State Power and the Regulation of Islam in Jordan

Author(s): QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ

Source: Journal of Church and State , AUTUMN 1999, Vol. 41, No. 4 (AUTUMN 1999), pp.
677-696
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23920400

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 State Power and the Regulation of
Islam in Jordan
QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ

Throughout the Middle East, both political movements and gov

ernments struggle to control Islamic discourse and practice. Like other
religions, Islam can be interpreted in a variety of ways, leading to a
process Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori term "Muslim politics"—
"the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols
and the control of the institutions, both formal and informal, that pro
duce and sustain them."1 While numerous studies elucidate Islamic
movement dynamics in Muslim politics, few detail the state's role in
the struggle to define Islam. This article addresses this lacuna by ex
amining the role of the Jordanian state in the regulation of Islam.
The Jordanian state is actively involved in "Muslim politics" be
cause the regime relies upon Islam to some extent for political legiti
macy. It has a vested interest in determining which interpretations of
Islam prevail in contests over religious discourse. Understandings that
contradict or challenge state policy or legitimacy are prevented from
mobilizing through central Islamic institutions in society. As a result,
the state utilizes the administrative apparatus to exclude particular Is
lamic voices from public Islamic space. In particular, the state care
fully regulates access to the mosque, the most important site of Islamic
practice and ritual, to prevent the production, articulation, and dissem
ination of alternative religious perspectives that could undermine re
gime interests. This article argues that the patterns of administrative
practice in the regulation of Islam are designed to produce a de
politicized and unthreatening interpretation of Islam that reifies state
power.

• QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ (B.A., Cornell University; Ph.D., American University) is

assistant professor of political science at Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Penn
sylvania. Special interests include Islamic movements, social movement theory, and state
society relations. Fieldwork for this study was conducted from 1996 to 1997 with the gener
ous support of the Jordanian-American Binational Fulb right Commission and the American
Center for Oriental Research. Researchers and personnel at the Center for Strategic Stud
ies at the University of Jordan in Amman provided invaluable assistance. The author would
like to thank Diane Singerman for her tireless comments on various renditions of this article.

1. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1996), 5.

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678 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE
Islamic Legitimacy and State Power

Throughout the Middle East, regimes have been afflicted by a

sis of legitimacy." As a result, they have experimented with a var
legitimating ideologies, including socialism, nationalism, pan-Ara
and especially Islam,2 which every regime in the region has u
justify its right to rule. While skeptics often argue that this recou
religion is a superficial façade—a veneer of religiosity intended t
imate secular policies or authoritarian rule—it underscores the
tance of Islamic appearances for governance. Charles Tripp a
that Islam has been mobilized by states in the Middle East pr
for two reasons, both linked to legitimation:
First, Islamic themes and symbols have been used to shore up patrimonial
itarian systems of rule, supposedly lending them a coloration that augmen
authority among predominantly Muslim members of the associated societ
ond, Islam, variously interpreted, has been used by these regimes to give
tive character to the identity of the state in order to correspond to the not
the state represents and speaks for a distinct ethical community.3
This instrumental use of Islam has been especially pervasive du
the modern period. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, th
dle East suffered from various forms of colonization by Western
ers. As a result, leaders in the movements for independence
Islam to assert a unique Arab culture and to mobilize commu
under a common framework of identity.4 Following independ
lam was incorporated into the process of state development t
legitimacy for the new regimes and policies. In other countr
afflicted by colonialism, such as Saudi Arabia, regimes succe
used ijtihad (independent reasoning), selected legal opinions, a
trative discretion, and sovereign prerogatives to successfully a
lam to the demands of modernization and economic developm
Many countries in the Middle East experimented with socialis

2. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, Co
University Press, 1977).
3. Charles Tripp, "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East," in
Fundamentalisms, eds. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 66.
4. See Jamil Abdun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious
the Moroccan Nationalist Movement," Middle Eastern Affairs (St. Antony's P
(1963): 90-105; Leon Carl Brown, "The Islamic Reformist Movement in North Afr
Journal of Modern African Studies 2 (1964): 55-63; Mohamed El Mansour, "Sal
Modernists in the Moroccan Nationalist Movement," in Islamism and Secularism i
Africa, ed. John Reudy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 53-71; and A
Hermassi, "The Political and Religious in the Modern History of the Maghrib," in
and Secularism in North Africa, ed. John Reudy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 199
5. James P. Piscatori, "Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia," in Islam in the Poli
cess, ed. James P. Piscatori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 56-72.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 679

