PEREZ, ZYRA ANNE G

August 15, 1961

In Re: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar
without talking the examination, ARTURO EFREN GARCIA
Barrera J.:

Facts :
Arturo E Garcia, A Filipino Citizen, has applied for the admission of practice of law in the
Philippines, which he had taken, finished and practiced Law at Spain. In his application, he cited
the provision of treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and Spanish State, and he is entitled to practice the law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue:
Can the petitioner validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to the
practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations?

Ruling:
the court resolve to deny the petion.

[T]he provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines, and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article
11 thereof:

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of
their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions
within the territory of the Other, . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject
to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides 

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the
liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities,
shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to
the laws and regulations of the latter. . . 

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is
desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the
legal profession in the Philippines, he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations

MACLANG, TRICIA

QUEEN V. KEYN
COURT OF CROWN CASES RESERVED, 1876

FACTS:
Ferdinand Keyn was a foreigner and in command of a German vessel called Franconia, passing
within three miles of the shore of England on a voyage to a foreign port. Jessie Dorcas Young
was a passenger by a British steamer called the Strathclyde, from London to Bombay, and that
when off Dover the Strathclyde was run into the Franconia. Thereafter, the Strathclyde was sunk,
and Jessie Dorcas Young was drowned. The point at which the Strathclyde was run down by the
Franconian was one mile and nine-tenths of a mile S.S.E. from Dover pier-head, and within two
and a half miles from Dover beach.
The prisoner Ferdinand Keyn was prosecuted at the Central Criminal Court for manslaughter of
Jessie Dorcas Young. Keyn found guilty. Hence, this appeal alleged that Central Criminal Court
had no jurisdiction to prosecute Keyn.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Central Criminal Court had jurisdiction.

RULING:
No, Central Criminal Court had no jurisdiction to try the prisoner Keyn for the offence charged.
Lord Coleridge, C.J., defined “International Law” as “The law of nations is that collection of
usages which civilized States have agreed to observe in their dealings with one another.” He
further stated that “International Law” is an inexact expression, and it is apt to mislead if its
inexactness is not kept in mind. Law implies a law-giver, and a tribunal capable of enforcing it
and coercing its transgressors. But there is no common law-giver to sovereign states; and no
tribunal has the power to bind them by decrees or coerce them if they transgress.

Cockburn, C.J. provides that the assent of nations is doubtless sufficient to give the power of
parliamentary legislation in a matter otherwise within the sphere of international law. However,
it would be powerless to confer without such legislation a jurisdiction beyond and unknown to
the law, such in this case, a jurisdiction over foreigners in foreign ships on a portion of the high
seas.
The arguments of Kelly, C.B., and Sir R. Phillimore (voted to quash the conviction of Keyn) was
according to the principles of international law that the power of a nation over the sea within
three miles of its coasts is only for certain limited purposes so the Parliament could not apply
English criminal law within those limits. While Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Amphlett, JJ.A.,
Grove, Denman, and Lindley, JJ., (voted that Court had the jurisdiction) argued that the sea
within three miles of the coast of England is part of the territory of England so the English
criminal law extends over those limits, and the Central Criminal Court has jurisdiction to try
offences there committed although on board foreign ships.

In this case, the majority of the Court, which is 7 out of 13 judge, voted that the admiral had no
jurisdiction to try offences by foreigners on board foreign ships, whether within or without the
limit of three miles from the shore of England. The subsequent statutes only transferred to the
Common Law Courts and the Central Criminal Court the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the
admiral. Therefore, in the absence of statutory enactment, the Central Criminal Court had no
power to try such an offence.

Hence, conviction quashed.

ARSULO, SEDFREY

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, et al. vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al.

G.R. No. 118295; May 2, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The Republic of the Philippines, through DTI Secretary Navarro signed in the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.

The Philippine Senate, then, received a letter from the President of the Philippines stating that
the Uruguay Round Final Act (the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization) is
submitted to them for their concurrence. Another letter on the same subject was given to the
Senate.

Senate adopted a resolution expressing its concurrence in the ratification of the international
agreement. Thereafter, the President signed the Instrument of Ratification. However, the WTO
Agreement ratified by the President did not contain certain documents contained in the Final Act
signed by the DTI Secretary.

This action was filed by Tanada, et al. questioning the validity and constitutionality of the WTO
Agreement. They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution
and viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

ISSUE:
Is the WTO Agreement consistent with the Constitution and does it unduly limit and restrict
Philippine sovereignty?

Does the concurrence made by the Senate and the President, in essence, defective since it did not
include other documents contained in the Final Act signed by the DTI Secretary?

HELD:
The WTO Agreement is not violative of the Constitution. The reliance on the principle of
economic nationalism espoused in Articles 2 (Sec. 19) and Article 12 (Secs. 10 and 12) of the
Constitution is misplaced as these are not self-executing provisions. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but are guidelines for legislation. These are broad
constitutional principles that need legislative enactments to implement them. Moreover, while
the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to
promote an isolationist policy. In addition, the GATT itself has provided built-in protection from
such unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

Participating in the WTO Agreement did limit or restrict, to some extent, the absoluteness of our
sovereignty, but is not necessarily reprehensible. While sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations. Through the incorporation clause in the Constitution, the Philippines is
bound by generally accepted principles of law as they automatically form part of the laws of the
land. Of great importance is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which means that international
agreements must be performed in good faith. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure
the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. So by their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. For instance, when the Philippines joined the UN and other bilateral relations
with other States, it effectively limits its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and
police power. It can then be inferred that a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution by virtue of the Philippines being bound by generally accepted
principles of law.

A Final Act is not the treaty itself. It is just a summary of the proceedings that took place during
the negotiation stage. In fact, the Senate did what the Final Act required—the concurrence to the
WTO Agreement. By the ratification of the Agreement, the other documents in question
(Ministerial Declarations etc.) were deemed adopted. Additionally, the WTO Agreement itself
stipulated what multilateral agreements are deemed included.

In sum, there was no grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part
of the Senate and the President. When the WTO Agreement was ratified and made part of the
law of the land, the Senate and the President was exercising, legitimately, its sovereign duty and
power. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and development of
international trade law.

SIOBAL, IRVIN
Italy (Gentini) v. Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission, 1923, Ralston, Venezuelan
Arbitration of 1903

Facts:
Gentini, who was living in Trujillio, Venezuela, is a grocer in 1871.
His store was ordered to be closed, his merchandise was confiscated, he was forced to enter into
a loan under the threat of violence. He was sent to prison.

He was diligent enough to gather evidence but no claim was done until 1903 when the Italian
legation made a move.

The claim is for a sum of 3900 bolivars.

Issue:
Whether or not Gentini’s action against Venezuela is barred by Prescription.

Ruling:
Prescription is even more important among nations than among individuals, as the disagreements
among them often escalates to war.

Prescription is a well recognized principle in international law.

Power (of the states) over fixed areas depends upon possession sanctified by prescription. (Ex.
Taking of territory etc.)

All nations and from earliest period has considered that dispute between individuals should be
brought about by efflux of time.

The principle of prescription is an outgrowth of general demand of equity, through the lapse of
time, the witnesses may have been dead or the vouchers may fade.

Equity does not encourage stale claims nor give relief to those who slept on their rights.

(Sadeka)

Great Britain (Eastern Extension Australia and China Telegraph Co. Claim) v. United
States Claims Arbitration, 1923 Nielsen’s Reports, 73

Facts:
Appellant-claimant Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co. is a foreign
corporation that was given three concessions to construct, operate, and maintain submarine
telegraph cables . The first concession was granted by a Royal Decree of the Spanish
Government in 1979. It was for a span of 40 years covering Hong Kong to Manila. The second
concession was in 1898, which empowered the claimant to extend its cable to Manila, and the
term of the prior exclusive grant was extended for 20 years. Like the first grant, the term
prescribes the same priority for official dispatches, but with the provision that they were to be
transmitted free only for the first 10 years from the date of this second grant.

In 1897, the claimant was granted with the third concession. This concession is the subject of this
dispute. This grant particularly allowed the claimant to lay down and operate three submarine
cables, connecting the Island of Luzon with three Visayas Islands—Panay, Negros, and Cebu. It
required the claimant to operate the cables for 20 years and to give precedence to official
dispatches and to charge for them at one-half the rates charged for private messages; to pay a tax
of 10% on receipts in excess of expenses not to exceed £6,000 per annum.

The government of Spain, on its part, agreed to pay the claimant in equal monthly installments,
an annual subsidy of £4,500 during the term of the grant. Meanwhile, on December 10, 1898, the
Treaty of Paris was signed which led Spain to relinquish and cede the Philippines to the U.S. and
take $20 million as payment.
The claimant commenced a suit to recover the amount of the subsidy agreed to pay by Spain in
the third concession, which had accrued over time. It is argued that the United States should be
held to have assumed the burden of the concession because it derived benefits and advantages
from the use of the cables.

The United States denied all liability, and the judgment of the Court of Claims, dismissing the
petition, was set for review.

Issue:
Whether the United States assumes the liability to pay the subsidy agreed with by Spain?

Ruling:
No, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.

Firstly, the findings reveal that no contract, express or implied, to pay the disputed subsidy, was
made by any officer of the United States. Upon the findings of fact and upon principles and
analogies derived from the law of private contract, it was determined by this court on the former
appeal that any right in the defendant derived directly from the Treaty with Spain, or any
obligation imposed upon the United States by principles of international law as a consequence of
the cession of the Islands, would not be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and
counsel for claimant, expressly disclaiming the assertion of any right under the Treaty of Paris,
urge that the case be treated 'exactly as it would be if it arose between two private citizens.'

It is obvious that no express contract by the United States to adopt and be bound by the third or
any of the concessions can be made out from the findings of fact, and it is equally clear that such
an implied contract, using the words in any strict sense, cannot be derived from the findings, for
it is plain that there is nothing in them tending to show that any official with power, express or
implied, to commit that government to such a contract ever intended to so commit it.

Also, as to the contention that defendant should be held to have assumed the burden of the
concession because it derived benefits from the use of the cables. Findings reveal the exchanges
between the claimant and the U.S. where the former offered the latter the transmission of official
telegrams over the Hongkong-Manila cable at reduced rates. However, the U.S. politely declined
the offer and stated that the department will pay the established rates on official cable messages,
and all accounts of this character.

The cables were in operation when the United States government assumed jurisdiction over the
Islands. The claimant in full ownership and control over them with the power to determine rates
for service. The government, to be sure, availed itself of the advantages of communication,
which the cables afforded, but for such service it paid the rates which the claimant demanded and
which it must be assumed were adequate.

Thus, these circumstances clearly show how the law will not raise an obligation on the part of the
government to assume the burden of the subsidy on the principle of undue enrichment or of
advantage obtained. It is because defendant United States used the cables as other customers
used them, and from such a use, paid for at the full rate demanded.

Therefore, the court deems it proper to dismiss this petition because no obligation can be derived
by implication.

(Murvi Cua)

The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170 (1871)

FACTS:
A dispute arose between the United States ship Berkshire and the British steamer Scotia. The
Berkshire was struck by the Scotia because of the Berkshire’s failure to display coloured lights
according to customary law of the sea. Berkshire only had a white light during the sail, while
scotia had the complete 3 accustomed lights which were red, green and white. The detailed
reason why the collision happened was because scotia could not clearly see how far Berkshire
was because of his light. Hence this petition According to the customary law.
LIGHTS FOR STEAMSHIPS.
ART. 3. Sea-going steamships when under way shall carry-
(a) At the foremast head, a bright white light . . . of such a
character as to be visible on a dark night, with a clear atmosphere, at a distance of at least five
miles.
(b) On the starboard side a green light, &c., visible on a dark
(c) On the port side a red light, &e., visible on a dark night, with a clear atmosphere, at a distance
of 4t least two miles

LiGHTS FOR SAILING SHIPS. ART. 6. Sailing vessels under way. . . shall carry the same
lights as steamships under way, with the exception of the white masthead lights, which they shall
never carry.

ISSUE:
Was Berkshire in violation of customary International Law in failing to display colored lights?

Ruling:
Yes, It was held that, when we find such rules of navigations in British law as well as 30 other
national laws of commercial states including those shipping in Atlantic Ocean, we are required to
regard them as laws of the sea which were in effect during this collision. This is not giving laws
of any nation’s authority outside of their national sovereignty. It is not treating them as general
maritime laws, but it is recognition of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind,
these rules have been given as a general obligation

(Mary Abigail Basco Modales)

Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., Belgium v.
Spain, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3

FACTS
The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Limited was incorporated in 1911 in
Toronto, Canada and formed a number of subsidiaries in Canada and Spain to create and develop
an electric power production and distribution system in Catalonia (Spain).

Barcelona Traction issued several series of bonds, principally in sterling. In 1936 the servicing of
these Barcelona Traction bonds was suspended due to the Spanish civil war.

Three Spanish holders of the sterling bonds petitioned for the company's declaration of
bankruptcy and the court declared so.

Due to such losses and a takeover, on behalf of Belgian nationals who invested in Barcelona
Traction, the Belgian government sued Spain to seek reparation for damage allegedly caused by
the conduct of various organs of the Spanish State towards the company which are said to be
contrary to international law.

ISSUE
Whether a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on
general international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its
territory.

RULING
Yes.

When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, it is bound to
extend to them the protection of the law and assumed obligations concerning the treatment to be
afforded to them.

However, such obligations were not absolute. In order to bring a claim in respect of the breach of
such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to do so.
 (MarkJohn Prias)

United States (Harry Roberts Claim) v. Mexico, U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission,
1926, Opinion of the Commissioners (1927)

Facts:
Harry Roberts, together with a number of other persons, was arrested by Mexican Federal troops
on May 12, 1922, in the vicinity of Ocampo, Tamaulipas. Mexico, charged with having taken
part in an assault on the house of E. F. Watts, near Ebano, San Luis Potosi, Mexico, on the night
of May 5, 1922.

The claimant was taken prisoner and brought to Tampico, whence he was taken to Ciudad
Vallès, San Luis Potosi, where he was held under detention until he was placed at liberty on
December 16, 1923. a period of nearly nineteen months due to the delay of the prosecution of
trial. As such The United States asks that an indemnity be paid by the Government of Mexico in
the sum of $10,000.00 for the wrongful treatment of the accused.

Issue
1.whether the detention of the accused was of such an unreasonable duration as to warrant an
award of indemnity under the principles of international law.

