Gerald E.

Peabody

SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION*

Thomas Kuhnl views scientific advancement not as the incremen-

tal process of accumulating individual discoveries and inven-
tions that is the conventional view, but in terms of the arti-
culation of a sequence of paradigms. Each paradigm in
succession allows an account of a wider range of natural pheno-
mena or an account of previously recognized phenomena with
greater precision. During periods of normal science, research
is conducted in terms of the world view determined by the para-
digm. The paradigm prescribes which problems are suitable for
investigation and the nature of acceptable solutions. In the
course of normal research anomalies are encountered which are
in conflict with the theories of the paradigm. If intensive
research within the normal rules of the paradigm cannot elimi-
nate the anomaly, a crisis ensues which is frequently resolved
by a scientific revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the
old.

The papers in this issue call for such a revolution in the

paradigm whic provides e world view or curren economic
thought. While Kuhn con inesisanalysis
sciences, his book has had a
to the natural
profound impact upon those in the
social sciences, including the authors here, who are attempting
to come to grips with, and throw off the yoke of, their train-
ing in the social sciences. In this introduction I examine
these papers in the light of Kuhn’s analysis of scientific
research. However, before considering these papers, it is use-
ful to review the major points of Kuhn’s analysis.2
Normal Science

Normal science is the usual activity of the community of schol-

ars engaged in research of a speciality in the natural sciences.
This community of scholars shares a paradigm which contains the
collection of theories, techniques, beliefs, values, and so on
to which the group is committed.3 The paradigm provides the
conceptual framework in which research is conducted; it deter-
mines which question will be asked and determines the form that
answers, to be acceptable, must assume. In the Postscript
Kuhn expands upon this notion by examining four important as-
pects of the paradigm (or disciplinary matrix). The first are
symbolic generalization that allow the use of logical and

*I thank Rick Simon and Howard Wachtel for their cogent com-
ments on a preliminary draft of this paper.

1
 2

mathematical manipulations and function as laws or definitions

of symbols. Next are beliefs in particular models which supply
the permissible metaphors and analogies and help determine what
will be acceptable as a problem solution and what puzzles re-
main to be solved. Values shared by the community are another
important aspect of the paradigm. The most deeply held values
in the natural sciences concern the nature of predictions--they
should be accurate, preferably quantitative, and have well-
_-defied error limits. The fourth item he isolates are
exemplars. These are the set of problem solutions that demon-
strate the empirical content of the theories and provide
examples for training students to see puzzles as like problems
they have already learned to solve.
Mature science is characterized by an unwavering committment to
aparadigm the part of the relevant research community.
on In
the natural sciences there are seldom competing schools addres-
sing the same problem, so the members of the community share
common goals, enjoy full communication, and are usually unani-
mous in their professional judgment. With the paradigms and
hence the foundations of the field taken for granted, each
worker can pursue more specialized problems in greater depth
and detail than would be possible without such agreement. The
research results are reported in specialized journal articles
that are generally understood only by other members of that
research community.

The major activity of normal research is to further articulate

the paradigm. Initially the paradigm provides the answers for
only a few questions, but these are frequently the problems
that invoked the crisis in the prior paradigm. Normal research
activities are geared to determining significant facts, im-
proving the match between facts and theory, and further articu-
lating the theory. The paradigm defines legitimate research
problems and methods, supplies clues to their solution, and
guarantees that the clever researcher will find a solution.
Only thoseproblems which a researcher feels he can solve will
be pursued. Indeed, the paradigm can insulate the community
t from socially important problems if they cannot be stated with-
‘in the conceptual framework the paradigm provides. Thus normal
science activity is mainly puzzle solving. This activity is
intended to fit all phenomena into a pre-formed, inflexible
box; there is no interest on the part of researchers in looking
for new phenomena.