das, and leaders used particular interpretations of Islam to equate the

socialist emphasis on socioeconomic equality with Islamic notions of
justice.6 Jean-Claude Vatin has referred to all these developments as a
kind of "political spirituality" in which "religion is used by the state, and
by the political elite, who tend to rely on the sacred sources (texts and
traditions) in order to obtain the consensus necessary for secular un
dertakings."7 Regardless of whether one believes these different states
or ruling regimes are Islamic, those in power believe it is necessary to
incorporate Islam into legitimation strategies.
In Jordan, the Islamic sources of legitimacy are of particular impor
tance because of the challenge posed by other ideological groups, both
inside and outside the kingdom. Over the years, Arab nationalists, Nas
serists, Ba'thists, communists, Islamists, and Palestinian groups have
challenged the sovereignty of the state and the prerogatives of the rul
ing family. Vulnerability to these challenges is due to the history of
state formation in Jordan. The kingdom, less than a century old, was
carved from British mandate territory following the defeat of the Otto
man Empire in World War I. In exchange for Hashemite support
against the Ottomans, the British gave Abdullah, grandfather of King
Hussein, the Transjordan territory, what is now contemporary Jordan.
At the time of its "creation" as a political entity, Jordan was dominated
by a multitude of independent tribes with little or no loyalty to their
new ruler. The Jordanian state was an artificial entity imposed upon
tribes by an external force, the British, which armed King Abdullah I
with the military capacity to quell tribal independence.8 Hashemite
power was thus initially supported by a British—therefore non-Is
lamic—military and administrative presence. Even after indepen
dence, the British supported the regime through subsidies for political
and economic development. As a result, both national identity and the
legitimacy of the state were weak and susceptible to attacks by ideolog
ical challenges.
The regime's legitimacy, therefore, is to a large extent predicated
upon its historical relationship with Islam. First, the Hasbemites of
Jordan (the ruling family) are from the Qurayshi tribe, the same tribe
as the Prophet Mohammed. King Abdullah II, who ascended the
throne after King Hussein's death in February 1999, is the forty-third

6. See, for example, the argument made by Mahmud Shaltut, the rector of the Islamic
university al-Azhar in Cairo, presented in John J. Donahue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam
in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
7. Jean-Claude Vatin, "Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism: Islam in Modern Alge
ria," in Islam in the Political Process, ed. James P. Piscatori (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), 99.
8. Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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 680 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

generation of direct descent from the Prophet through

the Prophet's grandson, al-Hassan. As a result, the roya
a genealogical link to the messenger of God and de
based upon this relationship. In the Muslim world,
link to the Prophet, who represents the Muslim exemp
stantial weight in creating an aura of religious leg
Hashemite regime.
Second, the Hashemites ruled Mecca from 1201
Abdullah II's great-great-grandfather, Sharif Hussein
and guardian of the two holiest cities in Islam, Me
before the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia regained cont
Finally, the Hashemites' role in protecting al-Aqsa
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, the site of the Pro
night journey and ascension to heaven, links them
third holiest city in Islam.9 Despite the Israeli occupati
since 1967, Jordan has continued to provide financial s
sight for Islamic shrines in the city. In addition, Shari
ied in Jerusalem and King Abdullah I (the curre
grandfather and founder of the kingdom), was sho
Aqsa mosque in 1951, which has given the Hashemi
martyrdom.
The Hashemites consistently draw upon this special relationship
with Islam, especially the Qurayshi and Jerusalem linkages, to perpetu
ate Islamic legitimacy and control. On television and in the print me
dia one can find numerous statements by the late King Hussein in
which he blatantly and direcdy refers to his Islamic heritage and the
role of his family in Islamic history in order to justify his policies, as in
1993 when amending the election law.10 Hussein stated: "I call upon

9. For a discussion of the Prophet's night journey, see Annemarie Schimmel, And Muham
mad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety (Chapel Hill, N.C.:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 159-75. Richard Antoun provides an interest
ing discussion of five different interpretations of the night journey by Muslim preachers in
Jordan. See Richard Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case
Study in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 219
34.

10. In 1993, the king changed the electoral system from block-voting to a one-person one
vote system (see Provisional Law 5 of 1993, Amendment to the Law of Election to the
House of Deputies, Law 22 of 1986). In the previous system, voters were given a block of
votes that could be used for various candidates. They could use all these votes for a single
candidate if they wished, thus amplifying the influence of political groups capable of mobil
izing disciplined voters. This system provided advantages for the Muslim Brotherhood
whose army of loyal cadres were able to effectively utilize the block-voting system to benefit
their own candidates in the 1989 elections. Prior to the 1993 elections, however, the king
implemented the electoral changes. Under the new law, individuals are only given one vote,
thus excluding the possibility of saving votes for single candidates. This change is generally
recognized as an attempt to curb the growing influence of the Islamists in electoral politics

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 681

you all to realize that the Arab Hashemite Hussein, who has been
honored by the Almighty Allah to be a descendent of the Prophet Mo
hammed bin Abdullah, peace be upon him, is above all worldly tides
and positions."11
In another example, during an address to the nation in 1993 in
which the king touched upon die sensitive issue of Jerusalem, he un
hesitatingly reemphasized his own special relationship to the city:
We Hashemites have borne a special historic honor through our distinctive con
nection with Jerusalem. For it is the site where Allah took nis Prophet for a jour
ney by night. And the site is the resting place of Hussein I. The soil of Al Aqsa
Mosque has been moistened by the blood of my martyred grandfather, founder of
the Kingdom Abdullah bin al-Hussein.12
Public statements such as these are common, especially during periods
of unrest in the kingdom or when pockets of resistance emerge. King
Hussein, during his long reign, therefore relied to some extent on his
Islamic sources of legitimacy to stave off attacks from challenges to his
right to rule.
Because of Islam's importance for society and for the royal family's
power, ample attention is given to the regulation and control of religion
in the kingdom. The state has effectively co-opted religious institutions
through the expansion of its apparatus into religious space. Through its
control of religious institutions, the state attempts to monopolize sacred
authority—the right to interpret Islam on behalf of the community.13
By regulating the institutions charged with defining Islam and Islamic
symbols, religious space is closed to opposition elements. Since the
symbolic meaning of Islam is important for regime legitimation, the
state carefully supervises the institutions capable of disseminating this
meaning in a manner that reifies state interests.