2.whether the treatment of the accused was not humane as to warrant an award of indemnity
under the principles of international law.

1.Ruling:
Yes. Clearly there is no definite standard prescribed by international law by which such limits
may be fixed. Doubtless an examination of local laws fixing a maximum length of time within
which a person charged with crime may be held without being brought to trial may be useful in
determining whether detention has been unreasonable in a given case.

The Mexican Constitution of 1917, provides by its Article 20, section 8, that a person accused of
crime "must be judged within four months if he is accused of a crime the maximum penalty for
which may not exceed two years' imprisonment, and within one year if the maximum penalty is
greater.“

In this case, it is evident in the light of provisions of Mexican law that Roberts was unlawfully
held a prisoner without trial for at least seven months. Having in mind particularly that Roberts
was held for several months without trial in contravention of Mexican law, the Commission
holds that an indemnity is due on the ground of unreasonably long detention.

2.Ruling
YES. Facts with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and nationals may be important in
determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment of an alien. But such equality is not the
ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of authorities in the light of international law. That test
is, broadly speaking, whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of
civilization.
In this case, it appears from evidence submitted by the American Agency that the jail in which he
was kept was a room thirty-five feet long and twenty feet wide with stone walls, earthen floor,
straw roof, a single window, a single door and no sanitary accommodations, all the prisoners
depositing their excrement in a barrel kept in a corner of the room ; that thirty or forty men were
at times thrown together in this single room; that the prisoners were given no facilities to clean
themselves; that the room contained no furniture except that which the prisoners were able to
obtain by their own means; that they were afforded no opportunity to take physical exercise; and
that the food given them was scarce, unclean, and of the coarsest kind.

Clearly, Roberts was treated not in accordance with ordinary standards of civilization as to
warrant an indemnity on the ground of cruel and inhumane imprisonment.

the Commission holds that damages may be assessed on two of the grounds asserted in the
American Memorial, namely, ( 1 ) excessively long imprisonment—with which the Mexican
Government is clearly chargeable for a period of seven months, and (2) cruel and inhumane
treatment suffered by Roberts in jail during nineteen months.

(Loren Delos Santos)

Texas Cattle Claims, American-Mexican Claims Commission, 8 Whiteman 749 (1948)

FACTS:
The American-Mexican Claims Commission, officially known as the General Claims
Commission (Mexico and United States,) was a commission set up by treaty that adjudicated
claims by citizens of the United States and Mexico for losses suffered due to the acts of one
government against nationals of the other.

Texas cattle claims arose during the period from the close of the American Civil War to about
1878. The principal ground of complaint, as pre¬sented by the claimant government, relates to
raids from Mexico and thefts of cattle and horses of American citizens in Texas. The claims are
462 in number. The total amount claimed is $53,275,890.50. Honorable Oscar W. Underwood,
Jr., the American Commissioner designated under that Protocol, made- an appraisal of the claim
and vast majority of them were found by him to be entitled to 'no award' upon the ground that
there was no showing of 'complicity or negligence on the part of Mexican authorities.

Commissioner Underwood seems to hold also that it is not sufficient for a claimant to prove that
during the existence of the general condition in question raiders from Mexico stole his cattle but
that he must also prove that in his individual case the Mexican Government (MG) could have
controlled the raiders or could have punished them through its usual means of repression.

ISSUE:
WON the MG can be held liable upon proof that MG could have controlled the raiders or could
have punished them through its usual means of repression.

RULING:
NO. The commission did not agree with Comm. Underwood.

The Comm. opined that each raid was not an isolated raid but was a part of a general lawless
condition which, throughout said period, was permanent and, as noted, was made possible by the
action of the Mexican authorities. It follows, therefore, in the opinion of the (this) Commission,
that, if a claimant proves that his losses were caused by a raid or raids from Mexico during the
period in question, he will thereby have established liability on the part of the Mexican
Government for the same

The general legal grounds, therefore, on which this Commission holds the Mexican Government
liable are: ( 1) active participation of Mexican officials in the depredations; (2) permitting the use
of Mexican territory as a base for wrongful operations against the United States and the citizens
thereof, thus encouraging the wrongful acts; (3) negligence, over a long period of years, to
prosecute criminals or otherwise to discourage or prevent the raids; and (4) failure to cooperate
with the Government of the United States in the matter of terminating the condition in question.

(Leriza Simpao)

United States (Walter A. Noyes Claim) v. Panama, America and Panamanian General
Claims Arbitration 1933, 6 United Republic International Arbitral Awards 308

FACTS:
This case is a claim filed by USA on behalf of Walter Noyes against the Republic of Panama
praying for indemnity for the personal injuries and property losses sustained by Mr. Noyes
through the attacks made upon him on June 19, 1927, in, and in the neighborhood of, the village
of Juan Diaz, near Panama City. USA asserted that there is an alleged failure to provide to the
claimant adequate police protection, to exercise due diligence in the maintenance of order and to
take adequate measures to apprehend and punish the aggressors.

As a defense, respondent claims that the Commission has no jurisdiction to decide the claim as
the said incident happened after the signing of the convention. On the other hand, Counsel for the
United States argued that the Commission has jurisdiction to decide this claim, because, whereas
Art. I of the convention fixes the date (November 3, 1903) since which claims must have arisen
in order to be within the jurisdiction of the Commission, but is silent on the date before which
such claims must have arisen, Art. VII shows that claims arising before the exchange of
ratifications are within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

ISSUE:
Does the commission has jurisdiction to decide the claim?

RULING:
Yes. The Commission decides that it has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

Art. VII of the convention between the United States and Mexico provides that claims for loss or
damage accruing after the signing of the convention may be filed at any time during the period
fixed in Art. VI for the duration of the Commission and it also provides that, should at the end of
that same period any such claim or claims not be decided as specified in Art. VI, the Government
will by agreement extend that period for such time as is necessary to hear, examine and decide
such claim or claims. Whereas, therefore, that convention provides complete machinery for the
filing and deciding of claims arising after the signing of the convention, the convention between
the United States and Panama contains no provisions on the subject. Moreover, Art. I of this
convention confers upon the Commission jurisdiction over claims "filed by either Government
within the time hereinafter specified" and as art. VI specifies a time with regard only to claims
arising before the signing of the convention, the jurisdiction of the Commission over Mr. Noyes’
claim would seem to be excluded by the convention but for the provision of Art. VII to which the
Commission has to give effect according to its meaning. It may be conceded that, by reason of
the absence of any reference in the preceding articles to claims arising between the signing of the
convention and the exchange of the acts of ratification, the inclusion of such claims within the
jurisdiction of the Commission is somewhat out of place in this article, but nevertheless the
article clearly recognizes such jurisdiction and an interpretation to the contrary would be
altogether inconsistent with its wording.

However, in so far as the decision towards the claim is concerned, the commission can’t agree
with the allegation of USA that the respondent failed to provide adequate police protection. The
mere fact that an alien has suffered at the hands of private persons an aggression, which could
have been averted by the presence of a sufficient police force on the spot, does not make a
government liable for damages under international law. There must be shown special
circumstances from which the responsibility of the authorities arises: either their behavior in
connection with the particular occurrence, or a general failure to comply with their duty to
maintain order, to prevent crimes or to prosecute and punish criminals.

There were no such circumstances in the present case. Accordingly a lack of protection has not
been established. The claim is also based upon the failure of the Panamanian authorities to
prosecute the perpetrators of the aggressions upon the claimant. It is a fact that no prosecutions
were instituted. Taking into account however the conditions under which the events had taken
place, the Commission cannot conclude to a liability of the Panamanian Government in this
respect.

The claim is disallowed.

(Joshua Rodriguez)

United States (Laura B. James Claim) v. U.S.A., U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission,
1926, Opinion of the Commissioners (1927), p. 108

FACTS:
This claim was instituted by the United States of America on behalf of Laura May Buffington
Janes, individually, and as guardian of her to minor children. This is made to claim for loses and
damages for the murder of Byron Everett Janes (American Citizen), Superintendent of Mines for
the El Tigre Mining Company who was deliberately shot and killed by Pedro Carbajal (citizen of
Mexico), a former employee of the Mining Company who had been discharged, at the same
company. Accordingly, after the incident, there was a delayed for the apprehending of the
culprit, thus, they failed to arrest him.

Subsequently, there was an information that relayed to Mexican civil and military authorities that
Carbajal was at a mescal plant near Carrizal, about seventy-five miles south of El Tigre.
However, they failed to take effective steps to apprehend the culprit, until the El Tigre Mining
Company offered a reward for the apprehension.

The Mexican government, on the other hand, denied through their Answer that they failed to take
appropriate steps to arrest and punish Carbajal and contends that they just relied on the
information that was relayed to them. However, the Court came to a conclusion that indeed they
were inefficient and dilatory, and there was clearly such a failure on the part of the Mexican
authorities to take prompt and efficient action to apprehend the slayer as to warrant an award of
indemnity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim against Mexican Authorities will prosper?

RULING:
Yes, the claim against Mexican Authorities will prosper.

International awards have held that, if a State shows serious lack of diligence in apprehending
and/or punishing culprits, its liability is a derivative liability, assuming the character of some
kind of complicity with the perpetrator himself and rendering the State responsible for the very
consequences of the individual’s misdemeanor.

In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the claimant government, Mexican authorities,
established lack of diligence in apprehending the culprit, Pedro Carbajal, of the victim, Byron
Everett Janes. The present case is one of nonrepression. Therefore, the international delinquency
in this case is separate from the private delinquency of the culprit. The culprit is liable for having
killed or murdered an American national; the Government is liable for not having measured up to
its duty of diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender. The culprit has
transgressed the penal code of his country; the State has transgressed a provision of international
law as to State duties.

(John Lerry Dela Cruz)

United States (T.H. Youman Claim) v. U.S.A., U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission,
1926, Opinion of the Commissioners (1927), p. 150

FACTS:
Thomas H. Youmans with two other Americans (John A. Connelly and George Arnold) were
employed in the construction of San Hilario Tunnel in Mexico to which the laborers are Mexican
residents of the town of Angangueo with approximately 7,000 population.

Connelly who was the managing engineer in the construction has an argument with Medina, a
laborer, over a trifling sum of about twelve cents which the laborer insisted was due to him as
wages to which considered the conduct of the laborer to be offensive, ejected the latter from the
house. Subsequently Medina, who was joined by several companions, began to throw stones at
Connelly while the latter was sitting in front of his house and approached the American with a
drawn machete. Connelly, upon fired at Medina with a shotgun and wounded him in the legs.
Soon the house was surrounded by a threatening mob, which increased until it numbered about a
thousand people. Connelly, Youmans, and Arnold, realizing the seriousness of their situation,
prepared to defend themselves against the mob. Connelly undertook to surrender himself to the
local authorities, but was driven back into the house by the mob. Stephen, the employer of the
Americans, proceeded to the Casa Municipal and requested the mayor to protect the Americans
in the house to which the Mayor requested his troops to quell the riot and put an end to the attack
upon the Americans. The troops, on arriving at the scene of the riot, instead of dispersing the
mob, opened fire on the house, as a consequence of which Arnold was killed. The mob renewed
the attack, and while the Americans defended themselves as best they could, several members of
the mob approached the house from the rear, where there were no windows and set fire to the
roof. Connelly and Youmans were forced to leave, and as they did so they were killed by the
troops and members of the mob.

The next day, Mexican President ordered to take all possible measures to identify the murderers
to which the court identified 29 individuals. Some were apprehended, some were acquitted. The
Mexican Government denies there was a lapse in the protection that should’ve been afforded to
the Americans and that proper efforts were not made to apprehend the persons participating in
the attack.

Reports from the American diplomatic and consular affairs shows that Mexico did not challenge
the substantial accuracy of the evidence with respect to the occurrences out of which the claim
arises are based. Accordingly, the troops on the ground failed to quell the riot and instead opened
fire on the Americans in the house which encouraged the mop to reopen the attack which killed
Arnold by a shot through the head.

ISSUE:
Whether there is liability on the part of the Mexican Government.

RULING:
Yes. There is a liability on the part of the Mexican Government.

The record shows a lack of diligence in the punishment of the persons implicated in the crime.
Citations have been made to evidence with respect to the participation of the soldiers in the
killing of the three Americans. The judicial record also shows that some soldiers were arrested
but were not sentenced. Evidence before the commission does not disclose whose weapons killed
the Americans, but the participation of the soldiers with the members of the mob is established

With respect to the question of responsibility for the acts of soldiers there are citations in the
Mexican Government's brief of extracts from a discussion of a subcommittee of the League of
Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. The
passage quoted, which deals with the responsibility of a State for illegal acts of officials resulting
in damages to foreigners, begins with a statement relative to the acts of an official accomplished
"outside the scope of his competency, that is to say, if he has exceeded his powers." An illegal
act of this kind, it is stated in the quotation, is one that cannot be imputed to the State

Apart from the question whether the acts of officials referred to in this discussion have any
relation to the rule of international law with regard to responsibility for acts of soldiers, it seems
clear that the passage to which particular attention is called in the Mexican Government's brief is
concerned solely with the question of the authority of an officer as defined by domestic law to
act for his Government with reference to some particular subject. Clearly it is not intended by the
rule asserted to say that no wrongful act of an official acting in the discharge of duties entrusted
to him can impose responsibility on a Government under international law because any such
wrongful act must be considered to be "outside the scope of his competency.” Citation is also
made in the Mexican brief to an opinion rendered by Umpire Lieber in which effect is evidently
given to the well-recognized rule of international law that a Government is not responsible for
malicious acts of soldiers committed in their private capacity. But the General Claims
Commission do not consider that the participation of the soldiers in the murder at Angangueo
can be regarded as acts of soldiers committed in their private capacity when it is clear that at the
time of the commission of these acts the men were on duty under the immediate supervision and
in the presence of a commanding officer. Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing
wanton destruction or looting always act in disobedience of some rules laid down by superior
authority. There could be no liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken.

The Commission therefore decides that the Government of the United Mexican States must pay
to the Government of the United States of America the sum of 520,000.00 (twenty thousand
dollars) without interest on behalf of Thomas H. Youmans
 (Jessa Santos)

United States (Neer Claim) v. U.S.A., U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission, 4 R.I.A.A. 60
(1926), Opinion of the Commissioners (1927), p. 71

(Jenny)

NOTTEBOHM CASE
(LIECHTENSTEIN VS GUATEMALA)

Facts:
Nottebohm was born at Hamburg, he was German by birth, and still possessed German
nationality when he applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein. In 1905 he went to Guatemala.
He took up residence there and made that country the headquarters of his business activities,
which increased and prospered; these activities developed in the field of commerce, banking and
plantations.

