
6.1.4 Combined Heat and Power plants
(CHP)
Users of large amounts of power and heat are
increasingly operating gas turbines to generate
electricity for their plant. Sometimes surplus
capacity is supplied to the National Grid. As with
a CCGT plant the huge amount of exhaust heat is

32 Fire Service Manual

used to produce steam but a CHP station uses the
steam for industrial processes or to heat buildings
or even districts. Users of CHP plants include
paper mills and chemical works, and one plant
serving a board mill produces 49MK of electricity
and 82MW of process steam.
of installation external shut down valves are not
provided and the emergency shut down valve will
be found on the normal incoming gas supply route.
Efficiency levels of a typical small scale CHP

6.1.5 Small Scale CHP systems %

Energy Input 100
Public buildings, hospitals, housing estates, hotels
and retail outlets are among the increasing number Electricity produced 30
of users of small scale combined heat and power Heat recovered 50
installations to economically provide heat and/or Flue Losses 15
electricity for on site use. Efficiency levels can
exceed 80% and the heat/power ratio is usually Radiated heat lost 5
1.7:1. A system will typically consist of a natural TOTAL 100
gas powered spark ignition engine driving a gener-
ator with a heat exchanger recovering heat from
the exhaust gases and another recovering heat from Other fuels used to power small scale CHP include
the engine cooling water and oil. Outputs vary LPG diesel, biogas and methane gas from landfill
from as little as 15kWe/25kWth (kilowatt electric- sites.
ity - kilowatt thermal energy) to 5MWe/8.5MWth
(megawatt electricity - megawatt thermal energy).
Economics will decide the exact operating pattern
of the plant but this is usually about 17 hours a day.
Heat recovered by the heat exchangers is used to
raise the temperature of feed water to the hot water
boilers by as much as 15°C.

6.1.6 Operational considerations

Stand-alone CHP units are invariably placed close
to the building they serve. The engine with its gen-
erator is housed within an acoustic enclosure in a
lightly clad building. It will be unattended, auto-
matic in operation, and remotely controlled and
monitored by sophisticated telemetry. It is unusual
for the building to have a fixed firefighting system
but on the outside, in a vandal resistant box, crews
will often find an emergency control valve for the
gas supply to the engine. Once operated this will
stop the engine and generator.

With the fuel supply isolated, electricity will not be

generated, but the building will not be electrically
isolated and normal precautions must be taken.

Where a CHP is installed within the building, per-

haps as an addition to an existing boiler house, it
will be protected by fire detection and firefighting
equipment similar to the existing plant. In this type