Scientific Crisis

Normal scientific research is a highly cumulative enterprise

and therefore fits the normal image of scientific work with one
major exception--it does not aim at novelty in fact or theory.
 3

However, novelties repeatedly arise. The awareness of novelty

begins when a scientist has the perception that something has
gone wrong. There are two sources of anomalies: novelties of
fact that occur with an unanticipated empirical observation,
and novelties that are associated with inventions of new theory.
A piece of scientific apparatus is used in a particular way
with the assumption that only certain sorts of circumstances
will happen with its use. The first kind of anomaly occurs
when a circumstance is observed that is outside the range of
these instrumental and theoretical expectations. The second
/
7 ,

kind of anomaly occurs when empirical observations do not con-

form to theoretical expectations. In response to this kind of
anomaly a crisis may arise and a new theory emerge.
When an anomaly comes to be seen as more than simply a puzzle
of normal science, the transition to crisis occurs and extra-
ordinary science begins. Attention is then focused on the
anomaly by an increasing number of eminent researchers in the
field. The early attack normally follows the usual rules of
science, but these rules become blurred if the anomaly persists.
If the crisis continues, the rules of normal research are
strongly violated and a number of ad hoc theories are proposed
in attempts to deal with the anomaly. Crises are usually
solved in one of three ways: by finding a normal science solu-
tion, by setting the problem aside for future research, or by
the emergence of a candidate for a new paradigm.

No paradigm is declared invalid unless a replacement is at hand.

A decision to replace the old with a new paradigm involves com-
parisons of both with nature and of each with the other. A
proposal for a new paradigm is often accompanied by strong
resistance since a change requires that previous standards of
beliefs and procedures must be discarded. A paradigm change
involves a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals.
The profession must make a complete transition: it must change
its view of its field, its methods, and its goals and learn to
see nature in a new way.

Scientific Revolutions

Kuhn terms the process whereby a scientific community undergoes

a change in paradigms a scientific revolution. He draws the
following parallel between scientific and political revolutions.
Both have their origins in a growing sense that the existing
institutions have failed to meet the problems posed by the en-
vironment that they have in part created. Political revolutions
aim to change political institutions in ways that those insti-
tutions themselves prohibit. Success therefore requires par-
tially relinquishing one set of institutions in favor of
another, and in the interim the community is not fully governed
4

by institutions at all. As in politics, the choice between

paradigms choice
is a between incompatible modes of community
life; that choice can’t be made by the normal evaluating pro-
cedures of normal science.
,
i
No paradigm can answer all the questions put to it, and no two
paradigms can solve the same set of questions. The debate be-
tween two paradigms thus involves conflict over which problems
are the more important to have solved. The debate is revolu-
tionary in that its resolution lies in criteria external to
science altogether. Ultimately, though, in the natural scien-
ces there is no higher standard than the consent of the rele-
vant scientific community.

Under a new paradigm not only the forms of laws change, but
also the fundamental structural elements of which the universe
is comprised are altered. The successful paradigm tells us
different things about the population of the universe and its
behavior than did the prior paradigm. After the change in
paradigms a scientist works in a different world. The changes
are more than just reinterpretations of observations which
are considered to be fixed by the nature of the environment and
the perceptual apparatus. The post-revolution paradigm may
have the same experimental manipulations as the pre-revolution
paradigm, but these manipulations can have a different inter-
pretation, or even changes in concrete results, in the new
paradigm.
Economic Paradigms
The question arises as to where, if at all, economics fits into
this picture. Kuhn is explicitly concerned only with the
natural sciences and draws most of his supporting evidence from
examples from physics and chemistry. He considers it an open
question whether or not some areas in the social sciences have
reached the paradigm stage. In the course of discussing the
various papers in this issue I will consider them within the
conceptual framework provided by Kuhn’s analysis, but I have
made no attempt to the historical development of
economics in this vein. anal ze
It is clear in many ways that economics is conducted within a
paradigm in a manner very analogous to Kuhn’s conception from
the natural sciences. The community of economic scholars is
easily identified. They conduct research on economic phenomena
under a fairly common set of theories and world view. While
there areseveral schools of economic thought, they generally
agree the basic core of economic theory.
on The competition
among some schools centers on the proper role of the government
 5

within the economy. There is also conflict over the relative

importance of fiscal and monetary policy in maintaining econo-
mic stability. Different schools may also be distinguished by
the mathematical sophistication of their analysis.

