__________________________________________ ___________________________________________

REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
ACADEMY OF THE ARMED FORCES
SECURITY AND DEFENCE FACULTY
DEPARTMENT OF LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DISSERTATION ON ‘DOCTORAL’ DEGREE

ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM OF ALBANIA IN THE

FRAMEWORK OF NATO COLLECTIVE PLANNING SYSTEM.

Dissertation by

(Col ® Thimi Hudhra, PhD)

Tirana, September 2018

 © Copyright: Thimi Hudhra, 2018

This doctoral thesis is drafted according to the requirements of the Regulation of Doctoral
Program, Academy of the Armed Forces, Tirana.
No material of this doctoral thesis may be reproduced, copied, published, modified,
distributed, or sold, in whole or in part, in electronic form or on paper without the author's
written authorization.

ii
The author of this doctoral dissertation, Thimi Hudhra, and the supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ruzhdi
Gjatoja, certify that this is an approved version of the dissertation with the following title:

Theory and Practice of Strategic Defence Planning and Albania

"ON A STRATEGIC DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM OF ALBANIA
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE"

Author of Dissertation Doctoral Supervisor

______________________ _______________________
(Col. ® Thimi Hudhra, PhD) Maj. Gen. ® Prof. Dr. Ruzhdi Gjatoja)

iii
 Theory and Practice of Strategic Defence Planning and Albania
"ON A STRATEGIC DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM OF ALBANIA
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE"

Dissertation by Thimi Hudhra, PhD

Submitted to
the Faculty of Strategy and History
Academy of the Armed Forces, Tirana,
in full compliance with the requirements
of the “Doctoral Degree” Regulation

THE JURY COMPOSED OF:

1) Prof. Dr. Fatmir Mema Chairman, (Faculty of Economy, UT)

2) Prof. Ass. Edmond Braneshi Opponent, (AAF Academy)

3) Prof. Dr. Skënder Kaçupi Opponent, (Faculty of Justice/UT)

4) Prof. Dr. Gjergj Sinani Member, (Faculty of Social Sciences/UT)

5) Prof. Dr. Agim Sula Member, (AAF Academy)

Academy of the Armed Forces

September 2018

iv
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to express my appreciation, gratitude and thanks to special people and
groups of people who contributed and provided food for thoughts to the development of
this PhD research thesis.
My first thanks go to Prof. Ruzhdi Gjatoja, as a friend, colleague, lecturer and my
hardworking supervisor of the doctoral thesis. Professor Gjatoja, who not only inspired me
to follow this path, but also gave me valuable and persistent advice I never misunderstood.
This is due to special respect for this person, for a lifetime of research he has devoted to the
defence institution, and for various duties he has performed with dedication and quality in
all levels of military hierarchy.
Second, my appreciations go to Prof. Bektash Kolasi, as a promoter of defence planning
after the democratic changes of the early 90-ies. Professor Kolasi lives in United States, but
he remains for me and for many others, an honourable, dedicated military man, with a
reform-oriented spirit and modest human qualities. He is one of my main inspiration
persons in the field of security and defence planning.
Third, my thanks go to the entire defence planning community in the Armed Forces. They
are many in number, and I would not prefer to mention someone and not to mention
someone else. They are a dedicated community and hardworking people with a low profile
and modesty; they often forget themselves, or are even rarely mentioned by others.
Fourth, I would like to thank all those colleagues, superiors and subordinates who have
supported me in various positions for building together a defence planning system in the
Republic of Albania, and harmonization with the NATO structures as a partner, aspirant,
and now as an allied country. A long journey followed by military and civilians with spirit
and admirable efforts, each in his/her own position.
And, last but not least, a special thank-you goes to my family, which supported constantly
all my efforts in this achievement.
Thank you all.

v
 Declaration on Authorship
(Anti-plagiarism)

I, the author of this dissertation, Thimi Hudhra, declare under my full responsibility that
this dissertation for the Doctoral degree named "NATO Collective Defence Planning and
Albania" - On a Defence Planning System of the Republic of Albania in the framework
of NATO Collective Defence" is my original work, without previously presented for
evaluation to any other institution.
I declare that the opinions expressed in this dissertation are my individual opinions and do
not represent the official opinion of the Academy of the Armed Forces, the Doctrine and
Training Command, General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, or any other governmental
institution.
This paper does not contain any material written by any other person, except those cited
and referred to in the dissertation. When using the domestic or foreign bibliography of this
dissertation, I have complied with the rules and legal acts against plagiarism, referring or
citing them with the footnotes at the bottom of the respective page, also listing their source
at the end of the dissertation, according to accepted rules of doctoral studies.

Tirana, on September 2018

Author of the Dissertation
Colonel (R) Thimi Hudhra, PhD

vi
 PËRMBLEDHJE NË SHQIP
Cilët janë mesazhet kryesore të këtij
disertacioni? Çfarë të reja sjell ky studim në
fushën e planifikimit strategjik? Çfarë zgjidhje
dhe rekomandime me vlera aplikative ofron ai?
Sa aktuale janë ato dhe kujt mund ti shërbejnë?
Në këtë tezë, nën këndvështrimin tim, u jepet
përgjigje këtyre dhe mjaft pyetjeve të tjerave që
janë në axhendën e reformave afatmesme të
Ministrisë së Mbrojtjes, si: Çfarë ndryshimesh
solli anëtarësimi në Aleancë? Përtej
anëtarësimit, cilat janë sfidat e mëtejshme? Cili
është ndryshimi midis anëtarësimit “de jure”
dhe integrimit “de facto”? Cilat janë përfitimet
dhe detyrimet në fushën e planifikimit të
mbrojtjes? Cili duhet të jetë Niveli i Ambicies i
vendit tonë në NATO? Çfarë duhet të heqim dorë
për t’ia besuar planifikimit të mbrojtjes
kolektive, dhe çfarë duhet të planëzojmë për të
kontribuar për mbrojtjen kolektive?
Cilat mund të jenë disa nga tiparet e forcës së
ardhshme në ndryshim nga ajo tradicionale? Si
mund të shfrytëzohen rekomandimet e Konceptit
të ri Strategjik të NATO-s në zhvillimin e
kapaciteteve? Cili është sistemi aktual i
planifikimit strategjik te mbrojtjes kombëtare
dhe sa është ai i harmonizuar me sistemin e
mbrojtjes kolektive? Cilët janë ato elementë që e
matin një gjë të tillë? Cilat janë faktorët
kryesorë, mekanizmat që duhet të përdoren dhe
strukturat që duhet të drejtojnë dhe
bashkëpunojnë për përafrimin e sistemit tonë të
planifikimit me atë aleat. Pse duhet të jemi
aktivë në këtë proces duke përgatitur stafe të
afta për ta përballuar atë me cilësinë e kërkuar?
Fjalë Kyçe: Planifikim Strategjik; Planifikim
Mbrojtje; Planifikim Force; Planifikim
Operacional; Strategji e Sigurisë; Strategji
Ushtarake; Rishikim Strategjik i Mbrojtjes;
NATO, BE, Mbrojtja, Kolektive; Mjedisi i Sigurisë,
Niveli i Ambicies; Doktrinë e Përbashkët; Forcat
e Armatosura; NDPP; Planifikim Bazuar mbi
Kapacitete; Objektivat e Kapaciteteve,
Kapacitete Niche; Forca Rezervë; STANAG;
Skenarë Planëzimi; Mbrojtje e Mençur.
vii
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH
What are the key messages of this doctorate thesis?
What news is this study bringing in the field of
strategic planning? What solutions and applicative
values does it offers? Who can make use of
conclusions, findings and recommendations of this
study?
This thesis, in my view, provides answers to many
questions related to the midterm agenda of reforms
of the Ministry of Defence and Albanian Armed
Forces, such as: What are the changes related to the
membership in the Alliance? And beyond
membership, what are other future challenges?
What is the difference between "de jure"
membership and "de facto" integration? What are
the benefits and obligations in the field of defence
planning? What should be the Level of Ambition of
our country in NATO? What to rely on collective
defence planning and what other is required to be
planned for contribution to the collective defence?
What might be some of the features of the future
force compared with the traditional one? How can
we use the recommendations of NATO Strategic
Concept and NATO NDPP process related to
development of capability targets? What is the
current system of national strategic defence
planning and how it is harmonized with the
collective defence system? What are those elements
to measure such a progress? What are the driving
factors, the tools to be used, and the leading and
supporting structures in order to align our planning
system with that of the Alliance? Why should we be
active and train appropriate strategic planning
staffs to handle this process with the required
quality?
Key Words: Strategic Planning; Defence Planning;
Force Planning; Operational Planning; Collective
Defence, Security Strategy; Military Strategy;
Strategic Defence Review; NATO, EU, NDPP,
Capability Targets, Force Goals, Capability Based
Planning; Security Environment; Level of Ambition;
Joint Doctrine; Armed Forces; Niche Capabilities;
Reserve Force; STANAG; Planning Situations/
Scenarios; Smart Defence.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Theory and Practice of Strategic Defence Planning and Albania

"ON A STRATEGIC DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM OF ALBANIA
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE"

 Copyright ii
 Acknowledgements v
 Declaration on authorship (anti-plagiarism) vi
 Abstract in Albanian / Abstract in English vii
 Table of contents viii
 Acronyms/ Abbreviations xii
INTRODUCTION TO DOCTORAL THESIS

 Introduction 1
 Bibliography/ Literature 3
 Motivation of the doctoral thesis 4
 Methodology 5
 Structure and content of dissertation 7

 Discussion of conclusions, findings and recommendations 9

I. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENCE & FORCE PLANNING

10
I.1 Introduction to Strategic Defence Planning 10
I.2 Relations between Defence, Force and Operational Planning 12
I.3 Methods of Defence Planning 16

viii
II. KREU II: NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS (NDPP) 24

II.1. Background on Strategic Collective Defence Planning 24

II.2. Introduction to Collective Defence Planning Process 26
II.3. Authorities and Disciplines of Defence Planning in NATO 34
II.4. NATO Defence Planning Process – Best Practice model 44
II.5. Steps of NATO collective Defence Planning Process 47
II.6. NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS) 52
II.7. Level of Ambition of Collective Defence 56
II.8. Types of Missions and Scenarios of Collective Defence 61
II.9. From mission types to Allied planning situations 63
II.10. Essential Operational Capabilities of the Alliance 65
II.11. From NATO Defence Planning to Operational Planning 72

III. CHAPTER III: HARMONIZATION OF DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM

IN ALBANIA WITH NDPP 75

III.1. Introduction to Defence Planning in the Republic of Albania (RA) 75

III.2 Harmonization of Albanian Defence Planning with NDPP process 76
III.3. Steps of Defence Planning process in Albania – Best Practice model 78
III.4. Harmonization of main Defence Planning Documents with NATO 81
III.5. Harmonization of Defence Planning Disciplines with NATO 87
III.6. A Project-proposal of the Level of Ambition of Albania 92
III.7. Harmonization of Planning Scenarios of Albania as an Allied Country 98
III.8. On a Capability Based Planning (CBP) in Albania 111
III.9. Draft-proposal for a more flexible C2 Structure of AAF 126
III.10. A Concept on Development of Niche Capabilities in AAF 139
III.11. Development of Volunteer Reserve component in AAF 145

ix
IV. CHAPTER IV: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW PROCESS (SDR). 154

IV.1. Introduction to SDR and Relations with Defence Planning 154

IV.2. Approach, Findings, Methods and Participation in SDR 156
IV.3. National Experience in SDR 159
IV.4. Phases of the SDR Process - 2012 in RA 161
IV.5. Targets of SDR- 2012 in Albania 163
IV.6. ‘Smart Defence’: A New Approach of Defence Planning 168

V. CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM IN ALBANIA 183
V.1. Conclusions, Findings and Recommendations i-vii
Bibliography viii
List of Tables:
Table 1: 10 methods pf strategic defence planning 16
Table 2: Responsible authorities in the Alliance related to 13 planning disciplines 41
Table 3: Steps of Defence Planning System in Albania (project by the author) 78
Table 4: Package of strategic planning documents of Albania (project by the author) 82
Table 5: Package of defence planning disciplines of Albania (project by the author) 88
Table 6: Top countries with defence spending 174
Table 7: Table of defence expenditure of NATO countries for the period 2011 – 2018 175

List of Figures:
Figure 1: Figure of evolution of NATO Strategic Concept 1953 – 2010 29
Figure 2: Package of 13 NATO Strategic Planning Disciplines, 2009 37
Figure 3: Best Practice model of NATO Defence Planning Process (Source R&T, 2009) 44
x
List of Schemes:
Scheme 1: Three Key Elements of the Strategic Planning 17
Scheme 2: A five step cycle of Defence Planning Process 48
Scheme 3: Map of NDPP Planning Scenarios/ Situations (project by the author based on NDPP) 64
Scheme 4: Graph of NATO country reserve personnel, an assessment of 2008 148
Scheme 5: Scheme of SDR Process 2012 in Albania (Project by the Joint Team) 162

List of Annexes:
Annex A – Evolution of NATO Strategic Concept x
Annex B – NATO NDPP System x
Annex C – NATO mission types xi
Annex D – Set of Planning Situation in Albania (project by the author) xiv
Annex E – Essential Operational Capabilities (translated by the author) xvi
Annex F – Size of Military and Civilian Personnel of NATO countries xviii
Annex G – Defence Budget of NATO countries xix
Annex H – Defence expenditure per capita and military personnel xx
Table 4 – real GDP of NATO countries xxi
Table 2 – Defence expenditure in million USD xxiii
Interview questionnaire xxiv
Brief CV of the author in Albanian and English xxvi

xi
 Abbreviations/ Acronyms used in the Dissertation

RA Republic of Albania
MOD Ministry of Defence
AAF GS Albanian Armed Forces’ General Staff
TRADOC Doctrine and Training Command
CDA Centre for Defence Analysis
NCSDS National Centre for Security and Defence Studies
DA Defence Academy
MAS Military Academy 'Skanderbeg'
TS Troop School
ANO NCOs Academy
BTC Basic Training Centre
UN United Nations Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EU European Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
NSS National Security Strategy
MS Military Strategy
SDR Strategic Defence Review
QDR Quadrennial Defence Review
LTDP Long-term Development Plan
MTBP Medium Term Budget Program
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
MP Military Police
CIED Devices against Improvised Explosives
CIMIC Civil - Military Cooperation
OMLT Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
POMLT Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams
OLT Observation Liaison Team
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HNS Host Nation Support
RSOM Reception, Staging and Onward Movement
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

xii
NMLT National Military Liaison Team
HOC High Officer Course
RAND US Company for Defence Assistance
SAIC US Company for Defence Assistance
CUBIC US Company for Defence Assistance
DFI US Company for Defence Assistance
ALION US Company for Defence Assistance
R&D Research and Development
DOTMLPFI Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Infrastructure, Interoperability
DPCS Defence Planning Capability Survey
DPQ Defence Planning Questionnaire
FOC Full Operational Capability
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
Iraqi Freedom Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’
IFOR NATO Operation "IFOR" in BiH
SFOR NATO Operation "SFOR" in BiH
ALTHEA EU Operation "ALTHEA" in BiH
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Clearing House Assistance Coordination Mechanism of Various Areas
NAC North Atlantic Council
MC 400 Military Committee Directive MC 400
PFP Partnership for Peace
PARP Planning and Review Process
MAP Membership Action Plan
DCI Defence Capability Initiative
EBAO Effect Based Approach to Operations
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
MC Military Committee
DPPC Defence Planning and Policy Committee
DPST Defence Planning Staff Team
NSIP NATO Security Investment Program
RPPB NATO Resource Planning Board
CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors
ADC Air Defence Committee
C3 Command, Control and Communication

xiii
CEP Civil Emergency Planning
NATINADS NATO's Integrated Air Defence System
ALTBMD Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
STANAG Standardization Agreement
SALIS Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process
IS NATO International Staff
IMS NATO International Military Staff
ACO Allied Command for Operations
ACT Allied Command for Transformation
PG Partnership Goals
FG Force Goals
CT Capability Targets
DRR Defence Requirements Review
CRR Defence Capability Review
CD Collective Defence
DAT Defence Against Terrorism
NA5CRO NATO Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
AFS Allied Force Standards
EOC Essential Operational Capabilities
NRF NATO Response Force
MIBG Motorized Infantry Battalion Group
NNEC NATO Network Enabled Capabilities
CIS Communication and Information Systems
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
NFS NATO Force Structure
FDC Force Declaration Categories
HRF Higher Readiness Forces
FLR Forces of Lower Readiness
LTBF Long Term Built-Up Forces
CREVAL Readiness Evaluation for Land Forces
TACEVAL Readiness Evaluation for Air Force
MAREVAL Readiness Evaluation for Navy Forces
NDPASS NATO's Automated Defence Planning System
OMP Peace Support Operations

xiv
NSE National Support Element
LOA Level of Ambition
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe
SDP Strategic Defence Plans
CONPLAN Plans for Special Situations
QBO United Operations Centre
FULLCOM Full Command
OPCOM Operational Command
JFC Naples Joint Force Command, Naples
MJO Major Joint Operations
SJO Smaller Joint Operations
CE Civil Emergencies
HNS Host Nation Support
SAR Search & Rescue Operations
SATCOM Satellite Communication
SF Special Forces
OCC Operational Capability Concept

xv
 INTRODUCTION TO DOCTORAL THESIS

- Introduction

After achieving the strategic goal of NATO membership in April 2009, that does not
mean that the integration process of Albania is completely closed. The Alliance is in a
period of continuous changes, so integration is a relative and evolving notion, and there is
not any clear definition of how integrated is one country or another. The argument used is
simple: the 12 founding nations of almost 70 years of life in the Alliance can not have the
same level of integration with those countries having only 1, 5, or 10 years in the
Alliance.
Albania's efforts for NATO membership have been one of the longest and most difficult
case compared with other partner and aspirant countries. From aspiration to finalization,
it lasted 15 years, from 1994 to 2009. When we were still a partner country, to show that
we were a desirable and committed country to contribute to NATO operations, our
strategic documents often used to mention that "Even though Albania is not a “de jure”
member of NATO, it is a “de facto” member of this collective defence organization”1.
This is just as true now, after joining the Alliance, when even though Albania is 'de jure'
an allied country, it is suffering a number of problems to be "de facto" such a country.
While "de jure" membership relates to the country's accession date to the Alliance, "de
facto" integration is a longer process associated with achieving sustainable political,
economic, military and financial capabilities of an allied country to normally exercise
both benefits from and contributions to collective security and defence, which are not
necessarily achieved on the first day of membership in the Alliance. This is true not only
for Albania, but also for a number of other allied countries, since 1999 Washington
Summit, when Albania, along with these countries in Eastern and South-eastern Europe,
were called aspirant countries.
In my view, there is a significant change between the notion of ‘membership’ and that of
‘integration’. In addition to common things, these two notions can not be totally
identified with each other. From up to date theory and practice the 10 new member states
after 1999, their full formal integration has lasted from 5 to 10 years after the
membership date, while real integration requires more time and efforts. This period is not
a field of flowers, but a period of challenges associated with deep reforms to adapt
quickly and properly to the environment and the collective defence agenda.
With NATO integration, security and defence of the country has experienced a profound
qualitative transformation. We have shifted from individual security and defence to

1
Membership Action Plan (MAP), Document 2004, page 28

1
collective security and defence. This qualitative change can not be easily and
amateurishly managed; it requires knowledge, expertise, active engagement and high
professionalism. The Alliance is a giant collective security and defence mechanism with
a nearly 70-year successful history, with familiar paths and unknown labyrinths,
classified and unclassified information, with profound reforms and continuous
transformation. The mechanisms of collective defence are complex, too complicated and
often move with difficulty. In this sense, moving from superficial to deep knowledge on
collective defence system of the Alliance remains a fundamental issue for all of us. Our
strategic level experts should provide an in-depth analysis of this new quality security
and defence system, in order to define our policies, articulate our attitudes and formulate
our positions on many key issues of participation in collective security and defence.
The current system of our national defence planning in the framework of collective
defence is still a system under development. Despite the progress made and difficulties
encountered, significant improvements are already made to reflect this new reality. In this
context, in order for Albania to enjoy all the benefits of collective defence, its defence
planning system should be harmonized in time, processes, methodologies, documents,
capabilities, and end products with those of the Alliance's collective defence planning
system. This is one of the main challenges of the post-accession period and real
integration in the Alliance.
This doctoral thesis on national defence planning in the framework of collective defence
and related issues it covers are of extraordinary importance. For this reason, national
defence planning reform is not to be left to ordinary military and civilian experts; it
requires both active engagement and guidance of civilian policymakers and participation
of strategic military leadership of security and defence area.
The writing process of this doctoral thesis is based on two conceptual pillars: it is based
both on a 'retrospective view' and a 'perspective vision'. It is also to be emphasized that,
like all the other countries aspiring to join the Alliance, Albania did not start its defence
reforms at the time of its membership, but long before. Alliance membership was
designed as a profound reform process to meet the Alliance's core criteria in 5 key areas
of the Membership Action Plan, (MAP Cycle 10), which will be discussed later in more
details. So, in order to give concrete recommendations and solutions to strategic planning
issues, this thesis looks back on what we have done since 1994 as a partner country, and
further deals with what we did after 1999 as an aspirant country up to April 2009 when
we became an allied country, but it also look ahead to what we should do now as an
allied country up to 2024, maybe even further.
The period until 2024 will be a period of reform and transformation of Albania and AAF
for alignment with basic NATO and EU standards. It will be a tough but not an unknown
pathway. Since 1999, with the open door policy of the Alliance, we have 10 new NATO
2
member countries, so despite all the original values that we have to show, we should also
benefit from the lessons learned and the best practices of NATO member countries in the
last 20 years.
Along with the benefits of collective defence, the doctoral thesis also describes the
military obligations of NATO membership, and further, EU membership, or other
security organizations. Thus, national defence planning, along with considerable benefits,
will also include, in parallel, the development of national capabilities in the interest of
international operations under the concept of "a single set of forces" as the most rational
solution for a small country like Albania.

This study also addresses current and future effects of the reforms generated by NATO's
Strategic Concept, Lisbon, November 2010, which together with the Bratislava
Ministerial and the recent Brussels Summit 2018 have brought about qualitative changes
in collective and individual defence planning.

A positive step of the improvement our defence planning system as an allied country, is
the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the Republic of Albania, concluded in June 2013.
SDR findings are a program of reforms of our Defence Planning and future force
development as a product based on 'smart defence'. The newly Strategic Defence Review
SDR-2018 in process is based on the SDR 2013, promoting further defence reforms up to
2024.

- Literature used

I have used a broad and variable literature for this thesis. Several thousands of pages of
literature from the Alliance, 29 member states, and our country's security and defence
strategic planning are used to this research product.

This literature is divided into several collections: theoretical literature on basics of

strategic planning; literature related to practical expertise on strategic planning in NATO;
as well as literature on strategic planning documents of most experienced allied countries.

It is worth pointing out that by 2010, the field of defence planning of our country in the
framework of collective defence was almost untreated by specific research studies. That
is why the bibliography/ research literature and references used are mostly of foreign
origin, and less of national origin.

One of my goals at the beginning of writing of my doctoral thesis was the identification
of the most prominent theoretic authors in this field of research and the most experienced
experts in NATO, which was not an easy task. Among them I can recognize professors of
my specialization studies at home and abroad, colleagues or even senior experts such as:
3
Prof. Paul Holman, Marshall Centre; Prof. Henri Bartlett, ISS Washington DC; Dr. Frank
Boland, Director of Strategic Planning and Policies, NATO; Prof. Colin Gray, ISS
Institute, London; Prof. Paul Davis, Researcher, RAND Corporation; Dr. Buzz
Kievenaar, Senior Leader of "SAIC Defence Review - 2001" in Albania; Dr. Mike
Simonich (SAIC Defence Modernization Team, Leader); Prof. Mirel Misharet (Senior
Leader of ISS Paris); Dr. James Mattis, ACT Commander (now US Secretary of
Defence), etc.; as well as the first Albanian researchers of the area, such as Prof. Bektash
Kolasi; Prof. Ruzhdi Gjatoja, and my colleagues, such as Dr. Foto Duro, Perikli Koliçi,
Piro Ahmetaj, Dilo Hoxha, Edi Zarka, etc., as well as other colleagues in the field of
strategic planning during the period 1993 - 2018.

- Motivation for the doctoral thesis

What was my motivation for this doctoral thesis? What inspired me to select such a
thesis? What positive impact will my topic have? What goals did I have to serve the real
process of integration into the Alliance?

My basic motivation was the development of the Armed Forces, not just as an institution
based on force, but first, as an institution based on knowledge. With this in mind, I
intended that my views, concepts and recommendations had a positive impact on
lawmakers and strategic planners who needed to understand that AAFs are a serious
institution whose development requires high cost, long-term investment, harmonized with
collective defence, and in line with dynamics of the security environment. This is because
few politicians and citizens understand this process; many people improperly realize that
NATO membership has solved all the security and defence problems of the country, and
now we have to sleep peacefully.

In fact, it's not that simple. With NATO integration, it is true that the country's security
and defence has experienced a profound transformation and this is the best solution in the
history of the Albanian people; and here is the central question of my motivation for this
topic: how to become a well-merited member of the Alliance, with both the benefits
coming from collective defence, and the contribution to be offered? This qualitative
transformation of the country's defence concept should continue to be associated with
multi-level and dynamic reforms in the area of security and defence in the coming years.

Another motivation has to do with promotion of other researchers on further in-depth

studies of this important area of strategic planning. Albanian Armed Forces have many
operational/ tactical-level researchers and few strategic-level researchers. The strategic
planning, under new conditions as a NATO member country and tomorrow as an EU
member country, is a little explored research area and requires more specific studies. I
4
strongly encourage and congratulate all other researchers to continue and explore this
important field of research, which can bring tremendous benefits to modest positions and
normal accommodation of our country and Armed Forces in collective security and
defence structures.

Also, another lesson learned in the last 25 years is the consolidation of a qualitative staff /
community of leaders and experts in the field of strategic defence and force planning,
which is still at the initial phase. Particular role should be given to education and research
institutions of the Training and Doctrine Command, especially the Defence Academy and
Doctrine and Research Centre. Formulation of a specific teaching module/course which I
have taught for military and civilians of strategic level courses (HCSD and HOC) has
served this motivation.

My basic goal when writing this study has been to develop a doctoral dissertation with
applicable values and not merely theoretical academic values. I can modestly confirm
that my motivation is increased by the fact that findings and recommendations of this
paper have become specifically applicable to the country's defence reforms, and
especially for Kosovo, where together with other colleagues, I have given some
assistance for the development of the Security Strategy and the KSF Defence Review,
and are also taken as a reference from other countries of the region and beyond. They are
welcome to learn both from our successes and mistakes.

- Methodology

When I started to write this thesis, I had in mind two main elements: the first, to be
applicable for a long-term 10 years (2014-2024), because the same is the strategic
planning system; and second, to be based on the concept of public good, and not merely
as an individual ambition for a doctoral degree.

With this aim, for the achievement of the final draft, I have used various, planned and
unplanned forms of research; this is because I have not considered it as a goal in itself.
Often I have succeeded, sometimes I have failed, but what's important, I have learned
lessons and I have properly reflected. My main motto was to keep systematic notes and
read them from time to time, and reflect on them when needed, because I am a fan of the
Latin maxim "Verba volant, scripta manent".

My PhD thesis is the product of a 25-year (1993-2018) long work through reading,
learning, debate, reflection, interview, analysis, synthesis, writing, conclusions, policy
development, elaboration, concrete meetings, interviewing, concept building, lessons
learned, concrete problem solving, recommendations, counselling, etc., according to
Bloom's taxonomy, one of my favourite in the field of knowledge and practice of
5
scientific research. To illustrate this research variety, I have described some statistics on
my doctoral thesis: I have explored over 9000 pages of literature of the area, read over
150 authors; used over 200 research references; developed over 20 pages with concepts
and arguments; written more than 80 pages of individual projects; elaborated over 40
pages of analysis and synthesis; recorded over 15 pages with statistics and facts;
formulated and taught a teaching module of some 48 classes for students of the Academy
of Defence's higher courses; drawn over 30 pages of lessons learned; proposed over 30
conclusions, findings and recommendations; etc.

As I stated above, in addition to the ‘retrospective view’, at the focus of my work I have
also outlined a ‘perspective vision’; so in addition to the analysis of the achievements
made before and by April 2009 at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit up to now, I have also
paid basic attention to changes and reforms now and ahead. This is not an empiric work,
but a genuine long term research work. I encourage all young researchers in this field to
further exploring this wide research space.

When writing my dissertation, my intention and conviction was to be free, critical and
non-conformist versus some controversial and highly enthusiastic self-censored,
rounded/favoured formulated attitudes written about this issue by some other researchers,
mainly state-partisan researchers. This is because, together with many others, I have been
an active member of this process in high positions of state structures, and now as a free
independent researcher, my intention is to be more realistic about the achievements, the
progress, together with the mistakes made in this long process.

Other methods include the lessons from frequent meetings, roundtables, workshops,
military conventions, or interviews with leaders and strategic planning experts in
Albania, NATO, or capitals of allied countries. I have been lucky to be for almost 20
years part of national delegations in over 100 NATO meetings/events, such as related to
IPP, PARP, MAP, DPSC, and over 200 regional and bilateral meetings, whose notes have
specifically served this doctoral work with concrete expertise.

I have tried to use both the inductive forms, moving from facts to conclusions and
findings (there are over 30 findings and recommendations at the end of the thesis), and
the deductive form, (by breaking conclusions and certain end states into their constituent
elements, such as strategies, concepts, strategic policies, and lessons learned).

Another method used in this PhD thesis is the use of comparative studies coordinated
with the "lessons learned" techniques from the experience of our country and other
countries that have experienced this period of reforms.

6
This doctoral thesis is intended to have a long-term and applicative value; it gives
recommendations and provides concrete solutions to senior civil and military authorities
on national defence planning issues in the coming years.

Structure and Abstract of doctoral thesis

The doctoral thesis on "Strategic defence planning of the Republic of Albania as

an Allied NATO country" is structured in five main chapters, which are given below
along with a brief analytical description:

1. Chapter I: The Basics of National Defence Strategic Planning;

2. Chapter II: Alliance Collective Defence Planning System;
3. Chapter III: Harmonization of Defence Planning of Albania with NDPP;
4. Chapter IV: Need for a Periodic Strategic Defence Review;
5. Chapter V: Findings and Recommendations of the Doctoral Thesis.

 First Chapter. This chapter is an Introduction to Long Term Defence Planning, its
origin and purpose. I have specifically addressed the Defence Planning theory during
the Cold War and especially after the Cold War. Through introduction of a
comparative study method, I have identified the differences between Defence
Planning, Force Planning and Operational Planning. Further, I have described main
classic/traditional and modern methods of Defence Planning. Key focus is given to
the Capability Based Planning method (CBP) as the most modern planning method of
the 21st century. I have then reviewed the methodology and process of Long Term
Defence Planning. Although this chapter is mostly characterized by theory, it is
associated with analysis and illustrated with many practical examples of Defence
Planning of the 20-th and 21-st century. My purpose is that, after a detailed
explanation of the theoretical foundations of the Strategic Defence Planning, this
chapter will normally bring the reader to the next chapters, dealing with the collective
defence planning, and the defence planning in the Republic of Albania as part of
collective defence. I think this approach makes this doctoral study more
understandable and logical when reading.

 Second Chapter. This chapter describes the basic foundations of Collective Defence
Planning of the Alliance. In this chapter, I have addressed the NATO collective
defence planning system, analysed key Disciplines of Defence Planning together with
their related Authorities. Further, I have provided a synthesis of the Defence Planning
Capability Survey (NATO-DPCS), and described the concept of Level of Ambition of
the Alliance. Also, the chapter is further focused on NATO types of missions,
7
 Collective Defence Planning scenarios, Essential Operational Capabilities (EOC),
NATO Task List document (NTL), and Capability Codes and Statements. I have also
described shortly the Types, Categories and Readiness Levels of the Alliance Forces,
as well as the methodology of transition from the Defence Planning to Operations
Planning in NATO. All this information, together with an analysis, synthesis,
statistics and arguments given in this chapter directly serve the strategic level
planners to understand the role of national defence planning in collective defence,
along with related benefits and contributions. This understanding and analysis gives
to all interested readers an easier access to the third chapter.

 Third Chapter. This chapter addresses the current Defence Planning system in RA,
the changes it has experienced after NATO membership and the efforts being made to
further harmonize with the collective defence system of the Alliance. Based on the
conclusions of the first and second Chapters, the Chapter three contains plenty of
research, analysis and recommendations for the actualization of our defence planning
system. This chapter addresses the key Defence Planning Documents of Albania, as
an allied country. It also addresses potential Disciplines of Defence Planning,
provides an original option of the Level of Ambition of Albania; formulates a set of
Planning Scenarios / Situations of Albania as an allied country; recommends a
Capability Based Planning in AAF; gives an option of the necessary capabilities of
the Future Force 2024; develops a concept of specialized "niche" capabilities in the
AAF; formulates a conceptual framework of a "Volunteer Reserve” force in AAF;
and generates ideas for institutionalization of a periodic process of Strategic Defence
Review (SDR) in Albania.

 Fourth Chapter. This chapter is focused on the issue of a Strategic Defence Review
(SDR) process and relations with Defence Planning. I have provided an analysis on
approaches, goals, methods and national-wide engagement in SDR; analysis of the
experience of current national SDR progress 2013, as well as the articulation of a
'Smart Defence' concept as a new approach to national and regional defence planning.

 Fifth Chapter. In this chapter of the doctoral thesis, I have listed more than 30
conclusions, findings and recommendations, which are coming as a logical result of
the analysis, lessons learned, facts, arguments, and personal experience. Findings and
recommendations are associated with an implementation action plan in order to
develop a defence planning system as an allied country. In my opinion, these findings
are of great interest for the defence planning experts and management staffs. Also,
they can also serve the students of the Academy of Defence, research centres, and
other interested researchers in the country and region.

8
 Discussion of conclusions, findings and recommendations
My purpose was to make all conclusions, findings and recommendations available to the
civilian and military decision-making authorities through the research forms and methods
described in this doctoral thesis. I have tried to answer the fundamental questions of the
mid-term agenda at national level, and especially the Ministry of Defence and General
Staff, based on the "lessons learned" method from the experience of our country and
other countries.

Some key answers are related to questions such as: What changes are brought about by
the membership in the Alliance? What are the benefits and obligations in the field of
defence planning? What are the key areas of harmonization with NDPP? What should be
the level of ambition of our country in NATO? What should we trust to collective
defence planning, and what should we plan to contribute to collective defence? How
much military force do we need for security and defence of the country now as an allied
country? Should the development of the armed forces be ignored like some sceptics and
nihilists claim now that we are a NATO country? If not, what might be some of the
features of future force in contrast to the previous traditional one? How do they vary in
quantity and quality from the current force? How can the recommendations of the new
NATO Strategic Concept be used in capability development? What is the current system
of national strategic defence planning and how much compatible it is with the collective
defence system? What are the elements measuring this relation? What civil capabilities
do we need to build in addition to military ones? What are the mechanisms to be used and
the structures guiding aligning our planning system with collective allied system? Why
should we be active in this process? The above were just a few of them.

Related to some 30 findings and recommendations of this paper I have provided relevant
solutions to the security and defence authorities and institutions of the country. A more
complete reflection of conclusions, findings and recommendations is given in Chapter V
(i).

9
I. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO DEFENCE AND FORCE PLANNING

I.1 General Considerations on Strategic Defence Planning

When talking about strategic defence planning, we usually mean long-term planning.
Strategic planning is about the basic question of the existence of a nation-state, it is a
question related to how and with what we will protect the country tomorrow. In terms of
strategic planning, the answer to the question of how to defend the country tomorrow
should be thought and formulated today. And, when strategic planners say tomorrow they
mean at least one or several decades.

When Robert McNamara2 initiated Long Term Planning and Policy Analysis3, he called
it “professional planning”. At the top of Pentagon, he implemented a long-term defence
planning approach up to 10 years in practice and established the link between the Policy,
Objectives, Plans, Programs and capability Products.

At the beginning he received many thanks and congratulations from both friends and
opponents, but later, after having left the duty of the US Secretary of Defence, he
ironically described the professional planning he adopted by dividing it into six main
phases: the first phase - the Enthusiasm Phase; the second phase - the Confusion Phase;
the third phase - the Panic Phase; the fourth phase - the Witch Hunt Phase, or Hunt for
the Responsible Persons; the fifth phase - the Punishment of the Innocent Phase; and the
sixth phase, the Decoration of Non-involved Persons in the process4.

The above sarcastic illustration was made to evaluate that strategic planning is a complex
and difficult effort. It requires qualified personnel, vision and strategic perspective, long-
term policies and plans, sustainable budget support, and a long-term consensus on
security and defence issues by all interested parties.

This issue is even more important today when we are in a very qualitative phase of the
post-NATO membership. We should take maximal advantages from the Alliance's
security and collective defence planning. Why? Because under the collective defence
treaty, many defence capabilities that we would have to develop individually on our own,

2 Former US Secretary of Defence, The eighth Secretary of Defence who served the President John Kennedy and
Lyndon Johnson during the period 1961 to 1968 of the Vietnam War.
3 Policy Analysis is a term with the origin from the Analysis of the Professional Planning System initiated by Robert

McNamara, former US Sec of Def.

4 R. McNamara, ‘Hunt for the Responsible’, Penguin edition 1969, page 47.

10
can be developed collectively by the Alliance, in exchange for some collective defence
obligations that are very little compared to those that we will benefit.

According to the definition agreed by the 29 countries of the Alliance, strategic defence
planning is "... the political and military process used by the countries to develop the
capabilities required to fulfil the defence commitments; this process takes into account
the political, economic, technological, and military factors affecting development of
capabilities for the implementation of the Alliance's strategy.”5 Thus, the end products
resulting from strategic defence planning are the capabilities that the Alliance and Allied
countries need to face the risks and threats of the future security environment, in order to
advance their national and collective interests, considering the limited financial situation.

The rational link between long-term, mid-term and short-term planning is the key to the
success of a strategic planning strategy. “Long-term Planning provides inputs to mid-term
and short-term defence planning. Sometimes, boundaries between long-term, mid-term
and short-term planning are often unclear. At the strategic level, boundaries are clearer;
in long-term planning, the main inputs are national interests and strategic objectives,
while outputs (products) are force development plans for the next 10 to 30 years. These
plans determine the changes required to military capabilities in this period of time” 6.
Long-term planning is a complex and difficult process. It requires careful analysis,
continuity, appropriate resources, cooperation and vision of political and military
leadership. Major deviations from long-term planning are associated with considerable
loss of resources. Only long term planning can promote sustainable reforms and
transformation of the armed forces.
In fact, Strategic Planning is not just a special attribute of the defence area. It promotes
values and progress and is widely used in all areas of human activity: from politics,
business, economics, diplomacy, environment, education, healthcare, or even families,
etc., which are not subject to this doctoral thesis, but a parallel conceptual line can be
drawn. Any serious public or private entity, organization, business has today a ‘strategic”
planning on paper or in mind, so they have a medium or long-term vision of the future of
their organization or business.

Strategic planning can be identified with the long-term course focused on the future of an
organization / business. "How far is this course? Many organizations / businesses have 3
to 5 year time frame, some other 6-10 years, and others even 10-30 years. This depends
on the type of activity, the size, personnel, strength, assumptions, surprises or

5 AAP- 42, NATO Glossary of Standardisation Terms and Definitions, page 46

6 Dr. M. Norheim-Martinsen, Dr. Sigurd Glærum, and Mr. Håvard Fridheim, Planning for the Future – A Norwegian
Perspective, page 45.
11
uncertainties of activity in the long run, the real opportunities of the organization /
business in human resources, financial support, the market competition of the respective
activity, and many other factors”.7

As mentioned above, Strategic Planning is and must be developed and managed at the
highest level of the organization/ business. Generally speaking, strategic planning is the
process of defining the strategy of a person, group, business, public or private
organization, national or multinational, for achieving their long-term objectives and
aspirations, by allocating relevant human, financial and material resources supporting the
implementation of this strategy.

The document describing this analytical method may be called a Long Term Plan or a
Strategic Plan. Of course a Long Term Plan can not predict everything that can happen to
the environment it will be implemented. Considering its long-term strategy, the strategic
plan should not make the mistake of falling into technical details or at tactical level. It
should generally describe the strategic concept or course of action for achieving strategic
objectives, so it should be flexible to predict or conduct potential courses of action or
tactical actions for different situations throughout its implementation period.

Below, based on comparative analysis, I have addressed the relations between defence
planning, force planning and operational planning, in the context of a small country, like
Albania or any other regional country.

I.2 Relations between Defence, Force and Operational Planning

In my view, it is very important and interesting to understand the differences and

relations between defence planning, force planning, and operational planning. Time ago,
especially during the Cold War, there was little difference between defence, force, and
operational planning. All defence planning was almost related to force planning, and the
force planning itself was deeply focused on combat operations. So, military force played
a decisive role for the defence of the country and this was conducted almost exclusively
through military operations. There were little or no options on the table other than
military ones. "Historically, defence planning and force planning for a long time
(especially throughout the Cold War) were used as synonyms”8.

Today, defence planning, force planning and operational planning have more relations
and differences than before. Trends are that these differences will be higher in the future.
Military force is one of the options, but not the only one. Preliminary data show that the

7 Michael C. Ripley,” Strategic Planning: It's Harder Than It Looks." Association Management August, 1986, 106-116.
8 Holger Pfeiffer, Defence and Force Planning, NATO as a case study, Baltic Security and Defence Review, Volume
10, 2008, page 108
12
effects of 'soft power' in the future will increase their relevance compared with effects of
the 'hard power'. Other defence related factors, beyond the traditional military ones, have
emerged today on the scene. Many risks and threats today, and especially tomorrow, will
not only require the use of purely military force, but integrated traditional and hybrid
means. As former President Obama said, "... we do not have the luxury to decide for
which of the challenges to prepare and for which not. We must be prepared for the whole
spectrum of threats - from conventional to non-conventional ones; from threats by nation
states to threats by terrorist networks; from the spread of deadly technology to the spread
of hatred ideologies; from the 18-th century type piracy to the 21-st century cyber
security”.9

In this new map of risks and threats, there are many things in common between the three
levels of planning, but there are also many specific things. By hierarchy level, the first
comes defence planning, the second is force planning, and the third, operational planning.
The first level has a political emphasis with military support, the second has a military
emphasis with political support, and the third is typically military, but under political
oversight.

Defence, Force and Operational Planning have both vertical hierarchy relations and
differences which are conventionally defined as follows:

Defence Planning, in terms of hierarchy includes force planning, operational planning,

and many other disciplines to be further discussed in more details (see NATO 13 defence
disciplines). It is the set of measures taken to guarantee defence of the territories under
the traditional view, as well as the new non-traditional risks and threats.

So defence planning integrates all national assets to guarantee the country's defence, and
not just military ones. This planning also includes institutions and authorities beyond the
Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.

Force Planning is planning and development of military forces needed to face all risks
and threats to the country. According to Lloyd and Lorenzini, force planning is "the
process of defining military demands based on the assessment of a country's security
environment, and development of military forces to meet those military requirements
under conditions of financial constraints.10

So, force planning relates only to the required military capabilities of a country. It is a
discipline of defence planning. We usually say that force planning is the basic discipline

9 Obama speech at the Naval Academy Commencement Day in May, 2010.

10 Richmond M. Lloyd and Dino A. Lorenzini, "A Framework for Choosing Defence Forces," Naval War College
Review, January/February 1981, p. 46.
13
of defence planning, but not the only one. In the second chapter we will see that, for
instance in NATO, defence planning has 13 main disciplines, one of which is force
planning. So, this is true for all individual allied members, including our country.

Operational Planning has to do with operations. It is about planning and use of military
forces in potential operations according to current or future security environment and
related planning situations. Operational planning takes place at a strategic, operational
and tactical level. It consists of a set/ package11 of operational plans, which should
include the entire spectrum of tasks of the mission. The link between force planning and
operational planning are planning scenarios or situations. For example, in NATO, "the
document describing with a common language this link between force planning and
operational planning is the Capability Code and Statement”12 of the two current strategic
commands (ACO and ACT).

“Both the Alliance and each individual allied country, in order to be capable to carry out
the entire spectrum of roles and missions of the armed forces, develop an "Operational
Planning System, which consists of Advanced Planning and Contingency Planning…” 13.
More information on each of them will be provided in the second chapter.

In addition to above, Henry Bartlett in his advanced work on "Fundamentals of Force

Planning"14, gives the key differences between force planning and operational planning.
Based on this approach, I have developed a comparative link between defence planning,
force planning, and operational planning, tailored for small countries like Albania,
identifying common and specific aspects of each of them.

Following Bartlett, common and specific aspects of defence, force and operational
planning are further elaborated in details by Paul K. Davis in terms of purpose,
orientation, inputs15, products, characteristics, decision making and their conceptual
basis16, which are briefly analysed below:

In terms of purpose, Purpose of Defence Planning is to produce and make available all
required national assets/capabilities for the defence of the country. Purpose of Force

11 Words ‘set/package’, in defence planning are used as ‘a group of elements of a specific area to define the related
capabilities’.
12 Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements, 2011, page 2

13 AJP-1 (D) Alliance Joint Doctrine, 2010, Albanian edition, page 93

14 Henry Bartlett, Approaches to Force Planning, Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol I, Navy Postgraduate School,

Naval War College Press Newport, R.I. Page 326

15 The term ‘input’ is used to define ‘all elements used in a process to achieve the required output’ – note of the author.

16
Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and
Transformation, (monograph), page 79

14
Planning is to develop military capabilities and provide a future force structure for the
spectrum of future operations; while purpose of Operational Planning is to organize
capabilities of the current force to conduct the current set of operations.

In terms of orientation, the aim of Defence Planning is at collective or national defence

level, facing the entire spectrum of potential risks and threats through use of all national
instruments of power; the aim of Force Planning is at collective or national defence
level, through development and use of only military forces; while the aim of Operational
Planning is at operational theatre level or operating area.

In terms of inputs, Defence Planning deals with national threats, objectives, strategies
and national military and civilian capabilities for defence; Force Planning is intended to
make available the entire set of military capabilities for the fulfilment of mission of the
commanders; while the aim of Operational Planning is to select the best course of action
to win the current fight, combat, battle, campaign, or war.

In terms of products, Defence Planning aims at the production and activation of all
defence capabilities, including the mobilization of the population and other resources
beyond the military; Force Planning develops the Requirement Plans and Future Force
Development Programs; while Operational Planning deals with Advanced Plans, Force
Generation Plans, Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) and Crisis Response Operation
Plans (CROs).

In terms of characteristics, Defence Planning addresses the development of all defence

planning disciplines; Force Planning deals only with the discipline of force development,
modernization, and force structure; while Operational Planning deals with the
deployment and use of forces, manoeuvres of forces, readiness, support, command and
control, re-deployment, etc.

In terms of decision-making, Defence Planning is a matter of collective defence,

government or inter-ministerial level; Force Planning has implications mainly at the
level of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff or allied force development process;
while Operational Planning is conducted by military units at strategic, operational and
tactical level.

In terms of time, Defence Planning handles the development of defence capabilities for
a period of 10-20 years ahead; Force Planning deals with the development of military
forces for 6-10 years ahead; while Operational Planning deals with operational planning
of current force, mainly 1-2 years in advance.

15
In terms of the conceptual basis, Defence Planning is based on the Strategic Concept of
the Alliance and the National Security Strategy; Force Planning is based on the Military
Strategy, the Long Term Plan, and the Medium Term Development Program of the Force
and the Ministerial Guidance of the Alliance; while Operational Planning is based on
General Staff (Force Commanders) Operational Guidance and Operational Scenarios/
Situations.

Conclusion: All common and specific relations above between defence planning, force
planning and operational planning are key issues and strategic orientation cornerstones.
No military or headquarters at strategic level can develop issues related to defence
planning without recognizing effects of force and operational planning, as they can not
develop operational planning without recognizing related defence and force planning
effects.
I.3. Defence Planning Methods
This topic provides an analysis of national and international defence planning experience
in the modern era. It focuses on main defence/ force planning methods used by countries,
especially before and after the Cold War, drawing appropriate conclusions on the
methods or combination of methods used in the past, today, and in the future.
The basic method used before the World War 2 was ‘Planning based on Historic
Experience’, countries had with other countries or group or countries. While, the basic
method of strategic planning during the Cold War was the ‘Threat Planning Method’.
This is the traditional method of defence planning. After the Cold War, based on the
security environment dynamics, many other new defence planning methods flourished,
which should be known by the entire community of defence planners in the armed forces
at strategic and operational level. Next, 10 key methods used by countries are addressed,
alone or in combination, according to the specifics and characteristics of each country.
Methods are treated randomly and not according to their importance:

Table 1: 10 Methods of Strategic Defence Planning

1 Policy-based Planning (Top-Down Planning)
2 Requirement-based Planning (Bottom-Up Planning)
3 Scenario-based Planning
4 Mission-based Planning
5 Budget-based Planning
7 Technology- based Planning

16
 8 Planning based on Existing Capabilities
9 Planning based on Historic Experience
10 Capability-based Planning (CPB)

1. Top-Down Planning. The basis of this planning method are the priorities of legal
decision-making authorities, so it is initiated from the top. Normally, this planning is
based on a political document, mainly a Defence Policy or Strategy. This document,
either a New (NDP or NDS) or a Reviewed one (SDR), approved by the highest
authorities should identify what they want to achieve with the armed forces in the coming
years; so this planning is driven by long-term objectives. After defining long-term
objectives, the second step is to develop a strategy on how to achieve them. Further, the
required capabilities and forces of this strategy are broken down, which may be different
from the existing ones. Thus, Top-Down Planning is the basic method for reforms and
transformation of defence.
It is important to understand that the Defence Policy/ Strategy involves three essential
elements of the triangle: Ends (Goals), Ways (Methods) and Means (Resources).
According to Bartlett17, these Ends, Ways and Means, should be placed in a fair balance
between policy-makers and military leadership. All three variables, together with their
changes, are associated with the respective risks. Any change in one of the variables
carries risks for other variables; e.g. when available resources do not guarantee the
achievement of the accepted Ends, then the level of Ends can be reduced or other ways
are to be found for compensation of the Ends (e.g. alliances) in order to keep the balance.
The most realistic possible combination of Ends, with Ways and Means, produces a safer
and more successful strategy, as shown in the diagram below:
Scheme 1: Three Pillars of Strategic Planning
1 Definition of National Objectives (Ends). Where do we plan to go?
2 Designation of Courses of Action. (Means) How to go there?
3 Allocation of National Resources (Means). With what resources?