Natural Gas Incidents 33

Natural Gas Incidents
Chapter 7 - Natural gas as a fuel
for vehicles
7.1 Introduction
Since the earliest days, gas has been used as a fuel
for vehicle engines and, perhaps more successful-
ly, for stationary industrial engines. But not until
the 1980's, prompted by the increasing availability
of natural gas, and ever more stringent demands
for cleaner exhaust emissions, did a development
programme of any size start in this country.
Abroad, many countries already have tens of thou-
sands of natural gas powered vehicles on the road.
Three fuelling systems are being evaluated.
(i) Vehicles which carry both petrol and
natural gas either of which can be used at
the flick of a switch. Engines for this
method operate on the spark ignition cycle.
(ii) Vehicles which carry both diesel fuel and
natural gas. The engine operates on the
compression ignition cycle with diesel
being used to start the engine and provide
the heat to ignite natural gas as it is
gradually introduced to the engine in ratios
which vary according to the operating
parameters. When conditions are at their
optimal the fuel mixture consists of about
80% natural gas and 20% diesel.
(iii) Dedicated Natural Gas Vehicles which
operate only on natural gas, carried either
compressed (CNG) or liquified (LNG).
The auto ignition temperature of natural gas is in
the region of 538°C (which is very high compared
to diesel at 250°C) and such a temperature is diffi-
cult to achieve in an engine by compression alone,
consequently all dedicated NGV engines use spark
ignition to provide the high temperature required
to ignite the fuel.
Previous page
is blank
Engines suitable for vehicles up to 44 tonnes have
been developed.
7.2 Fuel storage on Natural Gas
Vehicles (NGVs)
Dual fuel vehicles carry petrol or diesel in the nor-
mal way often using exactly the same fuel system
as the vehicle on which they were based prior to
conversion. Natural gas for these vehicles and for
dedicated vehicles is carried either as compressed
gas (CNG) or liquified natural gas (LNG).
7.2.1 Cylinders of CNG
(for use on vehicles powered by natural
gas Chapter 4 covers industrial cylinders
of CNG)
These are usually charged to a pressure of 200 bar
and are made from steel, a composite of steel or
aluminium wrapped with carbon fibre, or a com-
posite of plastic and carbon fibre wrap. Cylinder
size varies with cars, light vans, estate cars and
forklift trucks using a cylinder of between 60 to
90 litre water capacity (we) which is the equivalent
to 15 to 25 litres of petrol. Vans normally carry
more than one cylinder to give a total capacity of
typically 90 to 180 litres (we) and this is equivalent
to 25 to 50 litres of petrol.
Lorries and buses usually carry a number of cylin-
ders and the total capacity can vary widely from
350 litres (we) to in excess of 1,000 litres (we). A
large vehicle could conceivably have a CNG
capacity in excess of the equivalent of 250 litres of
petrol.
All cylinders are secured to be crashworthy, able to
resist the huge g forces of an impact and the stan-
dard of engineering throughout the gas fuel system
is high. Pipework is fabricated from stainless steel
Natural Gas Incidents 35
which is attached only to the structural members of
the vehicle. Each cylinder incorporates a manually
or electrically operated (or both) isolation valve
and is protected by a pressure relief device which
is likely to include a temperature sensitive fusible
plug. In the event of a fire heating the cylinder and
causing the pressure of the gas to rise the pressure
relief device will open and release the contents of
the cylinder to atmosphere outside the vehicle. The
escaping gas is likely to be ignited as it leaves the
vent line and a flame several metres in length
could result.
Other safety devices fitted to NGVs include a
deceleration switch, which will stop the flow of
gas and, if the cylinder is fitted with an electrical-
ly operated cylinder valve, isolate the cylinder if
the vehicle suffers a substantial impact. A vehicle
may also be fitted with an excess flow device
which will prevent the excessive flow of gas from
the storage container in the event of a ruptured
pipe or if the regulator pressure relief device is
venting.
Lorries fuelled by natural gas usually carry their
fuel containers secured externally to the vehicle
Super Insulation
Inner Vessel
Evacuation Plug
Relief Valve
Vent Valve
Protection
Ring
Excess Flow Check Valve
Economiser
Regulator Fuel Delivery Connection
Fill Check Valve
36 Fire Service Manual
chassis, whilst on buses they are likely (but not
always) to be carried at roof level screened by light
bodywork. Safety devices similar to those found
on smaller vehicles will be found.
7.2.2 Tanks of LNG
Natural gas can be liquified to enable the greatest
quantity of fuel to be carried in a given volume.
One litre of liquified natural gas (LNG) will vapor-
ise to give 630 litres of gas and to keep it in its