Further, the education of prospective economists is similar in

several respects to that for students in the natural sciences.
Textbooks have become the major vehicle for inculcating students
into the paradigm. Original historical literature is very
seldom read in theory courses, and the history of economic
thought as a separate course is being dropped from many univer-
sities’ curricula, as Gordon5 notes. As economic theory is
increasingly expressed in mathematical formulations, problems
and ’exemplars’ are entering into the normal course contents.
(However, this latter aspect is far less developed than it is
in the natural sciences.) George Stigler6 claims that &dquo;the
professional study of economics makes one politically conser- /
vative.&dquo; If true, this statement shows how effectively the
educational system indoctrinates economics’
world view of the orthodox paradigm.

a distinction between the positive

students into

(objective or scientific)
the
__ ji

Economists also feel that they are &dquo;scientists&dquo; and have drawn

and the normative (subjective) aspects of the discipline.

Stigler’s claim that &dquo;economics as a positive science is
ethically--and therefore politically--neutral&dquo;7 makes the point.
Economists are generally in agreement that they are joined in
a search for economic laws that have universal application.

While the analogue between the paradigm structure in economics

and the natural sciences is intriguing, it is not clear that
it is exact. In the natural sciences the paradigm is articu-
lated by a strong interplay between empirical data and a match
of these observations with theoretical predications. This as-
pect of scientific research appears to be largely missing, in
my view, from economic research. The theory of the neo-
classical paradigm has been extensively developed, but there
has been very little comparison of these theoretical develop-
ments with empirical observations. This is not to say that
economists are not engaged in empirical work; they are. But
very little of this work has been framed in a way that allows
the results to test the theory, e.g., measuring the marginal
propensity to consume or the exponents of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function does not test the appropriateness of the under-
lying theory.
There are, of course, a number of methodological difficulties
in making proper estimates of empirical relationships to test
with theory (some of these problems are noted in the paper by
Behr et. al.8),but even after taking these difficulties into
 6

account economists generally do not seem to be terribly con-

scorned that their theory has a minimal empirical base. In
’fact, Coats 9 states that the social sciences are &dquo;much less
concerned with instruments, apparatus, and applications of
theory than the natural sciences, and by the social sciences
context a paradigm may be defined as a ’basic theory’.&dquo;

Thus while orthodox economics does operate under a paradigm, it

is not clear that this paradigm tells us much that is instruc-
tive about the real world. However, this paper is not the
proper place to pursue this question. Let me note this view is
not held solely by young insurgents as the comments by Leontiefl~
attest. It is also amusing to note how one of the more capable,
younger practitioners in the field faces up to this situation:ll

There is practically no direct information

on whether or not labor is paid its marginal pro-
duct. Economists take it as an article of faith
or else claim that it is the best null hypothesis,
and economic theory is based on the assumption
that labor is indeed paid its marginal product.
Without this assumption, much of economic theory
falls apart. The theory of production certainly
does. The convenience of the hypothesis for eco-
nomists, however, does not make it correct.
(In the intervening paragraphs the author
summarizes the evidence concerning the validity
of the marginal productivity theory, he concludes:)

What little evidence this technique

(production function analysis) provides does not
indicate that labor is paid its marginal product...
there are at least some fundamental doubts about
the validity of the productivity theory of distri-
bution. In the rest of this book I shall assume
that labor is paid its marginal product unless
otherwise stated. The reader, however, should at
all times keep in mind that this is as yet an un-
verified assumption, retained because it is crucial
to the concept of human capital and its uses.

