Professional Documents
Culture Documents
全球金融危機專輯 (增訂版)
全球金融危機專輯 (增訂版)
1930
19301920
25%
John Maynard Keynes 1936
1970Milton Friedman
1980
1990
1997~1998
2007
9812
............................................................................................................................................................. I
...... ....................1
.............................. ..................25
...................................... ..................47
.............................................................. ..................73
.............................................. ................101
BCBSIMF..... ................119
.................................................. ................147
.......................................................... ................167
.............................. ................187
.................................................. ................197
.................................. ................215
.......................... ................225
...................................... ................235
() ........................... ................255
() .............................. ................273
..................................................................................................................................................................281
.......................................................................................................................................283
n
n
n
n
n
n Fed
n
n Fed
n
n
II
BCBSIMF
n BCBS
BASEL II
n IMF
IMF
n
2009Turner
n
n
CDSCDO
n
n
n
III
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
(DSGE)
n
(/)
()
n
IV
20078
20084IMF
9,450
5,650
4,950200810IMF
1.4
7,500
6,5002, 3
IMF
(mortgage-backed securities,
MBS)MBS (non-prime
MBS)20084IMF5,650
MBS4,500
105,000
1.1
IMFMBS
20078
()
1980
3~5%19701980
Association)40
(maturity mismatch)
1.
(10%)
4
1980
1980
519801990
2.
()
1980
1990
MBS
SPVs
Hellwig(1994a)
MBS
MBS
(tranche)MBS
(Government-sponsored
enterprises, GSEs)
(senior tranche)MBS
(mezzanine tranche)
(equity
tranche)
MBS
AAA
)20
MBS
10%
95%
(1-1)
1-1MBS
Diamond(1984)
Diamond
()
MBSFannie Mae
Freddie MacGSEs
Diamond
MBSFannie
MaeFreddie Mac
MBS
Diamond
200376%2006
43%11
2000
9%2006
10
40%122001
7%200614%13(1-2)
IMF(2007)
920015%2006
14%
2001
1-2
2000
1. 2000-2004
2.
conduits
SIVs
2000-2006
1.
1.
2.
2.
MBS
2006
MBSFannie
MaeFreddie Mac
2006
(CDO,CDS)
1. 20009%200640%
2. 20017%200614%
3. Fannie MaeFreddie MacMBS200376%200643%
*
7%200618%
36%14
Alt-A
20016%200626%15
12%6%
2006
2006
92%Alt-A
Alt-A
68%23%16
81%50%
1980
MBS
2006
20
2008160()
2001
6.35%1979
300
2.47%200622006
20041002006
2002001
200717
20012004
25%Alt-A
10-12%1-2% 18
7%39%
65%
()
18%19
21
IMF(2008a)
(UBS)
300MBS
MBS CDO
20084
22
2006
1.
MBS
BBB
UBS(
UBSMBS
)(asset-
BBB
CDO
AAA
2.
3.
MBS
23
20077
4.
MBS CDO
UBS
20078
2003
MBS CDOMBS
GSEsMBS
24 (
1-3)
()
MBS
20002006
() MBS CDO
2000
UBSMBS CDO
2004
MBS
MBS
MBS CDO
20052006
MBS CDOMBS
1-3
MBS
SPVs
MBS
MBS
CDOCDO2
MBSSIVsconduits
MBSBBB
AAACDOCDO2
CDS
CDO
()
1.
2.
3.
2000
MBS
MBS CDO
10
() (yield panic)
()
UBSUBS
2000
UBS
()
(incentive scheme)
20
26
27
2000
25
11
2006
(1-4)
1-4
2000-2006
MBS CDOMBS
CDO 2
1.
1.
2000
1.
2.
2.
2. MBS CDOMBS
C D O 2
MBS
1.
2.
3.
3.
200620076
12
2007
2007/2008
()
MBS
(100%)
IMFMBS
50%(conduits)
1.1 28
MBS(5.6
conduitsSIVs
)1/5(13)
ABSconduitsSIVs
1/10(20-30)
1/121/429
MBS5,000
ABCP
2000
1990
6,000-8,000
2000
13
(mark-to-market)
Industriekreditbank
(IKB)Sachische Landesbank
10
20078
conduits
conduitsSIVs
SIVsABS
ABS
20078
3090%MBS70%MBS
conduitsSIVs
ABS
conduits
conduitsSIVs
conduitsSIVs
Paribas
2007
conduitsSIVs
conduitsSIVs
conduitsSIVs
conduits
SIVs
14
()
()
ABSconduits
SIVs
conduitsSIVs
ABS
()
ABS
(Akerlofs lemons)
198015%
6%
MBS
conduitsSIVs
31
15
UBS
1990
MBS
10%2%-3%
1996Basel
32
34
33
1990
()
MBS2007
conduitsSIVs
20077/8
conduitsSIVs
16
()
MBS
2008
2007
MBS
20078
36 1990
35
()
37
17
1-6)
200778
MBS
20077conduits SIVs
conduitsSIVs
ABS
UBS
1.
conduits SIVs
1980
2.
3.
19801990
conduits SIVs
(1-5
18
1-5
()
1. conduitsSIVs20078
2. conduits SIVs
() 20078
1.
1.
2.Basel
2.
3.
19
1-6SIVsconduits
SIVsconduits
A B S
& MBS
ABS
MBS
SIVs
conduits
(
ABS
MBS
SIVsconduits
SIVsconduits
20078
1. ABS
2.
1.
2.
ABS
ABS
SIVs
MBS
& MBS
conduits
ABSMBS
ABCP
1.
2.
1. ABCP
2. SIVsconduits
3.