liquid state the fuel is kept at a temperature of
160°C and a pressure of 7 bar. To maintain these
conditions the cryogenic (very low temperatures)
storage tank incorporates both vacuum and super
insulation and is pressure resistant. Despite this
some "boil off" will convert the liquid to gas rais-
ing the pressure within the tank. Normal use of the
vehicle will relieve this pressure, but if the vehicle
is not used (and perhaps for as much as ten days)
the gas will be automatically vented to atmosphere
to keep the contents of the tank at a pressure
between 7 and 16 bar. It is important, therefore, if
LNG vehicles are left for long periods of time
without use that they are kept in a well ventilated
area, particularly at roof level.
Figure 7.1 Features of
an LNG storage tank.
(Diagram courtesy of ERF)
Outer Vacuum
Jacket
The LNG storage tank(s) is usually secured to the
chassis of the vehicle, in the case of an articulated
lorry, usually between the front and rear axles of
the tractor unit. As a general rule to achieve the
same range of an equivalent diesel lorry LNG
vehicles require twice as much fuel storage capac-
ity, whilst LNG vehicles require five times as
much.
7.2.3 Refuelling CNG vehicles
CNG vehicles can be refuelled overnight from a
slow fill dispenser or, in much the same time as
conventionally fuelled vehicles, by a fast fill dis-
penser. It is a design requirement of CNG refu-
elling systems that "the driver shall be dissuaded"
from driving the vehicle away during refuelling
operations. In early vehicles this was ensured by
placing the fuel inlet under the bonnet in a position
which required it to remain open during refuelling.
More recently sensors have been used to detect an
open refuelling flap and as a result immobilise the
vehicles ignition. The filling connections are
unique to CNG vehicles and are identical in both
fast and slow fill systems. When connected, the
nozzle maintains electrical continuity between the
vehicle and the dispensing unit and need not be
held whilst refuelling. Should it become dislodged
when in use, it will self seal (as will the fuel sys-
tem on the vehicle) to prevent natural gas escaping
to atmosphere.
(a) Slow Fill or Trickle Charge system
This option which can be connected to a domestic
natural gas outlet via a small compressor about the
size of a domestic fridge is aimed mainly at small
businesses, and depot based fleets who want their
own facilities. Bus and truck operators use the
CNG slow fill system with a larger compressor(s)
to top up the fleet overnight. Once connected and
switched on the system is automatic in operation
switching itself off when the CNG cylinder is full.
(See Figure 7.2.)
(b) Fast Fill Stations
These will be increasingly found at public com-
mercial refuelling stations as well as at the depots
of fleets using large numbers of NGVs. The fast
fill station consists of a gas compressor often with
a large electric motor in an acoustic enclosure.
The output from the compressor is kept in trans-
portable cylinders or similar vessels to act as
buffer storage for supply to the fuel dispenser with
its associated hose and nozzle. Excess flow sen-
sors are incorporated into the system and these
will stop the flow of gas should a large leak occur
in the pipework or the fuel dispenser and hose.
The dispenser unit will be separate from the com-
pressor and the storage part of the installation and
it will be clearly marked to identify it as a source
of natural gas. (See Figure 7.3.)
7.2.4 Fire involving CNG refuelling
facilities
The refuelling equipment for both systems is usu-
ally in open air with only the compressor and its
motor housed in an acoustic enclosure. Should gas
escape it will rapidly disperse vertically and if a
canopy is provided it will be designed so as not to
inhibit natural ventilation and to prevent the accu-
mulation of any potential gas release.
The procedure to follow for an "emergency shut
down" (ESDP) will be clearly displayed through-
out the filling station and emergency switches will
be clearly identified. Once the ESDP has been
activated the system shall be reset only by an
authorised person.
When the ESDP is actuated, the supply of gas to
the filling station will be stopped, the compressor
will be isolated and the storage facilities will be
closed (or at a low fill facility, the outlet from the
compressor).
The strategy for firefighting will concentrate on
cooling the surrounding risk whilst, unless life is at
risk, allowing any escaping burning gas to contin-
ue to burn until the supply of gas is exhausted and
the fire self extinguishes.
Increasingly fast fill gas dispensers will be found
alongside liquid fuel dispensers and in the event of
an incident involving either type of fuel the haz-
ards presented by all the fire risks will need to be
considered by the incident commander.
Natural Gas Incidents 37
 Slow Fill Refuelling system configurations