Having been an employee in the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos, which had been founded by his
brothers Juan and Arturo, he became their partner in 1912 and later, in 1937, he was made head
of the firm. He continued to have business connections in Germany. He paid a few visits to a
brother who had lived in Liechtenstein since 1931. Some of his other brothers, relatives and
friends were in Germany, others in Guatemala. He himself continued to have his fixed abode in
Guatemala until 1943, that is to say, until the occurrence of World War II which constitute the
basis of the present dispute.

Upon his return to Guatemala he was refused entry because he was deemed to be a German
citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before
the International Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala
challenged the validity of Nottebohm’s citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein to bring the action
and alleged its belief that Nottebohm remained a German national. After the Court rejected the
Preliminary Objection raised by the Government of the Republic of Guatemala to the
Application of the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein, several hearings were held
wherein both parties presented numbers of new documents.

The Government of Liechtenstein submit that the Court should adjudge and declare that the
Government of Guatemala in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr.
Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his property without compensation acted in breach of
their obligations under international law and consequently in a manner requiring the payment of
Reparation.

Government of Guatemala on the other hand argued that the claim of the Principality of
Liechtenstein is inadmissible because the Principality of Liechtenstein has failed to prove that M.
Nottebohm, for whose protection it is acting, properly acquired Liechtenstein nationality in
accordance with the law of the Principality; because, even if such proof were provided, the legal
provisions which would have been applied cannot be regarded as in conformity with
international law; and because M. Nottebohm appears in any event not to have lost, or not validly
to have lost, his German nationality

Issue:
Whether or not nationality be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a mere
device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally the concerns of that nation

Ruling:
No. The general rule of international law is that nationality gives rise to a right of diplomatic
Protection. Fundamentally the obligation of a State to accord reasonable treatment to resident
aliens and the correlative right of protection are based on the consent of the States concerned.
When an alien comes to the frontier, seeking admission, either as a settler or on a visit, the State
has an unfettered right to refuse admission. That does not mean that it can deny the aliens
national status or refuse to recognize it. But by refusing admission, the State prevents the
establishment of legal relationships involving rights and obligations, as regards the alien,
between the two countries. On the other hand, by admitting the alien, the State, by its voluntary
act, brings into being a series of legal relationships with the State of which he is a national.

As a result of the admission of an alien, whether as a permanent settler or as a visitor, a whole

series of legal relationships come into being. There are two States concerned, to which I shall
refer as the receiving State and the protecting State. The receiving State becomes subject to a
series of legal duties vis-à-vis the protecting State, particularly the duty of reasonable and fair
treatment. It acquires rights vis-à-vis the protecting State and the individual, particularly the
rights incident to local allegiance and the right of deportation to the protecting State. At the same
time the protecting State acquires correlative rights and obligations vis-à-vis the receiving State,
particularly a diminution of its rights as against the individual resulting from the local allegiance,
the right to assert diplomatic protection and the obligation to receive the individual on
deportation. This network of rights and obligations is fundamentally conventional in its origin—
it begins with a voluntary act of the protecting State in permitting the individual to take up
residence in the other country, and the voluntary act of admission by the receiving State. The
scope and content of the rights are, however, largely defined by positive international law.
Nevertheless, the receiving State has control at all stages because it can bring the situation to an
end by deportation.

(Iya Rocha)

The Canevaro Case, Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1912; Scott, Hague
Court Reports, 284

Facts:
Napoleon, Carlos and Raphael Canevaro demands the sum of 43,140 pounds sterling plus the
legal interest.

The debt arose from a decree of the dictator PIÉROLA of December 12, 1880, by virtue of
which there were issued, under date of the 23rd of the same month, pay checks to the order of
the firm of JOSÉ CANEVARO & SONS for the sum of 77,000 pounds sterling, payable at
different dates. The said checks were not paid at the dates fixed, which coincided with the hostile
occupation

Peruvian law of 1889 (Article 14 of the law of June 12, 1889) on domestic debt, without
affecting the existing claims against Peru, simply gave the government the privilege of
discharging its debts in a certain manner when the creditors should demand the payment thereof,
and it is at the time the payment is demanded that the matter should be considered in order to
ascertain whether the exception arising from the law may be invoked against all persons,
especially against foreigners.

Therafter, it has been held in a general way that the CANEVARO debt ought not to be under the
application of the law of 1889, as it could not be considered as coming within the domestic debt
because all its characteristics are against this, the obligation being to order, made payable in
pounds sterling, and belonging to Italians

And that, apart from the nationality of the persons, it is known that financial measures taken
within a country do not affect the acts concluded outside and by which the government has
appealed directly to foreign credit; but such is not the case in this instance, as it is a question, in
the case of the certificates issued in December, 1880, of a settlement of a domestic nature, of
obligations created at Lima, and payable at Lima, in compensation for a payment made
voluntarily on behalf of the Peruvian Government.

Two governments have respectively appointed as counsel: The Royal Italian Government and
The Peruvian Government.

Issue:
Whether the Peruvian law of 1889 on domestic debt would apply in the case at bar
Ruling:
No. This point of view seems in disagreement with the general terms and spirit of the law of
1889;
The CANEVARO firm, which was Peruvian at the time when the law of 1889 went into force,
and as, for the reasons already set forth, this situation has not been changed in law by the fact
that the claim has passed to Italians by indorsement or by inheritance.

It has been alleged that the Peruvian Government ought to indemnify the claimants for the injury
that the delay in discharging the debt of 1880 has caused them, and that the injury consists of the
difference between the payment of the consolidated debt in gold and its payment in bonds; that
thus the Peruvian Government would be obliged to pay in gold the amount claimed, even
admitting that the law of 1889 was properly applied to the claim.

The Tribunal considers that if it were to follow this line of thought it would be departing from
the terms of the agreement to arbitrate, which instructs it solely to decide whether the Peruvian
Government ought to pay in cash or in accordance with the provisions of the Peruvian law of
June 12, 1889.

However, it is only in regard the two brothers that the Tribunal is to pass judgment,
EXCLUDING RAPHAEL CANEVARO.

Dispositive Portion:
The Arbitral Tribunal decides that the Peruvian Government shall, on July 31, 1912, deliver to
the Italian Legation at Lima, on account of the brothers NAPOLEON and CARLOS
CANEVARO:
1.In bonds of the domestic (1%) debt of 1889, the nominal amount of 39,811 pounds 8 shillings
and 1 penny sterling (£39811.8.1) upon the surrender of two-thirds of the bonds delivered on
December 23, 1880, to the firm of JOSÉ CANEVARO & SONS;
2.In gold, the sum of 9,388 pounds 17 shillings, 1 penny sterling (£9388.17.1), constituting the
interest at 1% from January 1, 1889, to July 31, 1912.
The Peruvian Government may delay the payment of this latter sum until January 1, 1913, on
payment of interest thereon at the rate of 6% from August 1, 1912.

(Ise Mantuano)

United States v. Austria and Hungary, Tripartite Claims Commission, 1928; Decisions and
Opinions (1929)

FACTS:
The claimant was born in the United States of Austrian parents on May 14, 1895. Under the
Constitution and laws of the United States he was by birth an American national. Under the laws
of Austria he also possessed Austrian nationality by parentage. This created a conflict in
citizenship, frequently described as "dual nationality".

When the claimant was five years of age he accompanied his parents to Austria, where he
continued to reside.

In August 1914, the claimant, while residing in Austria a short distance from the Russian border,
was objected to preventive arrest as an agitator engaged in propaganda in favor of Russia. After
investigation he was interned and confined in internment camps for 16 months. He then took the
oath of allegiance to the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and was impressed into
service in the Austro-Hungarian army. A decision of the sharply controverted claim that this oath
was taken under duress and that he protested that he was an American citizen is not necessary to
a disposition of this case. It appears that in 1915 and later representatives of the Government of
the United States in Austria interested themselves in securing his release, but the application was
denied.

In July 1916, the claimant deserted from the Austro-Hungarian army and escaped into Russia,
where he was arrested and held by the Russian army authorities as a prisoner of war until the
outbreak of the Kerensky revolution, when he was released and thereupon returned to Prague,
where he still lives and where he is practicing medicine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian authorities were well within their rights in
dealing with him as such.

RULING:
Yes. The action taken by the Austrian civil authorities in the exercise of their police powers and
by the Austro-Hungarian military authorities, of which complaint is made, was taken in Austria,
where claimant was voluntarily residing, against claimant as an Austrian citizen. Citizenship is
determined by rules prescribed by municipal law.

Under the law of Austria, to which claimant had voluntarily subjected himself, he was an
Austrian citizen. The Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian authorities were well within their rights
in dealing with him as such. Possessing as he did dual nationality, he voluntarily took the risk
incident to residing in Austrian territory and subjecting himself to the duties and obligations of
an Austrian citizen arising under the municipal laws of Austria.

Assuming that the claimant suffered the loss and injury alleged and had not lost his American
citizenship by taking the Austrian Army oath, the Commissioner finds no provision of the Treaty
of Vienna or of Budapest obligating Austria and/or Hungary to make compensation therefor.
Wherefore the Commission decrees that under the Treaty of Vienna and the Treaty of Budapest
the Government of Austria and the Government of Hungary are not obligated to pay to the
Government of the United States any amount on behalf of the claimant herein.

(Gelo Ace)

The Paquete Habana v. The Lola, 125 U.S. 677 (1900)

Facts:
At the breaking out of the recent war with Spain, two fishing smacks were regularly engaged in
fishing on the coast of Cuba, sailing under the Spanish flag, and each owned by a Spanish
subject, residing in Havana.

The owners of the vessels were not aware of the existence of war until they were captured by
U.S blockading squadron. Both fishing vessels had no arms or ammunition on board and had no
knowledge of blockage.

Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the
condemnation of each vessel and her cargo as a prize of war. A claim was interposed by her
master on behalf of himself and the other members of the crew, and of her owner. A final decree
of condemnation and sale was entered.

"the court not being satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, treaty, or
proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from seizure."
Each vessel was thereupon sold by auction; the Paquete Habana for the sum of $490 and the Lola
for the sum of $800. There was no other evidence in the record of the value of either vessel or of
her cargo.

Issue: 
Whether coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded froM prizes of war.

Ruling:
Yes. It was a rule of international law that coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, were exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as
prize of war. Although not reduced to treaty or statutory law, courts were obligated to take notice
of and give effect to that rule.

The customary international law exempted fishing vessels from being taken as prizes of war.
There are a number of factors that determine if something is customary international law. In this
case, the Court found that, there was State practice by a number of different countries that
commercial fishing vessels were exempt. There was repetition of the practice over time. There
was opinio juris that commercial fishing vessels were exempt. Opinio juris is a subjective
element that is used to judge whether the practice of a state is due to a belief that it is legally
obliged to do a particular act. Customary international law can be thought of as a kind of
international common law. It is something that's not explicitly defined anywhere, but everyone
just agrees to it.

Thus, the decrees condemning the vessels were reversed and, in each case, it was ordered that the
proceeds of the sales of each vessel and cargo be restored to the respective claimant, with
compensatory damages and costs. The Court also noted that it had appellate jurisdiction over the
controversy without regard to the amount in dispute and without certification from the district
court, as required by prior statutory law.

(Florna Mae Ageas)

West Rand Central Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. The King, King’s Bench Division, 2 K.B. 391
(1905)

Facts:
Plaintiff is West Rand Central Gold Mining Company, Limited is a company registered in
England under the Companies Acts and owning and working a gold mine in His Majesty’s
Transvaal Colony. While the defendant is the King of Great Britain, represented by his Majesty’s
Attorney-General.

October 2, 1899- ounces of gold, while in transit by train, were taken possession from the
suppliants by an official of the late South African Republic, acting upon the instructions of the
State Attorney of the said Republic to take the said gold into safe keeping in African Banking
Corporation of Johannesburg.

October 9, 1899- two bars of gold were taken possession of upon the premises of the said bank
by two officials of the Government of the said Republic. The said gold was in each case taken
possession of by and on behalf of and for the purposes of the then existing Government of the
said Republic, and the said Government by the laws of the said Republic was under a liability to
return the said gold or its value to your suppliants. However, none of the said gold has been
returned to the suppliants, nor did the Government make any payment in respect thereof.

October 11, 1899- A state of war between Her late Majesty Queen Victoria and the said Republic
commenced.

September 1, 1900- the whole of the territories of the said Republic were annexed to and became
part of Her dominions, and the late Government of the said Republic thereby ceased to exist. By
reason of the said conquest and annexation Her late Majesty succeeded to the Sovereignty of the
said Government with all its rights and duties and became entitled to the whole property of the
said Government, and the obligation which vested in the said Government in respect of the said
gold is now as binding upon His Majesty.

The suppliants therefore humbly pray the return of the said gold, or payment to them.
In argument, on demurrer, that the petition disclosed no right on the part of the suppliants which
could be enforced against His Majesty in any municipal Court for there is no principle of
international law by which, after annexation of conquered territory, the conquering State
becomes liable, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, to discharge financial
liabilities of the conquered State incurred before the outbreak of war.

Issue:
Whether the contractual obligation of the conquered State towards individuals is to be
undertaken by the conquering State.

Ruling:
No. A Government claiming rights of property and rights under a contract cannot enforce those
rights in our Courts without fulfilling the terms of the contract as a whole. They have no bearing
upon the propositions, for the reasons given, that no right on the part of the suppliants is
disclosed by the petition which can be enforced as against His Majesty in this or in any
municipal Court; and therefore allow the demurrer, with costs. Judgment for the Crown.

It is a well-established principle of law that the transactions of independent States between each
other are governed by other laws than those which municipal Courts administer. It is no answer
to say that by the ordinary principles of international law private property is respected by the
Sovereign which accepts the cession and assumes the duties and legal obligations of the former
Sovereign with respect to such private property within the ceded territory. All that can be
properly meant by such a proposition is that, according to the well-understood rules of
international law, a change of Sovereignty by cession ought not to affect private property, but no
municipal tribunal has authority to enforce such an obligation.

(Cweezy Queñano)

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171 (1949

FACTS:
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was formerly a Leutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army in
the Philippines during the war. Now that the war has ceased, he is being prosecuted for war
crimes before a military Commission.