SIVsconduits
SIVs
ABSMBS
()
20
1988Basel
1995
1996Basel
(regulatory capture by
sophistication) 38
39
1990
UBS
1996
MBS
Basel
G10
1990
1993Basel
21
1990
FedAlan Greenspan
Robert RubinArthur
Levitt
conduits SIVs
19801990
20078
SIVs
22
(1) Martin Hellwig(2008), Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis,
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2008/43, November. 1. Journal De
Economist 157, No.2, 20092. The Sixth Jelle Zijlstra Lecture by the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, Wassenaar, NL., May
2008
(2) IMF (2008 a, 2008 b)
(3) 20091.3IMF1.52.8
3.4 (IMF, 2008c)
(4) Kane (1985, 1989), Benston et al. (1991)
(5) Schwartz and Torous (1991), Hendershott, P.H., and J. D. Shilling (1991)
(6) Englund, P. (1999), Takala, K., and M.Virn (1995)
(7) Duffie (2007)
(8) Franke, G., and J.P. Krahnen (2006)
(9) Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
(10) Duffie (2007), Dodd (2007)
(11) Duffie (2007)
(12) DiMartino and Duca (2007), IMF (2007)
(13) DiMartino and Duca (2007), IMF (2007)
(14) DiMartino and Duca (2007)
(15) IMF (2007)
(16) DiMartino and Duca (2007)
(17) IMF (2007), Demyanyk and Hemert (2008)
(18) IMF (2008)
(19) Mortgage Bankers Association
(20) Demyanyk and Hemert (2008)
(21) Demyanyk and Hemert (2008)
(22) UBS (2008)
(23) Duffie (2007)
(24) Dodd and Mills (2008)
(25) Calomiris and Kahn (1991)
(26) Dodd (2007), Kiff and Mills (2007)
(27) Crockett (2007)
(28) IMF (2007)
(29) IMF (2007), Slacalek (2006)
(30) Dodd and Mills (2008)
(31) Calomiris and Kahn (1991)
(32) Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008), Allen and Gale (2006)
(33) Blum and Hellwig (1995, 1996)
(34) Hellwig and Staub (1996)
(35) Hellwig (2007)
(36) Blum and Hellwig (1995, 1996), Hellwig (1995)
(37) Hellwig (1996)
23
Allen, F., and E. Carletti (2006), Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 89 111.
Allen, F., and E. Carletti (2008), Mark-to-Market Accounting and Cash-in-the-Market Pricing, Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 358
378.
Benston, G. J., M. Carhill, and B. Olasov (1991): The Failure and Survival of Thrifts: Evidence from the Southeast, in: R. Hubbard (ed.):
Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 305 384.
Blum, J. M., and M. Hellwig (1995), The Macoeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks, European Economic Review
39, 739 - 749.
Blum, J. M., and M. Hellwig (1996), Die makrokonomischen Wirkungen von Eigenkapitalanforderungen fr Banken, in: D. Duwendag (ed.),
Finanzmrkte, Finanzinnovationen und Geldpolitik, Schriften des Vereins fr Socialpolitik, NF 242, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 1996,
41 - 71.
Calomiris, C.W., and C.M. Kahn (1991), The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, American Economic
Review 81, 497 513.
Crockett, A. (2007), The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, in: Banque de France (ed.) Financial Stability Review Special Issue on
Hedge Funds, April 2007, 19 28.
Demyanyk, Y., and O. Van Hemert (2008), Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, mimeo, Stern School of Business, New York Universit.
Diamond, D. W. (1984), Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of Economic Studies 51, 393 414.
DiMartino, D., and J. V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, Economic Letter: Insights from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2:11
(2007).
Dodd, R. (2007), Subprime: Tentacles of a Crisis, Finance and Development 44, Nr. 4, 15 19.
Dodd, R., and P. Mills (2008), Outbreak: U.S. Subprime Contagion, Finance and Development 45, Nr. 2, 14 18,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/06/dodd.htm
Duffie, D. (2007), Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability mimeo, Stanford University, Stanford, CA,
http://www.stanford.edu/~duffie/BIS.pdf
Englund, P. (1990), Financial Deregulation in Sweden, European Economic Review 34, 385-393.
Englund, P. (1999), The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences, Oxford Review ofMEconomic Policy 15, 80 97.
Franke, G., and J.P. Krahnen (2006), Default Risk Sharing Between Banks and Markets: The M Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations,
in: M. Carey and R. Stulz (eds.), The Risks of Financial Institutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 603 631.
Hellwig, M. (1994 a), Liquidity Provision, Banking, and the Allocation of Interest Rate Risk, European Economic Review 38, 1363 1389.
Hellwig, M. (1994 b), Banking and Finance at the End of the Twentieth Century, WWZ Discussion Paper 9426, University of Basel, Switzerland.
Hellwig, M. (1995), Systemic Aspects of Risk Management in Banking and Finance, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fr Volkswirtschaft und Statistik/
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 131, 723 737; http://www.sjes.ch/papers/1995-IV-9.pdf
Hellwig, M. (1996), Capital Adequacy Rules as Instruments for the Regulation of Banks, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fr Volkswirtschaft und
Statistik/Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 132, 609 612; http://www.sjes.ch/papers/1996-IV-6.pdf
Hendershott, P.H., and J. D. Shilling (1991), The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of the Thrifts, in: R. Hubbard (ed.): Financial Markets and
Financial Crises, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 259 282.
International Monetary Fund (2008 a), Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, Global Financial Stability Report, April
2008.
International Monetary Fund (2008 b), Financial Stress and Deleveraging: Macro-Financial Implications and Policy, Global Financial Stability
24
(9811)
25
20078(subprime
mortgage)20089
200911
(negative
feedback loop)
Tobin Q
12007
26
2-1
Tobin Q
IMF (2008)Wilson (2008)
2000
(2-2)
(2-1)
2006
20074
Corporation)
2007
()
2007
27
2-2
Libor
2-3
2009
Libor
20078
()
20079
200837
20089
2-4
20071.25
200810
1.60122
LiborOIS
86 3
250(bps)
20071020084
25-50 bps
302009
28
2-3
Repo
Bloomberg
2-4(volatility)
Bloomberg
()
2008
50200810
2-52007
20084
20093
10
2008
2007
1130
2008A
20079
29
2-5
2008
(%)
-33.84
-31.33
-42.68
-40.37
-42.12
-46.03
-48.27
-49.17
-40.73
-65.38
20091130
Bloomberg
2009
()
Exchange, CBOE)
20084
20089
2009ABX
2-62008
30
2-6
CDX
ABX
Bloomberg
()
2-7
2006
2006
2008
(adjustable
2005200622008
2008
1.2
20063.320081
2008MBS
1.3
(Alt-A mortgage)
20090.35
20093
(covered bond)
9.6%(26.4%)
20093
4.5%(
()
15.4%)(2-8)
2-7
20096
IMF (2009f)
2-8
31
32
()
2-22009121
(Citi Group)(UBS)
(Northern Rock)
IKB(Fortis)
200810(International
1.4
AIG
1980
(2-9)IMF
200910
2.8
5%67%
FDIC)20091130
33%
200912417
7%
(2-10)FDIC
(2-1)
2-9
2-1
654
371
1,025
8.2
497
107
604
7.2
480
333
813
3.6
165
36
201
5.1
97
69
166
2.1
1,893
916
2,809
5.0
1.
