TOS-POC-P&A-QA-003 - Rev.A Well Control Analysis

PROVISION OF ENGINEERING AND EXECUTION OF PLUGGING AND
ABANDONMENT OF DH-5X, DH-9X, DH-10X, DH-11X WELL AT DAI

HUNG FIELD, BLOCK 05-1A
CONTRACT No.: PVEP POC-DRL-2021-684
WELL CONTROL & POLICY MANUAL

FOR
PLUGGING & ABANDONMENT OF
SUBSEA PRODUCTION & SUSPENDED WELLS
Doc. Number: TOS-POC-P&A-QA-003
LT Truyen
A 28/06/21 TQ Khai 28/06/21 HB Cuong 28/06/21 LT Ha 30/06/21
Name Sign Date Name Sign Date Name Sign Date Name Sign Date
Version Date
Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by TOS Approval by PVEP-POC
WELL CONTROL & POLICY MANUAL FOR PLUGGING & ABANDONMENT
Page: 2 of 74
OF SUBSEA PRODUCTION & SUSPENDED WELLS
Revision: A
Doc. No.: TOS-POC-P&A-QA-003
REVISION RECORD SHEET
Date Revision No. Section Revision Description
28/06/2021 A All Issued for Review
Page 2 of 2
Well Control & Policy Manual
for
Plugging & Abandonment of Subsea Production and
Suspended Wells
Contents
SECTION 1 ............................................................................................................................................................. 7
1 WELL CONTROL POLICY ..................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Well Control Policy ............................................................................................................................. 7
1.1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1.2 Well Planning ................................................................................................................................................ 7
1.1.3 Training ........................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.1.4 Equipment ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.1.5 Well Operations ............................................................................................................................................ 8
1.1.6 Dispensation ................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2 Barrier Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2.2 Barrier Policy Statement ......................................................................................................................... 10
1.2.3 Primary, Secondary Barriers .................................................................................................................. 10
1.2.4 Barrier Integrity Requirements.............................................................................................................. 10
1.2.5 Confirmation of a Barrier........................................................................................................................ 11
1.2.6 Barrier Selection ....................................................................................................................................... 11
1.2.7 Barriers in General .................................................................................................................................... 12
1.2.8 Barriers in Relation to Operations........................................................................................................ 13
1.2.9 Examples of Barrier Elements ............................................................................................................... 14
1.2.10 Re-Establishing .......................................................................................................................................... 14
1.2.11 Pressure Testing ......................................................................................................................................... 15
1.2.12 Leak Acceptance........................................................................................................................................ 15
1.3. Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................................... 16
1.3.1 TOS Project Manager ............................................................................................................................... 16
1.3.2 Superintendent/ Vessel Master / OIM................................................................................................. 16
1.3.3 TOS Offshore Superintendent ............................................................................................................... 16
1.3.4 TOS Toolpusher ......................................................................................................................................... 17
1.3.5 TOS Well Operations Supervisor (Driller)........................................................................................ 17
1.3.6 Client Representative .............................................................................................................................. 17
1.3.7 TOS Project Engineer .............................................................................................................................. 18
1.3.8 Subsea Intervention Lubricator Supervisor ....................................................................................... 19
1.3.9 Wireline, Electric Line and Coiled Tubing and Supervisors ....................................................... 19
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SECTION 2 ........................................................................................................................................................... 20
2 PLANNING OPERATIONS ................................................................................................................... 20
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 20
2.2 Well Servicing Program ................................................................................................................... 20
2.3 Well Abandonment Program .......................................................................................................... 21
2.4 Equipment Specifications and Certification ............................................................................... 22
SECTION 3 ........................................................................................................................................................... 23
3 QUALITY & SAFETY ............................................................................................................................. 23
3.1 Quality Management ......................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.1 Project Quality Assurance ...................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.2 Marine Operations..................................................................................................................................... 23
3.2 Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 23
3.3 Change Control .................................................................................................................................. 23
3.3.1 Management of Change........................................................................................................................... 23
3.4 Project Safety Plan ............................................................................................................................. 24
3.4.1 Client Bridging Document I Emergency Preparedness ................................................................. 24
3.5 Safe Job Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 24
3.5.1 Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
3.5.2 Scope ............................................................................................................................................................. 24
3.5.3 Responsibility ............................................................................................................................................. 24
3.5.4 Procedure ..................................................................................................................................................... 24
SECTION 4 ........................................................................................................................................................... 27
4 WELL INTERVENTION WELL CONTROL................................................................................... 27
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 27
4.1.1 Equipment Failure ..................................................................................................................................... 27
4.1.2 Well Performance Problems .................................................................................................................. 27
4.2 Well Barrier Terminology ............................................................................................................... 28
4.2.1 Primary ......................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.2.2 Secondary..................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.2.3 Tertiary ......................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.2.4 Barrier Systems .......................................................................................................................................... 28
4.2.5 Table 1 -Closed Barrier Systems ......................................................................................................... 28
4.2.6 Table 2 - Closable Barrier Systems ..................................................................................................... 28
4.2.7 Table 3- Additional Barrier Systems.................................................................................................. 29
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4.3 Wireline Well Control....................................................................................................................... 29
4.3.1 Electric Braided Line ............................................................................................................................... 29
4.3.2 Solid Line ..................................................................................................................................................... 30
4.4 Procedure to Control Well ............................................................................................................... 30
4.4.1 Through Tree with Electric Line .......................................................................................................... 30
4.4.2 Through Tree with Slickline .................................................................................................................. 31
4.4.3 Through Tree Bull-heading .................................................................................................................... 31
4.4.4 Through Tree Circulating ....................................................................................................................... 34
4.4.5 Flowing Well to Host Platform ............................................................................................................. 35
SECTION 5 ........................................................................................................................................................... 37
5 PRIMARY WELL CONTROL .............................................................................................................. 37
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 37
5.2 Well Control Theory.......................................................................................................................... 37
5.2.1 Major Causes .............................................................................................................................................. 37
5.2.2 Normal Gradient ........................................................................................................................................ 37
5.2.3 Sub-normal Gradient ................................................................................................................................ 37
5.2.4 Abnormal Gradient ................................................................................................................................... 37
5.2.5 Influx Behaviour ........................................................................................................................................ 38
5.3 Causes of Loss of Well Control ..................................................................................................... 38
5.3.1 Insufficient Density................................................................................................................................... 38
5.3.2 Losses ............................................................................................................................................................ 38
5.3.3 Failure to fill Hole ..................................................................................................................................... 39
5.3.4 Swabbing...................................................................................................................................................... 39
5.4 Warning Signs ..................................................................................................................................... 39
5.4.1 Pit Level Increase ...................................................................................................................................... 39
5.4.2 Flow Rate ..................................................................................................................................................... 39
5.4.3 Pump Pressure ............................................................................................................................................ 39
SECTION 6 ........................................................................................................................................................... 40
6 SECONDARY WELL CONTROL ....................................................................................................... 40
6.1 lntroduction .......................................................................................................................................... 40
6.2 Procedures to Secure Well (Abandonment Operations) ......................................................... 40
6.2.1 Through Wellhead with Electric Line................................................................................................. 40
6.2.2 Through Wellhead with Slickline......................................................................................................... 42
6.2.3 Through Wellhead Bull-heading .......................................................................................................... 44
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SECTION 7 ........................................................................................................................................................... 47
7 WELL CONTROL METHODOLOGIES ........................................................................................... 47
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 47
7.2 Bull-heading......................................................................................................................................... 47
7.2.1 Considerations ............................................................................................................................................ 48
7.2.2 Procedures.................................................................................................................................................... 48
7.3 Volumetric Control ............................................................................................................................ 48
7.3.1 Static Volumetric Well Kill.................................................................................................................... 49
7.3.2 Lubrication .................................................................................................................................................. 51
7.4 Dynamic Well Control Methods .................................................................................................... 52
7.4.1 Drillers Method .......................................................................................................................................... 52
7.4.2 Wait and Weight Method ........................................................................................................................ 53
7.4.3 Reverse Circulate Well Kill ................................................................................................................... 54
7.4.4 Forward Circulation Well Kill .............................................................................................................. 55
SECTION 8 ........................................................................................................................................................... 56
8 TERTIARY WELL CONTROL- (SUPPORTS ABANDONMENTS} ..................................... 56
8.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 56
8.2 Underground Blowout ...................................................................................................................... 56
8.3 Barite Plug ............................................................................................................................................ 56
8.3.1 Mixing and Pumping ................................................................................................................................ 57
8.4 Cement Plug ......................................................................................................................................... 58
8.4.1 Cement Plugging ....................................................................................................................................... 58
SECTION 9 ........................................................................................................................................................... 59
9 WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT ......................................................................................................... 59
9.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 59
9.2 Description ........................................................................................................................................... 59
9.3 Specifications ...................................................................................................................................... 59
9.4 Emergency Disconnect Package .................................................................................................... 59
9.4.1 System Shutdown Level .......................................................................................................................... 60
9.5 Lower Riser Package ......................................................................................................................... 60
9.6 Well Control Package ....................................................................................................................... 60
9.7 Lubricator Section .............................................................................................................................. 61
9.8 Pressure Control Head ...................................................................................................................... 61
9.9 Testing Procedure Outline ............................................................................................................... 61
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9.10 Contingency Procedures Outline ............................................................................................... 62
SECTION 10 ......................................................................................................................................................... 64
10 EMERGENCY DRILL PROCEDURES ......................................................................................... 64
10.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 64
10.2 Emergency Disconnect Procedure ............................................................................................ 64
10.2.1 Emergency Disconnect- Subsea Wireline.......................................................................................... 64
10.2.2 Emergency Disconnect- Coiled Tubing ............................................................................................. 65
10.2.3 UWG Emergency Disconnect Procedure........................................................................................... 66
10.3 Well Control Drills ........................................................................................................................ 67
10.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 67
10.3.2 Wireline in Cased Hole.................................................................................................................................. 68
10.3.3 Pumping in Cased Hole ........................................................................................................................... 68
10.3.4 Trip Drill ...................................................................................................................................................... 68
10.3.5 Coiled Tubing Pumping .......................................................................................................................... 69
SECTION 11 ......................................................................................................................................................... 70
11 SPECIAL SITUATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 70
11.1 Hydrates ............................................................................................................................................ 70
11.1.1 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................... 70
11.2 Carbon Dioxide (C02) .................................................................................................................. 70
11.3 Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) ........................................................................................................... 71
SECTION 12 ......................................................................................................................................................... 72
12 ENCLOSURES ....................................................................................................................................... 72
12.1 Abandonment Operations SIL I LRA (No Coiled Tubing) ............................................... 72
