CONTENT

● Armenia
○ Armenian genocide
● Norway
○ Sovereign wealth funds
● Switzerland
○ Direct democracy
○ Diplomatic neutrality (inc. Red Cross)
○ International tax evasion and financial services
● Former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia)
○ Yugoslav Wars
■ War crimes
■ Historical uncertainty
○ Kosovo
● Ukraine
○ Crimea annexation
○ Political climate
■ Relations with Russia and protests in Kiev
■ Social media and fake news
● Turkey
○ 2016 coup d’etat and the state of emergency
○ Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)
● Russia
○ Cultural legacy and history
■ Strong Russian state
■ The West
■ Religion post-Communism
○ Politics
■ Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin
■ Human and civil rights
● LGBTQ+ community and feminism
● Political opposition
● Media and journalism
○ Economy
■ Natural gas and oil
■ State ownership
○ Foreign intervention
■ Western democracies and populism
■ Proxy war in the Middle East
○ Former Soviet satellite states (i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia)
■ NATO forces
■ Transition post-Communism (inc. lustration policies, populism)

Armenia
A landlocked country with Turkey to the west, Georgia to the north, and Azerbaijan to the
east, Armenia boasts a history longer than most European countries.

Between the 16th and 19th centuries, the traditional Armenian homeland composed of
Eastern Armenia and Western Armenia came under the rule of the Ottoman and Iranian
empires, repeatedly ruled by either of the two over the centuries. By the 19th century,
Eastern Armenia had been conquered by the Russian Empire, while most of the western
parts of the traditional Armenian homeland remained under Ottoman rule. During WW1,
Armenians living in their ancestral lands in the Ottoman Empire were systematically
exterminated in the Armenian Genocide. In 1918, following the Russian Revolution, all non-
Russian countries declared their independence after the Russian Empire ceased to exist,
leading to the establishment of the First Republic of Armenia. By 1920, the state was
incorporated into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and in 1922
became a founding member of the Soviet Union. In 1936, the Transcaucasian state was
dissolved, transforming its constituent states, including the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic, into full Union republics. The modern Republic of Armenia became independent in
1991 during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and got quickly became drawn into a bloody
conflict with Azerbaijan over the mainly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Armenian genocide
For centuries, the mountain plateau of Eastern Anatolia (modern-day Eastern Turkey) was
inhabited primarily by Christian Armenians who shared the area with Muslim Kurds. The
area was even an independent Armenian state throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages.
However, during the 15th and 16th century, through the migration of nomadic Turks and
invasions by the Ottomans, Armenia was absorbed into the vast Ottoman Empire. Even
then, Armenians still retained a strong sense of communal identity embodied in the
Armenian language and the Armenian Church. That sense of distinctiveness was fostered by
the Ottoman ‘millet system’, which accorded non-Muslim minorities significant administrative
and social autonomy.

Significant tension began sparking as the Armenians was subjected to unfair discrimination
(seizures of their land, property, and the imposition of high taxes of Armenian peasants) and
they had very little recourse through local courts which favoured Muslims. Despite this, many
Armenians became successful artisans and merchants during the rise of international trade
during the 17th and 18th century, establishing significant Armenian settlements in Istanbul
and other Ottoman port cities. Although Ottoman society was still dominated by Muslims,
many Armenians attained prominent positions in banking, commerce, and government. This
prominence was a source of resentment and suspicion. During the 19th century, Armenians
struggled with the perception that they were a foreign element within the Ottoman Empire
and that they would eventually betray it to form their own independent state. This was
amplified by the fact that many Armenians would still lived Eastern Anatolia shared a border
with Russia, a majority-Christian state; the fear was that they would collude with Russians to
revolt for independence. In fact, this was true to some extent as many there were activist
groups made of young Armenians (e.g. ‘Bell’ and ‘Federation’), many of which were from
Russian Caucasia, agitating for independence. The hope was that sympathisers in Christian
Europe would pressure the Ottoman Empire to implement new protections and reforms for
Armenians. They weren’t actually very popular, but did stoke anxiety and fear among
Muslims. Anti-Armenian feelings led to several massacres during Armenian protests in the
19th and 20th century.

In 1908, a small group of Ottoman revolutionaries, popularly referred to as the ‘Young

Turks’, came to power. Armenians welcomed this and hoped that the changej would bring
about more harmony between the two sects and civil rights for Armenians. Over time,
however, the ambitions of the Young Turks became more militant, less tolerant of non-Turks,
and increasingly suspicious of their Armenian subjects, whom they imagined were
collaborating with foreign powers.

During WW1, Armenians living near the Russian border were resistant to recruitment efforts.
This was seen as a powerful act of treachery by the Young Turks despite the fact that many
Armenians living in Istanbul joined volunteer units to fight alongside the Ottomans. Antipathy
toward Christians increased when the Ottoman Empire suffered a humiliating defeat in the
First Balkan War (1912–13), resulting in the loss of nearly all its remaining territory in
Europe. Young Turk leaders blamed the defeat on the Balkan Christians. Fearful Armenians
capitalized on the Ottoman defeat to press for reforms, appealing to the European powers to
impose a major reform on the Ottomans that required supervision by inspectors in the east.
The Young Turks took that arrangement as further proof of the Armenians’ collusion with
Europe to undermine the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

In January 1915, after a devastating defeat of an Ottoman army at the Russian border
(which was blamed on Armenians), Armenian soldiers were disarmed and demobilised, and
were then systematically murdered by Ottoman troops… the first victims of what would
become genocide. About the same time, irregular forces began to carry out mass killings in
Armenian villages near the Russian border. Armenian resistance, when it occurred, provided
the authorities with a pretext for employing harsher measures. In April 1915, Armenians in
Van barricaded themselves in the city’s Armenian neighborhood and fought back against
Ottoman troops. This incident was used as justification for the arrest and murder of
approximately 250 Armenian intellectuals and politicians in Istanbul, including several
deputies to the Ottoman Parliament.

Throughout summer and autumn of 1915, Armenian civilians were removed from their
homes and marched through the valleys and mountains of Eastern Anatolia toward desert
concentration camps. The deportation, which was overseen by civil and military officials, was
accompanied by a systematic campaign of mass murder carried out by irregular forces as
well as by local Kurds and Circassians. Survivors who reached the deserts of Syria
languished in concentration camps, many starved to death, and massacres continued into
1916. Conservative estimates have calculated that some 600,000 to more than 1,000,000
Armenians were slaughtered or died on the marches. Many Armenians also fled during this
time, leading to a huge Armenian diaspora.

Now, Turkey has steadily refused to recognize that the events of 1915–16 constitute a
genocide, even though most historians have concluded that the deportations and massacres
do fit the definition of genocide. While the Turkish government and allied scholars have
admitted that deportations took place, they maintain that the Armenians were a rebellious
element that had to be pacified during a national security crisis. They acknowledge that
some killing took place, but they contend that it was not initiated or directed by the
government. Major countries– including the US, Israel, and the UK– have also declined to
call the events a genocide, in order to avoid harming their relations with Turkey.

Norway
Norway enjoys one of the world's highest standards of living, in large part due to the
discovery in the late 1960s of offshore oil and gas. Debates about how to invest in its oil
wealth is a hot political issue: whether to use more of it to improve infrastructure or
safeguard it for future generations.

Norway plays an active international role. It has mediated between Israel and the
Palestinians as well as in the Sri Lankan conflict, and has participated in military action in
Afghanistan and Libya.

Sovereign wealth funds

Norway is the world's number seven oil exporter and has invested its surplus wealth into the
‘Government Pension Fund of Norway’ otherwise known as its ‘Oil Fund’– now the world's
largest sovereign wealth fund (surpassing USD$1 trillion in 2017). It was created in the
desire to mitigate volatility stemming from fluctuating oil prices, the first of which were
experienced in the 1970s.

The wealth fund is worth more than double national GDP and its largest holdings are in
Alphabet, Apple, Microsoft and Nestlé, among 9,000-odd firms in 78 countries. Its success is
partly due to the global stock market boom in 2017– around two-thirds of the fund’s assets
are invested as equities, representing over 2% of all listed shares in Europe and more than
1% of shares globally. The fund is so big it is becoming a tool for 5m-odd Norwegians to
shape values abroad. It is an increasingly activist shareholder, speaking out on executive
pay, ethical behaviour, companies’ use of water, child labour and more. For example, it
revealed that it opposed about 6,700 resolutions in 2016’s annual meetings including a
proposal to merge the roles of Chief Executive and Chairman ExxonMobil, Johnson &
Johnson, JPMorgan, General Electric, and Procter & Gamble. Other proposals it voted
against were related to overpaid or overcommitted directors as well as the protection of
minority shareholders and the companies’ choice of auditors. It also joined a class-action
lawsuit against Volkswagen for its emission scandal, and has taken a strong stance in
pulling out of companies that divest in fossil fuels Eneva of Brazil and Korea Electric Power.

The wealth fund’s activist streak is likely due to the fact that its investments are topics of
heavy political debate. Some politicians, NGOs and others increasingly say moral concerns
should outweigh others, and even profits. While others, such as Progress (a populist, anti-
immigrant party), has long wanted more oil cash to be invested at home.

The design of the wealth fund is rather unique and ingenious. Its independence is not
constitutionally guaranteed, but it is protected as a separate unit within the central bank,
overseen by the finance ministry and monitored by parliament. It is run frugally and
transparently; every investment it makes is detailed online unlike most other sovereign
wealth funds which are secretive about their asset allocation. Many accredit the success of
this structure to the high level of government trust that has allowed the fund to save and
invest the nation’s money on its behalf.
Switzerland
A landlocked, mountainous country, Switzerland's geographical position in central Europe
and studied neutrality have given it the access and political stability to become one of the
world's wealthiest countries.

It joined the United Nations only in 2002. Surrounded by the European Union, it has
vacillated between seeking closer engagement with its powerful neighbour and other
international organisations, and preferring a more isolationist course.

The people are given a direct say in their own affairs under Switzerland's system of direct
democracy, which has no parallel in any other country. They are invited to the polls several
times a year to vote in national or regional referendums and people's initiatives.