Ends Ways Means

H. Barttlet, P. Holman, A. Lykke18

17 Henry Bartlett, Approaches to Force Planning, Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol I, Navy Post-graduate School,
Naval War College Press Newport, R.I. Page 329
18 Holman P, Bartlett H, Lykke A, A History of Strategic Planning in the XX-th century, Vol II, Navy Post-graduate

School, page 134-145

17
A realistic policy is based on the assumption that it is impossible to guarantee the security
of a country against all potential risks or threats. So, any defence policy and any force
structure should recognize an accepted level of risk. Also, budget constraints enforce that
not all required capabilities could be developed by a country, so to fix the balance some
of the low priority capabilities need to be eliminated.

This planning method has advantages because it guides the planners to focus on the end
states (Ends), so the targets to be accomplished. It provides a 'macro' based methodology
of force development rather than particular 'micro' elements of the force. A disadvantage
of this planning method is that, while focusing on long-term objectives and capabilities,
planners may neglect capabilities for current operations.

2. Bottom-Up Planning. Priorities of this planning method stem from demands of

tactical and operational level commanders, so from bottom to the top. So this planning
method tends to get closer to the operational planning for current operations. This
planning method is driven by demands of operational unit commanders to accomplish the
entire spectrum of tasks stemming from the mission. It is largely based on the
preservation of the current situation; and there is a risk of lack of reform or
transformation of forces in accordance with the future security environment. It also
misses the medium and long term vision of the future force. In this planning method, the
relations between defence planning, force planning and operational planning are
maximal; they come closer to each other.

Bottom-Up Planning method reflects the 'real' world, i.e. how missions will be met with
current strength. On the other hand, focusing on current strength, it loses the long-term
view of the future force as well as the "big picture" of future forces capabilities19.

3. Threat Based Planning. This planning method is primarily based on assessment of

potential threats. It is mainly focused on capabilities of potential adversaries/ enemies and
development of appropriate capabilities needed to face these threats.

Threat-based planning was the basic planning method during the Cold War. As enemies/
adversaries were usually known, the essence of planning was to develop capabilities to
cope with the enemy's military power; i.e. the establishment of a favourable proportions
of forces.

Assessment of enemy/adversary capability was conducted at the strategic, operational

and tactical level. The proportion of forces and main weaponry systems at strategic level
considered the number of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, strategic

19 Ibid, page 234.

18
submarines, strategic aircraft, corps and divisions, etc. Also, at the operational and
tactical levels, the force ratio considered the size of forces, number of units, type of units,
and main operational and tactical systems such as divisions, brigades, regiments,
battalions, missiles, tanks, warships, etc.

Focus on this planning method was the establishment of a dominant proportion/ratio of

more than 3 to 1 against the enemy/ adversary related to the number of forces and
weapon systems. Balance of proportion of forces in favour of 'blue' forces was
compensated through the use of compulsory military service, theory of fortification, the
development of effective doctrinal concepts, recognition and effective training on our
concrete terrain, technological surprise, party leadership and high morale of forces, etc.

4. Scenario–based Planning20. This planning is based on potential planning situations or

scenarios. A set of forces is used for each operational planning scenario. Potential
scenarios are developed by planners for the use of armed forces in national, regional or
global engagements.

Scenario-based planning is specific and straightforward; for each planning situation

planners build a special operational plan. However, this planning method has its
limitations, and we must be flexible and creative. “Experience so far has shown that
planning circumstances have hardly ever been in line with real situations. Similarly,
similar situations in different operations can be repeated once in a lifetime”21. So, we
must bear in mind that it is unlikely that situations evolve as forecasted. “... No plan will
survive the contact with the enemy ...”, Moltke says, while on the other hand he accepts
“…however, having a plan is better than having no plan...’22.

Why does Moltke say this? It is true that having a plan in peace times is many times
better than having no plan. Having a plan means having an organization plan, training on
that plan, manoeuvring on that plan, coordination on that plan, and many other things.
These are supporting elements to train and consolidate forces on the uncertainty of war,
surprise and variety of operational courses of action.

5. Mission Based Planning. This planning method is focused on the mission and main
tasks of the armed forces. Normally, the main mission and tasks are broken down in
peace time, time of the crisis, and time of war. Also, in NATO terms, "the main tasks of
the mission are of strategic, operational and tactical level”23.

20
Ibid, page 256.
21 Ibid, page 332
22 Helmuth von Moltke, On the Art of War, Selected Writings, Edited by Daniel J.Hughes, 1993, page 91
23 NATO Task List, Bi-SC Directive Number 80-90, TT 203294, 16 November 2007

19
Based on the mission, planners evaluate both fixed and deployable capabilities to fulfil
the entire spectrum of tasks of the mission; taking into account combat forces, combat
support forces, and service support forces. This is a positive aspect of this planning
method.

Mission Based Planning takes into account the entire spectrum of the mission of an
armed force. Of course, forces resulted from all tasks of the mission of the armed forces
are always greater than what expected by those who proposed it. Mission fulfilment
requires 'joint' forces, land forces, air force, navy, and other supporting capabilities, all
taken together outweigh the possibility of a state, especially a small state. So, the
planners’ question mark is what to keep and what to leave, what is of priority and what is
not, or what mission tasks could we handled with other means and ways? In this case,
planners and politicians establish round tables with participation of political and military
leadership and trade-offs are made.

On the other side, given that the focus of this planning method is the mission and not the
vision of the Armed Forces, there is a focus on the static fulfilment of the mission, and a
move from the dynamic future vision of the Armed Forces.

6. Budget-based Planning. This planning method supports force planning based on a

certain budget size in percentage of GDP. In the Cold War years, the size of defence
budget received by Western countries was 3% of GDP, whereas today it is agreed at the
threshold of 2% of GDP by the member countries. During the Cold War, our country
went to defence budgets up to 13% of the state budget, which was not normal at all for a
small and poor country.

The principle of reasonable burden sharing is based on the formula of "power parity", ie
based on combination of three factors: total country’s GDP, defence budget, and the size
of AAF. Alliance is a "club" with big and small countries. Great countries contribute
more, while smaller countries less based on power parity formula.

This planning method means that planners are limited to setting the critical capabilities to
be developed based on the budget provided by the government. It is a budget driven
method based on the competition between survival of current priorities and mid-term
force development goals. Also, this planning imposes a rivalry between the services and
other structures of the Armed Forces on which is getting the lion part. So, it is often an
expression of rivalry rather than real priorities of Armed Forces.

20
Also, in terms of effects of the financial crisis, almost all countries are making a review
of their public spending, among which extreme cuts are being made in defence spending.
Defence cuts will be always among the first cuts because the public reaction is low, and
because they do not affect directly the interests of citizens.

Budget-based planning is not likely to respond to all potential threats, but it allows to
develop main priority capabilities over the medium to long term.

7. Technology-based Planning. This planning method has the main focus on force
modernization. It is based on high technology of forces, technological sophistication, or
multiplication of human effects by improving technology. Technological superiority may
achieve strategic and operational objectives that are not previously achieved by use of
corps and divisions. Smart weapons and systems are put on the agenda of the military
industries of some developed countries.

Although the top priority in technology development, even the most developed countries
do not consider it as an end in itself, but as a force multiplier of human component and
leadership. This is because the main component of power in war remains the human
component. In the context of the Alliance, combat power consists of three components
closely related to each other: the physical component, the moral component, and the
conceptual component. None of the three components is considered more important than
the others; for example, in defining combat power, "there is little importance as
platforms, armaments, or allied unit sensors are advanced if people guiding them are
unmotivated, untrained, or lack proper leadership. On the other hand, in order to bring
the required effects, the three components can not be evaluated separately from each
other; each one is integrated with others”24:

On the other hand, we must bear in mind that technology can bring about appropriate
development in the field of strategy, doctrines, training, professionalism, command &
control and communication, simulation, modernization and transformation. It is said to be
"the beginning of a Military Revolution in Military Affairs, especially with the entry into
the post-industrial era of information”25.

This planning method, in addition to positive aspects, has also its shortcomings. Planning
based on advanced technology is very costly. It is based on Research and Development
(R&D) programs, and further on the applied technology. "By allocating most of defence

24 AJP-1 (D) Doktrina e Përbashkët e Aleancës, Albanian Edition, page 107

25 Michael J. Mazarr. “Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defence Planning” Strategic Studies Institute,
10 June 1994.
21
funds to a small number of modernization programs, it may jeopardize the balanced
development of all force capabilities as a whole”26.
8. Planning Based on Existing Capabilities. This planning method is based on
development of armed forces by mean of normal improvement of the existing structures.
The first priority of this method is to make minor changes to force organization rather
than deep changes to force capabilities. This planning method is mostly applicable when
there are no or little changes in the security environment and we want to maintain the
current status quo.

This traditional planning method brings little fundamental changes and maintains lines of
military conservatism and traditional services. This better serves the short-term planning
and survival of the current armed forces than plans for developmental reforms. It is only
used for transitory periods to keep the armed forces alive, when there are no other options
of reforms.

9. Planning based on Historic Experience. This planning method is based on the

concept that what has worked in the past can also work in the future. This planning is
heavily based on experience and use of lessons learned from historical cases, making
appropriate corrections.

This is a planning method based on historical traditions and conservative spirit, giving
credits to historical values. On one side, this is definitely a positive value. On the other
hand, this method leaves little room for creativity, vision and development of future
capabilities.

10. Capability Based Planning. This planning method is based on development of future
operational capabilities for the entire spectrum of future operations, while not neglecting
capabilities for current operations. Capability Based Planning (CPB) provides the next set
of capability packages for the future set of threats and risks based on long-term financial
constraints. This method, which integrates a considerable number of the above traditional
planning methods, will be discussed in more detail in the III.7 subchapter.

As above, the 10 selected defence planning methods are not addressed to simply provide
information. They should serve as 'food for thoughts' for defence planners to select the
most appropriate method according to concrete circumstances. And further, this gives us
an overview of the planning methods and thought to answer the question of what method
(or combination of methods) we should use as a member of the Alliance.

26 Hopkins, T, Technology and the Modern Warfare, Penguin Books 2008, page 344
22
The 10 defence/ force planning methods outlined above were described separately for
study purposes in order to understand the positive sides and their limitations. But, during
the real planning process, all NATO member countries and beyond, according to their
specifications and geopolitics, should normally perform a combination of two or more of
the above planning methods before deciding to develop an effective and efficient future
force in their countries.

As Henry Bartlett says, "In force planning, there is no theory or procedure that leads us
to the best solution, but it can be followed only after a long work, a rational judgment, a
deep analysis and experience, and a realistic reasoning”27.

Conclusion: The question is straightforward. From theory to practice, what method of

defence and force planning can be most effectively applied in our country? In my
opinion, based on the experience of many other countries, none of the above-mentioned
planning methods alone provides a complete solution to our country's case. Responding
to the question of choosing the preferred method from the above 10 methods, we should
provide a deep analysis and identify the "drivers" of our defence planning system.
Threats or missions, scenarios or resources, new technology or traditional force,
capabilities for today and the future, or a rational combination of them? Based on this
analysis, in my view the best system that takes into account almost all of explained
planning methods is the Capability-Based Planning (CPB) method. For this reason, this
topic will be discussed in more details in Chapter III.

27 Henry Bartlett, Planning Future Forces, Vol I, Navy Postgraduate School, Naval War College Press Newport, R.I.
Introduction, Page 1
23
II. CHAPTER II: NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS
(NDPP).

II.1. Background on NATO Collective Defence Planning

Collective Defence Planning is one of the most vital issues of the Alliance: it has to do
with the development of the necessary capabilities for the very existence of the Alliance
and meeting its Level of Ambition.

Collective defence planning has evolved together with the Alliance. It is adapted to the
changes of the security environment. During the Cold War, from 1949, when the Alliance
was founded, until 1989, Alliance defence planning had little changes. It was based on
the defence of the Alliance territories under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, mainly
against the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty.

Defence of the territories was the only task of the Alliance's mission for nearly 40 years.
Defence planning produced forces for the Alliance's strategic defence operations. As
mentioned above, during the Cold War we had a 'mixture' of defence planning, with force
planning and operational planning. The first two were mainly in support of the third, i.e.
how to use mainly military capabilities to defeat the enemy/ adversaries. For example,
NATO had a General Defence Plan, and all the defence and force planning system
produced were forces/ capabilities needed to meet the operational requirements of this
Strategic Defence Plan. Former under Secretary General of the Alliance, Holger Pfeiffer,
states on this issue that "... during the Cold War, this was simply and directly anticipated.
We had a General Defence Plan (GDP) defining the role and commitment of all member
countries to provide their available forces.28

After the Cold War, defence and force planning experienced tremendous changes.
Defence planning previously focused on a traditional confrontation of the Alliance
experienced changes to a defence planning of countries covering a much wider spectrum
of tasks, missions and operations. From static force planning of countries and alliances
facing each other at the strategic level, it changed to a very dynamic map of operations.
This new strategic concept of new operational planning scenarios brought about a radical
transformation of the types of forces needed for the new spectrum of operations leading
to a transformation of defence and force planning methods. Pfeiffer states that "...
although this system remained in force for some time after the Cold War, it became clear
that in practice, it was no longer needed for member states to allocate to collective
defence all their national forces, but only a part of them. This approach led to

28 Holger Pfeiffer, Defence and Force Planning in Historical Perspective: NATO as a Case Study, Baltic Security and
Defence Review, page 3
24
development of the NATO-generating force process as an indirect relationship between
defence planning and operational planning, or more specifically, between defence
planning products and current and future operational demands...”29.

The driving factor of the Alliance's collective defence planning is the security
environment. This national, regional, and especially global security environment is and is
expected to be so complex, variable and unpredictable that today's capabilities may be of
little use in the future security environment. The alliance has survived because it has been
able to respond to challenges of the future changing security environment.

Over the last 20 years, the range of traditional risks and threats to the Alliance has been
considerably reduced, while we also see a considerable expansion of the spectrum of non-
traditional, asymmetric, and hybrid nature, which are expected to recognize new
developments throughout the Alliance during the 21st century. Alliance
adversaries/opponents today are smaller, more numerous, more sophisticated, and more
difficult to be identified or anticipated. They have the advantage to change faster and
select the next "weapon" to strike weak points of allied countries by means of
asymmetrical approaches.

Events of September 11, 2001 was a turning point of the military thinking for all NATO
countries. It was a modern "Pearl Harbour", where asymmetric irregularity prevailed
over symmetric traditionalism. It is true that great events are lessons learned that promote
great transformation.

In harmony with the expected security environment, the pool of forces/capabilities of the
Alliance is also changing properly. Now, the challenge of collective security and defence
is: How much the Alliance and Allies will refresh their pool of forces/ capabilities to
react quickly to expected future threats? Which are the current “drivers”30 for the
development of future force. What size and quality should they have? What forces should
be sacrificed from traditional forces? What new capabilities should be developed to
replace them? The answer to these questions is given in the first paragraph of the new
Strategic Concept 2010, which evokes "... the next stage of NATO evolution in order to
remain effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities, and
with new partners”31.

In this context, the Alliance is constantly adapting the organization to produce the
appropriate capabilities in quantity and quality. Old capabilities are being "abandoned"

29 Ibid, page 48.

30 ‘Drivers’, here has the meaning of ‘driving factors’ – note of the author
31 NATO Strategic Concept, approved by Heads of State and Government at Lisbon Summit, 20 Nov 2010.

25
and new capabilities are being developed. Former Secretary Rasmussen asked for deep
reforms in the Alliance's capabilities when he said "I'm surprised when I knew that 70%
of the forces in Europe are stationary forces with no deployment ability ... so, even
territorial defence can not be effective if our forces are not flexible”32 New capabilities
will be developed by sharing the burden of responsibility among Allied countries. So they
will require special financial, human and material support from every ally country,
including our country.
As above and under the burden of consequences of the economic crisis, the allies
themselves have many questions about the evolution of the collective defence planning
system. How should the responsibilities between the allies be shared, what capabilities
should we develop in addition to the traditional ones, what objectives of the force should
we give up and what new ones should be introduced, what mechanisms should be
improved? How will the costs for missile defence, cyber defence, counter terrorism, new
anti-explosive devices, counter-insurgency operations, energy security, anti-piracy be
allocated etc.?
Answers to the above questions require deep reforms in the Alliance's business, which
are defined in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. Further, at the Munich Security
Conference, in February 2011, former Secretary Rasmussen gave the idea of a 'smart
defence', which aims to "achieve more security with less money, working together with
greater flexibility…., where NATO will serve as a 'Clearing House' for promoting best
practices ... as well as ... to significantly reduce bureaucracy and eliminate excess
structures”33 The 'Smart Defence' concept and a national and regional approach will be
addressed in Chapter IV.

II.2. Introduction to Collective Defence Planning in NATO

NATO basic document is the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, based on Article
51 of the United Nations Charter on the Right to Individual Self-Defence of Nations, or
the right to establish Alliances for their collective defence. This document is the founding
act of the Alliance, at political level, adopted by the presidents / prime ministers of the
founding countries and ratified by their parliaments. The document has not had any
fundamental change since the Alliance's creation, except for annexes relating to the
membership of new states.

The North Atlantic Treaty has only 14 Articles and founding members were only 12
countries. It began as a collective defence treaty from the former Soviet Union only

32 Munich Security Conference February 2011, Rasmussen speech, page 2

33 Ibid, page 3
26
within the Alliance's area of responsibility, and today it has been transformed into a treaty
engaging the members in many operations outside its area of responsibility. Today, the
Alliance has expanded to a total of 29 members, including Albania, and continues to
implement the "open door" policy. Montenegro is the 29-th member country from 2017
and Macedonia is expected become the 30-th member country after getting the invitation
for membership in July 2018, solving the name issue with Greece. Its new name, after the
referendum, is expected to be Northern Macedonia.

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "With a view to achieving the most
effective objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, individually and jointly, through
continuous and effective self-support and mutual assistance, will maintain and develop
their individual and collective capabilities to withstand an armed attack”34. Article 3 is
the basic article underlying the Alliance's collective defence planning. As it can be seen,
this Article promotes that allied countries, alone or together, develop appropriate
capabilities to withstand an armed attack on the Alliance territories.

Further, Article 5 of the Treaty states the obligation of the Allies to protect one another
through collective defence mechanisms. This Article provides obligations and benefits of
any allied country to and for collective defence, including Albania. That is why all
defence, force and operational planners of the Armed Forces of our country need to know
the mechanisms, procedures and authorities of this functional Article, based on
musketerian concept of "one for all, and all for one" .

Article 5 states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them
in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack on all Parties and
consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them in exercising the
right of collective or individual self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations shall assist the attacked Party or Parties by undertaking, immediately,
individually and in coordination with other Parties, those actions deemed necessary,
including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic
area....”35.

Albania is today a NATO member and we must be prepared to benefit from the collective
defence of the Alliance if we are subject to any external aggression, but also to contribute
to collective defence if one or some of the Alliance countries are subject to such an
aggression. This is called participation in collective defence operations, or "Article 5
operations". Also, we should be prepared to participate in operations outside the Article 5

34 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C, 1949, Article 3, page 2

35 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C, 1949, Article 5, page 3
27
of collective defence, which are called "non-Article 5 operations". These operations will
be treated in more details following this chapter.
After the North Atlantic Treaty, the second major policy-strategic document is
NATO Strategic Concept. While the North Atlantic Treaty is a fundamental,
unchanging document, the Strategic Concept is a dynamic document. The Strategic
Concept is the cornerstone of the Alliance's Strategic Planning, and it’s worth providing a
brief analysis on this document.
The Alliance's Strategic Concept is the basic document adopted at the highest level in the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) at the level of Presidents / Prime Ministers of the Alliance
countries, mainly during the Alliance Summits. The latest strategic concept is that of the
Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and the next is expected in 2020. The two concepts
after of the post-Cold War era were the Strategic Concept of Rome Summit, 1991, and
the Strategic Concept of Washington Summit, 1999.
The first NATO Strategic Concept was written in 1950. By 1950, the NATO Strategic
Concept was amended six times (Annex A). All Alliance Strategic Concepts until 1991
were classified as "secret", while the last three are of unclassified level. However, each
Strategic Concept is further accompanied with a classified MC 400 Series document
titled "MC Directive for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept",
which is a classified document.
Three global security environment has had fundamental effects on the evolution of the
Alliance's strategic concept: a) the Cold War period; b) post-Cold War periods; and c) the
period after the events of 11 September 2001.
a) The Cold War period, 1949-1991, the Alliance's strategic concept in this period was
largely based on the use of its military instrument. The basic strategic concept of
collective defence planning was "defence and deterrence")36, which is expressed in
compliance with the level of threats, in the evolutions of military strategic concepts of
“credible defence”, “forward defence” “flexible response”37 up to “massive retaliation”38.
Despite financial spending to 3% of GDP, this has been a period of militarization,
armament race, and the intense development of the Alliance's military capabilities, as the
only collective defence instruments against traditional threats.
b) The post-Cold War period, the Strategic Concept of 1991, promoted for the first time,
in addition to the typical military tasks, such as "Defence and Deterrence", other non-
military tasks, expressed in the concept of "cooperation and security". A new wider and
comprehensive concept was introduced: transition from the concept of ‘collective

36 MC 3/5 (Final) - 3.12.1952; The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area
37 MC 14/3 - 16.1.1968; Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area
38 MC 14/2 - 23.5.1957; Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area

28
defence’ to the concept of ‘collective security’. During this period, special attention was
paid to operations outside the area of responsibility, management of ethnic conflicts,
protection of human rights, failed states, political instability, security system reforms,
fight against organized crime and illicit trafficking. In this context, the expansion of
cooperation with partner countries, PfP, PARP and MAP initiatives of Eastern and South-
eastern European countries, enlargement of the Alliance, new regional initiatives, etc., are
well underway in this period. In this period, we have two of the Alliance's non-traditional
military interventions outside its area of responsibility, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
only one month after the 1999 Strategic Concept, in Kosovo.

Evulution of NATO Strategic Concept 1949 - 2010

Collective defence Collective Security
End WWII

1953

1957

1959
1961
1963
1965

1967
1969

1971

1973
1975

1977
1979
1981
1983

1985

1989

1991
1993

1995
1997
1999

2001
2003
1955

1987

2010
Article 5

INF/Dual Track Projecting Stability

Flexible Response
Capabilities Commitment

Massive Retaliation
New Strategic Concept

Deterrence 1949
Strategic Concept

Taken by the briefing of NATO integration team in Albania, April 2011

Figure 1: Evolution of NATO Strategic Concept from 1949 to 2010

The second post-Cold War’ strategic concept, in Washington summit, 1999, brought
fundamental changes to the Alliance mission. This concept expresses NATO's intention
to preserve the freedom and security of its members by political and military means to
protect the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. For the first time, we
have a shift to the third place of "defence and deterrence" task, by promoting the
"security" task in the first place. Also, we see a wide range of non-military tasks of the
Strategic Concept: 1. Security; 2. Consultations; 3. Deterrence and Defence; 4. Crisis
Management; and 5. Partnerships.39 For all tasks of the mission, a new Defence
Capability Initiative (DCI) was launched.

39 NATO Strategic Concept 1999, page 1

29
c) Events of September 11, 2001, provided an unprecedented effect to the transformation
of the mission of Alliance forces, including the issues of terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, the economic and financial crisis, anti-piracy issues, the concept of security
on energy issues, cyber threats, hybrid ones, etc.
Following terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly at the Prague summit in
2002, the Alliance paid special attention to NATO transformation in conformity with
future security challenges, notably the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Also, the Alliance continued the policy of
operations "out of the area of responsibility" by launching NATO-led or coalition-led
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, etc. It is to be noted that from the period between
the two recent strategic concepts, from 1999 to 2010, the Alliance has expanded from 19
to 29 members, with Montenegro becoming the newest member in 2017, and FYROM
with the new name of Northern Macedonia expected to become the 30-th member in the
next summit.
Riga's Comprehensive Political Guidance. Since the 1999 Strategic Concept was not yet
exhausted for production of a new strategic concept until 2006, the Alliance adopted a
Comprehensive Political Guidance in Riga Summit. Although a Political Guidance,
because it was approved by the Heads of State/ Government of the Alliance countries, it
had all the parameters of a transitional strategic concept up to Lisbon summit 2010, and it
normally served as such. Based on this Political Guidance, the Alliance produced and
approved the Ministerial Guidance 2006 which adopted the Level of Ambition of the
Alliance and provided accurate orientations for further transformation of Alliance
Capabilities.
The Comprehensive Political Guidance supports the 1999 Strategic Concept, takes into
consideration the events of September 11, 2001, provides a re-assessment of risks from
Terrorism and WMD, prioritizes asymmetric risks, and emphasizes out-of-area
operations and development of capabilities (8% with 40%, increasing later in Bratislava
to 10% with 50%), as well as endorsed the EBAO approach (Effect Based Approach to
Operations). It stresses the need for the Alliance to develop large and small operations,
including stabilization and reconstruction operations. And last but not least, the guidance
expresses the need for a comprehensive engagement in operations of all international
actors and agencies that have common goals with the Alliance.
In addition to political-strategic considerations, it clearly states the Alliance's basic
concept of development of new military capabilities to handle new risks and threats of the
new century; it expresses six basic sets of priorities for the development of Alliance
forces in the new security environment: 1) development of forces capable to be deployed
far from Alliance territories, supported logistically and capable of conducting "joint

30
operations”40; 2) the development of high availability forces capable of engaging in
high-risk regions, in difficult weather and terrain, under WMD conditions; 3) the
development of forces capable of dealing with all forms of asymmetric risks; 4)
development of capabilities with superiority of information; 5) development of skills to
use effectively all alliance instruments to resolve crises; 6) and building capabilities to
coordinate with state and non-state civil agencies and organizations 41.
NATO Strategic Concept in Lisbon, 2010. We are currently in the era of 2010 New
Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in November 2010. The previous Bucharest
Summit decided that the Secretary-General should organize the work for drafting this
Concept and submit it for approval in the next summit. Secretary Anders Fogh
Rasmussen set up a 12-member High Level Working Group led by former US Secretary
of State, Madeleine Albright. The process went through three phases: the first phase was
the "reflection phase" with a number of high-level workshops in various Alliance
countries; the second phase or "consultation phase" was the phase where the working
group presented to the national authorities of Alliance countries the findings of their
work; and the third phase, the "reporting phase", where the Secretary-General's team
made an evaluation of the Final Report of the Working Group presented on May 17,
2010, and presented its findings at Lisbon summit for approval by allied heads of state.

The 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept outlines three core tasks of the Alliance by 2020, 1)
Collective Defence, 2) Crisis Management and 3) Security Co-operation. Allied heads of
states and governments highlighted that "In order for NATO to fulfil, with the best
possible effectiveness and efficiency, the entire range of its missions, the Alliance will be
engaged in a continuous process of reform, modernization and transformation”42.

The Strategic Concept states that "... NATO will have full necessary capabilities to deter
and defend against any threat to the security and defence of the Alliance populations. To
this end, ... “we will have appropriate mixed capabilities of nuclear and conventional
weapons; ... we will retain the ability to support simultaneously both Major Joint
Operations and several Smaller Joint Operations for collective defence and crisis
response, including their engagement in a strategic distance";

The 2010 Strategic Concept pays special attention to building capabilities for the defence
of Alliance territories from ballistic missiles, protection against the risk of weapons of
mass destruction, against cyber-attacks, against international terrorism, boosting energy
security, and introduction of new technologies.

40 ‘Joint’ has the meaning of joint participation in operation of two of more services/ forces (land, air, navy) – note of
the author
41 Comprehensive Political Guidance, Riga Summit 2006

42 NATO Strategic Concept, November 2010

31
The following questions are placed on the table: following Bratislava, what are the new
elements related to collective defence planning? What are the key messages of the new
Strategic Concept? What is the Alliance doing since Lisbon Summit for reflection of the
Strategic Concept on the Alliance's business?

The Lisbon Summit brought about reforms to the development of the Alliance's core
capabilities. The summit approved the "Critical Capability Package" listing 10 "critical"
Capabilities, organized in three groups: ISAF Operation Capabilities, Short and mid-term
Capabilities, and Long-term Capabilities. According to estimates, "Capability Package ...
would be realized over a period of over 10 years, with a total cost exceeding 2.5 billion
Euros”43. This package of critical capabilities, always under the allied principle of "fair
and reasonable burden sharing44”, had significant impacts on Allied defence planning,
diverting much resources from traditional planning of current capabilities. This should
also be taken into account because new critical capabilities will be reflected in the new
DPCS cycle of each allied country in the new Force Goals/ Capability Targets (FG / CT
Package - 2013). This is another practical field of study for the researchers of all allied
countries.

Lisbon Strategic Concept can clearly reflect the terminology of dynamism, reforms, and
transformation, related to the review of collective defence mechanisms, structures and
methodology in line with the security environment of the 21st century. It constitutes a
program of work for important decision-makings, launched later by the Defence
Ministerials of March 2011 and June 2012.

In March 2011, the new Ministerial Guidance on the Level of Ambition of NATO was
approved, the Reform from 14 NATO Agencies to 3 Agencies; as well as Agreement on
Command, Control and Consultation on Missile Defence, etc.

So, after the new Strategic Concept we have experienced deep reforms in the Alliance's
business. These reforms had and will have significant impacts on the collective defence
planning and all individual allied countries. The main focus of the reforms of the Alliance
was to do more by spending less. The priority of reforms focused on facilitation of the
command structure, integration of military and civilian staffs, improvement of planning
process, production of new capabilities, avoidance of parallel structures and duplications,
and improvement of the management of the organization. In a short way, former

43 Hudhra Th, Military Review, Mars 2011, Collective Defence System and Albania, page 68
44 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009
32
Secretary Rasmussen specified these reforms as "... building muscles through burning
fat...”45.

These reforms focused on delivering sustainable solutions to collective defence planning

issues. During the last decade, only 5 Alliance countries respected the allocation of 2% of
GDP for defence46. Likewise, less than half of Allied countries was spending 20% of the
defence budget for modernization and new capabilities. The effects of the last financial
crisis may impose a further reduction of these figures. So many allied countries, despite
sharing the values and agreeing with the planning process, have had reservations to
increasing their contributions.

One of the recommendations of the Strategic Concept is that allies could develop certain
capabilities in regional, multilateral or other formats within the Alliance, especially for
those capabilities that go beyond the individual countries' ambitions. It is also
recommended to divert investment from old excess capabilities (surpluses) to other new
capabilities in need by the Alliance (shortages). The same approach was recommended to
a rational and effective use of common funding of the Alliance in support of collective
capabilities.

Messages of Brussels Summit, July 2018. Especially after the Cold War, with the
disintegration of Soviet Union, many NATO countries “have taken their security and
defence for granted”47 and gradually decreased their defence budgets. With Russian rise,
aggression against Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and aggression to Ukraine, threats
with exercises with WMD use against other countries, especially those at NATO
periphery, such as Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, attempts to get access in the
Balkans etc, it is imperative to react with appropriate means and capabilities to this rising
threat.

That is why US President, Donald Trump, more than other US previous presidents,
highly criticized countries for not complying with the agreed principles in the last 3
summits, from Wales to Brussels. In the last summit held in Brussels in July 2018, he
was really critical for a substantial 2% of GDP on defence for all European countries, as
soon as possible.

45 Sec. Rasmussen speech, Munich Security Conference, February 2011

46 During Cold War, the agreed percentage of defence budget of all allied countries was set at 3% of GDP, while after
the Cold War it was reduced to 2% of GDP. – Note of the author.
47
Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance. Group of Policy Experts report to the NATO Secretary General, June 2014,
edition 2014, page 4, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140606_140602-peg-
collective_defence.pdf

33
Other decisions of Brussels summit were about readiness of forces, improvement of
NATO command and force structure, a new Peace Establishment Plan, following the
presence of 4 mechanized group battalions in Baltic countries and Poland, a new
Framework Brigade in Romania, anti-ballistic capability, a new Allied Command for
Operations in USA, a Cyber command and new Logistic Command in Germany, etc., and
up to a new Air Base Support Facility in Kuçova, Albania, which marks a new stage of
NATO-Albania relations. A navy base in Pashaliman is another option to be added to
NATO Peace Establishment in the coming years.

The most important decision of Brussels summit was the initiative of Four-Thirties, up to
2020. It means that by 2020, in addition to NATO NRF forces, “…the Alliance agreed to
launch a new NATO Readiness Initiative. It will ensure that more high-quality, combat-
capable national forces at high readiness can be made available to NATO. From within
the overall pool of forces, Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combatants, 30
heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling
forces, at 30 days’ readiness or less.”48

Of course, the increase of capabilities and readiness of forces are generated to face
Russian threats to the west, and spending will be covered by all NATO countries under
the fair burden sharing principle. We should be aware of that.

II.3 Authorities and Disciplines of NATO Defence Planning

II.3.1. Authorities and structures of Collective Defence Planning

Pursuant to Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on defence planning and
collective defence, Article 9 of the treaty states that: "Through this Treaty, the Parties
shall designate a Council in which each of them shall be represented, to discuss matters
related to the implementation of this Treaty. The council will be organized in such a way
as to be able to meet at any time. The Council will establish subsidiary bodies based on
the respective assessment. In particular, it will immediately establish a Defence
Committee which will recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5”49

Since then, around 300 Committees, Boards, Agencies, Groups and Panels have operated
in NATO50. Out of them, about 40 have high decision-making authority within their area
(Senior Committee), and only 4 of them have decision-making authority at the highest
political and strategic level. They are the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defence

48
Joint Declaration of Brussels summit, 12 July 2018, page 6
49
North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C, main document 1949
50
These forums have constantly been under a reform called NATO committees and agencies reform, since
June 2011 Ministerial – note of the author
34
Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC), the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), and the
Military Committee (MC).

Albania participates in most of these Alliance forums. Most of the key Alliance defence
planning decisions (for the 13 disciplines) are taken with full consensus of all member
states. Often, decision-making is accompanied, directly or indirectly, with a financial bill
based on the principle of 'cost sharing' which all countries are obliged to afford. That is
why we need to know operating mechanisms and be an active part of Alliance's collective
decision-making in the 13 defence planning forums that I will briefly describe below.
Supporting structures, authorities, and the area of activity of 13 disciplines are, in my
opinion, the "eyes and ears" of the Alliance's defence planning system.

Following NATO Defence Planning Process 2009 (NDPP), with the developments
brought about by Lisbon Strategic Concept 2010, and in parallel with the reform of
committees and agencies in 2011, I have presented below a general analysis of "Who
does what, when, and in cooperation with whom" in the new process of collective
defence planning.

a) The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC (R). It is the
Alliance's collective defence planning committee. "He is responsible for the development
of policies related to defence planning and coordination of the overall management of the
activities of the NATO Defence Planning Process”51. This committee advises the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). So, DPPC (R) is the
central body that oversees the work, gives feedback and produces policies for all NATO
bodies and committees responding to all 13 planning disciplines.

b) Defence Planning Staff Team (DPST) team. The DPPC (R) work is supported by the
NATO Defence Planning Staff Team (DPST). The DPST team is the central team during
all steps of the NDPP process. This team is an ad-hoc group of civilian and military
experts working in NATO headquarters and Strategic Commands (mainly IS, IMS &
SCs). In fact, organically, it has only "a Core Element that facilitates the daily
coordination of defence planning...”52. Also, to discipline the engagement of experts
during defence planning phases, "an Internal Coordination Mechanism, which oversees
all aspects of the work during the NDPP process, is in place53.

c) Core Element. The Core Element is an inter-departmental group, attached to NATO's

International Staff, responsible for coordination and implementation of the Planning

51 NATO Handbook, Edition 2006, page 56

52 Briefing of NATO team in the Integration Conference, Tirana, April 2011
53 NATO Defence Planning Process; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm

35
Process at staff level. The Core Element facilitates daily management of defence
planning conducted by ‘Task Forces’ by playing a coordinating authority.

d) Task Forces. Most works of the defence planning process are carried out by the inter-
disciplinary defence task forces, designated by the staff of the Defence Planning Team,
with representatives from interested communities for the period of a particular
assignment. According to the steps and the allied countries to be evaluated, a number of
task forces may be running at any time, under the direction of the staff of the various
Alliance bodies. They are functional integrated teams, reinforced as appropriate, by
experts from member states or outside bodies.

e) Internal Coordination Mechanism. This Mechanism is designed to determine and

de-conflict staffing efforts with regard to defence capability development activities across
all planning disciplines and within various NATO defence staff, including assigned task
forces. This mechanism coordinates the establishment, composition, staffing, and task-
force work programs.

II.3.2. NATO Defence Planning Disciplines

NATO defence planning includes 13 Planning Disciplines. They are 1) Force Planning;
2) Resource Planning; 3) Armaments Planning; 4) Logistic Planning; 5) Nuclear
Planning; 6) C3 Planning (Command, Control, Consultation); 7) Civil Emergency
Planning; 8) Air Defence Planning; 9) Air Traffic Management Planning; 10)
Standardization Planning; 11) Intelligence Planning; 12) Medical Support Planning; and
13) Research and Technology Planning54.

54 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, page 1-3.
36
 NATO Defence Planning Discipline Model

NDPP
harmonizon
fushat dhe
disiplinat

ACT team briefing in April 2011, Tirana

Figure 2: Package of 13 Defence Planning Disciplines in NATO

For each of the defence planning disciplines, a special guidance is issued by the relevant
Alliance Committee/ Agency. Below, I have provided a brief analysis on main features of
13 planning disciplines:

1. Force Planning. NATO Force Planning is the process through which representatives
of Allied countries, NATO Military Authorities55, and International Staff define the pool
of forces to be made available to the Alliance in order to accomplish its full spectrum of
missions, by giving impact to development plans of national forces of member countries
in a reasonable and fair way. Force planning should not be understood simply in terms of
number of "forces", but mainly of "capabilities" required to efficiently fulfil the tasks of
collective defence.

The committee, providing overview of the entire NATO force planning process in a re-
enforced format, is the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC)56. It is
subordinate to North Atlantic Council (NAC) and is the highest decision-making
authority on issues of the Alliance's integrated military structure.

2. Resource Planning. Most of NATO resources are national. The aim of NATO
Resource Planning is to make available to the Alliance all capabilities needed, with a
particular focus on capabilities that are supported by Joint Funding.

55 Chairman of Military Committee and two commanders of Strategic Commands – note of the author
56 NATO Defence Planning Process; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm
37
The difference between the Joint Funding and the Common Funding of the Alliance is
that Joint Funding is related to activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO
Early Warning and Air Control System (AWACS)57 and NATO fuel networks/pipelines,
etc., while Common Funding has three different budgets: the civil budget, the military
budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).

The highest advisory authority for managing all NATO resources is Resource and
Planning Policy Board (RPPB)58. It advises and responds directly to the North Atlantic
Council for resource management. He is responsible for the full management of NATO's
civilian and military budget as well as the NSIP Program.

3. Armaments Planning. The aim of Armaments Planning is the development of

multinational weapons programs (not with common funds) for promotion of cost
effective procurements, joint development and production of armaments, encouraging
interaction and technological and industrial co-operation between allies and partners.

The Alliance's highest responsible authority for co-operation in the field of armaments,
standardization of materials and major defence procurements is the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The CNAD Conference brings together senior
officials responsible for defence procurement of Allied and Partner countries to address
issues of political, economic and technical aspects of development of equipment of
NATO forces, aiming at common solutions.

4. Logistics planning. The aim of Logistic Planning in NATO is to achieve logistical

support to NATO operations. This is achieved through promotion and development of
military and civilian logistic capabilities as well as of multinational logistics cooperation.

The highest advisory authority on logistics in NATO is the Logistics Committee. The
mission of this committee is two-fold: to address customer logistics issues with a view to
enhancing the performance, effectiveness, support, and efficiency of combat operations
of Alliance forces; as well as to exercise, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, a high
level of coordination authority across the spectrum of NATO logistic functions59.

5. Nuclear Planning. The policy and nuclear planning goal is to develop and maintain a
credible, non-conventional deterrence force in line with current and expected security
environment requirements. The new Strategic Concept 2010 states that ... "Deterrence,
based on appropriate nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains an essential

57 Airborne Warning and Control System

58 Resource Policy & Planning Board (RPPB); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67653.htm
59 Logistic Committee; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_61715.htm

38
element of our overall strategy ... As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a
nuclear alliance”60.

NATO has developed a flexible capability for nuclear planning. The Alliance's nuclear
forces are not directed to any specific threat or to any particular country. We must bear in
mind that the Alliance's nuclear policy formulation includes all NATO countries,
including non-nuclear allied countries, because consensus is needed for use of allied
nuclear weapons.

The highest authority making decisions on the Alliance's nuclear policy is the NPG,
which policies are modified and adapted to security environment situations61.

6. C3 Planning. Effective performance of NATO's political and military functions

requires the extensive use of systems, services and infrastructures of Alliance's
Consultation, Command and Control (C3) supported by relevant personnel, as well as
NATO doctrines, bodies and procedures.

C3 Systems include communication, information, navigation, and identification systems,

as well as networking and integration systems according to NATO needs.

The highest NATO authority for C3 planning is the Consultation, Command and Control
Board (C3)62. This Board is a senior multinational body working on behalf and
responsible for NAC on C3 issues in NATO.

7. Civil Emergency Planning. The aim of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO is to

collect, analyse and disseminate information on national planning activity to ensure the
more effective use of civilian resources for use in emergency situations, in line with the
Alliance's objectives. It gives the Allies and Partners the opportunity to assist one another
in preparing and addressing the consequences of crises, disasters or conflicts.

The highest advisory authority for protection of civilian population and the use of civil
resources in support of NATO's objectives is the Civil Emergency Planning Committee63.

8. Air Defence Planning. Air Defence Planning allows members to harmonize national
efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence
weapons. NATO Integrated Air Defence (NATINADS) is a network of systems and
related measures in order to eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air operations.

60 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon summit, November 2010, Military Review, March 2011
61 NATO Committees; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm
62 NATO Committees; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm

63 Civil Emergency Planning Committee; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50093.htm

39
Also, the aim of the active ballistic missile defence program at operational theatre levels
(ALTBMD) is to improve the existing NATINADS system, particularly against ballistic
missile threats at theatre levels.

The highest authority for air defence and missile defence is the Air Defence Committee
(ADC). It advises the North Atlantic Council and relevant Euro-Atlantic Partnership
bodies and promotes the harmonization of national efforts with international planning in
relation to air command and control and air defence weapons64.

9. Air Traffic Management Planning. NATO's role in civil-military air traffic

management is to ensure, in cooperation with other international organizations, safe
access to airspace, effective service delivery and civil-military interaction for air
operations in support of tasks and Alliance security missions, and to facilitate the
implications of the new civil engineering costs for defence budgets.

The highest civil-military authority for the use of airspace and air traffic management is
the Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC)65.

10. Standardization Planning. In NATO, standardization is the process of developing

common concepts, doctrines and projects to achieve and maintain the most effective
levels of "interoperability, interchangeability and interconnectivity in operations,
procedures, materials, technology and administration" 66. The primary products of this
process are Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) among member states.

The Alliance's highest authority in the field of standardization is the Standardization

Committee. He is responsible for providing coordinated NAC consultancy on general
standardization issues67.

11. Intelligence Planning. Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning
process, particularly with the emergence of multidimensional security challenges such as
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Intelligence is one of the key measures for effective and timely strategic warning against
possible military and terrorist attacks. It sets requirements for the provision, exchange
and improved analysis of all political, economic, security and military information, and
closer coordination of intelligence producers within the Alliance.

64 NATO Committees; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm

65 Ibid, page 56.
66 AAP-3 (J) NATO Directive on production, maintenance and implementation of STANAG-s, 2010

67 NATO Policy on Standardization, 2010, page 9,

40
The Intelligence Steering Board acts as a 'joint' coordinating body for leading intelligence
activities, supporting IS and IMS and the decision-making process in NATO. Intelligence
Capabilities derive from the List of Strategic Intelligence Priority Requirements.

The Military Intelligence Committee is responsible for the development and follow-up of
Intelligence Support Plans of NATO operations and enforcement of oversight of military
intelligence policy68.

12. Medical Support Planning. Medical support is normally a national responsibility,

however planning should be flexible to explore multinational approaches. The degree of
multi-nationality varies according to the circumstances of the mission and the level of
participation.

The Committee of Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS) is

composed of high military medical authorities of member states69. It is a focal point for
development and coordination of military medical issues and provision of medical
consultation to the Military Committee.

13. Research and Technology Planning (R&D). NATO promotes and conducts
collaborative research and exchange of information to support effective use of national
defence and technology research and to further the Alliance's military needs.

The Research and Technology Board (RTB) is an integrated NATO body, responsible for
defence research and technological development70. It provides consultancy and
assistance to CNAD and the Military Committee. It coordinates research and technology
policies at various NATO bodies, and is supported by the NATO Specialized Research
and Technology Agency.

The following table provides a summary of the Alliance's responsible authorities for each
of the 13 disciplines of strategic defence planning:

Table 2: Responsible NATO Authorities of 13 Defence Planning Disciplines

No. Planning Disciplines Responsible Authorities

1 Force Planning Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC

2 Nuclear Planning Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
3 Resource Planning Resource and Planning Policy Board (RPPB)

68 NATO Committees; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm

69 NATO Committees; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm
70 Ibid, page 47

41
 4 Armaments Planning
5 Logistics Planning
6 Air Defence Planning
7 Civil Emergency Planning
8 C3 Planning
9 Standardization Planning
10 Intelligence Planning
11 Operational Planning
12 Medical Support Planning Committee of Chiefs of Military Medical Services
13 R&D Planning
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)
Logistics Committee (LC)
Air Defence Committee (ADC)
Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC)
Consultation, Command and Control Board (C3)
Standardization Committee (SC)
Military Intelligence Committee (MIC)
Policy Coordination Group, Military Committee
(COMEDS)
Research and Technology Board (RTB)

Conclusions and recommendations:

Following this short description of allied defence planning disciplines, we can draw some
analytical conclusions in the interest of building a national defence planning system in
harmony with the allied system. The main goal is to take advantage of those capabilities
provided by the collective defence system, to avoid the development of parallel
capabilities that may lead to the re-nationalization of national defence policies.
In my assessment, some of 13 planning disciplines are of national responsibility
coordinated by the Alliance, some are both individual and collective responsibility, and
others are largely collective responsibility, and some are the responsibility of some
specific NATO countries. Below, I have conducted an estimation that may be of interest
for our defence planners:
1. Some capabilities of collective defence disciplines are a total of capabilities of
individual countries, such as force planning, resource planning, logistics planning,
medical support planning, etc.
2. Some capabilities of the collective defence disciplines are capabilities contributed
based on 'cost sharing' format, namely C3 planning, early warning and air defence
planning (AWACS), missile defence, common cyber defence etc.
3. Some capabilities are unique capabilities, owned by only a limited number of
countries, such as nuclear capabilities available to allied countries such as the United
States, UK and France.
4. Some other capabilities are both collective and individual planning disciplines in the
interest of collective defence and national interests, such as standardization planning,
research and development planning, etc.
42
5. Some other capabilities are mainly of individual country disciplines, but the Alliance
may play a ‘clearing house’ coordinator role, such as civil emergency planning, air
traffic management planning, and so on.
6. For some other capabilities, responsibilities are different at various levels, such as
missile defence is the responsibility of the Alliance at strategic level, while air
defence at the theatre level is the responsibility of the countries at operational and
tactical level. Also, strategic intelligence is the responsibility of the Alliance, while
operational and tactical intelligence is the responsibility of the countries, etc.
7. Some capabilities are specialized 'niche' capabilities developed by a particular
country/ group of countries serving the entire collective defence of the Alliance; these
capabilities are developed according to the principle of ‘pooling and sharing’, such as
the Czech capabilities against WMD, French-English bilateral capabilities, SALIS air
transport program capabilities71, development of CJTF forces72 of various countries,
MP, EOD, OMLT, POMLT, etc.
8. With this in mind, our country should not only take decisions on above issues, but
also develop related pragmatic policies. What capabilities should be developed by our
country and what not? If yes, what and how much capabilities should we develop? If
no, how can we engage otherwise to balance the decision? And many other questions
like these.
So, like all other allied countries, Albania should develop its policies for all basic issues
of collective defence. In my opinion, for each of the 13 planning disciplines, we also need
to develop a special development policy, a guidance or a development plan. Albania
should include all of the above disciplines in its defence planning system, evaluating
them according to the specificity, weight and role they play at the national level, but also
at allied level. At present, this approach has started to be developed with a set of
development policies initiated by 2011, 2013 and 2017 Defence Guidance, which should
be further and better followed.
The third chapter provides a personal view for a rational harmonization of our national
defence with collective defence disciplines, in order to draw benefits of collective
defence, especially from those disciplines we are unable to develop individually, or in
other formats, in order to fulfil the constitutional mission.

71 SALIS - Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)

72 CJTF – Combined Joint Task Force, note of the author
43
II.4. Strategic Defence Planning Process: The “Best Practice” Model
Before I go to the analysis of NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)73 approved by
the Ministers of Defence in Bratislava, I will give a very short description of the special
“Best Practice” Study made for this purpose by Research and Technology Organization
on Long Term Development Planning RTO-TR-069 AC/323 (SAS-025) TP/41’74.
The general model (best practice)75, conducted in 2003, is a 10-step approach, in order to
synchronize NATO collective defence planning process with individual member
countries, in time, space, factors, methodology and products.
"Application of the model also serves the community of strategic planners to facilitate
communication between them in the Alliance, to speak the same language and use
common terminology, follow the same process, and use the same methodology in this
vital area the existence of the Alliance and its member states”76.

Figure 3 gives a short step-by-step analysis of the defence planning process, which is the
basis of the current Alliance's collective defence planning system adopted in June 2009 at
Bratislava Ministerial77.

Formulation of Policy Scenario Development Assessment of Security Env.

(1a) (1b) (1c)

Development of Campaign
Options
(2)

Evaluation of Current/
Cost – Efficiency Testing Force Proposals
Future Forces
(4) (3)
(1d)

Testing Simultaneous
Force Structuring Total Cost of Forces
Operations
(6) (7)
(5)

Risk/Cost Analysis
(8)

Review of Force
Development
(9)

Figure 3- Best practice: The model of defence planning process (Source R&T, 2003)

73
Outline model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, April 2009, page 1-3
74 Handbook on Long Term Development Planning, RTO-TR-069 AC/323 (SAS-025) TP/41, Research and
Technology Organization, page 29.
75 Handbook on Long Term Development Planning, RTO-TR-069 AC/323 (SAS-025) TP/41, Research and

Technology Organization, page 54.

76 Ibid, page 33
77 NATO Defence Planning Process, PO(2009)0042, Bratislava Ministerial, June 2009

44
 The first step of defence planning has three main elements: assessment of security
environment, formulation of defence policy, resulting with the development of a set of
strategic scenarios where the country can be involved with the use of its national security
instrument.