12.2 Well Service Operations- SIL. ................................................................................................... 72
12.3 Subsea Tree Removal .................................................................................................................. 73
12.4 Well Service Operations - Riser ............................................................................................... 73
12.5 Well Abandonment Operations - Riser.................................................................................... 74
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SECTION 1
1 WELL CONTROL POLICY
1.1 Well Control Policy
1.1.1 Introduction
This section sets out the Well Control Policy and responsibilities which must be
implemented and adhered to in all operations involving well control on TOS operations.
TOS is fully committed to the provision of a safe working environment. The Company's
aim, goals and objectives in this respect are documented in its Health, Safety and
Environmental Policy. Of a paramount importance in achieving these goals is a thorough
understanding of and adherence to TOS Policies and Procedures.
The policies will be reviewed at the well operations planning phase in conjunction with the
current Regulatory Requirements and those of the Operator to ensure consistency.
In the event that the Client agrees to utilize the Policies and Procedures set out in this
manual, then the Confirmation of Acceptance Proforma contained must be completed and
transmitted to the TOS Operations Manager prior to mobilization of the project.
On TOS operated vessels it is the responsibility of the Offshore Superintendent to ensure
the implementation of these Policies and Procedures. It is the responsibility of the Director
to ensure the implementation of these Policies and Procedures Onshore during the
preparation of projects.
The following TOS Well Control Policy requirements set out in this document must be
regarded as the Company's minimum standards and shall not be varied without obtaining
written authorisation from the TOS Director.
If the Client's Well Control Policy is of a comparable standard and is adopted for use during
the project this must be clearly stated in the Project Specific Well Operations Manual and
a copy of the Policy must be attached as an Appendix.
1.1.2 Well Planning
• All Well Operations will be planned and implemented in accordance with TOS Barrier
Policy with two (2) independent and tested well barriers between the reservoir and the
surrounding environment unless dispensation to deviate from this policy has been
granted at the planning stage.
• The Client's well information will be reviewed with particular attention to:
o Client equipment specification and condition
o Maximum anticipated temperature and pressure
o Sour service requirement
o Quality of existing elements in place
o Location and nature of existing and proposed permanent barriers
• All Well Control Equipment will be certified fit for intended purpose.
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1.1.3 Training
• All Well Operations personnel will be familiar with the TOS Well Control Policy and
Barrier policies.
• Well control drills will be conducted as frequently as required to ensure that all
personnel are familiar with their respective duties. The minimum frequency for
applicable drills is weekly.
1.1.4 Equipment
During abandonment operations there will be an accurate system of surface volume
measurement with a remote readout, which will be supplemented by a manual level
indicator.
• A range of calibrated gauges will be installed in such locations as to ensure accurate
pressure readings over an anticipated range of pressures.
• All Subsea Intervention Lubricator rams will be fitted with an Autolock facility.
• The Subsea Intervention Lubricator will be configured with a minimum of 2 fail-safe
mechanisms of closure for all planned well operations, including an emergency
disconnect with coiled tubing.
• The Subsea Intervention Lubricator mounted accumulator will have sufficient
volumetric capacity (when compensated for water depth) to provide usable fluid to
close all “fail- safe close" functions with 100% designed excess capacity, without
assistance from the surface control system.
• The Subsea Intervention Lubricator surface accumulator system will have sufficient
volumetric capacity to provide usable fluid to close and open all lubricator hydraulic
functions with 50% designed excess capacity, without assistance from the charging
system.
• An accumulator test will be conducted after each reconfiguration of the Subsea
Intervention Lubricator system.
• The Subsea Intervention Lubricator will be configured to accommodate any planned
wireline tool-string above a double barrier.
• A minimum of one complete re-dress kit for all WOM Subsea Intervention Lubricator
rams and valves will be held on the vessel always.
1.1.5 Well Operations
• High pressure Subsea Christmas Tree caps will not be removed until it has been
confirmed that there are two closed and tested barriers in place and there is no trapped
pressure below the cap.
• When conducting well operations, both tubing and where practicable, annulus pressure
will be monitored.
• The Intervention system will be function and pressure tested on installation or on
removal or installation of components. Equipment will be function and pressure tested
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every 14 days. Test pressure will be initially at rated working pressure and thereafter
at maximum anticipated.
• A current wellhead stack-up diagram showing distances from datum to all closure
valves and BOP's will be posted on the Hydraulic Control Panel and in the Well
Operations Supervisor's Control Cabin. Additionally, current valve status should be
illustrated at these locations.
• When conducting operations requiring a hydrostatic barrier.
• The well will be circulated and monitored on a surface tank during wireline and
pumping operations
• Flow checks will be made prior to running in and pulling tubulars out of the hole
• A full opening safety valve with appropriate crossovers and circulating head will be
readily available in the derrick area during tubular operations. It will be installed
during interruptions in trips and prior to pumping operations
• In the event of uncontrolled losses, the hole will be filled with sea water and the
volume recorded. A cement plug should be the primary Lost Circulation Material for
TOS operations.
• The planned method of well kill should be bull-heading.
• When a well kill fluid is required,100% excess over calculated hole volume will be
readily available on the vessel.
• Volumes pumped and returned from the well will be continuously monitored during
all operations.
• The local weather conditions will be monitored and logged with 12 hourly location
forecasts being obtained to determine if any critical weather conditions are imminent.
1.1.6 Dispensation
Any Well Operation, which cannot meet TOS Well Control Policy, will require approval
of the TOS Director. If he is unavailable, the next highest level of authority will be
obtained.
In the event that a dispensation is required during the work offshore a Management of
Change will be raised and sent to TOS for the attention of the Director. Client may
countersign this request if so required.
1.2 Barrier Policy
1.2.1 Introduction
This Barrier Policy, as follows, is to be implemented and adhered to will respect to all Well
Operations on TOS vessel(s). The Policy will be reviewed at the Well Operations planning
phase in conjunction with current regulatory requirements and those of the Operator to
ensure that they are consistent.
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1.2.2 Barrier Policy Statement
During Well Operations at least two independent and tested barriers shall be available in
order to prevent an unintentional flow from the well.
The barriers shall be designed so as to enable rapid re-establishment of a lost barrier.
In the event of barrier failure immediate measures shall be taken in order to maintain an
adequate safety level, until the availability of at least two independent and tested barriers
has been restored. No activities for any other purpose than re-establishing these barriers
shall be carried out in the well.
The barriers shall be defined and criteria for failure shall be determined. The position status
of the barriers shall be known at all times.
The Operator shall stipulate requirements to accessibility for the different barriers and shall
be able to provide documentation to show that the requirements have been complied with.
1.2.3 Primary, Secondary Barriers
Barrier elements that make up the Primary Barrier are those elements, which are or might
be in direct contact with well pressure during normal operation. These elements provide
the initial and inner envelope preventing unintentional flow of reservoir fluid to surface or
another zone.
Barrier elements that make up the Secondary Barrier are those elements, which are or
might be exposed to contact with well pressure should any of the elements described as
Primary Barrier element fail. These elements provide an envelope outside the Primary
Barrier envelope providing a second barrier preventing unintentional flow of reservoir
fluid to surface or another zone.
1.2.4 Barrier Integrity Requirements
• Individual barriers which are normally open shall be regularly tested in accordance
with the operator I vendor testing procedures prior to operations commencing.
• Barriers which are normally closed shall be tested at the time of installation to confirm
that they are correctly positioned.
• First and second barriers installed to facilitate the removal of a Christmas Tree or BOP
shall have been tested and confirmed as leak tight.
• Testing of a barrier should be in the direction of anticipated flow.
• Where testing in the direction of anticipated flow is not possible, consideration shall
be given to supplementing the barrier with additional measures to enhance the
reliability of the barrier.
• In addition to the allowable leak rate specified for testing of individual valves, a
Christmas Tree shall always have at least one in line valve which has been tested as
leak tight.
• A SSSV in normal production operations is considered acceptable up to a specified
allowable leak rate. For use as a barrier during any intervention work the SSSV shall
require having been tested and found to be leak tight.
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Equipment acting as a barrier should be designed, pressure tested and certified suitable to
operate under the anticipated worst case well conditions.
Shearing devices, (Wireline Cutting Gate Valves, Blind Rams and Shear Rams), will not
be tested in cutting mode as to do so may impair their subsequent performance. However,
their suppliers will provide the relevant documentation to show that the equipment is fit
for purpose with the closing device provided. This documentation will be included within
the project documentation and available on the vessel.
To constitute a barrier equipment must be remote operating, (remotely operated from panel
on vessel), and fail-safe close.
1.2.5 Confirmation of a Barrier
The integrity of a Barrier will be confirmed by one of the following methods: Hydrostatic
Barrier
A fluid will only be accepted as a barrier when it is of sufficient density and vertical height
to exceed reservoir pressure and can be monitored and maintained. Loss of required density
or column height will be treated as a loss of barrier integrity. In the situation of a sub-
hydrostatic well often the fluid column cannot be monitored. In this case the following
must be adhered to:
• This must be identified during project planning with dispensation granted at this time
in the project.
• Bore pressure is to be monitored over an extended period prior to accessing the well
and that one accepted and tested mechanical barrier is in place. The extended period
will be detailed within the projects documentation. Adherence to these criteria will
satisfy the requirement for environmental barriers and allow the work-scope to
proceed. If however, divers are required to be in the vicinity of a sub-hydrostatic well
the two barrier policy will apply unless dispensation is granted.
Mechanical Barrier
Closed Barrier:
A closed barrier is accepted as a barrier when it has been successfully pressure tested after
installation.
Open Barrier:
A normally open barrier is accepted as a barrier after it has been successfully pressure
tested in the closed position.
1.2.6 Barrier Selection
For the purposes of Barrier selection work undertaken by TOS Subsea will be divided into
3 Basic Categories.
Removal of Suspended Wells
Under these circumstances TOS Subsea are responsible for removing a wellhead, which
has been suspended in accordance with local Regulatory and Operators Guidelines. In this
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case the well is considered safe for re-entry without the requirement of additional BOP
equipment and the wellhead can be removed without any need of intervention.
Wellhead Operations
For wellhead operations planned directly into a wellhead with no subsea Christmas Tree
in place a minimum of two mechanical barriers are required, with the aid of a hydrostatic
barrier for certain aspects of the program. A single barrier may be acceptable if it is
confirmed that there is no pressure behind a casing already perforated.
If a SIL is to be used, the barriers will normally be provided by a Lower Riser Assembly
package positioned between the SIL and the wellhead connector. The LRA will then allow
the safe removal of the SIL in the event that the operation reaches a point at which the
vessel cannot continue the actual program and additional engineering is required.
An alternative system consists of a twin inflatable packer assembly which is inserted
directly into the wellhead.
Two mechanical barriers are in place and tested before perforation of a casing string with
unknown pressures. Only one barrier is in place for subsequent perforation of the casing
with zero pressure.
On mudline wells where the annulus is in communication with the sea there is no
requirement for a well control barrier. The packers are only required to force a circulation
path through the ·lower perforations for cement placement.
Well Intervention
All interventions into a Subsea well with a Subsea Christmas Tree installed will be classed
as "live" intervention and will comply to the two-mechanical barrier policy whenever
possible.
Wireline Operations
In the case of well intervention, production logging, perforation etc. two mechanical
barriers are required at all times.
Subsea Christmas Tree/ Subsea Lubricator Removal
In the case of the Subsea Christmas Tree/Subsea Lubricator being removed from the
wellhead, where practicable the barriers will be of the closed mechanical type, examples
being, wireline plugs, bridge plugs, cement plugs etc.
1.2.7 Barriers in General
The term 'Barrier' means one or several independent barrier elements. For example, the
various valves of a Blowout Preventer or a Christmas Tree will be barrier elements which,
together with the anchorage, (including wellhead, casing and cement), constitute a barrier.
In the case of a well with drilling in process the following barrier status will normally exist:
• A barrier consisting of a homogenous fluid column in hydrostatic overbalance in
relation to the pore pressure.
• A barrier consisting of a cemented casing, wellhead, pipe ram, annular preventer and
drill string with a kelly valve, check valve.
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In the case of a production well, correspondingly a normal barrier status will be:
• A barrier consisting of a cemented casing packer production tubing and SCSSV.
• A barrier consisting of a cemented casing, wellhead and Christmas Tree with valves.
The barrier requirement is to be understood as a requirement related to activities where
pressure differentials exist that may cause unintentional outflow from the well.
Cement mixtures intended for anchorage of casings and settings of plugs which constitute
a barrier element shall have such composition that the reduction of strength over time does
not entail operational or safety related problems. This will normally mean adding a material
containing silicate.
In order that a cemented casing shall constitute a barrier element the quality and height of
cement behind the casing shall be documented e.g. by means of a cement bond log or a
temperature log evaluation of return during cementing or pressure testing. Cement plugs
and packers must likewise be verified to see that they are in place and that they will support
the required pressure.
In the case of two or more barriers in connection with the same source of outflow the
barriers should in principle be completely independent of each other without barrier
elements in common. In those cases where a degree of dependence exists, procedures shall
be established to implement compensating measures. Corresponding compensating
measures may lie in limitations in operative procedures.
With regard to implementation of operations which complicate the requirement of two
tested barriers, (e.g. snubbing), efforts shall be made to ensure that compensating measures
shall be implemented to avoid a reduction of the overall safety level. It furthermore follows
that the accessibility of the barrier is weighted against the requirement for restrictions in
operative procedures.
It follows from the provision that the following requirements are to be complied with:
• It must be possible to activate the barriers independently of each other and in such a
way that system failure or individual accidents cannot simultaneously eliminate the
barriers.
• It must be possible to activate the barrier elements one by one, but in such a way that
the total barrier integrity is ensured the well is secured and the barriers remain intact
for a period of time sufficient to regain complete well control.
Furthermore, it follows from the regulations that it is not permitted to carry out an
intentional influx of formation fluid in order to release a jammed drill-string if the drilling
fluid constitutes one out of two barriers.
1.2.8 Barriers in Relation to Operations
Requirements to barriers are applicable to all types of operations where unintentional
outflow may occur, exemplified by, but not limited to:
• Drilling
• Wireline, coil tubing or snubbing unit operations
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• Pulling / installation of well equipment
• Production / injection / stimulation
• Well testing
• Diving operations
1.2.9 Examples of Barrier Elements
Examples of recognised barrier elements are:
• BOP arrangement
• Christmas Tree arrangement
• Casings
• Production tubing
• Drilling fluid / completion fluid
• Cement plugs
• Production packers
• Mechanically / hydraulically operated plugs
• Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety Valve (SCSSV)
• Lubricators
• BOP system of coil tubing / snubbing unit
• Casing, Production tubing system including hang-off and seal assemblies
Although the essential point is not the distance between the barriers, but their independence
of each other. Maximum independence will often be achieved by ensuring a maximum
distance between the barriers.
Certain individual parts of a barrier element e.g. circulation valves in production tubing,
represent a part of the production tubing integrity and are consequently required to comply
with the requirements applicable to production tubing as barrier elements.
Furthermore, it follows from the barrier requirements that if the annulus is to be used for
gas lifting, an annular barrier element is to be installed, unless the gas lift valves can be
qualified as a tested barrier element. In addition, it should be considered whether an annular
barrier element is required as barrier against unintentional flow of gas from the annulus.
1.2.10 Re-Establishing
It is the intention of the Regulations that barriers should be designed so as to make it
possible to re-establish a lost barrier. A logical sequence in the event of a barrier failure
will be:
• Implement compensative measures
• Re-establish the barrier that has failed
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With regard to a fluid barrier this will mean that the installation must be equipped with an
independent power source to enable the fluid to be mixed and circulated in order to
maintain, re-establish complete well control in a situation where a well barrier is lost and
the ordinary power source has failed.
Recognised standard for equipment in order to comply with the requirement to circulation
of drilling fluid requires that the drilling fluid pumps of the installation can be supplied
from at least two independent power sources, e.g. from an independent generator, diesel
driven pump, cement pump with a sufficient working pressure and volume capacity for
circulation of drilling fluid.
An arrangement with a divided engine room may in this connection be considered to fulfil
the intentions of the guide-lines. Any damage, failure of power supply from one engine
room must be able to be compensated by power supply from the other. Both engine rooms
will then be regarded as a normal power source.
When a feeding pump for the mud pumps is required, this must also be independent of the
ordinary power supply of the installation.
1.2.11 Pressure Testing
Where practicable to do so, at least one of the barrier tests will take the form of a positive
test, in the direction of flow, or a negative test by reducing the pressure upstream of
the barrier. In either case, these must be no flow or loss of pressure for the duration of the
test. A subsequent flow or loss of pressure across the device will be treated as a loss of
barrier integrity.
When the Subsea Intervention Lubricator is configured with barrier devices below the side
outlets, these must be pressure tested in the direction of flow, on a test stump prior to
Subsea installation. Subsequent tests from above will be acceptable.
Closed barriers will be tested on installation and will not normally be re-tested unless
disturbed or abnormal conditions dictate otherwise (indications of wear, excessive
applied pressure etc.). Failure to pressure test a closed barrier will be treated as a loss of
barrier integrity.
The magnitude of required pressure tests will be well specific and will be stated in the Well
Operations Program.
Deviation for this will only come about if stated in Well Operations Procedures as per
Client's pressure testing criteria.
1.2.12 Leak Acceptance
The leakage criteria which has been set for acceptance of valves in normal service as
per API 14B and 14H:
Type of Test Leakage Criteria Test Vol.