Patterns of Regulation

The struggle over Islamic discourse has become central to th

ical scene in the Middle East. As Vatin notes, "Islam is the l

Eower andtoresistance
ave relied toonpower."14
some extent Because regimes
Islam for legitimacy, they areinvulnerable
the Middle East
to charges that they are not really Islamic in practice; and Islamic
movements have used a religious framework to critique incumbent re

and raised criticism from the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups who argued that the
law was undemocratic since it had never been voted on by parliament.
11. International Press Office, Royal Hashemite Court, Selected Speeches by His Majesty
King Hussein, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1988-1994, 2nd ed. (Amman: Interna
tional Press Office, Royal Hashemite Court, 1994), 91.
12. Ibid., 105.
13. Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 46-79.
14. Vatin, "Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism," 98.

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 682 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

gimes. In this manner, Islamic movements critiq

upon the very criteria regimes claim for themse
acted to the new challenge by tightening state co
institutions such as mosques.15 The struggle over
grown more volatile as Islamic movements and state
for hegemony over religious interpretation and sacr
Jordan is not immune to this struggle, and the re
series of measures and strategies to control the inte
Like other states in the Middle East, the Jordania
the independence of religious institutions and ap
support state policies. Islamic institutions are inc
state apparatus to enhance the state's regulative ca
gious discourse. The interpretation of Islam represen
institutions and practices reflects state interests i
meaning and its ability to effectively regulate publi
The remainder of this essay outlines how the stat
imams (prayer leaders), preachers, and the khutba
demonstrate how state administrative control is use
pretation of Islam in public religious space.

The Mosque

The mosque represents a central institution in Muslim societies,

providing a religio-spatial structure for ritual and community interac
tion at once religious, social, cultural, and political. Beginning with the
Prophet's mosque-house in Medina and the founding of the first Mus
lim community, mosques have been involved in all facets of community
life. The call to prayer structures the temporal pace of community ac
tivity, which spatially revolves around the mosque. Through the
mosque, Muslims pray, congregate for the khutba, collect and dis
tribute zakat (religious charity), listen to religious lessons, and receive
fatwas (religious legal rulings). The mosque is involved in life cycle and
social issues, such as marriage, death, and the resolution of local dis
putes, and serves as a center for communication. It has served as a
forum for political discussions and decisions, often fusing religious and

15. For example, see Mohammed Tozy, "Islam and the State," in Polity and Society in
Contemporary North Africa, eds. I. W. Zartman and W. M. Habeeb (Boulder, Colo.: West
view Press, 1993), 117.
16. For a comparison to this process in other countries, see Vatin, "Popular Puritanism
versus State Reformism"; Piscatori, "Ideological Politics in Sa'udi Arabia"; Fouad Ajami, "In
the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt," in Islam in the Political Process,
ed. James P. Piscatori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 12-35; and Robert Bianchi,
Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1989), 179-83.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 683

political symbols to mobilize collectivities. As an institution, the

mosque ties communities together through its various roles in everyday
life.17
The multifunctionality of the mosque, its communal dimensions,
and its centrality in neighborhoods not only serve the needs of the
community, but also create a potential institution for revolutionary ac
tion. Groups disseminate ideology through the khutba, lessons, and
informal interactions and utilize the mosque as a site for recruitment.
In North Africa, nationalist movements used the mosques in the strug
gle for independence, organizing and linking religious symbols to anti
colonial discourse in order to broaden the movement's appeal. In
Egypt, private mosques have served as recruitment grounds for violent
groups, such as Islamic Jihad and the Gamiyya Islamiyya, prompting
the state to tighten its control of mosques throughout the country. In
Algeria, the mosque became an arena for state opposition, providing a
forum for opposition figures and various Islamic groups excluded from
public discourse.
The mosque also provides a social site for the mobilization of col
lective action. Many instances of open defiance and protest originate
at mosques following the Friday sermon. Not only are large numbers
of prospective demonstrators already gathered, but the khutba can be
used to inspire and motivate individuals and groups to participate. In
Amman, the King Hussein mosque nestled downtown in the suq (mar
ketplace) is regularly used as a launching point for protests. In 1996,
demonstrations were organized outside this mosque after the Friday
prayers to protest an IMF structural adjustment package that reduced
subsidies on bread and in response to an uprising in the West Bank.
Mobilization and recruitment at mosques are difficult to regulate be
cause regimes cannot prevent people from praying. In addition, dem
onstrations are often unannounced, ignited once people are already
gathered.18

17. For the social and political role of mosques in communities, see Akbar S. Ahmed,
"Mosque: The Mosque in Politics," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic
World, vol. 3, ed. John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 140-43; Juan
Eduardo Campo, "Mosque: Historical Development," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern Islamic World, vol. 3, ed. John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),
133-35; and Patrick D. Gaffney "Mosque: The Mosque in Society," in The Oxford Encyclo
pedia of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 3, ed. John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 143-47.
18. In instances where demonstrations are announced, regimes typically prohibit them and
take security measures. Even when demonstrations are unannounced but there is potential
because of current events or conditions, regimes take precautionary measures such as police
armed with tear gas. This is also a common tactic of the Israeli army in Jerusalem where
their presence is increased in the old city on Fridays and during religious holidays to pre
empt any possible collective action.