1. Single unit Safety Vent

On site gas distribution

Gas check meter Gas dryer Compressor

Twin hoses serve

up to 2 cars or
light vans

2. Multiple installation Safety Vent

NGW&
On site gas distribution

Gas check meter

. Single hose to
serve a bus or truck

Double or triple
connecting manifold

Figure 7.2 Diagram of a Slow Fill system. (Diagram courtesy of British Gas Vehicles Fuels)

7.3 Incidents involving Natural Gas (b) the maximum system filling pressure "
Powered Vehicles (NGVs)
and
7.3.1 General Information
"The filling point for natural gas shall be identi-
Schedule 5A(12 -(i)) of The Motor Vehicles fied adjacent to the point by the words NATURAL
(Authorisation of special Types) (Amendment) GAS or other suitable word."
(No2) Order 1998 requires "Every vehicle which is
equipped to be fuelled by natural gas shall be fit- A European (CEN) committee has been set up to
ted with a metal identification plate, located in a consider regulations and harmonisation.
readily visible and accessible position, that is
marked clearly and permanently to identify - It is not surprising with so few NGVs on the road
(a) that the vehicle has been constructed or (at present) in this country there is little opera-
adapted to run on natural gas, and tional experience of fires involving these vehicles.

38 Fire Service Manual

 Meter and Compressor
inlet train and motor Storage
Meter
Acoustic
housing
Non- Excess flow
return valve
Solenoid Manual
valve valve
Meter
Figure 7.3 Diagram of a Fast Fill Compressed Natural Gas refuelling station. (Diagram courtesy of British Gas Vehicle Fuels)
Abroad, where there are often many more NGVs,
there is no evidence to suggest that NGVs or their
refuelling facilities are involved in fire more fre-
quently than traditionally fuelled vehicles.
In the absence of information from the driver of
the vehicle or markings about its fuel it may be dif-
ficult to identify if a vehicle is gas powered. The
filling point may be labelled "natural gas" but this
sign may be indistinct in a fire situation or sited
behind the filler flap and invisible if the flap is
shut. Other clues need to be sought.
It may be possible to see if the vehicle has two fill-
ing points (if bi fuelled or dual fuelled) or to see
the cylinder occupying some of the load space. In
a saloon car the cylinder will normally be in the
boot and if it is safe and possible to open the boot
this can be checked. Most cylinders fitted in the
boot are protected by a cylinder cover but their out-
line usually remains obvious.
Most lorries powered by natural gas carry cylin-
ders (CNG) or flasks (LNG) bolted to the vehicle
chassis often either side and clearly visible.
Refuelling
nozzle
Dispenser
The CNG used as a vehicle fuel is odourised and a
smell of gas in the vicinity of an incident could
well indicate a leak of gas from the vehicle. The
odour given to gas is destroyed by combustion.
LNG is not odourised.
At any incident involving a NGV it should be
established if an alternative fuel system is fitted to
the vehicle and if so the alternative fuel should be
treated in the same way as a conventional vehicle
powered by that fuel.
An experiment in France where an aluminium 127
litre cylinder containing natural gas at 190 bar
pressure was suspended immediately above a fire
consisting of many rubber tyres shows a protective
fusible plug rupturing after only 2 min 40 sec.
Immediately the cylinder pressure dropped from
190 bar to 79 bar and a few seconds later when a
second fusible plug actuated it fell to 74 bar. Both
gas discharges ignited to give flames about 3m
long. Nine minutes after ignition the cylinder pres-
sure was 1 bar and shortly afterwards the gas
flames self extinguished.
Natural Gas Incidents 39
7.3.2 Action at Incidents
Many safety devices are incorporated into the fuel
system of NGVs and it is not inevitable that an
NGV involved in an accident will leak or catch fire.
Nevertheless, gas presents a similar hazard to other
spilt fuels. A measured approach to a vehicle
involved in an RTA must always be adopted. Risk
management requires there must be a justification
if firefighters are to be exposed to risk. A risk
assessment of an incident involving an abandoned
vehicle on a country lane will result in a different
outcome from the assessment reached if the same
vehicle was burning in a crowded town centre. This
philosophy which is applied to all operational inci-
dents, not just those referred to in this manual, can
be summed up as 'if after implementing all avail-
able control measures, the cost of proceeding with
a task still outweighs the benefits, DO NOT PRO-
CEED but consider viable alternatives' (Dynamic-
management of risk at operational incidents. A Fire
Service guide ISBN 0-11-341221-5).
Upon arrival at the scene of an incident crews are
likely to find one of the following situations:
(a) THE VEHICLE IS NOT ALIGHT AND A
GAS LEAK IS NOT IMMEDIATELY
APPARENT
It may be difficult, particularly from a distance,
to determine if a vehicle is leaking gas but if the
vehicle is damaged it should be assumed that it is
and at risk from fire until it has been established
otherwise. A likely course of action for the above
scenario will be:
Assess the condition and location of any
casualties.
Assess the risk to them and the
surrounding area.
If possible contact the driver of the vehicle
and establish the nature of its fuel/s. If
there is a secondary fuel it is likely to be
petrol or diesel and if these are leaking
they should be dealt with in the normal
manner. It will be helpful if the driver can
recall if the vehicle's ignition has been
switched off. Some cylinder isolation
valves are solenoid operated and switching
40 Fire Service Manual
off the ignition will isolate the cylinder/s.
Evacuate the area immediately around the
NGV extending further downwind.
Eliminate potential sources of ignition.
(Many simple operations, such as opening
a car door which actuates an interior light
switch or turning on or off the ignition, can
create a spark which has the potential to
ignite a fuel/air mixture).
Layout firefighting jets.
If cutting is to be undertaken, take care not