Low Pressure Leakage Test (typically 20 bar / 5 mins) Less than 5% Any
High Pressure Leakage test (typically 345 bar / 10 mins) Less than 1.5%
mins)Pressure Leakage test (typically 345 bar / 10 mins)
High Less than 0.5%
1.2.13 Down Hole Safety Valve
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All inflow/negative testing of DHSV shall be performed with a reference pressure of 10
bar above DHSV, i.e. the differential pressure across DHSV equals (SIWHP -10 bar) in a
live well.
The void exposed to reference pressure shall be kept as small as practically possible.
Inflow/negative testing for lubricator purposes and inflow/negative test for final well
handover purposes will be conducted at SIWHP -10 bar for 30 minutes.
1.3. Roles and Responsibilities
The following sections deals with the Roles and Responsibilities of TOS Subsea and
third-party personnel involved in operations onboard a TOS Subsea vessel.
1.3.1 TOS Project Manager
Line management responsibility for TOS Well Operations and prime approval authority
for dispensation request during TOS Well Operations.
1.3.2 Superintendent/ Vessel Master / OIM
The Master is responsible for the safety of the vessel and for the safety, health and welfare
of all persons onboard including the LWI team.
The Master of any vessel is ultimately responsible for operations on his vessel including
Light Well Intervention and ROV work-scopes but he should not become involved in
their detailed management. He has a responsibility to ensure that they are carried out
safely taking into account all of the circumstances and if he has any doubt in this regard
he should, after consulting the TOS Superintendent and Client Representative order the
suspension of the operation.
At all times he should liaise closely with the TOS Superintendent, Client's Representative
and ROV Superintendent.
The Master of a dynamically positioned vessel has additional practical and technical
responsibilities. In particular, he should meet the minimum recommended standards
described in guide lines for the specification and operation of dynamically positioned
vessels.
A Master has the authority to veto the start or order the termination of a Well
Intervention operation through the TOS Superintendent, but he does not have the authority
to order the start or continuation of a Light Well Intervention operation contrary to the
judgement of the TOS Superintendent.
1.3.3 TOS Offshore Superintendent
The Offshore Superintendent's duties and responsibilities extend to all aspects of the
operation and safety of the wellhead equipment including the third-party operations for
which he is responsible and being fully aware of the work being undertaken.
He will liaise with the vessel's Master regarding safety, personnel and vessel
operations. He is responsible for coordinating all operational aspects of the subsea
operation to ensure safe and effective conclusion of all wire line and well servicing
operations.
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He will be conversant with and comply with all statutory requirements pertaining to
wellhead entry and wire line operations.
The Offshore Superintendent will liaise with the Client's Representative regarding the
schedule of work and with other client specialists or third-party personnel who may have
input with respect to their area of expertise.
He will liaise with the TOS Project Manager onshore on a regular basis highlighting issues
and forward plans
1.3.4 TOS Toolpusher
The TOS Subsea Toolpushers will liaise with the Offshore Superintendent in the daily
planning meetings.
Instruct the Well Operations Supervisor (Driller) in the execution of the activities in order
to ensure the activities are carried out in accordance to the client's program and in a safe
and efficient manner.
He also will be conversant with and comply with all statutory requirements
pertaining to wellhead entry and wire line operations.
He will work closely with the TOS Project Engineer ensuring all paperwork and
documentation is in place and up to date.
He will liaise with the ROV Superintendent, Supervisor and Sub Sea Intervention System
Supervisor regarding personnel, safety and operations
1.3.5 TOS Well Operations Supervisor (Driller)
The TOS Subsea Well Operations Supervisor / Driller is responsible for the overall
supervision of operations in the well operations areas onboard CSO vessels, including third
parties involved in well operations.
He will be conversant with all statutory requirements relating to Well Control, and well
intervention. All personnel involved directly or indirectly with well operations will
conform to the instructions issued by the TOS Subsea Well Operations Supervisor on
behalf of the CAV Toolpusher.
He will be conversant with TOS Well Control & Barrier Policies, and Procedures and
Bridging Policies which are in effect.
He will liaise with ROV Supervisor and the Bridge with regards to ongoing operations.
He will be conversant with the Well Operations Program and he will ensure the TOS
Toolpusher is fully informed of all Operational matters.
1.3.6 Client Representative
The Clients Representative may request the start of downhole operations, but the final
decision for allowing operations to start rests with the TOS Superintendent in consultation
with the OIM / Master.
He will be responsible for ensuring that the Well Operations Program addresses the work-
scope as defined by the Client.
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He will be responsible for ensuring that the Clients wellhead equipment and control system
are operated to the client's specification.
He will be responsible for maintaining communications with the clients offshore
representative and the clients shore-based operations management.
He will accept responsibility for the well on "handover" from Client Asset, and will
"handover'' the well back to the Client’s Asset in the same safe condition it was accepted
in.
He will have the necessary authority (which does not supersede nor restrict the Master in
his duties and responsibilities for the Health, Welfare and Safety of persons in that
operation or on the Installation) to issue instruction to TOS Superintendent or the Master,
as may be necessary for the proper execution of the services.
He will have the authority to terminate any operation, when to do so will not compromise
safety.
1.3.7 TOS Project Engineer
It may be the case - particularly in a program of considerable length - that TOS will utilise
a Project Engineer to assist in the operations. He will work in conjunction with the TOS
Subsea Superintendent, Toolpusher and Well Operations Supervisor. His duties will
include:
• Initiating and procedural changes and be responsible for seeing that any changes
have been fully reviewed and revised before issuing for use.
• Initiate a 24 hour look ahead plan which will have prior approval from the Offshore
Superintendent and Client Representative.
• Responsibility for ensuring all third party equipment has their equipment in good
working order and properly certified.
• During mobilizations he will liaise closely with third party supervisors ensuring their
equipment is accounted for, certified and positioned.
• He shall be conversant and comply with well control requirements.
• During mobilization, he shall be responsible, along with the crane operator, for
ensuring that the Bridge are aware of all load weights and dimensions, number of
lifts and advise of any hazardous materials which are required for operation.
• He, along with the deck supervisor, lead rigger will be responsible for ensuring
the deck load out is followed during mobilizations.
• He will ensure that all sea fastenings are carried out correctly prior to final inspection
by vessel Master.
• He is responsible that all relevant parties are issued with a copy of the program and
procedures.
• He shall liaise with ROV control, Intervention System Supervisor and Bridge as
operations dictate.
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1.3.8 Subsea Intervention Lubricator Supervisor
Although a third party Supervisor, the roles and responsibilities of the SIL Supervisor are
paramount to the success of the operation. His responsibilities include:
• Liaise with TOS Subsea Superintendent, Toolpusher, Project Engineer and Well
Operations Supervisor about equipment status and conditions of all equipment within
his area of authority.
• Work closely with Well Operations Supervisor and rigging crew in the running,
retrieving of intervention system.
• Ensuring all equipment is 'fit for purpose' and tested prior to running.
• Ensuring all certifications are valid prior to project commencement.
• Ensure all testing reports and charts are correctly marked up.
• Conduct regular testing of all subsea equipment as regulations required.
1.3.9 Wireline, Electric Line and Coiled Tubing and Supervisors
They will be responsible for and ensuring that all equipment needed to perform the work-
scope onboard the vessel has been mobilised prior to vessel departure.
They will ensure that equipment is fully certified and that all certifications are given to
TOS Toolpusher / Project Engineer.
They will report to the TOS Toolpusher and Project Engineer for all operational matters
and ensure that they are fully informed of all operations.
They will work with the TOS Well Operations Supervisor to ensure correct deployment,
installation, testing and recovery of all equipment.
They will ensure that all tool-strings run in the hole will have accurate dimensions taken
and logged.
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SECTION 2
2 PLANNING OPERATIONS
The procedures in this Well Control manual are to be used as a reference for Well Control.
It is not intended to be a rule book for all circumstances. It should not override sound
judgement based on detailed knowledge of well control.
2.1 Introduction
Due to the variety of Clients Operations, each Well Operations Program must be
thoroughly researched and prepared to ensure that the correct equipment and procedures
are sent to the vessel to facilitate a safe and efficient operation. The TOS Subsea Well
Control & Barrier Policies and the procedures which follow should assist in that process.
It is the responsibility of the TOS Subsea Superintendent, in conjunction with the
Toolpushers and Project Engineers to ensure that the Offshore Well Operations personnel,
are familiar with TOS Subsea Well Control Policies & Procedures to guide in the Planning
and implementation of Well Operations Programs.
All Well Operations will be planned and implemented in accordance with TOS Subsea
Barrier Policy with two independent and tested subsea barriers between the reservoir and
the surrounding environment, (unless dispensation to deviate from this policy has been
granted at the planning stage.
The Clients well information will be reviewed with particular attention to:
• Client equipment specification and condition
• Maximum anticipated pressure and temperature
• Sour service requirement
• Quality of existing elements in place
• Location and nature of existing and proposed permanent barriers
All Well Control equipment will be certified fit for intended purpose.
2.2 Well Servicing Program
The clients Well Servicing Program for well intervention forms the basis of TOS Subsea
Well Operations Program and should be reviewed to ensure that all necessary information
is provided, and to confirm the accuracy of the information presented. i.e. are the
shut-in pressures correct, depths correlate to logs.
Can the work be carried out safely in accordance with current governmental regulations
and TOS Subsea Well Control & Barrier Policies. This review should include, but not be
limited to:
o Well identification
o Well co-ordinates UTM's if available (Universal Transverse Mercator)
o Water depth
o Maximum anticipated FTHP, SITHP, THT
o Completion schematic
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o Tubular weights and grades
o Measured and true vertical depths
o Perforated intervals
o Location and status of any plugs
o Annulus fluid
o Gas lift status, if any
o Packer depth
o Production tubing restrictions
o Annulus tubing restrictions
o 9-5/8" shoe
o Gauge mandrel depth
o Height of subsea structures
o Depth and pressures (TVD and MD) of permeable zones
o Third parties in area, operational i.e. a drilling rig working near location
o Platform activities that may cause interference i.e. radio silence
o Prevention intervention in well to be worked on
o Tree manufacturer, type pressure rating, schematic, control fluid
o Tree valves to be controlled
o Gas Oil Ratio, (GOR). Hydrate potential. H 2S content
o Previous logs
o Information from previous interventions in adjacent wells.
The Client's Well Operations Program should, where applicable, address all the above in
addition to:
• SIL configuration for program
• Surface equipment requirements
• Third parties required
• Kill fluid requirements
• HAZOP
• Change Control (Reference 3.3)
2.3 Well Abandonment Program
The Well Abandonment Program developed by should be reviewed to ensure that all
necessary information is provided, and to confirm the accuracy of the information
presented.
For Example:
• Original suspension carried out correctly?
• Are the cement tops actual or calculated?
• What is the confidence level of quoted reservoir pressures etc.?
• Can the work be carried out safely in accordance with current governmental
regulations and TOS Subsea Well Control & Barrier Policies.
This review should include but not be limited to:
o Well identification
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o Well co-ordinates, including UTM's if available
o Water depth
o Maximum anticipated formation pressure
o Casing weights and grades
o Well suspension schematic
o Measured depth and true vertical depth
o Perforated intervals
o Location and status of any plugs
o Annulus fluid
o Depth and pressures (TVD and MD) of permeable zones
o Third parties in area operational i.e. a drilling rig working near location
Platform activities that may cause interference i.e. radio silence.
• Wellhead manufacture, type, pressure rating.
• Corrosion Cap type
• Well history, casing cement jobs, annular cement tops
• Fracture gradients and leak-off test results
• MASP
• MAASP
• Height of subsea structures
The Well Operations Abandonment program should where applicable, address all of the
above in addition to:
• SIL configuration for program
• Surface equipment requirements
• Third parties required
• Kill fluid requirements
• Weight of stack-up
• Deployment reeving
• HAZOP
• Change Control
2.4 Equipment Specifications and Certification
The Well Control Equipment onboard the vessel must comply with Governmental
Regulations and TOS Well Control and Barrier Policies.
All equipment must have current certification of fitness for intended purpose, such that
the system as a whole is "Fit for Intended Purpose".
The TOS Subsea Onshore Manager must ensure that all equipment is certified, and that
he is in possession of a certification package from a recognized Certifying Authority
prior to mobilization to the vessel. This certification package will be handed over the TOS
Project Engineer for confirmation.
When specifying Well Operations specific equipment the Onshore Manager in conjunction
with the Client, must ensure that all necessary information is provided to the third
party and Certifying Authority to ensure that the certification is correct.
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SECTION 3
3 QUALITY & SAFETY
3.1 Quality Management
3.1.1 Project Quality Assurance
Where there is a requirement for Project Quality Plans and Inspection and Test Plans, the
preparation and control shall be carried out under the guidance of TOS Subsea Quality
Assurance Department.
3.1.2 Marine Operations
Management Controls of Marine Operations shall be carried out in accordance with
appropriate Marine Management System.
3.2 Risk Management
The Project Team engaged in well servicing operations shall identify, assess and document
all hazards associated with the work and for those hazards which cannot be eliminated,
shall ensure that such residual risks are kept as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
over the full project-life cycle.
In addition, the Project Team may utilize any of the following methods in the pursuit of
ALARP. The list is not exhaustive:
• References to safe practices and procedures
• Record and investigating accident, incident and near miss occurrences
• Comparison of performance with declared targets (where applicable)
• Risk sensitivity to modifications
• Cost benefit analysis
The Project Manager shall be responsible for ensuring that records of all risk assessment
activities are maintained.
3.3 Change Control
3.3.1 Management of Change
Change is constructive. It can lead to enhanced safety, more motivated personnel,
improved products and services and ultimately benefits both Client and Contractor.
However, change entails risk.
Approved Project Procedures will be in place at each worksite. Any changes to Approved
Project Procedures shall be assessed by the Project Engineer in conjunction with TOS
Subsea Superintendent and Safety Representative to establish the safety impact. Any
additional risks identified shall be notified to the Onshore Project Manager, TOS Subsea
Safety Department and the Client Project Manager. A nil return form shall be submitted
by the Project Engineer where no safety impact/additional risk have been identified. All
findings and assessments will be included on the agenda or HS&E committee
meetings.
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The Project Team shall manage all changes effectively and ensure that all changes at the
worksite during operations are assessed and agreed with the Clients.
Safety Critical Project Procedures will be identified and will be clearly noted with a
'Change Control Trigger' to state that any significant departure from the approved
procedures must be promptly notified to the TOS Subsea Project Manager, Superintendent
and Client Representative including how any new risks identified are to be controlled and
reduced to ALARP.
3.4 Project Safety Plan
The Project Manager shall ensure that a project specific Health, Safety and Environmental
plan is developed and issued for each project in connection with well servicing
operations. As a minimum the HSE plan must address the following:
• Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. above.
• Control of PTW interfaces on the vessel and with Client installations.
• Control of isolation interfaces on the vessel and with Client installations.
• Well hand over procedures.
3.4.1 Client Bridging Document I Emergency Preparedness
The Project Manager, in conjunction with the Client, shall ensure that the appropriate
'bridging documentation' is produced in accordance with current guidelines.
Where SMS 'bridging arrangements' are well established with existing Clients, it will
normally only be necessary to address and document the emergency preparedness
requirements.
3.5 Safe Job Analysis
3.5.1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide a procedure for conducting a Safe Job
Analysis (SJA) of offshore operations. Such a procedure ensures that each non-standard
task undertaken offshore has been evaluated with regard to safety, prior to
commencement of the operation. Where necessary, risk reducing measures are considered
and incorporated in the execution of the operation.
3.5.2 Scope
The procedure applies to all unplanned operations that may be required offshore and
which, therefore, have not been subjected to a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP).
Refer to Figure 2.
3.5.3 Responsibility
It is the responsibility of the Offshore Superintendent to identify activities that may
require a SJA and to ensure that the SJA is performed. Furthermore, he is responsible for
ensuring that the recommendation of the SJA results are implemented during the
execution of the operation.
3.5.4 Procedure
General
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SJA shall be performed prior to commencement of non-standard activities to identify
potential safety hazards and to examine ways to reduce risks of injury to personnel and
damage to assets and the environment.
Safe Job Analysis Team
The composition of the team may vary depending upon the operation being considered,
however, supervisors and foremen from the relevant disciplines should be present. The
SJA team should decide a team leader who is responsible for driving the SJA and
ensuring that comments and conclusions are documented. The team leader is normally the
Offshore Superintendent.
A typical SJA team is as follows:
• Offshore Superintendent
• Vessel Master
• Client Representative
• Toolpusher
• Well Operations Supervisor
• Project Engineer
• Rigging Foreman
Other personnel e.g. from ROV crew may be co-opted as necessary. Conducting Safe Job
Analysis.
The operation in question shall be worked through in a systematic, step-by-step way,
utilizing the SJA form enclosed. For each step, the following questions shall be
addressed:
• Are the responsibilities clearly defined?
• Have all personnel been informed about their roles, responsibilities and
communication lines?
• Are the involved personnel suitably experienced in the type of operation?
• What safety hazards exist?
• Are the responsibilities clearly defined?
• Are these hazards acceptable or do additional risk-reducing measures need to be
implemented?
• What external factors, (weather, host platform activities), could affect the safety
of the operation?
• Does limiting criteria need to be identified?
• What potential failures in support equipment and systems (Dynamic Positioning,
Crane winches), may occur that affect the level of hazard? Does limiting criteria
Need to be identified?
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• All the necessary actions arising from the JSA and identified on the form shall be
closed out before commencement of the operation.
Every JSA will be given a unique identification number and stored in a central file on the
Vessel Bridge. Upon completion of the offshore work they shall be sent to the TOS
Subsea Onshore Manager for final reports and ultimate archiving.
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SECTION 4
4 WELL INTERVENTION WELL CONTROL
4.1 Introduction
Once a well has been drilled and completed it will normally be utilized to produce from
or inject into the formation.
Workover is the term commonly used to describe the process of entering a well after it has
been completed.
The necessity to do this may result as a consequence of problems in one of 2 areas:
• Equipment failure
• The need to replace, change, alter the completion string due to well performance
problems or other reservoir management requirements
Early recognition of warning signals and the rapid shut in of the well is the key to effective
well control.
4.1.1 Equipment Failure
These can include:
• Effects of pressure
• Effects of thermal stress
• Effects of applied and induced mechanical loading
• Corrosion failure
• Erosion
It is also important to distinguish between the two types of failure which are:
1. Catastrophic failure implying a safety concern
2. Inability to function with no immediate significant safety concern
The consequences of a component failure depend upon its integration with the
completion string and the action resulting as a consequence may include:
• Removal and/or replacement by means of a wireline or coiled tubing intervention
without killing the well.
• Removal and replacement of the Christmas Tree
• Partial or full removal of the completion string
• Other remedial work
4.1.2 Well Performance Problems
Workovers or interventions, designed to improve the performance the well are quite
common and can be directed at:
• The improvement or restoration of the performance of the well under natural lift
• The installation or replacement of artificial lift equipment
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4.2 Well Barrier Terminology
As stated in Section 1, there are two types of barrier- hydrostatic, (fluid), and mechanical
(closed and closeable).
Double barrier protection against well pressure and flow is normally the minimum
requirement for a production well.
In intervention mode the following terms apply for identifying the type of barrier in use at
any time.
4.2.1 Primary
Is a barrier that performs pressure control during normal operating conditions. Usually a
closed barrier.
4.2.2 Secondary
Is a barrier that performs pressure control in the event that the primary barrier fails. A
secondary barrier is usually a closeable barrier.
4.2.3 Tertiary
Is a barrier that performs pressure control in the event of failure of both the primary and
secondary barrier systems. A tertiary barrier is usually a closeable barrier and the last
and final means of pressure control during intervention operations.
Different barriers will be available for pressure control depending upon the status of the
well and the operation being performed.
In general mechanical barriers are either closed or closeable.
4.2.4 Barrier Systems
Closed and closeable barrier systems for well interventions are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
Additional barrier systems are illustrated in Table 3.
4.2.5 Table 1 -Closed Barrier Systems
CLOSED BARRIER
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
ANNULUS
Wireline Stuffing Box/ Riser Packer/Tubing System
Grease Injection/ Riser Tubing Hanger/Tubing Head Spool
Coiled Tubing Stripper/ Riser System
Coiled Tubing Check Valves
4.2.6 Table 2 - Closable Barrier Systems
CLOSABLE BARRIER SYSTEMS