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 684 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

The potential of mosques as social sites for col

prompted various regimes to incorporate mosques
activities into the state bureaucracy through the Mi
Religious Affairs, or some equivalent.19 Throughout
there has traditionally been a distinction between
and independent or "private" mosques, sometime
mosques because they are not regulated by the state.
funded by the state, which controls all related act
nate a highly depoliticized version of Islam designed
in the face of state power. The private mosques, in c
with private donations, often from a single, wealthy
recently, the patron of the private mosque usually de
the mosque and this "free" space provided room f
lamic discourse.21 Since the challenge from Islamic g
alities working through independent mosques inc
attempted to erode the private mosque's independ
by proclaiming it a public mosque and therefore u
ment. In Egypt, for example, Law 157 (1960) auth
of Awqaf to take control of the supervision of all m
1970, though to this day the government has been
1997, the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Mahmoud
pressed the regime's intention to take control of the
private mosques (out of a total of 55,000). More
stated reason for this reinvigorated effort to contro

19. A waqf is a religious endowment, often in the form of land.

are generally supposed to be used for charitable or religious purp
there has been some abuse of the system. Awqaf is the Arabic plu
the waqf, see Monzer Kahf, "Waqf," in The Oxford Encycloped
World, vol. 4, ed. John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Pres
20. For a discussion of private and public mosques and governmen
see Vatin, "Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism"; Antoun,
Modern World, 212-18; and Patrick D. Gaffney, "The Changing V
gence of Professional Preachers in Contemporary Egypt," The Mu
1991): 27-47.
21. It should be noted that, as Gaffney argues, this does not always mean that there are no
oppositional figures in government controlled mosques. There is often a lack of qualified
preachers and imams, and regimes therefore encounter difficulty excluding oppositional
figures. See Gaffney, "The Changing Voice of Islam." In Jordan, the director of Preaching
and Guidance indicated that many of the imams are not qualified to give Friday sermons.
This makes it difficult to completely exclude non-oppositional figures, particularly when
they are highly qualified. In addition, many of the private mosques showcase popular
preachers whose removal could very well incite unrest. Regardless, states do tiy to control
the content of the message by oppositional imams or preachers in official mosques, often
removing them from their position or suspending their duties.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 685

will help prevent the dissemination of the "unorthodox" views of Is

lamic groups critical of the regime.22
In Jordan, all the mosques are controlled by the government, re
gardless of whether they are state or privately funded.23 In contrast to
Egypt, in a country such as Jordan with a small population it is easier
for the government to take control of the mosques since there are only
2,24s.24 The growth of mosques in the country is therefore matched by
the extension of government control into this traditional institution of
religious space. There is no "independent" or "free" space in Jordanian
mosques.
The regulative control of mosques as physical structures is in itself
less significant than control over the kinds of social interactions and
practices that are permissible within this space. The effect of the con
trol over mosques thus manifests itself through the limitations imposed
upon those who operate within its context. Most importandy, it means
that the state controls who can speak and work through mosques, thus
direcdy determining who has "sacred authority" through arguably the
most important institution in religious space. This control, in turn, pro
duces a docile version of Islam that reifies state power and prevents
critical elements from utilizing this space to disseminate an alternative
interpretation of meaning.

Imams, Preachers, and the Khutba

Religious knowledge and understanding is acquired through a me

diated process of interpretation. Even the most erudite Islamic scholar
learns from others, both from past figures as well as present exper
iences. Today, religious interpretations are disseminated through
books, cassettes, videos, television, radio, religious lessons, sermons,
personal interactions, etc. These instruments represent the means for
obtaining religious understanding. While some groups and individuals
turn direcdy to the sources of the religion, the Quran and Sunna (the
path of the Prophet Mohammed), even they will also rely on other
scholars and past religious knowledge to help interpret these texts. De

Eendence onbecause
y illiteracy othersoffor
the interpreting Islam
inability to refer has to
direcdy often beentexts,
religious exacerbated
but in recent years, increasing literacy rates have replaced this absolute

22. Jordan Times, 3 August 1997. The number of mosques in Egypt has been the source
of debate and numbers vary. For a good discussion of different estimates, see Gaffney, "The
Changing Voice of Islam," 47.
23. While the Department of Preaching and Guidance currently supervises mosques,
there are plans to establish a new Department of Mosque Administration.
24. Ministry of Awqaf, Annual Report (Amman: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1996),
191, 208.