The second step concludes with development of Plans of Operations for each specific
scenario. Scenarios, also referred to as Planning Situations, are based on potential risks
and threats 10-20 years ahead78.
The third step has to do with an integrated multipurpose force package for all planning
situations and development of possible force structure for handling all operational
scenarios. "The goal is to reach a minimum force package for each specific scenario in
this step, as well as to determine a general package of capabilities that will guarantee the
fulfilment of the mission of force”79.
The forth step, the general package is subject to the process of optimization or adjustment
of force packages by testing their cost-effectiveness. The summary of force packages is
not an arithmetic total of numbers but an integrated capability package under the
assumption of facing all risks and threats at an acceptable level of reliability.
The fifth step is testing of simultaneous operations conducted by the Alliance or a specific
country, when it conducts or participates in more than one operation at the same time,
and when certain rotations are performed when operations are conducted for a long time.
The sixth step has to do with the size of necessary capabilities produced from the above
scenarios and organization of force structure to be trained, equipped, supported, etc. for
the entire spectrum of operations, according to the Operations Plan, avoiding shortages
and surpluses of capabilities.

The seventh step handles force costing. "Force costing takes place in almost all steps of
the process, but this step is final. Each mission of forces can be accomplished by
selecting between two or more capabilities, which are evaluated, inter alia, in terms of
cost”80.

The eight step is related to cost-risk analysis. During this step, through an analysis of
risks and costs, between civilians and military planners, courses of actions are analysed in

78
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2009): Working with scenarios, risk assessment and capabilities in
the National Safety and Security Strategy of the Netherlands, October 2009.
http://english.minbzk.nl/subjects?ActItmIdt=125930
79 Handbook on Long Term Development Planning, RTO-TR-069 AC/323 (SAS-025) TP/41, Research and Technology

Organization.
80 Ibid, page 25

45
order to achieve the development of a minimum cost force structure to accomplish
specific missions.

The ninth step is the evaluation of force development where the final force structure is
evaluated and the final force structure is provided in the form of a long-term force
development plan (e.g., the 2025 target force), where development of all unit capabilities,
personnel, equipment, systems, infrastructure etc., is designed.
The tenth step has to do with an evaluation of force structure of all planning cycle. From
the formulation of the defence policy to the final product of the desired force structure,
the process always requires re-evaluation of previous elements to confirm and obtain
their feedback.
Conclusions and recommendations:
1. Strategic/ long-term planning is a process which requires a continuous dialogue
between political decision-makers and military planners. All other actors, as properly
evaluated, should be included in the process.
2. The scenario-based planning method is the foundation of the defence planning
system. If certain scenarios create political sensibility, then generic scenarios may be
developed.
3. A cautious and revised long-term planning on a periodic basis leads normally to
successful mid-term and short-term planning. This has a lot of value, especially today
when the security environment is very unstable.
4. Despite the main role of the political factor in the long-term planning process, it
should not be instrumentalized as a political process. All other factors should be
evaluated in order to develop a real and objective process, regardless of the roles of
all participating actors.
5. The main principles of the process are transparency, objectivity, review, avoidance of
traditional thinking, and assessment in block of all steps of the process.
Fragmentation of the process may result in deviations from development of the future
force packages.
6. Long-term planning theory should be introduced to the teaching processes of defence
academies in order to create a smart strategic planning teams and leaders and
continually improve the existing system.
7. Defence Planning in Albania, as we will discuss in the next chapters, is performed
periodically, but parts of it can be re-initiated at any phase of the process. This could

46
 happen, for example, when "a new regional or global security environment, arrival of
a new government in power, a crisis situation, a new alliance, etc.”81
8. Defence Planning, according to the above methodology, should establish permanent
experience of strategic planning experts, trained, accountable and motivated civilian
and military planners. For a small country, the full cycle covering all aspects of the
defence planning process may require an average of 10 to 15 experts for 12 months of
the year. Part-time experts can also be contracted between periods of various steps.

9. The main product of the entire Strategic Planning Process is the development of a
Long Term Development Plan for the future force (LTDP). This LTDP and its
support plans explain how defence capabilities will be developed through an
integrated approach of supporting them with personnel, equipment, infrastructure,
logistical support, etc. in a timely manner of at least 10 years. This plan is normally
approved at the level of the highest possible political decision-making, to survive the
rotations of political parties and get the required support.

II.5. Steps of NATO Collective Defence Planning Process

From theory to practice, what is the approved NATO Collective Defence Planning
Process and how is it applied in practice in NATO and Allied countries? What are some
of key features of this document and what are the differences with the previous one?
Key document of defence planning in NATO and individual allied countries is PO (2009)
0042, NATO Collective Defence Planning Process (NDPP) (Annex B). Below, I have
provided an analysis of the steps of this basic document throughout collective defence
planning process in NATO and Allied countries.
Prior to 1990, the Alliance defence planning process was a strictly fixed mechanism to
build sufficient military capabilities to face the polar bear (Russia). According to
estimates, it required defence spending not less than 3% of GDP for allied countries.
"Before the end of the Cold War, many armies of allied countries planned their force
structure largely based on a clear and well-known threat. ... Since the end of the Cold
War, the lack of such threats has been a question mark for the development of reliable
forces for many of the allied countries.82”
NDPP system, adopted on April 2, 2009 by silent procedure by former Secretary General
Scheffer, responds to new developments in the field of more realistic collective defence
planning. This new 2009 NDPP process contains 5 main steps and 13 planning

81 Handbook on Long Term Development Planning, RTO-TR-069 AC/323 (SAS-025) TP/41, Research and
Technology Organization
82 Young, T-D. Capabilities-Based Defence Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO and Partnership for Peace

Countries. Quarterly Journal, Vol. V, No1 Spring-Summer 2006 English Edition, page 48
47
disciplines, 2 more steps and 6 more disciplines than the previous model, and responds to
the reform of the new system of Committees / Agencies in NATO.
The new NDPP system is a more advanced method than the previous Alliance defence
planning system. First, it brings a common denominator of the 13 Alliance planning
disciplines analysed above, using a more organized and inclusive approach. Second, it
integrates in a more organized way allied and partner country planning systems. And
third, it brings about the coherence of capability development with the European Union,
in line with the common document "EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing
Capability Requirements”83. So, if Albania is to align the national defence planning
system with NATO, then this system will be fully in line with the EU integration phase.
Alliance Defence Planning includes both NATO Capability planning as a whole, as well
as individual member states. It gives allied countries, in particular small countries, the
opportunity to exploit the political, military, and collective defence collective advantages
to achieve the degree of security and common stability.
Following this, I conducted an integrated analysis of the collective defence planning
model, an active part of which is our country as well. At every step, I have expressed,
directly or implicitly, what is the role of allied countries in the process. It is crucial for
our strategic planning experts to have good knowledge of this Model.

The steps of the NDPP system have been illustrated in this scheme and described below
in more details:

5 step process of NATO collective defence planning

1. Defence
Planning Step 1 – Formulation of Policy
Guidance
planning guidance;
2. Setting
5. Rev iew Capability
Requirements
Step 2 – Setting Capability
the Results
Im provem ent Requirements;
of Alliance
Capabilities
Step 3 – Allocation of Capabilities
3. Allocation of
and Setting Targets for Countries;
Capability
4. Facilitating
Implementation
Target for Step 4 _- Facilitating
Countries
of Capability Implementation of Capability
Dev elopment Development

Step 5 – Review of Results

Scheme 2: The 5 Step Cycle of Collective Defence Planning84

83 EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing Capability Requirements

84
This scheme is presented by Allied expert team in NATO Integration Conference in April 2011, Tirana

48
Step 1 - Formulation of Policy/ Planning Guidance;
Step 2 - Setting Capability Requirements
Step 3 - Allocation of Capability Targets for Countries
Step 4 - Facilitating Implementation of Capability Development
Step 5 - Review the Results
In all steps of this process, like all other Alliance member countries, our country is fully
involved through representations with experts at NATO headquarters and planning
structures in MoD/ GS/ Main commands. It is imperative not only to recognize their
content and products, but also to be creative and interested in formulation of positions to
be held from the point of view of a small country to this system, in order to get best
benefits from the collective defence system.
Step 1 – Formulation of Defence/Policy Planning Guidance;
It answers the question: What is the Level of Ambition of the Alliance? 'The Alliance
Defence Planning Guidance is normally revised every 4 years’85. It provides the overall
goal and objectives to be achieved by the Alliance in the long run. It is conducted by the
Defence Planning Staff Team (DPPC) under the auspices of the DPPC (R). After being
consulted with relevant NATO bodies and member countries, it is sent for approval to
NAC / DPPC / NPG, following support by the Heads of State / Government. This
Planning Guidance is based largely on the Alliance Strategic Concept or a document of
such level.
The Defence Guidance determines the number, scale, and nature of the operations the
Alliance will face in the future (called NATO Level of Ambition). It also sets
requirements for its qualitative Capabilities to meet this ambition as a mechanism to
initiate the process of development of Capabilities of each ally and the Alliance as a
whole. It also assigns the priorities and timelines for the development of the Alliance core
capabilities.
Step 2 - Setting Capability Requirements
It answers the question: What Capabilities should the Alliance develop to meet its
Level of Ambition? NATO Strategic Commands (ACO and ACT), based on the Policy
Planning Guidance, using mechanisms, methods and analytical expertise, identify the
entire set of capabilities needed to meet the required level and quality of ambition
expressed in the guidance, through a structured, comprehensive, transparent and inclusive
process.

85 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, page 1-4.
49
"The bottom line of this analysis is the development of a complete Capability
Requirements package, or otherwise called the Minimum Capabilities Requirements, to
meet the Alliance Level of Ambition set out in the first step”86. These capabilities will be
made available by member states through the NDPCS (NATO Defence Planning
Capability Survey), as well as the Alliance's own strategic assets. "For this purpose, both
Strategic Commands (SCs) also make a comparison of Minimum Capability
Requirements87 necessary for the future and existing capabilities made available to the
Alliance, identifying a list of potential shortages and a list of potential surpluses.
Designation of capability requirements is normally conducted every four years after the
adoption of the Planning Guidance, but in special circumstances, it is not excluded that
they can be set out outside the normal planning cycle.
Step 3 - Allocation of Capability Targets for Countries
It answers the question: What Capabilities should each member develop within the
Alliance based on a fair burden sharing? After determining the entire set of capability
requirements for the Alliance as a whole, the allocation of capabilities for all member
states will start in the form of capability targets. This process is conducted based on the
principle of "fair sharing of roles, burdens and responsibilities of countries”88 in the
Alliance.
Countries can accept that certain capabilities can be developed regionally, multilaterally
or in other formats within the Alliance, especially for those capabilities that exceed the
ambitions and possibilities of individual countries. Also, it is recommended to divert
investment of member countries from surplus capabilities to other priority capabilities.
Also, this step provides capability development on the basis of the Alliance's common
funding.
In this step, each member country of the Alliance is provided with a Set/Package of
Capability Targets (CT), (former Force Goals (FG)), to be developed in the long run
within the Alliance's collective defence, always on the basis of a fair burden sharing of
countries. This Set/Package of Capability Targets is sent to each Allied Country by the
International Staff (IS). "Each Package/Set of Capability Targets is sent in advance to
Allied countries to get the country's opinion on the acceptance of "Targets"89 assigned to
them, which are further discussed in a special related meeting”90

86 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, pages 1-5.
87 Ibid, pages 1-5
88 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, pages 1-10.

89 ‘Targets’ are Goals assigned to allied members in the capability/ force planning process.

90 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, page 1-7.

50
The allocation of Capability Targets/ Force Goals for member countries is normally done
every 4 years, but if deemed necessary, it can be done out of the cycle.
Step 4 - Facilitating Implementation of Capability Development
It answers the question: What Capabilities will be produced by each member country
through long-term development plans? After allocating Capabilities to allied countries,
it is the Capability development phase from relevant NATO countries and bodies,
focusing on development with priority of Capabilities shortfalls while considering the
elimination of surpluses.
Capability development of the Alliance and Allied countries requires constant monitoring
of their progress. The NATO Defence Planning Staff team decides "… what capabilities
of countries will be monitored and assigns Capability monitors who will be constantly
informed on the progress of the development of certain Capabilities and related problems
requiring solutions”91 Likewise, this Staff will inform at least annually with an Annual
Report for NAC/ DPPC/ NPG on progress made to develop certain Capabilities
shortages.
In this step, it is not excluded that, when there are differences in the allocation of
Capability requirements for member states under step 3, the Capability development
plans of each member country can be re-evaluated beyond the normal cycle.
Step 5 – Reviewing the Results
It answers the question: What progress is made by the member countries in developing
their Capability Targets? In this step, a NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey
(DPCS) is conducted. This questionnaire is filled in by countries and sent to NATO
Defence Planning Staff Team, reinforced (DPST (R)).
The Defence Planning Staff Team (DPST), every 2 years, after evaluation of individual
member countries, drafts a NATO General Capability Report assessing each individual
country progress, and the Alliance in general, concluding on the Alliance's ability to meet
the Level of Ambition set out by the Planning Guidance of Step 1. If a country does not
agree on any issue, it is discussed in the 'consensus minus 1' format.
Finally, this Report is sent through the NAC / DPPC / NPG to all Defence Ministers for
approval in principle.
Conclusions and recommendations:
1. I believe this new five-step process of collective defence planning is of great
importance for each allied country, and for our country in particular. Allied countries
are trying to establish a closer relationship between collective defence planning and

91 Ibid, page 1-9

51
 national defence planning. This is because collective defence planning has great
effects on national defence planning, especially over small countries.
2. Although a small country, with a modest level of ambition, Albania should follow an
active participation in every Step of the NDPP Process. Active positions are
developed when officers and civilians assigned to the defence planning process have
a background, experience and sufficient expertize in these areas.
3. Active positions should be formulated and articulated by the national Mission at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels, by national military representations in two strategic
commands, and by defence / force planning structures at MoD / GS. The time has
come to be a more active part in the process.
4. Continuous information and engagement of the highest authorities of MoD and GS in
the defence planning process is of great importance. Their information and
participation is particularly important before decision making in key meetings,
ministerials or high level summits.
5. Participation in collective defence makes us better understand what we should plan
for NATO and what NATO should plan for us, in order to understand, in addition to
our contributions to collective defence, what are the Alliance commitments under
Article 5 to our country. Our engagement should be higher, especially in steps 3 and 4
of the process.
6. We need to be aware that collective defence has a relatively large cost for all
countries. Any decision-making process related to increase of various Capabilities
will be associated with a reasonable cost for all Allied countries. Any decision-
making by authorities of 13 Alliance planning disciplines may have an additional
costs for all participating countries. This should be well taken in consideration during
the consensus reaching process.
7. In my view, in order to develop a good expert team on NATO issues, collective
defence planning and relations with national defence planning should be subject to
research at Doctrine and Research Centre, and a teaching Module should be taught at
our Defence Academy, especially in the Senior Officer Course.

II.6. NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey - DPCS

In my view, the Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS-2010 improved in 2013) is
an improved Version of the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ-2008). It is best
suited in quantity and quality with the new Collective Defence Planning Process (NDPP-
2009) with 5 steps and 13 disciplines, compared with the previous one with 3 steps and 7
disciplines.
52
DPCS-2010/2013 is the main mechanism for collecting information to support the
Collective Defence Planning Process. NATO DPCS is filled in by experts of Allied
countries on the basis of a two-year cycle. It expresses the development of collective
capabilities of the Alliance and individual member countries, associated with respective
financial resources for a period of 10 years. DPCS Questionnaire is filled in with related
answers and reported by countries each even year (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018
...), while Discussion and Review of DPCS Plans with Allied Countries are made each
odd year (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019 ...). The DPCS questionnaire, after being
filled in/ completed by the allied countries, is classified at least at the "restricted" level.

DPCS-2010/2013, more than its previous version DPQ-2008, "... requires information
from allied national plans and policies, their efforts to achieve "target", their national
inventory of military forces and their capabilities, as well as other non-military
capabilities that may be made available to Alliance operations”92.

Capability Survey may also serve better collection of information on defence planning in
European Union. The use of NDPASS software (NATO Defence Planning Automated
Support System) will enable, inter alia, visibility and comparability of national
capabilities that can be made available to both organizations, facilitating identification of
possible duplication of Capability Requirements.

DPCS-2010/2013 is a large 480 page questionnaire, along with the attached Capability
Codes and Statements. It is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter deals with
general issues, the second chapter provide equivalent questions for all three Forces and
Services and their Force Goals/ Capability Targets, and the third chapter is the block of
various sheets/tables on Resources (personnel, finance, equipment, logistics, etc. In
general terms, DPCS serves as the basis for the development of the Long Term
Development Plan for the Armed Forces.

Responding to this questionnaire requires specialized and well-informed staffs, as well as

capable in the field of defence planning. As the questionnaire is filled in only in English,
it also requires that strategic planning community is a good English-speaking staff.

Differences between Partnership Goals (PGs), Force Goals (FG) and Capability
Targets (CT)
The Force proposals prepared by the Alliance's defence planning staff, once approved,
are converted in the form of Partnership Goals (PG), Force Goals (FG) or Capability

92 Defence Planning Capability Survey 2010, 26 February 2010 AC/281-N(2010)0014-final (EWG(R)) NATO
unclassified
53
Targets (CT). These objectives are provided in the form of packages based on a
reasonable burden sharing in Step 3 (Target Setting).
Partnership Goals (PGs) are given to partner countries and aspirants based on their free
will. The Alliance provides a package of Partnership Goals for all partner countries
participating in PARP as well as all aspirant countries participating in PARP and MAP.
The Process of Partnership Goals started in 1995, when PARP initiated, and at the
beginning these Objectives were named Interoperability Objectives (IO). "From 1995
until the end of 1999, Albania had 10 Interoperability Objectives, of which 7 fully
implemented and 3 partially implemented”93. Following the Washington Summit in 1999,
the Interoperability Objectives changed their name into Partnership Goals (PG). These
Goals include only commitments involving non-Article 5 operations, as those related to
Article 5 are an obligation only to Allied countries.
Force Goals (FGs) are goals given to allied countries to be accomplished on the basis of
the NDPP allied system based on a reasonable burden sharing. The latest package of the
Force Goals of Albania is "The 2008 FG Package, which had a total of 49 FGs, of which
26 were General, 14 of the Land Force, 5 of the Naval Forces and 4 of the Air Force. In
addition to Military Force Goals, the General Force Goal package 2008 had 5 Goals
belonging to the Ministry of Interior as well as 3 Goals related to Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations”.94 The development cycle of Force Goals changed to
Capability Target (CT) in January 2013. The capabilities of the Alliance are given to the
whole spectrum of Alliance combat and non-combat operations (article 5 or non-article 5
operations).
Capability Targets (CTs) are targets given to allied countries in June 2013 Ministerial on
the basis of the new cycle of development of NDPP 2009 process, with a view to
mitigating existing capability shortfalls, which could be achieved through national,
multinational and collective efforts. These CTs should be expressed in terms of
Capabilities, i.e. the ability of forces to perform certain missions and tasks. The purpose
of the Capability Targets are to "... influence NATO bodies and countries to produce and
make available the necessary forces and military / non-military capabilities to fulfil
missions and implement the Alliance's military strategy”95
Comprehensive Approach to Defence Planning
The comprehensive approach of today's and future operations means a comprehensive
approach to defence and force planning as well. In NATO, the Comprehensive Approach
was initially launched in Istanbul Summit 2004, further institutionalized in the

93 Hudhra Th, A retrospective view of NATO engagement, Military Review, 2002, page 27
94 Force Goal Package 2008, Albania, page 1-3
95 Briefing of ACT team, Tirana, June 2011

54
Comprehensive Directive of Riga Summit, and cemented in the Lisbon Strategic
Concept, which states that "... lessons learned from NATO operations , particularly in
Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that comprehensive efforts, civil and
military, are needed for effective crisis management. The Alliance will actively engage
with other international actors before, during and after the crisis, to encourage joint
analysis, planning and conducting field activities in order to maximize the coherence and
effectiveness of international efforts in general. "
Comprehensive approach to national and collective defence planning has two
perspectives: the first, in the context of NATO; and the second, in the context of
individual allied countries. Below, I will provide with a short analysis of each of them.
First, in NATO context, the comprehensive approach implies the preparation, planning,
coordination and implementation of an engagement plan of all other national,
international and multinational, state and non-state, military and non-military actors in
defence planning and NATO-led operations. United Nations, European Union, various
non-member states with partner status, bodies with specific NATO relations, various
international, regional and national agencies, may be included here.
Second, in the context of individual allied countries, in addition to military actors, the
comprehensive approach includes the preparation, planning and implementation of a
comprehensive plan with all other national actors in NATO operations. Development of
capabilities beyond the military ones is one of the lessons learned from the operations of
the last two decades. Iraq and Afghanistan are showing that "it is less difficult to win the
war, but it is more difficult to win the peace” 96. A large number of military and civilian
capabilities have entered the international and national operations market only in the last
10 years, such as training teams, advisory teams, PRT teams, OMLT, POMLT, CIMIC,
OLT, MAT and many others. Force Goals/Capability Targets’ Packages are lately
enlarged with civilian Capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction, which are not
typically military or subordinate to the Ministries of Defence.
In terms of NATO-led operations, "... when it comes to the involvement of other non-
military agencies, it is almost impossible to achieve unity of command. In these cases, the
most appropriate definition would be the unity of purpose and effort; because good will,
common purpose, clear division of responsibilities of the parties involved in the
operation, and an understanding of the Capabilities and limitations of others are some of
the essential elements for maximum achievement of the objective of the comprehensive
effort”97.

96 David Fletcher, Wining the Peace, Parameters, December 2007, page 35

97 AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine, Page 102
55
 II.7. Level of Ambition of Collective Defence
The level of ambition (LoA) of a country or organization is one of the decisive factors in
defence planning and future military and civilian capabilities. The phrase "how much is
enough" is the determinant of the level of ambition.
According to the Report of the Secretary General SG 2004 0828 AS-1, 2005 "The Level
of NATO Ambition (LoA) expresses the number, scale, and nature of operations that the
Alliance is capable to perform. Due to its strategic nature in support of NATO Strategic
Concept, of the fundamental importance to the Alliance, its influence on all collective
defence planning disciplines, as well as its direct financial implications, the development
of the NATO Level of Ambition requires the highest level of political engagement...”98
The Alliance level of ambition is determined by the Political Defence Guidance. It is one
of the basic documents for collective defence planning. The NATO Defence Guidance
takes place once every four years. The last guidance was that of 2006, while the guidance
in force was adopted in March 2011, following the adoption of the Strategic Alliance
Concept, in November 2010. The Defence Guidance is endorsed by the North Atlantic
Council at the level of the Ministers of Defence Alliance countries. Being a "restricted"
classified document, the further content of the Defence Directive will not be part of this
thesis.
In order to make an analogy with our country, I will provide a short analysis of some
Levels of Ambitions of large and small organizations or countries:
NATO: The 2010 Alliance Strategic Concept states that NATO "will retain the ability to
carry out simultaneous large-scale operations, as well as some other smaller collective
defence and crisis response operations, including those at strategic distance”99 In this
context, the Alliance's Level of Ambition is "... two major "joint" operations, and six
minor "joint" operations, outside the Alliance territories …”100. Smaller operations are at
least the size of the Brigade-plus, while the major operations at the Corps-plus,
supported by certain Navy and Air Capabilities...”101.
EU: 102 The "Headline Goals 2010" document states that the level of ambition of the
European Union is "to respond with decisive actions across the spectrum of crisis
management operations covered by the EU Treaty. This includes humanitarian and
search and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, task forces of crisis management, including

98 Report by the DRC on new Defence Planning Procedure, SG 2004 0828 AS-1, 2005
99 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon summit 2010
100 Methodology for long term defence planning, Dejan Stojkovic and Bjørn Robert Dahl, Norwegian Defence

Research Establishment (FFI), 28 February 2007

101 W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry; NATO Command Structure; Considerations for the Future; National

Defence University, September 2010

102 EU Headline Goals 2010, page 22

56
peacekeeping; as well as other tasks such as demilitarization operations, support of
countries in the fight against terrorism, and security sector reforms”
USA:103 The US level of ambition is global. It is based on three alternatives with "... a
number of scenarios or combination of scenarios, including:

 A stabilization operation, an operation to deter and defeat a powerful regional

aggressor, as well as an operation to support civilian authorities in a catastrophic
event in the United States. This combination of scenarios attaches particular
importance to the ability of forces to defeat sophisticated opponents and to
support the needs of national response.

 Deterrence and defeat of two regional aggressors and maintaining a high level of
alertness in and around the United States. This combination of scenarios attaches
particular importance to the capabilities of US armed forces.

 A major stabilization operation, a long-term Deterrence operation in a separate

theatre, a mid-range counter-insurgency mission, and a long-term operation of US
civil authorities. This combination of scenarios pays primary attention to the
elements of the force equipped and capable of counter-insurgency operations,
stability, and counter-terrorism”.

United Kingdom104; The UK Level of Ambition (MB) is expressed in the Strategic

Security and Defence Assessment 2010 (SSDR). According to this strategic document,
the UK Ambition Level is "... Future Armed Forces will be complemented and
structured to carry out the following options simultaneously:

 a long-term brigade-level stabilization operation (up to 6,500 personnel) with

relevant navy and air support, also conducting a complex non long-term
mission (up to 2,000 personnel), as well as a simple non long-term mission (up
to 1,000 personnel);

 three long-term operations, if the forces are not engaged in any long-term
operation;

 a limited time operation, with sufficient early warning, engaging all our efforts
on a non-rotation mission of up to three brigades, with navy and air support
(about 30,000 personnel). "

103 US Quadrennial Defence Review, Washington D.C, 2010

104 UK SSDR Strategic Security and Defence Review, 2010 page 45
57
Slovenia105: “The type of scale of operations is important as it is the development of the
respective capabilities. Given the size of the Slovenian Armed Forces and its capabilities
for international operations, the participation level will be:

 Low-level operations; with a platoon level unit;

 Medium-scale operations; with a company-level unit;

 Large-scale operations; with a tactical battalion group level unit;

 Large-scale operations; with all the forces that Slovenia will have available to
prevent threats in the framework of national defence, or with all the forces that
will be available to protect the Alliance.

Simultaneous operations and length of operations are important factors in planning the
scale and force structure. The developed capabilities will enable simultaneous
participation in one of the following options:

 Two medium-sized operations for a long time (1 year or more);

 a simultaneous large-scale operation for a period of 6 months, and a long-term

peacekeeping operation;

 a large-scale operation with rotation options for a long period of time.”

Denmark106: “The support of deployable forces that reaches up to 2000 forces will be
achieved through the combination of several examples, not excluding other options. This
will also depend on ambition and cooperation with other participating countries.

 Land Forces should be capable of simultaneously deploying up to two units

organized as combat groups (2 battle groups, 300-800 personnel each), as well as
a small number of contingents at the company level (150 personnel).

 Navy should be able to deploy two frigates, support ships, or ocean patrol vessels
at the same time. Other deployments in special cases may be minor contingents
such as the Flyvefisken class (Standard Flex 300) or the Danish Royal Navy Task
Force.

105 Slovenian Strategic Defence Review, 2005 page 38

106 Danish Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014, Copenhagen, 24 June 2009, page7/38
58
  Air Force should be able to deploy up to three contingents, consisting of transport
aircraft, helicopters, fighter jets, and contingents of early observation and early
warning. Likewise, the Air Force should be prepared to contribute with mobile
staffs with specialized staff, such as support personnel for airplane loading and
unloading, as well as air base operations.

 Other contributions should be made with ... Special Operations Forces, with small
teams and elements of military capability building, with staff officers and
observers, etc.”.

France:107 In France's White Paper 2008 called the 'Sarkozy Strategy', it is stated that the
French armed forces over the next 15 years will achieve these objectives:
- Contribution to peace and stability in the world:
 Through participation in peacekeeping and stabilization operations using ground
forces units and a navy and air presence;
 Through exercise of deterrence and defence measures in the national territory.
- Participating in a major conflict outside the country's territories, as part of a
multinational framework, being able to deploy:
 A ground force of up to 30,000 for 6 months for a period of one year, followed by
a stabilization operation,
 A combat air force of up to 70 fighter jets;
 A navy or air-naval combat force, as appropriate;
 During deterrence mission, protection of critical infrastructures in the national
territory;
- Standby capabilities/forces for action and reaction, capable of making available within a
short period of time (one to several days), a national or international framework,
consisting of:
 Territorial force (5,000 people), naval and air force, and other national forces,
 Air and sea capabilities and resources for activating air bases.
Sweden108: According to the Swedish Government Bill, Sweden's level of ambition is "...
leadership and participation in 2 large international missions, with battalion level in
each of them, as well as participation in 3 small scale operations. Sweden will be ready

107 France White Paper on Defence and Security, Paris 2008.

108 Swedish Government Bill, 2008
59
to undertake some early warning operations and support other operations for a longer
time. It will also take part in crisis management tasks, from confidence building, conflict
prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, to peace enforcement operations.”
Croatia109: Croatia's Strategic Defence Review 2005 document provides this level of
ambition of Croatia after joining NATO: "After joining NATO, the Armed Forces of
Croatia must have the capabilities to carry out: a joint operation in defence of national
territories in response to Article 5 of collective defence; to participate in a collective
defence operation with declared forces (a reinforced company, until 2009, a battalion
after 2009); to conduct an operation in response to a national crisis with a battalion 'task
force'; to take part in an operation in response to an international crisis at company-
level”.

Albania110: In Albanian case, the concept of the Level of Ambition is introduced for the
first time in the AAF Long Term Development Plan, LTDP-2007, where the Level of
Ambition is expressed in three levels, which will be subject of my analysis in the third
chapter.

Conclusions and recommendations:

The level of ambition defines both military and civil capabilities required for achieving
the national interests and objectives of a country or alliance. It is a political and military
objective of strategic level. Next, I am addressing some conclusions influencing the level
of ambition:
1. Each ally, including our country, must develop their Level of Ambition, ie determine
the amount of simultaneous participation in national and international operations; I
would recommend that this should be described in a policy guidance of the highest
level, for example, in the SDR document;
2. Allied countries shall "... reach or exceed the boundaries of the use of land forces
with deployable capabilities outside the Alliance's area of responsibility, within the
limits of 50% with 10% of their total”111;
3. NATO commands and staffs should "... establish contacts with civil authorities and
governmental or non-governmental bodies for a more comprehensive planning and
control of their operations”112.

109 Croatian Strategic Defence Review 2005, Page 18

110 LTDP, Albania, VS 2020, page 47
111 Bratislava Ministerial Communique, June 2009

112 Lisbon Summit Communique, November 2010

60
4. Allied countries should allocate for defence a budget that is at or above 2% of GDP to
meet the transformation requirements of their Armed Forces into modern, deployable,
logistically supported, and interoperable forces;
5. All NATO allied countries whose current plans for modernization of equipment and
systems are below 20% of their defence budget should gradually raise that figure at
this level;
6. Limited resources currently devoted to maintaining the "obsolete" structures and
infrastructures should be reoriented to the development of new deployable military
capabilities in support of Article 5 or crises response operations;
7. The training and education curricula of NATO and national allied education and
training institutions should cover all aspects of Alliance development across their
spectrum of operations;

II.8. Types of Missions and Collective Planning Scenarios

The 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept still in force states that "The Alliance must and will
continue to fulfil its three basic core tasks, which contribute to the security of Alliance
members, always being in accordance with the international law.”113. These core task
are:

 Collective Defence. "NATO members will always help one another against any
attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This commitment
remains firm and binding”114.

 Crisis Management. ”...NATO will actively use an appropriate selection of these

political and military tools to assist in the management of emerging crises that could
affect the security of the Alliance before they escalate into conflicts; to stop existing
conflicts, which affect the security of the Alliance; and to help consolidate stability in
post-conflict situations when it contributes to Euro-Atlantic security”115.

 Cooperation on Security. “...The Alliance will be actively engaged in enhancing

international security through partnership with relevant countries and other
international organizations, contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation

113 Strategic Concept of the Alliance, Lisbon Summit, translated by the author in Military Review, March 2011, page 2
114 Ibid, page 2.
115 Ibid, page 2.

61
 and disarmament, and keeping the door open for Alliance membership for all
countries of European democracies that meet NATO standards.”116

Based on the Strategic Concept and the Political Defence Guidance, the Alliance
develops its missions and tasks. These missions and tasks are developed through a
Defence Requirement Review process (Step 2 of the NDPP Process). The latest
Defence Requirement Review (DRR) process was conducted in 2007, the process of
the new NDPP cycle developed in 2012 and improved in 2017, which is called the
CRR (Capability Requirement Review).
Currently, NATO has 3 types of mission with 17 missions in total, across its spectrum
of operations. The three types of NATO missions are: Collective Defence Operations
(CD), Defence against Terrorism (DAT), and Crisis Response Operations
"NA5CRO". Since we are an allied country, these missions and tasks will be the AAF
missions and tasks in NATO-led international operations. It is worth analysing them
in order to make them part of the training and education system of AAF personnel,
including individual, staff and unit training.
A detailed description of the three types of missions and 17 main Alliance collective
defence missions are given in Annexes C and D.
Conclusions and recommendations:
1. As mentioned, in response to the three core tasks of the Strategic Concept, the
Alliance has articulated 3 types of missions with 17 missions in total. These
missions are in dynamic development consistent with the security environment.
This set of missions should be studied to be integrated as main tasks of the armed
forces missions, with our national specifications.
2. We should identify how we can benefit from and contribute to all three core tasks
of the Alliance; e.g. the territorial integrity of the country will continue to be
subject to the collective defence of the Alliance, while Alliance participation in
crisis management outside allied territories will also be a mission of capabilities
of the Republic of Albania, etc.;
3. The Alliance is not simply an alliance of collective defence, it is an alliance of
collective security; a special role in this mission apart from civil diplomacy, has
the military diplomacy with a new platform for military cooperation;
4. The Alliance has a wide range of missions, from combat to crisis response
operations, which require a profound transformation of the AAF mindset,

116 Ibid, page 2.

62
 doctrines, training, equipment and operations. This aspect of transformation
should be subject to the teaching curricula of all TRADOC institutions;
5. Based on the realistic definition of a Mission Task List, the Armed Forces will
organize structures, formulate positions, ratify doctrines, train forces, buy
equipment, and distribute resources in the long run;
6. We must bear in mind that we do not develop forces only for international
operations; they should be multiple use forces, in-place and deployable forces for
national and international missions;
7. TRADOC Doctrine and Research Centre should further develop the concept of a
"single set of forces" of the Republic of Albania for all international operations
led by NATO / EU / UN / or potential coalitions;

II.9. From Mission Types to Planning Situations/Scenarios

What are Planning Scenarios/ Situations? What is their connection to the set of missions
of an armed force? How is defence planning, force planning and operational planning
connected with planning situations used by forces in the present and the future?
Connection of the three planning; defence planning, force planning with operational
planning, is the key to success of future forces. This effort can be achieved only through
closer and continuous cooperation between political decision-makers, strategic military
leadership, and commanders at the operational and tactical level.
In order for the Alliance and Allied forces to be prepared, trained, doctrined and equipped
to develop more realistic capabilities with their engagement today and in the future, they
should be prepared not only for the types of missions in general, but should detail the
general missions described above in Potential Scenarios/Planning Situations (PS).These
Scenarios may be based on concrete (real) or general (improvised) situations, i.e. they
may be located in real or generic regions or countries of the world.
Potential Planning Situations/ Scenarios are described in such a way as to be as realistic
as possible to enable the generation of necessary capabilities for NATO / Allied countries
to fulfil the entire spectrum of missions required by their Level of Ambition.
Some of the factors that are considered to specify the details of a Planning Scenarios by
region/ country where they are planned, "... include terrain, weather/ season, access to
the sea, availability of water and energy, temperatures, population size and its friendly/
hostile attitude, infrastructure and political structure, mandate of operation, geographic
size, cultural issues, distance from NATO (Brussels), available threatening capabilities,

63
population compactness, road system, port, airport, railway and bridges, of the host
country, the amount of forces related to terrain holding capacity, etc.”.117

Scheme 3: Map of 39 NATO Planning Scenarios

Below, I have described the set of planning scenarios/ situations of some countries and
organizations/ alliances:
NATO: According to the Alliance's DRR, "two NATO Strategic Commands have
adopted 39 Planning Situations in different real or generic (general) regions of the
world. For planning effects, 28 of them are assigned up to 8,000 km from Brussels, 9 of
them up to 12,000 km, and only 2 of them up to 15,000 km from Brussels”118.
Planning situations range from non-combat evacuation operations to forcible entry into a
large-scale (world) war. Based on planning situations, an inventory of forces is needed to
accomplish them.
BE.119 In the "White Paper for European Defence" there are 5 strategic scenarios defined,
which in general are:
- Large-scale Peace Support Operation
- High Intensity Humanitarian Operations
- Regional war in defence of European interests
- Prevention from an attack with weapons of mass destruction

117 Directive on Strategic and Operational planning, Bi-SC 2009, page 25

118 Briefing of NATO team in Oberammergau, 10 June 2010
119 White Paper for European Defence, page 56

64
- Defence the territories of member countries
Canada120: Canada has 11 Strategic Planning Situations, which are:
- Search and Rescue in Canada
- Relief of consequences of natural disasters
- International humanitarian assistance
- Control of the Canadian territories
- Evacuation of Canadian citizens from across the continent
- Peace Support Operations
- Assisting Civil Authorities/ option of Use of Chemical Weapons
- Exercise and Enforcement of National Sovereignty
- Peace enforcement / option of a failed state
- North American defence/ option of use of radiological weapons and cyber-attack (in
cooperation with the US)
- Collective Defence
Albania: In the case of Albania, I will address this topic in particular in the following
chapter. Based on the experience of Allied countries and our defence planning reality, I
have developed a project with 5 strategic planning scenarios and 15 operational scenarios
that can be used by Albanian Armed Forces.

II.10. Essential Operational Capabilities of the Alliance Forces

In my view, as discussed in sub-chapter I.4, in the NATO's collective defence planning
terminology, the word 'military force' is being replaced by the term 'military capability'.
This definition has evolved in almost all allied countries according to the specifics, and in
the framework of collective defence. Today, the term ‘capability’ includes from 5 to 10
integrated elements which produce one or some combat capabilities of a unit. Some of
the key elements of a military capability (i.e., what a unit is capable of doing) are closely
related to force organization, operational doctrine, training and education, equipment and
systems, element of military leadership, development of personnel, infrastructure, and
finally, the interoperability of forces/ services between them and with allied coalition
forces.

120 Canadian forces vision 2020, page 47

65
This is rationally illustrated by former NATO Deputy Secretary General Holger Pfeiffer,
who states that "When allied countries are required to make available through the Force
Goals ... divisions, brigades or battalions, they are not required only by a number of
assigned human staff to march through parades, but a complex range of their
capabilities, such as firepower, mobility, defence capability, logistic support, and many
other skills ... so they are not simply a numerical description of force”121
NATO: A NATO Capability consists of eight elements that are DOTMLPFI (Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Equipment, Leadership, Personnel, Infrastructure, and
Interoperability)122.
SHBA: US Capability is composed of a 6-element DOTMLP system (Doctrine,
Organization, Training and Education, Equipment, Leadership, Personnel)123.
Canada: Canada has adopted a 6-element PRICIE system (Personnel; Research-
Development/ Operational Research; Infrastructure and Organization; Concepts,
Doctrines and Collective Training; IT Infrastructure; Equipment; Supplies and
Services.)124
Australia: Australia has incorporated 8 elements in FIC system (Fundamental Inputs to
Capability). FIC includes Organization; Staffing, Collective Training; Major Systems;
Supplies; Infrastructure; Support; Command and Management125.

Croatia126 and Slovenia and many smaller NATO countries have begun implementing
the DOTMLPFI system, but since its implementation is complex, the system is under a
study process.

This system is also in the agenda of implementation by Albanian Armed Forces. LTDP
2010 states that "... The basis of designation of the readiness level of forces will be
aligned with the Alliance Force Standards (AFS) across the spectrum of DOTMLPFI

121 Holger Pfeiffer, Defence and Force Planning under the historical perspective – NATO as a case study, 2008, Baltic
Security and Defence Review, page 118
122 DOTMLPFI is NATO concept on Capabilities; it is an acronym of Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education,

Equipment and Systems, Leadership, Personnel, Infrastructure and Interoperability. Guide to Capability-Based
Planning, Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3 (JSA TP-3) of TTCP, Oct. 2004.
123 DOTMLP is the US meaning of Main Inputs to Capabilities. DOTMLP is an acronym for Doctrine, Organization,

Training and Education, Equipment, Leadership and Personnel. Ibid.

124 PRICIE is the Canadian term for inputs to Capabilities. PRICIE is acronym for Personnel, R&D/Operational

Research, Infrastructure & Organization, Concepts, Doctrine & Collective Training, IT Infrastructure, Equipment,
Supply and Services. Guide to Capability-Based Planning, Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3
(JSA TP-3) of TTCP, October 2004.
125 FIC are main inputs to Capabilities for Australia as part of TTCP. FIC has 8 groups of inputs: Organization,

Personnel, Training, Main Equipment and Infrastructure, Support, Command and Management
126 Croatian Long Term Development Plan 2007, CAF, page 56

66
elements”127. Some recommendations for applying this system to AAF will be provided
by a project of the author in the third chapter of this thesis.

II.10.1. Essential Operational Capabilities of Allied Forces:

In addition to the integral elements of a capability described above, after the Cold War,
we have a significant increase of the types of capabilities. Understandably, this expansion
of the range of capabilities comes along with the extension of the Alliance's mission and
tasks at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Today's military forces are planned to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of the
mission, from crises response operations to combat operations of Article 5, in the
periphery or outside the Alliance territories. In this context, "Essential Operational
Capabilities (EOC) are the military capabilities needed for Alliance forces and staffs to
be made available at the right time and place which are capable to perform effective and
continuous operations in the most difficult operational environments, while guaranteeing
the security of its forces.” 128

What are some of essential operational capabilities that any armed force should have to
accomplish the mission? In most NATO countries, with few changes, seven basic
operational capabilities have been defined that make a force capable to conduct a
successful missions.

For illustration, in order for an Albanian battalion or company to conduct a successful

NATO mission, e.g. in Afghanistan, this battalion/ company should have a certain
readiness time; be trained for the entire spectrum of mission; have functional C2
capabilities and effective intelligence capabilities; have strategic deployability and
tactical mobility; be autonomous in terms of logistical resources, and have protection and
survival skills in the theatre of operation.

A more complete description of the Essential Operational Capabilities (EOC), according

to the experience of the Alliance countries, is given in Annex E.

II.10.2. NATO Task List (NTL)129

Seven Essential Operational Capabilities analysed in Annex E are the main source for
identifying the NATO Task List (NTL). "The NTL List is built as a capability menu that

127 AAF Long Term Development Plan– Strategic Vision 2020, page 16
128 ACO Forces Standards, Volume 1 – General, 15 February, 2008
129 NATO Task List, Bi-SC Directive, Number 80-90, 16 November 2007, updated 2016

67
tells commanders what tasks can be done without specifying how or who will perform
them”130.

The NATO Mission Tasks List is organized in three levels, Strategic Tasks (Code ST),
Operational Tasks (OT Code), and Tactical Tasks (Code TT). The NTL list is in support
of both NATO and Allied countries.

"NTL List provides commanders and staff with a catalogue of missions and tasks at all
three levels, which serve them for planning exercises and operations. The changing
security environment brings about a change in the operational requirements of NATO
forces for the new missions and tasks of the Alliance. Crisis Response Operations and the
Implementation of New Concepts such as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF),
Graduate Response Forces (GRF), NATO Reaction Force (NRF) or European Security
and Defence Identity (ESDI) require revisions of missions and tasks, according to the
three core tasks of the Alliance's Strategic Concept”131.

NTL is a valuable tool for operational training and NATO force planning. It serves as a
single standard document for the commanders for conducting Article 5 operations, non-
Article 5 operations, crises response operations, as well as those related to security
cooperation.

II.10.3. Capability Codes and Statements.

The basic document defining the link with the essential operational capabilities of NATO
forces is "Capability Codes and Statements 2008", further enhanced by the "Capability
Code and Statements 2011", which provides for all types of capabilities described shortly
above. Such documents also have individual allied countries such as the United States,
England, France, Canada and many other countries.

"This document of two strategic commands provides a common language for the
capabilities linking Force Planning with Operational Planning and define the DPQ/
DPCS Questionnaire Force Goals/ Capability Targets, ACO Force Standards, NATO
Reaction Force (NRF), Combined Joint Specification and Common Requirements
(CJSOR), and the Global Force Generation Conference.”132

The Capability Codes and Statements standardizes all capabilities in order that Allied
units have the same capabilities during joint and combined operations. This is a very
positive step for their interoperability in operation. Any platoon, company, battalion,

130 NTL, NATO Task List, Bi-SC Directive, Number 80-90, 16 November 2007, updated 2016
131 Bi-SC Directive Number 80-90, Tt 203294, 16 November 2007, NATO Task List (NTL)
132 NATO Bi-SC Capability Codes and Statement, 2008

68
Brigade, Division, Corps, Platform or major equipment, etc., should be developed
according to the skills required by this document in order to be in accordance with
Alliance standards. This does not mean that capabilities should be developed by
templates. The code gives room for flexibility in many cases for building forces tailored
to the specific mission.

For illustration, EOC document provides the code and capabilities of a Light Motorized
Infantry Battalion Group (Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr) according to the Capability Target of our
Armed Forces in Allied operations, but also for all other international operations under
the concept of "a single set of forces"133.

The main requirements for contribution of a Light Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr to NATO are defined
according to NATO Capability Statement INF-MOT-BN”134, for the Light Motorized
Infantry Battalion Group. This document describes Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr as a fully-fledged unit
to fulfil a broad spectrum of mission, including from checkpoint and crowd control to
extremely high or low temperature combat operations, under all conditions of time and
weather.

The Motorized Infantry Battalion Capability Code is: Light Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr, consisting of
13 essential Capabilities, which for restricted classification are taken out from this
published study.

Structural elements of the Light Motorized Infantry Battalion Group will be at least the
battalion staff, the CIS unit135; combat units will be artillery units, mortars, engineering,
ISTAR, CIMIC, PSYOPS, and WMD protection; while as manoeuvre units there will be
no less than three manoeuvre companies (equipped with light skinned APC)...136. A
special study for this tactical group was made by a team led by Col. D. Hoxha, in co-
operation with JFC Command Naples, which results in a model137, taken out from this
study for classification purposes, composed with combat forces, combat support forces
and logistic units, with a total of some 800 - 1000 personnel. The employment of this task
force unit will depend on the concrete task it will be assigned, so it must have the
capability to adapt quickly to the specific task.

Figure 4: Draft organization structure of a Light Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr (taken out for classification purpose)

133
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm
134 NATO Capability Codes and Statements, 2008, page 47
135 Unit – under NATO standard, unit is any level of military organization despite the size of the unit (in Albanian

understanding, the tactical unit is called sub-unit)

136
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, 2014, page 134
137
Hoxha D, NATO Capability Statement INF-MOT-BN
69
 II.10.4. Types, Categories and Level of Readiness of Allied Forces

In general, NATO itself as a Euro-Atlantic security and defence organization has no

independent military forces in place, except those contributed by member states to
military operations. Exceptions are some strategic assets, such as NATO's Early Warning
and Air Control System (AWACS), etc. NATO Force Structure (NFS)138 consists of
allied forces, national forces and multinational forces, together with attached staffs,
which are made available to the Alliance on a permanent or temporary basis, under
certain conditions of readiness. National contributions are made available to the Alliance
by taking into account the agreed mechanisms for the Transfer of Authority139 as well as
coordination and cooperation agreements. These contributions are also added to the assets
and shared capabilities of Alliance specific scenarios.

Types of NATO Forces. “The NATO Force Structure (NFS) consists of two types of
forces: the In-Place Forces (IPF) and the Deployable Forces (DF), which are held at
levels of gradual readiness to support operations"140.

a) In-Place Forces. In-Place Forces are largely in support of collective defence, they are
in-place or territorial forces of the countries that make them available. They are
resources of the individual states of the Alliance. Although these forces / staffs may
not be fully deployable, they are kept at certain levels of readiness141.

b) Deployable Forces. Deployable forces are made available for the entire spectrum of
NATO missions, they have full deployment capabilities in all Alliance territories and
beyond them. These forces consist of forces and staffs with certain levels of
readiness. They are organized as a grouping of national forces/ staffs with rapid
response capabilities, and for reinforcement of In-Place Forces in cases of a collective
defence operation142.

Categories of National Forces Designated to the Alliance. At times of peace, "... The
structure of the NATO Force consists of 6 Force Designation Categories (FDCs). Each
FDC category indicates the availability by the Allied Forces/ HQs for NATO Force and
Command Structure. The nomination of the Force Designation Category is made in
accordance with the type of force (IPF / DF) and their level of readiness (HRF / FLR /
LTBF). In a summarized definition form (unclassified) these categories 143 are as follow:

a) NATO Committed Forces are the national forces or capabilities or national

138
For more, see Military Committee Directive MC 317/1, ‘NATO Force Structure’. Unclassified
139
See MC133/3 Annex C paragraph 11, page 8.
140
AJP-1 (D) NATO Joint Doctrine, 2010, 45-50
141
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, 2014, page 130
142
Ibid, page 231
143
Categories are in conformity with the Alliance Joint Doctrine, AJP-1 (D), 2010
70
 contributions to the multinational forces/ HQs that the countries have placed under
the command or control of a NATO commander or available for NATO operations.

b) NATO Affirmed Forces are national forces and capabilities, or national

contributions to NATO multinational forces/ HQs, which are subject to case-by-case
national policy decisions, for future operational rotations.

c) Other Engaged / Declared Forces are National Forces Available / Designated for
non-NATO led Operations.

d) NATO's Sustainable Forces are all those national forces and capabilities or national
contributions to multinational forces/ HQs that, after appropriate political decision-
making, may be made available by countries to be used throughout the spectrum of
Alliance missions. These forces can be deployed and operate over a long period of
time based on national rotations.

e) NATO Deployable Forces are all national deployable forces/ capabilities, or national
contributions to multinational forces/ HQs, adequately staffed, organized, trained, and
equipped. They are made available for the entire spectrum of Alliance missions.

f) Other Forces are all those forces/ capabilities in national inventories which can be
used for military operations after making relevant political decisions144.

II.10.5. Level of Readiness of NATO Forces.

NATO forces have two main levels of readiness with a total of 11 readiness categories. The
two levels of readiness are Graduate Response Forces and Long Term Built-Up Forces.

1. Graduate Response Forces (GRF). This level of readiness is further divided into
Higher Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR) (2 – 365
days):

2. Long Term Built-Up Forces (LTBF). “Long Term Built-Up Forces provide the
Alliance with additional capabilities to cope with the most difficult scenarios of large-
scale defence operations, aiming at an increase of Alliance forces, both for limited
demand and for response to any fundamental change in the security environment”145
(over 365 days).