Another major difference between the social and natural sci-

ences is that natural scientists seek universal laws that are
assumed to hold for all times. They believe that the basic
constituents of the universe and their interactions have not
changed with time so that the natural laws that operate today
are laws that have applied to the same phenomena throughout all
of time. It is, of course, outside the scope of normal science
to determine whether or not natural science is progressing
 7

, towards the &dquo;truth&dquo; in its succession of paradigms, but that is

what natural scientists think they are doing. Whether or not
/B natural science is coming
, clear that the social sciences
closer to
cannot
the
do
ultimate truth, it is
so, although orthodox
economists claim they are doing so. The nature of our social
institutions, the ways in which they interact, and the ways
that people interact with them, are all subject to constant
change. As Engelsl2 noted, the &dquo;so called ’economic laws’ are

/~not
eternal laws of nature but historic laws which arise and
disappear. &dquo;
Thus the claim of many economists that they are discovering T’
universal truths must be severly qualified. Economists
not only try to find the rules that govern the interactions of
should
/
our current institutions, they should also seek to
understand
how these institutions have developed in the past, how they z
might evolve in the future, and what effect this evolution will
have on the laws in operation today. In making projections
for the future it is especially important to realize that these
B
institutions are products of people and can therefore b6 changed
by people. There may, of course, be fundamental laws of human
behavior that limit or constrain the kinds of institutions and
their interactions that can be developed. But we are far away
from knowing enough about the psychology and sociology of in-
dividuals and groups to know what these laws may be. It seems
more reasonable with our present limited knowledge to assume
that man is flexible enough to adapt to a reasonably wide range
of institutions and that a variety of interactions between
these institutions is possible.

Economists, however, seem to be comfortable with their view

that the world is not changing and that they have discovered I
the truth. To quote Gordon: &dquo;It is, I think, remarkable com-
pared to the physical sciences that an economist’s fundamental
way of viewing
century...it is
the world
tribute
has
to
remained
the
unchanged since the 18th
supremacy of
/
a
purely positivis-
tic intellectual forces that such has been the case.&dquo;13 It is
i

not only remarkable; it is incredible! The world view that )

Gordon refers to is Adam Smith’s postulate that people are ;
, maximizing individuals who interact in a relatively free market.~
fact that contemporary economists find the world of today
he
I similar to that of Adam Smith’s day is more a commentary on
’

~
~
°
their lack of contact with reality than a tribute to their
jectivity. ob-
:J
~―~

But there is a more fundamental reason why the orthodox econo-

mist’s world view has changed little over this period.
evolved as an apology for the developing capitalist
economics
;institutions and remains (as Stigler noted) supportive of those
In the natural sciences the paradigm determines
1.
8

the world view, and only after intensive training is the para-
digm reasonably comprehensible to students of the science.
Because of this isolation the world view of the natural science
paradigms are by and large unaffected by the values and atti-
tudes of the lay public. (Although such has not always been
the case: recall, for example, the trouble that Galileo had
with the Pope when he tried to tell us that the earth wasn’t
the center of the universe.)

A different situationprevails in the social sciences. As mem-

bers of society, all social scientists have vested interests in
she nature of that society. The world view within which a par-
ticular social scientist operates is determined in part by the
world view of the paradigm, but it is also a product of the
social and political experiences that the person underwent in
his individual social and intellectual development. Also,
,social science research derives its support from the major in-
stitutions of the society, e.g., universities and the state,
and historically it has been exceedingly difficult to develop
and sustain an analysis critical of these institutions. Thus
are strong social and institutional reasons why a social
there
science practiced within a particular society generally re-
inflects the world view of that society. The role of political
beliefs in shaping social science paradigms is a major focus of
papers here, so I will return to this point below.
(the
Before leaving this issue, however, I would like to return to
the claim noted above that economics, in its positive role, is
an objective science. The paradigm shapes the world view of
researchers in any specialty. It determines which are the im-
portant behavioral units for study, which interactions are im-
portant, and which questions are relevant and most important.
When a science undergoes a revolution in paradigms, this whole
world view must change. For example, in the revolution from
Newtonian to relativistic mechanics, physicists’ concept of
the nature of the interaction between space and time underwent a
profound change. In Newtonian mechanics space and time were
considered to be independent, while under relativistic mecha-
nics they are felt to be inextricably linked in a curvilinear
four-dimensional space.