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 686 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

dependence with a relative dependency. Two of

institutions for shaping and disseminating interpret
the imam and the preacher.
An imam is the leader of the congregational praye
porary usage in Jordan this term often narrowly ref
in charge of the mosque. This person is, in theor
knowledgeable about Islam and capable of leading r
The imam is familiar with the community and can
disputes and cater to the specific religious needs o
although in some instances due to necessity an o
pointed. The main roles of the imam are to act as
the community, to work with the local zakat comm
bution of charity), to teach Quranic reading, and to
Because the imam is charged with overseeing the mo
ities, it is important to the state that the individ
dissension or opposition. The selection and trainin
fore tightly controlled and monitored by the Ministr
Imams are considered civil servants and are hired under the civil
servant laws as government employees. They are supposed to have a
bachelor's degree in sharia (Islamic law), but frequently community
college degrees are accepted because of the low level of candidate
quality. Many of the imams receive their education at the Ministry of
Awqaf s two-year College of Islamic Sciences or the four-year Da'wa
and Basics of Religion College.26 The Civil Servants Department con
ducts an interview process in conjunction with the Ministry of Awqaf,
and candidates are treated like other civil servant applicants. Selective
hiring practices tend to produce moderate, apolitical imams.27 After
being hired, all imams must continue to attend classes at the Center for
the Rehabilitation of Imams, which holds seminars on various contem
porary issues, such as drug use, water conservation, traffic accidents,
and the environment. The imams are paid civil servant wages—JD200
($286) a month (an average income in Jordan)—and are provided
housing at the mosque. In several instances, other benefits accrue as a
result of the position of the imam. Richard Antoun, for example, found
that the imam he studied received additional money from his role as a

25. For more on the role of imams, see Hamid Algar, "Imam," in The Oxford Encyclopedia
of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 2, ed. John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), 182-83.
26. Da'wa is the call to Islam. It entails both spreading Islam to non-believers as well as
calling Muslims who have strayed from religious practice back to the Islamic faith.
27. This practice of hiring only moderate imams has increased in recent years. In an inter
view, one imam noted that he would never have been hired in the current situation because
his views are not moderate enough. He also pointed to a systematic effort by the regime to
remove any imams whose views do not support the state.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 687

marriage official and pilgrimage guide.28 Mohammed Abu Shaqra, a

prominent imam in Amman and (former) Crown Prince Hassan's reli
gious advisor, reportedly drives a government-provided car. Other
funds are disseminated through donations for missionary work, either
from individuals or governments such as Saudi Arabia, which report
edly funnels donations through individuals, a practice allegedly toler
ated by the Jordanian regime because it defrays costs.
The khutba is the weekly religious sermon held every Friday at the
noon prayers in which preachers are supposed to discuss issues of con
cern to the community from an Islamic perspective, including local dis
putes, current events, and broader theological issues. The minbar
(pulpit) is used as an instrument for addressing the community, and the
khutba is a corporate experience whereby individual Muslims reinvigo
rate collective ties through their mutual participation as audience.
Even individuals who do not pray during the week often attend the
Friday sermon, which reconnects them to their obligations and duties
as part of the umma (Muslim community).29 As a "cultural broker," the
preacher interprets and applies Islam to rapidly changing conditions in
the modern world, mediating between the great traditions of Islam and
local practices and events.30 The khutba has recently been revitalized
as a form of political communication, channeling ideology through reli
gious speech and ritual.31 Particularly where the press and publications
are curtailed or constrained, the khutba becomes an important medium
of expression, at once religious and political, purveying a message
wrapped in religious symbolism. All of these factors mean that the
khutba can have a powerful influence on communities, often invigo
rating faith, mobilizing activism, and tightening the ties that bind indi
viduals together into a community.32 The Director of Preaching and

28. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World; and "Themes and Symbols in the
Religious Lesson: A Jordanian Case Study," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25
(1993): 607-24.
29. This community transcends ethnic and national identities and ties all Muslims together
through their religion.
30. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World-, and "Themes and Symbols in the
Religious Lesson: A Jordanian Case Study."
31. Bruce Borthwick, "The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication,"
Middle East Journal 21 (1967): 299-313; Asghar Fathi, "Preachers as Substitutes for Mass
Media: The Case of Iran, 1905-1909," in Towards a Modern Iran, eds. Elie Kedourie and
Sylvia G. Haim (London: Cass, 1980), 169-84; and "The Islamic Pulpit as a Medium of
Political CommunicationJournal for the Scientific Study of Religion 20 (1981): 163-72.
32. For an overview of the khutba and its role in Muslim communities, see Asghar Fathi,
"Khutba," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 2, ed. John Espo
sito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 432-35.

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 688 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

Guidance at the Ministry of Awqaf labeled this fu

important role for the imam."33
The ambiguous role of the preacher, at once religi
social, poses a challenge for states concerned with Is
Preachers are obligated to discuss injustice and w
threaten the state's Islamic façade if criticism is lev
and policy. The audience—the community—looks
guidance in interpreting the world through an Is
Where preachers attack the state or its agenda as un
affect broader opposition throughout the commu
skills of many opposition preachers, combined with
references, can inspire and mobilize the congrega
regimes fear that the mobilizing potential of the kh
challenges to the state or its functionaries.
Because of the pivotal role of the preacher in p
tion, regimes have increasingly curtailed the ind
khutba and harnessed it for their own purposes. T
lim world, preachers have increasingly come under t
various state agencies charged with overseeing th
tivities. The sphere of the "free" preacher, operatin
trol, is rapidly shrinking as the state extends th
apparatus into the realm of the khutba, shaping
prevent any mobilizing effect. By incorporating the
administrative structure and creating standardized t
has in effect created a professional preacher class
has not direcdy incorporated all preachers into th
ous requirements are promulgated to limit any oppo
the khutba.36

33. Interview with Mifli Adabas, director of Preaching and Guida

1996.