144
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, 2014, page 239
145 Ibid, page 57
71
Conclusions and recommendations:

1. Apply harmonisation of terms and definitions of types and categories of our forces by
ratifying STANAG 2437, AJP-1 (D), and STANAG AAP-6 'NATO Terms and
Definitions'. These STANAGs were planned and ratified in 2011 by AAF.

2. Adjust Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP), with force readiness levels based on
the three readiness levels of Alliance forces (HRF / FLR / LTBF).

3. Accept the types and categories of forces denomination under the Alliance's
document: Secretary-General's Directive SG (2006) 0244 (R), 'Declaration and
Designation of Forces', and their use when responding to DPCS Questionnaire.

4. Apply NATO Capability Code and Statement 2011, for all forces and capabilities
available in AAF.

5. Use the NATO Task List system at all three levels: strategic, operational and tactical;
draft a similar document for the Armed Forces.

II.11. From NATO Defence Planning to Operational Planning

“The purpose of operational planning process is to prepare the Alliance to cope with
future or emerging crises. This is the process NATO uses to initiate, develop, approve,
implement, review, modify and terminate all categories of Alliance operational plans,
and specify force activation and deployment procedures146.

In order for the Alliance to be able to perform the entire spectrum of roles and missions,
"two categories of operations planning are used: 1) Advanced Planning and 2) Crisis
Response Planning”147.

1. Advance Planning. The aim of Advance Planning is the preparation of the Alliance to
cope with future security threats. It includes two types of plans: Contingency Plans
(CONPLAN) and Standing Defence Plans (SDPs)148.

a. Contingency Plans. Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) are prepared to deal with a

potential future security risk (based on Article 5 and out of Article 5) and is normally
based on one or more Planning Situations (PS) identified in CRR Review of Two
Strategic Commands (Bi-SC), backed by some planning assumptions. If an

146 AJP-1 (D), Allied Joint Doctrine, 2010, translated by the author, page 127
147 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, 2014, page 239
148 Ibid, page 245

72
 anticipated crisis occurs, then the appropriate CONPLAN will require further review
and development to take into account the circumstances of the current situation.

b. Standing Defence Plan. The Standing Defence Plan (SDP) is prepared to deal for a
long time with a threat to collective defence security, of Article 5 with a short notice /
or no notice. The purpose of the Standing Defence Plan is that it be a fully developed
operational plan capable of being implemented quickly with the command of certain
forces as well as with the authority of delegated implementation at the appropriate
command level. Consequently, … “for the development of the Standing Defence Plan,
coordination with subordinate commands, international organizations, as well as
with other state and non-state actors is required149.

2. Crisis Response Planning. Crisis response planning is conducted, in response to a

current or emerging crisis, either under Article 5 or out of Article 5, and requires the
development of an Operation Plan (OPLAN) according to NAC Guidelines150. If a crisis
is anticipated, OPLAN may be developed based on an existing CONPLAN, although it is
still necessary to follow the OPLAN preparation process in order to validate previous
planning assumptions; and if the crisis has not been anticipated, OPLAN should be
prepared in response to the existing circumstances. An Operation Plan is a detailed,
complete and feasible implementation plan for which forces are assigned and fully
prepared.

Conclusions and recommendations:

Based on above issues, my proposal is to establish a National Defence Planning System

based on the Alliance's collective defence planning process (NDPP), recommending the
following measures:

1. institutionalize a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the Republic of Albania to

make an assessment of capabilities needed to defend the country as a NATO member,
especially in the context of the Strategic Concept of the Alliance and the Collective
Defence Planning Process (NDPP);

2. establish working groups for the update of a National Security Strategy and Military
Strategy as an allied country in the spirit of collective defence as the main basis for
defence planning, force planning and operations planning;

3. develop a concept of an improved functional operational planning system at strategic,

operational and tactical level in AAF as a NATO member country, through issuance

149 Ibid, page 246

150 Ibid, page 176
73
 of a Political-Military Guidance on AAF Strategic Planning of Operations. This
Guidance may be issued by senior authorities, such as the President / Prime Minister,
or the Minister of Defence, in order to start strategic, operational and tactical planning
of AAF operations;

4. based on the Political and Military Guidance, prepare the Planning Scenarios/
Situations the AAF units will be involved in the medium term; develop strategic,
operational and tactical planning of the country's defence; operation plans of the
Armed Forces units abroad under the collective defence (CD, Article 5) and Crisis
Response (CRO) in cooperation with NATO authorities; develop operational
planning for the entire spectrum of civil emergency operations, based on planning
scenarios for civilian emergencies;

5. develop the AAF Mission's Essential Tasks List from the strategic level to the tactical
level, based on the experience of NATO Task List (NTL);

6. establish a readiness unit system according to the categories of readiness expressed in

the Allied Force Standards (AFS-1 to AFS-9), for land, air, naval forces and other
headquarters and special units;

7. continue with ratification and implementation of main STANAGs/ APs related to

AAF operational planning in the framework of collective defence, ranging from
'capstone' doctrines, other doctrines of major operations within and out of Article 5;
build the doctrinal hierarchy of AAF;

8. develop a framework of regional cooperation in the context of regional emergencies

of different types among the countries of our region;

9. provide for continuous improvement of training and education curricula of TRADOC

institutions, regarding operational planning of Article 5 and out of Article 5 of the
Alliance.

10. provide training, education, and evaluation according to the TEEE Alliance System
(ACT); implement CREVAL, TACEVAL, and MAREVAL systems for evaluation of
land, air and sea units;

11. cooperate with the Alliance at strategic level, to begin timely planning of the
collective defence planning scenarios for the protection of Albania under Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty;

74
III. CHAPTER III : HARMONIZATION OF DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM
OF ALBANIA WITH NATO NDPP

III.1. Introduction to Defence Planning in Albania

In the first chapter we provided an analytical overview of fundamentals of defence
planning, while in the second chapter we explored collective defence planning in NATO
and some member countries. This third chapter will focus on the current defence planning
system in Albania and improvements to be made until 2024 and beyond, in order that the
defence planning system of Albania is harmonized and consolidated as a NATO member
country.

This PhD dissertation is exactly a modest effort to help in this process. From theory to
practice, we have many questions to make and many solutions to provide over the time
ahead. Despite the progress already made so far, we have not yet established a
consolidated defence planning system as an allied country.

Our country has begun to apply fragmented NATO planning practices since Partnership
for Peace period and later as an aspirant country. With membership in the PfP Initiative
in 1994, our country formulated for the first time after the democratic changes, the
Defence Policy and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania in 1996
with concrete targets of harmonization with the Alliance. Later, we also formulated and
approved the Military Strategy. The 2007 Military Strategy was updated in 2014, while
the 2004 National Security Strategy was updated in 2013.

The main legal basis related to strategic defence planning, such as the Law on AAF
Command and Control Authorities, Law on Armed Forces, Law on Ranks and Career,
Law on National Security Strategy, Law on Military Strategy, LTDP, etc., which were in
force since the period when Albania was a partner or aspirant country, and improved over
the period 2013-2015. So, all agree that this legal basis directly related to strategic
planning requires periodic review in accordance with the security situation, financial
constraints, and reforms as an Allied country.

Also, part of the AAF strategic plans in force since pre-accession years, such as the AAF
Long-Term Development Plan 2007, updated in 2015, while some of the AAF strategic
and operational plans, as well as most of AAF planning scenarios / scenarios, which were
outdated, are being adapted to the reality of collective defence. Such a reform is also
being extended to the AAF training, education and evaluation institutions. AAF doctrinal,
operational and material standardization is on the agenda since 2009; the same we can
say with the “lessons learned” system. Further, the readiness system is being revised and

75
subject to relevant changes, while the system of missions essential task list of unit is
being updated, etc.

On the other hand there are lots of other positive movements: the Strategic Defence
Review Process (SDR) was completed in 2013. A new SDR is launched in 2018 based on
SDR institutionalization on a periodic basis. This Defence Review method is used by all
new member countries of the Alliance after joining the Alliance. In my view, the
Strategic Defence Review is the basic defence planning document for countries
experiencing qualitative changes, such as joining the Alliance, or after important summits
such as Wales’s summit, or the last one in Brussels. SDR findings will pave the way for
quality reforms in the long run, and this issue will be further handled in the next chapter.

As a conclusion of this introduction, in my assessment, the approach to be followed in

this major reform effort should have a top-down method. For the main reason, the process
of this quality reform should be institutional and supervised by democratic civil
authorities of the country.

III.2. Harmonization of Albanian Defence Planning with NDPP Process.

NATO authorities are recently more and more talking about new reforms, new ways,
more effective management, avoidance of duplication and parallel structures, etc., always
with the slogan "to build more (capabilities) by spending less”.151 So, one main goal of
the Alliance is to reduce the size and increase the quality of capabilities required for
future operations. On the other side, "…the purpose of NATO defence planning is to
create a framework where the Alliance's collective defence planning activities are
aligned with those of its individual countries to achieve the objectives most efficiently”.152
In this framework, harmonization of Albanian defence planning in cooperation with the
two strategic commands of the Alliance, for a smooth transition of defence planning
reform, outlined 5 priority areas of cooperation, which No.4 area stated the immediate
need for "setting a framework for a smooth transition from current national defence
planning to NATO collective defence planning”153.

This harmonization process is under development; periodical meetings with the two
strategic commands of the Alliance between 2011 and 2013 served this very purpose.
NATO-Albania Integration Conference Report, stated that "Albania's National Defence
Planning should be aligned with the Collective Defence Planning Process (NDPP).
Decision-makers have deficiencies over NDPP knowledge, and few NDPP national

151 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Munich Security Conference, Speech, page 3

152 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009, page 1-1
153 Briefing held in the 4-th Integration Conference NATO-Albania, June 2011

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experts are in MOD. Consideration should be given to the modification of the defence
planning process of the Republic of Albania ..., as well as the training of experts in this
field”154
As a new allied country, it is very important for Albania to further harmonize the national
defence planning process with the collective defence planning process. In simpler terms,
this means that "... when the Alliance in Brussels is in the first step of the formulation of
NATO Defence Planning Guidance, we in Tirana should be also in the first step, that of
the formulation of Defence Policy of Albania”155.
"One thing is for sure: national defence planning is now more than ever linked with
collective defence planning; with the obligations we offer and the benefits we enjoy. Our
ability is to be "smart" in solving the equation with two unknown variables; obligations
and benefits”156.
The approach for a national defence planning system harmonized with that of collective
defence planning will be associated with many positive effects. In my assessment, the
five following areas will produce the most positive effects:
- Harmonization of defence planning process will be associated with an harmonization
of processes, methodology, content, steps, timelines, responsible authorities, defence
planning products, and relevant capabilities, while avoiding significant shortages that
have wasted much energy, time, personnel, and often other resources, etc.
- Harmonization of defence planning process will link our defence planning process to
the benefits and obligations we have from and to collective defence. National defence
planning is part of the collective defence planning. Harmonization with collective
defence makes us understand what we need to plan for NATO and what NATO will
plan for us, in order to understand, in addition to contributions to collective defence,
the Alliance's obligations under Article 5 to our country.
- Harmonization of defence planning process will bring a new 'top down' approach to
defence planning based on all disciplines. This will avoid production of documents,
development of parallel structures, and make us speak with the same language in both
national and international organizations. We have sometimes produced invalid
documents, not associated with related action plans, which have served well as
academic documents, but that have slept in drawers and are not properly applied.
- Harmonization of defence planning process will bring adoption of the best allied
defence planning experience in our national system. This is an experience tested by

154 Report of the Albanian – NATO Integration Conference, 08-09 June 2011, Tirana, Albania, page 4
155 Hudhra Th., Military Review, TRADOC Edition June 2011, page 34
156 Hudhra Th., KSN, Reflections on Collective Defence Planning for Albania and AAF, Military Review, March 2011

77
 the best Alliance experts. Moreover, with little change, this is the process followed in
the European Union as well, so this is in our favour (a single set of forces concept).
- Harmonization of defence planning process will bring about a harmonization of work
in MoD/GS integrated staff and greater engagement of the highest civil and military
authorities. Defence planning is one of the main tasks at the political and strategic
level. Decisions taken by collective defence authorities/bodies are often associated
with the relevant costs for all allied countries. Being out of a harmonized process can
enforce wrong attitudes, positions or decisions.

Conclusions. Sub-chapters III.3, III.4 and III.5 below, based on an analytical

overview and comparative study, describe my proposal for an updated Defence
Planning System in Albania. I have outlined the main areas of harmonisation of
Albanian Defence Planning System with the NATO Defence Planning System with
special focus on a 5-steps Best Practice Model, harmonisation of Planning
Documents, Planning Disciplines, Planning Scenarios, etc.:

III.3. Steps of Defence Planning Process in Albania: Best Practice Model

Albania and the Armed Forces should develop an official Defence Planning Document as
a member of the Alliance. This document should be based on NATO's Defence Planning
Process (NDPP) and follow a "top-down" approach. Below, I have proposed a “best
practice” model for Albania with the following 5 steps:
Table 4: Steps of a Defence Planning Process in Albania (Project of the author)
Steps Description of Albanian Defence Planning Process
Step 1 Formulation of Defence Policy/Guidance: How to accomplish the defence of the
country? This is explained by a defence policy guidance approved by high decision
making authorities. (NSS, DP).
Step 2 Setting Capability Requirements: How much capabilities are needed to
accomplish assigned mission and tasks? This is explained by the Military Strategy
approved by high decision making authorities (MS).
Step 3 Allocation of Capabilities and Setting Targets: What are the goals and how are
they apportioned between forces/ services? This includes the Long Term
Development Plan with allocated goals for each forces/ services. (LTDP)
Step 4 Facilitation of Capability Implementation: How are forces/ services supported to
implement their goals? This includes medium term budget programs and support with
resources (finance, personnel, material) (MTBP)

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Step 5 Assessment and Review of the Results: How is the development of capabilities
monitored and assessed? This considers the progress and review of plans/ programs.

Step 1 – Formulation of Defence Policy/ Guidance. This step may include the
development of the National Security and Defence Policy documents. The development
of these strategic documents is conducted simultaneously or after the formulation of the
Political and Military Assessment of National, Regional and Global Security
Environment. The policy guidance can also take place after issuance of an allied strategic
document, such as the Strategic Concept, or the Defence Policy Guidance, or MC-161.
This Step sets out the Level of Ambition of Albania for participation in national and
international, NATO, EU, UN-led operations, or other Coalition-led missions. When
defining the Level of Ambition, both current operations and the lessons learned from
operations are taken into consideration.
Based on Assessment of Security Environment and Security and Defence Strategy, we
should draft strategic scenarios (planning situations) on engagement of the Armed Forces
and other civil-military capabilities.
Step 2 - Setting Capability Requirements. This step may include the
development of the Military Strategy, the Defence Guidance, and the Guidelines of the
Chief of Staff for Long Term Planning.
The Military Strategy is the country's top strategic military document. It provides the
objectives, principles, concepts, structures, missions, capabilities and basic approaches to
the development of the Armed Forces to fulfil their mission. These elements should be
expressed by the Strategy in the format of goals to be achieved, ways to be followed, and
means to be made available (ends, ways and means).
The Defence Guidance is the breakdown of development policies and priorities expressed
in the Defence Policy. The Defence Guidance should clearly state the Minimum Military
Capability Requirements the country needs to meet the Level of Ambition. This is done
through the analysis of strategic scenarios and identification/ development of force
packages for each specific scenario.
The Defence Guidance can be associated with sectorial guidelines for 12 -13 planning
disciplines (force planning, equipment, C3, logistics, etc., as proposed in III-5), which
should support the principles and priorities of the Defence Guidance.
It is important that each scenario of the set of approved planning scenarios is evaluated in
the light of the expectation of the participation of other forces, e.g. either a NATO-led
engagement, EU or UN-led operations, or a national engagement. This approach will
make us define the size and organization of our forces and many other elements.

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This Step also makes a comparison between the Minimum Capability Requirements and
existing AAF capabilities, defining surpluses and shortages of capabilities. So, how much
‘surplus’ capabilities we have which are no longer needed, and how much ‘shortage’
capabilities we do not have, which need to be developed, etc.
Step 3 – Allocation of capabilities and setting targets. This step may include
the development of the Long Term Development Plan of the Armed Forces, as well as
those of Land, Navy and Air Force forces (services).
This is the phase of allocating the Minimum Capability Requirements arising from the set
of scenarios, between land forces, air force, navy, main HQ commands and other support
services, as well as national civil capabilities engaged in security and defence.
We expect in this step the Alliance to allocate our assigned Force Goals in the interest of
collective defence (now Capabilities Targets). It is therefore essential that the allocation
of capabilities is matched in time and content with the allocation of national objectives.
From this next step, we must pay particular attention to the allocation of Alliance Goals/
Targets and we must be very active in sharing the goals/targets both in allied and national
force plan, based on discussions about financial limitations, political implications,
resource issues, and many others.
In the framework of international cooperation, the development of joint regional, bilateral
or multilateral capabilities can be assessed. In our case, in a given period, it would be
reasonable and convenient to develop smart shared capabilities especially with the
Republic of Kosovo, but also in other multinational or regional formats.
Step 4 – Facilitation of implementation and development of capabilities. This
step may include the development of the Medium Term Budget Program (MTBP).
This is the phase when the required capabilities are developed and their implementation
is monitored. This is achieved through implementation of organizational unit structure,
implementation of modernization of equipment and systems, development of doctrinal
staff, development of standardization of the Armed Forces in general, as well as those of
each of forces (services) in particular.
Likewise, at this stage we can expect NATO monitoring teams visit for implementation
of Capability Targets in the framework of the DPCS survey. We need to keep in mind
that long term capability planning of LTDP is in full compliance with issues, deadlines
and capabilities of NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey and EU Questionnaire.
Step 5 – Monitoring and Review the Results.
This step may include the Annual Progress Report on development of capabilities and
harmonization with the DPCS annual report. This step may consider the assessment of
progress and capability review based on the analysis of the plans.
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As it is well known, report and delivery of the Survey (DPCS) from the countries is made
on each even year (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020 ...), while discussion and review
of DPCS Plans with allied countries are made bi-annually on each odd year (2011, 2013,
2015, 2017, 2019 ...). These alternatives should also be taken into account for updating
the AAF Long-term Development Plan once in two years.
In my analysis, what is the proposed defence planning ‘best practice’ model bringing
about?
- The proposed model creates a standard model to answer "who does what, when, how
and in cooperation with whom" in the field of defence planning in the Republic of
Albania;
- The above model harmonizes the national defence planning system with that of the
collective defence of the Alliance, and later with that of the European Union;
- Use of this model will bring about significant savings of human, material and
financial resources, because we can clearly identify what we will develop under
collective defence and what we develop on our own;
- Adopting such a harmonized model will make us feel comfortable at all levels of the
collective defence system, represented in the highest level of summits, committees,
agencies, working groups and panels of the Alliance;
All of the above steps should normally include other issues, such as who drafts the plans,
who approves them, their deadlines, support, implementation authority, reports, and other
details, as appropriate.

III.4. Harmonization of Main Defence Planning Documents with NATO

To develop a Defence Planning System for Albania as a NATO member, we must
necessarily have in the first step of the system a full hierarchy of strategic security and
defence documents. Most of this set of strategic documents are approved by legal
authorities, which makes the pillar of civilian control over the armed forces. Despite the
significant progress made by Albania over the last two decades concerning the
development of strategic defence documents, I believe that now as a full-fledged NATO
country, we need to reorganize this set of documents in line with the current membership
situation.
I have provided the following proposed package of strategic documents based on a
maximum approach. On the other hand, time has shown that the more documents we
have, the more confusion it becomes, and the more time we lose. In order to get
maximum benefit, some of the documents must be integrated, proposing an integrated
package for a small country like Albania, but this is not the subject of this doctoral thesis.
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The Alliance and allied countries have their basic documents defining their attitudes and
positions on various key security and defence issues. It would not be serious that
positions of allied countries agreed upon by Alliance's strategic documents would
contradict their positions at national level. Coherence of attitudes and consensus building
for collective decision-making is one of the strongest points of the Alliance.
Below, I have described the hierarchy of 8 main national security and defence planning
documents to be harmonized with equivalent collective defence planning documents:
Table 4: A project of Albania equivalent defence planning documents
No. Harmonization of Main Defence Planning Documents
NATO ALBANIA
1 North Atlantic Treaty Constitution of Republic of Albania
NATO Strategic Concept National Security Policy/ Strategy
2 NATO Political Guidance National Defence Policy/ Strategy
3 Directive 400-3 on Military Military Strategy (MS)
Implementation of Strategic Concept
4 Defence Planning Guidance Defence Planning Guidance
5 Intelligence Estimate MC - 161 Assessment of Security Environment
6 Defence Review Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
7 Defence Planning Capability Survey AAF Long Term Development Plan
8 Set of Planning Situations/ Scenarios Set of Planning Situations/ Scenarios

1. National Security Strategy/ Policy (NSS/NSP). NSS is the fundamental document

of national security planning. At the national level, NSS is based on the Constitution
of Albania, while internationally it should be based on Washington Treaty / Alliance
Strategic Concept as well as the EU's ESDP. It should reflect the development of state
policies for the safety of citizens, society and the Albanian democratic state against
domestic and foreign risks and threats. The National Security Strategy is approved by
the Assembly of the Republic of Albania and revised over a period of four years.
The difference between NSS and NSP is: while NSP indicates what should be done in
the area of national security, NSS shows how it should be done. In fact, only large
countries have both separate documents, while many countries, and especially small
countries, like Albania, have NSP and NSS in a single document.

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 The National Security Strategy/ Policy document is drafted under the direction of
civilian authorities (MFA-led), by an inter-ministerial group made by governmental,
non-governmental, civil society, academic and research institutions, etc, and
approved by the Assembly. The responsibility of the MoD and GS in formulation of
NSS is to define the defence policy and AAF role on security of the country, as well
as the description of missions, activities and capabilities needed to implement the
defence policy component of NSS. Also, NSS should include "... three key security
components: state security, social security and individual security".
Following the adoption of the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance in November
2010 in Lisbon, many allied countries made improvements to their existing National
Security Strategies. Albania, after joining the Alliance, adopted the NSS in 2013, in
form and content, agenda, capabilities and basic attitudes of collective security
(NATO, EU).
2. National Defence Policy (NDP). NDP is the country's leading defence policy
document at political level. NDP is a document equivalent to NATO Political
Guidance, as well as the EU's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At national level,
the Defence Policy is based on the Constitution of Albania and the National Security
Policy/ Strategy. At NATO level, Defence Policy depends on the Alliance Strategic
Concept.
Defence Policy of Albania defines the basic defence concept of the country under the
collective defence, and the relation between collective defence and individual defence
in the Alliance. It defines development policies, priorities and main capabilities that
AAF should develop in the medium term of 4-6 years, or linked to a government
mandate. Also, while the Alliance's Political Guidance is based on the Alliance's
Strategic Concept and approved once every four years by the North Atlantic Council
at the level of the Defence Ministers, the Defence Policy of Albania is based on or
may be part of the NSS, and the program of the government in the field of defence.
Development and implementation of Defence Policy document is the responsibility of
the integrated staff of the Ministry of Defence and consulted with all interested
stakeholders. Defence policy can be part of the National Security Policy / Strategy
document, or it can be a separate document.
NDP should express the Level of Ambition of the country (the number and size of
simultaneous operations, in the country and abroad) and is the reference point of the
defence planning of the Alliance for Defence Capability Requirement Review, based
on the set of planning scenarios.

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 Defence policy can be broken down into a more detailed set of policies by the
Defence Minister, such as personnel policy, financial policy, modernization policy,
and so on.
National Defence Policy and Defence Planning Guidance (NDP and DPG) may be
formulated together or separately. Again only large countries have both separate
documents, while many countries, and especially small countries, like Albania, have
NDP and DPG in a single document, called Policy and Planning Guidance.
3. Defence Planning Guidance (DPG). DPG is the main document describing in details
the Defence Planning System of the country (steps, processes, disciplines, documents,
authorities, participation, products, timelines, relations, etc.). Equivalent document
in the Alliance is NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP PO (2009) 0042157). The
DPG document is missing in the inventory of strategic defence planning documents in
Albania.
DPG is clearly focused on 10-13 Defence Planning Disciplines, through specific
guidelines for each of them. The Ministry of Defence should have a package of
planning disciplines that represent 10/13 defence planning areas as a whole. This
package should in principle be approved by the Defence Policy Council of the MoD.
Lack of this guidance, has led in several cases to the mistake that we have drafted the
Military Strategy before the National Security Strategy, or a subordinate document
before a superior document.
As the guidance covers many areas of interest, it should be developed by an ad-hoc
defence planning group with participation from all defence planning disciplines in
AAF and Albania.
4. National Military Strategy (NMS). NMS is the main document of military planning
and organization of national power at the strategic level. NATO equivalent document
for a National Military Strategy is the Directive 400/3 on Military Implementation of
Strategic Concept. It relies on the National Security Strategy, Defence Policy, and is
in line with NATO Strategic Concept. NMS revision should normally take place
every four years, i.e. whenever there are changes in the National Security Policy/
Strategy document or due to changes in the security environment, new governments,
and in the context of institutional periodical planning process of the country.
NMS formulation and revision is the GS responsibility, with co-ordination and
supervision by the Ministry of Defence and is subject to review and opinions of other
state security structures. NMS is approved by Albanian Parliament to reflect the
civilian control over the Armed Forces. The NMS document includes an analysis of

157 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process, 2 April 2009
84
 the security environment, AAF objectives, mission and tasks in times of peace, crisis
and war, the development of related capabilities of AAF organization structure, the
level of ambition of AAF (if necessary) for national and international operations, as
well as the necessary defence resources (ends, ways and means) .
5. Assessment of Security Environment. Document MC-161 "Intelligence Estimate" is
the Alliance's basic document for assessment of the future security environment. This
document has a secret classified character.
Currently, we do not have a full national document in size and content with this allied
document. Without such a professional document, no realistic planning of the
necessary security and defence capabilities can be made. The assessment of security
environment should be conducted every 4 years by the intelligence, counter-
intelligence and information structures (civil and military) of the Alliance for the next
10 to 20 years, together with inputs of security and defence researchers, think tank,
academic experts, civil society, and other interested actors.
This document is the basic document on security environment for the development of
National Security Strategy, Defence Policy, Military Strategy, Strategic Defence
Review, etc.
In my analysis, such a document should be developed by 2018 by the respective
structures, preceding the SDR process, the New Security Strategy and Military
Strategy. Research institutions, strategic studies in the field of security and defence,
as well as studies conducted by collective security organizations, think tanks, etc.
should not be left out of the process. Also, documents such as 'Multiple Future
Project', 'Alliance Vision 2030', 'Joint Vision 2030', etc., should be considered.
6. Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the
Republic of Albania is an element of the defence planning process. It is equivalent
with the Defence Requirement Review of NATO Defence Planning Process. As such,
Defence/Capability Requirement Review (DRR) should be integrated in the SDR
document as a single document.
As a member of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, and an applicant for EU membership,
Albania should also develop such a process. If so, it can be institutionalized in the law
of the Armed Forces Command and Control Authorities.
Strategic Defence Review is a cyclical process that takes place every 4-6 years or
more. SDR is a visionary document associated with relevant reforms, implemented
through a long-term LTDP. Its results are provided in a final report approved by the
executive (government) or by the legislature.

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 SDR is a modern method of updating defence capabilities. The ultimate goal of the
SDR is to guide the long-term development process of transformation and generation
of reforms in the security and defence sector. Albania has all national capacities and
expertise to develop this review. It should be initiated and its products should be
valued at a high level of security and defence authorities to launch implementation of
appropriate defence reforms.
Based on the most recent SDR processes of other allied countries, the Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) may be further expanded with a comprehensive participation
and findings under a Strategic Security and Defence Review (SSDR).
7. AAF Long Term Development Plan. LTDP is the Strategic Vision of the Chief of
General Staff for the next 10 years in response to the Military Strategy and Defence
Planning Guidance and other national strategic documents, translating their level of
ambition into the necessary military capabilities. LTDP is equivalent to NATO
Defence Planning Capability Survey questionnaire (NATO DPCS), which planning
looks 10 years ahead. It is also based on NATO Strategic Concept, and in particular
on resources made available to the defence.
The LTDP revision can be developed on a periodic basis, based on the findings of the
Strategic Defence Review. Normally, each SDR should be followed by a new or
improved LTDP.
The main responsibility of the defence review of the Armed Forces is to GS (Force
Planning Directorate / J-5), in cooperation with all J-s in GS, MoD Directorates and
Main Commands. Being a 10 year long plan, it can be approved by the Defence
Minister, but given its longer vision than a government mandate and required
resources, this plan can be adopted in Parliament in a summary way, as many NATO
countries do.
Major Commands of the Armed Forces may also develop their own Long Term
Development Plans, based on AAF LTDP, in order to accomplish their mission and
tasks, conduct their joint operations inside and outside the country, meet objectives
and priorities for development of capabilities in the long-term, manage defence
resources, modernize systems and equipment, deploy and employ forces and develop
their operational levels.
As NATO has gone through an automated system of collective defence planning
(NDPASS)158 our system should also try to build and use a similar system.
8. Set of Planning Scenarios/ Situations. The Set of Planning Scenarios or planning
situations for national and international operations to be conducted by AAF, is a

158 NATO Defence Planning Automated Support System

86
 planning document of defence planning. It is equivalent with the Package of Planning
Scenarios of AAF. The first draft of the Set of Scenarios for AAF operations planning
took place in 2013, presented as part of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
document.
Scenarios can be real or generic (based on the Assessment of Security Environment
(MC 161) according to their sensitivity and degree of secrecy. They should be such
that, if they occur, they give the opportunity for a flexible approach of their
implementation.
Scenarios will be the reference of the development of future force packages, together
with their organization, training, equipment and doctrines. Also, scenarios are based
on the logic of integration of capabilities (not arithmetic totals), on integration of
similar modules, leading to the total number of necessary capabilities of AAF.
This task is accomplished by the GS under the J3 & J5 coordination, always in
coordination with the force commanders and subordinate services, and under the
supervision of the integrated defence staff. The result of this process is elaboration of
force packages for engagement in planning scenarios.
My recommendation is that Planning Scenarios/ Situations are integrated in the SDR
Document. The next SDR draft 2018 may revise the previous draft, enriching or
simplifying it. This set of scenarios includes all the possible situations to be engaged,
from civil emergencies, crisis response, or combat operations of Article 5 or non-
Article 5, command & control, engagement rules, etc.

III.5. Harmonization of Defence Planning Disciplines with NATO

Defence Planning is a multiple/integrated planning disciplines. Defining component
disciplines of collective defence planning is of particular importance. The same is for all
defence planning disciplines of countries, which are integrated as a set/package of
disciplines. This approach makes the Alliance forces and individual countries armed
forces work for development of all required capabilities to fulfil their mission and tasks.

As we have addressed in Chapter II.3, the Alliance has 13 planning disciplines within
collective defence planning. The question is: when NATO has 13 planning disciplines
what about planning disciplines of individual allied countries? In this context, what set of
planning disciplines can specifically use our country? What planning disciplines can be
eliminated and what planning discipline can be added as national responsibility and
specificity?

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In this case, to respond these questions, Albania may also take as a reference the set of 13
disciplines of collective defence planning. Taking as a reference does not imply the copy-
paste method, but it implies realistic and creative assessment in our country's conditions.
It implies an analysis of each of them and inclusion of disciplines that have current and
future weight in planning our national defence in the framework of collective defence.

Based on an analysis of all planning disciplines, I have recommend a maximum package

of 12 key planning disciplines included in the defence planning umbrella. This set is
flexible and can be subject to discussions between all responsible national defence
planning authorities. Once consensus is reached, this set of disciplines is formalized in
the Defence Planning Guidance. These 12 disciplines will also be one of the main
annexes of the Long Term Development Plan of the AAF (LTDP).

For example, for reasons that are already known, among the 13 planning and collective
defence disciplines, we can not have a nuclear planning discipline or air defence planning
discipline (missile defence) etc., because they are attribute of the Alliance's collective
assets but we should articulate our positions and attitudes in the context of consensus
building in the Alliance. Also, some planning disciplines are entirely national
responsibility, such as disposal of surplus ammunition, or AAF peacetime force
stationing, and so on.

Large countries have a special policy for any specific discipline, while small countries
have a single consolidated document of Defence Planning Guidance, exploring all
defence planning disciplines, associated with specific long term plans.

Below, I have proposed a package of 12 disciplines of defence planning of the Republic

of Albania at the strategic level. This number can be reduced by integration of several
disciplines with each other. This package may also be subject to the concept of integrated
planning discipline package (e.g. based on combat, combat support, and logistical support
functions).

Table 5: Set of disciplines of defence planning in Albania (project of the author)

Harmonization of defence planning disciplines in Albanian AAF
No NATO ALBANIA
1 Force Planning Force Planning
2 Armament Planning AAF Modernization Plan
3 C3 Planning C2 Planning
4 Resource Planning Resource Planning

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 5 Logistic Planning Logistics Planning
6 Intelligence Planning Intelligence Planning
7 Nuclear Planning -
8 Civil Emergency Planning Civil Emergency Planning
9 Standardization Planning Standardization Planning
10 Medical Support Planning Medical Support Planning
11 R&D Planning -
12 Operations Planning Operations Planning
13 - Peacetime Stationing Infrastructure Planning
14 Air Traffic Management Planning Disposal of Excess Ammunition Planning

1. Force Planning. Force Planning is the main defence planning discipline. General
Staff, coordinated by Directorate J5, is responsible for planning and implementation
this discipline. Based on strategic documents and the Defence Guidance, Force
Planning should consider both forces for national operations and the forces available
to NATO / EU / UN / Coalitions led operations under the "single set of forces"
concept. The product of Force Planning is the Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP)
and the Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS).
2. Resource Planning. Resource planning is of high importance and has a wider
spectrum than before. This planning is mainly related to financial resources. MoD
Directorate of Planning and Defence Resources and J8 in GS is responsible for this
discipline. Resource planning is carried out through the development of Mid-Term
Budget Programs and annual budgets. The resource plan should consider
development and use of capabilities for national and international operations, as well
as budget obligations of membership in collective security structures.
3. AAF Modernization Planning. This planning is equivalent to NATO Armament
Planning. MoD Directorate of Modernization and General Staff are responsible for
planning and implementation of this plan, which may be part/annex of LTDP.
Because of the high cost of AAF's main equipment and systems, this planning area
requires special efforts for deep reforms, as their procurement becomes increasingly
complex under the context of smart procurement policies. Also, major procurements
require a longer period of time than all other disciplines.
4. Logistics Planning. Logistic Planning is AAF logistic support planning in their daily
activities and current operations. Logistic Planning is a task of J4 Directorate in GS. It
is a part/ annex of AAF Long Term Development Plan. In addition to current
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 operations, Logistic Planning takes also into account support of future operations.
Logistic planning plays a decisive role in the success of future operations, both inside
and outside the country. Special logistic planning is attached to logistic support of
national contributions to Article 5 Operations and Crisis Response Operations.
5. Standardization Planning. This planning involves the long-term standardization of
the Armed Forces according to Alliance standards. It is based on an Annual and a
Medium Term Standardization Plan. It is directed by GS (J5) and co-ordinated by
Doctrine and Training Command. Standardization planning will be selective based on
priorities of Capability Target package, starting from participation in current and
future operations and following a top-down approach, with particular regard to
financial support of implementation of ratified STANAGs/ APs. This planning should
also consider the development of specific national doctrines and manuals of the
Armed Forces, especially for national operations outside Alliance-led operations.
6. Intelligence Planning. Intel Planning has received the status of a special discipline. It
should cover all three levels: strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and
tactical intelligence. Spectrum of today's operations require a new mindset for
intelligence at all levels. At strategic level, the Strategic Assessment of Security
Environment document (MC-161 Intelligence Estimate) is one of the basic national
and collective defence planning documents. At a tactical and operational level, the
intelligence plan becomes decisive for success of the operations. Intel Planning (often
counter-intelligence and security included) is run by Directorate J2 in GS.
7. Medical Support Planning. Medical Support Planning should be a separate planning
discipline of operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Medical Support
is a national responsibility at certain levels; at other levels it has to be contracted or
planned based on other solutions. This planning discipline is generally managed by
the Health Inspectorate (or Logistics Department).
8. Research & Technology Planning. This planning discipline is introduced as a new
discipline of NATO defence planning. Individual nations apply this discipline only
when they have available capabilities for R&D Planning. R&D is of high cost so it is
difficult to be applied by small countries, which can only apply limited research and
no development capacities. It can be planned at the strategic and tactical level.
Research may be conducted by genuine research institutions of MoD; The Defence
Academy and Research and Doctrine Centre. My proposal is that research should
have a separate category in the defence budget.
9. Operations Planning. Operations are one of major defence planning disciplines. This
planning focuses on mission and tasks of the Armed Forces and is carried out based
on planning situations/scenarios (national operations and collective defence
operations, Article 5 and not Article 5). Operations planning will take place under the
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 modular concept of "joint" and "multinational" task forces. This discipline also
includes Civil Emergencies planning in support of the Ministry of Public Order, now
under the MoD. The basic document for operations planning of the Armed Forces
may be a Directive/Order of AAF Commander in-Chief, or Minister of Defence. GS
J3 prepares the GS Guidelines for implementation, and coordinates drafting of the
AAF Plan of Operations, which is approved by the Commander in-Chief of the
Armed Forces.
10. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). Civil Emergency Planning should be a planning
disciplines of defence planning, or it may be part of the Operations Planning. Not all
capabilities of civil emergency planning are military, they are both military and
civilian ones. Ministry of Public Order (former Civil Emergency Department) was the
management authority of CEP. Based on Lesson Learned from current CEP
operations, another option is that MoD is the best place for CEP management
activities, command and control and CEP operations, and it is recently approved. A
CEP Pool of military and civilian capabilities should be developed under MOD C2
for CEP operations.
11. Disposal of Excess Ammunition Plan. As a specific country, with massive excess
ammunition from the past, Albania had a special planning discipline, because of this
reality. This planning discipline had a special ad-hoc structure, which stayed in
business as long as it justified its mission. It relates to the relief of the Armed Forces
from the dangerous ammunition stocks of the past. The aim of this plan is to avoid
humanitarian catastrophes and to create a safer environment in the country, to support
the AAF restructuring goals through relief from surplus ammunition, enforcing
NATO requirements and standards, increase the security of ammunition storage
facilities, reduce storage and storage personnel, manage AAF ammunition facilities,
provide licensing of munitions depots according to NATO standards. The plan is
drafted by J-4 and revised periodically.
12. AAF Peacetime Stationing Infrastructure Plan. It is an important plan that defines
the Peacetime Stationing Plan for all AAF structures. It is drafted based on the
organization structure, command-control, other supporting capability infrastructure in
line with AAF main mission and tasks. AAF Peace Stationing Plan is designed taking
into account normal living and working conditions, and training facility conditions for
AAF personnel. This Plan is designed by SHP J3 and J4. The Chief of Staff proposes
to the Minister of Defence for possible changes to the Peacetime Stationing Plan,
which approval Plan is made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

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 Conclusions and Recommendations
 Any planning discipline, despite being run by a specific Directorate, may be
previously discussed by a separate Board, where all relevant stakeholders are
represented. So, planning disciplines prior to being approved by the decision-
making authorities (MoD, GS, etc.) must necessarily be discussed and agreed by
respective Boards, with representatives from relevant Forces and Departments.
 The above boards may be institutionalized in the Defence Ministerial Guidance of
or in a separate directive on functioning MoD boards, in accordance with the
respective decision of the Council of Ministers.
 With establishment of functional Boards, responsible national authorities from
MoD / GS will be assigned as representatives to respective Allied Committees,
Agencies and Boards, as well as national representatives to Albanian Mission at
NATO HQ in Brussels, Strategic Commands, and later at EU HQ.
 There should be ongoing contacts between representatives in the capital and
representatives in the mission (national delegation) in Brussels and two strategic
commands. These relationships can be regulated by an operating standard
procedure or separate regulation.

III.6. A new Level of Ambition (LoA) for Albania as a NATO country.

III.6.1. Introduction to the Level of Ambition of Albania
Sub-section II.7 addressed the Level of Ambition concept, by illustrating NATO level of
ambition and some allied countries. In this sub-chapter I will introduce specifics of a new
project of the Level of Ambition of Albania as an allied country.
As we have analysed, the level of ambition is a political decision-making and its
functional instruments may be political, economic and military. Despite being a political
decision-making, it is defined in accordance with the country's possibilities. Increasing or
decreasing the level of ambition of a country can create unpleasant consequences.
Generally speaking, ambition can be high, moderate, or low. It is based on an analysis of
all national traditional and future factors, and should answer the question: what role will
the instruments of national power and in particular the armed forces play in today's and
expected security environments, on their own or together with the allies?
Defining the level of ambition for Albania is an important decision-making. We must
necessarily have our concept of level of ambition; to know how much civil and military
capabilities we have at our disposal to normally exercise the level of ambition.

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In the military area, more than all other areas, defining the level of ambition is a difficult
exercise process between politicians on one hand and senior military leadership on the
other. It is also important that the level of ambition is clear, so that politicians know well
what they expect from the armed forces, but also for the military is clear what they
should do for their political 'masters'. Otherwise, decisions can be made beyond or below
the expected level of ambition.
Also, we must keep in mind the dynamics of the level of ambition; it is not a fixed
settlement; it is re-negotiable, based on a thorough analysis of many factors. In previous
periods of time, different countries and alliances have had different goals and levels of
ambition. After the Cold War, the levels of ambition have begun to be revised through
Strategic Defence Review (SSDR) processes.
The level of ambition, in terms of defence planning, is a political document. It can be
included in one of the main security and defence policy documents (NSS, NMS, LTDP,
etc.) and can be adopted at a political level, mainly in parliament, so that it has longer
support than a political mandate. Normally, I recommend that our level of ambition is a
modest one, but it should be well argued, analysed, and agreed. Level of Ambition is not
just a will, it is a rational decision.
Currently, we do not have a level of ambition formalized in such a specific document.
Only the document Long Term Development Plan 2007, when Albania was an aspirant
country, outlined the first ever level of ambition of the country, by MoD approval, in
three levels:
 Operational capabilities for defence of the country159.
Capability for Combat Operations: Conducting an operation with the participation of up
to two battalions by 2010 and up to a Brigade by 2015.
Capabilities for Non-combat Operations: conducting up to two simultaneous operations
in support of population in natural disasters and humanitarian crises, with the
participation of battalion level forces.
 Operational capabilities for collective defence160.
Collective Defence Capabilities (Article 5): up to 2010, the goal is our forces are able to
participate with a battalion in NATO collective defence operations (including anti-
terrorism operations), supported by participation of an NSE161 until 2014.
Peace Support Operations (PSO): with the participation of NATO units declared for
NATO, with the participation of up to a battalion until 2010.

159 AAF Long Term Development Plan, VS 2020, Edition 2007, page 20
160 Ibid, page 20
161 National Support Element, note of the author

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  Operational capabilities for Host Nation Support operations162.
In support of Albanian legislation, the Armed Forces, in cooperation with other state
institutions, provide the necessary capabilities as a host country for the NATO, EU and
UN led operations to fulfil their mission. This will be done according to the respective
Partnership Objective (PG G 4255 Host Nation Support).

III.6.2. A new option of Level of Ambition of Albania as an Allied country:

The above level of ambition was when Albania was an aspirant country. Now as an allied
country, this ambition should be re-modelled according to the new situation of NATO
membership, but also of the EU's perspective ahead.

This dissertation will address the level of ambition with regard to the Armed Forces, so
the instrument of military power. This study will focus on the level of ambition of ‘hard
power’, while other ‘soft power’ elements will be mentioned in general, but not treated in
details. Other instruments of national power will remain an unexplored area of study,
almost untreated until now.

We should bear in mind that the level of ambition described below as a new option is
about simultaneous participation and engagement in national and international operations.
In long-term engagement, we need to understand that the capabilities we should have
available should be 3 to 5 times larger than the ones we have in operation, to guarantee
rotations of participation in operation (ratio of rotational capabilities compared with
capabilities in operation).

An in-depth study on the Level of Ambition (LOA) of Albania was provided by BG Piro
Ahmetaj163 in his monograph on "A National Concept on LoA of the Republic of Albania
for Development of a" Single Set of Capabilities”164, as civil-military contributions to
international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE and Coalition-led). He concludes
that the LoA level of RA is: "a Full Operational Capability Battalion, CREVAL Alliance
Certified, a SF Company (Special Force), a MP Company integrated with units and
Capabilities, several medical teams, together with the Ministry of Health, an EOD
Platoon, some financial contributions to the Trust Funds of operations (case by case),
contributions to reconstruction projects - schools, hospitals, streets, etc., as well as 25-30

162 Ibid, page 20

163
BG Piro Ahmetaj, Current Defence Advisor to the President of Albania
164
BG Piro Ahmetaj, “A national concept on LoA of Albania for the development of Single Set of Forces,
civil and military capabilities for national and international ops (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE and Coalition-
led), TRADOC publishing, June 2011, page 43.
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positions in the NATO Command structure, together with the representation staff at the
National Mission (NATO HQ, SHAPE and ACT)”165.

My option of the Level of Ambition of Albania is outlined below, together with specific
explanations. In my option, I have included simultaneous participation and size of
engagement in national and international operations and considered the ‘single set of
forces’ concept for all international organizations. For study purposes, I have divided the
Level of Ambition into three main areas of AAF potential engagement in national and
international operations, and identified the respective capabilities and responsibilities, as
follows:

1) LoA in support of National and Collective Defence Operations (CD);

2) LoA in support of Crisis Response Operations (CRO);

3) LoA in support of Management of Civil Emergencies (CE);

Below, I have given my analysis and arguments in support of each of them:

1) LoA in support of National and Collective Defence Operations (CD): This is LoA
of the Alliance and all individual Allied countries to ensure their own existence,
namely the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Albania. This is also
the foundation of the Collective Defence Planning of the Alliance. This level of
ambition, as we have explained before, is highly binding than all other obligations to
Alliance contribution. Simply, contributions through burden sharing to meet the
Alliance Level of Ambition is achieved through integrated capability packages of all
Levels of Ambition (not arithmetic totals) of individual members of the Alliance.

So, this part of Level of Ambition is more enforced by Article 5 of the Alliance,
however, capabilities of this area are also capabilities for national defence. As stated
above, it is based on a "... reasonable burden sharing between allied countries ...".
Like all allied countries, Albania is allocated a certain package of capabilities for
contribution to CD Article 5 when required, in response to agreed burden sharing in
collective defence.

As explained above, contributions to Alliance capabilities are provided through force

goal/ capability targets packages that are increasingly trying to generate, in addition
to military capabilities, civilian capabilities as well. For more details on this, we can
refer to the package of Capability Targets (CT) of Albania.

165
Ibid, page 45
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 In my judgement, the level of Ambition of Albania for contribution to collective
defence of the Alliance territories should be One Tactical Group of INF-MOT-BN
Capability code, which is a light motorized infantry battalion according to "NATO
Capability Codes and Statements" with an engagement in operation from 6 months to
one year, without further rotation (This reinforced battalion should be organized
according to the specific mission and may be composed as in sub-chapter II.6). As for
the national defence of the country in the framework of collective defence, the level
of ambition is to engage all AAF capabilities to defence of the territories of the
country in cooperation with allied forces. This can be up to a Reinforced Brigade
(Brigade Task Force) or up to three Reinforced Battalions (Battalion Task Force
Group), followed by three-four reserve battalions.

2) LoA in support of Crisis Response Operations (CRO): Albania will participate in

NATO / EU / UN / Coalitions-led CRO operations, across national and allied borders.
This variety of participation, which in exceptional cases may be simultaneous,
requires development of capabilities and rational coordination of their deployment at
the required time. Normally, the ambition to contribute to these capabilities is stated
in the Alliance, EU and UN questionnaires on a periodic basis.
It's good to keep in mind that the ambition for these types of operations is not just
military. Civil contributions can be specified and developed according to the Force
Goal/ Capability Target Package (FG 3783, FG 3784, FG 3785, FG 3786).
My proposal is for a rational simultaneous participation in crisis response operations,
when there are no forces engaged in other operations, conducted on the basis of the
concept of "single set of forces" for all international institutions. The proposed LoA
should be participation of no more than three simultaneous companies in operation,
rotating for several years. The level of companies is used as a measurement unit, as
participation in both platoon and lower levels may be also acceptable, and especially
the use of ‘Niche’ capabilities, such as EOD, PU, OMLT, POMLT, CIMIC, special
expert teams, as well as small teams with trainers, advisors, coordinators, observers,
or participants in PE structures.
To issue the total number of participants up to three companies, the NATO Capability
Code and Statement should be used, while ‘niche’ capabilities and other teams can be
evaluated in numbers based on Force Equivalence System accepted by the Alliance
(e.g., 1 helicopter is equivalent to an infantry platoon, a special force team of 10 is
equivalent to an infantry platoon of 33 people, etc.).
3) LoA in support of Management of Civil Emergencies (CE): This LoA should be
considered as one of the most important AAF operations. It does not make sense for a
force to help the people of Afghanistan, Iraq or other countries, and not to have

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 appropriate capabilities to support its own people in disasters; natural, industrial, or
man-made operations. Of course, military forces should not take the responsibilities
given by the law to other institutions, but they must support them with the necessary
quality and speed when required by a concrete situation.
Of course, we do not expect civil emergencies to happen at the same time, but we
must be prepared for the most probable scenario of a certain number of their
occurrence. Based on the Civil Emergency Strategy, all risks and threat of civil
emergencies should be covered with respective capabilities, no matter where they are
deployed. The armed forces must respond to those operations that require rapid
response, strong command and control, and reliable military expertise. Other
capabilities subordinate to other relevant state institutions should be listed to a pool of
CE capabilities. For this, ‘task forces’ should be established in time, and joint training
and exercises should be planned in conformity with related planning scenarios.
As a reasonable approach, my proposal is that the armed forces should have the
capabilities to support state civil authorities with 1 CE Operation at Battalion Task
Force level; or 2 simultaneous CE operations at Reinforced Company levels (CE
Company Task Force), or 3 simultaneous CE operations at Reinforced Platoon level
(CE Platoon Task Force).
All these capabilities are integrated CE capabilities, not one capability for one
mission, but multi-mission capabilities. They conduct operations under the ‘task
force’ concept in full accordance with the type of emergency. The task force should
be organized tailored to the specific CE mission, with military and civilian
capabilities. They can be placed under the regional support elements (potential
reserve battalions) to be used in the most rational manner. Possibility of national
‘niche’ capabilities is not excluded for emergencies of the highest historical
probability of occurrence in Albania. Also, for specific capabilities, such as command
and control or support, this unit may be supported by other AAF structures.
According to type of emergency, AAF may have a main or a supportive role. Other
state institutions having CE capabilities and expertise should also do the same with
specification of their level of ambition.
The LoA proposed above expresses an option of CE capability package accepted by
our country to be developed to conduct simultaneously and intensity the most difficult
operations we are engaged at home and abroad.
Conclusions and recommendations:
- Level of Ambition outlined in LTDP 2007 needs to be changed and enhanced. It was
a LoA when we were an aspirant country. Now, we are a member country and the
LoA should be changed, considering quality changes of membership of Albania.