If concepts that seem so accessible and concrete as space and

time can change so drastically in the natural sciences, it r
seems unlikely that social scientists can specify units for ~(
analysis and their interactions in a way that is not subjective
At first glance the choice of units for social science-3:~-esearch~-
may seem obvious; an economist is interested in the economic
behavior of individuals and institutions and in the interactive
behavior between these units. But the issue is not that
simple--what is the basic view of man? Which aspects of the
 9

complicated psychology of people do economists focus on? Which

aspects of the complex interactions between people and between
people and institutions are isolated for intensive study? Are
individuals utility maximizers acting in isolation in a free
market, or are they members of a class whose common class in-
terests are defined by that class’s conflicts with other
classes in society? How do we view the entrepreneur? Is he
the dynamic driving force that ensures the continued economic
well-being of society, or is he a mercenary who exploits
by usurping the value of its product to gain his profits?
issue between the orthodox and radical paradigm is drawn
these issues, and neither approach can claim to have an
labor)
The
over
objec- I
I
[~

tive view of the world. The question is not which view is

&dquo;objective,&dquo;
hand.

The
but

In the last several years

which more

Challenge of Orthodox Economics

a crisis has occurred in the social
/i
adequately describes the problem a

sciences. This crisis does not have the usual source that Kuhn
describes as occurring in the natural sciences. The crisis has
not risen out of the normal science activities of social scien-
tists. Rather the social and political ferment during the late
50’s and the 60’s has led many to a belief that the world view
of current social science is incorrect. Some have come to this
view out of direct political engagement in this social struggle,
while others have come to it intellectually in trying to apply
that world view to current social problems. Thus some social
scientists have come to believe that the current social science
paradigms are inadequate for raising and solving the crucial
social problems of our day.

In particular, radical economists do not believe that the orth- B

odox paradigm is adequate to deal with questions of income
distribution, poverty, racism, sexism, imperialism, social and
economic development in the third alienation of workers,
world 14
the meaningless character of work, etc.i4 The view expressed
in the papers in this issue is that this crisis is based on th81
incorrect world view of the orthodox paradigm. The various
authors discuss how they think the choice of analytic units,
~_~
and particularly their interactions, are wrong in the orthodox
paradigm. The critique is stated most succinctly by Zweig:
&dquo;(the neoclassical paradigm) holds fixed what is changing. It
takes for granted what is at issue.&dquo;15 The orthodox paradigm /
does not correctly describe many facets of our society; if it
did, no one would want to live in such a society; and it does
not tell us how to build a better society. z

To the charge that the orthodox paradigm is based on unrealis-

tic assumptions, orthodox economists rejoin that the test of
 10

the of the paradigm lies not in their believabili-

assumptions
ty--any science must make abstractions and simplifications--but
in the results that flow from these assumptions. They believe--
in good normal science fashion--that the orthodox framework
can provide a resolution of these problems. Given the low
level of empirical basis of the orthodox paradigm, this claim
is difficult to rebut. For now, no resolution of this conflict
,~
is possible, and the matter of paradigm choice must remain a
~imatter of faith and values even more than is the case for the
natural sciences. In fact, as Sweezyl6 notes, paradigm revolu-
tions tend to accompany social revolutions, and until there is
a social revolution in this country it is unlikely that the
orthodox paradigm will be completely overthrown. As long as
the myths that support the functioning of our society continue
to be believed, there will-be support for the neoclassical
paradigm. Thus the task at hand is to further develop the
radical paradigm so that it can lead to the understanding neces-
sary to provide direction for the profound social change this
society requires. The papers in this issue set the framework
for this analysis.
* * * *

The Necessity of a Radical Political Economy. The first paper

in this issue by Ted Behr, Victor Garlin, Jeff Morris, and
Richard Roehl takes a slightly different approach than the
papers to follow. To begin, they question the utility of the
usual normal science route to understanding our world and dis-
cuss several difficulties with this approach. Only subjective
criteria can be used to choose between competing theories.
Little attention is given to the effects of the categorization
and measurement procedures on the validity of empirical tests.
An emphasis on the objective modes of human experience causes
us to-be more concerned with the quantity of objects than with
their quality. Worst of all, when an extreme emphasis is
placed on objective consciousness, then the society that is
orderly, predictable and controllable comes to be viewed as the
most desirable society.