34. The most comprehensive studies of the Muslim preacher to date are Antoun, Muslim
Preacher in the Modern World; and Patrick D. Gaffney, The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic
Preaching in Contemporary Egypt (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1994).
35. Gaffney, "The Changing Voice of Islam."
36. In Egypt, in addition to attempts to control all mosques and imams, the government
issued a new law in early 1997 which requires all mosques, regardless of whether they are
private or government-controlled, to register their preachers with the Ministry of Awqaf
(Jordan Times, 8 March 1997). In addition, the sermons of preachers in Egyptian govern
ment mosques are no longer written by the local preacher, but by officials at the Ministiy
(Ahmed, "Mosque," 141). The goal is to control who speaks on behalf of Islam and channel
the effects of the khutba into support for the state, or to at least prevent opposition. The
state thus sponsors its own legion of cultural brokers programmed to interpret Islam in a
fight which is favorable to those in power. Of course, this extension of state control is not
without historical precedent in Egypt. The trend began much earlier with Mohammad Ali,
considered by many to be the great modernizer of Egypt, who took over many of the reli
gious institutions and reduced the role of Islamic scholars to ritual and display.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 689

In Jordan, control over preachers and the content of the khutba has
expanded. In the 1960s, the local qadi (religious judge) and the De
partment of Religious Endowments supervised the preachers.37 In
1964, the Department of Religious Endowments began sending out
newsletters that suggested topics for the sermon, though evidence indi
cates that some preachers did not always adopt these suggestions and
retained some measure of independence. The department also re
quired that all preachers retain a written copy of the sermons, though
again it is not clear whether this was strictly enforced or followed.38
This practice continued after the establishment of the Ministry of
Awqaf in 1966. During the 1970s, the Ministry began sending out a
monthly journal to preachers which contained complete sermons that
could be used verbatim.39
Preaching now falls under the purview of the Department of
Preaching and Guidance at the Ministry of Awqaf, which regulates not
only imams, but non-government preachers who are brought from
outside the administrative apparatus. The growth of mosques has sur
passed the government's capability to staff them with qualified imams
and preachers. In 1996, there was a deficit of 1,037 imams and preach
ers for the some 2,245 mosques in the country, leaving 46 percent of
the mosques unstaffed by an imam or preacher from the government.40
Though there are other government officials at the local branch of the
Ministry of Awqaf charged with overseeing these mosques, outside
preachers are frequently brought in to deliver the khutba. In addition,
although one of the primary functions of the imam is to give the
khutba, officials at the Ministry recognize that not all imams are quali
fied.41 As the director of the department noted, "preaching is a gift
from God," and not all imams have this gift, though they may be quali

37. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World, 93-94.

38. Ibid., 97, 139-40.
39. Ibid., 93-94.
40. Calculated using information from Ministry of Awqaf, Annual Report, 191, 208.
41. This is not uncommon in Muslim countries where mosque building frequently out
paces the ability of the state to provide qualified personnel, straining the state's capacity to
effectively control mosques. This often times necessitates the use of non-state personnel,
including outside preachers. In Algeria in 1981, the Minister of Religious Affairs openly
admitted this fact when he commented that three-fifths of the imams at official mosques
were not qualified to comment on the Quran and Sunna (see Vatin, "Islamic Puritanism
versus State Reformism," 112). Various governments have attempted to rectify this by creat
ing training and educational courses for preachers and imams. For Algeria, see Vatin, "Is
lamic Puritanism versus State Reformism," 112-13; and Hugh Roberts, "From Radical
Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism,
1979-1992," in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements,
eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press,
1994), 428-89.

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690 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

fied for other activities at the mosque.42 In such cas

outside the government may be used. For examp
near the University of Jordan, professors from the
University are frequently asked to deliver a khut
gious judges, teachers, and anyone who is qualifie
to give a sermon. The preachers are paid a nominal s
ices, but it is a symbolic reward, not a financial ince
estimated that about 60 percent of all preachers are
while 40 percent are "outsiders." His estimate in
mosques hold a khutba because there would st
preachers to fill the unstaffed mosques and replace
Typically, individual preachers petition to give a s
Ministry does advertise if it needs to fill positions.
The fact that a substantial number of non-Ministi
does not indicate that the government has loosene
khutba; on the contrary, the selection process a
niques are utilized to ensure that the khutba rem
uncritical of the regime. First, the Ministry often d
of the khutba. About once every two to three mo
requires that imams and preachers speak on a certain
the topic of the latest seminar at the Center for the
Imams or an issue of pressing concern.43 Second,
ers, the government chooses so-called "balanced
mism in Jordan for those who are not critical of th
policies. The Ministry consciously avoids choo
figures who may espouse "radical" ideologies. Thir
tates outside preachers from mosque to mosque. Whi
charge of these appointments claimed that the rotat
the congregation does not tire of listening to the sa
week, it has the more controlling effect of prevent
preachers from cultivating a loyal following at one
group of mosques. In other countries, opposition
consistently at a specific private mosque, but in Jor
mosques are government-controlled means that
which preachers can develop a loyal following. Im
fied to deliver the khutba remain at the same mo
government-employed preachers an opportunity to
through the Friday sermon. Those who are less likel

42. Interview with Mifli Adabas, Amman, 5 October 1996.

43. A good example is the khutbas that discussed traffic. Traffic
risen dramatically over recent years, predominantly as a result o
frequently the cause. In conjunction with a program to highlight
press, khutbas were given to raise awareness of the issue.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 691

the state and its policies therefore have a greater chance of fostering a
loyal constituency at a particular mosque.
The final, and most important, mechanism of control for preachers,
whether employed by the government or not, is a set of informal rules
known as the "red fines." A great deal of politics in Jordan has always
been characterized by a certain degree of informality (the rights and
prerogatives of various tribes, for example). A set of unwritten, but
well-recognized, rules governing the political system and all social in
teractions are negotiated and understood by participants in the political
and social game. These "red fines" represent the limits to behavior and
action tolerated by the regime, and crossing these fines incurs reprisals.
They are not explicitly stated, only hesitantly discussed, and extremely
effective. While the government requests that preachers discuss issues
of concern to the community, spontaneity on the part of the preacher
bows to the weight of informal "red fines" which, in reality, guide
content.