Direct democracy
There are three instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland, all types of referendum:
mandatory, popular initiative and optional. A vote must be held on any amendment to the
constitution resulting in a mandatory referendum. A double majority, meaning the consent of
a majority of the people and of the cantons (i.e. constituencies) is required to amend the
country’s constitution.

Citizens can launch a popular initiative to demand a change to the constitution. Any Swiss
citizen who is eligible to vote can sign a popular initiative and a group of at least seven
citizens can launch their own. Before a vote is held on a popular initiative, the initiative
committee must collect 100,000 valid signatures in favour of the proposal within a period of
18 months. Two hundred popular initiatives have been voted on since its inception, but only
22 have been accepted. Examples of popular initiatives include: everyone in the country a
basic income in 2016, rejected by 76.9% of voters; six weeks of holiday a year for workers
(also rejected); and a particularly close referendum in 2002, started by the right-wing Swiss
People’s Party– less than 50.1% of voters rejected proposals to curb the number of asylum
seekers entering the country.

While parliament passes new legislation and amendments to existing legislation, citizens can
also call for a referendum on new laws and against certain international treaties. This right to
request an optional referendum is an important element in Swiss direct democracy.
For such a referendum to be held, either eight cantons must request it (this is a cantonal
referendum) or 50,000 signatures from eligible voters must be collected within 100 days. The
new law comes into force if a majority of those voting say yes (a simple majority). If the
majority vote no, the current law continues to apply. This type of referendum was introduced
in 1874. Since then, 180 optional referendums have been held, 78 of which have been
unsuccessful.

This structure has mixed success. Roughly 65% of Swiss citizens report being satisfied with
their government. Furthermore, Swiss voter turnout in 2015 amounted to just 48.4% of the
eligible electorate (still higher than some European countries though).

Diplomatic neutrality
Switzerland has for centuries been a neutral state, which means that it cannot take part in
armed conflict unless it is attacked. Its forces can only be used for self-defence and internal
security.

The idea of making neutrality the overriding principle in a state’s foreign policy was not a
new concept, nor was its recognition from foreign powers a novel idea. The significance of
the success of Swiss diplomacy was its consistency and its ability to get great powers to re-
endorse Swiss neutrality in a settlement that lasted for decades. This settlement was called
the Act of Perpetual Swiss Neutrality and Inviolability signed in 1815, and Great Britain,
Russia, Austria, and Prussia recognised that, “The neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland
and its independence from all foreign influences are in the true interests of the policy of the
whole of Europe.” This recognition has granted Switzerland a significant role in international
politics, conflict mediation, and humanitarian aid.

Consequences of this position have allowed Switzerland to set up diplomatic “good offices”
that are meant to investigate, mediate, negotiate, and reach judicial decisions on conflicts.
Switzerland currently represents the following countries though its good offices: Iran in
Egypt, the US in Iran, Russia in Georgia, and Georgia in Russia. Switzerland is also able to
use its internationally-recognized neutral status to help resolve conflicts by facilitating peace
agreements (e.g Turkey and Armenia, Israel and the Gaza Strip, Russia and Georgia). It
also helps resolve domestic conflicts. In the past seven years, Switzerland has been
involved with 15 peace negotiations, many of them internal disputes or violent conflicts in
other nations (e.g. Sudan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Nepal).

Switzerland is also home to the Red Cross was created in 1862, which has grown to become
a hugely impactful organisation with a unique legal status. It operates under the four Geneva
Conventions which concerns: 1) the protection for the wounded and sick of armed conflict on
land, 2) the protection and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of armed conflict at
sea, 3) the treatment of prisoners of war, 4) the protection of civilians in time of war. All four
conventions have been ratified by all UN member states, and they name the Red Cross as
the controlling authority. The significance of this cannot be understated: the idea that an
institution that is intimately tied to the foreign policy of a nation– Switzerland– has formed the
main basis of modern international humanitarian law! (I recommend that you read the
Geneva Conventions; they are highly specific about codifying conduct in war.)

The Red Cross also has certain legal powers that allow it to engage states directly and use
confidential negotiations to lobby for access to prisoners of war and improvement in their
treatment. No international or national tribunal/court can legally compel the Red Cross to
disclose information about any country if it threatens their ability to provide aid. Its findings
are not available to the general public but are shared only with the relevant government.
Examples of this apply in Guantamano Bay and Nazi Germany. This is in contrast to related
organizations like Doctors Without Borders and Amnesty International who are more willing
to expose abuses and apply public pressure to governments.

Criticisms of Switzerland’s neutrality position come when revealing the country’s complicity
in aiding war criminals (e.g. giving political sanctuary to disarmed soldiers) or facilitating
crimes against humanity. The World Jewish Congress revealed Switzerland served as a
repository for Jewish capital smuggled out of Nazi Germany and the states threatened by it,
and also for vast quantities of gold and other valuables plundered from Jews and others all
over Europe. For example, it would encourage the transfer of Jewish assets by guaranteeing
the anonymity of depositors but reject many Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust. Swiss
banks (including the Swiss National Bank) also bought gold from Nazi Germany that they
had stolen from Jews through concentration camps and programs.

International tax evasion and financial services

Swiss banks have enjoyed a reputation for quality, reliability and watertight discretion. They
act as infamous tax havens, one of the world’s largest offshore financial centres, and one of
the world’s biggest secrecy jurisdictions. According to the Swiss Bankers’ Association banks
in Switzerland hold USD$6.5 trillion in assets under management, of which 48% originated
from abroad. This makes Switzerland the world leader in global cross-border asset
management with a 25% share of that market

The success of Swiss banks can be accredited to three things: 1) Switzerland’s infamous
tradition of banking secrecy and lenient tax laws; 2) its political stability, underpinned by
neutrality and its powerful system of direct democracy; and 3) a ‘financial consensus’
strongly rooted in Swiss society which has generally protected the offshore financial services
centre against major political challenges.

Firstly, under Swiss law, banks cannot reveal information about an account (or even its
existence) without the depositors explicit consent. The only exception is if a government
agency is able to justify that the depositor is involved in criminal activities (e.g. financial
crimes). Knowing that secrecy is a big draw, Swiss banks have been very consistent about
their discretion, even holding up under pressure from activist groups and governments to
reveal details about accounts made by Nazi members during WW2. They were more blatant
about this vow towards secrecy, even making it a big part of overseas marketing campaigns,
but have been reigned in due to more recent pressure domestically and internationally. In
response to the global financial crisis of 2008, Swiss banks caved to pressure from the US
and the EU to reveal financial secrets of wealthy account holders. Switzerland is also a
signatory to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, commonly known as FATCA, which
obligates Swiss banks to reveal information about U.S. account holders or face penalties.
The country signed a similar agreement with the European Union, effectively ending privacy
for EU Swiss bank account holders. In spite of these radical changes, Switzerland maintains
the top position on the Financial Secrecy Index in 2018.

The country also has lenient tax laws. For wealthy individuals who seek only banking
services, they can pay a low, lump-sum option on the money they bank inside the country,
and the government considers their taxes paid. For foreigners living in Switzerland, the
government bases the amount of tax they owe on only five times their monthly rent. As for
corporations, the government reduces the amount of taxes a corporation owes on profit
based on the number of shares it owns and cantons levy no taxes on holding corporations.
As such, shell corporations often set up operations in Switzerland to take advantage of low
or no taxation. These simplified and low tax codes make Switzerland a popular tax haven for
foreign wealth. Some estimate banks hold upwards of USD$2.5 trillion in foreign deposits.
Notorious depositors include foreign dictators, despots, criminal mafia bosses, etc.

Secondly, Switzerland is considered a very safe investment as its banks are rarely at risk of
defaulting. Foreign policies of neutrality and high economic cooperation mean that
Switzerland’s economy is relatively stable and immune to conflict-related shocks (e.g. trade
wars, tariffs etc.) Furthermore, Swiss law requires that banks have high capital requirements
and strong depositor protection, which practically ensures that any deposits will be safe from
financial crisis.

Thirdly, banking is worth around 10% of Switzerland’s GDP (twice that of most European
states). With financial services deeply rooted in the Swiss economy, banks have become
very powerful in limiting government criticism or oversight. The Swiss government also takes
step to protect overseas operation (though this is slowly changing with growing international
backlash).

Former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia)

For most of the 20th century, there existed a country in south-eastern Europe called
Yugoslavia, which now exists as six different countries: Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Slovenia, and one self-declared independent country: Kosovo.

Due to economic underdevelopment and conflict, countries in former Yugoslavia have been
suffering from modernising their economies but have shown promising growth.

Yugoslav Wars
In 1918, at the end of WW1, Yugoslavia was created from Serbia, Montenegro, and what
used to be territories of the Austrian-Hungarian empire. It was originally called the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but was later renamed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In WW2, Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis Powers which installed puppet governments,
effectively ending the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the Allied victory in 1945, Yugoslavia
was re-established as a socialist federation of six states: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia. Throughout its existence, there had
been underlying ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia but under the rule of its first president, Josip
Broz Tito, nationalistic tensions were kept largely under control (sometimes with force), and
there was a large emphasis placed on unity and brotherhood between the six republics. The
death of Tito in 1980 is seen as the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. Its economy took a
turn for the worst with uncontrolled hyperinflation, and the rise of ethnic tensions and
nationalist movements. All of these factors along with the fall of Communism throughout
Europe would lead to the Yugoslav Wars, and, eventually, the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The ruling party in Yugoslavia was the League of Communists with 8 members: the six
states as well as the two autonomous regions of Serbia– Kosovo and Vojvodina. In 1986,
Slobodan Milosevic became the head of the Serbian branch. Milosevic and his supporters
were uncomfortable with the autonomous provinces of Serbia as Belgrade had little control
over the politics over these parts of the country. Milosevic’s supporters threw large protests
known as the ‘Rallies of Truth’ which managed to overthrow the leaders of Kosovo,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and replace them with allies of Milosevic. With this, Serbia had
effectively created a voting bloc which controlled four out of the eight votes in the League of
Communists. Other members, especially Slovenia, openly criticized these actions.