Said military commission was created by Executive Order No. 68, created by President Manuel
L. Quezon in the exercise his emergency powers as Chief of Staff of the AFP, to try war
criminals by virtue of the Hague Convention where Japan and US were signatories, and the
Geneva Convention where the PH is a signatory. Such war crimes were the commission of brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against civilians.

Petitioner’s Contention: It argues that such EO, being adherent to the Rules of the Hague
Convention where in the PH is not a signatory, is in violation of our constitution therefore,
invalid.

ISSUE:
W/N the Philippines can try war criminals based on an international law, of which it is not a
signatory.

W/N EO 68 is unconstitutional

RULING:
NO.
According to the Section 2 of Article II of our Constitution, “The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.”

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part
of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the PH was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the US and thus we were equally bound together with
the US and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty.

Therefore, the change of our government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people.
 (Centene Pablo)

Mortensen v. Peters, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland (1906)

FACTS:
A Danish captain was found guilty of violating a fishing by-law in the Moray Firth by a Scottish
court. His ship was operating within the Moray Firth and within the region protected by the
applicable by-law, but it exceeded the international three-mile limit. The case reached the
Scottish High Court of Justice, where Lord Dunedin focused his discussion of the captain's
appeal on the proper construction of the relevant statutes. He underlined that a lawfully passed
and assented Act of Parliament was supreme, and the Court was compelled to give effect to its
terms. In other words, legislation trumped customary law, and a British court would have to
follow the contents of a statute even if they violated a rule of international law. This is true
despite the presumption in British law that legislation should be understood in such a way as to
prevent confrontation with international law. Where such a dispute occurs, the statute takes
precedence, and the state is left to deal with the infraction of a customary rule.

ISSUE:
Whether the Act would only be applied to British fishermen?

RULING:
No. The ban here, which is the violation, is not an absolute restriction against doing anything, but
a prohibition against doing it in a given place. When a legislature conditions an offense by
territorial bounds, it establishes a strong inference that it is, for the purposes mentioned,
presuming a power to legislate for that territory against all persons. 

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the prohibition's intended remedy would be
undermined or rendered ineffective if it did not apply to all persons. It would be manifestly futile
to prohibit trawling by British subjects while other nations' subjects were free to fish.

(Ariel Reyes)

State of Missouri v. Holland and US Government, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)   

FACTS:
In order to protect the lives of migratory birds President Woodrow Wilson entered into a treaty
with Great Britain that provided greater protection for migratory birds. To effectuate the treaty,
the Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 prohibiting the selling, catching and
killing of the migratory birds protected by the treaty.
Before the bird treaty was entered into by the United States and Great Britain, the Congress
attempted to passed a law prohibiting the selling, catching and killing of migratory birds, even
without a treaty, however, it was struck down by the District Court for being unconstitutional.

In order to achieve the same, the Federal Government entered into a treaty with Great Britain,
however, the State of Missouri opposed, contending that the treaty which was implemented by an
unconstitutional migratory bird act is an interference with the powers reserved to the states by
the 10th amendment (the powers not delegated to the US by the constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states or its people). They contended that they have the absolute
control on the birds that are in their borders.

The District Court upheld the validity of the act of the Congress, because of that the State
appealed to the USSC.

ISSUE:
Can a Congress pass a statute implementing a valid treaty to protect migratory birds, even if the
equivalent statute was initially struck down for being unconstitutional.

RULING:
YES. The Congress may pass a law implementing a valid treaty to protect migratory birds, even
if the equivalent statute was initially struck down for being unconstitutional.
The Court held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is a valid exercise of the federal government’s
treaty-making power.

Under Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution, it allows the President to make a treaty, subject to
ratification by two-thirds of the Senate, for which the Migratory Treaty satisfies.

Under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution (Necessary and proper Clause), statutes passed to
effectuate a valid treaty is constitutional. Although as a stand-alone statute, the migratory act was
held unconstitutional, under the necessary and proper clause, if that statute is passed to give
effect to a valid treaty, that statute is deemed to be constitutional even if initially held as not.

Under Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Constitution (Supremacy Clause), it establishes that the
Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority constitutes
the supreme law of the land.

Therefore, the Migratory Bird Act takes precedence over state laws.

Therefore, The Congress may pass a law implementing a valid treaty to protect migratory birds,
even if the equivalent statute was initially struck down for being unconstitutional.

(Anna Angela Delos Reyes)

The Wimbledon Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1923 Series A, No. 1

FACTS:
An English steamship, the “Wimbledon” had been time chartered by the French Company “Les
Affreteurs reunis”. The vessel had taken on board at Salonica 4,200 tons of munitions and
artillery stores consigned to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig. In 1921, the vessel was about to
pass the Kiel Canal but was refused by the Director of Canal Traffic upon instructions based on
the neutrality Orders issued by the Germany in connection with the Russo-Polish war.

The French ambassador requested the German Government to withdraw this prohibition in
conformity with Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles. The German Government replied that
the German Neutrality Orders of July 25th and 30th, 1920 prohibited the transit of cargoes of this
kind destined for Poland or Russia and Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles was not an
obstacle to the application of the orders.

The vessel continued its voyage through the Danish Straits as ordered by the Sociéte des
Affréteurs réunis. The Wimbledon incident gave rise to active negotiations between ambassadors
and the Berlin government but led to no result. Hence, the Government of Britain, France, Italy
and Japan (the Applicants) brought a suit against the Government of Germany under the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
According to the petitioners, the German authorities were wrong in refusing the free access to
Kiel Canal to the steamship “Wimbledon” and is under the obligation to pay the prejudice
sustained.

On the other hand, the German authorities maintained that they were within their rights in
refusing to allow the steamship “Wimbledon” to pass through the Kiel Canal and rejected the
claim for compensation. German government argues that Germany’s neutrality would have
necessarily been imperiled if their authorities had allowed the passage of the Wimbledon through
the Kiel Canal because the vessel was carrying contraband of war consigned to a state then
engaged in an armed conflict.

ISSUE:
Whether Germany was entitled to invoke her rights and duties as a neutral power and the
provisions of her Neutrality Orders issued in connection with the Russo-Polish war as a ground
for her refusal to allow the "Wimbledon" to enter the Kiel Canal, in spite of the categorical terms
of Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles.

RULING:
No.
Neutrality Order: Between the Republic of Poland and the, Federal Socialist Republic of the
Russian Soviets ... the Government enacts as follows:

"Article 1: The export and transit of arms, munitions, [p29] powder and explosives and other
articles of war material is prohibited in so far as these articles are consigned to the territories of
the Polish Republic or of the Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets".

Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles: "Ports, Waterways and Railways"

"The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality". - It follows that the
canal has ceased to be an internal and national navigable waterway, the use of which by the
vessels of states other than the riparian state is left entirely to the discretion of that state, and that
it has become an international waterway intended to provide under treaty guarantee easier access
to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world.

In the case, the German Govt had not at the time when the Wimbledon incident took place
claimed any right to close the Canal to ships of war of belligerent nations at peace with
Germany. It expressly states that the German Govt claimed to apply its neutrality orders only to
vessels of commerce and not to vessels of war. It follows that that the passage of neutral vessels
carrying contraband of war is authorized by Article 380, and cannot be imputed to Germany as a
failure to fulfil its duties as a neutral. If, therefore, the "Wimbledon", making use of the
permission granted it by Article 380, had passed through the Kiel Canal, Germany's neutrality
would have remained intact and irreproachable.

Therefore, Germany not only did not incur the obligation to prohibit the passage of the
"Wimbledon" through the Kiel Canal, but, on the contrary, was entitled to permit it. Moreover,
under Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, it was its definite duty to allow it. Germany could
not advance its neutrality orders against the obligations which she had accepted under this
Article. Germany was perfectly free to declare and regulate her neutrality in the Russo-Polish
war, but subject to the condition that she respected and maintained intact the contractual
obligations which she entered into at Versailles on June 28th, 1919.

Accordingly, Germany’s refusal of passage through the Canal to the vessel “Wimbledon” gave
rise to their responsibility on the loss occasioned by the refusal and must compensate the French
government acting on behalf of the company known as “Les Affreteurs reunis” which sustained
the loss.

(A.C. Nuque)

The S.S. Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927 Series A, No. 10 

Facts:
A collision occurred before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926 between the French mail
steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier B0z-Kourt.  The French mail steamer was captained by a
French citizen named Monsieur Demons while the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt was directed by
Hassan Bey.
The Turks lost eight men after their ship cut into two and sank as a result of the collision.   On
the 5th of August, tenant Demons was asked by the Turkish authority to go ashore to give
evidence. After Demons was examined, he was placed under arrest without notice being given to
the French Consul-General and Hassan Bey.  Demons was convicted by the Turkish courts for
negligence conduct in allowing the accident to occur.  This basis was contended by Demons on
the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. French government protested against
Demon's arrest and demanded his release. Turkey and France then drew up an agreement in
Geneva thus bringing this case to the International Court of Justice the French argued against the
Turkish jurisdiction of Demons trial they agree that the Turkish captain ought to be prosecuted
by a Turkish Court but argued that the French captain should be prosecuted by a French Court
along with this they argued that the French ship ought to be considered French territory the
French argued there for the turkey had violated international law because they had tried to
Mullins
Issue:
Whether the exercise of Turkish criminal Jurisdiction over French Citizen, M. Demons for an
incident that occurred on the high seas contravened international law

Ruling:
The exercise of Turkish Criminal Jurisdiction over French Citizen, M. Demons for an incident
that occurred on the high seas does not Contravene international law.  The preamble of the
Convention says that the High Contracting Parties are desirous of effecting a settlement in
accordance with modern international law, and Article 28 of the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne, to
which the Convention in question is annexed, decrees the complete abolition of the Capitulations
in every respect.
In these circumstances, it is impossible to construe the expression “principles of international
law” otherwise than as meaning the principles which are in force between all independent
nations and which therefore apply equally to all the contracting parties.  Failing the existence of
a permissive rule to the contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law
on a state and it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state. It does
not however, follow that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory. In respect of any case that relates to acts that have taken place abroad which it cannot
rely on Some permissive rule of international law. With this, it is impossible to hold that there is
a rule of international law that prohibits Turkey from prosecuting Demons because he was
aboard a French ship. This stems from the fact that the effects of the alleged offense occurred on
a Turkish vessel. Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent Jurisdiction over this matter
because there is no rule of international law in regards - to collision cases to the effect that
criminal proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown.

2ND CASE
Zyra Anne Perez

Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. State of Russia

Tricia Maclang

The Spanish (Republican) Government v. Felipe Campuzano, Norway Supreme Court,

Nov. 2, 1938

FACTS:
The Secretary of the Legation, M. Felipe Campuzano, was Charge d'Affaires of the Spanish
Minister in Oslo, the Norwegian capital. Campuzano informed the Norwegian Foreign Ministry
that he had resigned and that he no longer represented the Spanish Government in Madrid and
had joined General Franco's Nationalist Party. While Dr. Joaquin Alvarez Pastor had been
appointed Secretary of the Legation and Charge d'Affaires in Oslo. Thereafter, the Spanish
Legation had to move from the premises which it formerly occupied. Some of the properties was
put into the house of Campuzano since the removal was on his direction while some properties
were in the storerooms of the company.

On behalf of the Spanish Republican Government, Dr. Pastor claimed the possession of the
property of the Spanish Legation and file a case to the Norwegian courts of justice. Campuzano
declined to give up the possession and claimed to hold them on behalf of General Franco's
Nationalist Government. Subsequently, Campuzano contends:

That according to the rules of international law his (General Franco's) government had a right to
immunity from suit in the courts of foreign countries; not being subject to the jurisdiction of the
Norwegian courts, the suit should be dismissed. If the Supreme Court did not share this point of
view he contended
That "the movables in question belong to Spain, represented by General Franco; that he (M.
Campuzano) as representative in Norway is entitled to keep the possession and the right of
disposition of the movables."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Norwegian courts had no jurisdiction in the matter.

RULING:
No, Norwegian courts had jurisdiction in the matter.

The claimant (Spanish Republican Government) is the only government recognized by Norway
as the government of Spain-or the Spanish State. The cause involves a demand to become the
possessor of property in Norway. The property in disputedly belongs to the Spanish State; and
that the said property is directly intended for, and has actually been, used as instrumentalities in
exercising government authority.

As long as the Barcelona or Madrid government is recognized by Norway as the Government of

the Spanish State, this government must have a right to resort to the Norwegian courts of justice
with a claim of the content as the one in question. The fact that General Franco controls apart-
even the greater part-of Spanish territory cannot be a bar to the exercise of Norwegian state
authority in this respect.

The government represented by Campuzano may create the necessary conditions of a future
recognition as a lawful government; but as long as there is in existence a state and a government
that is recognized by the Norwegian authorities, the representative of that government must be
entitled to the sole possession of property belonging to the Spanish State in Norway

Hence, Spanish Republican Government was entitled to the possession of the properties in
question.

Seth Co

Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd. Court of Appeals, Great Britain CH. 182 (1939)

FACTS:
Cable & Wireless company limited was a British company who took a loan from the treasury of
Ethiopia at that time Haile Selassie was the emperor of Ethiopia. As a result of this loan contract
between the defendant company and the Director-General of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
of Ethiopia, a sum of money become due from the Cable & Wireless co. LTD. to the public
revenues of Ethiopia.

In 1936, Italy attacked Ethiopia and established its command over the Ethiopian territory.
Meanwhile, Haile Selassie sued against Cable & Wireless Co. LTD. It must be noted that at that
time the de jure recognition of the United Kingdom was on behalf of Haile Selassie.

On this issue the Cable & Wireless co. ltd. claimed that Italy the de facto government of
Ethiopia, therefore, Haile Selassie does not have the right to claim that money, only Italy can
claim that money.

ISSUE:
Which recognized govt. would get preference and who was entitled to sue on behalf of Ethiopia
in the British court?

HELD:
On this dispute, the court of first instance decided that although Ethiopia was overrun by Italy,
the emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie as the recognized de jure sovereign, still possessed the
right to sue for the money although Italy was recognized as de facto power.

After such judgment, the defendants appealed and while the appeal was pending, Great Britain
granted de jure recognition to the occupying force of Italy as emperor of Ethiopia.
The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations."

The court of appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the claim holding that Heile Selassie is no
longer the de jure government or de jure sovereign of Ethiopia and therefore, his claim had to be
dismissed.