The most significant "red fine" is that "preachers cannot go against

state policy" or else they will be prevented from speaking.44 Officials at
the Ministry of Awqaf argue that this is the "spirit" of the "Law on
Preaching, Guidance, and Teaching in Mosques," which states that,
"The preacher shall be committed to wisdom and proper preaching
and shall not attack, accuse, or instigate and go beyond the guidelines
of the Islamic da'wa."45 Since one of the roles of the Department of
Preaching and Guidance is the "supervision of clearing the atmo
spheres in mosques of disagreements and conflicts,"46 officials interpret
the limits of preaching as a prohibition of criticism directed against the
state. Several Ministry officials referred to mosques as "government
agencies," reiterating the state's control and denying its status as a com
munity and social institution. As a consequence, the informal policy is
to prevent any actions that may be harmful to the government or ques
tion its Islamic legitimacy, which would be affected by any attacks from
the minbar.
The government uses several methods to enforce the "red fines."
First, the Department of Preaching and Guidance receives and reviews
the names of prospective preachers before the Friday sermon and can
deny permission to any candidate without specifying a reason. This is
used to systematically prevent opposition figures from using the khutba
to reach an audience. Individuals who preach despite being barred
from doing so are punished according to the law which states that, "If a

44. Interview with Mifli Adabas, Amman, 5 October 1996.

45. Law 7 of 1986, Article 3.
46. Ministry of Awqaf, Annual Report, 38.

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692 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

preacher insists on speaking publicly upon written not

vention, he shall be punished by imprisonment for
week to one month or fined a sum of JD20-100."47 In
ishment is often harsher and can mean referral to the
cret police)48 or the Ministry of the Interior.
A second technique is to ban and punish preache
permission to speak but cross the red line by critici
While the Director of Preaching and Guidance recog
and preachers do disagree with state policies, he argues
find an acceptable way of presenting this criticism
sions. When they pass the limits of acceptability, they
If they continue, they are banned for a period of two
More outspoken or influential figures are banned for l
time. Though this latter ban is not in strict accordan
Ministry officials admit that there are cases where pre
listed from delivering the khutba for long periods of
The practice of banning certain preachers has bec
mon since the signing of the peace treaty with Israe
opposed by most religious figures in the country. This
any other, has been a source of contention between
preachers. Prior to the signing of the peace treaty,
decried Israel, often actively encouraged to do so by
Once the peace process was underway, regardless of
roots opposition, preachers were prevented from critic
Ali Hassan al-Halabi, an influential sheikh who is know
audiences, has been prohibited from delivering ser
when he first criticized the regime's decision to make
The Ministry further restricted his activities when
from delivering weekly lessons at the mosque. Ove
people regularly attended these lessons, and the Minist
would use them as an opportunity to speak out against
A famous case in point is Abdul Munem Abu Zant, a
Muslim Brotherhood and an Islamic Action Front Pa
mentarian from 1989-1997. In 1994, Abu Zant was
controversy because he defied government orders prev
speaking in mosques. Despite the prohibition, he del
condemning the peace treaty. Following his speech, A
that police assaulted him. While police argue that he
supporters of the official imam, Sami al-Najjar, wh

47. Law 7 of 1986, Article 7.

48. The mukhabarat is the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), c
ing national security.
49. Interview with All Hassan al-Halabi, Zarqa, 26 October 1996.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 693

vented from delivering his own sermon by Abu Zant and his follow
ers,50 most imams and preachers accept Abu Zant's version of the story.
They point to his treatment as part of an unannounced government
policy to remove all opposition from the mosques. Abu Zant subse
quently went on a tirade in Parliament, charging that preachers ap
pointed by the Ministry were imploring God to be merciful to the
Israelis whom he referred to as "the killers of all God's emissaries and
prophets." In an ugly incident which led to personal insults in Parlia
ment, he was denied a request for the names of all appointed preachers
and the dates of their sermons.51 He was later tried in court on charges
of disrupting the peace when after a Friday prayer he criticized the
trial of twenty-four people in a south Amman court, accused of dis
rupting the peace by engaging in demonstrations against the signing of
the peace accords. In addition to Abu Zant, twenty-five other mem
bers of the IAF were banned by the Ministry from delivering the
khutba, a move that was upheld by the Higher Court of Justice.52 Two
other IAF deputies, Abdul Aziz Jaber and Mohammad al-Hajj, were
also investigated by the prosecutor general for delivering controversial
khutbas following King Hussein's meeting with Rabin in Washington
on 25 July 1994. They were accused of "harming national unity."53
Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is adamandy op
posed to the peace treaty, are routinely denied permission to deliver
sermons.54
Since the peace treaty, the regime has also attempted to remove
critical imams from their government positions. Salah Khaldi, who for
ten years was the imam at the central mosque in Sweileh, a neighbor
hood in West Amman, was removed from his position, widely recog
nized in the Islamist community as a move to crack down on imams
opposed to the peace process. He is known as an outspoken critic of
the government's policies, especially towards Israel. In Sweileh, there
is little tribal influence because of the predominance of the Islamic
movement, which emphasizes religion, rather than tribe, as the basis
for identity. This has created a situation where, as the current imam at
the mosque stated, "whoever controls the mosque, controls the com
munity."55 The regime decided it could not afford to have a govern
ment critic controlling the community. The government also tried to

Jordan Times, 29 October 1994.