They then cite some additional problems specific to social

science research that provide further evidence of the inade-
ggac f ~~ objective_mode of in ui . Generally social
science data is historical, which leaves room for considerable
subjectivity in interpreting the data and thereby makes empiri-
cal testing questionable. The strong interaction between the
observers and the observees makes it difficult to determine what
the world would have been like without the observation.
Finally, those interest groups in society that have the means
will try to direct social science research in directions that
will enhance their positions.
 11

Following a discussion of the role of values in social science,

they turn their attention to economics in particular. They
note several crucial distinctions between classical political
economics and modern economics. In particular, they suggest J f-
that modern theory is too formal and does not deal with the
social and institutional factors which must be incorporated
theJ
into the analysis to understand, for example, economic develop-
ment. They call for a return to political economics--a politi-
cal economics that is radical, i.e., non-conservative of the
existing order. The social scientist should regard as immutable
a minimum number of social institutions and human characteris-
tics.

They discuss six categories (of which the first four they at-
tribute to Herbgintis17) whichshould provide the focus of
this a ysis:
bution,~esponsiveness well-being,~quity
.~Inaterial in resource distri-
of institution to human needs an~ his-
torical eharacteristics f society-~uman development,‘tom-
and’ he
a
harmony of man in his natural
munity development,
environment. These categories, they suggest, provide a frame-
work within which one can conduct an analysis of social issues
that are obscured by orthodox economics.

They conclude by commenting that it is not enough to create a

more adequate analysis of American society within this frame-
work. We must also live and work in accord with the humanist
values that underlie this view of political economy. In our
teaching we must eliminate authoritarianism by practicing our
democratic ideals. In our research we must eliminate elitism
by demystifying economic analysis. Revolutionary social change
cannot be achieved solely by providing analyses of society’s
ills; we must, therefore, be continuously involved in the poli-
tical struggle for social change. Finally, in our life style
we should strive to eliminate individualism and to create com-
munal, natural ways of living.

Bourgeois and Radical Paradigms in Economics. Mike Zweig begins

this paper by comparing the world view of the radical paradigm
and the orthodox paradigm and then discusses the kinds of ques-
tions that the radical paradigm allows. He states that the
major shincl ft--at-lirL--S of the n-rtbodnx paradia he
emphasis on harmony and eguilibLIll~. Harmony within the system
evolves out of the assumption thatall the economic actors are
rational, homogenous behavioral units that are motivated by
the same desires regardless of possible differences in back-
ground, status, or race.
On the other hand, the radical paradigm is characterized by an
emphasis on conflict and dialectic. Conflict expresses itself
not in the market but among classes who are distinguished by
 12

their relations to conflict hat exists within society.

Further, the Marxian _
ward equilibrium (at
paradi4ma_spuTn _7~~
least
e-s ere is no
for societies in
no tendency to-
the capitalist
stage of development). Instead the analysis focuses on the
forces for change that will result from these conflicts. There
} is disagreement among radicals on which source of conflict in

1B U.S. society is the most basic, and Zweig lists several sources.
In the Marxian paradigm the source is contained in the labor
theory of value. Others find that conflict is contained in _,
J

consumer degradation, in the relationship between the U.S. and

the third world, or be yeen[the
powers of corporations as sup-
ported by the state
_problems that are
n the
dealt masses of people1 Some additional
with differently in the radical para-
digm are the economic and social implications of technology
and, particularly, the impact of technology on the socializa-
tion of labor.
_

Zweig concludes by discussing the political implications of the

orthodox paradigm and notes that neither the radical nor the
orthodox paradigm is value free. The attractiveness of the
radical paradigm lies in its ability to enable us to examine
questions concerning the distribution of income and wealth, the
role of the state, the nature of private property, and other
problems central to the current social struggles.
Toward aCritique of Economics. Paul Sweezy begins his paper
by contrasting the world views of the orthodox and the radical
paradigms. In the former the economist takes the existing
social order for granted, assumes there are harmonies of in-
terest and then investigates the tendencies toward equilibrium.
It assumes that change is gradual and non-disruptive. In the
radical paradigm, on the other hand, there is conflict instead
of harmony, and there are forces that lead to discontinuity
rather than gradual change. He points out that conflicts of
’
.,interest, disruptive forces, abrupt and violent change are the
dominant characteristics of capitalism world-wide, so_the or-
hodox paradigm’s world is levant _tQ.. ~he _.f.un~t.ioning
of modern capitalism. The erroneous basis of the orthodox
§aradig£T#AvefiE§ work based upon it from producing significant
results, no matter how sophisticated the methods used, since
meaningless analysis depends upon the questions asked and not
simply the methods used.

