Practical guide on admissibility criteria

application with the Court and whose activities were taken over by another firm which wished to
pursue the proceedings).
55. A case may be struck out of the list because the applicant ceases to have victim status/locus
standi. Regarding resolution of the case at domestic level after the admissibility decision, see Ohlen
v. Denmark (striking out); for an agreement transferring rights which were the subject of an
application being examined by the Court, see Dimitrescu v. Romania, §§ 33-34.
56. The Court also examines whether the case should be struck out of its list on one or more of the
grounds set forth in Article 37 of the Convention, in the light of events occurring subsequent to the
lodging of the application, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant can still claim to be a “victim”
(Pisano v. Italy (striking out) [GC], § 39), or even irrespective of whether or not he or she can
continue to claim victim status. For developments occurring after a decision to relinquish jurisdiction
in favour of the Grand Chamber, see El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands
(striking out) [GC], §§ 28-35; after the application had been declared admissible, see Shevanova
v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], §§ 44 et seq.; and after the Chamber judgment, see Sisojeva and Others
v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], § 96.

f. Death of the applicant

57. In principle, an application lodged by the original applicant before his or her death may be
continued by heirs or close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings, provided
that they have a sufficient/legitimate interest in the case (López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC],
§§ 71-73; Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC]; Tagiyev and Huseynov v. Azerbaijan, §§ 23-24
and the references cited therein; Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, § 71; Ergezen v. Turkey, § 30; Pais
Pires de Lima v. Portugal, §§ 36-40; Karastelev and Others v. Russia, § 51; Mile Novaković v. Croatia,
§§ 33-34).
58. However, where the applicant has died in the course of the proceedings and either no one has
come forward with a wish to pursue the application or the persons who have expressed such a wish
are not heirs or sufficiently close relatives of the applicant, and cannot demonstrate that they have
any other legitimate interest in pursuing the application, the Court will strike the application out of
its list (Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], § 50; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], § 57; Burlya and
Others v. Ukraine, §§ 70-75) save for in very exceptional cases where the Court finds that respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires a continuation of the
examination of the case (Paposhvili v. Belgium [GC], §§ 129-133; Delecolle v. France, § 39; Karner
v. Austria, §§ 25 and seq.).
59. See, for example, Raimondo v. Italy, § 2, and Stojkovic v. the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, § 25 (widow and children); X v. France, § 26 (parents); Malhous v. the Czech Republic
(dec.) [GC] (nephew and potential heir); Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), Ivko v. Russia, §§ 64-70 and
Delecolle v. France, §§ 39-44 (unmarried or de facto partner); contrast with Thévenon v. France
(dec.) (universal legatee not related to the deceased); Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], §§ 50-51
(niece); Savenko and Others v. Russia, § 53 (former wife who divorced the applicant twelve years
before his death and did not have any close contact with him afterwards).

4. Representation
60. Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than
lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act,
duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and
explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they
purport to act before the Court (Post v. the Netherlands (dec.); Centre for Legal Resources on behalf
of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], § 102 - see also Oliyevskyy v. Ukraine (dec.), §§ 16-22 and
V.M. and Others v. Belgium (striking out) [GC], §§ 32-41, where the applicants did not maintain

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 Practical guide on admissibility criteria

contact with their representative and contrast with N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], §§ 69-79, and the
references therein, where the representative remained in contact with both applicants via
telephone and WhatsApp, and the existence of special circumstances regarding respect for human
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the Court to continue the
examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine)). On the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev
v. Georgia, §§ 44-49; on the authenticity of an application, see Velikova v. Bulgaria, §§ 48-52.
61. As a general rule, minor children are represented before the Court by their parents. The
standing as the natural parent suffices to afford him or her the necessary power to apply to the
Court on the child’s behalf in order to protect the child’s interests also, even—or indeed especially
—if that parent is in conflict with the authorities and criticises their decisions and conduct as not
being consistent with the rights guaranteed by the Convention (Iosub Caras v. Romania, § 21). In any
event, the key criterion in relation to questions of locus standi is the risk that children’s interests
might not be brought to its attention and that they would be denied effective protection of their
Convention rights (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], § 157). In cases arising out of disputes
between parents, it is in principle the parent entitled to custody and therefore entrusted with
safeguarding the child’s interests, who has standing to act on the child’s behalf (Hromadka and
Hromadkova v. Russia, no. 22909/10, § 119, 11 December 2014; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia, § 43).
However, the situation may be different if the Court identifies conflicting interests between a parent
and child in the case brought before it, for example, if serious joint parental child neglect has
occurred (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], § 158, and E.M. and Others v. Norway, §§ 64-
65; compare and contrast with Pedersen and Others v. Norway, § 45).
62. Moreover, special considerations may arise in the case of victims of alleged breaches of
Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention at the hands of the national authorities, having regard to the
victims’ vulnerability on account of their age, sex or disability, which rendered them unable to lodge
a complaint on the matter with the Court, due regard also being paid to the connections between
the person lodging the application and the victim. In such cases, applications lodged by individuals
on behalf of the victim(s), even though no valid form of authority was presented, have thus been
declared admissible (Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC],
§ 103; however, compare and contrast with Lambert and Others v. France [GC], §§ 96-106). See, for
example, İlhan v. Turkey [GC], § 55, where the complaints were brought by the applicant on behalf
of his brother, who had been ill-treated; Y.F. v. Turkey, § 29, where a husband complained that his
wife had been compelled to undergo a gynaecological examination; S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United
Kingdom, Commission decision, where a complaint was brought by a solicitor on behalf of children
he had represented in domestic proceedings, in which he had been appointed by the guardian ad
litem; C.N. v. Luxembourg, § 28-33, where the power of attorney had been given by the parents
whose parental authority was later revoked; V.D. and Others v. Russia, §§ 80-84, where an
application was brought by a guardian acting on behalf of minors. See also, by contrast, Lambert and
Others v. France [GC], § 105, where the Court held that the parents of the direct victim, who was
unable to express his wishes regarding a decision to discontinue nutrition and hydration which
allowed him to be kept alive artificially, did not have standing to raise complaints under Articles 2, 3
and 8 of the Convention in his name or on his behalf; and Gard and Others v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), § 63-70, which differed from Lambert and Others since the direct victim was a minor, who
had never been able to express his views or live an independent life, and where the Court discussed
whether the parents of the direct victim had standing to raise complaints under Articles 2 and 5 on
his behalf, but did not come to a final conclusion on this point, given that the issues were also raised
by the applicants on their own behalf.
63. In Blyudik v. Russia (§§ 41-44), relating to the lawfulness of a placement in a closed educational
institution for minors, the Court stated that the applicant was entitled to apply to the Court to
protect the interest of the minor under Article 5 and 8 as regards her placement in the institution:
the daughter was a minor at the time of the events in issue, as well as at the time when the

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