It was found that after the appeal the UK government provided de jure recognition to Italy as the
government of Ethiopia for political reason and thus Italy became the recognized government of
Ethiopia. Generally, this recognition of government comes with the retrospective effect and
therefore the right of succession dated back to the date of the de facto recognition of the king of
Haley as sovereign of Ethiopia to the second half of the due 1936. Since de facto recognition
took place before the issue of the writ court (on January 4, 1938) the plaintiff’s claim fails and
had to be dismissed.

Sbl Irv

Whether coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from prizes of
war.United States of Mexico v. Viamonte Y. Fernandez Superior Court, Essex County
(U.S.) Massachusetts, U.S. Foreign Relations, II, p. 573 (1923)

Facts:
Fernandez, a Mexican Citizen, filed a plea in abatement so that a US Court will cease to hear an
action against him. He argued that the American Courts does not have jurisdiction over him
because the current Mexican Administration is not recognized by the USA.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion to dismiss and plea in abatement should be granted

Whether or not USA’s lack of formal recognition of the current Mexican Authority will bar the
action against Mariano Viamonte y Fernandez

Ruling:
No, the motion to dismiss should be denied and the absence of formal recognition of USA of the
current Mexican Authority does not bar the action against Viamonte.

The Court noted that the United States of Mexico is an “international person” and its property is
allegedly taken by Fernandez and the same is within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

The peoples of both Mexico and USA has been interacting with each other, consul
commissioned by Mexico is functioning in various places in the US and an embassy is
maintained in Washington and only formal recognition is lacking.

Negotiations for formal recognition between USA and EUM are already taking place.

The Justice of Superior Court of Essex that the current Mexican Authority is acting in this matter
that affects its property.

Sadeka

The Gagara, Great Britain, Court of Appeals, Probate 95 (1919)

Facts:
On January 1, 1919, plaintiffs West Russian Steamship Company sued out a writ in rem and a
warrant of arrest against the steamship Gagara, claiming possession of the same. In the affidavit
to lead warrant of arrest, the plaintiffs were stated to be a corporate body having their registered
office at Petrograd and to be the true and lawful owners of the said steamship. The writ was
endorsed with a claim for possession. On January 9, the Esthonian Government appeared under
protest and moved to set the writ aside together all subsequent proceedings, claiming that owners
of the Gargara were the Esthonian Government. The Esthonian Government avers (1.) that the
Court had no jurisdiction; (2.) that, if it had, it ought in its discretion to refuse to entertain the
suit. The grounds on which it was said the Court had no jurisdiction were (a) that the dispute was
between two foreigners as to a foreign ship; (b) that the ship was the property and in the service
of the Esthonian Government; and (c) that she had been properly and lawfully condemned as
prize by a decree of the Esthonian Government.

Plaintiffs West Russian Steamship countered that they were the owners of the vessel, that ‘she’
had been seized by the Bolshevists and later captured by the Esthonians. The Esthonian
Government filed an affidavit to the effect that the vessel was condemned as a prize by a
governmental decree and used for war purposes. She was then, under the name of the Kajak,
registered at Reval as of Esthonian nationality and subject to the ownership of the Esthonian
Republic.

Mr. Justice Hill inquired and invited the assistance of the Foreign Office for information as to the
status of the Esthonian Government. The Justice learned that Esthonian National Council is
recognized as a de facto independent body; and His Majesty’s Government had accordingly
received certain gentlemen as the informal diplomatic representatives of the Esthonian
Provisional Government. As a result of the inquiry, the writ was set aside. Thus, the plaintiffs’
appeal.

Issue:
Whether the Esthonian Government has the status of a foreign independent sovereign, thus,
possesses immunity?

Ruling:
YES. Lord Justice Bankes, writing the opinion, quoted with approval from the judgment below
that the court had no jurisdiction because the Esthonian Government was in actual possession,
and stated that the ship was used by it for public purposes. The Court of Appeal decided solely
on the ground that the ship was in the actual possession of a foreign sovereign - namely, the State
of Esthonia. The Courts of our country will not allow their process to be used against such a ship
and the arrest cannot be maintained. To permit the arrest of a vessel belonging to the Esthonian
Government would be contrary to principles of international comity, as it would compel that
Government, whose sovereignty was entitled to be respected, to submit to the jurisdiction of the
British Courts. The principle upon which that practice proceeds was laid down in the case of The
Parlement Belge and the case of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, “The principle to be deduced from
all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign
authority, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign State to respect the
independence and dignity of every other sovereign State, each and every one declines to exercise
by means of its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or
ambassador of any other State, or over the public property of any State which is destined to
public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign, ambassador, or
property be within its territory, and therefore, but for the common agreement, subject to its
jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the case with the writ and all subsequent proceedings were set aside.

Murvi Cua

Government of the Republic of Spain v. S.S. Arantzazu Mendi and Others, Great Britain,
House of Lords, Feb. 2, 1939, 55 times Law Report 454

FACTS:
Arantzazu Mendi was a Spanish ship which was registered under the Bilbao area of Spain. In
1936 there was a civil war in Spain between two-party the Republics and the Nationalists.
Nationalists were under the comment of General Franco. The UK recognized de jure the
Republican government of Spain, on the other hand, they also recognized de facto the rebel
government (the Nationalists). Slowly General Franco overtook many areas including Bilbao and
at that time the Republics nationalized all the (Registered) ships of that area. At that time the ship
Arantzazu Mendi was anchored at a port of UK. The De Facto Nationalist government of Spain
who was recognized by UK appeal to the UK that as The United Kingdom gave them the legal
recognition the Arantzazu Mendi ship legally belongs to the Nationalist government and therefor
UK should cease the ship and handover to the Nationalist government.

ISSUE:
Whether the republican government shall have the right to possess the ship?

RULING:
It was held: A de facto government has control over state assets within the territory it controls. A
de jure government has control even overstate assets abroad.

Reasoning:
It was held by the House of Lords that since the Nationalist was a de-facto recognized sovereign
ineffective contract over a large portion of Spain, it was immune from the jurisdiction of the
local courts of other sovereigns.

Mary Abigail Basco Modales

Republic of China v. Merchants Fire Assurance Corporation of New York, United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 30 F.2d. 278 (1922)

FACTS:
The Republic of China obtained an insurance policy issued by the Merchants' Fire Assurance
Corporation of New York to the Chinese Government Telephone Administration at Wuchang, a
department of the Republic of China, covering a building occupied by the Telephone
Administration. Fire damaged this particular structure. After the loss occurred, the military
forces of the national government captured the city of Wuchang and became the custodian of the
policy and the property covered.

The national government, by controlling 15 of the 18 provinces of China, demanded payment for
the loss from the insurance company. The latter refused so the national government filed suit
against the company in the US Court for China.

The insurance company contends that the plaintiff was not the Republic of China but merely a
revolutionary organization not recognized as the government of the Republic of China, thus it
has no legal capacity to sue in US courts. The court sustained the contention of the company and
the case was dismissed. The National Government of China appealed this dismissal.

ISSUE:
May the National Government of China sue in the US Court for China?

RULING:
Yes, it may. The National Government of China won its appeal.

The courts of US cannot recognize the existence of a government which originates in revolution
or revolt, until it has first been recognized by the political department of the government,
therefore it would seem to follow that the National Government of China had no existence in
contemplation of law and no legal capacity to sue in the courts of this country. But since the trial
below, there has been a material change in the situation, and of this change we must take judicial
notice.

On July 25, 1928, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, appointed by
the President of the United States, and the Minister of Finance, appointed by the National
Government of the Republic of China, entered into a treaty of commerce; and while this treaty
has not as yet been ratified by the Senate, it contains a clear recognition by the Executive
Department of this government of both the National Government of the Republic of China and of
its accredited representative. This recognition by the Executive Department would seem to
satisfy the requirements of the law; but, if this is not enough, the court has been advised by a
telegram from the Secretary of State that the Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary
of the National Government of China has been officially received by this government, so that the
recognition of the former is now settled beyond question. "

MarkJohn Prias

A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., Great Britain Court of Appeals, 3 K.B. 532 (1921), 37 Times
Law Reports 777-784

Loren Delos Santos

The Holy See v. Hon. Rosario Jr., G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994

Doctrine:
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case, the Holy See, exercises sovereign rights over City in Rome, Italy.
Respondent in this case, Star Bright Sales enterprise filed a complaint against the petitioner for
annulment of sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner. The subject land was owned by the petitioner and was initially intended to be the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.

Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of eviction and clearing the land. SSEI insists that petitioner should clear the
property of the squatters. Petitioner refused and proposed that either SSEI undertake the eviction
or that the earnest money be returned. Msgr. Cirilos returned the P100,000.00 earnest money,
and the property was sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Respondent filed suit for annulment of sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana.

The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. It was denied on the ground that petitioner ―shed off its sovereign
immunity by entering the business contract in question. A motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON The Holy See can avail of the sovereign immunity from suit.

RULING:
YES. The Holy See enjoys the sovereign immunity to suit. The action of Holy See on disposing
the subject parcel of land is Jure Imperi as it dispose the subject land and not for gain or profit. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

SIMPAO

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398

FACTS:
It all started when an American commodity broker, Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to purchase
sugar from a Cuban corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-
Camaguey de Cuba ("CAV") whose capital stock was owned principally by United States
residents. Now in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba
issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. In virtue of the decree, the Cuban government
would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with
Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. However the American
commodity broker refused to pay Banco Nacional. Hence the latter sued the former for damages.
The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar
violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
May the courts of the United States refuse to give effect to decrees of a foreign sovereign
government where the decree violates common international law?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that it will not decide the validity of a decree by a foreign
government absent a treaty or other agreement. It did not matter that the taking violated
customary international law. The majority noted that a judicial decision on this issue without a
treaty would strain U.S.-Cuba relations.

Joshua Rodriguez

The Sapphire, 78 US 11 Wall. 164 (1871)

FACTS:
On December 22,1867, while traversing at San Francisco harbor, a collision was happened
between the Euryale, owned by French, and The Sapphire, an American ship. After two days of
the incident, Napoleon III, the Emperor of the French and the owner of Euryale, filed a libel case
against the owner of The Sapphire. Depositions were taken and the court decreed in favor of the
libellant and awarded him $15,000, the total amount claimed. The claimants appealed to the
circuit court, however, said court just affirmed the decree.

Thereafter, on July 1869, The Sapphire appealed to the US Supreme Court. They contend that in
1870 Napoleon III was deposed. On the other hand, Napoleon III contends that The Sapphire
was in fault in anchoring too near Euryale and for not having sufficient anchors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emperor of France, Napoleon III and a foreign national, has a right to bring a
suit in US Courts?

RULING:
Yes, the Emperor of France, Napoleon III, and a foreign national, has a right to bring a suit in US
Court.

The US Supreme Court held that a foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who
has a demand of a civil nature against any person here may prosecute it in the US Supreme
Courts. To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling.

Further, they said that the US Constitution expressly extends the judicial power to controversies
between a state or citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects without reference to
the subject matter of the controversy. Their own government has largely availed itself of the like
privilege to bring suits in the English courts in cases growing out of their late civil war.
Important Matter regarding Sovereign Continuity.

John Lerry Dela Cruz

H.M. The Queen of Holland (Married Woman) v. Drukker, Great Britain, Chancery
Division, 1928, L.R. (1928) 1 Ch. Div. 877

FACTS:
Dutch, David Visser dies in Holland in December 1926, domiciled in Holland, leaving assets in
England. Drukker was the executor of his will, and he and another defendant, Zeegen were the
heirs of Visser. The third defendant, Bisschop was resident in England and has obtained letters of
administration of Visser’s estate in England under a power of attorney from Drukker. The
domicile and nationality of the three defendant are not stated. The net assets of Visser in England
amounted to € 1150.

The plaintiff, H.M. The Queen of Holland, the reigning sovereign of the Netherlands, sued in an
action as a married woman, and by her statement of claim alleged that she was a creditor of the
estate of one David Visser deceased
By her statement of claim, the plaintiff alleged that according to the law of Holland and in
particular by the Succession Act, 1859, a Dutch statute, as subsequently amended, the estate of
the said D. Visser was liable for succession duty; and she claimed that by art. 25 of the said Act
of 1859, the amount of succession duty on the said estate constituted a debt from the said estate
to the plaintiff, with priority over all other debts not secured by pledges or mortgages.

It does not appear from the report whether the plaintiff’s claim was made in respect of the
English assets, nor does this point appear to have been taken in argument. Upon an application
by the defendant Zeegen to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim under the Rules of the
Supreme Court, Order XXV, Rule 4, on ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant Israel Zeegen now moved the Court in the action for an order that the plaintiff’s
statement of claim be struck out under R. S. C., Order XXV., r. 4, on the ground that it disclosed
no reasonable cause of action and that the action might be dismissed, and that the costs of the
defendants to the action, and the defendant’s own motion be taxed and paid by the plaintiff

Issue:
Whether the English Courts would recognize and enforce a claim in England by a foreign State
against the subjects of the foreign State in respect of revenue due from the foreign subject.

Held:
NO.

There is a well recognised rule, which has been enforced for at least 200 years or thereabouts,
under which these Courts will not collect that taxes of foreign States for the benefit of those
Foreign States; and this is one of those action which these Courts will not entertain.

That the statement of claim must be struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and
that costs should be paid by the foreign sovereign, who had submitted to the jurisdiction by the
instituting proceeding.

Therefore, English Courts will not recognize and enforce a claim in England by a foreign State
against the subjects of the foreign S

Jessa Santos

Emperor of Austria and The King of Hungary v. Day and Kossuth, Great Britiain, High
Court of Chancery, 1861, 3 De Gex, Fisher and Jones 217

Facts:
The defendants had printed banknotes in London. Kossuth intended to use the notes in Hungary
after overthrowing the Emperor of Austria by revolution. The Emperor obtained an injunction
restraining the defendants from continuing to manufacture them. The defendants appealed.

Issue:
Whether the injuction should be upheld.

Held:
The injunction was upheld. One of the defences advanced was that the injunction should be
refused because the proceedings were brought to protect the Emperor’s political power and
prerogatives. Lord Campbell LC:’if the suit were instituted merely to support his political power
and prerogatives’ he would have denied the Emperor the right to maintain the suit.