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- My recommendation is for a modest level of ambition, but it should be well argued
and analysed and should not overcome the potentials of our country. Often, the level
of ambition was over estimated by the excessive pre-membership enthusiasm.
- Strategic Defence Review of Albania, as an analytical document, should provide a
well-thought approach to the level of ambition of our country, to be approved by high
legal authorities;
- Level of Ambition should consider not only military capabilities, but also civil
capabilities; these should be carefully evaluated according to related FG 2008
Package, and later related to CT 2013 package;
- Level of Ambition for national and international operations now needs to be more
diversified than before; capability package should be richer with non-traditional
capabilities with focus on those 'niche' capabilities with higher equivalence marks.
- Level of Ambition for Civil Emergency capabilities today is of particular importance,
but it should be flexible and should avoid parallel and non-functional structures and
capabilities of the past;
- We do not have the luxury to build specific forces for NATO, specific forces for EU,
UN, and for all other international organisations. We should support a 'single set of
forces' concept for all national and international operations. We can not afford to
build specific forces for specific missions. Our focus should be on development of
forces/capabilities with a wide spectrum of mission, and this requires high expertise
of defence planners.
- We should keep in mind that forces made available for international operations must
be deployable (i.e., have strategic deployment capabilities, etc.). For example, land
forces should have deployment capabilities out of Alliance's area of responsibility,
"within 10% limit of 50% of their total”166. This is a real challenge, especially for
small countries.

III.7. Harmonization of Planning Scenarios of Albania as an Allied country

Albania had some planning scenarios as a partner and aspirant country. These scenarios
have not been organized into a package for future force development, but they mainly
served as operational scenarios for training and exercises of forces. They are relatively
unusable for the new membership situation.

166 Communique of Bratislava Ministerial, June 2009, page 7

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The aim of this dissertation is to provide a general overview of planning scenarios for the
AAF engagement as a NATO country. In my judgment, Alliance membership brings a
new stage of planning scenarios, which I have grouped as follows:
In terms of approach; we can divide the AAF planning scenarios in the two groups: the
first set of scenarios are operations where the armed forces will act alongside the allies
(NATO / EU / UN / Coalitions-led), while the second group are operations where the
armed forces will act on their own.
In terms of level; we can divide the AAF planning scenarios into two categories: The
first category of scenarios is of the political-military nature of the strategic level, while
the second category is of a military nature, and includes the strategic, operational and
tactical level.
In terms of occurrence; we can divide the AAF planning scenarios into two types: real
scenarios, which are more likely to occur with real adversaries, real situations, and real
geographic areas/regions; as well as generic scenarios, which are likely to occur in
general, but mostly fictional situations.
Development of political-military scenarios at strategic level, therefore, on when and how
the armed forces will be engaged, is a political decision-making authority. These types of
planning scenarios will be of value to the development of future forces.
While defining strategic, operational and tactical military scenarios, i.e. planning and
employment of forces at the three levels of operations, this is the duty of the military of
related levels. These types of scenarios will be of value to development of a set of future
operations plans (CONPLANs and SDPs).
Thus, it is imperative that, as an allied country, Albania should have a set of planning
scenarios at the political-military level across the entire spectrum of AAF constitutional
mission as well as collective defence obligations. This set should be developed as soon as
possible, in order to further develop strategic, operational and tactical military scenarios
on which the armed forces will be organized, trained and equipped (Annex F).
Dr. John Clark, in a special monograph of Marshall Centre, in a study on security and
defence reforms in Eastern and Central Europe, answers the question of what might be
the main missions of Armed Forces in the 21st century167. He summarizes them in 6
following main categories:
 Attack/ intervention combat operations;
 Stabilization and International Support Operations;
 Civil Support Operations;

167 John Clark, “What Roles and Missions for Europe’s Military and Security Force in the 21st Century”, 2007, page 5.
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  National Defence Operations;
 Support and Provision of International Humanitarian Assistance;
 Autonomous Military Operations.
Based on this approach, my proposal is to include/attach a separate chapter or annex to
the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) with the set of strategic scenarios and sub-scenarios,
in order that AAF start to develop/update the AAF Plans of Operations, as an allied
country.
In this context, I recommend that the set of AAF strategic planning scenarios maintain a
logical division of national and international operations. So, for study purposes, the areas
of strategic scenarios may be organized with groups of sub-scenarios, such as: sub-
scenarios for National Defence of the country and Collective Defence; sub-scenarios for
contribution to international Crisis Response Operations; sub-scenarios for Civil
Emergency Operations, as well as sub-scenarios for AAF independent operations. First
two types of scenarios will never be conducted independently, but in the framework of
NATO, EU, UN, or coalitions-led operations. Other types of scenarios will be carried out
in support of or in cooperation with other national security agencies, where applicable,
and AAF may have a leading or supporting role.
Constitutional Mission of the Armed Forces: The constitutional mission of Albanian
AAF is and will remain the backbone of the planning scenarios of AAF units. As an
allied country, the AAF constitutional mission is the same, but the method of mission
accomplishment will undergo changes in line with the new situation of collective
defence. It must be translated with realism and creativity into realistic strategic scenarios
of AAF units within and outside the national territory.
According to the Constitution of Albania, the mission of AAF is "To ensure the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Albania; to protect
and support Albanian peoples in times of peace, crisis and war; to contribute to peace
and security in the region and beyond”168
Based on a simple analysis of the constitutional mission of the AAF, there are three main
pillars: the first pillar is the classic mission of any armed force, namely, sovereignty,
independence and integrity of the country from outside adversaries; the second pillar
deals with domestic contributions for the protection and support of the Albanian people;
and the third pillar of the mission is connected with the contribution to peace and
international security.
Prior to NATO membership, the accomplishment of the constitutional mission was
entirely attributed to the AAF of Albania, and despite the progress of our country as a

168 Constitution of the Republic of Albania, 1999, Section of AAF

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partner and aspirant country, the Alliance had no ‘de jure’ obligation to protect the
country's independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity, apart from consultations
stemming from the PfP Framework Document.
Following NATO membership in 2009 and efforts for EU accession, the accomplishment
of constitutional mission, particularly the first pillar, is now attributed to collective
defence. This will be conducted through collective defence scenarios, so we need to
know and reflect on related defence planning, forces, and operations. Along with the
benefits of collective defence, as an allied country, we shall simultaneously provide our
contribution to obligations stemming from the membership. So, AAF mission becomes
more diverse in shape and more dynamic in content than before.
Collective Defence should be viewed with realism and creativity and not considered
absolute in all cases and all situations. Collective Defence scenarios expect that all allied
countries must have available forces to react quickly in certain directions to prevent the
forces of a potential adversary, until the arrival of Alliance forces, upon the activation of
Article 5 by decision-making of collective defence, which may take some time. This
scenario should also be considered as one of the most difficult scenarios.
The aims of this sub-chapter is to provide exact answers to the questions ahead on how
the mission of the Albanian armed forces will now be fulfilled as a NATO member?
What is the difference between accomplishment of AAF mission now as a member
compared to the previous situations as a partner or aspirant country? What new scenarios
should be developed and what old scenarios should we eliminated? What could be a new
package of political-strategic and military scenarios of our country on which AAF units
are organized, trained, equipped and prepared for today and future challenges? We should
be always prepared to give an organized response to the set of difficult questions through
the Strategic Defence Review and reforms generated by this document.
Another important part of the mission, such as civil emergencies, will be fully respected
as national responsibility. However, even in this case, the assistance of other countries is
not excluded, coordinated by NATO and EU civil emergency coordination mechanisms.
This has been shown in all cases when foreign assistance was needed; for more
information there is a critical study of the team led by LtC Fatmir Lokaj "An Analysis of
Civil Emergency Operation in Support of population of the flooded area of Shkodra,
December 2010”169.
NATO itself, as a collective security and defence institution, has 3 types of missions with
17 main tasks and 39 planning scenarios/ situations in and out the Euro-Atlantic area. Just

169 F. Lokaj, Sh. Shllaku, E. Alibali, A. Nikolla, P. Takaj, A. Molla, “Analysis of Civil Emergency Operation in support
of population in Shkodër flooded areas, Research Publication Cycle, Centre for Defence Analysis, 2010.
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as the Alliance's collective defence has obligations for the security and defence of its
members, individual countries also have obligations to collective security and defence.
Based on this concept, namely the balance of benefits from collective defence and
contributions to the collective defence, I recommend a package of planning scenarios for
AAF participation together with engagement of other national security institutions. These
planning scenarios include the entire spectrum of their mission, from planning of national
operations and participation in collective defence of North Atlantic Treaty, EU, UN, and
Coalition-led operations under the concept of a "single set of forces".
The following policy and strategic planning scenarios are the main guideline for the
development of AAF Force/ Capability Requirements and other security institutions.
Force capability requirements for each particular scenario will be made based on the
development of modular capabilities according to each 7 Capability Codes and
Statements.
Likewise, planning scenarios will also designate the required level of readiness of forces
for each scenario in particular, and armed forces in general. Based on planning scenarios,
we should specify the size and types of High Response Forces (HRF), the size and types
of Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR), and the size and types of Long-Term Build-Up
Forces (LTBF) to be developed in AAF. Objective Force 2024 from SDR findings should
consider development of an AAF Readiness System, considering that higher readiness
forces have a much higher cost than other forces.
Strategic scenarios will also serve as 'drivers' for operational and tactical scenarios with
the engagement of related strategic, operational and tactical civilian and military staffs.
With the adoption of strategic scenarios, all relevant country security institutions should
develop their operational plans. As a rule, any strategic scenario will be further developed
in operational plans by ‘lead’ institution, while ‘in support’ institutions will develop their
support plan. Operational scenarios will be tested in various inter-agency training or
exercises.
Based on the new collective security and national security of the Republic of
Albania, my proposal is to consider a set of 5 Strategic Scenarios and 23
Operational Scenarios for AAF engagement and other civilian security
organizations in the country (as they are described below), while not excluding more
integrated formats. Decision making of all strategic scenarios are made by NAC or
other organization level authorities. Scenarios and Sub-scenarios are as follows:

1. Strategic and Operational Scenarios No.1: AAF participation in national

defence in the framework of NATO's collective defence (Article 5), and other
international security organizations.

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The area of Strategic Scenario No.1 may include planning and participation in some
of most potential sub-scenarios derived from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
with regard to the engagement of NATO Alliance in the security and defence of the
country (later in ESDP), in the event of an escalating threat situation against our
country or other allied countries in our region.
These sub-scenarios will be developed in co-operation with SHAPE and JFC
Naples command and their respective headquarters of the Alliance. These scenarios
will be made available to our country when the Alliance takes the political decision
to start collective defence operations’ planning of countries of the region, including
Albania. From these allied scenarios, we need to plan operations of our forces in the
context of general allied planning. As operations under Article 5 (CONPLANs or
SDPs), in line with the potential escalation of the conflict and based on Joint
Operations Plan, our planners should plan participation of national forces in Major
or Smaller Joint Operations.
In addition to above, this does not mean that we should not be prepared to react
quickly and with certain capabilities in certain directions to prevent / delay forces of
a potential adversary until the arrival of Alliance forces following the activation of
collective defence decision-making. We should be prepared on that situation.
Given that the country's defence operations in the framework of collective
defence (Article 5) are of a military nature, the reaction must also be of a military
nature. These scenarios should be developed by MoD/ GS in cooperation with
SHAPE or JFC Naples. The participation of AAF forces in this type of scenario
should be at the maximum level of participation of national forces (active and
reserve), so the scenarios will have both political-military implications and the
military engagement of forces up to two levels above.
The type of operations will be of a combat nature, but may also be associated with
other operations across the spectrum of crisis response operations. The nature of the
operations will be multinational, so it will be dominated by 'joint' and 'combined'
NATO/ Coalition-led operations. Command &Control of operations will be
transferred (OPCOM) to SHAPE/ACO supreme commander, while FULLCOM
will be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Distance of operations of national forces will be mainly within national borders but
based on the overall allied mission, it can be conducted well beyond national
borders. Key strategic, operational and tactical operations will be defence, attack,
delay, and civil emergencies operations.

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 Participating forces will be combat forces, combat support forces, and combat
service support forces. There will also be limited participation of civil emergency
management forces, inside and outside the armed forces.
The total amount of sub-scenarios to be planned may be up to 2 operational
representative (generic or real) sub-scenarios. Force requirements for each sub-
scenario will be calculated according to the 7 essential operational capabilities
(EOCs) and the Capability Code and Statement. Based on the concrete situation,
one of these operational scenarios may be 'real' and 1 may be 'generic'. Operational
sub-scenarios of this strategic scenario may be:
a) An Article 5 Sub-scenario, when Albania may be involved in conflict
situation as a result of a strategic aggression against the Alliance as a whole or
an allied group of countries, Albania included;
b) An Article 5 Sub-scenario, when Albania may be involved in a conflict
situation as a result of a volatile regional situation;

2. Strategic and Operational Scenarios No.2: AAF contribution to collective

security and defence of the Alliance (allied countries) within Article 5.
The Strategic Scenario No.2 may include planning and participation in one or more
of potential sub-scenarios stemming from our country's obligations under Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty (later in ESDP) concerning participation of AAF units
in the security and defence of the Alliance as a whole or individual member
countries, within its area of responsibility.
Since participation in the collective defence operations (Article 5) of the Alliance
territories is of a military nature, their scenarios should also be of a military nature.
These sub-scenarios should be developed by MoD / GS in co-operation with the
SHAPE/ACO or JFC Naples. These sub-scenarios will be made available to our
country in a timely manner, in the framework of the overall allied planning.
Any of these scenarios may be 'real', given the Alliance's relevant scenario for
deployment of a Light Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr according to FG 0035. Similarly, any other
scenario may be 'generic', given another scenario of Alliance engagement in the
periphery of Alliance territories (so it can be conducted in a certain theatre, but can
be exercised throughout the territory of the Alliance). In this sub-scenario, our
forces will participate in the execution of 'CONPLAN' or 'SDP’ 170 of Article 5 of
the SHAPE/ACO for the Defence of Allied Territories. In line with the potential
escalation of the conflict, our planners should be prepared to plan participation of

170 CONPLAN are Contingency Plans for specific situations, while SDP are Standing Defence Plans of the Alliance
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 forces up to two levels above, that is, in Alliance's "Major Joint Operations" (Corps
Plus), but participation in ‘Smaller Joint Operations’ - SJO '(Brigade Plus) is not
excluded.
Participation of Albanian forces in this type of scenario will be a "task force" group
battalion according to FG 0035, but this tactical group may be organized tailored to
the mission. The type of operations may be in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5 or non-Article 5, but they may be authentic combat operations conducted
in difficult weather and terrain conditions. These will be the toughest AAF unit
operations outside national territories.
Types of operations will be mainly combat operations, but it is not excluded that
other phases require forces for operations other than war. Participating forces will
be combat forces, combat support forces, and logistic support forces. Possibility of
using civil capabilities in the last phases of conflict and post-conflict, for institution
building, and development of the country are not excluded.
The distance of operations will be far away from national territories, mainly within
the boundaries or beyond the territories of the Alliance. Force requirements for each
sub-scenario will be calculated according to 7 essential operational capabilities
(EOCs) and Capability Code and Statement. The total number of sub-scenarios of
this strategic scenario may be 1 generic scenario:
a) A Sub-scenario of national contribution under the obligations of Article 5 of
collective defence, when one or several of Allied countries are attacked.

3. Strategic and Operational Scenarios No.3: AAF contribution to NATO-led

Peace Support Operations and other security organizations outside the area of
responsibility (NA5CRO).
Strategic Scenario No.3 may include planning and participation in some of most
potential sub-scenarios stemming from North Atlantic Treaty, concerning non-
Article 5" Peace Support Operations (PSO), outside its area of responsibility. Also,
potential scenarios for participation in EU, UN, or Coalitions-led operations may be
included here.
Because participation in Peace Support Operations is civil-military in nature, their
scenarios should be also civil-military ones. I believe that these scenarios should be
developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the MoD/ GS, in cooperation
with the respective structures in NATO HQ, and SHAPE/ACO or Regional
Component Command (JFC Naples). If it is another international organization-led
operation, the same structure of scenario planning and participation is followed.

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In my view, the military participation in this planning scenario should be primarily
a 'task force' type at up to company level or specialized 'niche' capabilities.
Scenarios should have, besides the general political-military situation of their
occurrence, the military implications of participation of forces of two levels above,
namely at Brigade level. Participation of civil capabilities will happen on a case-by-
case basis, based on participation and concrete possibilities of our country to
contribute to the concrete operation based on the related Force Goal of Stabilization
and Reconstruction.
Any of these scenarios may be 'real', given the relevant scenario of the Alliance
where our AAF sub-units will be used (outlined by SDPs or CONPLANs of the
Alliance). Likewise, another scenario may be 'general', given another scenario of
Alliance engagement in the periphery or far from its territories (so it may be
planned for a certain theatre, but it can be used in various theatres). Other scenarios
may include participation in various EU or UN coalitions-led operations.
The nature of the operations will be multinational, so it will be dominated by the
'joint' and 'combined' operations of the Alliance / Coalitions. Operational command
and control (OPCOM) will usually be transferred to SHAPE/ACO operations. Our
planners should be prepared mainly for participation of forces in NATO Small Joint
Operations (SJO) or potential Major Joint Operation (MJO).
Operations may include a broad spectrum of Crisis Response Operations where war
and peace are present, so forces must be prepared for 'full spectrum operations'.
The operations will be conducted outside national boundaries and territories of the
Alliance, mainly in remote areas of regional and global crises. Participating forces
will be combat forces, combat support forces, and combat services support. There
will also be limited participation of civil emergency management forces in the
theatre of operation.
Force requirements for each sub-scenario will be calculated according to the 7
essential operational capabilities (EOCs) and the Capability Codes and Statements.
This strategic scenario can be translated into 3 following operational sub-scenarios,
all of a 'generic' nature:
a) A Sub-scenario, based on NATO Crisis Response Operation scenarios, based
on NATO's SDP and CONPLANS plans;
b) A Sub-scenario based on EU Crisis Response Operations scenarios based on
the EU Contingency Plans;
c) A Sub-scenario, based on UN Crisis Response Operations scenarios, on the
basis of UN Contingency plans;

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4. Strategic & Operational Scenarios No.4. AAF engagement in National Civil
Emergency Operations (EC) in support of civil authorities.
The Strategic Scenario No.4 may include planning and participation in some sub-
scenarios against risks and threats set out in the National Civil Emergency Plan in
accordance with applicable law (natural, industrial, or man-made emergencies).
Normally, AAF plan and provide support to national authorities when civil
emergencies exceed the capabilities of other legal institutions for these missions.
According to the scale of civil emergencies, AAF participation in civilian support
operations may be proportional and at a strategic, operational and tactical level.
I support Dr. Clark when he says ... "The basic principle is that military forces
should always support civil authorities and provide assistance only when an
emergency exceeds the capabilities of other civilian authorities. Military forces
should not participate in civilian support operations on commonly routine basis but
only when they bring special capabilities that other national institutions do not
have. It is worth repeating that soldiers are not policemen; the approach that the
soldiers bring to the use of force is quite different from that of other law
enforcement forces."
Some of the civil emergencies scenarios, especially natural ones, may be 'real'
given the regions and intensity of their occurrence according to statistics in the last
100 to 200 years (we can mention earthquakes, floods, heavy snow, wild fires,
massive landslides, large natural, industrial accidents, etc.). Some may be
'generic', considering human casualties or industrial damages in areas with high
industrial and human density. (i.e. they can be planned in a certain theatre, but can
be used as a model for the territory of entire country with relevant characteristics).
Usually, the armed forces in these types of operations should be organized based on
a ‘task force’ concept at company level and above, so the scenarios will have both
general political and military effects of their occurrence, and military implications
of involvement of forces two levels above the level of battalion 'task forces'.
Since civil emergency operations are of a non-combat nature, their scenarios are of
a non-military nature. These scenarios should be developed by the Ministry of
Interior/ or Defence (General Directorate of Civil Emergencies). Readiness and
participation in these civil emergency operations of all state actors is based on a
special law. AAF units, except cases of declaration of a state of emergency, should
not be the first to be engaged in CE operations. On the other hand, AAF units will
maintain the chain of command-control, based on the mission taken from the
general plan of operation run by civil authorities.
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 The nature of Civil Emergency Operations will enforce joint peacetime planning,
joint inspections, joint training and exercises, as well as standardization of
equipment required for such operations.
The distance of operations will be mainly within the national borders, but based on
legal arrangements, possibilities of conducting these operations together with
neighbouring regional countries and their capabilities for operations within our
national borders are not excluded, and vice versa.
AAF participate in civil emergencies mainly with designated forces for this special
missions, but it is not excluded the possibility of participating support services of
other units.
The overall size of sub-scenarios of this strategic scenario may be up to 6, given the
overall national CE strategy. Force requirements for each sub-scenario should be
designated according to the 7 Essential Operational Capabilities (EOCs) and the
Capability Code and Statement. Based on concrete situations, 2-3 of these
operational scenarios may be 'real' and 4-5 may be 'generic', such as it follows:
a) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences from an earthquake in the
territory of the Republic of Albania;
b) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of large flooding in the
territory of the country;
c) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences from a severe snowfall
situation in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
d) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of a wild fire situation in
the territory of the Republic of Albania;
e) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences from a serious industrial
or man-made disaster in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
f) A CE Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of a massive landslide in
the territory of the Republic of Albania;
5. Strategic & Operational Scenarios No. 5: AAF Engagement in independent
national operations in cooperation with other national security institutions.
The Strategic Scenario No. 5 includes planning and participation of some of most
potential sub-scenarios of AAF unit’s independent operations that are not included
in the four areas of the above Strategic Scenarios.
Dr. Clark, researcher on missions of military forces for the 21st century, says that
"... in the interests of national security, any government must have in place

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appropriate responsibilities and capabilities to undertake missions independently,
when necessary."
These scenarios may include all potential temporary and low intensity operations,
which are not included neither the "Article 5" operations for collective defence,
"non-Article 5" crisis response operations, nor in civil emergency operations.
Since the independent participation of the country's capabilities and AAF units is of
a civil-military nature, their scenarios should be civil-military. These scenarios
should be developed by the relevant line Ministries, based on their missions, or by
some Ministries in co-operation.
Typical sub-scenarios of such operations may be special operations against
terrorism, against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or against illegal
trafficking. I think that a distinction should be made in the fight against terrorism
about the use of AAF in domestic and international operations. Dr. Clark clearly
states that "... support for counter-terrorism efforts requires a distinction between
national and international participation against terrorism. National engagement
are the responsibility of law enforcement authorities, while military forces must be
focused on such counterterrorism operations out of national borders. Military
forces can provide logistic support to national counterterrorism operations but they
should never take full responsibility in the domestic context."
Other specific scenarios may include operations against state and non-state cyber-
defence hackers, or special operations against the risks of hybrid nature or other
unexpected nature. Also, other scenarios should not be neglected, such as hijacking
of a "renegade" aircraft, explosion of an ammunition depot, collapse of an aircraft
in residential areas, management of strategic infrastructure damages, management
and control of insurgent crowds, separatist movements, etc.
A special operational scenario may be also related to host nation support operations
(HNS), where Albania can be a host country for a NATO / EU / UN / Coalition-led
strategic scenario for the entire spectrum of their operations.
Another specific scenario may be related to delay operations of reaction of national
forces before activation by Allied forces of Article 5 of collective defence, or in
other unfavourable conditions. Also, operations of national forces in case of an
aggression against the Republic of Kosovo may be a very specific scenario we must
think about and develop.
Force participation in this strategic scenario will be tactical-to-strategic level task
forces, so the scenarios may have, besides the general political-military situation of
their occurrence, the military implications of involvement of forces of two levels
above.
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The type of operation will be of a national nature and will require special
assessment for each specific scenario. The distance of operations will be mainly
within the national borders, but operations beyond national borders should not be
excluded for operational purposes.
Participating forces will be combat forces, combat support forces, and logistic
support forces. There will also be limited participation of civilian emergency
management presence, inside and outside the AAF, specialized 'niche' capabilities,
and so on.
Simultaneous participation of forces should be calculated according to the accepted
level of ambition and Capability Code and Statements. I have developed a total of
11 operational scenarios related to this strategic scenario, all of a 'generic' nature:
1. A Sub-scenario against a terrorist attack to our country sponsored by states,
extremist groups or individuals to our national or collective values;
2. A Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of an economic and financial
crisis that brings consequences to our country's security;
3. A Sub-Scenario for Search & Rescue (SAR) of people's lives during major
catastrophes and accidents in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
4. A Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of an explosion of an
ammunition storage site near the inhabited centres;
5. A Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of a cyber-attack to vital
information networks of the Republic of Albania;
6. A Sub-scenario for elimination of consequences of damages to the country's
strategic infrastructure (special importance facilities, such as ports, airports,
hydropower plants, tunnels, stadiums, rallies, etc.);
7. A Sub-scenario related to control of airspace and air policing for exercising
airspace sovereignty in cooperation with NATINADS;
8. A Sub-scenario for exercising maritime sovereignty and law enforcement in
the maritime space of the Republic of Albania;
9. A Sub-scenario for management of a 'renegade' air situation of an aircraft
hijacking or during an air catastrophe in the territory of Albania;
10. A Sub-Scenario for Disaster Relief situation related to a large Land, Sea and
Air Pollution;
11. A Sub-scenario to relieve the consequences of serious epidemics of infectious
diseases or of biological, chemical or radiological contamination;

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Conclusions and recommendations:
- The above proposal may be a general framework with 5 areas of strategic scenarios as
a member of the Alliance, which can generate up to 23 Sub-scenarios on which the
respective capabilities should be developed.
- AAF should plan, prepare, train and equip themselves with this new set of strategic
scenarios, as an allied country. From the set of strategic scenarios, evaluation of AAF
operational plans at the strategic, operational and tactical level should be identified.
- Scenarios are the link between force planning and operational planning. In this
context, based on the above scenarios, MoD / GS should start operational planning at
a strategic level and then extend to other lower levels (operational and tactical). This
method can be also used by other national security institutions.
- Of particular importance is the inclusion of new strategic and operational scenarios in
the process of staff training in AAF Academy, NCO Academy, Troop School, BTC,
Simulation Centre, senior courses, as well as other security related staff training.
- Although a large part of scenarios are associated with the participation of tactical-
level forces/ capabilities, their implications are at operational and strategic level,
especially those of international operations.
- Most of future AAF operations will be conducted at a strategic distance; this requires
development of deployable capabilities and "smart" approaches by our country to
find the most effective forms of provision of services in operations;
- Planning and execution of civil emergencies requires a real evolution of management
issues concerning legal, organizational, doctrinal, equipment and standardization, as
well as other coordination aspects of all national capabilities;

III.8. On a Capability Based Planning (CBP) System for Albania

III.8.1. Background of CBP System
As one of main planning methods (CBP) of this century explained in Chapter I, someone
may ask the question: What is Capability Based Planning (CBP)? When is CBP concept
launched and began to practice? Is it a single or a combined planning method? What are
the new innovative elements it brings? What are the advantages and disadvantages? How
is it implemented in NATO countries? If accepted, how can Albania develop and apply
this planning method?
In my view, CBP is a combined defence planning method. It takes in considerations
several planning method and rationally combines elements of top-down planning with
threat-based planning, scenario-based planning, and budget-based planning. It is the best
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highly responsive combination of defence planning methods. Results of CBP method are
the best capabilities resulted from a top-down approach to face future threats, based on
most potential scenarios, and with limited resources available.
Paul K. Davis in his monograph for RAND gives this definition to CBP: "CBP is the
planning under the effects of future uncertainty, which develops the capabilities required
to cope with a wide range of today and future challenges under economic constraints,
enforcing selection of the most essential ones171”.
In NATO's military terminology, the word 'military force' is more and more being
replaced with the term 'military capability'. The term military capability means "...
capabilities to accomplish one or more tasks under certain conditions or to produce a
desired operational effect in a particular environment (theatre) based on specific
standards of their performance...”172.
So, CBP primary importance is not just the size of forces being developed. Crucial
importance is in fact given to capabilities of these forces to accomplish their missions,
which are defined as an integrated product of Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Equipment, Leadership, Personnel, Infrastructure and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI).
More simply, what distinguishes the term ‘capability’ from the term ‘force’ is that if
traditional 'force' means mainly unit numbers (quantity); while 'capability' has the main
focus on quality, i.e. combat capabilities of organized, trained, equipped, supported, and
interoperable units. This relation between ‘force’ and ‘capability’ is also reflected in
NATO defence planning system through Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS),
where the word 'Force Goal' is replaced by 'Capability Targets'.

Again, Davis gives the notion of modularity and modular forces especially for small
countries. He argues that "... in order to effectively use the modularity method, we must
first understand what the modules are. In the military area, development of force building
blocks is achieved in various forms and at all levels of war - strategic, operational and
tactical. Also, another very important aspect of the modular approach is the selection of
specific blocks of the force building for use at the right time and place, through a
combined and rational selection of the capabilities required for the concrete task.”173

CBP planning method had its initial origin in early 60's of the last century by the US
military under McNamara direction of Pentagon, contrary to threat-based planning
method, which was considered too static and conservative. So, McNamara's staff shifted

171 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and
Transformation, (monograph) page 53
172 Paul Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation

(monograph), page 52, Study for RAND Corporation

173 Ibid, page 24

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from a fixed system to a more flexible long term defence planning system. This was a
profound reform of the existing planning system, which was further expanded with the
introduction of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system (PPBS).
Key words or 'drivers' of Capability-based planning are the uncertainty, the future, the
wide spectrum of challenges, scenarios, capabilities, modular forces, adaptation,
flexibility, financial constraints, etc. All of this implies that CBP system is a transforming
system, a new method away from fixed traditional Cold War planning methods.
Application of CBP method requires a high level defence planning staff able to shift from
classical planning methods to a modern planning method at strategic level to respond to
needs for planning and development of a set of capabilities to cope with a wider number
of adversaries/opponents/challenges of this environment, some of them using surprising
asymmetric and non-conventional elements. This is a critical challenge of CBP; it
requires high quality planning staffs to plan a smaller, but a higher-quality force.
Former US Secretary of Defence, Douglas J. Feith, after the events of September 11,
2001, states that " ... we are no longer facing the relatively predictable threats of the Cold
War, we have entered a new stage of uncertainty and surprise ... what we can anticipate
today is that we will face tomorrow with unpredictable challenges with a wide spectrum
of opponents - some of them well-known and many others unknown - with various
military intentions and capabilities…”174.
This planning method took concrete development in many western and eastern European
countries, especially after the Cold War, when a more favourable security environment
emerged. CBP is the most preferred defence planning method in the 21st century for
NATO and its member countries, so it is worth paying special attention.
Dr. Clark, one of Marshall Centre’s key analysts on European Security and Defence,
estimates that "... in most cases, forces of European countries are still in their Cold War
heritage format - of large size, with infantry formations and units with tanks and
armoured vehicles, and their logistic support will remain a big problems by still holding
some 30-40 year old weapons systems175. Dr. Clark goes further and say that "... many
European defence ministers are still in a vicious circle of focusing a significant portion of
their funds on old and unproductive old legacy forces ...”176.
The CBP method is a method conducted through a functional analysis of operational
capability requirements. It is a systematic approach that answers questions "what set of
capability" is needed to be developed today to cope with "what set of threats" of
tomorrow. In other words, CBP is based on developing a group of a high quality of
174 Douglas J. Feith, “Beyond the Cold War – What Next?” Speech at Institute for Defence Analyses, US, August 1994
175 Dr. John Clarke, Marshall Centre edition 2007, What roles and missions for Europe’s military forces in the 21st
Century, page 5
176 Ibid, page 9

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capabilities for a group of threats, rather than developing a specific capability for any
specific threat.
Capability-Based Planning (CBP) has several pillars:
CBP is based on measurable levels of capabilities to be developed, rather than the size of
forces or units to be built. This planning method answers the question of what capabilities
we need, and not how big armed forces we need? In this sense, CBP is based on concrete
and measurable capabilities for specific tasks.
CBP should definitely be associated with a policy guidance with clear objectives as to
what the armed forces are expected to accomplish. So, first step of CBP is a policy
guidance to ensure exercise of civilian control/ oversight over the armed forces. As
Clausewitz says, "War is a continuation of policy by other means, and precisely with the
means of violence.”177 This means that not the military, but policy-makers determine the
start and the end of war or strategic operations. Military should be responsible for
running war and operations to achieve policy goals. Political scientist Hans Morgenthau
says that "war is a very serious thing to be left in the hands of generals”178.
CBP provides the best method linking the policy with capabilities ... "With the help of
scenarios, CBP clearly provides strong links of capability objectives with policy
requirements. These objectives enable a thorough assessment of the desired defence
capabilities and the force options, under conditions of limited budgets for meeting the
range of missions set by the government”179.

CBP takes into account the uncertainty of future operational scenarios. It is impossible to
predict with absolute certainty what scenarios will involve the armed forces in the future.
Clausewitz, three centuries ago, is still valid when he says that "war is the kingdom of
uncertainty; three-quarters of the actions in war are covered by the fog of uncertainty”180
This means that we can not just predict the future with precision, nor can we direct the
course of history. What we can do, based on the capability-based planning, is to follow
and influence as much as possible this course.

CBP answers the question of what we really need for tomorrow, and not what we wish to
have tomorrow, so it gives priority to objective needs against subjective desires. This is a
planning method based on future realities, not hypothetical wishes of politicians or
commanders. CBP is a difficult negotiation about real needs between politicians and
military leadership. Likewise, this planning method can also balance various debates

177 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University publication, Micheal Howard edition, page 101
178 Hans Morgenthau, Quotations at http://www.quoteland.com/search.asp
179 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and

Transformation, (monograph) 2003, page 72

180 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University publication, Micheal Howard edition, page 101

114
between chiefs of forces (services), which compete and call for more forces, resources
and support based only on the interests of their force/service.

CBP takes into consideration the resources available in the long run. It requires
sensibilization of high-level authorities that military capabilities, especially procurement
of equipment, force training for the wide spectrum of the mission, and support for Full
Operational Capability (FOC) require medium and long-term efforts.

Conclusions and recommendations:

1. Capability Based Planning (CBP) attaches primary importance to development of
capabilities, i.e. AAF operational quality rather than quantity;
2. CBP is in favour of development of capabilities rather than traditional Land, Air and
Navy organization structures. Especially for small countries, it may not be
appropriate to maintain purely representative force/ services structures at the expense
of their capabilities;
3. CBP is based on modular force used under 'task force' organization concept; in our
case, the highest level will be the 'joint task force' at battalion level, which may be
part of the Alliance's "CJTF" units or the EU's Tactical 'Battle Group';
4. CBP in the case of our country will further extend to the company and platoon-level
‘task force’, which will be the basis of future AAF missions. Training at the 'task
force' format at battalion, company and platoon level should have priority in future
planning scenarios;
5. CBP identifies surpluses and shortfalls of capabilities of the Armed Forces. It
identifies the parallel structures and the duplication of capabilities between the AAF
services / forces, as well as those between various state institutions, on land, air and
sea. This method will guide us ahead to eliminate ‘surpluses’ of traditional
capabilities and build ‘shortage’ non-traditional capabilities;
6. Mostly, participation in operations of AAF units will be at tactical level, while their
effects will almost always be at strategic level, especially those of international
operations;
7. CBP is based on modern training and equipment of forces for a wide spectrum of
mission, that means the readiness cost for missions will be higher for development of
appropriate capabilities;
8. The development of units based on CBP requires deployable and well supported units
for national and international missions by land, air and sea; which requires deployable
capabilities to be developed or procured (by bilateral agreements)

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9. CBP relies not only on development of military capabilities, but also on development
of national civilian capabilities in the context of the comprehensive concept.

III.8.2. On a CBP Based Planning System for Albania as an Allied country

Chapter I explored the 10 methods of defence planning. Also, I have provided above a
background of CPB planning method. The central questions arising from this background
are: What is the best defence planning method for Albania, as a NATO country? What
are the advantages and disadvantages of the selected method or combination of methods?
What new capabilities are to be developed, and what from existing traditional capabilities
are to be sacrificed? How much capabilities should we have for national operations and
how much for NATO/ EU/ UN or coalition-led international operations? What are the
new "pillars" for development of future forces? What is the process to be followed? What
are the main authorities and expert teams?

One thing is for sure since the beginning: We want that the selected method to produce
capabilities rather than forces. Albania is one of the small countries of the Alliance. As
such, we must measure our ambition with our 'stature'; this means we must be modest
and realistic in our ambition. Realism and pragmatism are two of the main features of
Capability-Based Planning. This planning method is in line with the idea of former
Secretary General of the Alliance, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, expressed in the New
Strategic Concept of Lisbon, November 2010, on a 'smart defence'181 approach, in order
"to build more ... (capabilities) with less resources". This issue will be covered in more
details in the chapter IV.

All politicians, planners and citizens in Albania, as in all other member countries, want
their country to be safe and secure and with as less resources as possible. Some want to
have the security and defence for granted, but most want their armed forces to be
professional, small, modern, well-equipped, trained, motivated, and able to accomplish
the range of tasks of constitutional missions, expressed in a set of ‘real’ and ‘generic’
planning scenarios. They also want to have reasonable spending allocated to defence
because of other economic and social priorities. Under this conditions, my proposal is for
a Capability-based Planning method as the best defence planning method to be applied
by Albania, and for a 5-step defence planning system, balancing all elements of defence
planning through negotiation with all interested stakeholders.

It is important for AAF planners, when developing future forces, to understand that the
total amount of armed forces will not be an arithmetic total of capabilities of all specific
scenarios. Certain forces can be used in two or more scenarios, on the basis of

181 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 2011
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simultaneity and rotations within or outside the country. Use of 'joint' spectrum modular
forces and specialized 'niche' capabilities, as two innovative concepts, should be better
applied in our conditions. Also, capabilities that exceed national possibilities may be
developed on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Another recommendation of the Strategic
Concept is that Allies, such as Albania, are welcomed to divert investment from surplus
capabilities to other shortage capabilities the Alliance is in need.

Below, I have provided a number of priority issues for a reform of the defence
planning system of the Republic of Albania as a NATO country, with special focus
on AAF capabilities.

 Albania should adopt the 5-step ‘best practice’ defence planning system as proposed
above in sub-Chapter III.3, in harmony with NATO defence planning system;

 Albania and AAF should focus on a Capability-based Planning approach in order to

build capabilities rather forces, quality rather than quantity, combined with elements
of scenario planning, threat-planning, resource planning approaches;

 We should harmonize and follow the steps of NATO defence planning process in
time and products: When NATO is in Step 1 in Brussels, we should be in the same
Step 1 in Tirana, and so on;

 In addition to harmonization with NDPP system, we should harmonise planning

disciplines, key strategic documents, readiness times, EOC, training and education,
equipment, C2, some planning scenarios, etc. with NATO defence planning system;

 Albania should develop the next SDR, NSS, NMS, in line with the existing Alliance
Strategic Concept (last decision of Brussels Summit), EU Security Strategy and
Constitution of the Republic of Albania;

 Defence planners should use, according to the related Step, application of all elements
of other combined planning methods, such as: top down approach, threats, potential
scenarios, financial constraints, etc.

 Defence planning process should be led by politicians and military leadership,

supported by civilian and military experts, especially during the negotiation of any
product at the end of each Step. Plans and documents following the CBP process
should be approved by civilian authorities and senior military leadership;

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 When planning required capabilities, we should properly consider all required 8
following elements of capability, such as doctrine, organization, training, material,
leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability;

 When planning required capabilities we should primarily consider the package of

Capability Targets (CT) agreed with the Alliance DPST and plan them carefully in
line with CT implementation deadlines;

 Priority in defence planning should be given to capabilities for use in both national
and international operations, and capabilities under the single set of capabilities for
NATO, EU, UN, Coalition-led operations;

 We should also give priority to capabilities for both national and international
operations. Albania has not the luxury to develop specific forces for national
operations and other specific forces for international operations;

 Albania should also pay attention to the development of civilian capabilities, based on
CT package, which are not responsibility of Ministry of Defence and General Staff;

 We should carefully consider the mid-term budget allocated to defence, which should
normally go to 2% of GDP in 2024 (while 20% on modernization and R&D) in
accordance with Wales and Brussels decisions, with priority on motivation of
personnel, training, modernization, participation in national and international
operations, etc;

 Surpluses and shortages should be considered in the interest of development of the

appropriate capabilities within the financial constraints, in order to get rid of obsolete
equipment and units and take advantage of newly required capabilities;

So, we should be realistic and understand that the most-benefitted countries in the Euro-
Atlantic Alliance are small and medium-sized countries. This is because large countries
are able to guarantee their security and defence on their own, while small countries do
not. So, by sharing the same values, we benefit much by contributing less, though that
little will always seem too much to us, compared to 13% of GDP during the Cold War
regime.

With CBP adoption, my belief is that Albanian future forces will be smaller in quantity,
but with more operational quality. Because forces will cover a wide spectrum of tasks,
the next force will be more professional than the current force, smaller than the current
force, more trained and modern than the current force, more deployable, manageable,

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flexible, and mobile than the current force, more supported and with more other qualities
related to the distance, configuration, variety and tactics of future adversaries.

III.8.3 AAF Capabilities in view of the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP)

Many questions are ahead on how to build the best military we need. What types and
capabilities should our Armed Forces have in order to meet the modest spectrum of their
mission? How much should we have for national duties, and how for collective defence?
For what kind of operations should we be prepared, what types, at what distance, at home
and abroad? How many of them will be from the list of 17 Alliance missions, and how
many from the national task list? How should the forces be trained, doctrined and
equipped? How many "joint", cross-agency, and multinational operations can we face at
once? Also, how much land, air, and sea capabilities should we have? How much
supportive capabilities for intelligence, command-control-communication-information,
logistics, health, civil emergency, protection against WMD? How much combat forces,
how much combat support, and how much logistic support? What specialized 'niche'
capabilities, such as EOD, MP, CIED, CIMIC, HUMINT, HNS, etc...? Also, what
capabilities should we have as active forces and what in reserve? Should we develop all
capabilities we need, or should we only develop the most essential ones? Which
capabilities can be procured/ provided by private civilian entities? And finally, how will
we institutionally arrange all capabilities in an armed forces organization structure, and
how will we use modular ‘task force’ for a specific operation? What will be the command
and control system for national and international operations, etc., etc...?

Difficult questions to be answered in short time. They need a SDR process to be run by
expert teams of different areas. Other interested stakeholder should be engaged to
properly justify the money of the taxpayers. In my view, to give the right answers to
above questions, a top-down regular 5-step defence planning process should be
conducted in harmony of NATO defence planning process (NDPP). The aim of this PhD
dissertation is to provide and develop a general framework for this purpose.

In my view, the reform of capabilities is the key reform in the Armed Forces for the
next 10 years. The priority of the defence reform of small countries, including our
country, should be the development of ‘modular forces’ based on the ‘task force’
concept. The development of such forces is based on a new concept and culture contrary
to the traditional force. Development of modular capabilities raises a wide range of
questions that require answers. It is a smart topic for a thesis by academic staff of AAF
Academy.

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Below, I have outlined some of the key issues for development of a Long Term
Development Plan (LTDP) to produce the required AAF capabilities:

Capabilities based on planning scenarios. AAF capabilities will be subject to planning

scenarios, strategic and operational, based on periodically updated future security
environment. Planning scenarios are to be developed and updated based on lessons
learned under the SDR process conducted every 4-5 years. AAF should not be only
forces in garrisons, but above all, they should be forces in operations and training
activities. All AAF units should be trained, equipped, exercised and conduct activities in
accordance with the set of planning scenarios in ‘joint’, multi-agency, combined and
other formats.

Multi-task forces. On the other hand, not every AAF mission and task will have a special
capability to be managed. Any capability will be properly developed to perform several
tasks. It is difficult for small countries, and almost impossible, to develop a force to fight
across the spectrum of operations, like let’s say US Army. Also, it would be
inappropriate to maintain military capabilities that are not included in force packages of
‘real’ or ‘generic’ scenarios. These types of operations can be best conducted by
activating local reserve forces, where appropriate, both for national and international
operations. Or, some specific capabilities, especially those of combat support or logistic
service, can be procured or ordered by private entities.

Task forces and modular forces/ capabilities are taking priority in the 21-st century, but
there are still commanders or planners paying primary attention to the structure of the
Armed Forces, thus prioritizing the form before the substance. In modern times,
irrespective of how they are institutionally organized, the armed forces can be re-grouped
in ‘task forces’ for each particular task they conduct. New century operations are more
and more imposing fragmentation of units at low tactical levels against any unpredictable
asymmetric opponent. This kind of perception of the 21st century gives the substance of
the armed force an absolute superiority over its form182.

Conceptual changes instead of structural changes. In Albanian experience, there are

several cases when changes of new AAF structures are considered as a new reform or
transformation, especially for political purposes, and this is not fair. Not necessarily a
force must be re-structured to be reformed or transformed. Today, transformation has
little to do with the form/shape; it has more to do with substance/ content; how to train, to
equip and fight differently, to command and control and support forces differently, and to
do many things differently from traditional views.

182 Th. Hudhra, Wind of transformation, Military Review, Spring 2011, page 57
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Consolidation of professional forces. For Albania, 2010 was the final year of fully
conscript forces and beginning of a new era of professional forces. This was just the
beginning, because besides the professional numbers, the professional force must
necessarily be consolidated by cultivating the concepts, culture, and mindset of real
professional forces. So the reform of professional force has just begun; it must continue
with profound transformations of mentality, leadership, motivation, capabilities,
equipment, training, and values of a professional force for professional accomplishment
of its mission and operations.

Reserve forces in addition to active forces. In addition to AAF active capabilities,

Albania should start thinking about a volunteer ‘reserve’ component concept. In addition
to and in support of active forces, volunteer reserve component should be developed
accordingly, based on NATO country experience. Reserve forces have a higher readiness
time, so they should reinforce active forces, augment or replace them in certain
circumstances. Reserve component is sometimes more valuable in several planning
scenarios especially for civil emergency operations in local areas. A proposal for this
reserve component is treated in more details in the chapter III.11 of this dissertation.

Deployable forces for national and international operations. One of the elements of
capability reform is the development of deployable capabilities. Deployable forces for
national and international operations. The goal of deployable capabilities for international
operations should be based on 10% simultaneous deployability of forces of land
component. Also, 50% of this component should be trained and equipped to be
deployable for further rotations.
Streamlining AAF Command and Control. As a small armed force, we should have a
streamlined chain of command; more forces in operational units and less personnel in
main headquarters, and a fully integrated MoD and GS organization structure. An
example for the improvement of the C2 in AAF is given in sub-chapter III.9.
A financially supported Long Term Development Plan. The key product of a successful
Strategic Defence Review is the development of a Long Term Capability Plan which
should provide integrated support with personnel, equipment, training, infrastructure,
financial support of 2% of GDP, and sustainable logistic support, etc. I think, we are on
time to activate and implement a Long-Term Development Plan 2024.

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III.8.4. Defence Concept of the Republic of Albania and AAF capabilities
In my assessment, small countries like Albania, have two options about the security and
defence of the country, called the national security and defence concept.
The first, is to follow an individual defence option of the country, based on our own
forces, building all needed capabilities for a total defence option with some 100.000
active personnel and 500 000 thousand in reserve, a highly expensive option with some
13 % of the defence budget, unsuccessfully experienced during the Cold War.
The second, is to follow a collective defence option of the country, build a moderate
armed forces of some 6000-8000 military personnel as a NATO/EU member country,
with benefits and contribution to national and international efforts/ operations, with the
right capabilities and some 2% financial support of AAF.
I have been in full support of the collective defence option since the very beginning of
90-ies. From a PfP country, to an Aspirant, and now as a Member country of the
Alliance. This option and the strategic concept it supports should be fully kept in mind by
defence planners when building future capabilities of Albanian Armed Forces.
The Armed Forces are among the most serious state institutions. The development of
modern professional armed forces require professional expertise, constant financial
support and long-term efforts, based on short, medium and long-term priorities.
Based on the above assessment, my recommendation is that the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Albania should further balance the size of conventional capabilities, (combat,
combat support, and logistic support) with specialized capabilities, together with a small
volunteer “reserve’ force.
- Land Forces, in my view, should be the main component of the armed forces,
composed of active and reserve units at battalion or battalion task force level. Land
force units are the main component for participation in national operations, both
Article 5 operations (Combat Ops), and non-Article 5 operations at international level
(Crisis Response Ops),
Active component. Under the conditions of financial constraints of a small country,
the Armed Forces should generate at least a combination of up to 3-4 Active light
infantry group battalions (infantry, special, mountain, or commando). These 600-
1000 strength tactical task force battalions do not mean that they are organic, they can
be organized as a 'task force' battalion on the basis of the infantry battalion, or special
force battalion/ mountain battalion, attaching special sub-units or specialized 'niche'
sub-units according to the mission they will perform. For national missions, these
units may be deployed using air and sea components, while for international missions,

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 they should use dormant contracts, or strategic deployment assets of other allied
countries or collective assets, based on previous legal arrangements.
Particular attention should be paid to small units at company and platoon task force
capabilities. Most of the armed forces' non-Article 5 missions will be conducted at
this level, inside and outside the country. Missions at the level of the battalion 'task
force' will be very rarely conducted and of 'in extremis' Article 5 collective defence
operations, or in specific national defence operations.
One thing to point out is that although most AAF operations will be at tactical level in
terms of the size of force participation, they will almost always be at strategic level in
view of the effects they give, especially those of international operations.
Reserve component. After development of a volunteer ‘reserve’ concept for AAF, we
should start the activation of the reserve component of 3-4 light infantry battalions,
replacing the AAF Regional Support Elements we have in several regions of the
country, changing from roster to volunteer reserve battalions. My proposal is that
reserve component is only attached to land forces facilities at most populated areas of
the country, developed and organized in accordance with NATO best practices.
Volunteer ‘reserve’ component should be gradually developed in the period 2018 -
2024, when it is expected an increase of the defence budget to 2% of GDP, according
to the volunteer ‘reserve’ concept proposed in chapter III.11.
- Navy and Air Forces, in terms of mission, capability and organization, is difficult for
one to argue that these forces are and will have any real conventional combat force in
the traditional sense of the concept. They will be merely developed as non-traditional
security services in air and on the sea. Air and Maritime Space Surveillance Systems
should be nationally integrated in service of all state institutions, such as the example
of the Inter-Institutional Maritime Surveillance Centre. An important priority in the
future will be given to development of Air transportation capabilities as well as law
enforcement in coastguard space of the Republic of Albania. It is almost impossible
for Albania to develop in the next decade real air and sea combat capabilities. It will
continue to apply the agreements with the Alliance for integration of our Airspace
Surveillance System into NATO's NATINEADS and Air Policing.
- Support Capabilities. Some of main AAF capabilities will support national and
NATO operations, with the name of 'enabling capabilities'. In the conditions of
operations at strategic distance and in difficult conditions these types of operations
are of vital importance to AAF units conducting such missions. They are command-
control capabilities, strategic communications (SATCOM), intelligence, force
protection, tactical transport in theatre of operations, logistic support (NSE) etc. Some
of them are included in the organizational structure of the Battalion Task Force
Group, and some of them are national strategic assets.
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- Specialized Capabilities. A key focus should be given to developing specialized
'niche' capabilities for national and international missions, as appropriate, such as
EOD, PU, CIED, CIMIC, MAT, OMLT, POMLT, OLT, HUMINT, HNS, RSOM,
ISTAR, NMLT, Medical Teams, SAR teams, PSYOPS teams, etc. However, national
capability planning should include not only military capabilities of the defence
institution but also the civil capabilities of other state institutions, especially those for
Stabilization and Reconstruction, such as: diplomatic, police, training teams,
economic reconstruction projects, civil administration, civil infrastructure,
humanitarian assistance, language and cultural affairs, specific financial investments,
etc. A possible 'niche' selection menu that we can develop is provided in the
subchapter III.10.
So far, in the current cycle of collective defence planning, the level of ambition of the
Republic of Albania to participate in NATO-led Article 5 operations is the simultaneous
participation with only one rotation of a tactical group of Light Motorized Infantry
Battalion composed according to the requirements of related Capability Target. This is
the option found and agreed between NATO and Albania in NDPP cycle, and we have to
respect this obligation with maximum responsibility. This task force battalion is the key
unit of AAF, and we are building this unit as an exemplary AAF unit.
My judgment is that a battalion group for Albania is within the "fair burden sharing"
principle. It is simply a modular battalion 'task force' type according to Alliance standards
expressed in NATO Capability Codes and Statements for the Light Motorized Infantry
Battalion Group (Light-Mot-Inf-Bn-Gr). This task force unit is a deployable, logistically
and independently-supported battalion to conduct operations wherever required and
under most difficult weather and terrain conditions. In today's Alliance operations, one
can not imagine any longer the participation of non-motorized infantry in terms of
defence and survival of force.
Some other assessments/ thoughts supporting the motorized/ special/ commando/
mountainous, infantry battalion group formations:
1. First, the battalion group is not a fixed organic unit; it is a reinforced, fully supported
motorized, mechanized, mountain or special "task force" battalion, conducting
independent military operations according to the mission, or attached to a
multinational Brigade/ Corps level units for allied small or major joint operations;
2. Second, the battalion group is an ad-hoc type unit tailored to the mission and given a
task for a collective defence situation. It does not mean that the battalion group will
be used only for NATO/ EU/ UN operations, etc. Its modules can be also used
separately throughout the spectrum of national operations.