2. IMF200810
IMF(2008)
()
()
()
(%)
1.
2.
IMF (2009e)
2-2
33
2-10
200912
20088
2,618
2,476
2,098
2,055
2,020
1,985
1,674
(BOA)
1,495
1,498
1,448
1,407
1,435
(BOA)
1,371
1,301
1,310
1,084
(BNP)
976
1,041
940
10
(UBS)
600
Bloomberg (2009.12.15)
FDIC20091130
()
(2-11)
20093
2008
2008
(deleverage)
(2-12)
5
2007
2-11
2-12
34
2007
20062007
IMF
20091020082009
2-13Case-Shiller
20075.2%3%
2006220091
-1.1%20072.7%
2009-3.4%2007
28%
2.1%2.6%2009-2.7%-4.4%(
2-3)
2-14
200512
20091
200712
45.9%
2-1520092GDP
2009105.1%
3.8%19821
20082-23.7%
20096
200611200910
2-152-3
-13%
2-13
2-14
Bloomberg
35
2-15
Bloomberg
20082009
-5.4%-5.3%
IMF
200911.9%80
(2-16)
20078.3%2009
1.7%
2-3
5%(2-3)
2007
2008
2009 f
2010 f
5.20
3.00
-1.10
3.10
2.70
0.60
-3.40
1.30
2009
2.10
0.40
-2.70
1.50
2.70
0.70
-4.20
0.30
0.00
-0.70
-5.40
1.70
2.60
0.70
-4.40
0.90
()
8.30
6.00
1.70
5.10
6.30
5.20
1.70
4.00
5.50
3.00
-5.00
1.80
)5%
8.60
5.50
-6.70
2.10
10.60
7.60
6.20
7.30
13.00
9.00
8.50
9.00
9.40
7.30
5.40
6.40
6.30
4.80
0.70
4.00
6.20
5.40
2.00
4.20
2009
5.70
4.20
-2.50
2.90
IMF200910
()
2-17
36
2-16
2-17
IMF
2009102009
6(2-19)
(2-20)
2-18
2007
2009
IMF20085
200892009
2-18
Bloomberg
37
(2-21)
2-22
IMF
2008
10.2%
9.7%19833
200910
19991
199787
2008
2-19
2-20
Bloomberg
2-21
38
2-22
Bloomberg
85.9%2009
(CPI)
32
CPI
20091020076
(2-24)
3.3%5.2%200791.7%
IMF200910
200993.4%
CPI20083.4%2009
0.1%CPI
()
-0.4%-1.1%
2008
20089.3%20095.3%
(2-23)
20092110CPI
JOC(
-1.5%-1.1%-0.8%(2-4)
)20087
200869%52%
20093
2-23
9
7080
JOC
()
2008
Bloomberg
2-24
2-4
2006
2.0
0.60
1.0
2.2
3.6
4.6
6.2
13.1
1.7
5.8
2007
2.0
1.80
2.1
2.5
2.0
2.2
2.8
5.8
4.8
6.4
2008
4.3
3.53
6.5
4.7
5.4
5.5
9.3
9.5
5.9
8.3
2009
0.4
-0.8
0.4
2.8
0.7
-1.5
3.3
5.4
-1.1
10.0
1-10
1-10
1-9
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-9
()
Bloomberg
1996
2-25GDP
IMF
GDP2005-1.65%
2009-0.65%2010-0.54%
(
2-25)
39
40
2008
2-26
GDP
(2-26)2009
4
(G20)G20
2010
GDP
IMFG20
GDP20092%20101.5%
20092010GDP6
20076
OECD2007
GDP-2.7%-2.9%2009
-12.8%-10.2%2010-14.0%
-11.2%
IMF200962008GDP
IMF (2009b)
GDP
41
20091.09(2-28)
()
2008
20083
20085(2-29)
2009-2.53%
2008
(2-30)
()
1990
(2-31)20083
20032
SARS
2008
2008
98
0.57%(2-32)
2009
()20083
20091-26.87%1974
2(2-27)
20074.65
2-27(YOY)
2-28
42
2-29
2-31
2-33
2-30
2-32(YOY)
2-34
()
43
2-35
2008220083
2008
429.49%
20094
8.94%20106.85%(2-33)
25120093
200986.13%
331(2-35)
(2-30)105.96%
65.3
2008
17.5
2008
125
2009635.5
1402009
3101.4
2009103,412
(CPI)(
2-34)20079CPI3%
200875.81%
20092
()2008
4.5%200840.67%
2008
2009
44
2-36
(2-36)
20063
2000
10%8%
1930
2009
45
(1)
(3) 20
(4) Ginnie MaeFreddie MaeFannie Mac(GSEs)MBSMBS
(5) Fed(Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices)
(The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey)(Credit Conditions
Survey)(Bank Lending Survey)
(6) GDP
46
(2009)5
(2009)
3
(2009)576
(2009)5812
Bank for International Settlements (2009), Rescue, Recovery, Reform, BIS 79th Annual Report, June.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009), Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, July 21.
International Monetary Fund (2008), Assessing Risks to Global Financial Stability, Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 1, October.