In 1990, there was a heated debate about the future of Yugoslavia. Slovenia called for more
autonomy for the individual republics while Serbia wanted more unity and centralisation. The
League was dissolved and multi-party elections took place in all six republics. Croatia voted
in the Croatian Democratic Union party and its leader Franjo Tudman, and it slowly moved
towards declaring independence from the federation. Though Croatia is made up of mostly
ethnic Croats, there is a large Serb minority especially along the border of Croatia-Bosnia.
For many Serbs in Croatia, the prospect of independence was worrying since it revoked
memories of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), which was governed by the
super-nationalist, super-fascist group Ustase, which allied with Nazi Germany. During this
time, Croats took part in the Holocaust, committing genocide with ethnic Serbs. In a Serb-
majority cities, violence broke out as Serbs demanded for reunification and conflict erupted
between police forces and demonstrators.

In 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia officially declared independence. By this time, the
Yugoslav Wars had already begun but were mostly confined to the Serbs and Croats in
Croatia. However, with their declaration of independence, Slovenia was met with
Yugoslavian military forces. What followed was the Ten-Day War between Slovenia and
Yugoslavia. Though Yugoslavia withdrew their army eventually, they were preparing for a
massive attack against Slovenia with tanks, airforce, and artillery. However, Serbia’s
authorisation was required, but Serbian representatives refused on the basis that Slovenia
had very few Serbian minorities and was almost entirely made up of ethnic Slovenes.
Croatia, on the other hand, was a different story. Milosevic stated that he would be willing to
“defend every inch of Croatia”. Serbian rebel forces had already taken control of over a
dozen towns and villages, and fighting was breaking out in other regions.

In the midst of growing violence in Croatia, failed peace talks between all six republics (i.e.
the Carrington deal), Macedonia held an independence referendum that was passed with an
overwhelming majority. Macedonia was the only republic to break away from Yugoslavia
completely peacefully. Meanwhile in Croatia, the Yugoslavian armies laid siege on villages
and towns. At this point, Serbs held 1/3 of Croatian lands.

Though a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Croats and the Serbs in January
1992, we should note that the Yugoslav Wars was not just between these two. In fact, the
bloodiest conflict in Bosnia, which was the most multicultural of all the republics. Bosnia was
composed of 40% ethnic Bosniaks, many of which were Muslims, 30% Serbs, and 15%
Croats. In February, an independence referendum declared Bosnia’s independence with a
99.7% majority (most Croats and Bosniaks voted in favour of independence while Serbs
boycotted the vote). Violence broke out in multi-ethnic cities as a result.

In April 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially came to an end as a new
constitution was adopted that proclaimed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of
Serbia and Montenegro. Bosnian Serbs began to take control of many Serbian-majority
areas in Bosnia as well as many Muslim towns near the Serbian border. The capital was
under siege for nearly 4 years. At the beginning, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were unified
against a common enemy, but later on, Bosnian Croats began attempting to take control of
Croat-majority areas in Bosnia with the goal of joining Croatia. Like Serbs, Croat forces
didn’t just take control of Croat-majority towns.

Foreign forces failed to facilitate peace and safety in these areas. For example, areas such
as Srebrenica and Gorazde became UN safe zones for Bosniak Muslims who fled from their
homes, but they would be in danger of reprisal attacks by Bosnian Serbs. The international
community retaliated with an airstrike of a Bosnian Serb command post, which prompted
Bosnian Serbs to take 150 UN personnel hostage. Srebrenica was forcibly taken in what
came to be known as the Srebrenica Massacre where thousands of civilians were killed.
More attacks against civilian areas triggered an all-out NATO airstrike campaign against
Bosnian Serb forces.

Milosevic cut off all support to the Bosnian Serbs, demanding that they allow him to
negotiate a peace deal on their behalf. At the same time, Croatian forces were planning to
retake their land from Serbian control and launched two large scale assaults. The vast
majority of Serbs fled the country, even Serbs that had lived in Croatia for centuries. Villages
were burnt to the ground to ensure Serbs would never return.

The Dayton Agreement eventually ended the Yugoslav Wars. However, the treaties were not
the end of the violence. In the late 90s, war broke out in Kosovo as Albanians sought their
independence. Backed by NATO, Albanians took effective control of Kosovo and the war
ended in 1999, eventually leading to Kosovo’s independence in 2008. In the year 2000, after
the overthrow of Milosevic, the union between Montenegro and Serbia dissolved.

War crimes
The war in the former Yugoslavia has involved widespread violations of human rights and
humanitarian law, including mass killings and murder, systematic rape, torture, and other
crimes against humanity.

The term "ethnic cleansing" has entered the world's vocabulary to describe the horrifying
range of human rights abuses from forcible expulsion to murder committed in parts of the
former Yugoslavia in order to achieve "ethnic purity”. All parties to the present conflict in the
Balkans have committed human rights violations, but the great majority have been
perpetrated by Serb forces.

Some of the worst incidents include the following:

● In the fall of 1991, Serb forces shelled the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, an
action without military justification.
● Throughout the course of the conflict, Sarajevo and other cities have been subjected
to indiscriminate shelling. Scores of civilians have been killed or wounded by snipers
and cluster and napalm bombs used by Bosnian Serb forces. Six of these cities were
designated safe areas by the United Nations in May 1993. This did not stop the
shelling.
● Beginning in the spring of 1992, entire enclaves, ranging in size from towns such as
Prijedor, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Jajce, to hamlets such as Foca and Cerska, were
"cleansed" of their Muslim and Croat residents in a Bosnian Serb attempt to "purify"
lands they controlled.
● In November 1991, Krajina Serbs took several hundred wounded Croatian soldiers
from a hospital in the eastern Slavonian town of Vukovar, shot them in a field, and
buried them in a mass grave. Serb authorities continue to deny international forensic
teams access to the site.
● In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs set up a gulag of prison camps and detention facilities
holding tens of thousands of Muslims and Croats. During the summer of 1992,
 international investigators were denied access to detainees, but those who escaped
described repeated atrocities.
● During the summer of 1995 Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa,
committing gross violations of human rights as they proceeded. As many as 6,000
male Muslim detainees were shot and buried in mass graves. The entire Muslim
population of more than 42,000 people was "cleansed" from the region.
● Evidence is mounting that human rights abuses were committed against Serb
civilians in Croatia in mid-1995, when the Croatian military retook Serb-occupied
western Slavonia and the Krajina region.

In August 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a Special Rapporteur to

conduct on-site investigations into human rights violations and report on his findings. The
Special Rapporteur maintains human rights monitors in Sarajevo, Mostar, Skopje, and
Zagreb and has submitted a series of reports on violations throughout the former
Yugoslavia. The result was an impartial international investigation to identify persons
responsible for human rights abuses and to discourage more ethnic-based violence. The
‘Commission of Experts’ have documented thousands of crimes. As a response to the
widespread atrocities, the UN established a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
The tribunal subsumed the Commission of Experts and took over the task of amassing data
on abuses. The war crimes tribunal has issued indictments against 46 persons (42 Bosnian
Serbs, one Bosnian Croat, and three Serbs), including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Proceedings have begun against the first
defendant, a Bosnian Serb official accused of committing atrocities at a prison camp.

Neither Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, nor any other indicted war criminal has been
permitted to participate in the Dayton proximity peace talks or in any other international
peace negotiations. The United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose
amnesty for indicted war criminals. As warrants are issued, nations will be obliged to arrest
indictees in their jurisdictions.

Historical uncertainty
Throughout the post war era, though Tito denounced nationalist sentiments in
historiography, those trends continued with Croat and Serbian academics at times accusing
each other of misrepresenting each other's histories, especially in relation to the Croat-Nazi
alliance.

Communist historiography was challenged in the 1980s and a rehabilitation of Serbian

nationalism by Serbian historians began. Historians and other members of the intelligentsia
belonging to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) and the Writers Association
played a significant role in the explanation of the new historical narrative. The process of
writing a "new Serbian history" paralleled alongside the emerging ethno-nationalist
mobilisation of Serbs with the objective of reorganising the Yugoslav federation. Using ideas
and concepts from Holocaust historiography, Serbian historians alongside church leaders
applied it to WW2 Yugoslavia and equated the Serbs with Jews and Croats with Nazi
Germans.

Serbian Chetniks along with the Croatian Ustasa were vilified by Tito era historiography
within Yugoslavia. However, under Milosevic, Serbian historians looked to vindicate Chetnik
history by portraying Chetniks as righteous freedom fighters battling the Nazis while
removing from history books the ambiguous alliances with the Italians and Germans.
Whereas the crimes committed by Chetniks against Croats and Muslims in Serbian
historiography are overall "cloaked in silence". During the Milosevic era, Serbian history was
falsified to obscure the role Serbian collaborators Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić played in
cleansing Serbia's Jewish community, killing them in the country or deporting them to
Eastern European concentration camps.

Kosovo
Kosovo, Europe's newest country, was formed in 2008. It is peaceful today, but the path to
its creation lay in one of Europe's most brutal sectarian conflicts. The country is still divided
along ethnic lines. 90% of its people are Albanian speakers and mostly Muslim. About 10%
are ethnic Serbs, who are Orthodox Christians and live mostly in the north.
During the medieval period, Kosovo became the center of a Serbian Empire and saw the
construction of many important Serb religious sites, including many architecturally significant
Serbian Orthodox monasteries. Because of this, many considered Serbs considered Kosovo
to be a sort-of Jerusalem: the cultural heart of Serbia.
After WW2, Kosovo's present-day boundaries were established when Kosovo became an
autonomous province of Serbia in former Yugoslavia. Despite legislative concessions,
Albanian nationalism increased in the 1980s, which led to riots and calls for Kosovo's
independence. The Serbs instituted a new constitution in 1989 revoking Kosovo's
autonomous status as a form of retaliation. Kosovo's Albanian leaders responded in 1991 by
organizing a referendum declaring Kosovo independent and Serbia undertook repressive
measures against the Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s, provoking a Kosovar Albanian
insurgency.
Beginning in 1998, Serbia conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in
massacres and massive expulsions of ethnic Albanians (some 800,000 ethnic Albanians
were forced from their homes in Kosovo). After international attempts to mediate the conflict
failed, a three-month NATO military operation against Serbia beginning in March 1999
forced the Serbs to agree to withdraw their military and police forces from Kosovo. UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) placed Kosovo under a transitional administration,
the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), pending a determination of
Kosovo's future status.
A UN-led process began in late 2005 to determine Kosovo's final status. The 2006-07
negotiations ended without agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, though the UN issued
a comprehensive report on Kosovo's final status that endorsed independence. On 17
February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo independent. Since then, over 100
countries have recognized Kosovo, and it has joined numerous international organizations.
In October 2008, Serbia sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) on the legality under international law of Kosovo's declaration of independence. The
ICJ released the advisory opinion in July 2010 affirming that Kosovo's declaration of
independence did not violate general principles of international law, UN Security Council
Resolution 1244, or the Constitutive Framework. The opinion was closely tailored to
Kosovo's unique history and circumstances.
Demonstrating Kosovo’s development into a sovereign, multi-ethnic, democratic country the
international community ended the period of Supervised Independence in 2012. Kosovo held
its most recent national and municipal elections in 2017. Serbia continues to reject Kosovo's
independence, but the two countries agreed in April 2013 to normalize their relations through
EU-facilitated talks, which produced several subsequent agreements the parties are
engaged in implementing, though they have not yet reached a comprehensive normalization
of relations. Kosovo seeks full integration into the international community, and has pursued
bilateral recognitions and memberships in international organizations. Kosovo signed a
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2015, and was named by a 2018 EU
report as one of six Western Balkan countries that will be able to join the organization once it
meets the criteria to accede. Kosovo also seeks membership in the UN and in NATO.

