SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6567. April 16, 2008.]

JOSE C. SABERON, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERNANDO T.

LARONG, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J : p

In a Complaint 1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court,
complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T.
Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and
offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition 2 against Surigaonon Rural
Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose
family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of
the bank's registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the
bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles, which
were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife, despite
alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the
bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses 3 to the Petition stating,
inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed
by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to
coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain —

xxx xxx xxx. 4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder 5 to

complainant's Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious,
viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis", complainant filed the
present complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the
legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his
grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate
secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his
(complainant's) wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence,
there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.

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 Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of
damages upon his wife and "her children" who were thus deprived of the use
of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment 6 to the present complaint against him, respondent
argues that: (1) there was "nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper" in the way he used the word "blackmail" to characterize the suit
against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is
not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other
party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005, 7 the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006, 8 IBP
Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word "blackmail"
connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof
is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not
offensive, to characterize that person's act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present
factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client's
claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not
state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant
to Canon 15 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that
were "unnecessary and irrelevant to the case", respondent went "overboard
and crossed the line" of professional conduct. In view thereof, he
recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and
suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007, 10 the IBP Board
of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the
case for lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007,
transmitted the records of the case to this Court. 11
Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to
this Court via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule
139-B 12 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as
illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section
12 (a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be "reduced
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 to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it
is based."
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence,
complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of
suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by
respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction
involving moral turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the
administrative complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was
in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer
objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation
was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the
chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against
his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the
Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made
in any complaint or initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had
made serious imputations of wrongdoing against his clients — the bank for
allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive
and offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession,
with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of
some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant's
indignation for which he asked the latter's and this Court's clemency.
In his Reply, 13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment
reveals the latter's propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that
respondent's claim that the administrative complaint was a "harassing act",
deducible from the "fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which
has prospered . . . against the same rural bank and its owner", is bereft of
factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin,
knew of the two criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and,
as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel
arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him
and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for
clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
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 fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to
advance the interests of their clients. 14
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. 15 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. 16
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged. 17 In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
18

It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of

respondent were made not before a court but before the BSP. A similar
submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck down in
Lubiano v. Gordolla, 19 thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing
the National Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. 20
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.
Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the
Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that
lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment
in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their
clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in
making such remark or comment. 21
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial
proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged,
however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry. 22 The test of relevancy has
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 been stated, thus:
. . . . As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to
make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal
rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy
that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In
order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not
be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry
in the course of the trial . . . . 23
Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of
judicial proceedings, the ascription of 'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder
filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the subject
matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's alleged alien
citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply
discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the
further allegation that the Petition was "another in a series of blackmail
suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain." Hence, such
allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering that
complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases
against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of
their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
indeed only a "Notice of Resolution" was transmitted to this Court, together
with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January 18,
2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in
which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the
procedural requirement that the IBP Board of Governors' decision shall state
clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is based.
Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. —
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by
the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon
such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very important function not just to
inform the parties of the reason for the decision as would enable them on
appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in
agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has
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 reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 24

With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this

Court has consistently considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney
as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed
with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious
administrative charges. 25
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such
transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit respondent's
disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies, the Court finds it best to
temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is
considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent,
Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using
intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a
repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 1-5. Filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 22,
2004.
2. Id. at 6-11.
3. Id. at 12-19.
4. Id. at 13; p. 2 of the Answer.
5. Id. at 26-35. Denominated as "Traverse to Reply", the rejoinder stated on
paragraph 4, as follows:

4. Most notably, after Respondents revealed that the instant Petition is a

mere ruse employed by Petitioner to blackmail the former for
financial gain and after ample showing that this action is baseless and
fruitless, petitioner, finding his foot in his mouth, now changes gear and goes
amuck by raising new matters purely extraneous to his original cause of
action . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
6. Id. at 40-47. Filed before the OBC on February 1, 2005.
7. Id. at 192.
8. Id. at 187-190.
9. Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.
10. Rollo, p. 186.
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 11. Id. at 185.
12. Section 2 (c) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or
imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme
Court within (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise.
13. Rollo, pp. 243-249.
14. Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397, 420.
15. Rubio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84032, August 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 60,
63.

16. Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 408, 421;
Nuñez v. Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 364,
citing Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. Florido, 465 Phil. 1, 7 (2004); Cruz v.
Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 211, 219.
17. Section 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Vide Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,
455 Phil. 1, 21 (2003).
18. Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 465, 473; Torres
v. Javier, supra.
19. A.C. No. 2343, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 459, 462.
20 Supra, citing Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-
27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 17.
21. Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 17 at 19.
22. Torres v. Atty. Javier, supra note 16 at 418; Villalon v. Buendia, 315 Phil.
663, 667 (1995); Gutierrez v. Abila et al., 197 Phil. 616, 621 (1982).
23. Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 21. Vide Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No.
156183, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 74, 83; Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil.
1010, 1013 (1961).
24. Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, April 27, 2001, 357 SCRA 406, 412, cited
in Cruz v. Cabrera, supra note 16 at 216-217.
25. Nuñez v. Astorga, supra note 16 at 354.

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