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3. Third, almost all future operations of the armed forces will be organized for specific
tasks under the "task force" format. In this view, the task force battalion group will be
an exemplary unit of the armed forces. Based on the general task force concept, we
should develop related battalion task force, company task force and platoon task force
concepts of operations;
4. Fourth, the battalion group is a tactical group, depending on the type (special force,
commando, mechanised or motorized) it has some 600 - 1000 personnel, when all
AAF personnel has a total of about 8,000 personnel, so it falls about 6 - 12% of all
AAF personnel;
5. Fifth, the battalion group should be a light motorized unit, transportable by ‘soft
skinned light wheeled vehicles’, to conduct missions according to the Capability Code
and Statement. Today and in the future, we can not imagine Allied missions and
operations to be conducted without motorized or mechanized capabilities.
6. Sixth, the battalion group will be used as a whole tactical group only 'in extremis'
cases of a classical situation of Article 5 and very specific national missions. Even in
this cases, there will be only one rotation of 6 months to 1 year, and re-deployment of
battalion group is not expected to be carried out according to the classic format 1 to 3,
one unit in operation, one unit in pre-deployment training, and another unit under
recovery.
7. Seventh, the battalion group will also serve the EU integration process. It will be our
level of ambition under the "single set of forces" concept for EU operations, or other
international security organizations.
8. Eighth, over 70% of the cost of the battalion group is the cost of the battalion. The
cost of supporting units is calculated and spent by their own parent units. So it is a
normal cost of capability development under the building block concept.
9. Ninth, we can propose the replacement of the mot-inf-bat-group with a special force
battalion, or a mountain battalion, according to the Capability Code, adding some
supporting capability, as well as "niche capabilities". Albania is a 75% mountainous
country and these capabilities may also be available for national operations.
10. Tenth, we must comply with the requirements of the package of Capability Targets as
all small countries such as Baltic countries, or Slovenia and Croatia, which are
assigned almost the same size or more capabilities for contribution, based on "fair
burden sharing".
It is true that mechanism and typology of sharing capabilities for collective defence is an
issue that is much discussed in the Alliance. At the moment, the issue of capability
allocation and force/ capability packages, especially for small countries, is a difficult

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question for the Alliance. For example, the Light Mot-Inf-Batt-Gr may be a piece of cake
for the Alliance, but in view of its financial cost it is highly expensive for Albania.
For small allied countries, it is also suitable to have a special focus of their defence
planning on specialized "niche" capabilities for national and international contribution, in
addition to their capabilities assigned to collective defence planning.

III.9. A flexible Command and Control (C2) structure in AAF

When defence planning is based on a capability based planning method, the country will
develop the most critical capabilities for AAF mission and tasks. So, the country has the
right defence capabilities instead of the right numbers of forces.

Strategic planning has a logical connection with the strategic and operational Command
and Control (C2) of AAF. Command and control of the armed forces in national and
international operations requires today a more flexible approach than before.

Defence reforms of early 21st century have a fundamental change compared with defence
reforms of the end of 20th century. While those of the end of the 20th century were
largely designed for significant reductions of numbers and size of the Armed Forces,
those of the early-21st century are largely designed for an increase of their quality.

The transition from Cold War operations to post-Cold War operations has brought about
a change or variety of the Command and Control concept (C2) of units of many countries
in national and international operations. Development of technology, new capabilities of
armed forces, and rapid development of the security environment of operations is
bringing about a profound transformation of C2 approaches.

Why is this happening? Unlike the past, AAF units are now taking part in many
international NATO, EU, UN, or ad-hoc coalition-led operations. These operations are
taking place thousands of miles away from our country and often in different continents.
Also, AAF are participating in national civil emergency operations in support of civil,
central or local authorities. Throughout the spectrum of operations, both nationally and
internationally, the armed forces transfer their operational command and control authority
to international organizations, as well as to other national authorities according to the
laws in power.

Operational diversity inside and outside the country requires a new approach, both
regarding to force planning and command and control of AAF operations. This diverse
operational situation requires that many strategic assets need to be centralized at strategic
level. Among other things, we can mention command-control, communication,

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intelligence, strategic transport, logistic support etc. Current and future operations will be
conducted based on new organization of forces, called 'task forces' in military language.

Now, in spite of normal resistance of those supporting traditional command and control, I
think that the concept of unilateral and isolated operations of land, air or sea forces or
other supporting capabilities is being changed. We are making a selection between the
traditional concept of services on their own and the modern one of integrated joint
capabilities. In my opinion, what "we will plant" today in force planning system, "we will
harvest" tomorrow in the planning system of AAF operations.

Without a doubt, trends are for an integrated concept of both development and use of the
armed forces as a whole. The new allied terms, already familiar to our military and
civilian personnel, such as "joint", or “combined” and "comprehensive", are now in the
operational agenda of AAF planners. When we talk about command & control we mean
the concept of the Alliance about these terms183. One of developments of the last decade
in area of command-control has been the separate division of command and control
function of operations through creation of special commands for joint operations. This
division of the function is based on ‘force provider’ and ‘force user’ concept of
operations.

As a concept, ‘force provider’ commanders will train and develop forces for operation,
while ‘force user’ commanders will conduct command and control of operational forces
in operation, (OPCOM / OPCON). In AAF case, the force/service commander may have
a force provider role, while a joint operational commander may have a ‘force user’ role.
Based on this concept, this example has been followed by most allied countries, such as
the US Regional Commands, UK Joint Forces Command, Germany (Bundeswerh
Operations Command), Italy (Commando Operative Interforce), Norway (Joint
Operations Headquarters), The Netherlands (Joint Defence Command), Spain (Joint
Operations Command), Hungary (Joint Force Command), Canada (Canada Joint
operations Command), Slovenia (Slovenia Force Command), Macedonia (Joint Force
Command), etc. Also, the Alliance itself has established special joint operation

183
Command is the authority given to an individual to run, coordinate or control the armed forces. It can
be described as the process by which a commander expresses his/ her will and intentions to
subordinates for achieving certain objectives. It includes the authority and responsibility to deploy and
assign forces to fulfill their missions.

Control is the authority exercised by a commander over his subordinates. It can be described as the
process by which a commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, directs and coordinates the activities of
certain forces, to execute orders and directives.

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commands, citing here alongside SHAPE/ACO, its two "joint" commands, such as JFC
Brunsumm and JFC Naples, or the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

All above means that both today and ahead, both force planning and their use in
operations, should be guided by the concept of modular "task force" units of all AAF
capabilities. This means that it is no longer necessary for land, air and sea forces to have
all the capabilities they need to fulfil their mission as a specific independent
force/service. On the contrary, it is far more reasonable for the Armed Forces to have, as
a whole, all packages/ modules of potential capabilities to successfully complete the
spectrum of their operations today and in the future. This will avoid duplication of
capabilities, greater effectiveness, and lower cost.

This approach is today bringing about a variety of creativity to the effectiveness of

command and control structures under the "smart defence" concept of the Alliance, going
beyond their national framework. In this context, we also need to think more deeply
about a more efficient structure, a smaller, with lower cost, in terms of AAF operational
command and control.

We are in time to promote a ‘food for thought’ discussion about the development of a
written and approved AAF Concept on Command and Control of Operations, based on
related Allied Stanag 2199, which should be reflected in the Law on AAF Command and
Control Authorities.

III.9.1 Some aspects of Command and Control

As already known, Command and Control is of a strategic, operational, and tactical level.
All three levels are interdependent and often folded to each other. For an armed force of
our country, like many other allied countries, the tactical and operational levels have
significant effects on the strategic level, and vice versa. Today, we are all experiencing
the fact that the effects of tactical participation at home and abroad are having significant
effects on the operational and strategic level, because of strategic communication issues.

Being a very delicate matter, the command and control of forces at all levels is an issue
that is increasingly being established by law. This will be even more visible in the future.
It is enough to bring attention to the fact that even an injured soldier in operation, today
or tomorrow, gives sensitive effects to the strategic level.

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According to the NATO doctrine, command and control of forces in operation can be full
command and control (FULLCOM / FULLCON), or operational command and control
(OPCOM / OPCON)184.

Some command and control options to be applied by AAF units in various national and
international operations, may be as follows:

- Command and Control by commanders of superior/parent units, i.e. they have Full
Command and Control (FULLCOM). This command and control option will be
mainly in time of peace activity, mainly during force training and exercises, outside
the operational activities of the units;

- Command and Control by a Joint Operational Centre or Command of AAF

(OPCOM). This command and control option will be mainly during periods of
national operations of the AAF units;

- Command and Control by a Multinational/ International Command/ Centre for

NATO, EU, UN, Coalition-led operations, etc. (OPCOM); etc.

We should take into consideration that, with the Transfer of Authority (ToA) of
operational command the control of a direct subordinate unit, certain command and
control relationships are maintained between all commands related to the unit in question.
In all three cases, there may be a combination of full command and control and
operational command and control. In any case, none of the authorities/ commands lose
completely their authority, but assume specific roles based on command and control
position that they are given.

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Full Command (FULLCOM): The authority and responsibility given to a superior officer to give
orders to his subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration. Full
Command exists only at national level. (AAP-6)

Operational Command (OPCOM): The authority assigned to a commander to assign missions or

tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-organize forces, and to retain or delegate
operational and / or tactical control when he deems it necessary. It does not include responsibility for
administration. (AAP-6)

Operational Control (OPCON): The authority delegated to a commander to control forces assigned
to him, so that he or she fulfills specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time
or place; the authority to deploy units and maintain or assign tactical control of these units. Operational
control does not include the authority to allocate partial use of the components of the units they belong
to. It also does not include administrative or logistical control. (AAP-6).

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On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that not every international operation will
require the same command and control structure. According to AJP-1 (D), NATO
military structure (EU as well) takes into account three command models. Each model
provides a command and control option (C2) that can be special for each particular
operation185.

As a conclusion, one thing is very important: Depending on the option to be selected, the
appropriate structures will be developed to apply it in practice. Thus, the selected
command and control option gives considerable impact to AAF structure as a whole. No
MOD/GS structure should be established without previously agreeing on AAF command
and control relations, and not the opposite.

III.9.2 Command and Control (C2) – The AAF case

At a strategic level, Albania has a specific law in force on AAF's Strategic Command and
Control Authorities. Also, at the operational level, we have a national doctrine, and have
ratified the Alliance Command and Control Doctrine (STANAG 2199, ATP-3.2.2). On
this basis, I think we are in due time to improve the law and AAF national doctrine on
Command and Control.

For a small armed force like that of our country, I think that the Ministry of Defence and
General Staff need to develop an even more integrated institution than before. In today's
terms, it would be luxurious to maintain parallel or non-productive structures that often
hinder each other's affairs. These are issues of a professional debate that should be
opened in military education and research institutions.

This integration of the institution does not mean that its component parts lose their
specific functions. On the contrary, these specific functions should be clearly defined
through standard operating procedures. The integrated structure should maintain civilian
control lines, through policy development according to the Constitution and the Law of

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Model 1 - Fully Integrated. This command model integrates forces based on 'proportional division'.
This division may result in a bilateral or multinational generation of operational level or component
level staffs. Language and work procedures are agreed between the contributing countries.
Commanders of such multinational formations are mainly assigned based on rotation.
Model 2 - Lead Nation. This command model provides that a lead country assumes responsibility for
planning and execution of an operation. Commander, headquarters, command & control capability
(C2), communication & information capability, doctrine coordination, and force logistics are from the
leading country. Other countries can provide their contributions to this force structure, as well as
complement staff positions within the HQs Staff.
Model 3 - Framework Nation. This command model means that a country provides the command and
control framework (C2). The main staff positions as well as elements of staff support are set by the
Framework Nation, while language and working procedures are based on Alliance standards.

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Authorities, and professional military lines, through policy implementation, military
capability development, and operational planning and control in and out the country.

On the other hand, the development of a functional integrated defence staff requires the
cultivation of a new culture of team work, high level organization, promotion of civil and
military professional skills, and increased understanding and trust between integrated
civilian and military personnel.

III.9.3. MoD Organization structure in terms on C2 relations

The organization of MoD integrated structure should meet two main conditions: first it
should serve as an institution of the government of the Republic of Albania in the field of
defence of the country, and second, it should serve as a military planning structure and
command and control of military operations at strategic level.

The above functions can be met in some form of organization of the MoD and GS. Some
of their functions are civil, some others are military, while most of them are mixed
functions that require combined civil and military expertise. In this case, early retired
officers or civilians educated in security and defence institutions in and out the country,
may be used to provide their expertise.

According to the defence reform experience in the last two decades, it is not only the
AAF structure to guarantee the success of the institution. The most active element of
functional or non-functional organizational structure are the people; it is to the quality of
civilian and military personnel. Structures are dead diagrams; it is the people that makes
these structures alive and functional. “Even the best organization structure may fail if
there are no qualified personnel and appropriate operating procedures supporting it,
also even the worst structure may be successful when it has professional qualities, strong
willingness of leaders and personnel, and exact work procedures”186.

From this point of view, based on the theory and practice of command and control (C2),
for the mission and functions at strategic level of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic
of Albania, I have selected for analysis 4 options to be considered. Each of these options
requires different concepts, organizations and operating procedures:

Option 1: Fully Integrated MOD/GS.

This option is based on the modern method of staff integration and division of labour. It
correctly defines "who does what, when and in cooperation with whom" in the Ministry

186 Hudhra Th., Winds of transformation, Military Review. Spring 2011, page 49

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of Defence? This option clearly formulates who is in charge for the policy, who develops
the strategies, who opens and who conducts an operation, who initiates a task and who is
engaged, who has the leading and who has the supporting role, who makes the plans and
who executes them, when and where are the reports developed and submitted, what are
the products of measuring success, etc.? For each task, execution of tasks is done by
using the "task tracker" method.

The first option divides plans and policy function of development of country's military
capabilities from the use of capabilities/forces in operation. Based on role specialization,
the MoD integrated staff (Civil-Military) is responsible for AAF strategic planning and
control, while a Joint Operations Command (JOC) (GS as a single Command) takes on
operational control functions, including collective training, education, etc. JOC
commander is a senior officer included in AAF command and control authorities as
Deputy Chief of GS for Operations directly subordinate to Chief of General Staff. The
other Deputy Chief of GS may cover defence planning area in the position of Deputy
Chief of GS for Force Planning.

For command and control of AAF operations, JOC Commander has a typical operational
headquarters with G1-G9 standard, organized into two major Departments, one for
Operations and one for Support. For the fulfilment of its mission, JOC maintains strong
links with the integrated MoD staff through lessons learned from operations and exercises
of the Armed Forces.

In this option, the integrated MoD staff should be a smaller organization/staff at strategic
level, responsible for planning, development, organization, coordination, monitoring and
support functions of AAF in general, rather than daily operational control of subordinate
units. In a civil-military integrated structure, civil-military expertise is normally
integrated into 4 major pillars equivalent to General Department/Directorate level (GD),
while the pillar 5 may be the Defence Staff (General Staff). GD-s may be as follows: GD
for Defence Policy and International Relations; GD for Long Term Planning, Budgetary
Resources and Infrastructures; GD for Human Resources, Legal and Services
Management; GD for Materials/ Modernization and Support. Also, for specific areas
there may be separate sections at a lower level. All general departments/directorates
(GD), departments, sectors and specialists will have specific missions, tasks and job
descriptions.

Also, it would be normal that the position of Deputy Minister of Defence should be more
active than today; they are playing an unspecified role or simply a substitution role. The
number of 2-3 deputy ministers without any specific function and concrete

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responsibilities, in my judgement, is of no value, but only for political favours. The same
should be said for the Deputy Chief of General Staff positions as well.

In this option, the Chief of General Staff of the AAF takes on the functions of Chief of
Defence (CHoD, according to NATO standard) with two basic functions: the top military
commander for command and control of the Armed Forces, as well as the top military
adviser to the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The direct command
and control chain of command of day-to-day AAF operations is transferred to the JOC
Commander (he may be also CHoD’s deputy), who still remains directly subordinate to
him. While the other function of the Chief of Defence is the strategic advice to senior
civil authorities on strategic planning issues, development of military capability,
capability planning for international and national operations, implementation of
international relations in the defence area, inter-institutional relations, development of
military positions in the field of defence, provision of military expertise on security
matters, international representation at senior forums of Chiefs of Defence; etc.

Unlike the JOC, the Chief of Defence does not have a typical full-fledged J1-J9 strategic
command and control staff, because this staff is integrated into the MoD staff (for
strategic issues) and JOC (for operational issues). CHoD may have a reduced organized
staff in 2-3 Integrated Directorates to cover specific areas that remain uncovered from the
two above organizations (my recommendation is for a Planning Directorate (J2 + J3 / J7
+ J5 + J9) and Supporting Directorate (J1 + J4 + J6 + J8). In this option of the Integrated
MoD / GS, civilian and military staff will be integrated into the organization structure to
accomplish the above missions. There will be no separate civilian departments for the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and no separate military departments for the Chief of
General Staff (GS). All departments may be mixed and serve both authorities on the basis
of clearly prescribed standard operating procedures.

Based on this concept, the integrated MoD staff departments will primarily focus on
policy and management development functions and will be chaired by civilian leaders,
while those that will require more military and operational expertise will be chaired by
the military personnel. Their deputies may be the opposite, it means those that have a
civilian leader, they will have a military deputy, and vice versa. Likewise, the
composition and expertise of the departments should be civil-military, in a fair proportion
and in harmony with the main functions they fulfil; policy development, planning,
management, or their implementation.

It is very important to understand that in this option of an integrated MoD staff, the role
of the ‘force provider’ will be played by the commands of forces (units), while the role of
the ‘force user’ in operations will be played by JOC at GS HQ. So in a given operation,

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commands providing forces for operations (force provider) lose the command authority
as the parent unit and transfer this authority to JOC. In this case, according to NATO
standards, command and control of the Joint Operation Command over units made
available for operation is called Operational Command and Control (OPCOM and
OPCON). Meanwhile, Full Command and Control authority (FULLCOM and
FULLCON) still remains to the commands providing available force for operations (force
provider).

This fully integrated MoD staff is an organization structure successfully applied in

European countries having an advanced maturity, military experience and a high
democratic culture. As an option based on roles specialization, in order to be functional,
it requires special training of civil and military staff, mutual understanding and trust, as
well as accurate standard operating procedures according to the integrated concept.

Option 2: Half-Integrated MOD/GS.

In this hybrid option of the MoD structure, main civil functions will be covered by civil
departments, main military functions will be handled by military ones, while those
functions which require integrated expertise will be covered by an integrated civil-
military staff of integrated subordination as in the first option.

With this option, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff will have some
typical structures under their respective subordination, while others will not be integrated
as in the first option. MoD and GS may have integrated only those departments that have
similar or integrated functions; such as the Directorate of Human Resources Management
of MoD with Directorate J1 of GS; Planning and Policy Directorate at MoD with J5 at
GS, Budget Management Directorate at MoD with J8 at GS, Culture and Media Centre at
MoD with J9 at GS, etc.

All integrated departments will be mixed as in the first option, while others will maintain
a clean civilian or military line, according to their functions. Also, the division of
functions in this option will be conducted according to the concept of this structure: civil
departments will be responsible for civil functions, military departments for military
functions, and integrated departments for integrated functions.

In this option, the Chief of General Staff will have direct subordination only over typical
GS military structures, and integrated subordination (or coordination lines) over all
integrated MoD departments. He does not have a full J1-J9 format staff, but he must have
J2, J3/ 7, J4, and J6 structures which are strongly linked with operational functions. Also,
if this option will be selected, my recommendation is that the Chief of General Staff also
have a Military Operation Centre (MOC), versus the JOC of the first option.
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MOC has far less command and control authority over armed forces than the JOC of the
first option. By law, in cases of emergencies, crisis or war situations, the MOC may take
on functions of an Operational Command led by the Chief of General Staff, reinforced
with related staff of General Staff (J2, 3/7, 4, 6) according to their respective functions.

MOC chief is a lower rank officer than the first JOC commander option, and should not
be included in AAF chain of strategic command and control authorities. He has a small
supporting staff for operational control without command and decision-making authority.
He follows operational situations and drafts periodic operational reports for the Minister
and Chief of General Staff. Military Operation Centre maintains direct contact with the
Chief of GS, the GS and MoD staff on issues related to AAF day to day operations.

If this option is selected, the MoD/ GS should develop very good civilian structures for
the management and development of civilian control policies on the Armed Forces, very
good military structures for typical military expertise of military personnel, and very
good integrated structures with integrated civil-military expertise of civilians and military
personnel. For the development of this half integrated structure no golden recipe can be
given; it has its own dynamics and lessons learned for individual countries, based on
specific reality, traditions, level and culture, political will, teamwork, etc.

This option of a semi-integrated MoD organization structure has an average staff number
engaged not only in AAF planning, development, organization, coordination, monitoring
and support, but through MOC, in daily operational control and activities of AAF units.
So, this option offers an AAF with an eye on force development and an eye on
operations.

The semi-integrated MoD option is an organization structure successfully applied in

some countries. It requires special training of civil and military staffs and accurate
standard procedures for a functional implementation.

For this option, bearing in mind that AAF structure has a General Staff with subordinate
Forces / Brigades/ Battalions unit, my recommendation is that the ‘force provider’ is the
Force / Brigade/ Battalion units, while the ‘force user’ is the General Staff, supported by
MOC.

Option 3: Division of civilian MOD functions from military GS Functions.

This is the traditional version of AAF and many other eastern countries before joining the
Alliance. This option is in support of the division/separation of civil and military
functions and is the opposite of the integrated structure. In this version, in addition to

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other negative aspects, Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are mostly established
in different locations.

In this case, the Ministry of Defence assumes the function of civilian control over the
AAF (legal, personnel, finances), while the General Staff is both a strategic force
development staff and the function of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The
Chief of GS is also the commander of the Armed Forces, and the General Staff is also the
main headquarters of AAF operations.

This option, had some positive aspects, but it was dominated by negative aspects, which
may be of objective and subjective nature. Any decision-making for the selection of this
option should assess their negative and positive aspects of the existing reality of the
country. In my judgment, this option belongs to the past.

With this option, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff will have their
typical subordinate structures. Almost all civilian expertise will be subordinate to the
Minister of Defence and all military expertise subordinate to the Chief of GS. All civilian
departments will be subordinate to MoD and all military departments will be subordinate
to the Chief of GS. The Chief of GS will have a full military structure of the J1-J9 model,
reinforced for both development of military capabilities and command and control of
national and international military operations.

In this option, the Minister of Defence will have limited military expertise, and the Chief
of General Staff will have limited civilian expertise in development of defence policy
issues, management of international relations, public relations, etc. These limitations will
also be reflected in their respective staffs. Experience has shown that such structures are
characterized by a clear division of expertise, by major difficulties of organizational
nature, by other difficulties of subjective attitudes of the authorities and their staff, which
may be aggravated in cases of countries with limited democratic culture.

This option is based on the concept of division of functions of development of defence

policies with the functions of force development and military operations. The former will
have mainly civilian functions and the second mainly military functions. This is the
classic system of organization of defence institutions often characterized by isolated work
between civilian and military personnel, extreme division of labour, lack of civilian
expertise by military and lack of military expertise by civilians, highly bureaucratic
civilian directives and instructions, lack of mutual trust, delay processes, competition, etc.

If this option is selected, the Chief of General Staff will have a Defence Operational
Centre (DOC) or a Situation Centre (SC) subordinate to him to follow the operational
situation of the AAF. This DOC/SC with limited staff, in emergency, crisis or war
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situations, may change to a Joint Operations Command led by the Chief of General Staff,
based entirely on the General Staff structure.

This option requires a larger number of civilian-military personnel than all other options,
because both the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff will compete to have full
structures to carry out their own mission, often followed by parallel structures. In this
option, bearing in mind that the AAF structure has a General Staff with subordinate
Force/ Brigade/ Battalion units, it is recommended that the ‘force provider’ are the Force/
Brigade/Battalion units, while the ‘force user’ is the AAF General Staff.

Option 4: MOD/GS with a subordinate Joint Force Command (JFC).

The concept of this option is based, on one hand, on an integrated MoD / GS structure
explained in the first option, and on the other hand, the establishment of a Joint Force
Command (JFC) focused on Full Command and Control (FULLCOM and FULLCON) in
peace, crisis and war time (not only OPCOM / OPCON). The Joint Force Command has
command-and-control authority over all AAF units. JFC Commander is subordinate to
the Chief of General Staff (and according to the law, to Commander in Chief of Armed
Forces).

As in the first option, the Chief of General Staff takes on the functions of the Chief of
Defence (CHoD). JFC Commander has direct command and control of forces, while the
CHoD takes on the functions of strategic advice and consultation to senior civilian
authorities, defence planning and development of military capability at the strategic level,
capability planning for national and international operations, bilateral regional and
international relations in the defence area, inter-institutional relations, formulation of
military positions in the field of defence, military expertise on security issues,
international representation in senior forums of Chiefs of Defence; etc.

In this option, the General Staff is not a single/unique command of the Armed Forces. As
such, it is not a typical J1-J9 format staff of command and control of AAF, but a small
HQ staff, as part of the MoD / GS integrated structure, supporting the functions of the
Chief of General Staff.

The JFC commander is a high rank officer (Major General) included in AAF Command
and Control authorities. He has a G1-G9 operational level headquarters to fulfil his
mission. It has direct subordination of all AAF tactical units, other than those directly
subordinated to MoD/ GS. JFC maintains strong links with the integrated MoD/ GS staff.

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The special feature of this option is that JFC is both a force-provider and a force-user.
Apart from control the daily activity of all direct subordinate forces, it also has command
and control of all operational forces inside and outside the country, thus it has a dual role.

This option is very suitable for small countries. A full legal basis is required for
implementation of this option, a clear standard operating procedure, and specific training
of relevant staff at a strategic, operational and tactical level.

Conclusions and recommendations:

1. The C2 concept of AAF will highly depend on the structure of the Ministry of
Defence, General Staff and Armed Forces. So I recommend that the C2 concept
comes first and AAF command structure comes second. A force structure that is built
without a C2 concept is unlikely to be functional successfully.
2. Of the 4 options above, other hybrid options can be generated. All options may be
acceptable, with the positive and negative aspects they have. The truth is that future
trends are moving towards integrated defence structures. On the other hand, in order
to be successful, integrated structures require time, culture and joint civil and military
training at all levels.
3. The option to be selected in our case should be the option that is best supported by
AAF current and future situation, the will of political and military authorities,
political-military relations, professional and cultural level, interests, characteristics,
traditions, and support with human, material and financial resources in the medium
term, etc.
4. Lessons learned show that structural reform of defence institution should not be done
by one or two persons in a closed process, as it has happened in some cases. It should
be done in an institutional, open and transparent way, by a civil-military working
group with the best national experts, considering also the best practices of allied
countries.
5. My recommendation is that Strategic Defence Review (SDR) findings, completed in
April 2013 (or 2018 SDR findings), are taken as a starting point for a mid-term
reform. This SDR, despite some shortcomings, is an official document institutionally
conducted for an 18-month period and with the participation of experts from 10
institutions of the country and with the help of US DIRI team.
6. In my view, the AAF command and control system and structure should target the
first option in the long run, starting from a transitional second option. To make this
option successful tomorrow, we need to prepare today for its success. Success of this

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 option requires appropriate legal and conceptual changes, a full training package for
AAF civilian and military staffs and related standard operating procedures.
7. It is very important that changes are to be made first in the C2 concept and then in the
organization structure. So, conceptual and legal changes in the command and control
relations should be conducted before structural changes. This is one of the 'lessons
learned' in the last 20 years. Sometimes, political masters, while achieving their
political objectives, have made structural changes, promoting them as ‘deep reforms’,
while the goal of these ‘reforms’ have been focused only on personnel "cuts". These
‘reforms’ have led to insecurity and instability of organization structures, sometimes
leading to demotivation of the armed forces personnel.
8. Likewise, the existing legal framework and strategic documents related to defence
and security in the Republic of Albania are now outdated and need to be updated to
reflect the current situation, such as National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy,
AAF Long-Term Development Plan, Law on Command and Control of Authorities,
Law on Rank and Career in AAF, etc.
9. In order to develop operational integrated structures they should necessarily require
standard operating procedure (SOP) which is the engine for success or failure of
integrated structures. Each director, section or specialist should have, as appropriate,
the mission, duties and job descriptions before their organization structure enters into
force. Senior and junior staff/ specialists should meet all job requirements. The
implementation of integrated structures takes some 1-2 years, during which a team
work culture of civil-military staffs should be established, good understanding and
trust between them should be promoted, and professional expertise through joint
training and practice should be consolidated.
10. Last but not least, development and implementation of an integrated structure requires
related best practices of other countries. Countries that can be recommended are
Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovenia, etc. Over the
years, some such meetings have taken place, but their results are not properly applied.

III.10. A Concept for development of “Niche” capabilities in AAF

III.10.1. Introduction to ‘Niche’ capabilities
Following the above-mentioned capability-based planning recommendations, the focus of
this sub-chapter is on articulation of a concept to guide the long-term development of
'niche' capabilities of AAF of the future force 2024 and beyond.

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NATO is talking about 'niche' capabilities, especially after NATO summit in 1999. The
term niche187 (pronounced niç or nish) comes from French and has the meaning of
specialty, business, work, or concentrated human activity. In more technical and military
term, "niche" means the development of that individual skill or capability or a group
specialty, associated with a highly specialized level and expertise compared with other
individuals or groups.
NATO Force Planning Experts, and especially the US, in the framework of today’
Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA), point out that "... today is no longer reasonable
the approach of improving all elements of combat power of any individual NATO country
rather than the approach of development of an integrated and synergetic capability that
NATO should develop as a whole body...188..
At the beginning, the 1999 Washington Summit identified the risks posed to the Alliance
by "oppression, ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the
global proliferation of weapons technology and terrorism.189" At that time, the Alliance
had too much capabilities to handle Article 5 missions, but there were also considerable
capability shortfalls for new missions. To fill the gaps for the capabilities imposed by the
new risks, the summit aimed at NATO's response to the development of specialized niche
capabilities.
For example, the Czech Republic developed a special military unit with special expertise
in nuclear, chemical and biological detection and destruction. Bulgaria significantly
improved their military capability in Afghanistan (ISAF) with a tactical unit capable of
disposal of WMD consequences. Slovenia gave a good contribution to the Balkans for
demolition of some 30,000 mines in neighbouring countries. Romania sent a military
police platoon to fight al-Qaeda in the ISAF-Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan.
Lithuania sent a reinforced platoon of 40 specialty operations to support US troops in
Afghanistan and provided a medical team for the Czech medical unit in ISAF. Estonia
sent two dog training teams to detect explosives in support of air base operations in
Afghanistan190, etc.
Further, the Prague Summit 2002 promoted short and medium-term spending of Allied
countries on improving 'niche' capabilities in areas NATO Alliance had significant
shortages for future operations, such as: deployment of capabilities, sustainability of
operations, and interaction of forces, information superiority, and defence against WMD.
At this summit, the Alliance encouraged and supported 5 specialized capability building
initiatives against the possible effects of terrorist attacks with Weapons of Mass

187 Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/niche
188 Revolution of Military Affairs, George Rifen, text 2006, page 12
189 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, Chapter 2

190 Coalition contribution to the war on terrorism, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/14627.htm

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Destruction (WMD), such as: a deployable prototype of analytical laboratory against
WMD; a prototype team against WMD effects; a virtual Centre of Excellence for WMD
protection; a NATO Infrastructure Centre with equipment and tools to protect against the
effects of biological and chemical attacks; as well as a disease monitoring system.

New member states of NATO Istanbul Summit sent clear messages to develop niche
capability priorities. "Slovakia continues to follow the example of niche capability
building; being a mainly mountainous country, we are developing some specialized units
to operate on rugged mountain areas; we are also paying special attention to training of
experts for discovery, development of field units and production and use of mining
equipment very successful in peacekeeping operations”191, underlined the Prime-minister
Dzuringa after the summit.

Former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, said at the Istanbul summit: "the
new countries do not bring large military forces to NATO. NATO no longer need these.
The era of large-scale operations on the European continent now belongs to the past."
While former NATO secretary, George Robertson said that "... even NATO countries
themselves can no longer afford to invest with priority over heavy metal bullet items such
as tanks, armoured carriers, fighter-bomber jets, etc., when in fact the focus should be on
lighter, more versatile and well-informed forces with deadly effects capable of striking
asymmetric enemy groups far from the European continent”192.

Slovenia focus on niche capabilities is based on forces for special operations. Slovenian
army has also expertise and is developing niche-type capabilities such as alpine military
units, mine clearance capabilities, and humanitarian aid teams. Also, “… Slovenia has
provided niche capabilities such as a chemical rescue platoon for the NATO Response
Force (NRF), as well as well-trained and well-equipped SAR teams193.

The Canadian experience of 'niche' focuses on specialized capabilities such as “… winter

engineering units, CIMIC teams, multinational operations logistics teams, intelligence
and reconnaissance teams, or coordination and distribution teams for humanitarian aid
population”194.

It is also worth exploring Finland case, as a non-NATO member. Finland is the second in
per capita population, contributing to NATO-led operations. Finland worked in Kosovo
after 1999 with a mechanized battalion which had integrated a team of mechanized
CIMIC armoured carriers with TETRA radio network providing that service to all

191 Dzuringa, Slovakia way to NATO missions, page 3

192 George Robertson speech to RUSI, 2004, page 4
193 Coalition contribution to the war on terrorism, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/14627.htm
194 Ibid

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organizations and agencies in the area of responsibility. So this case is about a niche
capability integrated into a combat operational capability. Also, a specialized Finland's
capability in NATO and EU-led operations is the MNF HQ CIS module (Multinational
Force Communication and Information System), which is still a highly required ‘niche’
capability by NATO operations.

We should not forget that another strategic objective of Albania is the membership in the
European Union as well. Like NATO, the same concept is being applied by the European
defence force in the EU context. In the framework of "EU Battle Groups Concept" Vision
2010, some countries were expected to contribute with real combat capability for "EU
Battle Groups" individually or jointly under "Joint Vision". The "EU Battle Groups" goal
was to create a force of 13 Battle Groups and 4 niche support units for battle groups with
a total staff of 100,000 personnel, 400 fighter jets, 100 combat ships, 1 aircraft carrier, a
strategic air transport unit, an intelligent strategic unit, a CIMIC team, a Crisis Response
Unit (CRT) etc. Battle groups and niche capabilities in support of "EU Battle Groups"
were developed individually or under individual or group responsibility of the EU states.

In addition to this, the EU initiated the development of CCRT packages (Civil Crisis
Response Teams) with a total of 100 personnel, with a pool of experts appointed by
member countries in specialized expertise areas such as border police, civil defence,
logistic support, etc. ready to be deployed for 5 days by request made by the EU Council.
In these commitments, the EU welcomed the contribution of other NATO countries that
are not members of the European Union, but also NATO aspirant countries and other
potential partners. The concept of "EU Battle Groups" is a complementary and mutually
reinforcing concept along with the NATO Response Force (NRF).

III.10.2. Albania and Development of Niche Capabilities:

The concept of 'niche' capability is a chance given by NATO to small countries, and this
chance should be maximized. Specialized ‘niche’ capabilities, in addition to contribution
to NATO operations, are really useful for national contributions. On the other side,
waiting for more security from the collective defence, it is normal for us to give up from
some traditional inherited concepts of the past, to release the armed forces (services) from
old traditional combat, combat support and logistic support capabilities. Being a small
country with limited resources, our defence planners should think harder on planning the
capabilities needed by the country as a whole, rather than on development of specific
capabilities for each of the forces/services. The actions of our forces under the "joint task
force" concept will further release parallel surplus capabilities which do not justify
themselves, while developing a modular force to act effectively in most typical national
and international missions.

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What are some specialized "niche" capabilities our country has already a good tradition
or to be promoted for development of new traditions? Based on the experience of other
countries, but also on our national traditions, geography and experience, I have
recommended below a comprehensive ‘niche’ capability package as "food for
thoughts" for national planners or decision-makers of defence planning.

The niche capability menu recommended below does not imply that we will develop all
those capabilities. This would be totally impossible financially and not logically. Our
ability is to rationally select those capabilities really needed by the country for the entire
spectrum of national and international missions. We do not have the luxury to develop
'niche' capability for contribution only to NATO/EU/UN/Coalition-led operations, and
which are not usable in the national context. Below, there is a proposed menu list with
some of niche capabilities to be identified, developed or upgraded through 2024 and
beyond:

1. Modules of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Countering Improvised

Explosive Devices (CIEDs);

2. Military Police Teams or groups for various Peace Support Operations (PSO)
missions, or for training and advice of local forces;

3. Civic-Military Relations Teams/ Modules (CIMICs) in the interest of Battalion Group

units, related to civil administration, civil infrastructure, humanitarian assistance,
cultural affairs etc.;

4. Liaison Observation Teams / Modules (LOTs), as modules to operate independently

or subordinate to the Allied Intelligence and Information Centre;

5. Special Forces Teams/ Special Force Modules (SF), for special operations attached to
battalion units in the interest of the allied operation theatre;

6. Alpine / Mountain Teams / Groups / Modules capability for search and rescue (SAR)
operations in mountainous terrain, special operations, etc.;

7. PRT Teams/ Modules/ Groups of civil engineering, or civil infrastructure in support

of the population in certain areas of interest;

8. OMLT and POMLT teams / training and advice modules in areas and specializations
of a high experience in our forces;

9. Divers Team/ Modules for search and rescue operations, or other operations in the
interest of PSO Operations;
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10. Translator/ Culture Teams/ Groups in certain areas where we are interested and when
necessary;

11. Teams / Modules on Coordination of Humanitarian Aid,

12. Personnel for HNS teams for filling the RSOM Group Staff (Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement), especially for movement control teams.

13. WMD protection capability; a deployable capability for collective WMD protection;
or a chemical detection point capability for chemical multi-agents.

14. Personnel for meteorology and oceanography (Marine and Air component) for
Meteorology and Oceanography Centres of Joint Commands;

15. Staff officers or modules for filling NATO multinational headquarters as; JCC (Joint
Logistics Coordination Cell);, JTCL (Joint Transportation Coordination Cell); JECC
(Joint Engineering Coordination Cell), JMCC (Joint Medical Coordination Cell),
JHNS CC (Joint HNS Coordination Cell);

16. National capabilities as training evaluation teams, personnel for inclusion in OCC
Evaluation teams;

17. National Team/ Module for Psychological Operations, as a support element of

national operations or staff headquarters in NATO-led CJTF.
18. Surgical Team/ Module especially for trauma Role 2 or ambulance capability up to
30-40 barrels at once.
Development or consolidation of niche-type capability is not an easy thing. In my
opinion, we must pay priority to those niche capabilities that are focused on combat
support and logistic support, which have a lower probability of casualties than combat
forces.
Especially now, when contributions to international operations are beyond military ones,
other national civilian capabilities may be helpful with their specialization in
international operations. When handling terrorism risks, there is a need for mixed
capabilities of both professional military forces and police and civilian capabilities,
intelligence agencies and services, anti-cyber experts, counterterrorism experts,
information security, for computer network protection and storage of key infrastructure,
or capabilities of other law enforcement agencies on land, air and sea.
Also, other public or private capabilities can be evaluated such as police forces,
firefighters, medical and healthcare providers, private security companies, and even
diplomatic modules for assistance on institution building missions. A roster database is
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needed to have all these capabilities identified and updated periodically. These
capabilities should be made available for national missions, and some of them may be
declared or contracted to be designed under NATO / EU / UN operations under the
concept of a "single set of forces" at the time they may be required.

III.11. Development of a Volunteer “Reserve’ component in AAF

This sub-chapter addresses a very specific and important issue of defence and force
planning of the country and provides answers to the questions: Will the armed forces of
Albania need a reserve component in the future? How advantageous is the reserve
component? If so, what type of reserve, what quantity and how will this reserve force be
used? What are missions and tasks of this component? How can the voluntary reserve
component be trained and supported? What may be some of the challenges of
development of reserve component? What is the experience of other small NATO or EU
member countries?

I believe that the voluntary reserve component may be one of the elements of the future
defence reform. Let’s make a parenthesis at the very beginning: it is not about
reminiscences on the classical obligatory reserve force of the past, based on the concept
of total defence of every meter square the country with our own forces, when every
citizen was a soldier and every soldier was a citizen. On the contrary, it is about a new
and realistic view of voluntary reserve forces in the new conditions of the security
environment, which is a reasonable, cost-effective, and usable in operations in and out of
the country.

Why are the reserve forces necessary today? What are some of best practices in Alliance
countries?

After the end of the Cold War, new international relations in the new global and regional
strategic environment brought about a significant change in the nature of international
conflicts. Over the last two decades, "the main threat to peace and security in the world
has not come from traditional forms of conflict between the states, but mainly from
asymmetric threats, internal conflicts of various states, as well as dangerous activities of
international terrorism. These conflicts are reflected in unusual clashes between different
ethnic groups, cultures, and even civilizations.”195

Under these conditions, "this change in the nature of international conflicts created the
perception of a stable peace and stability, far from major confrontations, accompanied

195 Ethno politics: Conflict versus cooperation, Stephan Wolff, Oxford University Press 2006
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by significant cuts in the armed forces and defence budgets at the global level. In most
countries, aim of the reform was shifting from broad active and reserve mandatory forces
to smaller active professional forces, supported by a voluntary reserve force”196.

This tendency of defence reform became more evident especially in small countries and
with limited national resources, including our country. With ever-increasing commitment
to UN, NATO, the EU-led coalitions Peace Support Operations, countries’ participation
is becoming more and more difficult. Also, the armed forces are increasingly engaging in
domestic national operations, in particular in support of civil emergencies. Under these
conditions, volunteer reserve forces are playing an important role in AAF missions
alongside with regular active forces, contributing significantly to their size, support and
strength.

So, reserve forces, from a component traditionally configured during the Cold War for
territorial defence of the country, is increasingly becoming today part of all spectrum of
humanitarian and peace-support operations, including civil emergencies in the country.
This successful engagement is accompanied by conceptual changes in the development,
training and use of this component.

Expectations of the third decade of the 21st century are that the engagement of reserve
component in operations inside and outside the country will be even higher. Especially,
participation in some key specialized roles of the Armed Forces, called specialized
"niche" capabilities in the operational language, is expected to be of crucial importance.

III.11.1 Origin and historic development of volunteer reserve forces?

Historically, reserve force in the Army was born when the Prussians were defeated in the
Jena-Auerstedt battle and they signed the Tilsit Treaty, on July 9, 1807, when Napoleon
forced Prussians to have an army non larger than 42,000 personnel, in exchange for some
occupied territories. Under these conditions, the reform called Krumpersystem197,
proposed by Prussian military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst, reflected intelligently
by training each year on a quarterly basis a large number of recruits who did not exceed
the prescribed figure but, if necessary, they were a much larger military contingent. This
concept was significantly improved during the First and Second World War, and was
updated to a system based on relevant laws, according to the specifics of each country.
After the Cold War, the concept of the voluntary reserve is the most modern concept of
NATO and EU countries.

196 Gjatoja R., Hudhra Th.: “A Concept Paper’ on a Volunteer Reserve Component in AAF”, Military Review, Dec

2010, page 23
197 A History of Modern Germany: 1648-1840, By Hajo Holborn, Page 418

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Voluntary reserve force is a force consisting of reserve officers, non-commissioned
officers and soldiers who voluntarily join the armed forces to serve at a specified time by
performing certain tasks as defined by the law. Its recruitment is done on a voluntary
basis. According to Wikipedia, "a voluntary reserve force is a military component of a
country with volunteer personnel in reserve that join the armed forces, combining, in
addition to civil career, a part-time military task”. 198

Normally, the voluntary reserve component based on this concept is less costly than
active professional force, because it is activated on a part-time model over the year.
Moreover, for certain specialties, functions and tasks, it is much more qualitative than the
active force itself, leading to an appropriate option for specific capabilities in the armed
forces.

In some countries, after the end of compulsory military service, reserve service is still
mandatory, while in many other countries, both active military service and reserve
military service is entirely voluntary.

In the first case, compulsory reserve service is characteristic of countries such as Sweden,
Finland, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Israel, (as well as Switzerland as a neutral
country!!) etc., which have an historic burden or problematic memory of immediate
military nature with neighbours. The same system had our country before 1990.

In the second case, voluntary reserve service is a specific feature of countries that have
been relatively relieved from the problems of traditional state to state or bloc to block
confrontation. This reserve service is practically applied in most NATO and EU
countries, such as US, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Slovenia,
Hungary, Croatia, etc.

As a good example, each rotation of Canadian forces in Afghanistan includes 15 to 25%

from reserve component, which performs up to 6 months of pre-training before deploying
to Kandahar to serve there six to nine months. Moreover, some reservists working on
Civil-Military co-operation or special operations have better skills than regular Canadian
forces. Almost the same concept is applied by US, UK, German and Slovene cases,
which, with their specific features, attach particular importance to the use of reserve
component in international missions.

In some countries, such as United States, UK, Canada, etc., voluntary reserve forces
come mainly from active military service personnel after they are released from active
duty. This obligation to further service after the active duty to voluntary reserve is

198 Wikipedia, at www.wikipedia/volunteer military reserve

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provided by a specific contract with individuals for many Alliance countries. Also, in
NATO countries, reservists may also be recruited from civil society volunteers who want
to contribute to the armed forces in certain areas of their specialized expertise. This
system is regulated by law.

Scheme 4: Graph of NATO country reserve forces, estimation of 2008

The attached scheme presents the ratio between the number of regular and reserve staff of
NATO countries for 2009. Of the then 28 NATO member states, 42 percent support their
defence in a structure where there are more regular than reserve forces. Among these
countries are the US, Germany, Italy, Turkey. Whereas for countries such as Greece,
Bulgaria, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Norway, the Baltic States etc., the number of reserve
forces is higher than that of the regular forces.199

Also, any US reservist is a volunteer reserve and not a compulsory reserve. All reserve
units are mainly included in the National Guard. With about 20% of US Army units and
5.3% of the budget, the Army's Reserve Forces provide about 50% of the military combat
support of the Army. The National Guard also plays an extraordinary role and
contribution to civil emergencies.

One of the major advantages of voluntary reserve force is that this contingent is either
trained or needs a certain time to be trained before a mission. Another advantage is that
they are much less costly than active forces, which is related to the partial time of their

199 Military Balance 2008, page 168

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service, and only to the extreme needs of their use. One of their disadvantages is that they
can not be used for the entire spectrum of the Armed Forces mission.

III.11.2. Proposal for a volunteer reserve component in AAF

The future Albanian reserve force may benefit from the best practices of the Alliance's
reserve forces, based on our practical conditions, reality and perspective of long-term
defence reforms. It should be a small reserve force/ component, specialized, cost-
effective, usable and long term built-up volunteer reserve force to build additional
capabilities in support of mission of active professional forces.

Normally, we should not expect that the AAF reserve component to carry out all the
missions and tasks performed by active professional forces, but based on best practice, it
can successfully perform some of their tasks, and often even with higher quality,
especially when they relate to their field of civil expertise. Recognizing these qualities is
key to determining the areas of recruitment of future voluntary reserve forces.

Neglected Roster Experience. The 2007 AAF structure supported the development of a
concept of a "Roster" reserve component, whereby all active members of the Armed
Forces are listed in a "database" with the intention to further join reserve service, after
they leave active service, if they want to volunteer. This concept was never fully
articulated and no serious efforts are made to get into the system. Also, the new AAF
structure does not mention the reserve component at all. I recommend that the Roster
experience of volunteer registration of all active military service personnel after leaving
this service, for a period of time of 3-6 years in the voluntary reserve service, should be
applied without any delay to the new AAF structure.

