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2 contracting parties: A buyer and seller can trade a quantity q 2 [0, 1] at a price P .
Buyer’s valuation v and seller’s production cost c are uncertain when contracting takes
place and can be influenced by investments
For example:
– Buyer invests in marketing to increase price that he can sell the good at.
– Seller invests in modern infrastructure to reduce production cost.
Buyer: vq P (j)
Seller: P cq (i)
Timing:
1
First Best
Assume that
c H > vH > c L > vL
– q = 1 if ✓ = (vH , cL )
– q = 0 otherwise
0
if b (vH cL ) = jf b
0
j f b (vH cL ) = if b
Nash Equilibrium
✓ is observable to both parties ex-post, but it is not contractable ex-ante, nor are the
investment levels i and j.
Assume that ex-post bargaining gives each party half of the surplus.
1 ⇤ 0 1 ⇤
i (vH cL ) = (j ⇤ ) and j (vH cL ) = 0
(j ⇤ )
2 2
Solutions ?
2
Default Options
0
q̃ (cH cL ) = if b
Consider the following contractual mechanism (after the state of nature ✓ is revealed):
Buyer will o↵er (P, q) such that seller is indi↵erent between accepting the o↵er and re-
jecting it.
0
First order condition: q̃ (cH cL ) = (i), so that i = if b .
Buyer maximizes
8 9
>
> >
>
>
< h i >
=
max if b j (vH cL ) P̃ if b cL q̃ 1 if b cH q̃ (j)
j >
> | {z } | {z } >
>
>
: total surplus >
;
seller’s payo↵
0
First order condition: if b (vH cL ) = (j), so that j = j f b .
Comments:
3
– Investment efficiency for the buyer since he’s the residual claimant ...
– ... but why is there investment efficiency for the seller who has no bargaining power
at all?
– Incentive to invest comes from availability of default option, which becomes more
attractive when cost is cL and this can be influenced through i.
References
Che Y.K. and Hausch D.B., (1999), “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting”,
American Economic Review.
Hart O. and Moore J., (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”, Econometrica.