International Monetary Fund (2009a), Global Prospects and Policies, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 1, April.
International Monetary Fund (2009b), Global Prospects and Policies, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 1, October.
International Monetary Fund (2009c), Country and Regional Perspectives, IMF, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 2, October.
International Monetary Fund (2009d), From Recession to Recovery: How Soon and How Strong? Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 3,
April.
International Monetary Fund (2009e), The Road to Recovery, IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 1, October.
International Monetary Fund (2009f), Restarting Securitization Markets: Policy Proposals and Pitfalls, IMF, Global Financial Stability Report,
Chapter 2, October.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009), Beyond the Crisis: Medium-term Challenges Relating to Potential Output,
Unemployment and Fiscal Positions, OECD Economic Outlook 85, June.
(9812)
47
(Northern Rock)
2008915
(Bear Stearns
2007
)Fannie MaeFreddie
28Countrywide
Mac(Lehman Brothers
Financial1
)(American International
GroupAIG)
89
Fannie MaeFreddie
MacAIG
(Northern Rock)
()
1.
1965
(Newcastle)
48
2.
3-120061231
63.65%
26.60%
354
85.82%20062005
31.4631.68
(10-15)
3-12006.12.31
%
()
956
0.95
871
0.86 ()
5,621
86,685
2,136
2.11
26,867
26.60
2,392
2.37
64,295
63.65
40,226
39.82
6,202
6.14
17,867
17.69
2,109
2.09
3,211
3.18
101,010
100.00
5.56
85.82
6,630
6.56
247
0.24
101,010
100.00
2006/12/3131.462005/12/3131.68
()
2007
49
20062007
Moody
2007
2007
(63.65%)(85.82%)(3-1)
200762006
2007
2007
26.60%)
(3-1)
200710
()
2007914
200788
3-1
1.
2007
Bloomberg
2007813
Moody
2006
2.
50
102007822
Llyods TSB
20081
6910
3.
913
914
2009212
104-5%
917
4.
5.
Mervyn King
7914
3-4
2007917
919109
230
919
31,700
35,0009
6.
2008218
Lloyds
of LondonRon Sandler
221
First
51
AIG
)76.74%
RP25.89%(
)5.37%
(Bear Stearns)
()
82.11%
1.
(34.97%)
1923
20.8%
160
1930
2006113028.89200711
3033.53
()
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organizations)20089
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144
(2) Financial Stability Forum (2008), Report of the Financial Stability on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, April.
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A
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6
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(15) BIS
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financial system and sovereign balance sheet risks4Unwinding soverign interventions
(17) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision,
September
(18) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision, May
(19) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), Core principles for effective deposit insurance systems, June
(20) Financial Stability Forum (2008), The Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience,
April
(21) Financial Stability Forum (2009), FSF principles for sound compensation practices, April 2
(22) FSB20099G20925
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(23) Financial Stability Forum (2009), FSF principles for cross-border cooperation on crisis management, April 2
BCBSIMF 145
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008a), Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision, September.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008b), Comprehensive strategy to address the lessons of the banking crisis announced by the Basel
Committee, press release, November 20.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), Supervisory guidance for assessing banks' financial instrument fair value practices, April.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b), Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision, May.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009c), Core principles for effective deposit insurance systems, June.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009d), Basel II capital framework enhancements announced by the Basel Committee, press release,
July 13.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009e), Enhancements to the Basel II framework, July.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009f), Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book, July.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009g), Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework, July.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009h), Comprehensive response to the global banking crisis, press release, September 7.
Financial Stability Board (2009), FSB principles for sound compensation practices: implementation standards, September 25.
Financial Stability Forum (2009a), Financial Stability Forum issues recommendations and principles to strengthen financial systems, press
release, April 2.
Financial Stability Forum (2009b), FSF principles for sound compensation practices, April 2.
Financial Stability Forum (2009c), FSF principles for cross-border cooperation on crisis management, April 2.
Financial Stability Forum (2009d), Report of the Financial Stability Forum on addressing procyclicality in the financial system, April 2.
Financial Stability Forum (2008), Report of the Financial Stability on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, April.
G20 (2008), Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, November 15.
International Monetary Fund (2009a), Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets and for
Liquidity Management, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, February 4.
International Monetary Fund (2009b), Initial Lessons of the Crisis, Research, Monetary and Capital Markets, and Strategy, Policy, and Review
Departments, February 6.
International Monetary Fund (2009c), Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF, Research, Strategy, Policy, and
Review Department, February 18.
International Monetary Fund (2009d), Lessons of the Global Crisis for Macroeconomic Policy, Research Department (in consultation with the
Fiscal Affairs and the Monetary and Capital Markets Departments), February 19.
International Monetary Fund (2009e), Crisis-Related Measures in the Financial System and Sovereign Balance Sheet Risks, Fiscal Affairs and
Monetary and Capital Markets Departments, July 31.
(9812)
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163
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Acharya, V. V. & Richardson, M. (2009), Restoring Financial Stability: How to repair a failed system, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp.
283-300 & 365-375.
164
(1) 20(G20)200992425
(2) Luci Ellis (2008)
(3) Luci Ellis (2008)30%200650%
(Alt-A)2008540%41(ARMs)
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Protection Oversight Board)FedFDICNCUA(FTC)(NBS)
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10%
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(2009)
(2009)
Acharya, V. V. & Richardson, M. (2009), Restoring Financial Stability: How to repair a failed system, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp. 283-300 &
365-375.
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 1.
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CBS (2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/12/60minutes/main4862191.
Edmund L. A.and L. Story (2009) Fed Considers Sweeping Rules on Bank Pay, September 18, The New York Times.
Johnston N. and Dodge C. (2009), Obama Says New Financial Rules Needed as Crisis Eases, Bloomberg, September 14.
Luci Ellis (2008), The housing meltdown: Why did it happen in the United States? BIS Working Papers No 259, September.
Thomson, J. B. (2009), On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Progressive Systemic Mitigation, Policy Discussion Paper No. 27,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, August.