Lord Justice Turner agreed and noted that the bill put the plaintiff’s case on three grounds: (i)
violation of the rights and prerogative of the plaintiff as King of Hungary ‘by promotion of
revolution and disorder and otherwise’; (ii) injury to the State of Hungary by the introduction of
a spurious circulation into that kingdom; and (iii) injury to the subjects of the plaintiff by the
same cause. There was no doubt that the court did not have jurisdiction to interfere on the
grounds that the notes were intended to be used for the purpose of promoting revolution and
disorder. He rejected the second ground saying the right of coining and issuing paper money is
the prerogative of a sovereign: ‘so far, therefore, as this bill is founded upon the prerogative
rights of the Plaintiff, or upon the political rights of his subjects’ the injunction should be
refused: ‘the prerogative rights of sovereigns seem to me, as at present advised, to stand very
much upon the same footing as acts of State and matters of that description, with which the
municipal courts of this country do not and cannot interfere’.

But the court upheld the injunction on the third ground on which the bill was based. Lord
Campbell was of the opinion that ‘if the acts meditated by the defendants and forbidden by this
injunction were actually done, a pecuniary loss would be sustained by the plaintiff and by all his
subjects, holders of the existing currency’. The court has jurisdiction to protect property from an
act which, if completed, would give a right of action. Lord Justice Turner said that the third
ground on which the bill was based alleged a case of injury to the subjects of the kingdom, ‘an
injury not to the political but to the private rights of the plaintiff’s subjects’. He concluded: ‘I
agree that the jurisdiction of this Court in a case of this nature rests upon injury to property actual
or prospective, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of acts which
are merely criminal or merely illegal, and do not affect any rights of property, but I think there
are here rights of property quite sufficient to found jurisdiction in this Court.’

Lord Campbell LC, Lord Justice Turner

Jenny Wicas

Baer v. Tizon, Philippine Supreme Court, L-24294, May 3, 1974, 57 SCRA 1

Facts:
Edgardo an application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against Baer,
commander of the US Naval Base, for the alleged interference of the latter to his logging
business in Morong Bataan. Judge Tizon issued a restraining order against Baer from interfering
with the logging operation of Edgardo.

Donald contested the jurisdiction of Judge Tizon on the ground that the suit was one against
foreign sovereign without its consent and cessation of logging operations is within the scope of
his authority for the maintenance of Naval Base. However, despite the findings that Edgardo
failed to renew his timber licenses, Judge Tizon grants Edgardo’s application. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable

Ruling:
Yes, The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate.

In the case of Coleman v. Tennessee the court ruled that a foreign army, permitted to march
through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign,
is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place."

A foreign government acting through its naval commanding officer is immune from suit relative
to the performance of an important public Junction of any government, the defense and security
of its naval base in the Philippines granted under a treaty.

What was sought by Edgardo and what was granted by Judge Tizon amounted to an interference
with the performance of the duties of petitioner Donald in the base area in accordance with the
powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement.

Therefore, the writ of preliminary injunction against Donald shall be annulled.

 Iya Rocha

Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, Philippine Supreme Court, 84 Phil. 312 (1949)

Facts:
Plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the
United States of America for billeting and quartering officers of the U.S. armed forces. The term
or period for the three leases was to be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America. When said court proceedings were
commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General of the US Army and was said to
control the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the US
Government to assign officers of the US Amy to said apartments or to order said officers to
vacate the same.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to
renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable
rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a
letter refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States
Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before
the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the properties as their agreement
supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the premises were vacated.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the
action.
2. Whether or not this is a suit against the United States of America.

Ruling:
1. The court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action,
because the real party in interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants
named in the complaint.

Under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United States
Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear
from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been
named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named
as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in
question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government.

2. The present action must be considered as one against the U. S. Government.

It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The U. S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country.

Ise Mantuano

The Cristina, Great Britain, House of Lords, 1938, A.C. 485

FACTS:
A ship called “The Cristina” belonging to the appellants, a Spanish company, and registered at
the port of Bilbao, was lying in the port of Cardiff. Shortly before her arrival there, a decree was
made by the Spanish Government requisitioning all vessels registered at the port of Bilbao. In
view of this, consul at Cardiff went on board the Cristina, stated that she had been requisitioned,
dismissed the master and put a new master in charge.
Thereupon the appellants issued a writ in rem claiming possession of the Cristina as their
property. The Spanish Government entered a conditional appearance and gave notice of motion
for an order that the writ should be set aside inasmuch as it impleaded a foreign sovereign State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the country shall allow the arrest of the ship.

RULING:
No. The Courts of this country will not allow the arrest of a ship, including a trading ship, which
is in the possession of, and which has been requisitioned for public purposes by, a foreign
sovereign State, inasmuch as to do so would be an infraction of the rule well established in
international law that a sovereign State cannot, directly or indirectly, be impleaded without its
consent, and, therefore, that the writ and all subsequent proceedings must be set aside.

Gelo Ace

Berizzi Brothers co. v. Pesaro, U.S. Supreme Court, 212 U.S. 562

Facts:
This was a libel in rem against the steamship Pesaro on a claim for damages arising out of a
failure to deliver certain artificial silk accepted by her at a port in Italy for carriage to the port of
New York.

The usual process issued, on which the vessel was arrested, and subsequently she was released, a
bond being given for her return, or the payment of the libelant's claim, if the court had
jurisdiction and the claim was established. In the libel the vessel was described as a general ship
engaged in the common carriage of merchandise for hire.

The Italian ambassador to the United States appeared and on behalf of the Italian government
specially set forth that the vessel at the time of arrest was owned and possessed by the
government, and it was operated by it in its service and interest, hence, it was immune from the
process of the courts of the United States.

At the hearing it was stipulated that the vessel, when arrested, was owned, possessed, and
controlled by the Italian government, was not connected with its naval or military forces, was
employed in the carriage of merchandise for hire between Italian ports and ports in other
countries including the port of New York, and was so employed in the service and interest of the
whole Italian nation, as distinguished from any individual member thereof, private or official,
and that the Italian government never had consented that the vessel is seized or proceeded
against by judicial process.

Issue: 
Whether a ship owned and possessed by a foreign government, and operated by it in the carriage
of merchandise for hire, is immune from arrest under process based on a libel in rem by a private
suitor in a federal District Court exercising admiralty jurisdiction.

Ruling:
The government-owned merchant ships of foreign powers have been held to be public ships and
immune from the process in rem of our admiralty courts.

In The Parlement Belge, L.R. 5 P.D. 197, the question was whether a vessel belonging to
Belgium and used by that government in carrying the mail and in transporting passengers and
freight for hire could be subjected to a libel in rem in the admiralty court of Great Britain. The
Court of Appeal gave a negative answer and put its ruling on two grounds, one being that the
vessel was a public property of a foreign government in use for national purposes.

After reviewing many cases bearing on the question, including The Exchange, the court said:
"The principle to be deduced from all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute
independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces every
sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each and
every one declines to exercise by means of its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the
person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the public property of any state
which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign,
ambassador, or property be within its territory, and, therefore, but for the common agreement,
subject to its jurisdiction."

The court said that the decision in the Exchange cannot be taken as excluding merchant ships
held and used by a government from the principles there announced. On the contrary, if such
ships come within those principles, they must be held to have the same immunity as warships, in
the absence of a treaty or statute of the United States evincing a different purpose.

The principles are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a public
purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue
for its treasury, a government acquires, men, and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are
public ships in the same sense that warships are.

Florna Mae Ageas

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, U.S. Supreme Court, 7 Cranch 116 (1812)

Facts:
Schooner Exchange, a vessel owned by John McFaddon & William Greetham, seized by French
Navy under the command of Emperor Napoleon, then encountered great stress of weather upon
the high seas, was compelled to enter the port of Philadelphia, USA for refreshment and repairs
but was prevented from leaving by the process of the court. The owners filed libel case in the
District Court of the United States to claim the vessel for it had been wrongfully seized from
them.
At this point in time, the U.S. and France were on friendly terms. The United States’ request for
the dismissal of ownership and release of the ship was granted by the district court. However,
this judgment was reversed by the circuit court and this did not prevent the United States from
appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Schooner Exchange, public armed vessel, can claim immunity from judicial
jurisdiction.

Ruling:
Yes. The Schooner Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign,
with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered an American port
open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the
ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory, under
an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner,
she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.

Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, the notion that a state’s immunity is the
natural consequence of its sovereignty, and that no state can exert its authority over another.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns has created over time the need
for states to waive a portion of their territorial jurisdiction in order to satisfy the greater good
inherent in sovereign immunity. States thus have a mutual interest and obligation under
international law to respect this status of foreign sovereigns. The desire for reciprocity demands
that this concept be obeyed by all states. Stemming from this absolute theory of sovereign
immunity are international norms that prevent, among other things, states and sovereign agents
of states from being sued in foreign courts.

The Court makes a clear distinction between public ships and private ships. It argues that public
ships are in a legal sense international ‘agents’ or ‘extensions’ of a sovereign government, and
must receive the same immunity that is granted to the government itself. It goes on to describe
how public vessels are granted an implied license when they enter a friendly port of a foreign
state, and that this license contains an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, in this
case the United States Government. During peacetime, the ports of friendly nations are
considered open to the public ships of all powers and thus the Exchange entered the port of
Philadelphia believing that this ‘implied promise’ would be upheld. Making a reference to
customary international law, the Court notes that certainly in practice, nations have not yet
asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign. Therefore, there is
no reason to believe that the Exchange is any different in this respect

The Schooner Exchange, which was the property of the Libellants, whose claim is repelled by
the fact, that the vessel is now a national armed vessel, commissioned by, and in the service of
the emperor of France.

Cweezy Queñano

Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

DOCTRINE:
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. Even then, it is not the individual’s rights
that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s own rights.

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what
extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to
the particular case.

FACTS:
Vinuya et al. in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organizations,” claimed that
since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Vinuya et al. argued that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the
Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by
Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity,
sexual slavery, and torture. They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is
jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of
Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine
government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against
humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine government’s acceptance of the
"apologies" made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) were
contrary to international law.
However the Philippine government maintained that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

In addition, they argued that the apologies made by Japan8 have been satisfactory, and that Japan
had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the
Asian Women’s Fund.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them.

RULING:
NO. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse MALAYA Lolas’s
claim.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. Even then, it is not the individual’s rights
that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s own rights.

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what
extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to
the particular case.

Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said
determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

PETITION IS DISMISSED.

Centene Pablo

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, G.R. No.
173034, October 9, 2007

FACTS:
The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association (PHAP) assails the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the DOH for allegedly going beyond the provisions of
the Milk Code when the RIRR prohibited the advertising of infant formula, thereby amending
and expanding the coverage of said law, which did not prohibit the advertising. The defense of
the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is the position of the DOH that said
international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Correct? 

HELD:
NO. The Court noted that the following international instruments invoked by the DOH, namely:
(1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken
by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided
with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said (international)
instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk
substitutes. The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk
substitutes are the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) and
various World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions. The Court ruled that the World Health
Assembly resolutions promoting breastmilk and rejecting substitutes cannot be considered as law
of the land without a law enacted by Congress since the DOH was not able to establish that such
rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinio juris). 
 Ariel Reyes

Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) [1960] ICJ 6

FACTS:
The Government of Portugal has a territory in the Indian Peninsula, namely Goa, Daman and
Diu, the district of Daman, comprised also of two territories completely surrounded by Indian
territory.

The Government of Portugal filed an Application before the Court regarding their right of
passage between Daman and the enclaves, and between the enclaves, across intervening Indian
territory, to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, subject to
India's right of regulation and control of the passage claimed, and without any immunity in
Portugal's favor. It claims further that India is under obligation so to exercise its power of
regulation and control as not to prevent the passage necessary for the exercise of Portugal's
sovereignty over the enclaves.
India contends that the right claimed by Portugal is too vague and contradictory to enable the
Court to pass judgment upon it by the application of the legal rules enumerated in Article 38 (1)
of the Statute.

Portugal answers that the right which it claims is definite enough for determination on the basis
of international law, and that all that the Court is called upon to do is to declare the existence of
the right in favor of Portugal, leaving its actual exercise to be regulated and adjusted between the
Parties as the exigencies of the day-to-day situation might require.

In support of its claim, Portugal relies on the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and on sanads (decrees),
issued by the Maratha ruler in 1783 and 1785, as having conferred sovereignty on Portugal over
the enclaves with the right of passage to them.

India objects on various grounds that what is alleged to be the Treaty of 1779 was not validly
entered into and never became in law a treaty binding upon the Marathas.

India contends further that the Treaty and the two sanads of 1783 and 1785 taken together did
not operate to transfer sovereignty over the assigned villages to Portugal, but only conferred
upon it, with respect to the villages, a revenue grant of the value of 12,000 rupees per annum
called a jagir or saranjam.

ISSUE:
Whether the Government of Portugal had established a right of passage over the Indian territory.

RULING:
YES. The Government of Portugal had established a right of passage over the Indian territory,
but only with respect to private persons, civil officials and goods in general. They have no right
of passage with regard to armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunitions.

The Portugal contended that sovereignty over Daman and the enclaves as well as right of passage
over Indian territory was conferred to them by the Marathas by the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and
two sanads in 1783 and 1785.

However, from a careful perusal of the Court on the various texts of that treaty, they failed to
conclude that the Maratha conferred to the Portuguese the sovereignty over Daman, the two
enclaves as well as the right of passage to it. Instead, they found out that what is being given to
the Portuguese as a grant is the so-called jagir, a revenue-tenure.

It appears therefore, that the Treaty of 1779 as well as the sanads of 1783 and 1785 were
intended only to give the Portuguese a revenue-grant.

However, the major turn-around occurred when the British succeeded Marathas.

The sovereignty of Portuguese over the village was not brought into question by the British, nor
did they accord express recognition of such exercise. In short, the British recognized the
sovereignty of Portuguese over the villages in fact and by implication, the Indians subsequently
tacitly recognized the same.

The Court must consider the circumstances that transpired during the British and Post-British
period in order to determine whether the Portuguese had established a right of passage.

The Court found out that during these periods, the parties are allowed to pass through the Indian
territory without any restrictions as regards to private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, thereby, the right of passage has been established on the aforementioned, this has
become a practice of the parties for several years.

Therefore, the Portuguese had acquired right of passage but only as regard to private persons,
civil officials and goods in general as a way of practice by the parties.

However, the treatment is different with regard to armed forces, armed police and arms and
ammunitions. They are not given a right of passage over the said territories, without consent and
unless they permitted or authorized to do so.

There was thus established a clear distinction between the practice permitting free passage of
private perçons, civil officials and goods in general, and the practice requiring previous
authorization, as in the case of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition.