Ukraine
Ukraine gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and has since
veered between seeking closer integration with Western Europe and being drawn into the
orbit of Russia, which sees its interests as threatened by a Western-leaning Ukraine.

Europe's second largest country, Ukraine is a land of wide, fertile agricultural plains, with
large pockets of heavy industry in the east.

While Ukraine and Russia share common historical origins, the west of the country has
closer ties with its European neighbours, particularly Poland, and nationalist sentiment is
strongest there.

A significant minority of the population uses Russian as its first language, particularly in the
cities and the industrialised east.

An uprising against pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 ushered in a Western-

leaning government, but Russia used the opportunity to seize the Crimean peninsula and
arm insurgent groups to occupy parts of the industrialised east of Ukraine.

Crimea annexation
The Crimean Peninsula was annexed by Russia in February–March 2014 and since then
has been administered as two Russian federal subjects: the Republic of Crimea and the
federal city of Sevastopol. The annexation from Ukraine followed a Russian military
intervention in Crimea that took place in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and
was part of wider unrest across southern and eastern Ukraine.

On 22–23 February 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin convened an all-night meeting
with security service chiefs to discuss the extrication of the deposed Ukrainian president,
Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych was facing large-scale protests that were taking place in
Ukraine’s capital, Kiev. The movement (‘Euromaidan’) opposed Yanukovych’s delays in
entering a pro-EU agreement that would have allowed Ukraine to receive conditional loans in
exchange for instituting liberalising reforms. Yanukovych, despite running on a pro-EU
platform, seemed hesitant to follow through. When he fled from Kiev to Russia, parliament
relieved him of his position with a 380-to-0 vote.

At Putin’s meeting, he remarked that "we must start working on returning Crimea to Russia".
On 23 February, pro-Russian demonstrations were held in the Crimean city of Sevastopol.
Four days days later, masked Russian troops without insignia took over the Supreme
Council (parliament) of Crimea and captured strategic sites across peninsula, which led to
the installation of the pro-Russian Aksyonov government in Crimea, the conducting of the
Crimean status referendum and the declaration of Crimea's independence on 16 March
2014. Russian troops were stationed at the Crimean border, and violent border skirmishes
broke out during the crisis. On the 18 March 2014, Russia formally incorporated Crimea as
two federal subjects of the Russian Federation.

Putin’s defence was that the annexation of Crimea was to defend the peninsula’s large
Russian-speaking population. Though that may sound like an empty justification to some,
Crimea has actually had a very long history and popular sentiment of separatism from
Ukraine. Crimea was part of the USSR in the 1990s, and after it reunified with Ukraine, a
local government poll in 1994 showed that huge majority wanted higher political autonomy
and have the right to dual Russo-Ukranian citizenship. Local Crimean politicians have often
butted heads with the Kiev administration, which several times denied requests for Crimean
citizenship, independent monetary and defence policies, or for taxes to be collected in
Simferopol (Crimea’s port city) instead of Kiev. In 1997, the leaders of the Russian
community in Crimea held a press conference to oppose a government policy that would
reduce Russian language rights. The previous Fall, the Ukrainian president gave instructions
to the government and heads of local administrations to intensify control over the putting into
effect of the language policy, to draft a new edition of the law on language, to work out
privileges for the publication and circulation of materials in Ukrainian and to issue licenses
only to those TV companies which broadcast mostly in Ukrainian. From these examples, it’s
not hard to see why many local Crimean people would support Russia’s annexation.

It is also very highly likely that the annexation undertaken as a punitive measure for the
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Russia accused Ukraine of syphoning off gas from pipelines
that were meant to be exported to EU countries. Crimea is also of territorial importance as it
contains some of the only warm deepwater ports in the Black Sea, most notably the Port of
Sevastopol which is close to many Russian naval bases.

International organisations and states heavily condemned the annexation. The UN General
Assembly also rejected the vote and annexation, adopting a non-binding resolution affirming
the "territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders”. The G8
suspended the membership of Russia. Countries in the EU and the US have done four
rounds of economic sanctions on Russian imports. By mid 2016, Russia had lost an
estimated USD$170 billion due to financial sanctions, with another $400 billion in lost
revenues from oil and gas from the fall in oil prices. The Russian ruble has roughly halved its
exchange value against the US dollar since 2014. However, Putin’s popularity polls soared
to 87% immediately after the crisis (though they have fallen significantly to 47% due to
economic stagnation).

Political climate
The Ukraine has been described as a “hybrid regime”– there traits of a democratic state (e.g.
a politically elected legislative parliament, a judiciary, direct elections) but also of an
autocratic one (e.g. corruption, silencing free press, political intimidation, voter fraud). Critics
also describe Ukraine’s political system as “over-centralised”, born out a Soviet legacy and
fear of separatism.
Relations with Russia and protests in Kiev
Ukraine has had many widespread protests from the start of the 2000s. Two particular
examples are the Orange Revolution from 2004-2005, and Euromaidan from 2013-2014.
Both demonstrations were held in Kiev and opposed perceived corruption or political
manipulation in the Ukranian government. The Orange Revolution was relatively peaceful–
thousands of demonstrators staged non-violent sit-ins and strikes because they believed the
2004 preisdential elections between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych were rigged
to favour the latter. With an international observer, a second election was held and
Yushchenko about 52% of the vote while Yanukovych only secured 44%. The Orange
Revolution ended when the pro-EU Yushchenko came into office.

In 2010, Yanukovych succeeded Yushchenko but was ousted in 2014 by the violent
Euromaidan protests. Protests were sparked by the Ukrainian government's decision to
suspend the signing of an association agreement with the EU, instead choosing closer ties
to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. There were protests and clashes with police
throughout Ukraine, especially at the Maidan (central square) in Kiev, which was occupied
and barricaded by protesters, along with some administrative buildings. Protestors burned
tires, furniture, and debris while the police regularly attacked protest camps with water
canons, stuns grenades, and rubber bullets. Violence quickly escalated. Journalists
confirmed that live ammunition was being used against protestors. In total, more than 100
people were killed and 2,500 injured in clashes with security forces.

Ukraine was divided over the Euromaidan protests. Western and Central Ukrainians showed
clear support for them, while Southern and Eastern Ukrainians supported government
decisions to align more closely with Russia. Both in response to Euromaidan as well as the
annexation of Crimea, pro-Russian separatism grew in the Eastern and Southern regions,
gradually escalating into an armed insurgency. To maintain control over southeastern
territories Ukraine's government started "antiterrorist operation" (ATO) sending armed forces
to suppress separatists from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkov, Odessa, Novorossiya, and
Crimea. Many of the rebels were supported by Russia-affiliated arms and soldiers, leading
countries in the EU and the US to characterise these movements as an orchestrated military
campaign.

Social media and fake news

Many commentators have pointed out that the careful use of media campaigns and fake
news helped fuel many insurgencies. Russian television networks are watched by many
Russian-speaking Ukranians, and news stories often feature persecution of the Russian
minorities in Ukraine. NPR covered some of the stories being spread: a Russian toddler
killed by Ukranian soldiers, Ukranian celebrities with Nazi sympathies, and a new language
law that will ban the use of Russian in Ukraine. These stories have been verified to be untrue
(see: anti-propaganda campaign StopFake), but combined with proliferation of such
disinformation using social media and broadcasting, language minorities in Ukraine often
feared their rights and physical safety and welcomed Russian troops to protect them.
Turkey
Straddling the continents of Europe and Asia, Turkey's strategically important location has
given it major influence in the region - and control over the entrance to the Black Sea.

Progress towards democracy and a market economy has been halting, especially with
Erdogan becoming president in 2014. Though joining the EU has been a longstanding
ambition and membership talks were launched in 2005, they stalled over serious misgivings
about Turkey's human rights record.

Kurds make up about a fifth of the population. Kurdish separatists who accuse the Turkish
state of seeking to destroy their cultural identity have been waging a guerrilla war since the
1980s.

2016 coup d’etat and the state of emergency

In 2016, there was a military coup against President Erdogan. It was attempted a faction
within the Turkish military called the Peace At Home Council who sought to “reinstate
constitutional order, human rights and freedom”. Their name is a reference to a quote by
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the military officer who established the secular Turkish state from
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Since its founding in 1923, the military has arguably
perceived itself at the defender of Ataturk’s philosophy of Kemalism and has intervened in
1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 when it believed Turkey’s political order to be threatened.
However, the 2016 coup did not have the full support of military leaders, one of the reasons
it failed.

Erdogan blamed the coup of Gulen-ists, followers of Sunni cleric Fetullah Gulen who
currently resides in the US. Once an ally to Erdogan, Gulen’s media outlets have accused
the president of corruption and, in response, Erdogan seized all of Gulen’s media assets and
labelled his sizeable political party as “terrorists”. This has led some, including Gule, to
believe that Erdogan staged the coup himself as a means of consolidating power in the
midst of his increasing unpopularity. Since his presidency in 2014, Erdogan has pushed for
constitutional changes that grant more executive powers, cracked down on protests, and has
also prosecuted dissenting academics and journalists. He has also been criticised for
pushing Islamic education into public schools and for allowing Turkey’s border with Syria to
become porous during its civil war.