US Department of Treasury (2009a), House Financial Services Committee and the Treasury Department Release Draft Legislation to Address
Systemic Risk - Too Big to Fail Institutions, October 27.
US Department of Treasury (2009b), Financial Regulatory Reform- A new foundation: rebuilding financial supervision and regulation, June 17.
US House Financial Services Committee and the Treasury Department (2009), Draft legislation of Financial Stability Improvement Act,
October 27.
US House Financial Services Committee Press Release (2009), House approves historic new rules to govern Americas financial system,
December 11.
US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (2009), Restoring American Financial Stability- Discussion Draft, November
10.
Wall Street Journal (2009): Chicago Fed Chief Cites Weakness in Regulatory System, January 3.
9812)
167
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Barth, J., Caprio, G., and Levine, R. (2006), Rethinking Banking Regulation: Till Angels Govern, January.
Darling, A. (2009), Pre-Budget Report statement to the House of Commons, December 9. Retrieved December 15, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
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liquidity reform, FSA/PN/142/2009, 22 October. Retrieved November 24, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/142.shtml
HM Government (2009), New industry, New jobs-building Britains future, April. Retrieved September 20, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file51023.pdf
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HM Treasury (2009b), Reforming Financial Markets, Building Britains Future CM 7667, July. Retrieved July 17, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/prebud_pbr09_repindex.htm
Levine, R. (2004), Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, NBER working paper no. 10766, September.
Turner, A. (2009), The Turner Review: a regulatory response to the global banking crisis, Financial Services Authority, March 18. Retrieved
September 10, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf
US Treasury (2009), Financial Regulatory Reform A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, p.24 and p.76,
June.
Walker, D. (2009a), A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities, HM Treasury, July 16. Retrieved
September 17, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm
Walker, D. (2009b), A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities Final recommendations, HM
Treasury, November 26. Retrieved December 14, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf
(9812)
186
187
2008
()
(forward)(futures)(swap)
(option)
(Chicago
OTC
CDO)(9-1)
188
9-1
/
)
(
OTC605
OTC
2006663%
437
OTC
72%
2009
4936
625
(9-1)
203
196OTC
96.5%
2006620
OTC
2008657CDS
OTC
20096
(Bank For
36
189
9-1OTC
20066
20076
20086
20096
370,178
516,407
683,814
604,622
38,127
19,407
9,696
9,024
48,645
24,530
12,312
11,804
62,983
31,966
16,307
14,710
48,775
23,107
15,072
10,596
262,526
18,117
207,588
36,821
347,312
22,809
272,216
52,288
458,304
39,370
356,772
62,162
437,198
46,798
341,886
48,513
6,782
1,430
5,351
8,590
2,470
6,119
10,177
2,657
7,521
6,619
1,709
4,910
6,394
456
5,938
2,188
3,750
7,567
426
7,141
3,447
3,694
13,229
649
12,580
7,561
5,019
3,729
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3,304
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1,533
20,352
13,873
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42,581
24,239
18,341
57,403
33,412
23,991
36,046
24,112
11,934
35,997
71,194
81,719
72,255
(BIS)
2008
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Bank)1998LTCM(Long-Term
Capital Management)2008
(Societe Generale)
190
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CBO)
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Derivatives in Emerging Markets: Improving Efficiency While Safeguarding Financial Stability 200811
Alicia Novoa, Jodi Scarlata and Juan sole (2009), Procyclicality and Fair Value Accounting, IMF working Paper No.09/39 March
Bank For International Settlements (2007), Triennial Central Bank Survey, December.
Bank For International Settlements (2008a), OTC derivatives market activity in the second half of 2007, May.
Bank For International Settlements (2008b), BIS Quarterly Review, December.
Office of Comptroller of the Currency (2008), OCC Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities Second Quarter 2008.
John Kiff (2009), Jennifer Elliott, Elias Kazarian, Jodi Scarlata, and Carolyne Spackman, Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy
Options? IMF Working Paper No.09/254 November.
NYU STERN White Papers, Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, Restoring Financial Stability How to Repair a Failed System, March
2009.
(9812)
197
2007
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(procyclicality)
2
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(GAAP)
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(IFRS)
IFRSGAAP
198
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assumptions)
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199
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OBSEs
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(Basel
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200
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14.96
17.72
21.82
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14.98
5.09
16.59
0.73
9.87
1.13
6.73
7.50
6.55
0.64
2.96
6.73
7.50
6.32
0.47
2.96
0.23
0.17
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2.67
5.28
14.71
1.19
4.44
1.48
1.87
7.76
...
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1.20
3.41
6.96
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10.11
5.63
23.77
23.00
25.84
4.72
2.82
11.88
6.84
12.92
3.66
2.82
3.57
10.97
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1.41
1.78
1.71
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9.26
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5.19
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4.16
2.03
4.52
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6.54
37.44
26.43
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29.09
10.78
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8.35
15.65
28.60
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17.34
5.41
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8.68
12.77
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5.49
15.34
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120.00
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46.20
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20.30
46.20
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20.30
46.20
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67.30
25.10
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204
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205
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7.6
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7.6
7.9
7.6
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.7
3.7
2.3
3.4
5.0
3.7
3.7
3.8
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3.6
3.7
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2.8
2.9
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2.9
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2.6
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206
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(10-8)
10-6)
207
20077
(3)
(1)
(2)
2%4%
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40%
208
209
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10-3
10-4
10-55
210
10-6
10-8
10-7
211
10-16
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213
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10
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214
(1) Alicia Novoa (2009), Jodi Scarlata and Juan sole Procyclicality and Fair Value Accounting, IMF working Paper No.09/39,
March
(2) (
)
(3) ()
(4) (FSB)20094
(Addressing procyclicality in the financial system)
(10-1)(BCBS) 20094(Supervisory
guidance for assessing banks financial instrument fair value practices)
(10-2)
(5)
(6) Financial Stability Forum (2009), Report of the Financial Stability Forum on addressing procyclicality in the financial
system, April 2
(7) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), Supervisory guidance for assessing banks financial instrument fair
value practices, April
(8) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), Fair value measurement and modelling: An assessment of challenges and lessons
learned from the market stress, June
(9) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Supervisory guidance on the use of the fair value option for financial instruments by
banks, June
(10)
(two-tier)
()(one-tier)
(9811)
215
(financial leverage
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()
()
1()
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216
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217
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2007813(Northern Rock)
91417
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2007
()27.0(11-1)
(GSEs)23.5
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9.830
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5150 (530)
22.820052006
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31.4631.68(
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11-12007
20032007
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10
5,597
5,390
207
27.0
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1,669
1,598
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23.5
1,911
1,720
191
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11,194
10,050
1,144
9.8
1,815
1,607
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759
672
87
8.7
22,945
21,037
1,908
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(2008)Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin
(2008)
218
(11-1)2007
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219
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220
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4. ConduitSIVs
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Conduit
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26
17
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221
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IMF (2009)
222
conduitSIVs
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() (International Monetary
Fund, IMF)
223
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(10) (2008)
224
(2008)4312
(2009)57
Basel Committee (2006), Basel II: International Convergence of Capital measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised frameworkComprehensive Version, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June.