~current
Sweezy also notes
economics
a distinction between the research goal of
and what historically has been called poli-
tical economics. Economists currently are content to devise
ways of manipulating the existing institutions in order to
achieve certain results and are not attempting to understand

economics
the dynamics of our social system. On the other hand political
seeks to comprehend the laws that govern the
 13

socioeconomic system. Current economics is_more―social engin- j ~

eering than science and unfortunately draws upon a faulty
science in making its recommendations. ~
z’)
; Sweezy then discusses the fact that paradigms in the social
sciences break down when the social realities on which the
can
based undergo fundamental change in addition to
iparadigms are
/crises generated by the practice of normal science. Without
such political and social change it is much more difficult to
abandon an old paradigm in the social sciences than in the
natural sciences because the world views of the social sciences
involve the interests of individual, classes, etc. within the
.
society. Therefore, revolutions in the social science para-
digms tend to be associated with political and social revolu-
tions and are fairly rare without such large scale social
changes.
~e
<He concludes with example of where the radical paradigm pro-
an

videos
loutlines
an explanation superior to the orthodox solution. He
how the gap between the advanced industrial nations
;and the third world can be easily understood within the Marxian
but not at all in the orthodox paradigm.
paradigm,
--A_ Critique of Economics. In this paper Zweig isolates
New Left
a few aspects of the conventional paradigm as examples of how
its world view prevents economists from dealing with some
crucial problems. He notes that marginal analysis has
economists from asking questions concerning, for example, the
legitimacy of economic institutions. This kind of
also induces us to acce existing constraints while in many
&dquo;&dquo;~B!
analysis
prevented

cases the first order

constraints.
o busines
should be to remove these
He points ,_the foundations of welfare
economics a!~~e!1umé~J1i_zj.pg_J:>Y as_sumirig~~~a~_theinditiidual-~~’~r
functions are independent, thereby assuming world is com- ’f~y
posed of isolated and selfish individuals. Welfare
is silent on such crucial issues as the distribution of income
economics
and wealth and problems of equity. The conventional theory of
economic development is ethnocentric, being tied to social and
economic institutions peculiar to the U.S. The orthodox para-
digm does not properly treat the role of government in economic
affairs by failing to inform us, for example, in whose interest
various government policies operate. It does not deal with
questions of the distribution of income, economic resources,
and power. It claims to be neutral but instead is supportive
of the institutions and the goals incorporated within these in-
_
stitutions of capitalist society.

Political Economy and the Politics of Economists. John Weeks

responds to several issues in the preceding paper by Zweig,
and adds to the criticism of the orthodox paradigm. His major
 14

point is that it is the politics of economists that make them

reactionary, not their tools. Economists gain disproportion-
ally from the existing social order and are therefore suppor-
, tive of the present system; it is their vested interest in the
present system that inhibits economists from providing us with
a guide to alternative systems. Thus he argues that marginal
analysis is a method that can be put to alternative uses, and
~ it is the politics of the user that will determine this use.
Weeks then discusses Zweig’s other points in this vein. Weeks
~
claims that most orthodox economists share the world view

~
B
’i
/B
I
(myths) of most Americans, but in a more sophisticated version.
These myths are based on the acceptance of extreme inequality
and include &dquo;social mobility, the necessity for some (there-
fore existing) income inequality for efficiency, the sacredness
of private property, and the potential of the individual to
affect his situation.&dquo;