The EU and the US had official stances that neither supported nor condemned Turkey’s
coup. This is most likely because Turkey had become vital in the war against ISIS– as the
entry point of Syrian refugees into the EU, Turkey’s cooperation was integral to
counterterrorism efforts. The US also used Turkey-stationed air bases to launch air strikes in
Syria.

After thousands of military personnel were arrested, Erdogan announced a state of

emergency. The two-year state of emergency lapsed in 2018, but Erdogan replaced it with
sweeping counterterrorism legislation. They include widening already broad powers of
appointed provincial governors to restrict assemblies and movement; executive authority for
three years to dismiss public officials, including judges, by administrative decision; and
increased police powers including custody periods extendable for up to 12 days.

Terrorism charges continue to be widely used against political opponents, journalists, and
human rights activists. As of June, almost one-fifth (48,924) of the total prison population
(246,426) had been charged with or convicted of terrorism offences, according to the
Ministry of Justice. Of the 48,924, 34,241 were held for alleged Gulenist (FETÖ) links, and
10,286 for alleged links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and 1,270 for
alleged links to the extremist Islamic State (ISIS) group. Many terrorism trials in Turkey lack
compelling evidence of criminal activity or acts that would reasonably be deemed terrorism,
and the practice of holding individuals charged with terrorism offenses in prolonged pretrial
detention raised concerns its use has become a form of summary punishment. Turkey
remains the world leader in jailing journalists.

Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)

The Kurds are a people that belonged in former Kurdistan. They have a long history of being
an independent state with their own language and culture. However, they were absorbed
into the Ottoman Empire and after the end of WW1, Kurdistan was split between modern-
day Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Kurdish communities in those four countries have differing
levels of rights. In Iraq, they form an autonomous region with its own military, but in Iran,
Syria, and Turkey, they have fallen victim to genocides and persecution.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK is a Kurdish far-left militant and political organization
based in Turkey and Iraq. Since 1984, the PKK has been involved in an armed conflict with
the Turkish state (with a two-year cease-fire during 2013–2015), with the initial aim of
achieving an independent Kurdish state, later changing it to a demand for equal rights and
Kurdish autonomy in Turkey.
The group was founded in 1978 by a group of Kurdish students led by Abdullah Öcalan. The
PKK's ideology was originally a fusion of revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism,
seeking the foundation of an independent Communist state in the region. The initial reasons
given by the PKK for this were the oppression of Kurds by the Turkish state and by
capitalism. By then, the use of Kurdish language, dress, folklore, and names were banned in
Kurdish-inhabited areas. The words "Kurds", "Kurdistan", or "Kurdish" were officially banned
by the Turkish government temporarily. Following the military coup of 1980, the Kurdish
language was officially prohibited in public and private life. Many who spoke, published, or
sang in Kurdish were arrested and imprisoned. The PKK was then formed, as part of a
growing discontent over the suppression of Turkey's ethnic Kurds, in an effort to establish
linguistic, cultural, and political rights for Turkey's ethnic Kurdish minority.
Since the PKK's foundation, it has been involved in armed clashes with Turkish security
forces. The full-scale insurgency, however, did not begin until 15 August 1984, when the
PKK announced a Kurdish uprising. Since the conflict began, more than 40,000 have died,
most of whom were Turkish Kurdish civilians. In 2013, the PKK declared a ceasefire
agreement and began slowly withdrawing its fighters to the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq
as part of the solution process between the Turkish state and the Kurdish minority. In July
2015, the PKK announced that a ceasefire was over and said that Ankara had welched on
its promises regarding the Kurdish issue. Since then, there have been sparks of insurgency,
exacerbated by the influence of ISIS– and President Erdogan has cracked down on Turkish
Kurds using terrorism as pretext. The European Court of Human Rights and many other
international human rights organizations have condemned Turkey for mass human rights
abuses. Many judgments are related to systematic executions of Kurdish civilians, torturing,
forced displacement, destroyed villages, arbitrary arrests, murdered and disappeared
Kurdish journalists, activists and politicians

The group has moved on from an independent state to calling for more Kurdish autonomy
and civil rights. In May 2007, former members of the PKK helped form the Kurdistan
Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organisation of Kurds from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and
Syria. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by several states and organizations,
including NATO, the US, the UK, Japan, and the EU. However, the UN and countries such
as China, Switzerland, India, Russia, and Egypt have not designated the PKK as terrorists.

Russia
Russia, the largest country on earth, emerged from a decade of post-Soviet economic and
political turmoil to seek to reassert itself as a world power.

Income from vast natural resources, above all oil and gas, have helped Russia overcome the
economic collapse of 1998, but the oil price slump of 2014 ended the long run of prosperity.
The state-run gas monopoly Gazprom still supplies a large share of Europe's needs.

Vladimir Putin - Russia's dominant political figure since 2000, has enhanced his control over
state institutions and the media, a process supplemented more recently by an emphasis on
fierce nationalism and hostility to the West.

Cultural legacy and history

To understand the political structure and narratives prevalent in modern Russia, it is
important to first understand its historical memory and how it has been manipulated for
specific ends. Strategic narratives are not only a means for Russia to shape its international
image for geopolitical purposes, but also to shape and consolidate power domestically.
Common themes that are used feature Russia versus the West. It is not just a remnant from
the Cold War; instead, Russia has long had a history for inducing anxiety in Western Europe.
The fact that Russians both feel and have been made to feel like they are outsiders to a
wider Euro-centric world order impacts the efficacy of, say, sanctions on Russia.

Strong Russian state

The idea of a ‘strong mother Russia’ is actually relatively new. The first president, Boris
Yeltsin, inherited the ashes of the Soviet Union. He contrasted post-Soviet Russia, which
was striving for European-style democracy and a free market economy, to the ‘old’,
‘totalitarian’ ways of the USSR or the ‘autocratic’ Romanov empire. This marked a radical
transition of Russia’s ruling elite towards an era that rejected Soviet principles. In particular,
Yeltsin and his administration placed particular emphasis on the Great Patriotic War, when
the Russians fought the Nazis along the Eastern front. The victory over Nazism was framed
as a triumph of the people rather than as the result of the Communist state. This gave a new
inflection to an important historical event: the victory of Soviet forces was greater not
because it was the result of Stalinist repressions, but because it happened in spite of it. This
allowed for partial rehabilitation of familiar symbols while still distancing the country from
Communism.

Putin took a radically different approach to nation-building. For example, he established the
three-colour Russian flag that appealed to the Romanov empire and also created a new
national anthem that was based on the old melody of the Soviet anthem. Explaining this, he
said that he wished to abandon the logic that focused on the “dark sides of the history of our
country”. There was a strong desire to commemorate Russia’s cultural, scientific, and
military achievements, but Putin argued that a strong Russian state was the basis of past
and future greatness of Russia: “maintaining the state as an extensive geographical space,
keeping a unique community of peoples united, and at the same time, the powerful position
of the country in the world were the great historical deeds of the Russian people (2003)”.

In his 2005 presidential address, Putin made the strong statement that the collapse of the
USSR was the “largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. He faulted “bad politicians”
but celebrated the legacy of a “great” and powerful state that could overcome difficulties, to
succeed in modernising (though imperfectly), and become a world player in international
politics. This brand of nationalism helped Putin quell dissent. He attributed protest to his re-
election in 2012 to an “apparent deficit in spiritual values such as charity, empathy,
compassion, support, and mutual assistance”. The solution would be a state narrative that
would inspire respect for Russia’s continuous “one thousand year history”. By framing
totalitarianism as part of a natural and historical legacy, Putin was able to attribute all of
Russia’s greatest successes to state power and all of its failings to individual deficiencies.

The West
Russian narratives of the international system serves as a public deliberation on Russia’s
role in the world and as a means to exert persuasive force in international relations. It’s more
than merely pursuing material interests but also a core component of the Russian state itself
—shaping its own self-conception and setting expectations on Russia’s role in the world and
how it should be recognised. There are three core components to Russia’s strategic
narratives: 1) a demand to be recognised as a Great Power, 2) recognising the failure to
include Russia in the post-Cold War European order, and 3) supporting multipolarity.

Firstly, central to understanding Russia’s narrative of the international system is the role of
great powers working in concert, an elite group of states reinforcing a hierarchy to which
Russia claims membership. In official Kremlin documents there are references to Russia
being “one of the world’s major countries, with a centuries-old history and rich cultural
traditions” (National Security Concept, 2000) and that “the Russian Federation has a real
potential for ensuring itself a worthy place in the world” (Foreign Policy Concept, 2000). This
claim to ‘superpower’ membership is likely due to the lingering resentment of Russia’s ruling
elite from being excluded from contemporary geopolitical canon. Contemporary canon
typically sees things like economic freedom, Western liberal democracy, and law as a
universal ‘norm’ or ‘ideal’. It was largely formed after WW2 as there was a large emphasis
against fascism or human rights abuses, but also as a strategic propaganda campaign to
alienate Soviet Russia.

Secondly, Russia has repeatedly pointed to how institutions such as the EU or NATO has
failed to consult it in any regional decisions (e.g. growing EU/NATO membership). This
exclusion of Russia from meaningful security decisions has supported scepticism whether
cooperation between Western powers and Russia is possible. It also contradicts many of the
EU’s own narratives around a common European identity since the EU and NATO reinforce
a clearly divided security architecture. This is an impactful thing to note this frustration allows
Putin to justify taking assertive action as a first resort (e.g. the annexation of Crimea). On the
converse, it also justifies the use of harsh sanctions rather than seeking negotiation or
conciliation.

Thirdly, it is really interesting to note that Russia has not supported a hierarchy in which
Russia is at the top or even part of a bipolar power dynamic (e.g. the Cold War). Instead, the
Foreign Policy Concept supports “a multipolar system of international relations that really
reflects the diversity of the modem world with its great variety of interests”. Putin himself
delivered a speech at the 2014 Valdai International Forum that warned against unipolar
domination. He spoke of the end of Western hegemony, marked by emerging countries in
the Asia-Pacific that were gaining prominence. This rallying cry of a more egalitarian world
order is probably why Russia isn’t perceived to be an antagonist or a threat in Asia, Africa, or
South America.