to sever gas pipes. Cold cutting equipment
only should be used in the vicinity of a gas
leak.
IF IT IS NECESSARY to investigate the vehicle,
wear full firefighting clothing and approach the
vehicle from upwind paying particular attention
for:
A possible smell of gas. Unlike CNG, LNG
is not odourised and the resulting gas from
LNG will not have the characteristic 'gas'
smell.
The sound of gas escaping.
A mist of LNG indicating the vicinity of a
leak.
A pool of rapidly evaporating LNG below
the leak.
Consider the presence of other types of fuel
if there are no obvious signs of a serious
gas leak (or the spillage of other fuels), and
it is necessary and safe to do so, close the
cylinder isolation valve/s.
If it is safe to do so switch off the ignition
if this has not been done. In many cases
this will close the cylinder/s isolation
valve/s by the actuation of solenoids.
The manually operable part of such valves
is not always obvious.
A further safety precaution that can be
undertaken in the absence of a gas/air
mixture is the disconnection of the vehicle
battery.
(b) A SERIOUS GAS LEAK IS DETECTED
OR SUSPECTED
If there is a serious gas leak it must be assumed
that the resulting gas cloud could ignite.
Re-assess the system of work. The risk is greatly
increased and only if the benefit of continuing with
the task remains greater than the risk it entails
should the vehicle be approached:
It is likely, in the event of a serious
gas leak from an NGV, that the only
justification there can be to work in the
immediate vicinity of the vehicle will be
the preservation of life.
BA should be worn and most of the actions
listed previously should be implemented.
Water sprays may help to disperse the gas
clouds (which will rapidly ascend) and only
cold cutting gear should be used to cut
metal in order to release a casualty.
Where life is not threatened, allow the
CNG (or LNG) to disperse to atmosphere
while, if necessary, protecting the
surrounding area. When sufficient time
has elapsed for the gas to escape, approach
the vehicle again employing all the
precautions previously listed.
NB. After the incident the NGV should be inspect-
ed and made safe by a suitably competent person
before it is taken away.
(c) THE VEHICLE IS ALIGHT
A fire in an NGV may not be the result of a gas
leak. It could follow from a fault in the secondary
fuel system (if it is so fitted) or may have resulted
from the usual causes of fire in vehicles (arson,
electrical, carelessness etc). Whatever the cause,
any major fire in an NGV could result in the gas
cylinder/s being weakened by the heat before the
pressure release device/s (prd) have actuated and a
risk of explosion exists.
The standard advice that burning gas should not be
extinguished unless it directly threatens life
remains.
Set up initial 200m Hazard Zone.
Consider evacuation.
Assess the condition and location of any
casualties.
Use jet/sprays from a safe distance to cool
the cylinder/s. This may be difficult as they
are often shrouded by trim and bodywork.
Do not extinguish the burning gas. A flame
from an open pipe carrying CNG may be
several metres long.
Protect the surrounding risk and,
particularly, in the case of large vehicles,
any part of the vehicle not effected by fire.
IF IT IS SAFE TO DO SO, turn off the gas
cylinder/s. This action will not prevent the
prd from actuating and releasing CNG. The
flame from a prd vent pipe will be several
metres in length and should not be
extinguished.
Wear full firefighting clothing and
additionally, in the immediate vicinity of
the fire, breathing apparatus.
Consider the possible involvement of a
secondary fuel.
A thermal imaging camera may be able
to assist in providing an indication of the
relative temperature of the fuel cylinder/s.
Natural Gas Incidents 41
A Case Study
One of the first incidents of fire in a CNG powered vehicle in the UK
Just six minutes after a call to a "refuse truck
alight" two pumps arrived on a bright still after-
noon to find the front and centre of the lorry to be
well alight. Two jets one on either side of the truck
and a hose reel were used to attack the fire which
at this time was thought to involve a diesel pow-
ered vehicle.
Through the intense flame a Junior Officer spotted
a cylinder beneath the lower compartment and
close to the chassis, and he immediately informed
the Incident Commander, who moved the crews
away from what was thought to be a disused cylin-
der which had been collected by the bin men. The
Officer s suspicions were raised by the nature of
the flames which were strong, noisy and clean and
made him suspect that this was not a usual truck
fire. He noted more cylinders on the other side of
the lorry and at about that time he was approached
by a dustman who told him the vehicle was pow-
ered by CNG.
The Incident Commander maintained the jets, not
to extinguish the fire but to minimize the effects of
radiated heat and to protect the rear of the truck
which had been little affected by the flames.
42 Fire Service Manual
After about a further ten minutes the flames from
the cylinders (two banks one on either side) sub-
dued with the rapidity which later reports suggest-
ed they had appeared. A 'stop' message was sent
seventy five minutes after the initial call and not
surprisingly the incident was investigated by the
brigade and other interested parties.
It was established that the jets of flame issued from
the pressure release plug incorporated in each of
the eight cylinders, four on each side, carried by the
lorry. The cylinders were each of 80 litre capacity
and as the vehicle was approaching the end of its
working day would not have been full. It probably
took about fifteen minutes for them to empty.
The vehicle was extensively damaged at the front
and in the centre but the rear including the rubbish
compactor and the load was only slightly damaged
by fire.
Investigations have revealed the most likely cause
to be a failure in a hydraulic pipe which allowed
fluid at high pressure to escape. The resulting mist
may have been ignited by either a hot exhaust or a
spark.
Acetylene Cylinder Incidents