Since the Court found out that with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general,
Portuguese had established a right of passage over the Indian territory prior to 1954, however,
when the particular event transpired in 1954 leading to the prohibition of the Indian government
to the Portuguese the right of passage, the Indian government did not acted contrary to their
correlative obligation on giving the right of passage, they only prohibited the Portuguese
authorities the right of passage as it will only worsen the condition of the conflicts happening in
the enclaves.

Anna Angela Delos Reyes

Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) [1973] ICJ 98

FACTS:
The French Government had carried out atmospheric tests of nuclear devices at its Centre
d'expérimentations du Pacifique in the territory of French Polynesia in the years 1966, 1967,
1968, 1970, 1971 and 1972. As the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation has recorded in its successive reports to the General Assembly, the testing of
nuclear devices in the atmosphere has entailed the release into the atmosphere and the
consequent dissipation, in varying degrees throughout the world, of measurable quantities of
radio-active matter.

It is asserted by New Zealand that the French atmospheric tests have caused some fall-out of this
kind to be deposited, inter alia, on New Zealand territory. On the other hand, France has
maintained, in particular, that the radio-active matter produced by its tests has been so
infinitesimal that it may be regarded as negligible and that any fall-out on New Zealand territory
has never involved any danger to the health of the population of New Zealand.

On May 9, 1973, New Zealand submitted an application with the ICJ, instituting proceedings
against France, with respect to the atmospheric nuclear tests and its infringement on the rights of
New Zealand under international law.

France did not participate in the proceedings and asserted in a letter addressed to the ICJ that "the
Government of the [French] Republic, as it has notified the Government of New Zealand,
considers that the Court is manifestly not competent in this case and that it cannot accept its
jurisdiction".

The French Government made public statements. The President in a press conference said: “I
had myself made it clear that this round of atmospheric tests would be the last, and so the
members of the Government were completely informed of our intentions in this respect.” The
French Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed the UN General Assembly in a statement: “We
have now reached a stage in our nuclear technology that makes it possible for us to continue our
programme by underground testing, and we have taken steps to do so as early as next year."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unilateral declarations made by France are binding to other States

RULING:
Yes.

Declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific.
In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance of
the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to
take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of
the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

The Court finds that the communiqué issued on 8 June 1974, the French Embassy's Note of 10
June 1974 and the President's letter of 1 July 1974 conveyed to New Zealand the announcement
that France, following the conclusion of the 1974 series of tests, would cease the conduct of
atmospheric nuclear tests. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to
the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking
possessing legal effect.

The Court by nine votes to six finds that the claim of New Zealand no longer has any object and
that the Court is therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon.

A.C. Nuque

Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011

Facts:
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’ Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the
Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.

On May 13, 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Blas F. Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain
persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the
nonsurrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that
the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international
law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.
Bayan Muna, an organization that represented the ‘marginalized sectors of society’. It brought a
petition against the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary, alleging grave
abuse of their discretion for having concluded the Non-Surrender Agreement on the basis that it
undermined the Rome Statute, violated internationally accepted principles of international law,
and that there was a lack of similar legislation in the United States that would punish the crimes
covered by the Rome Statute.

Bayan Muna requested that the Non-Surrender Agreement be struck down as unconstitutional, or
declared to be without force and effect. Alberto Romulo, Executive Secretary, argued that the
Non-Surrender Agreement was constitutional and valid because it was in the nature of an
executive agreement, which did not require Senate concurrence.
Issue:
WoN the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is in contravention of the Rome Statute

WoN the said Agreement is Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Ruling:
The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute.

The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far
from going against each other, one complements the other.

The Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over
serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the
ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish
the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC.

Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty.

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a State-Party, on the
other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.

In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute
and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. As a result, petitioner’s
argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their
obligations under the Rome Statute must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-
Parties, not signatories

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law.

As OSG described - non-surrender agreement is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try
and punish crimes under its national law
What the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws.

With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law
concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the
nonsurrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.

3rd CASE
Zyra Anne Perez

U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 21 F. 2d. 396 (1927)

Tricia Maclang
Cuevas v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000

FACTS:
The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio
Muñoz for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of
conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong. The Philippine Department of
Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal
Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice pursuant to
Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Thereafter, it is forwarded to the
NBI, who filed an application for the provisionary arrest of respondent Munoz before RTC. RTC
granted the application for provisional arrest and issued the corresponding Order of Arrest. Then,
respondent Munoz was arrested and detained at the NBI detention cell.

On appeal to Court of Appeals, it declared the Order of Arrest null and void on the grounds,
among others that there was no urgency for the provisional arrest of respondent; the municipal
law (P.D. No. 1069) subordinates an international agreement (RP-Hongkong Agreement); the
supporting documents for a request for provisional arrest have to be authenticated; there was lack
of factual and legal bases in the determination of probable cause; and the offense of accepting an
advantage as an agent is not an offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended. Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition.

Petitioner submits that the CA erred in nullifying the Order of provisional arrest on holding that
no urgency for the provisional arrest of respondent and supporting documents for a request for
provisional arrest have to be authenticated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in nullifying the Order of provisional arrest against respondent Munoz.

RULING:
Yes, Order of provisional arrest against respondent Munoz is valid.

First, there was urgency for the provisional arrest of the respondent pursuant to Sec. 20(a) of
P.D. No. 1069 and Article 11 of the Extradition Agreement between the Philippines and Hong
Kong. The Court held that urgency connotes such conditions relating to the nature of the offense
charged and the personality of the prospective extraditee which would make him susceptible to
the inclination to flee or escape from the jurisdiction if he were to learn about the impending
request for his extradition and/or likely to destroy the evidence pertinent to the said request or his
eventual prosecution and without which the latter could not proceed. The Court found that such
conditions exist in respondent's case. Hong Kong DOJ was concerned that the pending request
for the extradition of the respondent that would motivate respondent to flee the Philippines. As
well as the gravity of the imposable penalty which is 7-14 years imprisonment upon an accused
is a factor to consider in determining the likelihood that the accused will abscond if allowed
provisional liberty.

Second, twelve (12) days after respondent was provisionally arrested, the Philippine DOJ
received from the Hong Kong DOJ, a request for the surrender or extradition of respondent.
Provisional arrest of an accused to continue, the formal request for extradition is not required to
be filed in court. It only need be received by the requested state within the periods provided for
by P.D. No. 1069 and the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Court infers from the required
receipt of the request for extradition and its accompanying documents, the additional requisite
that the same be filed in the court within the same periods.

Third, the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents are valid
despite lack of authentication. Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a
request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement
makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any document accompanying a
request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for
surrender or extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest. There is no requirement for
the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents.
The PD No. 1069 RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement serves the purpose sought to be
achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request
for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic
channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great
likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their
extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for
provisional arrest were formulated.

There is also sufficient compliance with the foregoing if the request for provisional arrest is
made by an official who is authorized by the government of the requesting state to make such a
request and the authorization is communicated to the requested state. In this case, the request for
provisional arrest of respondent was valid since it was signed by Wayne Walsh, Senior
Government Counsel of the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the
Hong Kong DOJ.

Last, there was sufficient factual and legal basis for the determination of probable cause as a
requisite for the issuance of the Order of Arrest.
Hence, provisional arrest of respondent Munoz was valid.

Seth Co

Case Concerning Military & Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US
ICJ Reports, 1986

Sbl Irv

Government of the United States v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002

Sadeka

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000

Facts:
Two years after President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 in 1977 or the law "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country",
Justice Sec. Franklin Drilon, representing the Republic, signed the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate ratified said treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents. Based on the documents, Jimenez appears to be charged with violation of the
following provisions of the United States Code (USC): two counts of conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud the U.S.; four counts of attempt to evade or defeat tax; two counts of fraud
by wire, radio, and tv; six counts of false statement or entries; and thirty three counts of election
contributions in name of another.

The panel of attorneys designated by the DOJ began with the "technical evaluation and
assessment" of the extradition request. Pending evaluation, Jimenez wrote DOJ Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request; and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.

Petitioner Secretary denied Jimenez’s request on the ground of prematurity to furnish him with
copies of the extradition request pending evaluation by DOJ. Drilon stressed that the denial the
respondent’s request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides
that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

Due to this denial, Jimenez filed with RTC Manila, a petition against the DOJ Secretary, the
DFA Secretary, and the NBI Director, for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The trial court
ordered petitioners to maintain the status quo, in favor of with the request the extradition of
Jimenez. Thus, DOJ Secretary filed this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitutes a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
US Extradition Treaty¬?

Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled that respondent Jimenez must be entitled to the basic due process rights
during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party. The doctrine of incorporation
is applied when municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict
between a rule of the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to
harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the
municipal law must prevail. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the
municipal sphere. In states such as the Philippines, where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land.

However, in the case at bar, there is no conflict between international law and municipal or
national law. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, the
Court sees a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings. The law is silent as to these twin rights, even the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifest this silence. Petitioner took this silence as absence and unavailability of
these rights, which the Court could not agree with.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application
of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. Thus, there would be no
breach of the treaty by affording Jimenez the twin rights of notice and hearing.

Murvi Cua

Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009, 578 SCRA 438

Mary Abigail Basco Modales

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138572, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449

FACTS
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US
military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the
Philippine panel to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). On October 5, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.

ISSUE
Does the phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, mean that the
VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own
constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the
United States?

RULING
NO. This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To
be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty

MarkJohn Prias

Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec.
21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Charge d’ Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory state.

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.

Ruling:
NO. The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states
and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the
members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

Loren Delos Santos

The Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, Qatar v.
Bahrain, ICJ Reports 112 (1994)

Leriza Simpao

The Temple of Preah Vihear Case, Cambodia v. Thailand (Siam), I.C.J. Report 6 (1962)

FACTS:
This is a complaint initiated by Cambodia against Thailand with regard to a territorial fight over
the Temple of Preah Vihear. Thailand and Cambodia are among many asian countries who still
share a colonial legacy of an ambiguous border. In 1954, Thai troops occupied and claimed
Preah Vihear, located about 400km north of Phnom Penh. Five years later, Cambodia took
Thailand to the ICJ on the basis of colonial-era treaties and other documents in an attempt to
regain what it regarded as part of its cultural heritage, arguing that the temple was inextricably
linked to its Angkor Wat complex, 140km to the south west. Cambodia contends that Thailand
had occupied a piece of its territory surrounding the ruins of the Temple of Preah Vihear, a place
of pilgrimage and worship for Cambodians, and asked the Court to declare that territorial
sovereignty over the Temple belonged to it and that Thailand was under an obligation to
withdraw the armed detachment stationed there since 1954. Thailand asserted various arguments
aimed at showing that the map had no binding character. In its Judgment on the merits, rendered
on 15 June 1962, the Court noted that a Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 provided that, in the area
under consideration, the frontier was to follow the watershed line, and that a map based on the
work of a Mixed Delimitation Commission showed the Temple on the Cambodian side of the
boundary. Thailand asserted that (1) The Map wasn’t binding because it wasn’t made by the
Mixed Commission. (2) The Map didn’t follow the true watershed line, so it was void. (3)
Thailand never accepted the Map. (4) If it did accept the Map, it was only because it thought the
Map followed the true watershed line.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Thailand’s contention is meritorious.

RULING:
No. Thailand's claims are not meritorious. The Court provides reasoning in each of Thailand's
contention:

The Map wasn’t binding as it was not created by the Mixed Commission
Thailand claimed that as a result of the Mixed Commission had stopped functioning many
months before the Map was created, it was non-binding. Nonetheless, the Map was bestowed to
the Siamese government as being the results of the borderline in deep trouble the 1904 pact. The
Court found that the Siamese government didn’t complain or raise any objection concerning this
at the time of receipt and for several years later. The border from that Map was additionally
employed in alternative maps revealed by each party within the years that followed. As such, the
Court found that although the Map was at the start non-binding, it gained the character of a
binding pact by Thailand and Cambodias’ conduct. This actually showed the implied consent
from both.

The Map didn’t follow the true watershed line, so it was void
After the Map had been completed, it was shown to the Siamese members of the Commission,
none of the United Nations agencies complained concerning it. An equivalent factor happened
with native Siamese authorities: United Nations agencies were acquainted with the world. The
Court’s view was that if they didn’t object or complain once the Map was discharged, they
cannot complain fifty years later which is very late.
Also, the divergence between variety or true watershed line and also the border illustrated within
the Map had been established as early as 1934-1935. Nonetheless, Thailand had to continue to
publish maps showing Temple Preah as being in Cambodian territory. Also, Thailand did not
raise the matter in negotiations in 1937 and 1947, solely raising the matter in 1958..

Thailand never accepted the Map.

Thailand claimed that as a result of it never accepting the Map, it was never required to lift the
matter throughout the previously mentioned negotiations. It claimed that its body acts established
this. The Court checked out the very fact that in 1930 a politician from Thailand was greeted by
a Cambodian official once visiting the world. The Court recalled that Thailand had neveer
complained concerning this.

Also, the Court discerned that although Thailand had, indeed, shown some administrative body
acts, it wasn’t enough to override the consistent administrative position that indicated that they
accepted the Map as binding.

If it did settle for the Map, it was solely as a result of it thought the Map followed the true
watershed line.
The Court pointed that Thailand had accepted the Map, and enjoyed the advantages of getting a
stable border, for fifty years before questioning the validity of the Map. Moreover, it discerned
that the target once creating a boundary pact is sometimes to create a stable frontier – primarily,
following the watershed was solely a method to realize that goal. Therefore, the Court thought it
didn’t matter whether or not or not the Map followed the watershed, as a result of the aim of the
pact was to determine a boundary. The court also held that Thailand was under an obligation to
withdraw any military or police force which is stationed there and to restore to Cambodia any
objects removed from the ruins since 1954.

Joshua Rodriguez

USAFFE Veterans v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil. 1030 (1959)

FACTS:
In October 1954, the USAFFE, prayed in its complaint before the Manila court of first instance
that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Philippine Government undertook to
return to the United States Government in ten annual installments, a total of 35-million dollars
advanced by the United States to, but unexpanded by, the National Defense Forces of the
Philippines be annulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal and that defendants as
officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained from disbursing any funds in the National
Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys
available, instead of being remitted to the United States, should be turned over to the Finance
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all pending claims of the
veterans represented by plaintiff.

The complaint rested on plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds to be "returned" under
the Agreement were funds appropriated by the American Congress for the Philippine army,
actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by said Government;
second, that U.S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from
the P.I. Government; and third, that Philippine foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no
authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called
Romulo-Snyder Agreement.