All these three core concepts combine to have some intriguing consequences. Russia’s
actions reflect a common dilemma in international affairs: whether to be driven by a realistic
response to emerging events, or to strive for what you perceive to be correct. Russia’s
foreign policy has been remarkably consistent at achieving the latter. Despite the fact that
Russia’s actual material circumstances (e.g. its economy, military, cultural influence) has
declined significantly relative to other states, it has successfully projected itself as an
influential global power. This illusion of prestige is arguably not tied to Russia’s material
status, but its historical legacy as a global player and its fundamental right to assert itself.
That’s why economic sanctions and political condemnations have done very little to actually
affect how seriously policy analysts take Russia. Consequently, it’s treated as if it was a
large power. How successful this strategy will be in the long term is up for debate.

Religion post-Communism
Putin is unique in how strongly he has supported the revival of Russian Orthodox Christianity
after the long Soviet departure. In press releases, the Kremlin has stated that “the
restoration of unity in the Church is an essential prerequisite for the restoration of the lost
unity of the entire Russian world, a world in which the Orthodox faith has always acted as a
spiritual foundation”.

During the Soviet era, there was a government effort to suppress religious life. Russian
Orthodoxy had, since then, been strongly associated with the Tsar and the aristocracy.
Therefore the undermining of religious sentiment was a Bolshevik tennant. Nearly all of the
clergy, and many of its believers, were shot or sent to labour camps. More than 85,000
Orthodox priests were shot in 1937 alone. Religious schools were shut down and church
publications were prohibited. This lead to a fear of persecution, even though anti-religious
campaigns died down by the time Stalin had died.

Putin has crafted an image of himself as a religious protector, winning the hearts of many
Christians. Putin regularly attends the most important services of the Russian Orthodox
Church on the main Orthodox Christian holidays. He has also established a good
relationship with Patriarchs of the Russian Church. This devotion to religion serves as the
ideological backdrop upon which many political decisions are justified. Same-sex marriage is
an encroachment on Orthodoxy and are part of Western decadence. Even foreign policy
decisions are justified using religion: Putin has stated that interventions in Syria and Crimea
were to protect Christian minorities.

His approach to other religions in Russia such as Islam, Buddhism, and Eastern Orthodoxy
has been liberal, and he has attempted to unify them under the authority of the state. This
comes as no surprise since the diversity and the geographical concentration of certain
religious communities (e.g. Chechnya) have necessitated a tolerant religious policy to
maintain stability and reduce secessionist movements.

Politics
Like with all political climates, this section will not only focus on what kind of political culture
Russia has, but also what circumstances necessitate it or have given rise to it. This will allow
us to better understand what impact (if any) certain policies can have.

Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin

It is hard to underestimate just how influential Putin is to the current political structure of
Russia. The US and the UK have figureheads that are symbolically important but the
implementation of their policies is much more decentralised over large interest groups. This
isn’t the case for Russia where Putin has consolidated much of the Kremlin’s power.

Putin was born in 1952 and lived during the height of the Soviet Union. He spent much of his
young life as a mid-level agent in the KGB until he resigned in 1992 to work for St
Petersburg’s first democratically-elected mayor, Sobchak. During this time, the USSR saw
its demise and was fractured into 15 new countries including the new Russian Federation.
Putin would later describe this event as the “biggest geopolitical catastrophe in history”. The
government was forced to sell off 45,000 nationalised businesses and it lost 2 million square
miles of territory in which Putin’s “co-patriots” resided. The economy of Russia was in a
tailspin. Important sectors in mining, energy, and media were privatised– becoming an
oligarchy owned by a handful of corrupt business leaders.

Though Yeltsin, the president at the time, de-escalated tensions with the US, he was wildly
unpopular domestically. People felt betrayed by his cooperation with the West and his
mismanagement of the economy, which had allowed inequality to skyrocket. In his time in St
Petersburg, Putin started to create a socio-political network. Allegations say that he allowed
crime organisations to create monopolies, that he collaborated with them to regulate
gambling, that he preferentially assigned government contracts and licenses, and embezzled
city funds to give to allies in the private sector. Soon, Putin had amassed a strong support
structure of politicians, crime bosses, oligarchs, and Russian security officers.

In 1999, Putin was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin. Quite suddenly, Yeltsin stepped
down as president. Many believe this was due to the escalating violence in Chechnya, a
region that had informally seceded from Russia in the mid-90s. Chechan terrorists were
pushing into Russian territory and launching attacks in major cities (including Moscow). Over
300 people were killed in a series of bombings. It was during this chaos that Putin became
the acting president. He regularly made appearances on national television condemning
Chechan separatists and stating that he would avenge Russia. His approval ratings spiked
from just 4% to 45%. Putin launched a devastating war on Chechnya, and the entire city of
Grozny was levelled to the ground by bombs. Over 80,000 people died, but within a year,
Putin succeeded in bringing Chechnya back under Russian control.

Putin won the election in 2000 and began shaping modern-day Russia. Though patronage
and corruption were still part of his main political toolkit, he became more assertive with
demanding support. Oligarchs who challenged Putin’s authority were quickly arrested under
criminal charges (e.g. Mikhail Khordovsky was once Russia’s richest man and a Kremlin
critic, but he was imprisoned under charges of embezzling oil). Those who were complicit
with Putin’s administration were rewarded, those who didn’t faced arrest and even
assassination. This includes the infamous case of Alexander Litvinenko, a former
intelligence officer, who wrote books about how Russian secret services conducted the 1999
terrorist bombings in order to bring Putin to power.

The Russian constitution disallows individuals to serve as president for more than two
consecutive terms, but it doesn’t set a limit on the total number of terms someone can serve.
In the interim period between his presidencies, Putin appointed Mendelev (a hand-picked
successor). But in 2012, he comes back into power by winning the election by a
preposterous margin (62%).

From the start of his political career, he’s shown a mastery over the spread of information.
All major media outlets are either state-owned or run by oligarchs loyal to Putin. Stories that
are critical of Putin are censored, and the media depiction of Putin supports a patriotic,
strongman narrative. He created a nationalist and more conservative national identity that
people rallied behind. It stoked nostalgia for the height of Russian global influence and the
revival of traditionalist values in religion and human rights. This ideological backdrops
allowed him to advance a very aggressive foreign policy that sought to restore former Soviet
borders. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and succeeded in taking small regions. And in
2014, Russia annexed Crimea.

Putin’s foreign policy also includes sophisticated interference in other parts of the world.
Russian hackers have been responsible for several devastating data leaks in the Pentagon,
and a social media campaign that supported the rise of right-wing leaders in Western
Europe. Putin also maintains a network of Russian-proxy states such as the Assad regime in
Syria by supplying them with arms.

Vladmir Putin’s vision for Russia is one of the most ambitious and ingeniously executed in
history. That is not to say that it doesn’t show cracks. Though the Kremlin is mostly
controlled by Putin, many of Russia’s periphery regions are very unstable. Arguably one of
the reasons why Putin’s Kremlin has failed to crack down on anti-gay purges in Chechnya is
because of the local power of Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Republic.

Human and civil rights

Again, like with understanding political structures, it is important to understand why human
rights are protected in certain conditions and why they aren’t in others. Some theories posit
that Russia’s notoriously bad human rights record is part of a larger strategy for Putin to
maintain control rather than a reflection of his personal beliefs: crackdowns on gay
populations are allowed to appease conservative religious authorities; the suppression of
free press is orchestrated to maintain Putin’s prestige; and political opposition is stifled to
main his control over policies.

LGBTQ+ community and feminism

Since 2017, there has been a systemic anti-gay purge in Chechnya, during which local
police tortured dozens of men presumed to be gay and forced others into concentration
camps. This led to a scramble for human rights activists and organisations to help sexual
minorities fleeing persecution without state support. Other than superficial investigations, the
Kremlin has not taken measures to stop this.

In other parts of Russia, continued to enforce the discriminatory “gay propaganda” law. In
May 2018, authorities ordered the blocking of ParniPlus, a website that raises awareness
about the HIV epidemic among gay men. These examples of negligence or active
participation in homophobia are probably due to the fact that many regions in Russia are
largely conservative and practice very orthodox branches of Christianity and Islam. In order
to continue being popular and winning the support of various religious churches/authorities,
Putin has been inactive in protecting LGBT rights.

Feminism has also eroded since the decline of the Soviet Union where women were
encouraged to take active roles in the workforce. In February 2018, a court in Yekaterinburg
ruled a 40-year-old woman unfit to foster two children with disabilities, claiming that because
she allegedly projected a “style of male behavior,” she violated Russian family legislation, as
well as Russian society’s “traditions and mentality.” The previous year, first offences for
domestic violence were decriminalised, making it harder for women to seek help, especially
since Russia does not provide protection orders for victims.

The media has characterised several feminist and LGBTQ+ movements as radical and as a
threat to Russian traditional values. For example, when Pussy Riot, a feminist punk rock
group band, staged a protest performance at an orthodox cathedral, many media outlets
described it in similar tones: that the women were vulgar and were being disrespectful to the
sanctity of the church.

Political opposition
The stifling of political opposition didn’t start with just Putin. Stalin’s administration were
ruthless in silencing political dissent– critics of the Soviet regime were physically intimidated
with the threat of kidnappings, arrests, and torture. During Putin’s era of power, there’s been
a revival of KGB-type strategy in intimidating political opponents (e.g. the repeated arrests of
political opponent Alexei Navalny).

Police also arbitrarily detain thousands of protesters in several nationwide peaceful

demonstrations. Courts routinely sentence protesters to fines and short-term arrests for
violating restrictive regulations on demonstrations. Authorities also pressure universities,
schools, and parents to discourage students from participating in protests. For example,
police detained at least 1,600 people, including 158 children, in 27 cities during peaceful
protests against Putin’s inauguration in 2018.
Authorities also conduct large-scale smear campaigns against independent NGOs such as
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. The prosecutor general banned four more
foreign organizations from Russia as “undesirable.”