Appendices

1 Considerations for Incident Commander

(Gas cylinders heated or involved in fire)
2 Basic Risk Assessment
3 Some significant dates in the development of gas as a fuel
4 Glossary of Terms

Natural Gas Incidents 43

APPENDIX 1
Considerations for Incident Commander
(Gas cylinders heated or involved in fire)

Considerations for Incident Commander

Actions on arrival As the incident develops

Siting of appliances Appoint safety officers
Gather information to determine likelihood If possible apply cooling water
of cylinders being involved and heated Determine tactical mode, any firefighting
Assess potential risk in order to determine should be undertaken from behind
operational actions shielding
Operation of pressure release devices Use of ground monitors and/or lashed
Determine 200m hazard zone branches
Consider shielding Wetting test
Establish Inner Cordons When cylinder is cool reduce hazard zone
Consider evacuation

Key Actions

ACTION

Identify initial 200m hazard zone

Carry out Dynamic Risk Assessment within Type of structure

hazard zone Topography

Establish Cordons Public safety

Firefighter safety
Liaise with Police
Apply Water Accessibility of cylinder
Public safety
Firefighter safety.
Environmental impact
Operational restraints

Re-assess risk and reduce hazard Cylinder remains wetted

zone/cordons Cylinder leaking?
Contents burning off?
Shielding

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Natural Gas Incidents 45
APPENDIX 2
Basic Risk Assessment

Operational Activity Hazards dealing with incidents involving

natural gas cylinder(s)

Task Hazard/ Level Risk Control Measures

Risk of Risk Groups

Firefighting Death from catastrophic High All Pre-planning.

failure of cylinder.
11d information.
Projectile Hazards.
Intelligence Gathering i.e. liaison with
Secondary Projectiles. local authority planning depts etc.
Thermal Radiation.
Where information is not available
assess premise likelihood of cylinders
being present. Based on the nature
of processes.