David Greenlaw, Jan Hatzius, Anil K Kashyap, and Hyun Song Shin (2008), Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown,
Working Paper, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, University of Chicago and Princeton University.
European Central Bank (2004), Credit Risk Transfer by EU banks: Activities, Risks and Risk Management, Press release, May 24.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2005), Statement Regarding Meeting on Credit Derivatives, Press release, September 15.
Geithner, T. F. (2009), Remarks at the Economic Club of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 9.
International Monetary Fund (2008), Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, Apr. 14.
International Monetary Fund (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating the Financial Challenges Ahead, Oct. 9.
Krugman P. (2008), Financial Russian Roulette, The New York Times, September 14.
Krugman P. (2009), Out of Shadows, The New York Times, June 18.
Olivier Blanchard (2009), The Crisis: Basic mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies, IMF working paper WP/09/80, International Monetary
Fund.
Tracy Alloway (2008), Citi of over-leveraging, Financial Times, November 24.
Viral V. Acharya and Philipp Schnabl (2009), How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds.)
Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, 83-100, New York University Stern School of Business.
(9812)
225
(information asymmetry)
20052006
(structured products)
20072008
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234
(2009)416-24
(2008)6668-90
(2007)1109-140
(2009)99-101
(2009)27719-28
Committee of European Securities Regulators(2008), CESRs Second Report to the European Commission on the compliance of credit rating
agencies with the IOSCO Code and the role of credit rating agencies in structured finance, May.
Committee on the Global Financial System (2008),Ratings in Structured Finance: what went wrong and what can be done to address
shortcomings? BIS CGFS Papers No. 32, July.
European Commission (2008), Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies Impact Assessment, Brussels, Belgium, November.
European Union (2009), Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies, July.
European Union(2006), relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, Directive 2006/48/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, June.
European Union(2003), on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council, 28 January .
Financial Stability Forum (2008), Report on enhancing market and institutional resilience, BIS FSF Report, April.
Matthew Richardson and Lawrence J. White (2009), The Rating AgenciesIs Regulation the Answer?, NYU STERN, January.
Securities and Exchange Commission (2009a), Annual Report on NRSROs, September.
Securities and Exchange Commission (2009b), Amendments to Rules for NRSROs, February.
Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staffs Examinations of Select Credit
Rating Agencies, July.
(9811)
235
2006(subprime
mortgage)
1930
(United
UNCTAD)Joseph Stiglitz
(Commission of
SystemStiglitz )
2009
2009c)
236
(International Monetary
Fund, IMF)
()
IMFIMF
8,3522
13-1
13-12000
13-2
2000
6.8
2001
2006200714
20068,000
16
13-2
2000
9,54320042007
75%
(mortgage-backed
securities, MBS)
2006
13-1
%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
-4104
-3916
-4516
-5161
-6246
-7405
-7984
-7247
-7072
9543
6577
7686
8171
14040
10760
18351
17575
6200
4776
2455
2695
2877
8703
3639
10299
10958
1139
4767
4122
4991
5294
5337
7121
8052
6617
5061
2.9
2.7
3.5
3.5
3.4
1.4
2.4
1.7
2.7
Table F107 of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemTable 2.1
of National Income and Product Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis
237
13-2
%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
6.8
7.3
7.8
8.8
10.5
11.5
14.0
16.1
15.1
0.8
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.7
1.0
2.5
2.1
-1.0
**
13.0
7.1
6.6
12.8
19.7
9.4
21.2
14.9
-5.9
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.4
3.2
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.3
1.6
1.4
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.6
1.8
2.3
2.7
2.5
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.5
1.9
2.0
2.4
2.8
1.8
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.7
1.7
1.9
2.2
2.5
2.6
4.9
5.5
5.7
6.7
7.9
8.7
10.3
12.0
11.5
**
72.1
75.3
73.1
76.1
75.2
75.7
73.6
74.5
76.2
Table L107 of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
* ()
**
20002004
20042006
2.7%3.5%20052007
1.4%2.4%20051.4%
174.25
(13-16)
238
20042006
Bernanke (2005)
(13-1)
1997-98
1990
Fed20046
239
(13-1)
13-1
1990
BIS)20074
31
Fed
250750
250
(impossible trinity)
13-1
UNCTAD2009
240
Mejia (1999)
(unremunerated reserve
requirements)
Tax)
(James Tobin)
1972
tax)
(Qualified Foreign
40
25
1997-98
2007-08
20098(Financial
(Prospect Magazine)FSA
241
Steinbrck9
10
IMF
0.005%922
G20
Spahn (1996)
Spahn (1996)(two-tier
Tobin tax)
200910
20
()
2%3
200171.5%
200864.1%20092
35
62.8%
()
13-3
242
13-3
%
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009 II
71.5
67.1
65.9
66.0
66.9
65.5
64.1
64.1
62.8
19.2
23.8
25.2
24.8
24.1
25.1
26.3
26.5
27.5
2.7
2.8
2.8
3.4
3.6
4.4
4.7
4.1
4.3
5.1
4.4
3.9
3.8
3.6
3.1
2.9
3.1
3.1
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
1.1
1.3
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.1
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves Database, International Monetary Fund
()
Fed20012003
()
(IMF)
()
(seigniorage)
(international seigniorage)
243
931Stiglitz(United
2009
Nations, 2009b)
2009319Stiglitz
SDRs
Stiglitz
(United Nations,
2009a)
13-1
()
()
()
()
()
()1990
()
(lingua franca)
(inertia)
17(Dutch guilder)
18(pound sterling)191872
1860191460%1915
244
13-2(SDR)
SDR
SDRIMF1969IMF
SDR
1974SDR
552006
201044%34%11%11%
5
SDR
SDR
IMFSDRIMF(quotas)2009IMFSDR
1970197219791981214SDR(
SDRIMF)4.5SDR0.48%
200942G202,500SDR (1,570SDRIMF829
SDR1,784SDR4.0%
1981IMFSDRIMFSDR
214SDR(330)200999
200999SDR1,998SDR
4.5%IMF2,174SDR91.9%
SDR
()
IMFSDR()
()
SDRIMFSDR
IMF(2009)
(reserve fund)
UNCTAD
(global reserve
bank)
Stiglitz
245
Stiglitz
()
1.