Reserve component and the Constitution of Albania. In fact, the reserve force is based
on the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, which Article 166 states that "Albanian
citizens can participate in the defence of the Republic of Albania, as provided by law"200.

Another question comes out from here. What could be the main principle of developing
an AAR reserve component? I believe that the main principle of this component is the
development of a voluntary type of reserve force rather than a compulsory type
component. All citizens who meet the admission criteria can participate, according to the
requirements and the needs of reserve component of the Armed Forces. Despite the will
and the constitutional right, the reserve component, like the active component, can not be
as "universal" as to accept any citizen who apply for such a thing. Certainly, every citizen
is respected by constitutional right to apply, but based on professional criteria and the

200 Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 166

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concrete needs of AAF structures, only part of them may be eligible for participation in
the reserve force. This right will be basically the same as recruiting active professional
soldiers.

What type of reserve component? The reserve component may be recruited by active
AAF personnel after the end of their professional active service, by means of individual
contracts up to 3-6 years after the end of active service. Likewise, the voluntary reserve
force can be also recruited from individual citizens, on a volunteer basis, with high
quality expertise and specialties needed by AAF at certain times.

First we need to develop the concept of a voluntary reserve force in AAF (according to
best practices), then start activating and developing the reserve component. There may be
several options, but I found it appropriate to briefly address two of them:

1. Development of a volunteer reserve personnel based on the above "Roster" concept of

registration of the professional personnel of active units and Regional Support
Elements willing to join the reserve component.

2. Development of a volunteer reserve personnel based on reserve unit organization in

specific military reserve units, part of AAF reserve component.

Option 1. Development of a Volunteer Reserve "Roster", or registration of all persons

who wish to volunteer in the AAF units. This includes registration in a database of all
military personnel (officers, NCOs and professional soldiers) up to a certain age, who
after active service, want to voluntary join the reserve component. Also included are all
citizens who voluntarily join the reserve component meeting the registration criteria, who
after being included in AAF database should be available for training or participation in
missions. They can be called by districts authorities for local civil emergency missions,
or central authorities for national and international missions. Prior to deployment, they
should participate in pre-deployment training, etc., for a certain period of time.

In this option, reserve component can be used as an integral part of a mixed active and
reserve military unit, or as part of Regional Support Elements, etc. This means that the
reserve personnel in this option is not organized on the basis of a compact reserve unit or
sub-unit; but it is used to fill in active units to a certain percentage that does not hinder
the required unit readiness for operations.

Based on today's practice this level of reserve percentage may range from 10 to 20% of
the unit (so 80-90% active and 10-20% reserve), based on the unit mission and needs for
missing civilian expertise. Also, the possibility of development of a dominant reserve
component of "niche" capabilities, especially units for national emergencies, as well as

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international deployment, especially small civilian and military capacities included in the
CT Package.

Option 2. Development of specific reserve units in AAF, in addition to active units. This
means to develop 3-4 new light infantry battalions, replacing AAF Regional Support
Elements in several districts of the country, and their transformation from registration in
database into volunteer reserve battalions based on HQ framework Battalions. My
proposal is the development of 3-4 other reserve battalions in the most populated areas of
the country, attached to the organizational structure of the land force, according to the
best practices of allied countries. The volunteer reserve component should be
conceptually developed and implemented in the period 2018-2024 when an increase of
defence budget is expected at 2% of GDP.

Regional Support Elements can be model unit for application of voluntary reserve
system. They can be staffed as framework battalions with active personnel with 10-20%
active staff and the rest with reserve personnel.

How and where can voluntary reserve best be used? Based on best practices of other
countries, in the case of our country, it is not only about recruiting volunteer civilian
soldiers to fill up ordinary infantry companies, but it is also about filling them up with
some specific qualitative capacities that AAF are in real need for their mission. So, my
proposal is for development of those reserve capabilities we need at certain times and for
certain missions, because of their specialised niche quality and cost effectiveness.

In theory, mission of reserve force, according to the situation, may include broad
spectrum, from peacekeeping to combat, but in practice, priority should be given to their
participation in NATO/ EU/ UN-led Peace Support Operations, and in national
emergencies. Among these, in our case, we can pay special attention to missions of the
last decade of advisory teams, training staff, border traffic checkpoints, EOD and CIED,
coordination and representation activities etc.

In the article "A Concept Paper for the Development of Voluntary Reserve Force", the
authors recommend "the largest presence of the reserve component in the land forces
compared with the navy and air force; a greater presence on specific specialties than
typical combat units; more presence in "enabling" supporting elements than in purely
combat ones.201"

Possibility of using a combined active and reserve option for specialized capabilities is
not excluded. For illustration, let's take one of the main tasks of the Air Force mission:
201
“A concept paper for a volunteer reserve in AAF”, Hudhra Th, Gjatoja R, Military Review, Spring 2003

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providing airspace security of the Republic of Albania. In addition to Air Force active
professional component responsible for providing air space security, we can also have a
voluntary reserve civilian component from the Air Space Control Agency of Albania,
which has exceptional expertise, and only with a timely partial training to the military
system and the NATINADS system of the Alliance can be very valuable to the Air Force
mission. The same can be said for the Inter-institutional Maritime Observation System.
Likewise, we can expand this list with other national capabilities against the WMD
protection, civilian capabilities for civil emergency missions, capabilities against
terrorism, cyber and hybrid warfare, etc. And we can further continue with all other
specialized civil-military capabilities required under the Force Goals/ Capability Target
package in support of Light Inf-Mot-Bn-Gr Task force.

Another issue is about the size of the reserve component we need and can afford? From a
preliminary view, in my view we should not reduce the readiness of active professional
force below the required level of readiness system. With this in mind, we can attach up to
10-20% of the unit in reserve in mixed units, in order that active professional force have
at least an acceptable final operational capability, i.e., FOC 81-90%.

A new legal framework. It is very important that in order to institutionalise this new
volunteer reserve concept in AAF, the initiative should be timely supported by an
advanced legal framework. Voluntary reserve force may become or may not become
functional, it can not become halfway. This means that if we start to develop an elite
active military force, we should also develop an elite volunteer reserve force.

How long should volunteer reserve forces be trained to develop suitable skills for the
tasks of their mission? How much should they be paid for the training days in reserve
service? According to the experience of Allied countries, the voluntary reserve force
should be regularly trained every year and should be paid for the period in service some
80-100 percent of the regular active force. A volunteer training option, according to the
situation from urgent to normal, should be from 21 to 36 training days a year, consisting
of one week-end each three month and a two - three weeks training periods on an annual
basis.

And last, one key question is about the size of voluntary reserve component of Albania.
In my opinion, for an active professional force of 10 thousand personnel, the
development of a voluntary reserve force of 1-2 thousand people (i.e. 10-20%) is the
most appropriate option in the priorities recommended above.

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Conclusions and recommendations:

1. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR-2018) which is in process should consider, by

means of all AAF potential scenarios, in addition to active professional forces/
capabilities, what are the AAF needs for the reserve component;

2. Efforts to build a concept, a policy and legal framework of a voluntary reserve

component of the future AAF force should start now from the highest instances of
the integrated MoD staff;

3. The MoD staff may take into considerations the two above options and many other
combinations in order to submit for approval to decision making authorities the
most rational option of the volunteer reserve component for AAF;

4. The mission and tasks of the voluntary reserve component may be focused on civil
emergencies, specialised roles, and peace support operations in and out the country,
or others, as appropriate;

5. This voluntary reserve personnel (officers, NCOs and reserve solders) should be
voluntarily recruited by professional force personnel after the end of active service,
and by civilian citizens wishing to join the voluntary reserve service and meeting the
criteria and needs of the Armed Forces;

6. Another priority for development of voluntary reserve component may be focused

on specialized capabilities for specific shortage capabilities of AAF missions and
tasks;

7. Organization of the AAF reserve component shall take place based on the needs of
Forces Commanders/ Units and needs of participation in future operations in and out
the country. A Reserve Section should be added to the Personnel Recruitment Centre
of AAF;

8. An experienced working group should be established to formulate a conceptual,

legal, organizational, motivational, training, and financial package of the future
voluntary reserve component;

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 IV. CHAPTER IV. STRATEGIC PLANNING REVIEW (SDR) IN ALBANIA.

IV.1. Introduction to SDR and relations with Defence Planning.

What is the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the accepted definition of SDR? What
is the SDR origin and for what reasons? How is it supported in different countries? What
is the Albanian history and experience in SDR? What are its purposes and objectives?
What are the key elements of a Strategic Defence Review? What are the main findings
and products of this process? What are SDR links with defence planning, force planning
and operational planning? These and many other issues will be addressed in this chapter.
This is due to the fact that in April 2013, as a new member of the Alliance Albania
concluded the first SDR process, and the second SDR is underway in 2018.

Strategic Defence Review should be evaluated as a radiographic diagnosis of country's

defence capabilities in the new security environment to determine what is needed and
what is no longer needed, what armed force should develop our country in the next
decade to satisfy the equation of national and international operations, etc. This is the key
question for national defence planners.

The national, regional, and especially global security environment is and is expected to
be even more complex, flexible and unpredictable so that today's capabilities may be of
little use in the future security environment. So, above all, the Strategic Defence Review
focuses on the elimination of the old capabilities and the development of new capabilities
relevant to a changing security environment; it is an harbinger of AAF changes and
transformation.

SDR Origin. Strategic Defence Review is a process originated after the Cold War, when
major changes happened in the security and defence environment of allied countries and
no more conventional risks and threats were in the horizons. This significant change in
the security environment, coupled with promotion of many economic and social factors,
forced many countries to begin the review process of "outdated" military capability and
building "other modern" capabilities to cope with risks and threats expected ahead.

This profound change in the nature of the capability could not be carried out with partial
or amateur decision-making, but only with deep reviews of the whole business of security
and defence institutions. Research of this area advised institutionalization of periodic
review processes for transformation of mindset, relationships, management, capability,
and many other priority aspects in security and defence affairs of the new security
environment after the 90-ies.

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For the first time, the Strategic Defence Review process was initiated in 1997, by the
United States of America, and in 1998 by the United Kingdom. Subsequently, this
process was supported by many other countries as the best way to conduct reforms in the
security and defence sector.

In the United States, the Defence Review is named the Quadrennial Defence Review
(QDR) and was initiated by the then Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, based on
law202 where "the Secretary of Defence should conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the national defence strategy, the force/ services structure, infrastructure, budget plans,
and other elements of defence policies and programs every four years with a view to
defining the United States defence strategy and defence program for the next 20 years.
Each QDR is conducted in consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff203”.
Since then, the United States has conducted three reviews, respectively in 2001, 2006,
2010, 2015, while a new one is recently being conducted by Pentagon.

In the United Kingdom, the process is called Strategic Defence Review, and is firstly
initiated in 1998 by former Secretary of State for Defence, Sir George Robertson, former
NATO Secretary General. Later, the United Kingdom conducted its second Review in
2010, extending it in the framework of the Comprehensive Approach, naming it as a
Strategic Security and Defence Review - SSDR. The third review is also underway after
the Brexit.

Further, other states began to conduct Strategic Defence Review processes to update the
development of armed forces according to the security environment. First, Germany,
France, Italy, Poland, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia,
Slovenia, the Baltic countries, etc. launched the SDR process. Although the document has
not in all cases have the same name, content, messages and objectives, such as France's
"White Book", Germany's "Defence Policy of Bundeswehr", or Denmark's "Danish
Defence Agreement", etc., are clear Strategic Defence Reviews according to the specifics
of these countries.

In the North Atlantic Alliance, the Strategic Defence Review is a periodic process that
includes not only NATO structures, but also all allied countries. As discussed above, it is
carried out through the new NATO Strategic Concept, which follows the Defence
Requirement Review (DRR) process, of NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP),
resulting in general into issues of transformation, reform and development of the
Alliance's respective capabilities for the next 10 years, as well as member states in

202 The US National Defence Authorization Act - 1997

203 USC 10, §118 (a) based on “Title 10” US Code

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particular. Since 1996, our country was included in this process as a PARP country, in
1999 as an aspirant country, and after 2009 as an ally country.

IV.2. Approach, Findings, Methods and Participation in SDR

Political Approach. In all cases, the Strategic Defence Review is a political effort and
process. It is always initiated by political authorities, and expresses their political will to
undertake security and defence reforms. SDR can use and involve in the process all
mechanisms, institutional capabilities, research institutions, civil society, distinguished
personalities, media, non-governmental organizations, and other interested stakeholders.

Despite the political approach of the process, it is important to understand that SDR
findings and products should not be influenced by political masters. They should be the
result of a profound and independent analysis of experts of various areas engaged in the
process. Any prior intervention to politicize the outcomes of the process may discredit
efforts of the entire process.

At the end of the process, accepting SDR findings is again political. Policy choices on
conclusions and findings of the SDR may be different; it may either accept or may not
accept them, or may require other intermediate or parallel solutions based on the famous
triangle: ends ways and means204. If the findings express goals that require more financial
resources, there are other ways to compensate for the military capabilities needed to fulfil
them, or they can be extended over a longer period of time to achieve. So, theory gives us
dozens of other ways to balance the triangle by negotiation or trade-offs between
politicians and senior military experts to fulfil the final findings of the Strategic Review.

SDR Products/Findings. Key Strategic Products / Findings differ from one country to
another. Each country has its own specifics, but most countries have many things in
common. All countries confirm that SDR purpose is to determine the direction and
generate a number of reforms to "improve the performance, capability, management and
coordination of the national defence instrument for advancing national interests in the
long run, in coordination with other instruments of national power”205.

An important finding is to determine the role, mission and tasks of the armed forces in
the future security environment. Of course, the role, missions and tasks may be similar in
principle, but the way they will be accomplished and the capabilities to be required to
accomplish them may experience significant changes.

204 Making Modern Strategy, Bartlett, Holman and Lykke, Vol 1, page 231
205 Fighting the Long War, Peter Barnet, NDU Press, Defence Focused Studies 2009
156
Another finding is the specification of planning scenarios/ situations. Based on the roles
and future missions of the Armed Forces, the starting point of SDR's findings will be the
planning scenarios/ situations where armed forces will be engaged in the spectrum of
combat and non-combat operations within and outside the country. Specification of these
scenarios will have direct effects on capabilities, organization, training, education,
doctrines, equipment, infrastructure, and future force qualities.

After specification of planning scenarios, another important SDR finding has to do with
the capabilities that the armed forces need to engage in each planning scenarios in the
long run. Then, SDR makes a parallel assessment between future and existing
capabilities, identifying capability shortfalls and surpluses.

Another SDR finding is the determination of the future organization structure of the
armed forces. This target of organization structure is called objective force structure and
looks ten year ahead. This is done through testing development of capabilities of the
future organization with long-term financial support provided by the government.
Financial support can influence for better or for worse in the development of the
objective force structure. Financial defence support is projected as a percentage of GDP,
while assessing several assumptions in the interest of long-term planning (such as annual
GDP growth, inflation, etc.).

Other SDR findings may address areas of institution management reform; such as the
introduction of new modern methods of institution management, integrated management
structures, resource management, centralized planning and de-centralized execution, and
so on.

SDR Process. Careful planning and implementation of the SDR process is of special
importance. In theory and practice, the SDR process is divided into several main steps to
be properly applied. Each step of the process has its own time period, product, and
responsible persons / institutions. It is very important to attach a measuring unit of the
progress for each step.

In this context, the main steps of the SDR process can be listed as follows: evolution of
new roles and mission of the armed forces, development of specific planning scenarios,
identification of respective capabilities, elimination of obsolete capabilities, development
of new capabilities, development of future force structure, command and control of AAF
operations, development of modernization plans, infrastructure, budget, management
reforms, and other basic plans for the next 10 or more years.

To do that, the SDR document begins with a realistic assessment of challenges, risks,
threats and opportunities of national, regional and global security environment for the
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next 10-20 years, recommending related strategic priorities and approaches for their best
management.

As mentioned above, there may be several changes according to the specifics of each
country, largely based on main SDR objectives. The 'all-in-all' generalization of the SDR
priority objectives can divert attention from key issues of the specific country.

SDR Activity Program: Team work period of the Defence Review process will depend
on many factors. Generally, it varies from 6 months to 1.5 years to conduct a detailed
Strategic Defence Review and produce an Implementation Plan. It seems a long time, but
in fact, this time will seem too short after the work has started. Experience has shown that
there is no fixed time if we intend to make a profound Strategic Review to serve future
reforms.

Normally, program of activities is drafted in a gradual and logical way. For example,
initial assessment of future strategic environment is made and then assessment of
appropriate capabilities to handle identified threats and risks. Or, first, the necessary
operational capabilities are identified and organizational structure of the Armed Forces is
then made, and so on.

Logical and gradual step by step alignment of problems to be solved and questions to be
answered is crucial to guide us to success in the second phase. Asking irrelevant
questions will make the job harder in the implementation process.

As an SDR exemplary document, with regard to experience, approach, findings, methods,

and participation in SDR, we can take the examples of US QDR, United Kingdom SSDR,
or the White Book of France.

SDR Method. Method of conducting the Strategic Review is of great importance. SDR
findings and products will be greatly affected by the method used. The SDR process can
not be conducted in office. It should provide a diverse program of activities such as
meetings, consultations, surveys, observations, lessons learned, comparative research or
studies, site visits, as well as consultative meetings with country experts who have
recently conducted this process.

Practice has shown that, for certain issues, study or practical research may be required
that may take time. For this purpose, we recommend that the SDR Program is
accompanied by a program of relevant studies or research. Master and doctoral thesis, or
other studies of the Academy of Defence, Doctrine & Research Centre, and other AAF
training, education and research institutions or other research institutions may be used.

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Each finding of relevant groups should be tested in meetings, brainstorming or
roundtables methods, or even through specific research seminars and conferences. No
finding will be called closed without a broad consensus of actors involved in discussions.
It is necessary that all SDR findings and products should normally be discussed with the
institutions/units experiencing the reforms of this process.

SDR Participation. The Strategic Defence Review, according to the experience, requires
a broad participation of the best national experts and analysts in areas of interest.
International assistance of friendly countries or allied institutions is not excluded to
confirm the findings and make them more reliable. Integrated teamwork is among the
decisive factors for realistic and coordinated findings. An all-inclusive approach of
experts of interested stakeholders makes the product and findings both representative and
more acceptable.

Also, all-inclusion approach should be assessed proportionally to the size and ambition of
each country for the SDR. For illustration, we mention the 2016 Polish Defence Review
process206, led by a high level steering group, supported by 5 working groups on key
areas of expertise, a total of some 500 experts of different fields inside and outside the
defence institution. Or, the Strategic Review of Bulgaria207 where more than 400 experts
were active, or Slovenia, where more than 200 experts from different fields of defence
were involved, or Macedonia Defence Review adopted in July 2018, etc.

When we talk about SDR participation, we should not forget that it includes, besides the
defence institution, other security related institutions related to defence policies such as
diplomacy, finance, order, justice, etc. Engagement of these experts increases the values
of Defence Review as a document of national character and not just a defence document.

IV.3. National Experience in SDR

Why does Albania need to periodically conduct a Strategic Defence Review? And since
we have decided to do so, what do we intend to achieve with this SDR? Will we be able
to produce a document that does not remain on paper, unfortunately, like some other
strategic documents of the last 20 years? What could be some specifics, compared to the
theory and practice of other countries? Does Albania have any experience in this field?

Institutionalization of SDR. As discussed above, the Defence Review process should be

the only process our country should follow to run defence reforms in the long run. It is
true that major changes have occurred in the last two decades, but some of the reforms

206 http://en-m.mon.gov.pl/defence-concept/defence-concept/the-strategic-defence-review-l2017-07-18/
207 file://C:/Users/HP/Downloads/Policy%20Framework%20of%20the%20Strategic%20Defence%20Review.pdf

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have been superficial. Unintentionally, due to lack of experience, some of them have
focused more in quantity reductions than quality reforms. Part of the force planning and
force management problems have not been totally eliminated, they are moved from larger
structures into the smaller structures that have followed them.

The reasons behind that is because in several cases reforms are only focused on changes
of organizational structure of the armed forces and not of their management, which have
the same priority. Not rarely, we have moved in a short time from one organization
structure to another, just and only because of the fact that structures are blamed instead of
people running them. Moving from one structure to another structure without a profound
analysis of the positive and negative sides is nothing more than lack of professionalism.
From this reality, the AAF unit personnel has felt the pressure of these "reforms", which
have relatively affected in the decline of morale and performance.

This should not happen any longer. I believe that the introduction of the Periodic Defence
Review method should bring an end to amateurism and subjectivism of reforms. This
means that it is time for us to legally institutionalize the Strategic Defence Review. This
may be reflected in the Law on AAF Command and Control Authorities, which is under
review.

Albanian SDR experience. This SDR process is not the first in the Republic of Albania
and the Armed Forces; it has been conducted at least three times with the best levels of
joint US-Albania expertise: the first in 2001-2002, the second in 2006-2007, and the third
in 2011-2013. So, SDR 2018 will be the fourth Strategic Defence Review in the Republic
of Albania and AAF.

First Strategic Defence Review 2001-2002208 was conducted in cooperation with US

Company SAIC (Science Application International Corporation) & CUBIC. Analysis
and findings of this review were reflected in two volumes. This review is associated with
an Objective Force structure and a Long-term Implementation Plan 2002-2010. No doubt,
this is the deepest AAF Defence Review, which was followed by deep reforms not only
of their structure. Worth mentioning, this Defence Review was conducted for a work
period of almost 1.5 years by an Albanian-US high level steering group and 8 joint expert
teams of various areas of expertise, with about 50 experts in total. Also, from the
preliminary data, more than 200 other people, military and civilian personnel, inside and
outside the armed forces, were engaged in the process, as well as a considerable number
of meetings with various relevant ministries in SDR.

208 Defence Review of the Republic of Albania, 2001

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Second Strategic Defence Review 2006209 was conducted as a Defence Assessment of
AAF in coordination with DFI & ALION, funded by the office of the US Secretary of
Defence. Almost, at the same time, another Defence Assessment210 was conducted by
NATO Command for Transformation (ACT). Both defence assessments had things in
common, but also some different approaches, which are not subject of this thesis.
Findings of these Defence Reviews had their values reflected in the defence reforms
ahead.

I think this experience of the three SDRs can serve as a good starting point for the 2018
Defence Review of the country. The method used in the previous three SDRs can be
advanced, the process can be improved, and lessons learned can be reflected. We have
several volumes with over 1200 pages written on previous Strategic Defence Reviews.
So, we have what to learn from what we have done in the past. Some ideas as "food for
thoughts" coming from SDR 2011-2013 (hereinafter SDR 2012) to assist in the ongoing
process of SDR 2018 are as follows:

IV.4. How was the SDR - 2012 conducted in Albania?

The adoption of NATO's Strategic Concept at Lisbon Summit 2010 paved the way for
deep reforms in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and its member countries. Reforms required
to be conducted were multi-level and complex. In addition to that, they were expected to
be carried out in the situation of after financial crisis effects, driven by the concept of a
"smart defence”211 which focus was on development of more capabilities with less
resources.

SDR-2012 process was conducted at an inter-institutional level.212 This group was

chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence and included representatives from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry
of Finance, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the State Intelligence
Service. Each of the institutions involved in the SDR established their working groups
with experts of the area, who contributed to the assessment of national defence from their
point of view and responsibility.

209 Alion & DFI - A Review of the Defence and Military Reforms of the Republic of Albania in the Run-Up to
Consideration for NATO Membership, 2006
210 DACOS Defence Planning: ACT Assessment of Albanian Transformation Requirements, 21 Sept. 2006

211 “Smart Defence”, referring to NATO Gen Sec, Rasmussen, in Munich Security Conference, 2011

212 Order of the Prime minister, No. 50, on 12.04.2011 “On establishing the Interministerial Work Group for the

Strategic Defence Review of the Republic of Albania”.

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Phases of SDR Process. The SDR process was completed within a period of 18 months,
according to a clear and comprehensive program of activities. The main stages of this
process are given in the following scheme and are described briefly as follows:

ALBANIAN SDR 2012 – 2013 PROCESS

Scheme 5: SDR 2012-2013 Process in Albania (designed by DIRI and Albanian team)

- Phase I included the establishment of an SDR Inter-Ministerial Working Group,

respective working groups for each line ministry, establishment of SDR Secretariat,
and preparation of the initial documentation for starting the SDR process. At this
stage, the SDR environment process was explored, so the examination of legal
aspects, traditions and specific experience of the country, and so on.

- Phase II included aspects of understanding and defining the framework of national

security policy, through the analysis of existing national strategic documents, and the
formulation of a national security environment document. During this phase, national
and institutional objectives and interests are identified, as well as definition of the role
and mission of Armed Forces and various ministries and agencies involved in
national security and defence.

- Phase III included the development of planning scenarios related to defence of the
country. Based on planning scenarios, the role of key institutions related to national
defence are discussed with all stakeholders, aiming at a comprehensive approach to
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 political, economic, social, environmental and military instruments, as well as
academia. Other planning instruments were added based on Inter-Ministerial Working
Group discussions.

- Phase IV included the definition of main mission and tasks and the development of a
detailed analysis of capability shortages or surpluses identified for national defence.

- Phase V included identification and development of required capability options,

considering them closely in accordance with related financial aspects. This phase
required drafting and proposal of courses of action to decision-making authorities at
the strategic level.

- Phase VI included the presentation of key SDR findings and issuance of relevant
legal and sub-legal acts for their implementation in the short, medium and long term
(implementation plan)”213.

The SDR process, through all phases, was carried out in close cooperation with US DIRI
team through organization of meetings, field visits, workshops and "roundtables" with
experts in various security and defence areas. All-inclusive participation, teamwork,
transparency to other institutions and to the public were some of key features of the
review process.

IV.5. SDR - 2012 Targets in Albania

Albania is already a member of the Alliance. It is also in the process of opening the
negotiations to become an EU member. As part of these organizations, Albania has
benefits and obligations, based on roles, burden and responsibilities. As member of the
Alliance, Albania has the opportunity to re-assess its military capabilities, given the
commitment to collective defence and national emergencies. Also, we should not forget
the assessment of civil capabilities in the interest of a comprehensive approach.

One of the key elements addressed by this SDR-2012 was the economic-financial issue.
As a small country with limited resources, we need to develop and maintain fully
reasonable capabilities? This strategic review "launched war" to outdated capabilities,
parallel capabilities, and some Cold War traditional capabilities.

In my judgment, Albania should not have specific defence capabilities for international
missions, and other capabilities for national missions. Also, we should not have specific
capabilities for NATO, other capabilities for EU, UN, or future coalitions-led
contributions. Based on the level of ambition, Albania should promote a "single set of

213 Hudhra Th., Zarkaj E.: SDR – A Transformation and Reform Process in AAF, Military review, March 2011.
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forces" concept of contribution to national and international operations, with military and
civilian capabilities.

Some Specifications of SDR 2012. Based on above national and international

experience, I have identified some specifics, goals and considerations of this SDR-2012
in the Republic of Albania, viewed from inside and outside of the AAF institution.

From an internal view of the Armed Forces, the question arises naturally: What is the aim
of with this Defence Review? What can we change further of this small force of about
8,500 active force? Where will we go further? What really remains to be changed? Are
we spending too much or little for defence and AAF personnel? Will this AAF be able to
fulfil the constitutional mission alone or even under the terms of collective defence?

From an external view of the Armed Forces, the question can be articulated differently:
Albania is now a NATO member, our goal is to become an EU member, and as such, a
8,500-strong force is too much. We have other priorities until we have no immediate
threats to the security of the country. Are we spending too much for defence which is not
properly justified?

These questions are natural and must be understood from a one-sided view and sensitivity
they represent. One thing is for sure: the armed forces of any country are subject to
civilian control of the lawful authorities and the will of the Albanian taxpayers. So their
size, mission, financial resources, legal framework and development policies, etc., are not
the attribute of the military, but civil lawmakers.

On the other hand, we should never prejudge from the beginning that the future force will
be smaller. Jumping to such conclusions is absurd and could lead to influential
approaches. Evaluation of "how much is enough, why and for what”214 should be the big
question of this Strategic Review, which should include all stakeholder views. The SDR
working group may be small in number, but it should include all stakeholders in the
process and best expert in military affairs. The activation of other stakeholders, especially
those outside state institutions, may be done in other forms.

SDR specificity should be followed by an Implementation Plan of reforms for

development of a small professional, motivated, well-trained, equipped, interoperable and
capable force for accomplishment of constitutional mission and tasks with quality
according to the set of planning scenarios in and out the country.

Elements of SDR-2012. The SDR process of the Republic of Albania should prioritize
the development of specific capabilities of the Armed Forces in the long run. Not
214 ‘How much is enough’ means the size of force a country need for its security and defence – note of the author
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necessarily the SDR process should address all issues that classically addresses an SDR
of United States or United Kingdom, which pay priority attention to nuclear capabilities,
missile defence, sub-marine, airspace and space capabilities, global threats, cyber
security, etc., that have no relation to our level of ambition.

Two main elements should not be forgotten when we start an SDR process: first, we
should use the best practices and an improved methodology of the previous national and
international SDR-s, and second, we should determine from the beginning the
fundamental issues of SDR that are specific to the Albanian reality.

I do not claim I have exhausted everything, however I have specified some of the key
questions that will require analytical responses to the SDR of Albania, such as: How the
strategic security environment will look like in the next 10-20 years; how will national
interests and objectives advance; how will the level of ambition of Albania evolve; how
will the spectrum of the role, missions and tasks of the Armed Forces change; what is the
role of other instruments of national power ; what strategic planning scenarios will AAF
have in mid and long run; how to improve the defence planning and operational planning
system as an ally country, what future military and civilian capabilities we will have;
what future financial resources may be available; what defence management reforms are
needed; how will bilateral, regional relations and alliances be developed; what about the
training and education reform; what are some of human, material and financial resource
management reforms; what type of AAF modernization should be logical for the Armed
Forces; trends of education, training and research in the Armed Forces; the future
organization structure of AAF; reform of command-control system in AAF; reform of
integrated institutions and capabilities of the Ministry of Defence, etc.

As above, one of basic reforms that SDR should promote is the reform of the defence
planning system of the Republic of Albania. As discussed above, the defence planning
system is still a mixed system with some elements of the time when Albania was a
partner, aspirant and member country. The SDR should analyse, and update key elements
of defence planning of the Republic of Albania as an allied country, harmonizing national
defence planning with collective defence planning in time, documents, processes,
methodologies, capabilities and relevant products, as proposed in this dissertation.

Another element is the AAF reform related to strategic and operational planning
scenarios; national and international. SDR should provide a complete overview of the
spectrum of operations AAF will be engaged by 2020 or 2030. It should be based on
evolving 3 types of NATO missions, 17 types of tasks, and 39 planning scenarios.
Naturally, we will not participate in all this spectrum, but we have to select our spectrum

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of scenarios with the corresponding coefficients of the intensity of combat operations.
This will serve to build our most critical capabilities under the collective defence.

The SDR should answer the question whether the next force will continue to be a
traditional force, or modular force with small capabilities and capable of operating in the
future security environment. According to the forecasts, the future of AAF operations
will be modular small task force models from company to battalion, up to the battalion
task force level. This means that traditional organization structure in a small force will no
longer be appropriate, except honorific, representative, plenty of duplication, and often
disruptive. Reducing duplication of high level staff in the interest of building required
unit capabilities may be one of SDR elements to be covered.

Also, another focus of revision may be the development of the concept of national
capabilities instead of the parallel capabilities of several state institutions on land, air and
sea. There is some progress in this respect, but there are still duplications of capabilities
of state institutions of some ministries. SDR should provide strong capability messages
based on missions. Therefore, a more inter-institutional cooperation is needed for the
development of national capabilities, coordinated by the governmental level. Therefore, it
would be better if the next SDR processes are not just a Strategic Defence Review (SDR),
but a Strategic Security and Defence Review (SSDR). This process take time, high
expertise and political will to be implemented.

Priority attention SDR should pay to the development of quality capabilities for the entire
spectrum of national civil emergencies. The public image, but also the justification of the
armed forces, are considerably increased when they serve the community. The SDR
should support the modern concept of security reform, embraced by the armed forces and
all other security instruments, as public services in the interest of security and defence of
the community and the country. This concept, however, should not be abused, to see the
armed forces performing tasks which belong to local or central government agencies.

In addition to national missions, the SDR should evaluate development of capabilities in

support of Military and Civilian Force Goals (FG) in the long run; mostly of the Task
Force Battalion (Light Inf-Mot-Bn-Group). Consolidation with personnel, equipment,
training, support, doctrine of operations, and command and control of this task force unit
will take time and resources for many years. Also, the use of battalion task force or any
'task force' in international operations will require qualitative support capabilities called
'enabling capabilities'215, such as those of NNEC, SATCOM, Force Protection, ISTAR,
CIMIC, C-IED, NSE, etc., with a level of deployability of 10% and 50% of total land
force capabilities.

215 ‘All supporting capabilities’ – note of the author

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In capability development, the SDR can orientate new approaches also suggested by the
Alliance's Strategic Concept, particularly supporting regional capabilities, especially with
the Republic of Kosovo and other regional countries. Also, development of 'niche'
capability concept of the armed forces is still an area of further exploration in details.

The SDR should also promote the need for legal changes in the areas of security and
defence. Some defence package laws need to be updated. So, the SDR-2018 should
provide for legal changes and sub-legal considerations at the right time, in the interests of
reforms that may be generated in the future.

Other issues may include consolidation of professional active forces and development of
a long-term voluntary reserve component of the Armed Forces. Also, a review of the
AAF infrastructure should be made as an important SDR element. Consolidation of
procurement processes of AAF equipment and systems should be in the agenda in order
to spend approximately 20% of the defence budget in the coming years.

Training, education, and evaluation system (Creval, Taceval, Mareval) should be part of
the SDR to adapt to the spectrum of future scenario operations. Doctrinal reform,
standardization and lessons learned should be part of institutional processes in AAF. SDR
should develop a force based on knowledge and continuous self-improvement.

Conclusions and recommendations

The SDR is a complex and difficult process. The SDR product is a strategic level
document, but it also has profound effects on operational and tactical levels. It brings
about deep reforms and transformations on how to better guide, manage, plan, train, fight,
spend, coordinate and conduct operations, etc. Therefore, in order to make the SDR
process more understandable for every member of AAF, at the stages of initiation,
formulation and implementation, I have provided the following conclusions and
recommendation:

- Strategic Defence Review is anticipated by a Security Assessment of National,

Regional and Global Security Environment, together with our country's commitment
and reactions to this environment;

- The link between SDR and other documents in the hierarchy of national security
documents, such as NSS, SU, etc., should be clarified. In my opinion SDR is a
process leading to findings and recommendations for the formulation of NSS, NMS,
LTDP, etc.;

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- Criteria and measurement units of success for each step of the SDR Implementation
Plan should be established clearly, such as timelines, products, findings, responsible
authorities, etc.;

- After the Strategic Defence Review 2018 is adopted by relevant authorities, General
Staff should draft a NMS and Long Term Development Plan 2024 to implement the
findings;

- Approximate financial data should be provided by the Ministry of Finance to support

defence transformation plans over the period 2018-2024, targeting 2% of GDP in
2024;

- SDR should include, in addition to MoD and GS, high-level experts such as strategic
analysts, diplomats, lawyers, finance experts, and managers etc.;

- SDR process should involve all education and research institutions in the armed
forces, in particular TRADOC institutions, but also other research throughout in the
country;

- Role of MoD/ GS and Main Commands should be determined throughout the process
through activation of a SDR Secretariat of the Steering Group;

- Transparency and credibility of the process should be maintained, senior state

institutions and authorities should be briefly updated, and AAF staff and public
opinion should be informed through meetings and written and electronic media;

- Politicizing SDR's findings should be avoided; consensus on findings and proposals

of independent groups of expert should be reached.

- Resource management reform as one of the critical points of SDR should be assessed:
how to build more capability with less resources under the 'smart defence' concept;

- Timely designation of decision making authorities/ institution on approval of this

document after its formulation, and monitoring of further work for implementation;

IV.6. ‘Smart Defence’: A New Approach of Defence Planning in Albania

“Do you want to sell sugared water all your life, or do you want to come with me to change
the world?”216 This metaphoric but smart maxim of the late Steve Jobs has a profound
meaning when it comes to changing and transforming an organization or business. It is

216 This is the famous Steve Jobs’ question to John Sculley, ‘Apple’ CEO in early 80-ies.
https://signalvnoise.com/posts/2813-do-you-want-to-sell-sugar-water-for
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universal, which means it is valid for all areas of reform and transformation of the society. It
is also valid for security and defence.

Introduction to ‘Smart Defence’

Today, the market is plenty of Smart things. We have heard among others: Smart
Technology; Smart Solutions; Smart Phone; Smart System; Smart Card; Smart
Programs; Smart Procurements; Smart Logistics; Smart Weapons or Smart Bombs; and
last but not least Smart Defence, which is the main topic of this sub-chapter of the
dissertation, with a focus on our region.

Why Smart Defence? We know that the Alliance and all allied countries live in a time of
substantial changes. Other countries outside the Alliance are not excluded. The financial
crisis has given considerable impacts to defence budgets of all European countries in the
last years, especially after 2008.

The central question of Smart Defence is how to spend better on defence; how to be more
efficient and effective using limited resources? How to develop more capabilities with
less resources? How to further prioritize the priorities? How to specialize in small niche
capabilities we can afford? How to promote multinational approaches and develop
regional capabilities to face regional threats, and how to ‘pool and share’ many of
capabilities at regional level? And, how to find innovative solutions different from
traditional ones. These and many other questions will be the subject of this sub-
chapter217.
Smart questions that require smart answers. So, when adopted, Smart Defence is going
to be in itself a significant change in the defence policy of regional countries. Instead of
‘going alone’, it is a ‘going together’ approach of doing some defence businesses.

There are different perceptions about “smart defence”. Some researchers218 are very
ambitious, some others are sceptical. Many say that our Balkan region is still immature
for such smart projects, and that it is practical for more developed regions with a happy
history, such as Nordic, Baltic or other regions. Also, some others say that Smart Defence
might be important for NATO as a whole, some say it is relevant only to big NATO
countries, and some others say it might be effective for all allied countries, either they are
big or small.

217 Demi L., Hudhra Th., Military Review, Dec 2011, ‘Smart Defence-A New approach for regional countries’, page 9.
218
http://www.mod.gov.al/arkiv/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1660:smart-defence-an-
innovative-approach-to-security-challenges&catid=320&Itemid=661

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One thing is sure: the idea of going smart in times of financial austerity will dominate the
agenda of all defence organizations of all allied countries, and nobody can avoid that
easily. Most researchers say it is expected to be the trend for the future219.

In my opinion, smart defence is an option for all countries, and for all regions which have
some common goals, interests and understanding. Especially now, when the conventional
state-to-state confrontations are no longer in the list of immediate threats, we have to
think about common threats to national and regional security. Now, most of our regional
countries are either EU and allied countries, or aspirants, or partners. It is a new era of
cooperation and competition.

Frankly speaking, “smart defence” in our region is at the very initial phase, we have very
small ‘smart’ examples at regional level. Other countries of various regions have already
developed several tools of smart cooperation, we will discuss a little bit later.

In my opinion, ‘smart defence’ may have a specific approach for our region. The Balkans
is a region of small countries with a total of about 550,000 km2 and a population of over
60 million people220. We initiated with the Vilnius group after the Washington summit,
later we continued with the A3 Initiative with the US in May 2003 with 3 countries
(Albania, Croatia and Macedonia). From October 2008, we are 5, together with
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later we expect to be more.

All our countries have and will have pressure to national budgets; there is no doubt that
pressures to defence budget will not be excluded. Our small regional countries cannot
develop all required capabilities on their own. There is an urgent need for new solutions.
Being flexible and pragmatic, away from being conformist and traditional, are two key
elements of a smart defence. A new vision should be developed; a new mindset should be
articulated. Capabilities we cannot afford at national level, could be developed together,
following the best practice of other regions.

Of course, going smart in defence in our region is much easier in theory than in practice.
In this evolutionary effort, we need to overcome some historic barriers linked with the
traditional development of security services and the armed forces. Now, our region is in a
more favourable position than several years ago for smart choices and solutions. In order
to start with ‘smart solutions’, we need first, smart ideas to convince our political
masters, second, we need political will, and third, we need popular support. “Where there
is a will, there is a way”, once the iron lady, Margaret Thatcher said. In my opinion, the
glass is going to be half full.

219 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281855634_NATO_and_the_Smart_Defense_Initiative_-
_An_analysis_in_the_context_of_post-Cold_War_capability_initiatives_in_NATO
220
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkans
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NATO and Smart Defence
NATO former Secretary-General Rasmussen, when explaining the concept of 'smart defence',
says: "… we need to better define priorities, specialize on certain capabilities, and seek
multinational solutions. These, together, I call ‘smart defence.”221

The essence of “smart defence” is not about how to spend more or how to spend less; it is
how to spend better, under the NATO SecGen slogan: “Prioritization, specialization and
multinational solutions for ‘pooling and sharing’ capabilities of collective defence”222 were
three of the key options for discussion, before, during and after the Chicago summit.

NATO 'smart defence' concept is connected with the preparations for the November 2010
New NATO Strategic Concept of Lisbon. Secretary Rasmussen, advised by the 'Wise Men's
Group' led by Madeleine Albright, supported the idea of a profound change in the Alliance's
business. He further reviewed his vision at the Munich Security Conference in February
2011, only about 2 months after the new Lisbon Strategic Concept. The Lisbon Strategic
Concept supports the 'smart defence' concept in the 'Reform and Transformation'223 section.

Initiated in Lisbon 2010, the Smart Defence224 was one of the pillars in the agenda of
Chicago summit 2012. Later, at Munich Security Conference in 2011, Secretary Rasmussen
presented an Alliance Smart Defence Platform, while the NATO Defence Ministerial, in
October 2011, discussed a preliminary package with smart defence projects. Secretary
Rasmussen appointed two special envoys to coordinate and pursue wise defence progress to
Chicago and specifically the NATO Ass. Secretary-General, Bisoniero and ACT
Commander, the French General Stephane Abrial. A package of 24 Smart Projects out of
150 smart solutions, identified by ACT together with all allied countries.

The Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) set up a Special Working Group of 5
Working Groups. The Task Force and the Working Groups in coordination with the allies
prepared a package of Smart Projects, made available to Allied countries. Commander Abrial
and Ass / Secretary Bisoniero undertook work visits throughout NATO allies and agencies to
discuss the alliance 'smart' package / menu.

The five Working Groups covered five areas such as: 1) Capability Initiative and
Organization of Forces, 2) Purchases and Procurement, 3) Operations and Maintenance, 4)
Forces Preparation, 5) Innovative Solutions (R & D)225. The first phase was the collection of
project proposals from the countries with a deadline until 6 May 2011, the second phase was
the evaluation of the projects by 30 August 2011, and the third phase was the draft of the

221 Speech of NATO Sec. Gen., Rasmussen, in the European Policy Centre, in Brussels, on 30 Sept 2011.
222 Fogh Rasmussen A., Munich Security Conference, Feb 2011, page 3
223
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
224 https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/smart-defence/Smart-Defence-analyst-view/EN/index.htm
225 Terms of Reference, ACT Task Force on Building Capability through Multinational Approaches, page 2

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Final Report for the Defence Planning and Policy Committee DPPC (R) and Defence
Ministerial of October 2011.
Smart Defence: More Capabilities with Less Resources226!
Why Smart Defence? What are the main goals of this new approach? What specifics have
this approach compared to previous approaches of NATO and Allied countries?
Among other things, the main reason of launching the Smart Defence concept was the
financial crisis of 2008 and related risks of meeting NATO's Level of Ambition through the
NDPP system described in Chapter II of this study. "Smart defence" is related to budget
constraints in Europe during the first decade of our century, and especially the sharp fall in
NATO, primarily defence budgets of European countries after 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
In 2008, the US was the world's first US military spending with US $ 607 billion with 41.5%
of global defence spending, China ranked second with 84.9 billion US $ or 5.8%, France
ranked third with 65.7 billion or 4.5 %, UK ranked fourth with $ 65.3 billion or 4.5%, Russia
ranked fifth with $ 58.6 billion or 4.0%, Germany ranked sixth with $ 46.8 billion or 3.2%,
Japan ranked seventh with $ 46.3 billion $ or 3.2%, Italy ranked eighth at $ 40.6 billion or
2.8%, Saudi Arabia ranked ninth with $ 38.2 billion or 2.6%, and India ranked tenth with $
30.0 billion or 2.1% of global military spending227.
In 2009 and 2010, the allies of Europe spent $ 48 billion less than 2008. By 2010, compared
to 2000, out of 26 NATO allies, only 5 of them retained their defence budget at an agreed
level of 2% of GDP (US, France, England, Albania and Greece), from the Alliance
Ministerial Directive 2006 and 2011 (see table below)228. Also, only 5 Allied countries had
an increase in the defence budget in this period (USA, Canada, England, Poland and
Albania). While 2011 results in a reduction in the defence budget for all allied countries of
Europe, with no exception.
On the other hand, during this period, unlike European countries, the US defence budget
from 50% increased to 75% of NATO's total spending229. President Obama, however, had a
relative reduction in the defence budget starting from 2012, by reducing spending of
engagement in several operations during the first decade of the century, as well as reducing
relative costs of excess capability available and building new capabilities.

226
Rasmussen Fogh, A, Munich Security Conference, Speech, original in English, Feb 2011
227 Table of spending of NATO countries up to 2010, according to NATO Budget Dept. page 4
228 Ibid, page 6
229 See Graph 7 of NATO defence expenditure below.

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On January 5, 2012, presenting the US Quadrennial Defence Review of the Future Joint
Force 2020, President Obama stated that "... the American people will understand that our
armed forces must be strong and that our nation must be guaranteed with a defence budget
larger than the budgets of ten other following countries taken together". Further, Secretary of
Defence, Panneta, in line with the Obama Strategy, said that “…the US Strategic Defence
Review will be based on 'smart defence' by ... developing a Future Joint Force, which will be
smaller but more versatile, more manageable, more readily and technologically
advanced.”230 To achieve this strategic goal, US 'Joint Forces 2020' will have 10 main
missions and 8 priority areas for building US 'smart' capabilities.
Now, under Trump administration, there is a strong urgency for 2% of GDP by 2024, 20% of
which allocated to modernisation and R&D, as a decision of Brussels summit in July 2018.
Outside the Euro-Atlantic area, China has increased three times the defence budget in the last
decade of 2000-2010. On the other hand, India has increased the defence budget by 60% in
this period, while Russia has increased by 25%. Additional increase from these three
countries and other countries are expected in the decades ahead claiming a new regional role
of these powers231. Top ten countries in the world for defence spending in 2010 cover some
75% of global defence spending. First place goes to the United States, which spend 43% of
global spending on defence, the second place goes to China spending only 7.3%, while the
tenth place goes to Italy with 2.3%232.

230Leon Panneta, Sustaining US Global Leadership – Priorities for the 21-ST Century, 5 Jan 2012
231SIPRI 2010, Stockholm Peace Research Institute, page 45
232These facts are taken by Annex 4A of SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex .
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The following table shows the top 10 countries with the highest military spending in the
world during 2010. Spending is given in billions of dollars, and share of global military
spending for 2010, which was $ 1630 billion233.
Table 6: World countries with higher defence spending (Source: SIPRI 2010)
Rank Country Defence Spending, In (%) of total global spending
in Milliard US$
1 USA 698 43 %
2 China [119] [7.3]
3 UK 59.6 3.7
4 France 59.3 3.6
5 Russia [58.7] [3.6]
6 Japan 54.5 3.3
7 Saudi Arabia 45.2 2.8
8 Germany [45.2] [2.8]
9 India 41.3 2.5
10 Italy [37.0] [2.3]
Total 10 countries 1217.8 [75%]
World All world 1630 100 %
Total countries

In addition to development of "more capabilities with less resources”234, the smart defence
handles also other issues, such as a more efficient resource management system, development
of innovative methods and approaches for development of military and civilian capabilities
different from traditional ones, transformation of collective defence planning system (NDPP)
and development of new military and civil capabilities. In conclusion, smart defence is
focused on a new methodology for the development of Capabilities Targets 2013.
The following table gives the Alliance and Allied defence spending for the period from 2011
to 2018. This table provides an overview of their performance as a percentage of the
country's GDP over this period235.

233 Figures in brackets […] are SIPRI estimations (Stockholm Peace Research Institute. Spending figures are in US$
234 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Speech at European Policy Centre, Brussels, on 30 September 2011
235 http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_PR_CP_2011_027.pdf

174
 Table 7: Defence expenditures of NATO countries during 2011 - 2018

As mentioned, the three main areas Alliance and Allied countries are invited to apply
Smart Defence are: identifying critical priorities, specialization of capabilities, and
multinational solutions. A brief analytical description of their content is given below:
1. Prioritization of critical capabilities - this requires elimination of some traditional
old capabilities of the Alliance and allied countries and development of high priority
capability capabilities, such as the 10 Lisbon Critical Capabilities Package, the 50
Required Alliance's Capabilities in Afghanistan, Capabilities of the Joint Alliance
Security Investment Program (NSIP), Common Bilateral and Multilateral Capabilities
as well as Critical Capabilities at the Level of Each Allied Country.
2. Specialization of Capabilities - This requires the specialization by allies and
partners, according to the NATO Capability Code, aimed at developing some special
capabilities, known as "niche" capabilities, which each country has traditionally
175
 cultivated for a long time and developed from a country as specialized capabilities in
support of all forces in a theatre or area of operation. They are CIED, EOD, MP,
SAR, CIMIC, OMLT, NBCR, logistic, maintenance capabilities, etc. An illustrative
case is the EOD team Albania had in EU "Althea" operation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Access to the 'niche' specialization approach is mostly preferred and
beneficial for small allied and partner countries.
3. Cooperation on multinational solutions - this requires beneficial cooperation
among participating States according to the "Pooling and Sharing" format, or
regionalization of some capabilities, where available. Following, I have analysed
some of the most successful cooperation programs so far:
- Bilateral Defence Agreement UK-France236, November 2010: This agreement
engages UK and France with a major defence co-operation, such as those on
Nuclear Reserve Management, Industry and Armaments Cooperation,
Development of Shared Joint Forces, Joint Use of Aircraft Carriers, Co-operation
on Satellite Communications, Air Supply and Airborne Personnel, Unmanned
Aviation Systems (UAV), Anti-Terrorism Capabilities, Technological Research
and Development Co-operation, Submarine Systems and Technology, Anti-Mine
Counter Measures237. These projects have a total annual cost of some 2 milliard
Euro.
- Nordic N5 Cooperation Group, 2009238: (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark
and Iceland). The co-operation of this group focuses on Strategic Assessments,
LTDP and R&D, 'Nordic Battle Group' capability, Joint Education and Training,
Nordic Training Centre, Joint Multinational Exercise Plan (CJNEP), Joint
Infrastructures, common participation in operations;
- Baltic Initiative B3: The Baltic Initiative Cooperation (Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia) includes the Baltic Defence College (BALDEFCOL), Air Policing,
Baltic Maritime Control Centre (BALCENNAVY), Joint Battalion (BALBAT),
Joint NATO Unit in NRF, etc.;
- Vishegrad Group Initiative V4, 2011239: (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia) is a cooperation on establishment of Vishegrad Battleground V4, May
2011, which is expected to become operational by 2018, Development of
Common Training Infrastructures; Participation in NATO Response Force;
Development and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction capability (NBCR);

236 Treaty on Cooperation and Security and Defence between Republic of France and United Kingdom, N0. 10
Downing Street, 2 Nov 2010, signed by President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime minister David Cameron.
237 A new structure,
Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) document. December 2009,
238 Baltic Cooperation Initiative document.