Structural damage. High All Development Programme to identify

correct procedures to be followed during
incidences of structural damage

Signs and Symptoms.

Safe Areas.

Vehicle Marshalling.

Establishing Death from catastrophic High All Maintain hazard Zone.

hazard zone. failure of cylinder.
Evaluation of projectile travel distance
Projectile Hazards.
Secondary Projectiles. PPE.

Shielding.

Maintaining Assault on personnel. Med A Confrontation Management.

the cordon.
Police Attendance.

Public Campaigns led by local

authority.

Public injury. Med B, C Insufficient resources to undertake a

safe and expedient evacuation.

Provide information to public.

Use of premise owners building to act

as shielding in instances of potential
explosions e.g. Move occupiers to a
safer part of building with sufficient
distance between incident and them.

46 Fire Service Manual

Operational Activity Hazards dealing with incidents involving
natural gas cylinder(s)

Task Hazard/Risk Level Risk Control Measures

of Risk Groups

Applying Death from catastrophic High All Time.

cooling failure of cylinder.
Distance.
water.
Shielding.

Environmental damage. Med None Prohibit water run off from entering
watercourse.

Develop environmental impact

assessment programme.

Closing the Breakdown In Med B, C Establish clear lines of communication

incident. Communications. with all relevant agencies, within the
area of responsibility e.g. railway
companies, local government etc.

Risk Groups .

A Firefighters

B Non-Service

C Public

Natural Gas Incidents 47

APPENDIX 3
Some significant dates in the development of gas as a fuel

1272 Marco Polo observes natural gas burning in Baku near the Caspian Sea.

1659 Thomes Shirley observes natural gas emanating from a coal seam near
Wigan.

1684 John Clayton makes a "flammable gas" by carbonising coal.

1733 John Lowther extracts fire damp (methane) from a mine and burns it
continuously on the surface.

1780 The ninth Earl of Dundonald builds a tar oven to obtain tar from coal
and produces gas.

1799 Patent issued for the use of gas for heating and lighting.

1826 First telescopic gasholder erected in Leeds.

1844 Dry gas meter patented.

1850 Cooking by gas begins to attract public attention, James Sharp cooks
dinner for 120 people in Southampton.

1876 Compressed gas used to light railway carriages.

1917 An explosion in a munitions factory causes a nearby gasholder to

collapse. Eight million cubic feet of gas destroyed in a single flame.

1937 Substantial quantities of natural gas encountered in a trial bore at

Eskdale (Yorks).

1948 Gas Act passed: industry nationalised.

1959 First trial import of liquid natural gas from Louisiana.

1963 Regular shipments of LNG start to arrive from Algeria.

1969 National programme of conversion to natural gas started in

Burton-on-Trent.
First polyethylene pipes laid to distribute gas.

1976 Production of coal gas falls to negligible quantities.

1979 Conversion of nation to natural gas completed.

1986 Gas Act 1986 passed to introduce a new structure for the gas
industry in the private sector. British Gas plc floated on the stock
market.

1998 Interconnector to link the UK gas system with the European system
opened. The pipeline runs between Bacton (Norfolk) and Zeebrugge
(Belgium).

48 Fire Service Manual

APPENDIX 4
Glossary of Terms

Term Meaning

Ambient Surrounding

Bar A unit of pressure which is approximately equal to atmosphere

pressure (0.987 standard atmospheres).

Barg Shortened form of "bar gauge". A unit of pressure in a pipe when

measured relative to the pressure surrounding the pipe.

Baseload The permanent load on a power supply system

Calorific Value (CV) A measure of the ratio of energy to volume measured in Megajoules
per cubic metre (MJm3). For a gas this is expressed under standard
conditions of temperature and pressure.