Ibid., 26 January 1995.
Ibid., 16 September 1995.
Ibid., 2 August 1994.
Interview with Ishaq Farhan, 10 October 1996; interview with Abdul Latif Arabiyyat,
27 November 1996. Both Farhan and Arabiyyat are leaders in the Islamic movement in
Jordan.
55. Interview with Mohammed Raoud, Amman, 1 April 1997.

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694 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

fire another imam who delivered a khutba which

Peres was more dangerous than other Israeli lead
considered a friend of the Jordanian regime, or at l
such charges were unacceptable. The mukhabarat
brary, and the Ministry of Awqaf took measures to
position. He was able to retain his post only after
wasta (personal connections).
This censorship of the khutba and control of imam
however, does not always prevent preachers from d
message in a more subtle format. In interviews, crit
to "loopholes" and "ways to get around" the rule
commented, "There are limits to what I can do, b
around these limits so that I can bring a message wi
myself. The Quran is the best instrument of
change by going back to the Quran." Critiques ar
quotes from the Quran and hadiths (reported sayi
Mohammed), presented as hidden analogies to cur
and conditions. By quoting the Quran and hadiths
late themselves from direct reprisals because serm
the word of God, something the regime simply cann
dict or punish. Without any direct references to th
preachers can creatively use religious symbols and an
state policy. Thus, without naming people or even
preacher can discuss topics such as Jerusalem or t
one imam described it, "Through the various aay
Quran), the preacher can say exactly what he wants
ing and significance of the aayas change with circum
same reference can mean different things at di
moments.

But this technique requires a particular skill. Not every preacher

capable of effectively disseminating a message and subtly discussing
topic without referring to it by name. As one preacher noted, "m
imams cannot do this except directly," and often find themselves f
reprisals. The preacher must be careful not to be too obvious and m
be prepared to defend the sermon on religious grounds with altern
interpretations that mask the true intent. One imam cautioned
"Every Friday preacher can use interpretations of the Quran to b
through thoughts and ideas without saying something specifically,
he should know exactly what he is saying." The implication is th
should be able to present a reasonable and innocuous interpretati
the khutba should the government ever question him.

56. These sources will remain anonymous for their safety.

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STATE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF ISLAM IN JORDAN 695

The use of hidden analogies and continued opposition by some

preachers and imams indicate that the regime does not enjoy complete
hegemony over the mosque and its religious space. Its control, how
ever, is substantial and significantly limits how this space can be effec
tively utilized. Preachers admit that their subtle, embedded messages
are not always understood and that even if they are, it is only by a small
number of people. The state also retains the right to remove imams or
prevent specific individuals from delivering the khutba. Permission is
contingent upon government approval of content, and this approval is
only forthcoming for "balanced thinkers" who do not openly criticize or
oppose the state or state policy. The mobilizing potential of the khutba
is thus diminished, and it has become a reflection of state control
rather than social concerns or community interests. The state controls
religious institutions and thus manages the definition of Islam.

Conclusion

State power does not necessarily entail raw, coercive force

pression. Through the selective application and manipulation
reaucratic rules, procedures, and processes, regimes can effec
project state power through less visible mechanisms of social c
The Hashemite regime in Jordan relies to some extent upon I
credentials and is therefore vulnerable to ideological challeng
ated within alternative understandings of Islam. As a result, the
is inextricably linked to the struggle over meaning in "Muslim p
and this vested interest informs patterns of regulation in the re
sphere. In particular, the state bureaucracy is used to control
Islamic voices have access to sacred authority through central
institutions in society. This article has demonstrated how the
manipulates regulative practices to control the mosques, i
preachers, and the khutba, all of which have been harnessed to su
the regime's interpretation of Islam. Alternative understandin
limited and repressed through this process of regulation.
The relevance of this pattern of control for contemporary polit
Jordan is that it questions the extent of political and religious fr
in the kingdom. Although King Hussein initiated a transition
mocracy in 1989 that included the Islamic movement, it is cle
democratization has not extended to the religious sphere. Wh
regime wraps itself in the symbols and institutions of democr
continues to replicate authoritarian practices in less visible g
through its regulation of Islam. Beneath the fanfare of electio
formal politics, the regime utilizes the bureaucracy to repress in
tations of Islam which threaten state power or public policy. Thi
visible form of repression creates a disconnect between dem

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696 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE

rhetoric/ideals and praxis, a disconnect produced by

perative linked to Islamic meaning. Democracy d
ance of alternative voices, and until that acceptan
regulation of Islam, democracy in Jordan will re
project.

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