2.
(, 2005)
3.
()
1.
()
1.
2.
(13-2)
2.
13-2
3.
4.
246
Eichengreen
Frankel(1999)
13-3)13-1
()
ACU)ACU
Eichengreen (2009)
ACU
ACU
13-3
247
EMCF
ACU
2000
2005
ShimizuECU(Asian
2000
() (Exchange Rate
Mechanism, ERM)
20092
ERM1979
1,200
ECU
1228
(central pivot)
(lateral pivot)
CMIM)EMCF
2.25%1993
IMF(Asian
15%ERM II1996
Monetary Fund)
1999ERM II
EMSEMS
1992
2005
(Asian Bellagio
Group)
EMS
() (European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, EMCF)
EMCF
EMS
EMS
1994
EMCF(European Monetary
Institute, EMI)9
248
(2005)
10
(11)
13-3()
1989Delors(Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the
European Community)19901999Delors
(19907199312)
(economic and monetary convergence)
(19941199812)
(2005)
IMF
IMF
IMF
IMF
IMF
1997-98IMF
IMF
UNCTAD
(13-413-5)
IMF
IMF
IMF
249
20097
IMF(International
Monetary Fund, 2009)IMF
l
85%
l
IMFC
(Article IV
13-4IMF
IMF
() (FCL)
FCLIMFFCL
() (SBA)
FCLIMFSBA
SBA
()
200%600%
()
()
IMF
() IMF5,000
IMFG202,50037,500
SDR
() 2,500SDR
IMFG202,500SDR
()
IMF403.3IMF
IMF(2009)
250
13-5IMF
IMF2006
2008328IMF428
200910234264%85%
544.92
1355.460.6%
57.9%2.739.4%42.1%2.7
17.674%16.732%
5610
11
IMF5
2013G20IMF20111
IMF(2009)
350%
20078
(1984)
Fed14
IMF
G20
2009925117
(G20, 2009a2009b)
1985(Plaza Accord)9
12G20
IMF2,500SDR
G20
251
13 1999
G20
1990
1990
G20G20
G20
G20
14
1980
1990
10
IMF
252
(2) (2009)
(3) 20083
1.5%2008100%
(4) 19447144730(New Hampshire)(Bretton Woods)
IMF(World Bank)1971
19733
253
(2009)571-45
(2005)27455-82
(2009)(SDR)
(2009)IMF57115-125
Aslund, A. (2009) The Group of 20 Must Be Stopped, Financial Times, Nov. 26.
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254
(9812)
255
1930John M. Keynes
1970
2008
Milton Friedman
Paul Krugman
Eugene
Fama(efficient-market
hypothesis)Robert
Lucas
2000(the
Great Moderation)
Krugman
(Krugman, 2009)
256
Spaventa (2009)
2003Robert Lucas
Bernanke2004
20
2008IMFOlivier Blanchard
Wyplosz (2009)
Acemoglu (2009)
(2007)1930
Wyplosz (2009)
1776
Milton Friedman
Adam Smith160
(Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963)
(Mishkin, 2007)
19301930
1970Eugene Fama
Keynes
(Krugman, 2009)
19501960
257
19802000
(state)
FedAlan Greenspan
(multi-period)
Greenspan
(the
(Krugman, 2009)
Stiglitz (2009)
()
(neo-classical
synthesis)
()
258
()
Woodford (2003)
Borio (2006)
()
(Buiter, 2009) 4
Whitehouse (2009)
1930
1970
(Buiter, 2009)
Krugman (2009)
Keynes
()
19501960
Keynes
()
1976)
(inflationary bias)
Friedman (1963)
()
259
1990
(Goodfriend,
2007)
()
(financial frictions)
1980
()
1990
1970
(Mishkin, 2007)
(BIS, 1997)
(nominal anchor)
IS-LM
5(time-inconsistency
Modigliani-Miller (1958)
Gordon, 1983)
1990
()
(Borio, 2006)
(financial accelerator)
(Hubbard, 2008)
(inflation targeting)
Svensson (2002)
260
Bernanke
1990
(Borio, 2006)
(Walsh,
2009)
Buiter
(Buiter,
FedWarsh (2007)
2009)
Buiter
(CDO-squared)
261
()
(1992)
()
Minsky
(, 2009)
Janet
L.Yellen (2009)
2009)
Borio (2006)
1.
(random
walk)
(prisoners dilemmas)
(coordination failures)(herding)
2.
()
(self-reinforcing momentum)
3.
262
4.
(market completion)
Mishkin (2009)
5.