PRODUCTION ANNULUS
BOP Valves Tubing Hanger Outlet Valves
Annular Preventers Tubing Hanger I Tubing Head Spool System
Shear/Seal Valves
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SCSSSV's and SCASV may not be classified as an appropriate barrier(s) or containment devices as they may not
satisfy inflow test criteria as set down by either governmental legislation or operating company (client) philosophy
4.2.7 Table 3- Additional Barrier Systems
ADDITIONAL BARRIER SYSTEMS
PRODUCTION ANNULUS
Wireline Plugs Tubing Hanger Outlet Valves
Tubing Hanger Plugs Tubing Hanger/Tubing Head Spool System
Packer Plugs Ice Plugs
Retrievable Bridge Plugs
Non-Retrievable Bridge Plugs
Cement Plugs
Ice Plugs
The additional barriers above may be installed in an event of a failure of the Primary and
Secondary Barrier systems.
4.3 Wireline Well Control
4.3.1 Electric Braided Line
This is a multi-strand line, normally with a single internal conductor sheathed in insulating
material resistant to well fluids and temperature. All electric lines are braided because of
the construction method.
Braided lines have disadvantages when compared to solid line. These include:
• The various wires are round and often braided together in opposite directions, resulting
in spaces being left between them making it more difficult to affect a pressure seal.
• Because the wire must include insulation it does not have a high stiffness to weight
ratio. If braided electric line breaks it can form bundles in the well making
remedial operations extremely difficult.
Electric line is usually associated with logging but can often be utilized in a number of
workover related activities.
The most frequently utilized line sizes are 7/32" and 5/16". For different wire sizes the
wireline BOP rams must be appropriately dressed. However, braided lines with no
conductor are much stronger than electric line with at least double the breaking strain for
the same outside diameter.
WIRE UPPER BOP MIDDLE BOP LOWER BOP
.125 Slickline Variable Variable Variable
7/32" Slickline Variable Variable Variable
5/16" Slickline Variable 5/16" 5/16"
BOP's must be redressed for 5/16" operations and tested with the aid of a polished rod across the rams. All
periodical ram changeouts must be logged and note on the maintenance schedule. Rams are to be inspected
pre and post operations for.
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4.3.2 Solid Line
Also classed as 'slick' line utilizing a solid, single strand line. The most commonly used
are 0.108" and 0.125" diameter with breaking strains dependent upon the type, and
composition of the wire.
Operations that can be done by Slickline are numerous, and with the advent of memory
PLT string and advanced measurement technology are expanding continuously.
4.4 Procedure to Control Well
This section identifies various procedures to secure the well, when well servicing
operations are being carried out Subsea, with the Subsea Intervention Lubricator system
installed on the clients Christmas Tree.
4.4.1 Through Tree with Electric Line
The subsea Intervention Lubricator is normally configured for combined Electric
line/Slickline operations, thus allowing both scopes of work to be carried out without
having to recover the lubricator.
When the Subsea Intervention Lubricator system is configured to carry out well
servicing Electric line operations, the following components will be in the positions
shown:
Latched Liquid Seal Stuffing Box, latched & operational
Open Upper Blind BOP
Open Middle Variable BOP
Open Lower Variable BOP
Open Wireline Cutting Gate Valve
Open Production Swab Valve
Closed Production Wing Valve
Open Production Master Valve
Open Sub Surface Safety Valve (SSSV)
In the event that the Liquid Seal System (CLSS) failed, releasing hydrocarbons into the
environment, the following actions would be carried out:
• Instruct electric line to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Close Middle BOP
• Confirm leak has stopped
• Confirm electric line depth
• SIL Engineer to attempt to regain seal
Once this stage has been reached, TOS Subsea Superintendent will discuss this problem
with the Clients Representative. Based on technical advice from SIL supervisor on the
CLSS problem, actions would then be carried out, subject to severity of leak, and depth
of electric line:
Severe Leak
o Severe Leak Electric Line Deep
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o Severe Leak Electric Line Shallow
o Minimal Leak Electric Line Deep
o Minimal Leak Electric Line Shallow
4.4.2 Through Tree with Slickline
The Subsea Intervention Lubricator is normally configured for combined Electric
servicing Slickline operations the following components will be in the open position:
Latched SIL Slickline Stuffing Box, latched & operational
In the event that the Slickline Stuffing Box has failed, releasing hydrocarbons into the
• Instruct Slickline to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Confirm wireline depth
• SIL engineer to attempt to regain seal
with the Clients Representative. Based on technical advice from SIL supervisor on the
stuffing box problem, actions would then be carried out, subject to severity of leak, and
depth of slickline:
• Severe Leak Electric Line Deep
• Severe Leak Electric Line Shallow
• Minimal Leak Electric Line Deep
• Minimal Leak Electric Line Shallow
4.4.3 Through Tree Bull-heading
The Subsea Intervention Lubricator is normally configured for combined Electric
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The flushing Supply and Return lines in the Main Control Umbilical can be used as
individual pumping paths, or combined for a greater pumping rate, depending if in the
hole with Wireline.
When the Subsea Intervention Lubricator system is configured to carry out well servicing
operations, which include bull-heading, the components listed below in the following
position:
Flushing Supply Only
Open SIL Slickline Stuffing Box
Closed Upper Blind BOP