Coal Gas Mixed gases extracted from coal and used for heating and lighting.
Last produced in the UK in any significant amount in 1976.

Combined Heat and The simultaneous generation of electricity and heat for use within
Power (CHP) buildings or processes by the recovery of heat used in the generation
process.

Closed Circuit Gas The generation of electricity utilising the power of the gas turbine and
Turbine (CCGT) steam made from its exhaust gases.

Cubic Metre (m3) The unit of volume approximately equal to 35.34 cubic feet.

Downstream In the direction of flow of a stream etc.

Fossil fuel A natural fuel such as coal or gas formed in the geological past from
the remains of living organisms.

Gasholder A vessel used to store gas for diurnal use.

Gas Processing Facility Any site which blends or purifies gas, removes from gas any of
its constituent gas or separates any oil or water and is situated at a
terminal which receives gas directly or indirectly from a gas
production facility.

Gas Production Facility A facility for the production of gas from strata or for the manufacture
of gas.

Interconnector A pipeline which transports gas for another country. The Irish
interconnectors takes gas from the UK to Ballylumford and
Dublin, the European to Zeebrugge (Belgium).

Interuptable Service A service which supplies gas at a lower price, but which can be shut
off by Transco at times of high demand.

Natural Gas Incidents 49

Kilowatt hour(kWh) The unit of energy used by the gas industry. Approximately equal
to 0.0341 therm.

Liquidfied Natural Gas Natural gas in its liquid state.

(LNG)

Local Distribution Zone A defined geographic area supplied by one or more NTS offtakes.
(LDZ) Consists of a LTS and Distribution system pipelines.

National Transmission A high pressure system consisting of terminals, compressor stations,

System (NTS) pipelines and offtakes. Operates at pressures up to 85 bar. NTS
pipelines take the gas from terminal to the NTS offtakes.

Offtake An installation defining the boundary between the NTS and LTS (or
very large consumer). The installation will include equipment for
metering pressure regulation etc.

Odourisation The addition of the distinctive odour given to natural gas to make the
detection of leaks simpler.

Public Gas Transporter A company licensed by OFGAS to transport gas to consumers.

(PGT) Transco is the largest PGT.

OFGAS The Office of Gas Supply. A non ministerial government department

and regulator of the UK onshore gas industry. It grants licences to
PGTs shippers etc.

Producer Operators who explore for gas (for the UK invariably in offshore
waters) and deliver the gas to gas processing facilities.

Shippers A company with a licence to buy gas from a producer and who sells it
to suppliers using a PGT to transport it to the customer.

Supplier A company with a Supplier's Licence contracts with a shipper to buy

gas which is then sold to the customer. A supplier may also be
licensed as a shipper.

Service Pipe A service pipe connects the distribution main to an individual premise
and terminates at the outlet of the emergency control valve (often
close to the meter). It is upstream of the installation pipework and
other fittings.

T.B.M. Tertiary butyl mercaptan - a sulphur based liquid used to give

natural gas its distinctive smell.

Telemetry The transmission of readings etc to a distant receiving set, station,

or control.

Therm The imperial unit of energy now largely replaced by the metric unit
the kilowatt hour (kWh). 1 therm equals 29.3071 kWh.

50 Fire Service Manual

Town Gas A manufactured gas for domestic and commercial use. Almost totally
replaced in the late 1970's by natural gas.

Watt The SI unit of power equivalent to 1 joule per second.

Watt-hour The energy used when one watt is applied for one hour.

Natural Gas Incidents 5 1

Natural Gas Incidents

Acknowledgements

HM Fire Service Inspectorate is indebted to all who helped with

the provision of information and expertise to assist the production
of this Manual, in particular:

Geof Cooper

Mark Wheeldon
Transco

Dr Norman D'Urso
British Gas Vehicle Fuels

SDO Graham Maltby

Kent Fire Brigade

Paul Fagan
Hannaford Forensic Ltd

Stephen Elliott
British Compressed Gases Association

Small Scale CHPs

Nedalo (UK) Ltd

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