Robert Shiller
(Friedman, 2004)
(Krugman, 2009)
(Walsh, 2009)
Stiglitz (2009)
(Whitehouse, 2009)
Stiglitz (2009)
(imperfect
information)
Adam Smith
20089
263
DSGE
(random shocks)
Borio (2006)
Borio
(shocks)
Borio
(Borio,
2006)
(Adolfson, Lasen
Svensson (2008)) 10
DSGE
(financial dislocations)
DSGE
264
L(Buiter, 2009)
Stiglitz (2009)
(Spaventa, 2009)
DSGEWillem Buiter
(Krugman, 2009)
Charles
GoodhartDSGE
Krugman (2009)
Borio (2006)
(1)
(2)(3)
1980
1990
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
11
265
1997-1998
(Spaventa, 2009)
(Bank of
(Mishkin, 1997)
()
Robert Shiller
2004Greenspan
(Spaventa, 2009)
1.
Bernanke
Keynes
2005
(Krugman, 2009)
()
Spaventa (2009)
Modigliani-Miller
Raghuram Rajan2005
2.
Nouriei Roubini
2005
Mankiw (2006)1990
2006b)
Eichengreen (2009)
266
3.
Mishkin (2007)
(1)
(2)
()
( (
)
)
( (
)
)
( (
)
)
( (
)
()
()
267
()
(3)
Blinder (1998)
(4)
(Dark Art)
(5)
Borio (2006)
Grauwe (2009)
(animal spirits)
Krugman (2009)
(Grauwe, 2009)
12
Boiro (2006)
1.
268
2.
bubbles)
(Cecchettiet al.(2000,
(preemptive)
3.
Walsh (2009)
269
(KydlandPrescott, 1977)
(6)
(7) (
)
270
(2009)
(2007)()
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(9812993)
273
Janet L. Yellen
(Credit Default
Swaps, CDS)(shadowing
banking system)1(global
imbalances)2
(Hyman P. Minsky) 4
1986
(financial instability
hypothesis)
19631986
1992
274
(economic units)
/(hedge)(speculative)
(Ponzi)
()
(pro-cyclical)
(debt
deflation)
10
(McCulley
(forward)(reverse)11)
275
Meltdown)
()(
)()
(Minsky Moment)McCulley
12
20078
(debt deflation)
McCulley (2009)
()
(counter-cyclical)
(Minsky
13
Fed
(paradox of deleveraging)
(paradox of thrift)
()
(fire sale)
276
14
1986
17
2007
2001Joseph Stiglitz
2008Paul Krugman
Lawrence Summers
15
Grauwe (2009)
Cooper (2008)
16
277
18
(propagation)
(information asymmetry)
20
model)
(financial accelerator)
19
278
200724
United Nations (2009)Adrian and Shin (2009)
(2)
(9) (7)
(10) McCulley (2009)Minskys Economic Journey: Forward and Reverse
(11) (6)
(12) McCulley (2009)200783
(13) (6)
(14) Minsky (1986)
(15) Fox (2009)Krugman (2009)
(16) White (2009)
(17) Cooper (2008)
(18) Fazzari (1999)
(19) (18)
(20) (18)
279
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2009), The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation, Financial Stability Review,
Bankque de France, Sep.
Astley, Mark, Julia V. Giese, Michael James Hume and Chris Kubelec (2009), Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 178-190.
Blanchard, Olivier and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2009), Global Imbalances: In Midstream? SPN/09/29, IMF, Dec. 22.
Cooper, George (2008), The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy, Harriman House, Aug..
Fazzari, Steven M. (1999), Minsky and the Mainstream: Has Recent Research Rediscovered Financial Keynesianism? Working Paper No. 278,
Aug..
Fox, Justin (2009), The Myth of the Rational Market, Time, June 22.
Grauwe, Paul De (2009), Economics Is in Crisis: It Is Time for a Profound Revamp, Financial Times, July 21.
Kindleberger, Charles P. (1996), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis, Wiley Investment Classics, NY, John Wiley & Sons.
Krugman, Paul (2009), School for Scoundrels, The New York Time, Aug. 9.
McCulley, Paul (2009),The Shadow Banking System and Hyman Minskys Economic Journey, PIMCOGlobal Central Bank Focus, May.
Minsky, Hyman P. (1992), The Financial Instability Hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 74,
May.
Minsky, Hyman P. (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Yale University Press.
Minsky, Hyman P. (1982), Can It Happen Again?: Essays on Instability and Finance, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (2009), Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes, Prepared for the
FRBSF Asia Economic Policy Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, Nov..
United Nations (2009), Chapter III: Learning from the Crisis: Policies for Safer and Sounder Financial Systems, in UNCTAD, Trade and
Development Report, 2009.
White, William (2009), Modern Macroeconomics Is on the Wrong Track, Finance & Development, IMF, Dec..
Yellen, Janet L. (2009), A Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers, Presentation to the 18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on
the State of the U.S. and World Economies, Meeting the Challenges of the Financial Crisis, April.
(993
)
280
281
282
283
(CESR)
284
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
(CPSS)
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS)
conduit
covered bond
deleverage
(HUD)
discount window facility
discriminatory auction
European Commission
285
exotic options
(FFIEC)
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
foreclosure rate
286
Modernization Act
haircut
incremental risk
(IAIS)
International Currency Certificates (ICCs)
(IMFC)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Commissions (IOSCO)
International Petroleum Exchange (IPE)
loan-to-value
(LIFFE)
287
market infrastructure
market-neutral arbitrage
mark-to-market
migration risk
monoline insurers
Organizations (NRSROs)
negative feedback loop
(OFHEO)
Office of National Insurance (ONI)
OM Stockholm (OMS)
Development (OECD)
originate and distribute
288
pipeline risk
predatory lending
procyclicality
Recapitalisation Scheme
recourse
seigniorage
shadow banking
SNB StabFund
structured notes
subprime mortgage
Supervisory Colleges
(FINMA)
Swiss Interbank Clearing System (SIC)
289
20
Industry (RIETI)
Tobin tax
(TIFFE)
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
Development (UNCTAD)
value at risk (VaR)
warehousing risk
World Bank
290
/ . --
-- 99.03
2129.5
ISBN 978-986-02-2772-7 ()
1.
2.
561.78
99004433
1006612
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