Closed Middle Variable BOP
In the event that the Upper Blind BOP or Middle Variable BOP, (or both), failed, thus
reducing the barriers to one or none, with the potential of releasing hydrocarbons into the
• Instruct pumping to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Close Wireline Cutting Gate Valve
• Close Production Swab Valve
• Confirm any leak has stopped
• Confirm what barrier(s) failed
with the Clients Representative. Based on technical advice from SIL supervisor on what
failed and why, the following actions would then be carried out, subject to what failed:
• Confirm what remedial action is required
• Repair hydraulics locally
• Function & Pressure test locally
• Continue with operation
OR
• Recover Subsea Intervention Lubricator
• Repair
• Function & Pressure test
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• Run Subsea Intervention Lubricator
• Continue with operations
Flushing Supply and Return
In the event that the Stuffing Box inserts fails with the potential of releasing hydrocarbons
into the environment the following actions would be carried out:
• Instruct Pumping to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Confirm any leak has stopped
• Confirm Stuffing Box failed
• Repair Stuffing Box Insert
• Function & Pressure test locally
OR
• Recover Subsea Intervention Lubricator
• Repair Stuffing Box
Function & Pressure test
• Run Subsea Intervention Lubricator
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4.4.4 Through Tree Circulating
The Subsea Intervention Lubricator is normally configured Electric line/Slickline
operations, thus allowing both scopes of work to be carried out without having to
recover the lubricator. Flushing supply and flushing return lines can be used as
individual pumping paths or combined for a greater pumping rate. Additionally, some
clients will have the ability to pump via the annulus, allowing nitrogen, kill fluid etc. to
be circulated into position.
servicing operations, which include circulating, the components listed will be in the
following position:
Flushing Supply
Closed Upper Blind BOP
Closed Middle Variable BOP
ANNULUS BORE
Open Annulus Swab Valve
Closed Annulus Wing Valve
Open Annulus Master Valve
In the event that the Upper Blind BOP or the Middle Variable BOP or both failed, thus
reducing the barriers to one or none, with potential of releasing hydrocarbons into the
Inform Bridge
• Close Annulus Swab Valve
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• Function & Pressure Test
OR
• Recover Subsea Intervention lubricator
• Repair
• Run Subsea Intervention lubricator
• Instruct Pumping to stop
4.4.5 Flowing Well to Host Platform
The Subsea Intervention lubricator is normally configured for combined Electric
When the Subsea Intervention lubricator system is configured to carry out well
servicing operations, which include flowing the well while logging, the components
listed below will be in the following position
Status Component
Latched SIL Liquid Seal Head
Open Production Wing Valve
In the event that the Liquid Seal System fails, with the potential of releasing
hydrocarbons into the environment, the following actions would be carried out:
• Instruct electric line to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Close Production Wing Valve
• Confirm electric line depth
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with the Clients Representative. The corrective action will be the same as for 4.4.1.
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SECTION 5
5 PRIMARY WELL CONTROL
5.1 Introduction
Primary well control is the use of fluid density to provide sufficient pressure to prevent the
influx of formation fluids into the wellbore.
Primary well control is maintained at all times, and involves the following:
• Fluids are of adequate density
• Hole volume is continuously monitored
Appropriate action to be taken as soon as there are changes to:
• Fluid density
• Flow rate
• Volumes
5.2 Well Control Theory
5.2.1 Major Causes
There are 5 major causes for the loss of Primary Well Control:
• Failure to keep the hole full
• Swabbing the hole
• Lost circulation
• Incorrect mud weight
• Riser operations, loss of fluid column
5.2.2 Normal Gradient
Most formations are deposited in a seawater environment with a rate of deposition
which allows normal compaction to take place. These formations have a normal
pressure gradient, i.e. bottom hole pressure equivalent to a column of salt water.
• Specific Gravity 1.07
• Normal Pressure Gradient 0.465 psi/ft
5.2.3 Sub-normal Gradient
Initial pressure gradients of less than 0.465 psi/ft are attributed to fresh water
depositional environments. Sub Normal pressures are most likely to be due to depleted
reservoir pressures in mature fields.
5.2.4 Abnormal Gradient
Gradients above 0.465 psi/ft are considered abnormal and gradients as high as 1.0 psi/ft
have been encountered. One cause of this phenomenon is rapid deposition which did not
allow the full expulsion of matrix water prior to additional deposition. The fluid
helped to support the overburden thus increasing the pore pressure.
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Other causes of abnormal gradients are dipping reservoirs where the reservoir fluid is
less dense than salt water, or a formation being over pressurized by another higher-
pressure formation. (Across non-sealing faults by underground blowout etc.)
5.2.5 Influx Behaviour
Water
Water does not expand to any appreciable extent as pressure is reduced. Because of this
property there is little surface pressure change as a water influx approaches surface.
Gas is highly compressible which expands greatly as pressure is reduced.
The volume occupied by a gas is a function of temperature and pressure. If a gas influx is
allowed to migrate to surface without being allowed to expand, the pressure in the
bubble will remain effectively unchanged. As the bubble attempts to expand, the
wellbore pressure will increase and may eventually fracture the formation or cause
casing or equipment failure.
Conversely, if the gas bubble was allowed to migrate and expand at an uncontrolled rate,
an excessive volume of liquid would be expelled from the wellbore, lowering the bottom
hole temperature and allowing an additional influx.
If a gas bubble is allowed to migrate (either by circulation or migration) it is essential
that the bubble is allowed to expand at a controlled rate to minimize the risk of
catastrophic failure.
Oil is more compressible than water and less than gas. Its compressibility is dependent on
composition and gas ratio and its behaviour varies accordingly.
5.3 Causes of Loss of Well Control
5.3.1 Insufficient Density
This can be the result of a number of factors such as:
• Poor maintenance of fluid properties.
• Accidental dilution of fluid.
• Poor prediction of pore pressure.
• Increase in near wellbore pressure due to well-being shut in for a prolonged period.
• Startup of water injection etc.
• Reduction in hydrostatic pressure due to fluid becoming gas cut.
• Gas migration bringing trapped reservoir pressure to a shallower depth. When this
occurs, the pressure will normally be bled down to the leak off pressure of the weakest
exposed formation.
• However, the observed surface pressure will be in excess of the hydrostatic head
ofthe planned kill fluid.
5.3.2 Losses
Loss of circulation can cause the fluid level in the hole to fall. This may result in an influx
if the hydrostatic pressure drops below the formation pressure of an exposed
permeable interval.
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This situation can occur after bull-heading cement or kill fluid or attempting to test a
plug if the formation fracture pressure is exceeded, resulting in losses. Additionally,
after perforating casing there is always the possibility of losses.
5.3.3 Failure to fill Hole
Failure to keep the hole full is a common cause of influx. If the correct volume of fluid is
not added to the hole to replace the steel displacement when tripping tubulars, the
drop in fluid level may be sufficient to reduce hydrostatic pressure below pore pressure
and cause an influx.
Similarly, if there are slight losses from the wellbore to the formation, the level of fluid
in the wellbore will slowly fall, eventually lowering the wellbore pressure below
formation pressure if the hole is not filled.
The hole must be monitored always to avoid this possibility when formations are
exposed.
5.3.4 Swabbing
Even with the well completely full of fluid of sufficient weight, an influx can be induced
by the swabbing effect of withdrawing tubulars or Wireline tools from the well.
A reduction in bottom hole pressure due to swabbing cannot completely be avoided.
However, this pressure reduction should be less than the overbalance of the fluid
column.
In Well Operations the most likely operation which would induce a swabbed influx is the
withdrawal of a large diameter Wireline tool in a well with exposed perforations below.
(i.e. bridge plugs etc.)
5.4 Warning Signs
5.4.1 Pit Level Increase
The most reliable indicator of an influx is a pit gain. Fluid entering the wellbore from the
formation produces a positive gain which, with the correct surface equipment, can be
detected at very low levels. Pit levels will be monitored carefully during all operations
when the vessel is taking returns to surface. Any anomalies are to be treated as a
potential influx and investigated.
5.4.2 Flow Rate
An increase in flow rate, flow from a static well, can be an earlier warning sign than a pit
gain. Flow meters must be operating satisfactorily and have been calibrated. They are to
be monitored carefully during circulating and any discrepancies investigated.
5.4.3 Pump Pressure
Decreased pump pressure may indicate an under balanced fluid column. An influx into
the wellbore will reduce the annulus fluid column resulting in reduced pump pressure.
Washout in the circulating system, pump failure or an out of balance circulating system
can all cause pump pressure losses. The system should be carefully monitored, and the
anticipated differential pressures calculated prior to pumping cement plugs, etc.
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SECTION 6
6 SECONDARY WELL CONTROL
6.1 lntroduction
This section will look at the procedures to secure the well when abandonment operations
are being carried out Subsea with the Subsea Intervention Lubricator and Abandonment
system in situation.
Early recognition of warning signals and rapid shut-in are the key to effective well control.
6.2 Procedures to Secure Well (Abandonment Operations)
When abandonment operations are ongoing with the Client's Subsea Tree still in situ then
Section 4.4 will apply. This section is specific to abandonment operations via the wellhead.
6.2.1 Through Wellhead with Electric Line
The Subsea Intervention Lubricator is normally configured for abandonment operations,
with additional Subsea components to give two mechanical barriers below the side
outlets for pumping into the well.
abandonment and Electric-line operations, and Electric-line operations are ongoing in the
well the following table shows the components position.
Component Position
Liquid Seal Stuffing Box latched and operational Latched
Upper Blind BOP Open
Middle Variable BOP Open
Lower Variable BOP Open
Wireline Cutting Gate Valve Open
Annulus Valve Closed
Production Valve Closed
BOP Shear/ Seal Open
BOP Blind Open
In the event that the Liquid Seal System failed, potentially releasing hydrocarbons into
the environment the following actions would be carried out:
• Instruct electric-line to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Close middle BOP
• Confirm electric-line depth
Once this stage has been reached the TOS Subsea Superintendent will discuss this problem
with the OIM, Client's representative SIL and electric-line supervisors.
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Based on technical advice from SIL and electric-line Supervisors on the Liquid Seal
System problem the following actions would then be carried out, subject to severity of leak
and depth of electric-line:
1. Severe Leak- Electric-line Deep
2. Severe Leak- Electric-line Shallow
3. Minimal Leak- Electric-line Deep
4. Minimal Leak- Electric Line Shallow
Severe Leak - Electric-line Deep
• Close- Lower BOP
• Inject grease between Middle and Lower BOP 's
• De-pressurize lubricator
• Unlatch- Liquid Seal System Head
• Recover Liquid Seal System Head to surface and effect repairs
• Install Liquid Seal System once repairs complete
• Latch - Liquid Seal System Head
• Pressure Test Liquid Seal System Head- Middle BOP 15 minutes
• Bleed down to 100 psi above SITHP
• Open- Middle and Lower BOP's
Severe Leak- Electric-line Shallow
• Inject Grease between Middle and Lower BOP's
• Slowly recover electric-line until below wellhead
• Open- Lower and Middle BOP
• Pull electric-line into lubricator
• Close- Wireline Cutting Gate Valve
• Flush contents of lubricator
• Recover Liquid Seal System Head
• Recover electric-line
If this was not the preferred course of action, then the only course would be the same as
for Severe Leak- Electric Line Deep.
Minimal Leak- Electric-line Deep
If electric-line were deep, but the leak minimal, the decision may be taken to recover into
the lubricator without effecting Liquid Seal System repair.
• Inject Grease between Middle and Lower BOP's
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• Slowly recover electric-line until below wellhead
• Open- Lower and middle BOP
• Pull electric-line into lubricator
• Close- Production Swab Valve
for Minimal Leak- Electric Line Deep.
Minimal Leak- Electric-line Shallow
• Recover electric-line into lubricator
• Close- Production Swab Valve
• Unlatch- Liquid Seal System
for Severe Leak- Electric Line Deep.
6.2.2 Through Wellhead with Slickline
with additional Subsea components to give two mechanical barriers below the side outlets
for pumping into the well.
abandonment, and Slickline operations are ongoing in the well, the following the table
shows the components position:
Component Position
Stuffing Box insert latched and operational Latched
Upper Blind BOP Open
Lower Variable BOP Open
Wireline Cutting Gate Valve Open
Annulus Valve Closed
Production Valve Closed
BOP (1) Shear I Seal Open
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BOP (2) Blind Open
In the event that the Slickline Stuffing Box has failed potentially releasing hydrocarbons
into the environment, the following actions will be carried out:
• Instruct slickline to stop
• Inform Bridge
• Close- Middle BOP
• Close- Upper BOP
• Confirm slickline depth
• Slickline to attempt to regain seal via hydraulic unit
Once this stage has been reached, the TOS Subsea Superintendent will discuss this problem
with the OIM, Client's representative and SIL and Slickline Supervisor.
Based on technical advice from SIL and Slickline Supervisors on the Stuffing Box
problem, the following actions would then be carried out, subject to severity of leak and
depth of slickline:
1. Severe Leak- Slickline Deep
2. Severe Leak- Slickline Shallow
3. Minimal Leak- Slickline Deep
4. Minimal Leak- Slickline Shallow
Severe Leak- Slickline Deep
• Depressurize lubricator above Upper BOP to 500 psi
• Fully depressurize lubricator
• Unlatch- stuffing box
• Recover insert to surface and effect repairs
• Install stuffing insert
• Latch- stuffing box
• Pressure test stuffing box, Upper BOP
• Bleed down to 100 psi above SITHP
• Open- Upper and Middle BOP's
Severe Leak- Slickline Shallow
• Open- Upper BOP
• Slowly recover slickline until below wellhead
• Open- Middle BOP
• Pull tool-string into lubricator
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• Close- Tubing BOP
• Recover slickline tool-string
If this was not the preferred course of action, then the only course would be the same for
Severe Leak- Slickline Deep.
Minimal Leak- Slickline Deep
• Pull slickline into lubricator
If this was not the preferred course of action, then the only course would be the same for
Severe Leak- Slickline Deep.
Minimal Leak- Slickline Shallow
• Recover slickline into lubricator
If this was not the preferred course of action then the only course would be the same for
Minimal leak- Slickline Deep.
6.2.3 Through Wellhead Bull-heading
with additional Subsea components to give two mechanical barriers below the side
outlets for pumping into the well. This additional system is called the lower Riser.
Assembly {lRA) and will allow the recovery of the Sll leaving two barriers "in-situ".
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abandonment, and bull-heading operations are ongoing in the well, the following the
table shows the components position:
Component Position
Slickline Stuffing Box Open
Upper Blind BOP Closed
lower Variable BOP Open
Wireline Cutting Gate Valve Closed
Annulus Valve and HCR 's Closed
Production Valve and HCR 's Open
BOP {1) Shear/ Seal Open
BOP {2) Blind Open
BOP Failure in Slickline lubricator

