Reconstructing the Fascist Occupation of Ethiopia: The Italian Telegrammes as Historical Sources

Author(s): IAN CAMPBELL

Source: International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2004), pp. 122-
128
Published by: Tsehai Publishers
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27828842
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 A RESEARCH NOTE

Reconstructing the Fascist Occupation

of Ethiopia: The Italian T?l?grammes as
Historical Sources

IAN CAMPBELL

Most historical accounts of the Fascist occupation of Ethiopia rely on

the Italian military t?l?grammes as theirprincipal source of information.
Given the general lack of rigorous research and documentation of the
events of 1936-1941 by the Ethiopian authorities after the liberation,
the t?l?grammes represent the most readily available?and supposedly
authoritative?source. have come to assume an
Consequently, they

unquestioned source. In his forthcoming book, There Remains No Trace:

The True Story of the Massacre of Debre Libanos, the author presents
a detailed historical reconstruction of this infamous massacre, which
constituted a major component of Viceroy Graziani's programme of
retributionfollowing the attempt on his life in February 1937. Based on
research conducted over a period of thirteen years, covering interviews of
surviving eye-witnesses and detailed examination of the geography of the
relevant sites, he has been able to establish an hourly and daily time line
of the events before, during and after themassacre. One of theprincipal?
though unexpected?discoveries has been that the Fascist t?l?grammes
contain much erroneous, and often false, information. Their use by
historians for purposes of historical reconstruction without supporting field
research is called into serious question.

entirereportabout themassacre ofDebre Libanos in the t?l?grammes

The of the Fascist administration consists of littlemore than two lines of
text.While the purported reason for it is well-known,1 the details of what

happened?who died, where, and under what circumstances?were never

divulged in those briefmessages, neither did the post-occupation Ethiopian

government document the facts.2 Had the war crimes trials gone ahead as the

Ethiopian authorities intended,detailed investigations

might have been carried
out into these and other atrocities of the occupation, but itwas not to be.

JournalofEthiopianStudies (ISSN: 1543-4133) ispublished twotimesa year by

The International
Tsehai Publishers, P. 0. Box: 1881, Hollywood, CA 90078. Copyright ? 2004. Volume I,Number 2.

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RECONSTRUCTING THE FASCIST OCCUPATION OF ETHIOPIA 123

In the absence of the factswhich would have been established had

investigations been conducted in the 1940s, historians have chosen to regard
the Graziani t?l?grammes as the sole source, and have adopted their contents
without question. This was presumably based on the assumption that,
notwithstanding the bestiality of the behaviour of itsmembers, the records of
a twentiethcenturyEuropean militaryHigh Command would be flawless.

The assumption, however, does not bear examination. Firstly, the

Graziani t?l?grammes do not contain the objective and dispassionate technical
instructions and reports that one would expect from a military High Command.
Rather, they reflect the literary culture of fascism. Le Hourerou asserted,
"The manly style?references to conquest, adventure, power, passion, sacrifices,
domination?was typicallyfascist.)fh Indeed, the Viceroy's recommendations are
full of personal invective and sometimes border on the hysterical:

"I order that theyall be shot immediatelyaccording to thedirection of the

Duce repeated a thousand timesand yet littleobservedbymany... "4

"5
"What I recommend is to quell without mercy...

While some of Graziani's reports to Rome are reasonably precise, there

are great inconsistencies. Many contain vague expressions, lack the time of
transmission, details of data, time and location of the events on which he is
supposed to be reporting, and are replete with personal pleas and theatrics:

"From today theairforce will hammer unceasingly therebelstronghold in the

Dennebazone in order todestroy,burn, terrorize'\6

"I repeat thatI must not be deprived of thepersonal touch thatmay be called
"7
smell, intuition,ability, luck, and soon...

Secondly, the Fascist administration in Ethiopia is well-known to have

been badlymanaged, and itsofficialsnotorious fortheirdishonesty,corruption
and self-interest, as the Duke of Aosta was exasperated to discover. Why, then,
would theirpersonalmissives be expected to be models of accurate reporting?
? as tradition at the monastery
The research carried out has determined
has maintained all along? thatmore than 1,200monks, priests and pilgrims
were shotnear Debre Libanos on the 21st ofMay 1937well in excess of the
320 reportedbyGraziani.8 And similar findingshave been made with respect
to the second set of executions, near Debre Berhan, where approximately
500 more innocentpeople were shot,many of whom had littleor no direct
connection with the monastery. In fact, very little information on the second

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 124 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES

set of executions was ever actually provided to Rome, so far as the author is
aware.9

It is also found, for example, that theViceroy reported that prisoners

had "spared" when
been their graves were already being dug, last-minute
"discoveries" of proof of guilt were announced after arrangements for
executions had already been made, and that children had been sent home to
the welcoming arms of their parents, while arrangements were being made to
send them to Danane concentration camp.

Events immediately after the massacre of Debre Libanos were also

reported in the same inaccurate manner. For example, Graziani's t?l?gramme
toRome of the21st ofMay states that themonastery had been closed aftera
"
commission had made "an inventory of objects of any value found in themonastery,

making no mention of any object being removed,whereas it iswell attested

that the fascists pillaged the monastery, and that Graziani returned to Rome
with no less than seventy-nine crates of booty.

Given the apparently great, noble and confident cause of fascism, and
the need, explicitly expressed on many occasions, to terrorize the inhabitants
of Ethiopia into total submission,why did Graziani need to cover up such
activities?After all, itwas Mussolini himself who had earlier instructed
"
Graziani in thisregard: "I repeattoyou, theDuce had reportedlycommanded
'no
him, "that it is necessary to establish a regime of absolute terror.