Media and journalism

As of 2013 Russia ranked 148th out of 179 countries in the Press Freedom Index compiled
by Reporters Without Borders. The Russian constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press; however, government application of law, bureaucratic regulation, and politically
motivated criminal investigations have forced the press to exercise self-censorship
constraining its coverage of certain controversial issues, resulting in very little media
freedom.

Journalists report being harassed, physically threatened, violently assaulted, or even in

some cases, murdered. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, since 1992, 50
journalists have been murdered for their professional activity in Russia (which made it the
third deadliest country for journalists in the 1992–2006 period): 30 journalists from 1993 to
2000, and 20 journalists since 2000.

Economy
Russia has an upper-middle income mixed and transition economy with state ownership in
strategic areas of the economy. Market reforms in the 1990s privatized much of Russian
industry and agriculture, with notable exceptions to this privatization occurring in the energy
and defense-related sectors.

Russia's vast geography is an important determinant of its economic activity, with some
sources estimating that Russia contains over 30% of the world's natural resources. The
World Bank estimates the total value of Russia's natural resources at $75 trillion US dollars.
Russia relies on energy revenues to drive most of its growth. Russia also has a large and
sophisticated arms industry, capable of designing and manufacturing high-tech military
equipment, including a fifth-generation fighter jet, nuclear powered submarines, firearms,
and short range/long range ballistic missiles.

The economic development of the country has been uneven geographically with the Moscow
region contributing a very large share of the country's GDP. There has been a substantial
rise in wealth inequality in Russia since 1990 (far more than China and other Eastern
European countries).

Natural gas and oil

The petroleum industry in Russia is one of the largest in the world. Russia has the largest
reserves and is the largest exporter of natural gas. It has the second largest coal reserves,
the eighth largest oil reserves. However, Russia has recently been overtaken by the US and
is now only the third largest oil producer in the world due to American advances in fracking.
The global fall in oil prices means that Russia’s heavy dependence on its petroleum industry
has slowed economic growth. GDP growth was around +5% in 2012 before the crash in oil
prices, reached a low in 2013 at -3%, and since only recovered to +0.5%. This is especially
worrying since state-owned oil producers such as Gazprom have failed to expand their
production to capture more of the market, and OPEC has failed to fix high oil prices in
response to increasing American oil supplies.
Many analysts have drawn connections between Russia’s foreign policy and the
performance of its oil market. When Vladimir Putin came to power, the price of oil was $25 a
barrel. At that time, Russia allied itself with the US and did not object to NATO’s enlargement
that took place in the Baltic States. Seven years later, when the oil price was at $105 a
barrel, Russia invaded Georgia, and its relationship with America deteriorated dramatically.
However, this is not to say that low oil prices necessarily mean a less assertive Russia.
Since the decline of oil prices, Putin has attempted to maintain domestic popularity with
patriotic euphoria in the form of annexing Crimea. This has had mixed success: immediately
after the annexation in 2o14, Putin’s approval ratings jumped to 85.9% (a six-year high). In
January 2019, it has since decreased to 33.4% (according to the polls, 67% of people
believe that Putin is complicit in high-level corruption, and only 14% of people believe the
economy is improving).

Beyond providing wealth, Russia’s hydrocarbon industries also give it significant leverage in
Europe. For years, Western European countries have worried about their access to gas,
almost two-fifths of which is supplied by Russian pipes. These fears have not receded since
2014 when Russia cut off gas to Ukraine, the main country through which gas arrives in EU
countries. Three times since 2006, rows with Russia stopped gas flowing through Ukrainian
pipelines, leaving customers down deprived of gas for heating and energy. Though many EU
leaders are attempting to find alternatives (e.g. from Iran or Turkmenistan), all have
struggled to establish the expensive infrastructure of building new pipelines while still paying
competitive prices. European politicians fear that reliance on Russian energy would reduce
the EU’s capacity to combat the country’s interference in territorial disputes or rigging
elections. For example, Merkel was under huge criticism for approving Nord Stream 2 (NS2),
a planned pipeline that would carry more Russian gas under the Baltic Sea directly to
Germany. On December 122018, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for
the project to be cancelled, citing security reasons, but with 370km of pipes already laid it
looks hard to stop.

State ownership
Despite waves of privatisation after the fall of the Soviet Union, state-owned enterprises still
play a large role in the Russian economy. They have increased already sizable share in the
economy in the past five years despite calls from Putin for increased competition. A report
published by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service found that state companies make up close
to or more than half of each of the four major sectors in the Russian economy: energy,
transport, mining and finance. Old-and-gas giants Gazprom PJSC and Rosneft PJSC alone
contribute as much as 14% to GDP. State-run banks control around 65% of the banking
system.

Many of these companies are on a spectrum of state ownership. They are either completely
nationalised, partially state-owned through the government having a large chunk of publicly
traded shares, and/or run by individuals who have held public office.

The IMF has gives slightly more moderate estimates of the relative size of state-owned
enterprise st around 33% of the economy. However they noted that the share would
increase to more than 50% if quasi-state companies are included.
Many have criticised the state’s role in the economy, pointing towards the high level of
nepotism and mismanagement in crucial industries. Reports warn that Putin’s strategy of
patronage has stalled productivity, innovation, and the growth of small- and medium-sized
businesses.

Foreign intervention
Russia’s foreign policy has in recent years become more assertive than it had been in the
first two decades since independence. The Kremlin surprised many with its 2008 war in
Georgia, its 2014 seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, and its 2015
deployment of forces in the Syrian civil war. Underpinning this greater assertiveness is a
growing consensus among Russian analysts, scholars, and officials that Russia should play
a larger role in the world, one where Moscow is free to act according to its own interests
without being beholden to others and where no issue of global significance can be resolved
without Russian participation. The viability of Russia’s assertive approach, however,
depends on many factors, not least the health of the Russian economy. The CSIS Russia
and Eurasia Program engages in research and analysis regarding all aspects of Russia’s
foreign policy.

Western democracies and populism

From old interviews with spies who defected to the US after the Cold War, we know that only
around 15% of the KGB’s resources was spent on formal espionage. The rest of the KGB’s
time, money, and manpower was spent on a strategy known as ‘ideological subversion’
(otherwise known as ‘active measures’). Yuri Bezmenov, ex-Russian spy, described the goal
as such: “To change the perception of reality of every American to such an extent that
despite the abundance of information, no one is able to come to sensible conclusions in the
interest of defending themselves, their families, their communities, and their country.”

When the KGB dissolved, Russia’s disinformation apparatus remained firmly intact. In 2005,
Putin’s administration established an English-speaking Russian news network called ‘Russia
Today’ (RT News). Cliff Kincaid, the director of Accuracy in Media's Center for Investigative
Journalism, called RT "the well-known disinformation outlet for Russian propaganda".
Though most of their coverage is accurate, this accuracy allows them to interweave fake
stories with little resistance.

Though the US is no stranger in using propaganda to interfere with democratic elections,

Russia’s disinformation apparatus is far bigger and far more sophisticated. For the fake
news story to be effective, Russia targets it at pre-existing socio-economic fractures in
society and make bold lies that have a kernel of truth. They relied on their fake news stories
being picked up by morons who would push it into their target audience, and eventually over
time, the accumulation of fake news would have a major political impact.

This was accelerated with the widespread adoption of social media and the Internet. Russian
hackers backed Jill Stein, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump in the 2016 US elections,
spreading stories that would proliferate any polarisation in the voter base. They published
stories on a variety of fake news outlets, exploited social media algorithms that trap
individuals in echo chambers, and set up fake social media accounts to share stories. The
most infamous example to come out of 2016 was probably Clinton’s campaign manager’s
leaked emails. Russian hackers, while making up wild stories about what the emails
contained, dumped the emails onto Wikileaks and made sure that their fake news stories
contained some kernel of truth. The story about Clinton running a child sex ring in the
basement of a pizza parlour was picked up by pundits like Alex Jones.

It’s not only the US’ news networks Russia is tampering with. Reports have shown Russian
links to orchestrating Brexit, Italy’s recent elections, etc. However, it would be a
mischaracterisation to say that Russian hackers only support alt-right populists. Instead,
reports have shown their involvement in spreading stories that would advantage populists on
both sides of the political spectrum.

Proxy war in the Middle East

To understand Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, we’ll look at a broad overview of the
conflicts it’s been involved in as well as some of the common strategies the Kremlin has
taken. The main baseline of Putin’s foreign policy in the region has been a balancing act.
Russia fights alongside the West in combatting jihadist powers due to internal terrorist
threats that it experiences in Chechnya, while still posing a challenge to Western influence in
the region.

One such conflict is the proxy war between the region’s most influential powers: Saudi
Arabia and Iran. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Saudi Arabia and Iran
established themselves as wealthy countries with vast deposits of oil. However, the prior
was far more stable and had an amorous relationship with the US. Iran, on the other hand,
had a revolution against the Western-backed, secular leader, Reza Shah, in 1979. The
revolution was the accumulation of negative sentiments towards the Shah’s aggressive
reforms that bred prosperity but also corruption and a subversion of Iran’s history of political
Islam. Iran’s new leader was Ayatollah Khomeini who posed a threat to much of the region’s
stability as he funded Shia militias that were revolting against their Sunni governments.
Khomeini criticised the Western puppet dictatorships in the Middle East and supported Iran
as the world’s true Islamic state. This was arguably the beginning of tumultuous Iran-Saudi
relationships. The two would continuously engage in proxy wars across the region, funding
Shia or Sunni militias in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and other Gulf States. All of these proxy
conflicts heavily involve Russia and the US as well. Post-revolution Iran has aligned itself
closely with the Russian government, which supported its rhetoric of anti-Western
neocolonialism, while Saudi Arabia has aligned with the US. Both regional powers get aid
(e.g. logistical support, funding, arms) to fight this proxy conflict.

Another conflict that has defined modern Russian involvement in the Middle East has been
Syria. Relations between Damascus and Moscow date back to 1945 when Russia installed a
Soviet naval base and used Syria as a vital warm water port. Since the beginning of the
Syrian Civil War, Putin has used this opportunity to upgrade its military presence there and
support its pro-Russian government, the Assad regime. Since 2015, Russia has launched
extensive airstrikes against ISIS and rebels that hope to overthrow Assad.