In the event that the Upper Blind BOP or the Wireline Cutting Gate Valve, or both fail,
thus reducing the barriers to one or none, with the potential of releasing hydrocarbons into
the environment, the following actions will be carried out:
• Inform Bridge
• Close Middle and lower BOP's
• Close Tubing BOP
• Close Production HCR Valve
• Confirm what barriers failed
Once this stage has been reached, the TOS Subsea Superintendent will discuss the
problem with the Clients Representative. Based on technical advice on what failed and
why, the following actions would then be carried out subject to what failed:
• Confirm what Barrier(s) failed
• Function and Pressure test locally
• Recover SIL
• Repair
• Function and Pressure Test
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• Run SIL
• Function and Pressure Test
Failure of High Pressure Hose and Connection(s)
In the event that either of the High Pressure Coflexip Hose connections fail, with the
potential of releasing hydrocarbons into the environment, the following actions will be
carried out:
• Inform Bridge
• Close- BOP Shear I Seal Ram
• Close- BOP Blind Ram
• Close- Annulus HCR Valve
• Close- Production HCR Valve
• Confirm what hose(s) connection(s) failed
Once this stage has been reached, the TOS Subsea Superintendent will discuss the problem
with the Clients Representative. Based on technical advice on what hose failed and why
the following actions would then be carried out, subject to what failed:
• Confirm what hose(s) failed
• Pressure Test locally
• Continue with operation
OR
• Recover hoses
• Replace hose connection seal
• Pressure Test
• Run hose
• Pressure Test
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SECTION 7
7 WELL CONTROL METHODOLOGIES
7.1 Introduction
Early recognition of the warning signals and rapid shut in of the well are the keys to
effective well control.
By acting quickly the amount of influx entering the wellbore is minimized. The size and
severity of a well control situation depends upon:
o How much underbalance
o How permeable the formation is
o How long the well is in underbalance
Smaller influxes provide lower choke or annulus pressure, both upon initial closure
and later when the influx is circulated to the choke.
Well control can be broken into three basic methods:
o Bull-heading
o Volumetric
o Dynamic Well Control
o Wait and Weight
o Drillers
o Reverse Circulation Well Kill
o Forward Circulation Well Kill
7.2 Bull-heading
Bull-heading is a method of well kill in which the formation fluid is displaced back to the
formation in preference to circulating it to surface.
Bull-heading is normally considered in the following circumstances:
• It is not desirable to handle the influx at surface due to its suspected nature e.g. H2S,
or a limitation in capacity of the surface equipment.
• The work I tubing string is out of the hole and stripping is not possible.
• Normal circulation methods are not possible due to plugged tubing, off bottom
circulation path etc.
• After a well test or prior to a workover I abandonment where the tubing contents will
be bull headed to a reservoir interval with adequate permeability.
As TOS operations focus on live well intervention, well servicing and well abandonment
inside cased hole, the vessel is configured to kill wells by bull-heading.
These operations are always in cased holes with annular cement isolation above the
zone of injection. In these instances, there is little risk of breaking down a weaker zone
while bull-heading to the reservoir interval.
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7.2.1 Considerations
o Maximum allowable pumping pressure. There is less risk of subsequent losses if the
formation fracture pressure is not exceeded. The pressure limitations of the tree
,tubulars, etc. (including safety factors and considerations for wear).
o The type of formation fluid and relative permeability of the formation into which
the fluids are to be bullheaded.
o How many intervals are exposed, and the maximum vertical distance and
separation. If a casing annulus is to be bullheaded, is there a potential for tubular
failure.
o The required bull-heading rate to displace the fluid back into the formation, (i.e. the
bull-heading pump rate must exceed the ga s migration rate).
o Is there a check valve in the line?
o The consequences of and the contingency plan in case of major losses.
7.2.2 Procedures
o Determine surface pressures that will cause formation fracture during bull-
heading. Note: that there may be cases where it is necessary to exceed the theoretical
formation fracture pressure (e.g. where H 2S is expected).
o Calculate maximum allowable safe pressure, consider tubing and casing
burst/collapse and tree/wellhead burst, including safety factors for
wear/deterioration etc.
o Calculate static tubing pressure during bull-heading and prepare schedule.
o Start bull-heading slowly, to establish injection rate, and increase to the required
rate. Monitor pumping pressure/volume closely and if possible, monitor annulus
pressure to minimize risk of annulus overpressure due to leaks.
o Bullhead the required volume at the maximum allowable rate. If possible stay below
the formation fracture pressure by controlling surface pumping pressure.
o Surface pressure should decrease as the formation fluid is displaced into the
formation by the kill fluid. If surface pressure does not drop, it is an indication that the
migration rate exceeds the displacement rate.
7.3 Volumetric Control
This method of well kill should be considered for use when it is not practicable to
bullhead formation fluids back to the formation. This may be due to:
o Inability to establish an injection rate to the formation due to impermeability.
o Low formation fracture pressure with potential for serious lost circulation. Risk
of tubular failure while bull-heading.
The volumetric well kill is used to control the expansion of an influx as it migrates
up the wellbore. It therefore can only be used, if significant migration is/has occurred.
This will only occur in the case of a gas influx.
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There are two techniques that may be required in operations involving volumetric control
of an influx that is in the wellbore:
Static Volumetric Control
Using the Subsea Intervention Lubricator pressure gauge to measure bottom hole
pressure. (This assumes that no work string is in the well). This method will allow a
gaseous influx to migrate up the wellbore in a controlled manner, ensuring that no more
influx is allowed into the well, and that pressures are kept under control.
Lubrication
When the influx is at or near the surface this method is used to replace the formation fluid
with kill fluid as the influx is bled off at the choke.
7.3.1 Static Volumetric Well Kill
The principle of this procedure is that the bottom hole pressure is maintained slightly
over the producing zone formation pressure while bleeding fluid from the well to allow the
influx to expand as it migrates up the wellbore. The fluid is bled in increments from the
well as the choke pressure rises, due to influx migration.
A predetermined amount is bled off for each incremental increase in choke pressure.
Considerations
• Is the kill fluid of sufficient density? If not, there will still be choke pressure after the
influx has been removed by the volumetric method.
• What is the nature of the influx? The volumetric kill method will only be
effective if the fluid can migrate up the wellbore. It must be gas (or at least fluid with
high GOR).
• Constant choke pressure must be maintained while bleeding off fluid at the choke.
If fluid is bled off incorrectly (too much, too fast) a further influx will result.
Accurate volume measurement must be possible.
• This method is slow. Killing a well by the volumetric method is gas migration
dependent and may take several hours.
Procedures
• Record shut in pressure. Ensure that the pressure has stabilized. This will be almost
immediately in the example of perforating a casing string with gas behind it but
may take up to fifteen (15) minutes in other instances.
• Develop a pressure profile for shut in choke pressure versus fluid bled off. This profile
will be similar to that resulting from the "Drillers" well kill method. The maximum
wellbore pressures can then be estimated together with anticipated surface volume
gain.
• Determine migration rate. After surface pressures have been initially established,
further increases with time will be due to influx migration. The rate of migration can
be estimated from two (2) pressure readings, taken at a known interval apart.
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The distance (D) in feet migrated up the annulus in the time interval (T) in minutes
is given by:
D= P2- P1
W x 0.052
The migration rate therefore can be estimated by: MR = (D x 60)/T
Where: P1=surface pressure at start of time interval (psi) P2 = surface pressure at end of
time interval (psi)
W =weight of fluid in the hole (ppg) MR =migration rate (feet/hour)
T = time (mins)
As a general rule of thumb, gas migrates at approximately 1000 ft/hr
• Calculate the hydrostatic pressure of wellbore fluid per barrel. The hydrostatic
pressure of the original fluid in the well per barrel should be calculated at the point
in the hole immediately above the Influx as follows:
Hydrostatic pressure per barrel of fluid
= W XL 0.052
Where: W = weight of fluid in the hole (ppg)
L = hole volume (linear feet per barrel)
o Allow the choke pressure to build by an overbalance margin. This pressure
provides a safety margin above the shut in well pressure.
o Allow the choke pressure to build by an operating margin. The choke should be
allowed to build up further to provide the operating margin that will be built
up/bled off as the influx migrates up the wellbore. This is typically 100 to 250 psi.
o Bleed an increment of mud off at a constant choke pressure. A suitable amount of
mud/well fluid should be bled from the well to reduce the bottom hole pressure
by an amount equivalent to the operating margin in above step.
That the pressure is kept constant as fluid is bled from the well, ensuring that the initial
200 psi over balance is always kept on the well.
The fluid bled off at each sequence is a volume with a hydrostatic equal to the 150 psi
operating margin {8.5 bbls with and hydrostatic of 27.5 psi/bbl).
The migration/bleed off process is a long operation, particularly at the start of the
operation when the gas expansion volume change is low. The operation speeds up as the
influx approaches surface.
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• Continue until the influx has migrated to the wellhead/BOP. When the influx has
migrated to the BOP, migration will virtually cease , and the pressure will cease to rise.
(There may be a slight increase due to migration up the choke line, but this will be much
less than previously).
• Commence the Lubrication Technique to vent the influx from below the BOP
while maintaining control of the bottom hole pressure.
7.3.2 Lubrication
• Calculate the hydrostatic pressure of one barrel of the lubricating kill fluid. This is
done in the same manner as for the Volumetric Method.
• Determine a safe maximum pressure to pump the kill fluid into the well. This
pressure will be based on formation breakdown/de-rated casing or wellhead
limits,whichever is lower. A safety factor should be applied.
• Slowly lubricate a measured quantity of kill fluid into the well. Line up to pump down
the kill line and take returns through the choke line. Pump slowly into the well until
the pump pressure reaches a predetermined limit, (closely monitor the exact amount
of fluid pumped).
• At this point, stop pumping and shut in the well for a period while the gas
migrates through the fluid pumped into the well.
• Bleed gas from well. Gas should be bled through the choke line to reduce the surface
pressure by an amount equivalent to the hydrostatic pressure of the quantity of kill
fluid previously pumped into the well. If the surface pressure increased while fluid
was being lubricated into the well, the amount that the pressure increased should be
bled back in addition.
• Line up returns through the gas separator to a calibrated tank to ensure that any
volume of fluid bled back while venting gas is recorded and accounted for. Ensure that
no significant quantity of fluid is bled from the well during this operation. If
fluid appears at the choke before the surface pressure has been reduced to its desired
level, shut in the well and wait for the gas to percolate through the kill fluid.
• Repeat the procedure until all the influx has been vented from the well. It is likely
that it will be necessary to reduce the volume of kill fluid lubricated into the well at
each successive stage of the procedure, due to the reduction in volume of gas in
the well.
• Providing that the kill fluid is sufficient to at least balance the formation
pressure, the choke pressure will gradually reduce until the gauge reads only the
safety margin applied previously .When all the gas has been vented and there is no
entrained gas left in the choke line from the Subsea well control equipment to the
manifold, the well will be dead.
• Observe the well for a minimum of thirty (30) minutes to ensure that conditions are
static.
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7.4 Dynamic Well Control Methods
The principle method of well control on TOS operations will be bull-heading, however
there may be circumstances where the equipment is in place to allow a constant bottom
hole method to be employed.
These methods of well control require drill/tubing/work string to be at or near TD to enable
the influx to be circulated out of the well.
There are two (2) standard techniques for a dynamic (circulating) well kill, the Wait &
Weight (Engineers) and the Drillers methods.
7.4.1 Drillers Method
In the Drillers method the influx is circulated out of the wellbore without increasing the
fluid density. A second circulation displaces the well to kill weight fluid. If the influx is
the result of swabbing or trapped gas, the fluid in the wellbore will already be kill fluid
and the well will be dead after the first circulation.
This method is the preferred procedure for dynamic (circulating) well control on
operations.
Pre-Kill Considerations
• Can an influx be quickly detected?
• A method must be available to detect small, (less than 10 bbls), volume
increases in the circulating system and to detect any flow from the well.
• Can the BOP rams be easily and quickly closed around the string? BOP controls
must be accessible to the operator, the accumulators operational and
equipment regularly tested.
• Is the circulating system configured such that a dynamic kill can be conducted.
Fluid must be pumped down the string and returns taken via a choke and
degasser back to the tanks. The necessary valves and crossovers should be readily
available to connect the circulating system to the string and the fluid returns up to
the tanks.
• Is the adjustable choke, pressure monitoring system configured to read and
control pipe and annulus pressure? The choke system should be lined up to kill the
well at any time the string is being used, gauges should be set ,calibrated and
tested.
• Can fluid being pumped and returned from the well be accurately measured? Mud
tank must be accurately calibrated to measure returns, and pump stroke
counter/displacement tank must be accurate.
• The string and annulus volumes must be known at all times. The volume of the
string and the volume of the string/annulus is required prior to commencing the
well kill. This information should be pre-recorded on the well kill sheet.
• Be aware of any space out required to close pipe rams on the string.The Subsea
Intervention Lubricator system will be located such that a known space out is
required to ensure that a seal is affected around string body. The space out required
should be recorded and updated as required.
• Ensure that pressure losses through the choke line/circulating system are
pre-recorded at time the well depth, well fluid or pumping parameters change.
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Procedure
1. Initial response to the influx.,
2. Space out string as required
3. Shut down pump
4. Flow check well
5. Open choke line valve
6. Close BOP
7. Record shut in pipe and annulus pressures
Circulating Out Influx
o Ensure all crew members and third parties are aware of their duties during the well
kill and all sources of ignition are extinguished.
o Bring pumps up to kill rate (20-30 spm) holding initial casing pressure constant.
o Circulate out the influx, holding the predetermined pump rate and the initial
circulating pressure constant.
All adjustments should be made using the choke not the pump rate
o If the influx is gas, it will expand rapidly a s it nears surface, increasing both
casing pressure and pit volume, be prepared for these increases, and do not panic.
It is often difficult to bleed off the gas fast enough to prevent an increase in string pressure.
If it cannot be bled off fast enough it may be necessary to slow down or even stop the
pumps until the pressure can be bled down. Return the pumps to the original rate as soon
as possible.
After the Influx has been circulated out, the well will either be static, or a second
circulation will be required with kill weight fluid.
After the required kill fluid has been prepared in the tanks, the second stage of the
killing operation can commence.
• Bring pumps up to kill rate, holding casing pressure constant.
• Hold kill rate constant throughout the kill.
• Circulate the string to kill fluid, holding the casing pressure constant.
• When the kill fluid reaches the bottom of the string, the pump pressure should be
very close to the calculated kill pump pressure. Record this pressure and
maintain this pressure for the remainder of the kill.
• After the entire system has been displaced to kill fluid, shut down and flow
check the well. If the well is static, open up and circulate the system prior to
returning to operations.
7.4.2 Wait and Weight Method
This method involves one circulation, kill fluid is prepared, and is pumped from surface to
end of string, while following a prepared string pressure drop schedule. Once the kill fluid
enters the annulus, a constant string pump pressure is maintained until the kill fluid returns
to surface.
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Because the formation pressure to be encountered during abandonment and
suspension operations should be known, equipment on the vessel is configured such, that
using the wait and weight method is not usually practicable (i.e. the facility to eight
up and handle large volumes of hydrocarbon are not part of standard rig up).
The wait and weight method is summarized below for completeness.
1. Ensure that all crew members and third parties are aware of their duties and are in
position. Confirm all ignition sources are extinguished.
2. Ensure that kill fluid is at the correct weight, and that the kill schedule is
completed.
3. Establish initial circulating pressure, by bringing pumps up to kill speed, holding
initial casing pressure constant. When pumps are up to speed start following
pumping pressure schedule. Hold the kill pump rate constant throughout the well
kill. If the rate is allowed to vary without the appropriate adjustment to the
pumping pressure, the bottom hole pressure will fluctuate with the risk of losses
or additional influxes.
4. As the kill fluid is displaced down the string, lower the pump pressure at the
rate shown on the schedule. Remember that following the schedule allows
constant bottom hole pressure to be maintained. All adjustments must be with the
choke not the pump rate.
5. When the kill fluid is at the bottom of the string, the pumping pressure should be
close to the calculated final circulating pressure. Record this pressure and
maintain it throughout the remainder of the operation.
6. If the well kill has to be interrupted at any point, shut the pumps down and close
the well in holding the casing pressure constant.
7. As the gas and contaminated fluid reach surface, the gas will expand rapidly,
causing increases in casing pressure and tank volume. Be prepared for these
increases and don't panic.
8. On completion, flow check well. If static, open well and carry out a complete
circulation prior to continuing operations. Be aware of the possibility of trapped
gas below BOP.
It is often difficult to bleed off the gas fast enough to prevent an increase in string pressure.
It may be necessary to slow down or even stop the pumps until the pressure can be bled
down. Return the pumps to the original rate as soon as possible.
Both methods discussed above are dynamic well control methods more usually
associated with an overbalance drilling environment.
7.4.3 Reverse Circulate Well Kill
Entails pumping down the casing/tubing annulus and up the tubing via a point located
above the production packer. The most common type of circulating device is a sliding
sleeve or side pocket mandrel. However, if these circulating devices cannot be opened and
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the tubing is to be removed, then an explosive or punch can be utilized to give a circulation
path.
It is usual for a mechanical plug to be deployed below the point of circulation to ensure
that minimal communication with the formation occurs, thus protecting the reservoir
during circulation operations.
If a plug cannot be deployed or its integrity is suspect, then the well should be circulated
maintaining a back pressure on the tubing to ensure that BHP is within the appropriate
pressure window to prevent flow to or from the reservoir.
Surface tubing pressures during this type of well kill will follow a kill graph or table
generated for the operation.
This is a plot of surface tubing pressure versus the volume of kill fluid pumped into the
annulus. This is usually prepared in advance and presented as a kill table identifying
what the surface tubing pressure should be at a particular number of pump strokes
during the well kill operation.
Surface pressure is controlled by the use of a variable choke integrated into the surface
configuration.
7.4.4 Forward Circulation Well Kill
In this form kill fluid is pumped down the tubing whilst returns are taken from the
annulus.
This method of well kill is often not practical as the migration rate of the gas in the
tubing can be higher than the velocity of the kill fluid being pumped into the tubing.
Kill graphs and/or tables are adhered to and usually prepared in advance.
It is worth stating that killing a production well and all related tasks, are usually
well-planned events.
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SECTION 8
8 TERTIARY WELL CONTROL- (SUPPORTS
ABANDONMENTS}
In the event that Secondary control cannot be properly maintained, due to hole conditions,
or equipment failure, certain emergency procedures can be implemented to prevent the
loss of control.
8.1 Introduction
Unlike Primary & Secondary control, there are no established Tertiary well control
procedures that will work in most situations. The procedures to be applied depend on
the particular operating conditions which are encountered and specific
recommendations regarding appropriate Tertiary control procedures cannot be given until
the circumstances leading to the loss of Secondary control are established.
There are two (2) procedures which have generally been used, and involve the use of
cement and barite plugs.
8.2 Underground Blowout
The term underground blowout describes the condition where fluids flow from one
formation or zone into another (zones can be determined by temperature survey). If the
fracture gradient is exceeded during a well kill operation, formation fluids may flow from
the kicking zone into the fractured zone at an uncontrolled rate. This situation can occur
any time there is lost returns into one interval when a higher pressure permeable zone is
exposed.
An underground blowout cannot be solved by conventional methods. The flow cannot
be restrained with an applied pressure from surface. Either the high- pressure zone
must be stopped or the loss zone sealed.
8.3 Barite Plug
As the setting of a barite plug is relatively slow, where possible the plug should
achieve a hydrostatic kill of the flowing zone which will achieve both a hydrostatic kill
and a bridging of flow, as the barite settles out.
The required displacement rate can range from as low as 5 bpm to as high as 50 bpm in
severe blowouts. A rate of 5-8 bpm is reasonable for the first attempt. If the well is killed
in the course of placing the barite plug, consideration may be given to slowly pulling
above the barite plug to minimize the consequences of stuck plugged pipe. If there is
doubt as to the condition of the well or operational considerations dictate otherwise, the
pipe should be left in place and the barite allowed to bridge around it.
The slurry is composed of barite, SAPP or lignosulphonate, caustic soda and fresh water.
The chemical thinner increases the barite settling rate, by lowering the yield point and
gel strength of the slurry. SAPP gives a fluid loss in the 2Scc range but is only temperature
stable to 180 deg F and MUST be mixed with fresh water. Lignosulphonate only gives a
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fluid loss of +/- Sec but is temperature stable up to 350 deg F and can be mixed in seawater
if the pH is kept close to 11.
Caustic soda is added for pH control to increase thinner effectiveness.
The most effective procedure for controlling an underground blowout has been to spot a
barite plug between the flowing formation and the zone of lost returns. A well-placed barite
plug can seal off a high-pressure zone below a lost zone, enabling the well to be
controlled. This plug employs a barite slurry mixed at between 18-26 ppg with fresh
water and a chemical thinner. The settled barite plug forms an almost impermeable
seal and helps provide additional hydrostatic pressure to restrain the flow. Barite
plugs work especially well with gas kicks, however in water flows the barite is often
washed away as it settles.
One barrel of 22 ppg slurry requires the following:
• 21gallons of fresh water
• 750 lbs. of barite
• 0.5 lbs. SAPP (or 4-8 lbs. lignosulphonate)
• 0.25 lbs. caustic soda
8.3.1 Mixing and Pumping
1. Determine volume of slurry required - minimum recommended 150' of settled
barite (larger plugs are more effective).
2. Mix/pump at 5-8 bpm, a spacer is not required, DO NOT stop pumping once
slurry has entered string, as barite may settle out and plug off. (Have back up
pump ready).
3. Over displace by 5 bbls to clear string (leave string in place).
4. Wait 6 hours- run temperature survey.
5. Wait 4 hours - run second temperature survey. If flow has stopped the
temperature of the loss zone will have decreased.
6. A cement slurry may be required to form a permanent seal.
7. Zone of lost returns can be cured and fishing initiated.
A pilot test should always be run on a barite plug slurry prior to actual use. This will
ensure that the correct quantity of thinners etc. are used to optimize settling. If it has been
decided to pull above the plug,(back-stripping may be necessary).
• After plug in place pull a minimum of 1stand above the barite plug.
• If there is pressure on the annulus circulate the well using drillers method. If
returns become gas free the barite plug has been successful. If not, it will be
necessary to return to bottom and spot another plug.
• If the annulus is full, circulate at low rate & monitor well.
• If the annulus is not full, fill with water and observe. If annulus will stand full
attempt to slowly break circulation.
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8.4 Cement Plug
A cement plug can also be used to shut off a downhole flow, it is the probable alternative
to a barite plug.
A high fluid loss, accelerated cement slurry, is used to minimize the risk of gas cutting
and subsequent flow through the plug. The string will be cemented in place and
subsequent plug attempts if required will probably require the string to be perforated
above the plug.
Cement plugging should only be considered as a last resort or if the interval is planned to
be abandoned.
8.4.1 Cement Plugging
Cement plugging will be performed as per P&A Program.
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SECTION 9
9 WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT
Well control equipment is an extremely important aspect of well control and proper
selection of equipment is paramount to a safe operation.
9.1 Introduction
The purpose of the Wireline Lubricator System is to create a high pressure well barrier
required to allow the passage of down-hole wireline tools whilst maintaining pressure
control of the well bore fluids. The SIL is designed to cut slick line and braided electric
line. WOM have developed a valve to cut and seal in, this valve has been witnessed by
DNV and is built into the system.
9.2 Description
The system has the ability to quickly disconnect at the following points:
• Grease injection head (hydraulic latch I unlatch with ROV over-ride).
• Slick connector to disengage lubricator sections and SIL (hydraulic latch and
unlatch).
• EDP connector to disengage Emergency Disconnect Package from the Lower Riser
Package. Hydraulic latch and unlatch with ROV over-ride.
• Umbilical disconnect required to remotely disconnect the umbilical from the well
control system if required. A manual overpull system with shear pins is designed
into the unit.
• 2" Choke and Kill hoses can be disconnected using pressure balanced system
attached to EDP.
9.3 Specifications
Design Water Depth 5,000 ft

