Practical guide on admissibility criteria

provided with sufficient redress (Webster v. the United Kingdom (dec.) and the references cited
therein).
The imposition of a more lenient sentence by a domestic criminal court on the ground of the
excessive length of the proceedings may amount to an adequate acknowledgment of and sufficient
redress for delays in those proceedings (Article 6 § 1), provided that the reduction is express and
measurable (Chiarello v. Germany, §§ 54-59). The mitigation of a sentence may also be relevant for
removing victim status in respect of the length of a detention on remand in breach of Article 5 § 3
(Ščensnovičius v. Lithuania, §§ 88-93; compare and contrast Malkov v. Estonia, §§ 40-41). Victim
status as regards the right to a fair trial cannot be lost when another judgment, on a different issue
from that alleged by the person concerned, was rendered in favour of him in another proceeding
(Sine Tsaggarakis A.E.E. v. Greece, §§ 27-31).
51. In some other cases whether an individual remains a victim may also depend on the amount of
compensation awarded by the domestic courts or at least on the possibility of seeking and obtaining
compensation for the damage sustained, having regard to the facts about which he or she complains
before the Court and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the
award (Normann v. Denmark (dec.); Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], § 202; see also Jensen and
Rasmussen v. Denmark (dec.); Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], § 262; J.B. and Others v. Hungary
(dec.), § 59). With regard to the sufficiency of compensation awarded to an association representing
several individuals, see Društvo za varstvo upnikov v. Slovenia (dec.), §§ 48-64. The express
acknowledgment at the domestic level of a violation of an applicant’s right to a fair trial within a
reasonable time in criminal proceedings may not be sufficient to remove that applicant’s victims
status, in the absence of any award of compensation or reduction of the sentence (Tempel v. the
Czech Republic, §§ 77-83). Conversely, in the case of a lawyer whose lawyer-client privilege had been
breached by intercepting his telephone conversation and by forcing him to appear as a witness at his
client’s trial, an implicit acknowledgment of the violation by excluding the respective evidence from
the file together with the possibility, for that lawyer, to seek compensation by filing a civil claim,
were deemed to be sufficient to deprive him of his victim status in relation to Article 8 of the
Convention (Mateuț v. Romania (dec.), §§ 33-39).
52. An applicant who has been forced by adverse environmental conditions to abandon his home
and subsequently to buy another house with his own funds does not cease to be a victim in respect
of an alleged violation of his right to respect for his private life and his home under Article 8 of the
Convention (Yevgeniy Dmitriyev v. Russia, §§ 37-38).
53. For other specific situations, see Marshall and Others v. Malta, §§ 33-34, 46-47 (Article 6); Arat
v. Turkey, § 47 (Article 6); Constantinescu v. Romania, §§ 40-44 (Articles 6 and 10); Guisset v. France,
§§ 66-70 (Article 6); Chevrol v. France, §§ 30 et seq. (Article 6); Kerman v. Turkey, § 106 (Article 6);
Moskovets v. Russia, § 50 (Article 5); Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 168-175; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia,
§ 51, (Article 8); X. and Y. v. Romania, §§ 109-114 (Article 8); Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. v. Turkey
(dec.), §§ 47-51, (Article 10); Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, § 33 (Article 11); Moon v. France, §§ 29 et seq.
(Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); D.J. and A.-K.R. v. Romania (dec.), §§ 77 et seq. (Article 2 of Protocol No.
4); and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], § 115 (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7); Dalban v. Romania [GC],
§ 44 (Article 10); Güneş v. Turkey (dec.) (Article 10); Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey, §§ 39-40,
(Article 2 of Protocol No. 1).
54. The fact that a legal person is declared bankrupt during the Convention proceedings does not
necessarily deprive it of its victim status (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy
v. Finland [GC], § 94). The same applies to a company which has ceased to exist and whose sole
shareholders have indictated their interest in continuing the application in its name (Euromak Metal
Doo v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, §§ 32-33, concerning a tax dispute under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; see also Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA
v. Switzerland, § 43, concerning a company which ceased to operate after having lodged its

European Court of Human Rights 18/110 Last update: 31.08.2022