On Economics and the Politics of Economists. On commenting on

Weeks’ critique, Zweig says that, while true, Weeks’ comment
that orthodox economics is reactionary because economists are
reactionary is not a useful point. This argument does not show
where orthodox analysis goes wrong and how it is supportive of
capitalism. He then returns to the issue of marginal analysis.
While agreeing that, as a method, it can be used by diverse
persons, he points out that methodology generally arises from
specific needs and once adopted frequently impedes considera-
tion of problems for which it is not designed. As examples of
such problem areas Zweig mentions class conflict, economic in-
stitutions, alienation and the dynamics of capitalism.
* * * *

In closing this introduction I would like to add my own comment

to the- preceding debate. Using marginal analysis as a vehicle,
the debate between Zweig and Weeks has focused on the role of
the political belos of social scientists. Simply viewed,
marginal analysis, i.e., maximization subject to constraint, is
a method that can be fruitfully used in any paradigm where
such maximization problems arise. However, marginal analysis
is more than one method in a bag of analytical tools which the
orthodox economist calls upon in plying his trade. Indeed,
marginal analysis is at the heart of the orthodox paradigm in
the view it presents of the motivations of the major economic
actors. Both individuals and firms are all assumed to base
their behavior on maximization of a function (utility or pro-
fits, respectively) subject to constraints. Further, this
view is consistent with the political beliefs of most orthodox
economists. They believe that individuals and firms are
essentially free to pursue their own destinies and do so by
maximizing utility or profits. Thus orthodox political views
 15

are equivalent to the world view of the orthodox paradigm. The

politics of orthodox economists and the framework of the para-
digm are interlinked to give marginal analysis its central im-
portance within orthodox research.

The Urban Institute; Washington, D.C.

Notes

Thomas
1 S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
,
Second Edition, (Chicago, 1970).
The following paragraphs are essentially paraphrases of
2
what I consider to be the essential points of Kuhn’s framework.
No page references or quotes are given, but the order of expo-
sition generally follows his with the exception that clarifi-
cations from the postscript of the second edition have been
incorporated into the sequence when I felt they were appropri-
ate.

In the postscript to the second edition Kuhn notes that

3
he has used the term paradigm in a variety of ways, but two
major usages can be distinguished. In one sense paradigm has
been used to denote the entire constellation of theories,
values, etc. to which the specific scientific community is com-
mitted. This is the sense in which paradigm is used in this
introduction and in the papers to follow. However, in the
postscript Kuhn suggests the term ’disciplinary matrix’ instead
of paradigm be used for this ensemble of group commitments.
He prefers to reserve the use of paradigm for the exemplars or
shared examples from which the scientist learns his trade.

Such
4 an attempt has been made for sociology in Robert W.
Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology (New York, 1970).
Donald
5 Gordon, "The Role of the History of Economic
F.
Thought in the Understanding of Modern Economic Theory,"
American Economic Review (May, 1965), pp. 119-27.

George
6 Stigler, "The Politics of Political Economists,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1959), pp. 522-32.
Ibid
7
., p. 522.

Ted Behr,
8 et. al., "Towards a Radical Political Econo-
mics," this issue.
16

A.W.
9 Coats, "Is There A ’Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions’ in Economics?" Kyklos (1969), pp. 291-2.

Wassily
10 Leontief, "Theoretical Assumptions and Non-
observed Facts," American Economic Review (1971), pp. 1-7.
Lester
11 Thurow, Investment in Human Capital (Belmont,
1970), pp. 20-2.

Frederick Engels’
12 letter to Lange of 29 March, 1865
[as quoted in R.L. Meek (ed.), Marx and Engels on the Popula-
tion Bomb (Berkeley, 1971), p. 85].

Gordon,
13 . cit., p. 124.
op
These points
14 are further in R.C. Edwards,et.
developed
.,"A Radical Approach
al Basis for a New Curricu-
to Economics:
la," American Economic Review (May 1970), pp. 352-63; and in
John G. Gurley, "The State of Political Economics," American
Economic Review (May 1971), pp. 53-62.

Mike Zweig, "Bourgeois

15 and Radical Paradigms in
Economics," this issue.
Paul Sweezy,
16 "Toward a Critique of Economics," this
issue.

Herbert Gintis, Alienation and Power, Towards a Radical

17
Economics unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
Welfare ,
University, May, 1969.