The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from suit. But the court
required an answer, and then heard the case merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the complaint,
upheld the validity of the Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction it had previously
issued. The plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Romulo-Snyder Agreement is void?
RULING:
No, the Romulo-Snyder Agreement is not void.

ART. VII. Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Further, Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements entered into may be termed
as presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress,
which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.

In the case at bar, the Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for
precisely on September 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the
President of the Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government
of the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities. Even granting, arguendo, that there was no
legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally
and validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely, "agreements entered into
purely as executive acts without legislative authorization." This second category usually includes
money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that
this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this
kind.

John Lerry Dela Cruz

Eastern Greenland Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, P.C.I.J. Report, Series
A/B No. 53 (1933)

Facts:
The agreement not to obstruct Danish plans with regard to Greenland was what Denmark wanted
to obtain from Norway. To this request, a declaration on behalf of the Norwegian government
was made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs that Norway would not make any difficulty in the
settlement of the question.

Danish Government placed reliance on Palmas Island decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration which stated that a title “founded on the peaceful and continuous display of State
authority over the island”. It stressed on various conventions and treaties ratified by the Denmark
with other countries where a stipulation for non-application of such convention over Greenland
was inserted to demonstrate that other nations admitted that Denmark has right to exclude
Greenland.

These treaties are sufficient to establish Denmark’s will and intention to act exercise sovereignty.
From the facts i.e. legislations on Greenland for administration, various treaties ratified,
concessions granted for erection of telegraph lines, fixing limits on territorial waters, etc are
manifestations of the exercise of sovereign authority.

Regarding uncertainty over sovereignty during 1814 to 1915, the Court said that taking into
account the facts and circumstances Denmark should be regarded as having displayed her
sovereign authority. Despite considering just the period from 1921 to 1931 the Court concluded
that Denmark regarded itself as possessing sovereignty over Greenland.

ISSUE:
W/N the Declaration by Minister of Foreign Affairs is binding upon the country to which the
Minister belongs.

HELD:
Yes. A country is bound by the reply given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

What Denmark desired to obtain from Norway was that the latter should do nothing to obstruct
the Danish plans in regard to Greenland. The Declaration which the Minister for Foreign Affairs
gave on July 22nd, 1919, on behalf of the Norwegian Government, was definitely affirmative: “I
told the Danish Minister to-day that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty
in the settlement of this question”. The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this
nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a
request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within
his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.

The PCIJ after it was satisfied about the valid title to the sovereignty over Greenland at the
critical date adjudged the contention in favour of the Danish Government. It said having regard
to a pattern of activity between 1921 and 1931, including the enforcement by legislation of a
state trade monopoly, the granting of trading, mining, and other concessions, the exercise of
governmental functions and administration, and the making of numerous treaties in the terms of
which Danish rights over Greenland were explicit. The Norwegian occupation was illegal and
invalid, since Denmark, at the very least in the 10 years previous to the Norwegian occupation,
had ‘displayed and exercised her sovereign rights to an extent sufficient to constitute a valid title
to sovereignty’.

Jessa Santos

US Diplomatic & Consular Staff (US v. Iran), ICJ Reports, 1980

Jenny Wicas

World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242

Facts:
Dr. Leonce is an Acting Assistant Director of Health Services in Manila assigned by the WHO.
Dr. Leonce, when he arrived in the Philippines, has his personal effects contained twelve crates
as unaccompanied baggage which is allowed free entry from duties and taxes. These crates were
stored at Eternit Corporation’s warehouse.

COSAC believing that the crates contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the
official needs, applied for the issuance of warrant for the search and seizure of the crates, in
which, judge Aquino granted.

DFA Sec. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Leonce is entitled to immunity from search in
respect of his personal baggage pursuant to the Host Agreement entered into by the Philippines
and WHO.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Leonce can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic
immunity.

Ruling:
Yes. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of government as in the
case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the solicitor general in this case, or
other officer acting under his direction.

In the case at bar, the Government of the Philippines has expressly recognized that Dr. Leonce is
entitled to diplomatic immunity pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. In fact, DFA
advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Leonce shall not be subjected to court summons without violating
international law of the Philippine Government

Iya Rocha

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124772, August 14, 2007

Facts:
In compliance with the Order issued by the Office of the District Attorney in Zurich pursuant to
the OSG’s request; the Swiss Banks in Zurich was directed to freeze the accounts of the accused
in PCGG I.S. No. 1 and in the “List of Companies and Foundations”. Bankers Trust A.G.
(BTAG) of Zurich froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings, N.V. (Officeco).

Officeco appealed the Order of the District Attorney to the Attorney General of the Canton of
Zurich. The Attorney General affirmed the Order of the District Attorney. Officeco further
appealed to the Swiss Federal Court which likewise dismissed the appeal on 31 May 1989.
Officeco then made representations with the OSG and the PCGG for them to officially advise the
Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters to unfreeze Officeco’s assets. The PCGG required
Officeco to present countervailing evidence to support its request, but instead of complying with
the PCGG requirement for it to submit countervailing evidence, Officeco filed the complaint
with the Sandiganbayan praying for the PCGG and the OSG to officially advise the Swiss
government to exclude from the freeze or sequestration order the account of Officeco with
BTAG and to unconditionally release the said account to Officeco.

A motion to dismiss was filed but it was denied hence, a petition was brought to the SC claiming
that the civil action in effect seeks a judicial review of the legality or illegality of the acts of the
Swiss government since the Sandiganbayan would inevitably examine and review the freeze
orders of Swiss officials in resolving the case.

As this would be in violation of the “act of state” doctrine which states that courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another in deference to the
independence of sovereignty of every sovereign state.

Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss.

Ruling:
No. The parameters of the use of the act of state doctrine were clarified in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398; 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964). There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
international law does not require the application of this doctrine nor does it forbid the
application of the rule even if it is claimed that the act of state in question violated international
law. Moreover, due to the doctrine’s peculiar nation-to-nation character, in practice the usual
method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the
executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or
before an international tribunal.

Even assuming that international law requires the application of the act of state doctrine, it bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan will not examine and review the freeze orders of the concerned
Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164. The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss officials to
submit to its adjudication nor will it settle a dispute involving said officials. In fact, as prayed for
in the complaint, the Sandiganbayan will only review and examine the propriety of maintaining
PCGG’s position with respect to Officeco’s accounts with BTAG for the purpose of further
determining the propriety of issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG. Everything
considered, the act of state doctrine finds no application in this case and petitioners’ resort to it is
utterly mislaid. (PCGG, et al. v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 124772, August 14, 2007, Tinga, J)

Ise Mantuano

International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990)

FACTS:
International Catholic Migration Commission was one of those accredited by the Philippine
Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in
New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international
humanitarian and voluntary work.
IRRI or (International Rice Research Institute) on the other hand was intended to be an
autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the
principal objective of conducting “basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice
production, management, distribution and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and
economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through
improvement in quality and quantity of rice.”

The labor organizations in each of the above-mentioned agencies filed a petition for certification
election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:
Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC/ and the IRRI from the application of Philippine labor
laws valid?

RULING:
Yes. There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to
international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus:
1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge
of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the
nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage
by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization
should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its
official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States.

The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. “It is
not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of
functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to
enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The
raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions
by the agencies concerned.

ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic
rights, which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section
31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations provides that “each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which
the specialized agency is a party.”

Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the
Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is
free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in
fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as
evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)
wherein “both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”

Gelo Ace

Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 242

Facts:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national appointed as Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in
Tokyo, Japan, and Manila, came to the Philippines to study at the University of the Philippines in
1974. He became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines and
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. Minucher, and one Abbas
Torabian were charged with information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”. They were accompanied by the private
respondent, Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 8
January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

On 3 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil case before the RTC Branch 19 of Manila for damages
on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to
DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue:
Whether Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Ruling:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The consent of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

 The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries.
 Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy.
 Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust
operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo.

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of Scalzo but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers
and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY It is a well-established principle of international law that

diplomatic representatives, such as ambassadors or public ministers and their official retinue,
possess immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the country of their sojourn and cannot be
sued, arrested or punished by the law of that country.

Flor A Jewel

Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553

FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from the Luneta
to the gates of the United States Embassy. The participants composed primarily of those in
attendance at the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases.

However, it turned out that in October 19, such permit was denied by the City Mayor Bagatsing
due to police intelligence reports of criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. The oral argument was
heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the answer was filed granting the mandatory
injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. Respondent Mayor
posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes to provide protection to the US embassy from such
lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And
that under our constitution, we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.

RULING:
No. The Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the
case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the
peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of
the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.

The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in

1961. It was concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of
ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with
the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was
binding on the Philippines.

Furthermore, a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment
of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by
the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing,
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. There can be no valid
reason why a permit should not be granted for the opposed march and rally starting from a public
park that is the Luneta.

Cweezy Queñano

United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1987)

DOCTRINE
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts, It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

FACTS
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against
the US.

ISSUE
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity? YES

PROVISIONS
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the
rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia
and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

HELD/RATIO
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private,
commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign
function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes

Centene Pablo

Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, Great Britain, Queen’s Bench Division, 1 Q.B. 149 (1894)

Ariel Reyes

Three Friends, 166 U.S. 63 (1896)

FACTS:
On June 12, 1895, a formal proclamation was issued by the President, and countersigned by the
Secretary of State, informing the people of the United States that the Island of Cuba was "the
seat of serious civil disturbances, accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the
established government of Spain, a power with which the United States are and desire to remain
on terms of peace and amity;"

They declared that "the laws of the United States prohibit their citizens, as well as all others
being within and subject to their jurisdiction, from taking part in such disturbances adversely to
such established government, and admonishing all such citizens and other persons to abstain
from any violation of these laws.

The United States libel the vessel named Three Friends before the district court of Florida
alleging that in the said vessel within the territorial waters of the United States has it on board
certain arms and ammunitions with the intent to aid certain people, the insurgents in the island of
Cuba called the Cuban Revolutionist, to commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens and
property of the King of Spain in the island of Cuba, by whom the United State are at peace, they
prayed for the forfeiture of the vessel in violation of Revised Statute Sec. 5283.

Napoleon B. Broward and Montcalm Broward, master and owners, intervened as claimants,
applied for an appraisement of the vessel and her release on stipulation, and filed exceptions to
the libel.

The District Court appraised the vessel for S4,000 and a bond on stipulation given for S10,000,
upon which she was directed to be released. They also sustained some of the exceptions
interposed by the claimants.

The District Judge ordered the libelants to amend their information within 10 days or else the
case will be dismissed on the ground that Sec. 5283 is not applicable to the present case as the
United State did not recognized the insurgents as a belligerent powers.

ISSUE:
Whether Revised Statute Sec. 5283 is applicable only to insurgents recognized as belligerents.

RULING:
NO. The US Supreme Court ruled that the neutrality law of the US was applicable in spite of the
fact that the US had not recognized the insurgents as a belligerent power.

The decision was essentially based on the words “colony, district or people” the Court stated that
why should the meaning of the words “colony, district or people” be confined only to parties
recognized as belligerent?

Neither of these words is used as equivalent to the word 'state,' for they were added to enlarge the
scope of a statute which already contained that word.

A political community whose independence has been recognized is a 'state' under the act; and, if
a body embarked in a revolutionary political movement, whose independence has not been, but
whose belligerency has been, recognized, is also embraced by that term, then the words 'colony,
district, or people,' instead of being limited to a political community which has been recognized
as a belligerent, must necessarily be held applicable to a body of insurgents associated together
in a common political enterprise, and carrying on hostilities against the parent country, in the
effort to achieve independence, although recognition of belligerency has not been accorded.
The Court treated the words “colony, district or people” in the Neutrality Act covers any
insurgent or insurrectionary 'body of people acting together, undertaking and conducting
hostilities,' although its belligerency has not been recognized.

In this case, the political department has not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent
power engaged in hostility with Spain, but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary
warfare prevailing before, at the time, and since this forfeiture is alleged to have been incurred.

Therefore, although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents by the political department

has not taken place, the act in question is applicable.

Anna Angela Delos Reyes

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., U.S. Supreme Court, 246 U.S. 297 (1918)

FACTS:
The cases were commenced in a circuit court of New Jersey and are suits in replevin and involve
the title to two large consignments of hides. The plaintiff in this case is the assignee of Martinez
and Co., a partnership based in Mexico while the defendant is a Texas Corporation. The plaintiff
claims ownership as an assignee while the defendant claims to own by purchase from Finnegan-
Brown Company which purchased the hides from General Francisco Villa in Mexico in January
1914.
On February 1913, the president of Mexico was assassinated. General Huerta declared himself as
the provisional president immediately after the death of the president. In March, General
Carranza stood against Huerta and proclaimed the organization of a constitutional government
under the plan of Guadalupe. Hence, civil war has started between the followers of the two.
When General Carranza assumed leadership, he commissioned General Villa as his
representative to the North. Villa proposed levying a military contribution on the inhabitants to
support his army. Thereafter, a meeting was called and attended by influential citizens and an
assessment was made on men of property of the city. Martinez, the owner of the hides was a
wealthy resident in Torreon who fled the city when Torreon was captured. He then failed to pay
the assessment imposed upon him. Hence, the hides were seized and sold to Finnegan-Brown
Company.

The government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto
government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on
August 31, 1917.

The plaintiff argues that "Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting
Laws and Customs of War on Land" constitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico;
that these "Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of property. Therefore, somewhat vaguely,
no title passed by the sale made by General Villa, and the property may be recovered by the
Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this country.

The court of New Jersey and the court of errors and appeals ruled in favor of the defendants.
Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the “Regulations” annexed to Hague Convention of 1907 forbids seizure and sale
of subject property which in effect invalidates the sale made by General Villa – No

Whether the action can be tried in the US Court – No

RULING:
1. The Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and international character, do not apply to a
civil war, and that the regulations annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a
military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case.
The Court applied the three principle which are:

1. "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political,
question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and
subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this Court, and has
been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."

2. “When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the

political department of our government as the de jure government of the country in which
it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and
conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.”

3. "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts
must be obtained through the means open to be available of by sovereign powers as
between themselves."

Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, the Court ruled that plainly this was the
action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican government when dealing with a Mexican citizen,
and, as the Court have seen, is not subject to reexamination and modification by the courts of the
US.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned
in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the
custody of a court. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."

Affirmed.

A.C. Nuque

State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. District Court, 99 F. Supp. 655