Bore Diameter 7-3/8"
Design Pressure 10,000 psi
Total Weight (dry) 138,000 lbs
Total Height 109 feet
Maximum Wireline Tool Length 72 feet
Temperature Rating of WCP 0- 250"F
Temperature Rating of Lubricator 0- lSO"F
Pressure Control Head 1,400 lbs 13' long
Lubricator 48,000 lbs 25' long
Well Control Package 88,000 lbs, 16' long
Umbilical- Electric and Fibre 38 mm diameter 3.3 KVm 24 + 2 conductors
Umbilical- Chemical 51mm diameter, 10,000 psi
Lubricator Hydraulic Fluid Oceanic HW 443
9.4 Emergency Disconnect Package

The function of the EDP is to connect the Riser System and/or the lubricator to the Lower
Riser package. This system has been designed to work in either riser or lubricator mode.
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If the vessel is driven off station by weather or engine failure the EDP is designed to
quickly disconnect from the LRP on a signal from the surface HPU. The Valves on the
LRP will close securing the live well and the riser system is pulled up allowing the vessel
to move off station.
The unit consists of:
• 13-5/8" lOK studded top High angle release (HAR) connector
• Spool hub by 13-5/8"-lOksi API flange
• 7-3/8" lOk Retainer valve block
• 2" bore annulus female connector
• 2-1/16" 10k failsafe Annulus valves
• Grease Injection pump system
• Umbilical termination
• Choke and Kill termination connectors
9.4.1 System Shutdown Level
Production Shutdown Close all valves outside main bore
Emergency Shutdown Sequential shutdown of all valves and wireline cutting
Emergency Quick Disconnect Sequential shutdown of all valves, wireline cutting
and disconnection of umbilical
9.5 Lower Riser Package
The Lower Riser Package (LRP) forms the independent well control barrier immediately
above the Production Tree. It is a mono bore system and has been designed to lock onto
Horizontal and Dual Bore tree systems. The unit consists of:
• Annulus spool
• 7-3/8" 10K Dual Valve Block with FAI actuators
• 13-5/8" 10K API hub Re-entry Mandrel
• Hydraulic Control Coupler Plate
• Hydraulic Accumulator bank
• Support and protection Frame
• ROV Intervention panels
• Subsea Control Module (SCM) two off
9.6 Well Control Package
• Weight 88,000 lbs

• Dimensions (W x D x H) 11.8 ft X 11.8 ft X 16.1ft
• Hydraulic Fluid
Brayco sv/b
• Hydraulic fluid Reservoir
500 litres
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• Valve cutting capability Slickline and braided wires
• Shear Seal Ram Slickline and braided wires
• Bottom end connection 13 5/8-10K mechanical quick connect
9.7 Lubricator Section