Putin has taken advantage of the growing resentment against US intervention post-9/11. In
the early days following 9/11, Russia publicly offered its support to the US for the military
operations in Afghanistan, while it also gave the US access to military bases in Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan in order to conduct their aerial attacks against the Taliban. However, in the
summer and fall of 2002 Russia openly confronted the US over its Iraq policies. Russia not
only opposed any discussion regarding the prospect of regime change in Iraq in various
international venues, including inside the UN, but also provided political support to Saddam
Hussein before and during the Iraq war of 2003. During the Obama administration, the US
was fatigued with intervention in the Middle East and pivoted to the Asia-Pacific. This led to
uncertainty regarding American foreign policy in the Middle East. To take advantage of this
power vacuum, since its intervention in Syria, Moscow has signed investment, energy and
arms deals with states throughout the region. Senior Russian dignitaries, including Putin,
have increased the tempo of their personal engagements with Middle Eastern leaders.

The Trump administration has since attempted to reclaim the ‘losses’ made in the Middle
East by re-strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

Former Soviet satellite states (i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia)
A satellite state is a country that is formally independent, but under heavy political, economic
and military influence or control from another country. Together with the USSR, these
satellite states formed the Russian sphere of influence. The history of relationship between
Russia and these Eastern European countries helps to understand the reactions of the
Eastern European countries to the remnants of Soviet culture, namely hatred and longing for
eradication.

Russia’s sphere of influence was typically established using methods of economic cronyism
as well as heavy-handed political maneuvering. Due to WW2, many Russian troops
occupied various parts in Europe and could oversee elections. The end result was that many
elections were rigged in favour of minority Communist parties using tactics of rigging
elections, intimidating voters, and arresting political opponents. Albania, Bulgaria, and East
Germany immediately saw the election of Communist parties when the war ended in 1945.

In the 1947 Polish parliamentary elections, many right-wing parties were banned under the
pretext that they were pro-Nazi. The only legal opposition to the communist Polish Workers’
Party (PPR) were the Polish People’s Party (PSL). The PPR began a ruthless campaign to
snuff out the PSL and all other potential opposition using electoral laws to remove 409,326
people from the electoral rolls. Over 80,000 members of the PSL were arrested under
various false charges in the month preceding the election and around 100 of them were
murdered by the Polish Secret Police.

The only country in Eastern Europe that wasn’t hardline Stalinist was Yugoslavia led by
Josip Broz Tito. Though Tito was a Communist, he disagreed that Moscow should be the
supreme Communist authority– the Yugoslavs did not implement policies such as joint-stock
companies nor did they consult Stalin when deploying troops to Albania to stop the spread of
Greece’s civil conflict. This disloyalty led to Yugoslavia being expelled from Cominform, the
Soviet intelligence sharing network that suppressed political dissent. One of the reasons that
Yugoslavia was able to openly challenge Russia was that it had a large number of Western
troops stationed in its borders. This was part of the ‘Percentages agreement’ that Churchill
and Stalin secretly negotiated in Yalta. Churchill conceded many Eastern European
countries to Soviet influence in exchange for Russian military power in WW2. These
percentages (which changed with increasing Russian aggression) are detailed below:
Another method of ensuring loyalty to Moscow, Russia also supplied huge amounts of aid,
eventually to the detriment of its own economy. In 1947, many “socialist-leaning” countries
were part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which functioned as
a free-trade zone where members were all command economies. COMECON was Russia’s
answer to the Marshall Plan, a generous US aid package that accelerated development in
war-torn parts of Europe.

Moscow prospered from highly industrialized sectors in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
as part of the communist bloc; the prior relocated entire industries to the USSR to pay off
reparations. However, this wealth did not last long as the COMECON suffered many of the
inefficiencies that command economies typically have. With few exceptions, foreign trade in
the COMECON countries was a state monopoly, and the state agencies and captive trading
companies were often corrupt. Even at best, this tended to put several barriers between a
producer and any foreign customer, limiting the ability to learn and adjust to foreign
customers' needs. Furthermore, there was often strong political pressure to keep the best
products for domestic use in each country. From the early 1950s to COMECON’s demise in
the early 1990s, intra-COMECON trade, except for Soviet petroleum, was in steady decline.

NATO forces
A significant motivation behind the Soviet sphere of influence was to create a buffer zone
between Russia and Western states, to protect it from any potential hostility. It’s clear to see
why Russia may perceive NATO enlargement as a threat to its security.

When the U.S., Canada and 10 western European nations came together in 1949 to form
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they had a clear goal. “Keep the Soviet Union out, the
Americans in, and the Germans down,” said Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO’s first
Secretary General. The military alliance was intended to rebuild Europe from the rubble of
World War II and to act as a deterrence against Soviet aggression. Perhaps the most
important clause in NATO’s treaty is Article 5, which considers an attack on one of its
members as an attack on all of its members. Therefore, any attempt to invade any country
along the ‘Iron Curtain’ (i.e. countries straddling the Western and Soviet sphere of influence)
would trigger an all-out war. The establishment of NATO prompted the creation of the
Warsaw Pact, a collective defence treaty of a nearly identical nature amongst the communist
bloc.

NATO played a huge role during the Cold War. One particular example is the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962 when the US stationed Jupiter Ballistic Missiles in Turkey (a NATO member),
thus putting Russia in-range for a nuclear attack. This led to Russia attempting to erect
similar missiles in Cuba, leading to a naval blockade and a series of close-call exchanges.
Similar events have occured since then: e.g. when George W. Bush administration’s planned
to deploy ballistic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic as a counter to Iranian
missiles, creating huge protest in the Kremlin.

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, 13 countries have joined
NATO; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004), Albania and Croatia (2009), and
Montenegro (2017). But the collapse of the Soviet Union also made NATO’s purpose less
clear. In fact, in 1990, as the Cold War drew to a close, President Mikhail Gorbachev
proposed the Soviet Union join NATO. In 1991, Boris Yeltsin even echoed this sentiment,
calling NATO membership a “long-term aim” of Russia. This led many analysts to question
what exactly the role of NATO was in light of changing circumstances.

However, this period of uncertainty was short-lived. The accession of Vladimir Putin has
seen a revival of anti-Western sentiment in the Kremlin. His actions made clear that Russia
saw NATO as an adversary. In April 2008, NATO promised membership to Georgia and
Ukraine at the Bucharest summit, but a membership plan was not offered. In August 2008,
Russia launched a five day invasion of Georgia on the pretext of defending the breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And in 2014, he sent Russian troops to annex
Crimea from Ukraine. Putin addressed the Russian Parliament shortly after the Crimea
annexation and said that Russia was humiliated by NATO’s expansion eastward after the fall
of Communism. The Russian president has repeatedly warned NATO against forging closer
ties with Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO’s response to Putin’s expansion in Eastern Europe has been lacklustre. Its response
to Russia annexing Crimea amounted to unaminous non-recognition and economic
sanctions. However, NATO members have shown some strategic unity in countering the
Russian threat. Since 2014, the alliance has said “readiness” has been at the top of its
agenda, which has led to security reinforcements of some 4,000 additional troops on its
eastern flank. This is undermined by Trump’s administration to pull out of NATO (note this
corresponds to 51.1% of NATO’s defence expenditure).

Transition post-Communism (inc. lustration policies, populism)

The collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union led to upheaval and transition in the
region of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the
bordering countries declared independence and began the process of integration into the
European community. Moldavia changed its name to Moldova. The countries of
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia each broke into multiple countries. Czechoslovakia
peacefully agreed to separate into two states: the Czech Republic and the Republic of
Slovakia. Yugoslavia was not so fortunate (see: Yugoslav Wars).

Governments that had been controlled by Communist dictators or authoritarian leaderships

before 1991 were opened up to democratic processes with public elections. The power of
the state was transferred from the Communist elite to the private citizen. People could vote
for their public officials and could choose businesses and work individually.
With the fall of Communism came economic reforms that shifted countries from central
planning to open markets. The open markets invited private capitalism and western
corporate businesses. The now-independent countries of Eastern Europe shifted their
economic direction away from Moscow and the collapsing Communist state and toward the
core industrial countries of Western Europe and the EU.

However, many experienced challenges in democratising and developing. For example,

upon declaring independence from Russia, Bulgaria held multiparty elections but
experienced issues with corruption. Romania’s Communist dictatorship lasted all the way up
until 1989. It’s not surprising that many countries (e.g. Ukraine, Poland, Germany etc.)
undertook lustration policies where government institutions were systematically purged of all
individuals that were affiliated with the previous Communist regime. This had mixed results.
It rebuilt public trust in government institutions and aided in post-regime narrative building.
But the scale of such purges meant that a wide range of civil servants were expelled,
throwing the country into a long period of instability, political revenge and human rights
violations (e.g. in the Ukraine).

Economic development has also been difficult. The years lost due to Soviet rule means that
many Eastern European countries suffer from obsolete infrastructure and economies that
are rife with cronyism and inefficiencies. Despite efforts to transition away from mining,
tourism, and agriculture, countries such as Bulgaria to develop beyond primary/secondary
sectors. It is also unclear whether EU membership has helped alleviate or exacerbate issues
with underdevelopment and unemployment (see: European Union).

Relations with Russia have also been mixed. Countries like Ukraine still heavily depend on
Russia for natural gas and oil, and have economies that are deeply integrated with that of
Russia’s.

Populism has also seen a recent rise in Eastern Europe, which have typically held onto
traditional values surrounding religion and communitarianism. All four so-called Visegrád
countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) are governed by populist parties
including Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary – where populist parties secured 63% of the vote
in this year’s elections – and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice in Poland. Both these
parties have shown culturally conservative and authoritarian tendencies, attacking the
independent courts (and stacking the judiciary) and denouncing the free press. These
populist parties in former Soviet republics exploit their country’s lack of national identity after
the Cold War. Populists have successfully grappled with anxiety surrounding the EU, the
recent migrant crisis, and a legacy of being sceptical of authority/establishment figures.
Electorates seem split between hedging closer to the EU and perceiving the pro-Russian
government as corrupt, or vice versa.