239 Vishegrad Group Initiative V4 initiative.

176
 - EU Battle Group Experience and NATO NRF240; Co-operation in the
framework of EU capability building of 15 Battle-groups, such as French battle-
group, Italian battle-group, Spanish battle-group, British battle-group, Franco-
German battle-group (Fr-Ge-Be-Lu-Sp), French-Belgian battle-group, battle-
group 107 (Ge-Ne-Fin), German-Czech-Austrian battle-group, Italian-Hungarian-
Slovenian battle-group, Italian-Spanish Amphibian battle-group, Polish battle-
group (Pol-Ge-Sl-Lat-Lit), Nordic battle-group, Balkan battle-group (Gr-Bu-Cy-
Ro-Sl), Czech-Slovak battle-group, Spanish battle-group (Sp-Ge-Fr-Por), Italian
battle-group (Su-Fi-Es-Ir-Nor), Anglo-Dutch battle-group, Ita-Rom-Turk battle-
group, and Visegrad battle-group (Pol-Czech-Hun-Slo), etc.;
- Others, we can simply mention the initiatives for joint NATO/ EU capability
initiatives such as the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), the European
Air Transport Command (EATC), the Ghent initiative (Germany with Sweden)
The Anglo-Dutch Amphibian Group, the Euro-Corps, as well as Brigades and
other multinational battalions.
Smart Defence - Advantages and Disadvantages
- Advantages: I have tried to highlight some of the advantages of smart defence in
order to apply this experience during the development and implementation of our
national approach. First, we need to understand that there is no obligation from
the Alliance for participating countries; so we have to accept the concept of this
initiative, but we may need more time for practical decision-making. Second,
smart defence projects will have a positive impact on improving the spirit of
political solidarity in bilateral, multilateral or regional framework. Third, joint
projects will aim to develop those capabilities that none of the regional countries
can develop independently. Fourth, spending under the 'smart defence' concept
will significantly reduce spending on specific capabilities, compared with
development on our own. Fifth, this approach will make specific countries leader
in the region for certain capabilities of expertise. Sixth, the aim is to develop joint
projects that can be used not only for the country, the Alliance, but also for the
EU, the UN and various Coalitions under the "Single Set of Forces" concept.
- Disadvantages: First, my perception is that Smart Defence as a concept is still
immature in our region for real 'smart' projects, compared to other regions such as
the Nordic, Baltic, V4, etc. Second, with the application of the concept of smart
defence, we must accept both giving and taking some elements of sovereignty to
the participating states. Third, smart defence should not be adopted as an end in
itself but only for those projects of specific expertise; which are of special interest

240 EU Battle group Initiative and NATO NRF initiative.

177
 and benefit to our country. And fourth, in my view, we should necessarily accept
it as a concept for participation in long-term projects which may bring about
maturity of the region for such projects.
Based on above advantages and disadvantages, I think that "smart defence" requires a
change of mentality on sovereignty issues in the defence policy of the countries of our
region; a new balance between national sovereignty and the separation of sovereignty
(solidarity) for some defence capabilities; better coordination of defence reforms between
regional countries, and political will to share sovereignty through 'smart' projects; long-
term investment in military education and training, a special assessment of R&D and
promotion of innovative methods; review and integration of parallel capabilities of
Albanian institutions on land, air and sea; training, education, logistics issues, etc.
These may be findings of the SDR process in the country. Also, 'smart defence' requires
the continuation of the use of services by third parties in the Armed Forces and the use of
private companies in security matters where possible. And last but not least, it requires
further elimination of bureaucratic, parallel, excessive or parasitic structures in the
Armed Forces, following the examples of the NATO Command Structure with a
reduction of up to 34% of the staff, UK with over 10%, Bundeswer with 8%, and others
targeting to about 10%241.
Smart Defence - A national and regional approach
What about our country? What about our region? What are some of the 'smart'
approaches so far? In order to be more practical, below I have explored through the ‘food
for thought’ analysis, some of the key areas for a 'smart defence' in Albania, in Balkan
region/ or A5 countries. Experts in specific fields can highlight other capabilities
according to the 'smart' thinking concept.
All regional countries, including our country, have or will have budgetary constraints,
which defence budget constraints can not be avoided. Security and defence of individual
countries in the region is no longer an isolated issue. In addition to specifics, we have
common regional challenges, threats and threats that require the use of regional
approaches, capabilities and solutions.
Small countries, such as our regional countries can not develop all required defence
capabilities only with their own efforts. We must be flexible and pragmatic and non-
conformist and traditional if we have to apply elements of a smart defence. It is necessary
to develop a new vision, to articulate a new mentality, opening up new cooperation
windows. The capabilities that we can not afford at national level can be developed
together. A good example to follow is the successful approach of the Baltic countries.

241
NATO website www.nato.int on reform of command and control structure

178
Following the Washington Summit, our region started joint integration efforts within the
Vilnius Group, then continued with the A-3 Initiative with the USA in May 2003, with
three countries (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia). From October 2008 we are 5, along
with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later, other remaining countries are
expected to join this initiative.
We currently have some initiatives like SEDM with several projects of good areas of
cooperation, but we are not yet at the 'smart' level. The largest project is SEEBRIG - the
Multinational Brigade of South East Europe. The best 'smart' experience is the use of 'A3
/ A5 Join Medical Team' in ISAF, joint participation in OMLT and POMLT in ISAF, and
some other cases.
The connection of smart defence concept of the Strategic Defence Review, the
formulation of the documents of the National Security Strategy and the Military Strategy,
should be on the agenda of relevant working groups. It is very positive that Albania
completed an SDR process in April 2013 and is now conducting another SDR-2018.
In order to be more practical, I have analysed some of the priority areas we can apply a
‘smart defence’ in our countries and in the Balkan region/ A5 community, or other
formats of cooperation:

First, we have to follow a ‘smart defence’ approach at national level. When building
national capabilities, we should avoid parallel capabilities in the armed forces, police,
information services, border control units, customs services, etc. We cannot develop a bit
of everything and everywhere. We need to prioritize, and now under the ‘smart defence’,
we need to further prioritize the priorities. Studies have shown that there are still many
duplications of national capabilities of the security institutions in land, air and maritime
areas. Small countries of the region cannot afford maintaining or building national
capabilities with the same mission in different national security institutions.

Second, ‘smart defence’ is about development of most critical capabilities through

elimination of surpluses, obsolete capabilities, or units of low frequency use. The concept
of usability is a primary test for future forces. Again, we cannot afford to maintain
military units which belong to the past and do not resist to the existing or expected
security situations. As Secretary Rasmussen rightly argues “Our guiding principle should
be to cut fat, and build up muscle242. SDR is the right tool to identify surpluses of “fat”
and shortages of “muscles” of a smart defence.

Third, we need to develop a ‘smart defence’ concept at regional level. We together

should build a new mentality for a better cooperation in the area of joint and common

242
Secretary Rasmussen, Munich Security Conference, February 2011
179
capabilities needed to face common threats and risks to the region. In the emerging
security situation, no country in the region can develop all required capabilities to deal
with the full spectrum of threats we are facing today and tomorrow. Where necessary,
‘regionalization’ of some defence capabilities, based on NATO standards, is a smarter
choice to be considered by all our countries. “The best security is shared security”, says
Rasmussen243.

Forth, we need a ‘smart defence’ for the development of collective defence capabilities of
NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process). This ‘smart defence’ has to do with the
implementation of the Partnership Goals, Force Goals, or Capability Targets of our
countries. These are a very important areas of cooperation. NATO is in the transition
phase of the NDPP and we should take advantage of this period to develop the
capabilities we need for Article 5 or Non-Article 5 contribution. To build more and spend
less, we can develop a regional framework for the development of specific Partnership
Goals, Force Goals or Capability Targets. The best practice to follow is to develop a
SEEBRIG-type or the EU Battle-group example under the “single set of forces concept”

Fifth, we need a ‘smart defence’ with regard to joint participation in NATO/EU/UN or

Coalition led missions. Joint participation in NATO-led operations, based on the
experience of A3 Joint Medical team and the current POMLT case in ISAF. Going
together in operations is much better and cheaper than going alone. This is an area of
great interest for all of our regional countries.

Sixth, we need a ‘smart defence’ with special focus on the development of some
specialized niche capabilities. All our countries have traditional units and specialties, for
which NATO is in real need. What NATO and EU need from our countries today are not
mechanized or motorized battalions; they are in need for EOD, C-IED, MP, OMLT,
POMLT, CIMIC, PRT teams, and other small specialized capabilities, which can be
better provided by smaller nations.

Seventh, we need a ‘smarter defence’ with regard to Civil Emergencies. Civil Emergency
is the primary area for cooperation and development of joint capabilities, especially with
neighbouring countries; bilaterally, multilaterally or regionally. The last years, Albania
had both a flood and a fire crisis situation and most regional countries helped our country.
We are committed to do the same, and we should continue this approach of helping each
other in these cases. First priority should be given to smart capabilities with Kosovo,
especially regarding joint training and education, and civil emergency capabilities.
Eighth, we need a ‘smart defence’ through applying a ‘pooling and sharing’ approach at
bilateral, multilateral and regional level, where possible. Pooling & sharing could be a
243
Secretary Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 30 September 2011
180
better way to develop capabilities which overcome the possibilities of our individual
nations, such as a Regional Airspace Management System, a Regional Air Policing
System. Also, none of our countries is able to develop Strategic Airlift or other highly
expensive capabilities, but we can work on alternative approaches based on national,
regional, or collective level.

Ninth, we need a ‘smart defence’ in support of the Education and Training,

Infrastructure and Maintenance. Where necessary, ‘pooling & sharing’ some of the
national training and education institutions, is a very efficient tool to get closer our armed
forces, and save considerable spending. The efforts made so far are to be appreciated, but
this is the largest area for ‘smarter projects’ in our region to be further explored by the
experts. Among others, Albania has made available a Senior Regional Course on Security
and Defence, successful so far.

Pooling & sharing can be further extended when building and using the capabilities of
existing and future Regional Centres of Excellence, or Facilities for Training and
Exercises of regional countries. I think all countries should provide a menu of national
capacities for regional use.

Using infrastructure, maintenance and logistics capabilities of countries at bilateral,

multilateral and regional level is another area of smart cooperation to be further explored.
For example, for a small region such as the Balkans, instead of having separate
capabilities in all regional countries, we can use at a regional level destruction sites of
excess ammunitions, or repair and maintenance factories, ship-building and shipyard
facilities, and many other services. Communication is another area of interest to promote
interoperability of our forces.

Tenth, but not the least, ‘Smart Defence’ is not completed without the Research and
Development element. We cannot find smart solutions without research and development
in our defence institutions. Smart solutions require smart peoples and smart defence
institutions based on knowledge and innovation practices. In my opinion, R&D in the
security and defence area should become a new element in the agenda of cooperation
among our regional countries.

I identified only ten areas of a smart defence approach in our region. Of course, there
may be tens of others to be explored and discussed in different formats. Some
conclusions and recommendations are given below.

181
Conclusion and recommendations

 Small countries like those in the Balkans cannot develop all required capabilities on
their own. Being flexible and pragmatic rather than conformist and traditional is part
of a smart defence. A new vision should be developed, a new mind-set articulated,
and a new era of cooperation initiated. Capabilities unaffordable at a national level
could be developed together. A good example to be followed is the successful
approach of the Baltic countries.

 Smart defence may require short-, mid- and long-term solutions. It has to do both
with use of existing capabilities and building new ones as well. But building new
capabilities requires an initial common vision and good will, followed by short-, mid-
and long-term planning and then implementation.

 The implementation of the concept of 'smart defence' firstly requires a full political
will at the national and regional level. It will also seek new legal arrangements from
all the involved regional countries, whether they are NATO and EU members or
aspirants. New changes should be reflected in the National Security Strategies and
Military Strategies of our countries.
 In my judgment, the concept of "smart defence" can be extended to all security-
related areas, namely the concept of 'smart security', because security and defence are
issues related to each another, but this study is focused mainly on the armed forces.

182
V. CHAPTER V: FINAL CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Conclusions
As an ally country, Albania has now moved from the individual defence system to the
collective defence system. Albania is more secure than ever before, but this
transformation of the concept of security and defence is accompanied with new
challenges for normal accommodation in the collective security structures. Challenges are
of political, economic, financial, military and information nature.
Post-membership challenges are just as tough as the pre-membership challenges. As a
small country and with limited financial resources, Albania will continue to face post-
membership challenges at least by 2024.
In addition to the extraordinary benefits of membership, we also have some specific
obligations based on NATO fair burden sharing policy. We have obligations to
participate in NATO operations, financial obligations of certain amounts to both civil and
military budget of the Alliance, representation with civilian and military personnel at
NATO HQ and command and force structures, etc.
One of the fundamental challenges is the harmonization of the national defence planning
system with collective defence planning system, which is today at a more advanced stage.
Consolidation of this new system is on the agenda through development and promotion
of an elite professional staff of the area.
Defence planning is a very important and serious undertaking for any country. It has to
do with the destiny of the country's defence against threats, risks and challenges of the
new century. They are more numerous in number and more complex in substance than
those of the last century. The security environment is under constant development.
Many issues explored in this doctoral thesis are on the agenda of Albanian MoD/ GS and
many allied countries. Some of them are being discussed by Strategic Defence Review
processes as analytical methods of field experts.
Based on my motivation on this doctoral thesis, in the fifth chapter, I have summarized
the main findings and recommendations for the harmonization of the long-term defence
planning of the Republic of Albania, as an ally country, with the collective defence
planning system in support of civilian-military defence planners at strategic and
operational level.
Of particular importance is the implementation of 13 defence planning disciplines,
according to the specifics of our country set out in the third chapter. The implementation
of Capability Targets (CT) is also on agenda of AAF reforms. Also, the implementation

i
of the standardization system according to allied standards has successfully started and
the progress is evident, etc.
- Findings and recommendations
The following findings and recommendations of this PhD dissertation are a logical result
of the detailed analysis and discussions along the doctoral thesis. I have associated them
with proposals for their respective solutions:
1. Institutionalize a national defence planning process in harmony with the Alliance's
collective defence planning, with regard to methodology, substance, timelines,
responsible authorities, and defence planning products. This issue can be solved by
formulating a National Defence Planning process in line with the 5-step Alliance
NDPP Process. This document may be approved by the Minister of Defence every 4
years. A concept of this document is provided in this doctoral thesis.
2. Adopt a package of defence planning disciplines of the Republic of Albania, based on
recommendations made in this study for a Set of 12 disciplines of the national
defence planning. Designate responsible directorates for each of the 12 planning
disciplines, and to set up an MoD / GS separate board for each of them. These Boards
may be established through a separate directive on functional MoD Boards, in
accordance with the relevant Decision of Council of Ministers on Boards.
3. Harmonize national security and defence documents with those of security and
collective defence according to the recommendation made in this study. It is
necessary to streamline the hierarchy of strategic documents and integrate security
and defence documents, for example, national security policy and strategy can be
developed in a single document, as well as defence policy and strategy (military), etc.
4. Approve a Set of Planning Scenarios for development of main forces/ capabilities of
Albanian Armed Forces. For this purpose, this doctoral thesis gives an option of a Set
of 5 Strategic Scenarios with 23 Operational Sub-Scenarios, which can be integrated
to up to 12 representative planning scenarios (generic or real). On this basis, defence
planning and capability of the future armed forces should be developed;
5. From the package of planning scenarios, inside and outside the country, determine the
minimum requirements of related capabilities of the Armed Forces. The first priority
of capability development should be devoted to key capabilities to protect Albanian
people in civil emergencies, and declared capabilities for crisis management and
defence of the country under Article 5 and non-Article 5 NATO-led operations, etc.;
6. Formulate and adopt a reasonable Level of Ambition of Albania, i.e. determine the
number of simultaneous participation in national and international operations,
according to the recommendation made in the relevant chapter of this dissertation.

ii
 This is to be defined in a policy directive at the highest level, such as Strategic
Defence Review 2018 which is under way. In this context, further develop a "single
set of forces" concept of military and civilian capabilities of Albania for all NATO /
EU / UN / Coalitions-led national and international operations.
7. Develop a smart strategic and operational command and control system in AAF (C2)
for national and international operations, apply an integrated MoD/ GS organization
structure, according to the option recommended in this doctoral thesis.
8. Update the AAF operations plans at strategic, operational and tactical level, as well as
AAF unit preparation, training and equipment, as well as other national security
institutions, based on the set of strategic and operational planning scenarios, as an
allied country. The approach provided in this study may be considered for this
purpose;
9. Establish a continuous and constructive dialogue between political decision-makers
and military planners in the interest of national defence planning, including, where
appropriate, all other national security authorities. The MoD Defence Policy Council
of the, the CoM Security Policy Committee, and the President’s National Security
Council should play a special role to finalize the basic defence planning issues.
10. Develop and assign high-efficiency community of civil and military experts in all
defence planning disciplines at the MoD/ GS, at the Force level, and at NATO
mission. This community of experts will develop their skills and make career
preferably within the specific defence planning area of expertise.
11. Continue to allocate a gradually increased defence budget at a level from 1.2% in
2018 to 2% of GDP in 2024, to meet the commitment of Brussels summit 2018, for
AAF transformation requirements, develop modern, deployable, logistically-
supported and interoperable military capabilities according to allied standards. Also,
continue the modernization of AAF equipment and systems, allocating them up to
20% of the defence budget, based on the Alliance's Political Guidance;
12. Accelerate formulation of new National Security Strategy and Military Strategy, in
the spirit of the principles of collective defence, the Alliance Strategic Concept 2010,
the Welsh and Brussels Summits and the EU's ESDP. Keep in mind that each strategy
comes out at least 6 months to 1 year after an equivalent NATO/ EU strategy
according to the assessments and recommendations made in this study. New
strategies should be action strategies, not just ‘academic’ strategies, such as some of
past strategies.
13. Introduce periodic institutionalization of Strategic Defence Review (SDR) to AAF,
every 4-6 years, or even 10 years. The current SDR should make an assessment of
capabilities of defence of Albania as a NATO member country, in particular in the
iii
 context of the Strategic Alliance Concept and Collective Defence Planning Process
(NDPP) 2009. SDR process should engage experts from all AAF education and
research institutions, MoD and GS military and civilian experts, other high-level
experts such as diplomats, finance, strategic analysts, lawyers, and managers should
be involved in SDR, and should be consulted with NATO and strategic allies, etc.
14. Improve the curricula of higher education courses of the Academy of Defence with
the theory and practice of defence planning. Also, all TRADOC teaching institutions
and AAF units should update their training and education curricula with Article 5 or
out of Article 5 operations, as well as new national operations. Simulation Centre
should introduce and test planning scenarios for staff and command training,
exercises and new tactical tasks developed and tested by joint units, national and
international, according to new scenarios as an allied country. Also, basic defence
planning issues need to be made subject to strategic studies and operational research
by the AAF Centres for Research and Doctrine.
15. Continue the ratification and implementation of the main STANAGs/ APs under the
annual and long-term standardization plan in AAF. The plans relate to AAF
operational planning in the framework of collective defence, ranging from 'capstone'
doctrines to doctrines of major operations inside and outside Article 5. Also, build the
AAF doctrinal hierarchy, based upon Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations of the
Alliance. Particular focus should be given to doctrinal development of the relevant
AAF structures in national operations, especially those of civil emergencies and
national independent operations, according to the recommended set of scenarios;
16. Harmonize terms and definitions of types and categories of forces with those of
Allied units, by ratifying STANAG 2437, AJP-1 (D) and STANAG AAP-6 "NATO
Terms and Definitions". These STANAGs are in the AAF plan of ratification and
implementation of STANAGs 2024.
17. Accept the alliance system of types and categories of forces designated under the
Alliance's document - General Secretary's Guidance SG (2006) 0244 (R),
"Declaration and Designation of Forces" and providing answers to the questions of
Defence Planning Capability Survey - DPCS. Apply a functional NATO Capability
Code and Statement to all units and capabilities available to AAF.
18. Develop the AAF Mission's Essential Task List for the strategic, operational and
tactical tasks of the units (ST, OT, TT), based on the experience of NATO Task List
(NTL). The list is based on three types of AAF constitutional mission and three types
of NATO mission.
19. Establish an AAF Unit Readiness System according to the readiness categories of
Alliance Force Standards (AFS-1 to AFS-9) (HRF / FLR / LTBF) for land, air, navy,

iv
 as well as staffs and other special units. This should be done through ratification and
implementation of Allied Joint Publication AJP-1 (D) and relevant Allied Force
Standards (AFS).
20. Training, education and evaluation of units (individual and collective) should be done
according to the TEEE Alliance System (ACT); implement the Creval, Taceval, and
Mareval systems for evaluation of land, air and navy units.
21. Establish cooperation with the Alliance at the strategic level, to start a timely
development of planning scenarios of collective defence for the defence of Albania
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as the participation of our forces in
operations of the Alliance outside Article 5 'Out of Area';
22. Consider the ‘comprehensive approach' concept by planning and development, in
addition to military capabilities, the required civil capabilities for stabilization and
reconstruction in support of FG 2008 or CT 2013 Package, such as FG 3783, FG
3784, FG 3785, and FG 3786.
23. Bear in mind that the forces made available for international operations should be
deployable (i.e. have strategic deployment capabilities, etc.) outside the Alliance's
area of responsibility, at 10% simultaneous deployment of a total of 50%.
24. Develop a review of legal, organizational, doctrinal, equipment and other aspects of
coordination of all state institutions capabilities in terms of civil emergencies. Aim at
further improving their management based on findings of the 'lessons learned' system;
25. Introduce a Capability Based Planning (CBP) system in AAF by means of an
integrated evaluation of all DOTMLPFI military elements. In AAF case, CBP should
be applied for the development and operations of battalion, company and platoon task
forces, which will be the basis of future AAF missions. Training and exercises at the
'task force' level (task force Bn, Coy and Plt) should have priority in future scenarios;
26. The current SDR should use the CBP method to identify surpluses and shortfalls of
capabilities of AAF of Albania, parallel structures and duplication of capabilities
among the AAF services and with other state institutions on land, air and sea.
27. Consider developing a broad AAF concept and a menu of "niche" capabilities,
according to the recommendations given in this study. Participation and presence in
future national and international operations will be more diverse than today, so we
should apply prioritization and specialization of non-traditional specialized 'niche'
capabilities and other highly used modular sub-units.
28. Develop a concept for a volunteer reserve component of the future AAF forces. This
dissertation has recommended two options of the volunteer reserve component. An
experienced working group should be established to draft a conceptual, legal,
v
 organizational, motivational, training, and financial package of the voluntary reserve
component, based on Allied best practices. The voluntary reserve component may
have a key role in civil emergencies as well as peace support operations involving the
AAF, in and out of the country, as required by Service/ Unit commanders. A
volunteer reserve component section should be added to the Personnel and
Recruitment Centre;
29. Develop a national document titled "Assessment of Security Environment" by a joint
working group of all intelligence organizations and research centres equivalent to the
NATO document MC-161 "Intelligence Estimate". This document may be as ‘driver’
for the Strategic Defence Review and key national security documents;
30. Draft an AAF Long Term Development Plan, LTDP-2024 for implementing the
findings following the Strategic Defence Review. This document may be drafted or
updated by the General Staff, coordinated by J5. This plan should be normally
adopted at the highest possible level of political decision-making in order to survive
the rotations of political power.
31. Long-term Defence Planning should be in accordance with the PPBS system. So
long-term planning priorities are reflected in mid-term planning (defence programs)
as well as in short-term planning (annual budgets).
32. The Defence Planning System of the Republic of Albania should be based on the
'Smart Defence' approach launched in Lisbon Strategic Concept, focused on
prioritization, specialisation and multinational solutions. This approach should be
developed according to and in co-operation with regional countries, in particular
Kosovo and neighbouring countries, as well as in a regional format, especially for
development of unaffordable capabilities by each of individual countries.

vi
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33. Donald Rumsfeld: The way ahead to NATO missions,
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35. AAF Partnership Goal Document, General Staff of AAF
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38. European Security and Defence Policy, Text Document, 2003
39. Planning and Review Process (PARP), Part II, 2006
40. Membership Action Plan, MAP 1999, Defence Issues
41. Defence Capability Initiative, Washington Summit, 1999

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43. Istanbul Summit Joint Statement, 2004, Part 1

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Transformation, RAND Corporation Publication, 2002.
5. Aldrige, et. al., Joint Defence Capability Study: Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Resourcing and
Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities, Final Report to the U.S. Secretary of Defence, 2004.
6. Framing the Problem of PPBS and Changing the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System, T. Davis (Ed), 2000.
7. Stojkovic, D. and Dahl, B. R. Methodology for Long Term Defence Planning, Norwegian Defence
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8. Walker, S, Capabilities-based planning – how it is intended to work and challenges to its successful
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Alexandria, at http://www.mors.org/meetings/cbp/read/TP-3_CBP.pdf, accessed: 2 May 2007.
11. Tagarev, T. Introduction to Program Based Defence Resource Management, Connections Quarterly
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, p. 55–69.
12. Young, T.-D. Capabilities-Based Defence Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO and
Partnership for Peace Countries, Connections Quarterly Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, p. 35–54.
13. Clausewitz, C. 1976. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
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Analysis, and Transformation. Santa Monica [etc.]: RAND 2004.
15. National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia. Approved by the Riigikogu (Parliament) 16
June 2004
16. European Union. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels,
12 December 2003.
17. Feith, D.J. 2002. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defence for
Policy. Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, February 14, 2002.
Washington File, 15 February 2002
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of Defence. Germany.
19. Kask, A., J. Murumets and T-D. Young. 2003. Approaching the need for defence reform:
Background and outlines of suggested Estonian defence planning system.
20. Kelley, C., P. Davis, B. Bennett, E. Harris, R. Hundley, E. Larson, R. Mesic, M. Miller. 2003.
Metrics for the Quadrennial Defence Review’s Operational Goals.
21. Meinhart, R. 2006. Strategic planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005.
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks.
22. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2001. NATO Bi-SC Directive 80–90, NATO Tasks
List, 19 June 2001
23. Waltz, K.N. 1979. The Theory of International Politics, London: McGraw-Hill Wendt, A.E. 1987.
“The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”,

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24. Young, T-D. 1995. Capabilities-Based Defence Planning: The Australian Experience. Armed Forces
and Society, Vol.21, No.3, Spring 1995, pp.349–369
25. 2006. Capabilities-Based Defence Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO and Partnership for
Peace Countries. Connection Quarterly Journal, Vol. V,
26. Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson,. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic
Civil-Military Relations. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2008.
27. Bulgarian MoD. White Paper on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. White
Paper, Sofia: Bulgarian MoD, 2010, 5.
28. Callaghan, Jean, and Jürgen Kuhlmann. Military and Society in 21st Century Europe. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000.
29. Caparini, Marina. “The Challenge of Establishing Democratic Civilian Control over the Armed
Forces of Central and Eastern Europe.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 27, 2 (Winter, 1997):
30. Caudle, Sharon. “Homeland Security Capabilities Based Planning: Lessons from the Defence
Community.” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 2 (2005).
31. Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Foster. Civil-Military Relations and Defence
Planning: Challenges for Central and Eastern Europe in the New Era. Working Paper No.9, Sussex
European Institute, Sussex: One-Europe Programme, 2000, 7.
32. Davis, Paul, Russel D. Shaver, and Justin Beck. “Portfolio- Analysis: Methods for Assessing
Capability Options.” RAND (National Defence Research Institute), 2008.
33. Donnelly, Chris. “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework For Tackling the
Problem.” NATO Review Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 1997): 15–19.
34. Muresan, Liviu. “Defence Reform in Romania- An Ongoing Process.” (Centre for Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) ). 2001.
35. Pfeiffer, Holger. “Defence and Force Planning in Historical Perspective: NATO as a Case Study.”
Baltic Security & Defence Review 10 (2008): 104.
36. Reengineering the Defense Planning in Bulgaria, Velizar M. Shalamanov and Todor D. Tagarev,
Research Report No. 9, Sofia, December 1998
37. Ratchev, Valeri. “Context Scenarios in Long-Term Defence Planning.” Information and Security:
An International Journal 23, no. 1 (2009): 62–72.
38. Simon, Jeffrey. “NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Prospects for the Next Round of
Enlargement.” Occasional Papers (East European Studies- Woodrow
39. “Status of Defence Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria.” CCMR Report,
July 28–29, 2008.
40. Tagarev, Todor. “The Art of Shaping Defence Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (But No
Algoritms).” Connections- The Quarterly Journal V, no. 1 (2006)
41. Talbot, Imlay, and Monica Toft Duffy, . The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and
Strategic Planning Under Uncertainty. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006.
42. The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). Guide to Capability-Based Planning. Alexandria, VA,
2004.
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44. Young, Thomas Durell. “Capability-Based Defence Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO”
The Quarterly Journal 5, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 35–37.
45. Dr. Duro F, Planning, Programming and Budgeting in AAF. MoD edition 2011
46. Koliçi P, PPBES Manual in AAF, MoD edition 2007
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 Annex A

Evolution of NATO Strategic Concept 1949 - 2010

Annex B

NATO Defence Planning Process

NATO Defence Planning Process

Step
Pol – Mil Analysis
1 INT PG LoA

Future Trends
Operations
Minimum Capability
PS Requirement (MCR)
Lessons Learned

NATO and National Surplus Capability

2 Existing and Planned
Capabilities
Compare MCR to Existing
and Planned Capabilities RISK
Capability Shortfalls
Analysis

Capabilities to be Maintained Priority Shortfall Areas

Note Synopsis of MCR including Priority Shortfall Areas

National Targets

Develop Targets Determine Capability

Multi-National Targets
3 - apportion Shortfall Solutions

NATO Targets

Associated Risk Agree Targets x Reasonable Challenge

4 Monitor /
Facilitate
National / Multi -National
Implementation
NATO
Implementation
Support

5 NATO Capability Survey Progress Report Annual Capabilities Report

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
 Annex C

DESCRIPTION OF 3 TYPES AND 17 MISSIONS OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

MISSION TYPE 1: Collective Defence of Territories under Article 5. (Collective Defence (CD)
This Mission Type has only one mission, which is the basic mission for which NATO was founded,
namely the collective defence of its territories. The mission statement is the following:
1. "Restoring and Maintaining the Security of the North Atlantic Area".
As discussed above, "... NATO member states are determined to implement the provisions of the
Washington Treaty, and in particular the Collective Defence Article 5, which considers an attack by an
external enemy to one or more of them, as an attack to everyone. "
A major difference between the operations of Article 5 and operations outside Article 5 (NA5CROs) is
that, unlike operations outside Article 5 where Alliance countries are not formally obliged to
participate, in the operations of Article 5, they are formally obliged to take action to re-establish and
maintain security in the North Atlantic area.
MISSION TYPE 2: Defence Against Terrorism (MC 472)
This Mission Type has rapidly evolved, especially after September 11, 2001, when terrorism became
active, by attacking the twin towers in the US. This Mission Type includes three separate missions:
Anti-Terrorism; Consequence Management; and Counter Terrorism.
1. Anti-Terrorism (AT) The Anti-Terrorism Mission includes all preventive defensive and attack
measures taken to reduce the damage to the forces, persons and property from terrorist actions,
including protective and deterrent measures with a view to preventing an attack or reducing its
effects.
2. Consequence Management (CM) The Mission of Consequence Management has to deal with
the mitigation and management of the consequences of terrorist acts where they have occurred.
3. Counter Terrorism (CT) The Counter-Terrorism Mission has to do with planning and
implementing measures to crack down organizations, networks, and persons with terrorist activity
before they hit. Counter-terrorism is more active than anti-terrorism.
MISSION TYPE 3: Crisis Response Operations
This Type of Mission of Crisis Response Mission (NA5CRO) consists of a range of missions outside
the scope of operations under Article 5 of Collective Defence, including all political, military and civil
activities, initiated and implemented in accordance with international law, including and international
humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in pursuit
of the Alliance's stated objectives. This Mission Type has a wide range of support operations (SO)
carried out in support of civil agencies, Peace Support Operations (PSOs), and Alliance combat
operations (which are not subject to Article 5 of collective defence). The whole spectrum of this Type
of Mission is expressed in 13 separate Missions, as follows:
1. Peacekeeping - PK. Peacekeeping operations are undertaken in accordance with the principles
of Chapter VI of the UN Charter to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace
agreement reached between the Parties.
2. Peace Enforcement (PE). Peace Enforcement Operations are normally conducted under the
principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are carried out in conditions when the parties to
the conflict have not yet reached or are uncertain about granting consent to a peace agreement.
3. Conflict Prevention (CP). Conflict Prevention activities are normally conducted in accordance
with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Deploying military forces to repel conflicting
parties must be credible, and this may require the preparation of a Peace Enforcement mandate

xi
under the principles of Chapter VII. Conflict Prevention activities may range from diplomatic
initiatives in security sector reform efforts in terms of democratic civilian control of the Armed
Forces, up to the deployment of forces supporting diplomatic initiatives with a preventive effect of
escalating the conflict.
4. Peace-making (PM). PM covers the diplomatic activities taking place after the start of a
conflict aimed at imposing a fire interdiction or a quick peace settlement. They include mediation,
reconciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions, or others under the direction of the NAC.
PM is a mission that is largely accomplished by diplomatic means, however military support
should be provided, as appropriate, directly or indirectly.
5. Peacebuilding - PB. Peacebuilding covers actions that support political, economic, social, and
military measures aimed at supporting political solutions to a conflict. This includes mechanisms
to identify and support structures aimed at consolidating peace, building trust, economic well-
being and reconstruction. So, Peacebuilding requires commitment to humanitarian resources and
economic development as well as a long-term political process.
6. Humanitarian Relief (HR). Humanitarian Relief is an operation conducted to alleviate human
suffering when the responsible civil authorities in a particular region are incapable or unwanted to
support the needs of the local population. Humanitarian Relief can be carried out before, during or
together with the activities of specialized civilian agencies in the humanitarian field.
7. Support of Humanitarian Operations (HO). Humanitarian operations can be carried out in
response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hunger crises; or man-made disasters,
such as radioactive, biological or chemical pollution. They can also be carried out as a result of
political, religious or ethnic conflicts or persecutions. NATO's military activities can carry out
tasks such as re-establishing communications, managing supply, providing emergency health care,
various landmines and allocating priority aid priorities.
8. Facilitation of Disaster Relief (DR). Disaster Relief is closely related to humanitarian
operations. Facilitating disasters related to the salvation of people's lives requires a quick response.
This reaction can be done by NATO's rapid reaction forces, as well as by individual countries.
9. Search and Rescue (SAR). SAR is "the use of aircraft, rubber boats, submarines, or rescue
teams to search for and rescue personnel or people in difficult situations on land or on the sea." All
NATO countries have signed the Convention of Chicago 1947 on International Civil Aviation and
the International Convention on Maritime SAR, by agreeing to the SAR's minimum policies,
procedures or minimum standards.
10. Support of Non-Combat Evacuation Ops (NEO). Non-combat Evacuation Operations are
diplomatic initiatives with Alliance forces supporting the Alliance's forces, a safe place for
civilians who are at risk in a foreign country. Within an NEO operation, forces should have the
ability to establish security, crowd control, take-over and control, movement and emergency
medical support for unarmed civilians.
11. Extraction Operations (EOP). Extraction Operations are missions where a NATO-led force
covers or supports the withdrawal of a UN mission or other body from a crisis region to be the
same as those of NEO operations. Extraction operations are usually carried out in an uncertain or
hostile environment, or when the UN, other body or local government has lost control of the
territory in question.
12. Military Assistance / Support to Civil Authorities (SCA) Military Assistance / Support to
Civil Authorities includes all military activities that provide temporary support to the community
or civil authorities, when permitted by law, and that are normally carried out in unusual
circumstances, or when an emergency exceeds the capabilities of civil authorities.
13. Exercise of Sanctions and Embargos (ESE) The Exercise of Sanctions and Embargo is
conducted on countries that through a resolution or mandate are obliged to respect international
law, sanctions are mainly in the form of trade, diplomatic, economic or other trade privileges as
well as freedom of movement in their area. According to geography, sanctions may include a

xii
combination of land, air and sea forces. ESEs may be in the form of an embargo, sea interdiction,
and exercise of non-flying areas.
a) (Embargos). An embargo means stopping or blocking the entry and exit of goods, people,
and services through ports, airports or land routes under the embargo. Embargoes also include
maritime deterrence operations through localization, classification, tracking of submarine
ships and aircraft, and embargoes on them. In addition to the air and naval forces, during
NATO embargoes, NATO's land and special forces may also be involved, with capabilities
such as unmanned aerial surveillance, border reconciliation, electronic intelligence tools,
which can be used in support embargoes.
b) Maritime Interdiction Operations. Maritime Interdiction operations (MIO) include
maritime deterrence measures to intercept the movement of certain types of goods in a
particular country or area. MIOs are carried out to seize ships, and if necessary, to do so in
order to verify, change the direction, or seize their cargo in support of economic sanctions or
military sanctions. The most extreme form of Maritime Interdiction Operations is called the
Blockade.
c) Non-Fly Zones. Exercising a Non-Flying Zone with the mandate of an international body that
has the right to this sanction is a very special mission that forbids a Party to carry out missions
in a particular airspace. The non-flying area may be on the territory of a Party or in a
neighbouring country. Enforcement of Non-Fly Zones may include fixed-wing aircraft or
helicopters of opposing (friend-enemy) or non-combatants. Enforcement of Non-flying Zone
is usually a defensive mission using Airborne and / or Interceptor Patrols supported by
Observation Systems and C2. Neutral aircraft operations, such as the neutralization of air
defence or air strike operations on opposing installations, are excluded when these are caused
by the opponent's reaction.

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 Annex D

Package/ Set of Strategic and Operational Scenarios of RA

(Project of the Author)
1. Strategic Scenario No.1. AAF Commitment to National Civil Emergency Operations in Support of
Civil Authorities.
a) a national operational emergency scenario for elimination of consequences of an earthquake
in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
b) A national operational emergency scenario for elimination of consequences of heavy rainfalls
or floods in a large territory of the country;
c) A national operational scenario for elimination of consequences of a severe snowfall situation
in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
d) An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of massive wild fires in a part of the
territory of the Republic of Albania;
e) An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of a situation of heavy industrial
accidents or man-made mistakes in a part of the territory of the Republic of Albania;
f) An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of a massive landslide in the territory
of the Republic of Albania;
2. Strategic Scenario No.2. AAF commitment to defence of the country in the framework of NATO's
collective defence (Article 5), and other international security organizations.
b) An operational scenario of Article 5, when our country may be involved in a conflict as a
result of strategic aggression against the Alliance as a whole;
c) An operational scenario of Article 5, where our country may be involved in a conflict as a
result of an unstable regional situation;
3. Strategic Scenario No.3. AAF Commitment to contribute to the collective defence of the Alliance
(Article 5).
a) An operational scenario of engagement of our country in the framework of collective defence
obligations if one of the Alliance countries is attacked.
4. Strategic Scenario No.4. AAF Commitment to Peace Support Operations led by the Alliance and
other security organizations outside their area of responsibility (NA5CRO).
a) A general scenario, based on Alliance Crisis Response scenarios, according to NATO's SDP
and CONPLANS plans;
b) A general scenario, based on EU Crisis Response scenarios according to the EU Contingency
Plans;
c) A general scenario, based on UN Crisis Response scenarios, according to UN Contingency
Plans;
5. Strategic Scenario No 5. Planning independent national operations of AAF units in the country.
a. An operational scenario in cases of terrorist attacks in our country sponsored by states, groups
or individual extremists to national or collective values;
b. An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of an economic and financial crisis
with consequences on the security of our country;

xiv
c. An operational search and rescue scenario (SAR) of saving people's lives during major
catastrophes and accidents in a part of the territory of the Republic of Albania;
d. An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of an explosion of ammunition
storage or air accident near inhabited areas;
e. An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of a cyber-attack to official
information networks of the Republic of Albania;
f. An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of damages to the country's strategic
infrastructure (facilities of particular importance such as ports, airports, hydroelectric power
plants, tunnel roads, railways, etc.);
g. An operational scenario for development of airspace control and air policing in support of
airspace sovereignty in cooperation with NATINADS;
h. An operational scenario for exercising the sovereignty and law enforcement in the maritime
space of the Republic of Albania;
i. An operational scenario for the management of a 'renegade' airspace of an aircraft hijacking
situation or during an air catastrophe in the territory of the Republic of Albania;
j. An operational scenario for elimination of consequences of major ground, marine and air
pollution;
k. An operational scenario to relief the consequences of serious epidemics of infectious diseases
or contamination by biological, chemical or radiological factors;

xv
 Annex E
Essential Operational Capabilities (EOC) of the Alliance

1. Timely Availability of Forces, which means "... the ability to make available the required amount
of forces declared to the Alliance in accordance with accepted readiness times, as well as for
supporting and performing rotation of the forces on the mission through other ready-made forces.
To be prepared to accomplish a wide range of mission tasks, Alliance forces must be given different
readiness times. "The Alliance's ground, air, and naval readiness categories are classified into 11 major
categories ranging from 0 -2 days to High Readiness Forces, up to over 365 days, for Long Term Built-
Up Forces, especially those in reserve. Generally speaking, these levels of readiness have been
expressed in NATO Capstone Doctrine AJP-1 (D), as a High Readiness Forces (HRF), Forces of
Lower Readiness (FLR), and Long Term Built-Up Forces (LTBF). "
When we say that a unit is made available to the Alliance, we mean that this unit shall be ready for up
to 10 days from the notice time, this unit must be fully staffed with personnel, equipment, logistics and
material reserves, etc., over 90 % of the table of organization.
2. Effective Engagement is related to the ability to use the equipment and systems available to
effectively combat all types of combat or non-combat operations of the Alliance mission spectrum.
Effective engagement covers a number of elements such as platforms, armaments, ammunition,
infrastructure equipment; types of war, manoeuvres, tactics and procedures; detection, observation,
capture and attack of opponent's targets; staff training, performance and mission effectiveness.
It also includes information operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, civil-military
relations; issues of linguistic, cultural multi-nationality, and standardization.
3. Effective C2 capabilities includes command capabilities - Effective and uninterrupted control of
forces in operation to accomplish the mission; The MCM1 Directive 38-02d sets out the Minimum
Military Requirements for NATO Command Relations.
"Operational planning serves for the preliminary preparation of the Alliance for command and control
of expected operations of Article 5 of collective defence and out of Article 5 of crisis response
operations, including for its non-member countries. The Alliance's operational planning is expressed in
the document Bi-SC Document - Guidelines of Operational Planning (GOP).
Fixed, and in particular deployable communication systems are an essential tool for effective
command-and-control. Information security is of particular importance in all types of communication.
Standardization of communication within countries' services, among multinational forces, and other
agencies should be applied according to the respective STANAGs.
4. Effective Intelligence. It implies effective intelligence system capabilities to create superiority to
the opponent for rapid and accurate decision-making;
"Intelligence is the ability to collect, process, and disseminate real-time information in order to precede
or respond to any hostile activity that affects the security of the Alliance."
It is imperative to use all forms of national intelligence and collective defence intelligence. They
should be synchronized to the highest strategic level to serve operational and tactical commands. The
exchange of real-time information between Alliance countries is of crucial importance. Types and
intelligence systems will be different for different operations.
5. Deployability and Mobility. They include the capability to deploy to remote strategic distances
from the Alliance territory, and Tactical Mobility of forces after deployment in the operation theatre.
Deployability and mobility are necessary for both types of operations, of Article 5, or out of Article 5.
Deployability is usually performed at strategic distance, while operational and tactical mobility.

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Deployability and mobility must always be made in fulfilling the mission and not as a goal in itself.
The Alliance's deployment publication is the Joint Doctrine AJP3 -13, "Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Deployment of Forces," while for Tactical Mobility is the Joint AJP4.4 Doctrine for Movement and
Transportation Doctrine.
6. Logistic Sustainability. These are capabilities that include the logistical support of forces in the
operation theatre according to Alliance Force standards;
"Logistic support is the ability to provide logistic support available at the right time and place to the
achievement of NATO mission goals." NATO's logistics system, including transport and
transportation, infrastructure, engineering and medical support, should be able to provide support for a
long period of time. This requires considerable facilities, equipment, and reserves to be kept in storage
sites in peace time to be made available when required.
During crisis response operations (NA5CRO) logistic support should pay particular attention to
frequent rotations of forces. This is described in the Allied Force Standards Volumes, according to the
respective forces (AFS 1-9).
During collective defence operations logistic support is based on planning of all scenarios for logistic
needs, equipment, ammunition, fuel, medical support, engineering or other classes of supply
7. Force Protection and Survivability. These are capabilities for protection and survival of forces
from all possible effects and capabilities of the opponent in the operation theatre.
According to AJP-1 (D), "Force Survival covers the ability to operate, protect and preserve our forces
both in conventional and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)". Survival measures should
guarantee staff, key military and civil infrastructure, and all major materials. Survival is a fundamental
factor in the operational effectiveness of military operations.
AJP-1 (D) states that "Defence Force covers a wide spectrum of security and defence activities,
including Operational Security (OPSEC). In times of peace, force protection measures will be
primarily for its security and protection from emergency services such as Police, Firearms, Search and
Rescue, Medical Services, etc. In times of tension or crisis, when forces move from peacekeeping
operations to peace-enforcement operations or combat operations, the defence of force should include
more traditional combat measures of security, such as Security Protection, Active Protection, and
Recovery”.

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 Annex F:
Size of Armed Forces of Allied Countries
(In thousands of personnel)

xviii
 Annex G
NATO COUNTRY DEFENCE BUDGETS 2014 - 2017
(In % of GDP, in Monetary Units of Allied Countries)

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 Annex H

Military and Civilian Personnel of NATO countries

xx
(in % of labour force)

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xxii
xxiii
 Interview Questions

For a Defence Planning System of the Republic of Albania as a of NATO member

1. What do you think is the difference between strategic planning, operational planning
and tactical planning?
2. In your opinion, is there any difference between defence planning of big and small
countries? What may be the changes?
3. What, in your opinion, are some of Albania’s benefits to NATO membership?
4. What are the main challenges of Albania after joining NATO?
5. What are some of the changes the membership in the Alliance brought about in our
country?
6. What is the difference between ‘de jure’ membership and ‘de facto’ integration?
7. Do you think that 'Capability Targets CT-2013' for Albania are beyond its reach?
8. In your opinion, what should be the level of ambition of our country in NATO?
9. What are the benefits and obligations in the field of defence planning?
10. What should we trust to collective defence planning, and what should we plan to
contribute to collective defence?
11. What might be some of the features of future AAF compared with the traditional one?
12. How can the recommendations of NATO Strategic Concept be used in capability
development?
13. How can we harmonize our current national defence planning with collective defence
system?
14. What, in your opinion, are some of the elements that measure the quality of today’s
capabilities with capabilities of the past?
15. What are some key main factors, mechanisms to be used, and structures to lead and
cooperate on harmonization of our planning system with allied collective planning?
16. What quality staff should we activate and train to successfully handle this transition
process with the required quality?

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 Interviewed Persons

 Foreign Respondents

1. Prof. Paul Holman, Marshall Centre

2. Prof. Henri Bartlett, ISS Washington DC
3. Dr. Frank Boland, Director of Force Planning, NATO HQ
4. Prof. Colin Gray, ISS Institute, London
5. Prof. Paul Davis, Researcher, RAND Corporation
6. Dr. Buzz Kievenaar, Leader of US-Albanian "SAIC Defence Review - 2001"
7. Dr. Mike Simonich, etc. (SAIC Defence Modernization Team, Leader)
8. Prof. Jan Murumets, DIRI, Defence Institution Reform Initiative, US

 Albanian Respondents

1. Prof. Bektash Kolasi

2. Prof. Ruzhdi Gjatoja
3. Dr. Foto Duro
4. MsC Perikli Koliçi
5. MsC Piro Ahmetaj
6. Col. Dilaver Hoxha
7. Col. Editson Zarkaj
8. LTC ® Agim Hajro
9. LTC ® Ahmet Krasniqi
10. LTC ® Çelik Çeliku

Note: From the above list of respondents, four interviewed foreign respondents and six
Albanian respondents answered via e-mail.

Thimi Hudhra, PhD

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 Short CV of the Author
Col (R) Thimi Hudhra, PhD

Thimi Hudhra is a retired

colonel of Albanian Armed
Forces serving for more than
30 years in the defence
institution. His last positions
were the Chief of the Centre
for Defence Analyses of
Albanian TRADOC, and the
Dep/Director of the Centre for
Strategic Security and Defence
Studies, Tirana.

For the last 20 years he has worked as a specialist in foreign relations in Albanian MOD,
then the Branch Chief in the Integration Department, and Plans and Policy Director (J5)
in General Staff, especially with a focus on reform and long term planning. He has also
been for several years the Defence Advisor to the Prime-Minister of Albania.

He was for almost a decade one of the team members for negotiations in PARP and MAP
process, leading to Albanian integration in NATO in April 2009. He has also been
member of the working groups for the development of the National Security Strategy,
Military Strategy, Long Term Development Plan (LTDP-2007), and he was a member of
working groups of 3 Strategic Defence Reviews (SDR) conducted in Albania in 2001,
2006 and 2011-2013.

His research experience is largely focused on strategic planning, defence and policy
planning in the MOD, international relations and NATO integration. Colonel ® Thimi
Hudhra is a lecturer of the High Course on Security and Defence, Senior Officer Course
and other courses of the Defence Academy. He has published many articles in the
Albanian Military Review, a research focused review in AAF, and in other foreign
research magazines.

He is a candidate for a doctoral degree in the Academy of Defence of Albania focused on

“Defence Planning of the Republic of Albania as a NATO Allied Country”.

Thimi Hudhra is married with Mrs. Enkela Xhamaj, and he has two sons, Valentin and
Daniel. He knows very well English, French and Italian.

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