Lubricator consists of:
• Lubricator pipe sections of various lengths designed to provide the max wireline
tool length.
• A Slick hydraulic connector has been designed to permit the remote connection or
disconnection of the lubricator joints subsea.
• 10K ball valve
• Open Water Latch
• Slick Line Mandrel
• Electric Line Mandrel
9.8 Pressure Control Head
Weight 1400 lbs
Dimensions (height x diameter) 12.8 ft X 2.4 ft
Flow tube I Stuffing Box Size 1/8 slickline, 7/32, 5/16, 7/16 of braided wire
9.9 Testing Procedure Outline
The summary outline test procedures are conducted in preparation for standard well
operations.
o Subsea MUX function test
o System Function and Verification
o ROV Testing of EDP Connector
o Secondary Disconnect Communication Test
o Subsea Pressure Testing Operations
o Retainer Valve,X-Over Valve and Body Test
o EDP Gasket and Lower Cutting Valve Test
o Upper Cutting Valve and Annulus Valve Test
o Retainer Valve and Annulus Valve Test
o Annulus and Production Bore Test
o Operations Testing
o Emergency Disconnect and Deadman Sequence Testing
o Deadman Lower Cutting Valve Test
o Deadman Sequence Testing
o Valve ROV Override Pressure Testing
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9.10 Contingency Procedures Outline
The summary outline contingency procedures are produced subject to vessel and
operational specific requirements, to highlight the possible areas of operational issues
during any particular campaign of work and also to highlight the safety and redundancy
features as well as to ensure offshore personnel are familiar the necessary actions during
operations.
In addition to the contingency procedures it is necessary to tie in these operational
requirements to the marine operations and client operations requirements through job
specific procedures and appropriate bridging documents.
• Grease Injection System
o Injection Control Failure
o Loss of Seal During Wireline
o E Line Mandrel Failure
o System Leaks- Surface
o System Leaks- Subsea
• Hydraulic Control System Failures
o Umbilical Line Leaks
o Well Bore Leaks
o Control System Unresponsive
o Electrical Supply Failure
o Hydraulic Supply Failure
• Chemical Injection System Failures
o Chemical Injection Pump Failure
o Chemical Injection System Leaks
• Hydrate Issues
o Hydrate within Mandrels
o Hydrate within Production Bore
• Stuck Tool Procedures
o Downhole
o Surface I Subsea Equipment
• Communications Contingency
o Power Failure
o Communications Failure
o System Recovery
• Hydraulics Contingency
o ROV Override Open Water Latch
o ROV Override Chemical Injection
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o ROV Override EDP
o ROV Override Well Control
• Master Control Station Contingency
o System Control PLC Issues
o System Control Network Issues
o System Control FO Issues
• System Interlock Contingency
o System Overrides
o Manual Interlock
o Solenoid Management
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SECTION 10
10 EMERGENCY DRILL PROCEDURES
Drills will be conducted as appropriate, at least once a week by each crew. The frequency
may be increased by the TOS Superintendent as required to maintain a high standard of
response from all crew members, and third parties involved in operations onboard
carrying out well servicing an abandonment operation.
10.1 Introduction
The purpose of these drills is to acquaint each crew member and third-party contractor
with his role in any given situation, so he they can perform it promptly, efficiently and
safely.
The drills should (if possible) be conducted unannounced, in a variety of situations,
and the response time for everyone, in their assigned tasks logged. The timings of these
drills should be such that the holding of the drills will not cause operational
difficulties or endanger the operation. The TOS Superintendent will work closely with
the Vessel Master, Toolpusher and TOS Subsea Safety Officer to ensure everyone is aware
of what drill is being carried out where and any outside involvement, if required.
10.2 Emergency Disconnect Procedure
A dynamic positioned vessel and is not anchored in position. This may create an
emergency disconnection situation due to a number of reasons examples being:
• Imminent collision with another vessel
• Sudden deterioration in weather conditions
• Failure of the DP system
Drills will be tailored to reflect these and other situations which may arise onboard the
vessel. The DP Traffic Light system will inform the Well Intervention Control Cab,
(doghouse),and ROV Control of a problem. During normal operations, the green light will
be active.
10.2.1 Emergency Disconnect- Subsea Wireline
During normal operations, and if possible the DPO (Dynamic Positioning Officer) on the
bridge will inform the TOS Well Operations Supervisor that the vessel will be going to
Yellow status.
TOS Subsea Superintendent will instigate a DP downgrade to Yellow status for the Drill.
1. Master Alarm panel in "Doghouse" will sound and indicate that the vessel has gone
to yellow. TOS Subsea Well Operations Supervisor will confirm that the SIL
Hydraulic Technician is standing by and in communication.
2. TOS Subsea Well Operations Supervisor will contact the Bridge via the"Talk
Back" and confirm status.
If slickline were shallow they would be instructed to pull back into the riser. If deep they
would hold at depth until given further instructions.
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3. Well Operations crew will man positions and check in vis radio with Well
Operations Supervisor.
4. Well Operations Supervisor will inform Superintendent via radio:
o Yellow Status, Bridge on Talk Back
o Wireline in position and in communication
o Crew standing by and in communication
o SIL Panel manned and in communication
o ROV in communication
5. TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform Well Operations Supervisor to simulate
DP Downgrade to red status and vessel is losing position.
6. Well Operations Supervisor will instruct crew via radio link to begin controlled
pay out on control umbilical.
7. Well Operations Supervisor will instruct wireline to:
o Commence controlled payout of wireline
OR
o Standby ready to cut wire
8. Well Operations Supervisor will inform all personnel to standby for
disconnection. Bridge to confirm they are unable to hold station.
9. Well Operations Supervisor will instruct SIL Supervisor to cut wireline in hole,
close in well and disconnect umbilical's.
10. Crew will recover umbilical's. Wireline will recover wireline and secure. Well
Operations Supervisor will inform Bridge that all lines are clear and secure on
surface.
11. On completion of drill, wash up meeting will be held with all personnel involved
and any recommendations noted and discussed.
Fail safe valves will automatically close on release of break-away system.
10.2.2 Emergency Disconnect- Coiled Tubing
During normal coiled tubing operations, via the Tie-Back Riser System, the DPO
(Dynamic Positioning Officer) on the bridge will inform the TOS Well Operations.
Supervisor that the vessel will be going to Yellow status.
TOS Subsea Superintendent will instigate a DP downgrade to status Yellow for the drill.
1. Master Alarm panel in "Dog House" and the Coiled Tubing Control Cab will sound
and indicate that the vessel has gone to yellow. Well Operations Supervisor will
confirm via radio that Coiled Tubing have suspended operations and that the SIL
Hydraulic Technician is standing by and in communication.
2. Well Operations Supervisor will contact the bridge via the "Talk Back" and
confirm status.
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If coiled tubing were shallow, they would be instructed to pull back into the riser. If deep,
they would hold at depth and await further instructions.
3. Well Operations crew will man positions, check in via radio with the Well
Operations Supervisor.
4. Well Operations Supervisor will inform Superintendent via radio:
o Yellow Status, Bridge on Talk Back
o Coiled Tubing in position and in communication
o Crew standing by and in communication
o SIL Panel manned and in communication
o ROV in communication
5. TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform Well Operations Supervisor to simulate
DP downgrade to red status and that vessel is losing position.
6. Well Operations Supervisor will instruct crew to begin a controlled pay out on
control umbilical.
7. Well Operations Supervisor, will inform everyone to standby for disconnection.
Bridge to confirm they are unable to hold station.
8. Well Operations Supervisor will inform SIL Hydraulic Technician to carry out full
Emergency Disconnection of the riser.
9. Well Operations Supervisor will inform bridge that riser has been disconnected.
10. Bridge informs Well Operations Supervisor that they cannot maintain position.
Well Operations Supervisor informs SIL Technician to disconnect control
umbilical's.
11. Crew will recover umbilical's and secure. Well Operations Supervisor will inform
bridge that all lines are clear and secure on surface.
12. On completion of drill, wash up meeting will be held with all personnel involved
and any recommendations will be discussed, drill will be logged in the DPR log.
10.2.3 UWG Emergency Disconnect Procedure
The UWG Disconnect can be achieved in a safe and controlled manner by depressing a
single ESD Disconnect button.
The ESD Disconnect button automatically vents down all control hoses, except for the
packer lines. After a pre-determined time, it then energizes the subsea disconnect
function. This releases the lock down mechanism and drives the stab plates apart,
allowing the umbilical to be pulled free from the BHA. The BHA will continue to
be securely locked in place in the wellbore with all barriers intact.
In general the DP status levels will force the following:
Yellow: In the case of a YELLOW alert, actions will be taken to make the well
secure and prepare for disconnecting on the RED status. The specific actions will depend
on the current operation.
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Red: Any time the RED alert is activated with the BHA in the well the ESD
Disconnect will be initiated immediately. The ESD Disconnect will also be initiated
immediately on the instruction of the UWG Supervisor or TOS Subsea Superintendent.
More specifically the procedures will follow the outline following: During Deployment
Yellow : If the assembly is being deployed and the packers have not been set, the tools
will be picked up into open water below the vessel.
Red: Recover BHA back to the vessel with live upper guns. If the lower guns have already
entered the well they will be disconnected at the drop sub and allowed to fall down the
well.
With the BHA Set in the Wellhead
Yellow The system will be made secure ready for disconnect.
In the case of an intermittent YELLOW alert, or if there is a warning of severe weather
then cementing operations will not commence.
If the YELLOW alert is intermittent and cementing operations are underway the
UWG Supervisor will make the decision whether to continue cementing or shut down
the operation.
If the YELLOW alert is frequent and cementing operations are underway the cementing
operation will shut down immediately.
If the decision to shut down the operation has been made, then pumping will stop.
Lines will be flushed with seawater. Cement already pumped into the casing will be
displaced into position if there is enough time. Circulating and return line valves and all
pilot valves will then be closed. Any remaining cement will be dumped overboard.
Personnel will then await further instruction.
Red Any time the RED alert is activated, the ESD Disconnect will be initiated
immediately. The ESD Disconnect will also be initiated immediately on the instruction
of the UWG Supervisor or TOS Subsea Superintendent. Once the umbilical comes free
of the BHA it will be recovered to surface for inspection and cleaning.
The allowable vessel offsets for various water depths are given in the project specific
Well Operations Manual, based on a maximum of 5 degrees pull at the wellhead. This
data is input into the ESD system for the current well so that the RED alert is triggered at
the correct offset.
10.3 Well Control Drills
The following drills are to be conducted as appropriate on all operations which require
a hydrostatic barrier.
10.3.1 Introduction
When the Subsea Intervention Lubricator is configured for pumping and circulating
operations, the following drills will be carried out.
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10.3.2 Wireline in Cased Hole
• TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform the Well Operations Supervisor the level
indicator is showing an increase.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct pumping to cease for flow check.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct SIL via radio to close in well, by closing
supply and return valves. Wireline will all stop.
• Well Operations Supervisor will inform Bridge of operational change and
prepare to revoke any hot work permits.
• Record gain, pressure etc.
• On completion of drill, wash up meeting will be held with all personnel involved
and any recommendations will be discussed, drill will be logged in DPR.
10.3.3 Pumping in Cased Hole
• TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform the Well Operations Supervisor the rate
of returns has increased.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct pumping to cease for flow check.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct SIL via radio to close in well, by closing
supply and return valves.
• Well Operations Supervisor will inform Bridge of operational change and
prepare to revoke any hot work permits.
• Record gain, pressure etc.
and any recommendations will be discussed, drill will be logged in DPR.
10.3.4 Trip Drill
Running and pulling tubulars through the Subsea Intervention Lubricator will take place
to spot balanced cement plugs inside the casing, or to circulate out oil-based mud etc.
Although the operation will primarily take place above tested mechanical barriers, trip
drills will be conducted to assure continued personnel awareness.
• TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform the Well Operations Supervisor that
the ROV has monitored flow from the lubricator.
• Well Operations Supervisor will inform crew to stab OPEN TIW valve and make
up, CLOSE TIW valve.
• Ensure heave compensator is open and operational, space out to ensure
coupling is clear of BOP.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct SIL Technician to close BOP- simulate.
• Set heave compensator- simulate.
• Line up to record pressure- simulate.
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and any recommendations will be discussed drill will be logged in the DPR.
10.3.5 Coiled Tubing Pumping
Running and pulling coiled tubing through the Subsea Intervention Lubricator will take
place to spot balanced cement plugs inside the casing, or to circulated out oil-based
mud etc. Although the operation will primarily take place above tested mechanical
barriers, trip drills will be conducted to assure continued personnel awareness.
• TOS Subsea Superintendent will inform the Well Operations Supervisor that
Coiled Tubing has monitored flow at surface.
• Well Operations Supervisor will instruct crew to CLOSE manual choke on choke
manifold, and observe pressure build up.
• Line up to commence bull-heading, down both annulus and coiled tubing
simulate.
• Prepare to close in Quad BOP, and Subsea BOP.
and any recommendations will be discussed, drill will be logged in the DPR
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SECTION 11
11 SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Hydrate is frozen gas, commonly methane. Hydrates are created by the reaction of natural
gas with water, under certain conditions of pressure and temperature. They are
composed of approximately 10% hydrocarbon and 90% water and exist in varying forms,
from solid "ice like" crystals to jelly like mush.
A quantity of free water must be present in the flow-stream for hydrate formation. The
vapour phase is incapable of supplying sufficient water at any localized point. Both H2S
and C02 will accelerate hydrate formation at high temperature, while liquid
hydrocarbon inhibits their formation
11.1 Hydrates
Hydrates cause plugging of lines, valves, chokes lubricators etc. they are particularly
prone to form where there are restrictions to flow, creating a pressure drop i.e. across
valves, chokes etc. and where there is a drop-in temperature at the seabed. Where hydrates
are expected, glycol and methanol should be used, with water for flushing, and should have
at least a 50/50 mix of waterglycoI.
Hydrates pose a serious safety problem, because they can occur rapidly at any time when
the conditions are suitable. They can form a total blockage, making valves difficult or
impossible to function, restricting access to the wellbore. Additionally, they can trap
Wireline causing a major well control problem.
If hydrates have formed, producing a blockage, it is advisable to balance the pressure
across the blockage, during dispersion. Great care should be taken when breaking
connections, where hydrates have formed in case of trapped pressure remains behind the
hydrate plug.
When working on gas condensate wells always ensure there is a supply of glycol and
methanol on the vessel. In Subsea Wireline operations, 50/50 mix of water glycol has
proved very effective in combating hydrates, additionally, methanol injection during
certain operations has also proved very effective.
11.1.1 Recommendations
• Flushing medium for lubricator and riser must be 50/50 water/glycol.
• Methanol injection to be operational at all times.
• On installation of tool-string and /or coiled tubing in Subsea lubricator and I or
riser, flush to 50/50 mix before pressure testing and opening well.
• Always open well with at least 100 psi. above SITHP.
• Confirm all cavities are clear before removing HP Cap or Subsea lubricator.
11.2 Carbon Dioxide (C02)
Carbon Dioxide can cause asphyxiation and will be bled off in dedicated area of the
vessel. Generally Carbon Dioxide will not pose a safety risk unless concentrations are
Page 70 of 74
for
Suspended Wells
very high. Under these circumstances, the vessel sits always with the head into the weather,
with the dedicated venting area at the stern, but the wind direction must be monitored
at all times during these types of operations and must be part of the permit to work.
11.3 Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S)
Hydrogen Sulphide is an extremely toxic gas and even in low concentrations can cause
loss of consciousness, and death. It can be identified in low concentrations (1 - 30
ppm) by its characteristic smell of rotten eggs. At higher concentrations it becomes
sweetish and above 150 ppm,ol factory paralysis occurs, and the sense of smell can no
longer be relied upon. If working on a well with potential H2S, an H2S contingency
program, must be included in the well operations program and breathing apparatus
and additional H2S detectors installed. A Third- Party specialist company will be required
to install cascade systems etc. H2S drills, and sensor calibrations must be successfully
completed prior to commencement of operations.
H2S is absorbed by steel and causes embrittlement, it must be confirmed that all Wireline
and well control equipment is certified "fit for purpose" in H2S conditions.
When bleeding off pressure at surface, BA sets must be worn, and gas checks carried
out at regular intervals. Bleeding off any hydrocarbon inventory will always be, with the
vessels head into the weather, and from the dedicated area on the vessel.
H2S is heavier than air and will collect in low points on the vessel, during these
types of operations, all accommodation doors and hatches will be kept closed, this will
stop any accumulation inside.
If H2S is detected anywhere on the vessel cease operations, close in well and suspend all
further operations until the source can be identified. Notify the TOS Subsea
Superintendent and Client immediately.
Page 71 of 74
Thien Nam Offshore Well Control & Policy
Manual for Plugging & Abandonment of
Production and Suspended Wells
SECTION 12
12 ENCLOSURES
12.1 Abandonment Operations SIL I LRA (No Coiled Tubing)
OPERATION BARRIER BARRIER OPTIONS
REQUIREMENT
Through Wellhead with Two Mechanical Production Casing I Hanger
Subsea Lubricator, with no One Hydrostatic (if Previous set cement plug
Subsea Christmas Tree required)
Slickline Lubricator Stuffing Box
Upper Blind Ram Middle
Variable Ram
Wire Cutting Gate Valve, Shear I Seal
Ram
Blind Ram
Electric- Line Lubricator Stuffing Box Upper
Blind Ram Middle Variable Ram
Wire Cutting Gate Valve
Shear I Seal Ram, Blind Ram
Shut-In Upper Blind Ram Middle
Variable Ram Wire Cutting
Gate Valve
Shear I Seal Ram, Blind Ram
Pumping Production Valve
Annulus Valve Shear I
Seal Ram Blind Ram,
Kill Fluid
12.2 Well Service Operations- SIL.

REQUIREMENT
Through Wellhead with Two Mechanical Production Packer Tubing Hanger
Subsea Lubricator with no Annulus Seals Christmas Tree Valves
Subsea Christmas Tree Tubing
High Pressure Cap Removal Production Swab Valve
Production Master Valve
Annulus Swab Valve Annulus
Master Valve
SSSV
Slick-Line Lubricator Stuffing Box
Upper Blind Ram Middle
Variable Ram
Production Swab Valve
Electric Line Lubricator Liquid Seal
Stuffing Box
Page 72 of 74
Middle Variable Ram

Lower Variable Ram
12.3 Subsea Tree Removal

REQUIREMENT
Tree Removal Two Mechanical Production Packer
Kill Fluid
Annulus Sub Surface Safety Valve
Tubing Cement Plugs
Deep Set Tubing Plug
Tubing Hanger Plug
12.4 Well Service Operations - Riser

REQUIREMENT
Through Wellhead with
Subsea Lubricator, with no
Subsea Xmas Tree
Slickline Production Swab Valve
Annulus Swab Valve
Production Master Valve
Annulus Master Valve
SSSV
High Pressure Cap Removal Lubricator Stuffing Box
Upper Blind Ram Middle Variable
Ram Wire Cutting Gate Valve
Slickline Upper Blind Ram
(Prior to the installation of Middle Variable Ram Wire
the Tie-Back Riser)
Cutting Gate Valve Shear/Seal
Ram
Blind Ram
Coiled Tubing Stripper
NOTE, tree and SSSV valves Surfaced Quad BOP
will be configured to stay in 1. Blind Ram
the OPEN positioning, in the
event of an emergency 2. Shear Ram
disconnect. 3. Slip Ram
4. Pipe Ram Upper Blind Ram
Middle Variable Ram
Subsea Mono-Block BOP
1. Gate Valve
2. Shear/Seal
3. Pipe/Slip
Kill Fluid
(contingency
Page 73 of 74
12.5 Well Abandonment Operations - Riser

REQUIREMENT
Through Wellhead with Two Production I Casing Hanger
Mechanical Previous set cement plugs
Subsea Lubricator with Tie-
back Riser for Coiled Tubing
One Hydrostatic (if required)
Slickline (Prior to Lubricator Stuffing Box Upper
installation Blind BOP Middle Variable BOP
of the Tie-Back Riser) Wire Cutting Gate Valve
Coiled Tubing Stripper
Surface Quad BOP
1. Blind Ram
2. Shear Ram
3. Slip Ram
4. Pipe Ram Upper Blind Ram
Middle Variable Ram
Subsea Mono-Block BOP
1. Gate/Valve
2. Shear/Seal
3. Pipe/Slip
Production Valve
Annulus Valve
1. Shear/Seal Ram
2. Blind Ram Kill Fluid
(Contingency
Page 74 of 74

TOS-POC-P&A-QA-003 - Rev.A Well Control Analysis

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TOS-POC-P&A-QA-003 - Rev.A Well Control Analysis

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PROVISION OF ENGINEERING AND EXECUTION OF PLUGGING AND

ABANDONMENT OF DH-5X, DH-9X, DH-10X, DH-11X WELL AT DAI

WELL CONTROL & POLICY MANUAL

A 28/06/21 TQ Khai 28/06/21 HB Cuong 28/06/21 LT Ha 30/06/21

REVISION RECORD SHEET

Date Revision No. Section Revision Description

28/06/2021 A All Issued for Review

Type of Test Leakage Criteria Test Vol.

4.2.6 Table 2 - Closable Barrier Systems

CLOSABLE BARRIER SYSTEMS

Closed Upper Blind BOP

BOP Failure in Slickline lubricator

Design Water Depth 5,000 ft

9.4 Emergency Disconnect Package

• Weight 88,000 lbs

9.7 Lubricator Section

12.2 Well Service Operations- SIL.

Middle Variable Ram

12.3 Subsea Tree Removal

12.4 Well Service Operations - Riser

12.5 Well Abandonment Operations - Riser

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