It is apparent that while wishing to be seen to uphold the fascist doctrines,

Graziani felt that his own increasingly erratic behaviour and his excesses
would call into question his credibilityand suitabilityfor the position of
Viceroy. This iswhy he under-reported to Rome the extent of his repressions
and the mounting resistance to fascist rule which they were creating. He
also maintained considerable secrecy in the execution of such operations,

particularlyafter themassacre of Addis Ababa. This secrecyhe justified to

Rome by emphasizing theneed to avoid witnesses hearing Ethiopians crying
out loud theirsupportfor independentEthiopia in the face of death.11
The principal reason forGraziani's fear thathis credibility
would be called
into question, and that he must at all costs maintain secrecy for many of
his activities,was almost certainlyhis knowledge thathe had an implacable
enemy in Rome: Allesandro Lessona, theMinister for the Colonies (whose
titlewas changed toMinister for ItalianAfrica inApril, 1937). Graziani was
afraid thatLessona would seize upon the fact thathe was shootingprisoners
without proof of guilt to justifysummaryexecution.Again, thiswas especially
noticeable afterthemassacre ofAddis Ababa, which was brought to a halt only
by the interventionof Rome. In the t?l?grammeof the21st ofMay, he was at
pains to explain toRome thatsince themassacre ofAddis Ababa, all prisoners

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 RECONSTRUCTING THE FASCIST OCCUPATION OF ETHIOPIA 125

who had been summarily executed (mainly the victims of the massacre of
Debre Libanos) had had their guilt ascertained and proved.12

Graziani had good reason to be cautious with Lessona. The two officials
had clashed on a number of issues when Graziani had been appointed Viceroy.
Lessona had tried earlier to get him removed on the ground that he was not
tough enough in his enforcementof fascistpower inEthiopia. However, this
had turnedout to be an ineffectivestrategy.It had proved difficulttomake
these charges stick, given Graziani's well-earned reputation for ruthlessness.
But the attempt on Graziani's life, the massacre which ensued and Graziani's
increasing paranoia, gave Lessona a new opportunity to discredit Graziani on
the grounds that far from being weak, he was now out of control, exceeding
his authority, conducting unauthorized killings, "considered by the natives as a
faithless man" and was unfit for office.13 In his memoirs, Lessona was to admit
"
that Graziani's "actions in Command furnished me with convenient reasons, and
that he had announced in Rome that Graziani's behaviour "was showing signs
of derangement.>nA

Lessona, in turn, had good reason to think that he would succeed in getting
ridofGraziani. The principle thathe was unfitforofficehad apparentlybeen
agreed byMussolini himselfwhen news of the attempted assassination had
reached him. Lessona was to report that the Duce's reaction was, "Graziani
after what has happened cannot any more remain Viceroy; it is necessary to replace
him."15

?
Thus, Graziani's policy of conducting executions in secret ostensibly
to avoid victims making public martyrs of themselves in the face of death
? was almost certainly adopted to enable him to carry out atrocities without

reporting the details to Rome, and without fearing that the information would
leak out.16 In other words, themaintenance of secrecy from the Ethiopians was
often a device for ensuring secrecy from Rome. And secrecy would also avoid
unofficial activities coming to the notice of locally-based Italian journalists
such as Ciro Poggiali.17

Conveniently,Northern Shoa was aflamewith fascist action against the

rebels, extensive shooting of patriots,burning of tukulsand use of poison
gas, so the executions near Debre Berhan, for example, could go virtually
unnoticed, particularlyas theEthiopian Orthodox Church had no presence in
the area concerned.

Of course, Graziani's reports to Rome had to be consistentwith his

subordinates' reports, and in this regard he received full collaboration from
Maletti. To enable theViceroy to justifythe execution of hundreds atDebre
Libanos, he gotMaletti to classify them as rebels by creating an entirely
fictional report.The account described howMaletti's troopshad scoured the

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 126 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES

countryside and found these people hiding in ravines and crevices, whereas the
troops had, in fact, ringed the monastery and enticed the visitors and clergy
into the Church of Tekle Haymanot by promises of gifts and a feast.The
reported act of 'hiding' labeled them dangerous rebels, and thence subject to
execution inMussolini's eyes. Graziani certainly knew all about the enticing
of the pilgrims into the church, for itwas the culmination of the process
of ingratiationby the carabinieri
with themonks of Debre Libanos, which
had been going on forweeks, and which was certainly implementedwith
Graziani's full agreement, if not on his initiative.

The reason forGraziani's false reportson thefateof the thirty

young boys
from theDebra Libanos area falls into the same category.On thedayGraziani
"18
reported to Rome that they had been "sent to their native homes, arrangements
were already being made for their incarceration at Danane, where over half of
them were to die. It is apparent thatGraziani would not have wanted to report
to Rome the deportation to Danane of children who were not deacons, and
who were
therefore unconnected with the monastery, and innocent of any
involvement with the attempted assassination. Shooting the children would
have been very difficult to keep secret, and might have led to an insurrection
among the Eritrean troops. On the other hand, releasing them would have
resulted in thedissemination of informationthathundreds of otherprisoners
who had been heldwith theboys atDebre Berhan, butwho were unconnected
with Debre Libanos, had been shot without cause. One lie had to lead to
another. Graziani had to get these boys out of circulation altogether, and
Danane was the most convenient solution.

There were also other channels of communication which could create

problems for Graziani's policy of secrecy For example, there was the
possibility of communications being seen by junior officials in theAddis
Ababa administrationwho might be shocked by theircontents.This could
be addressed to some extentby theuse of code words or completely coded
t?l?grammes.19 But the more worrying possibility was Graziani's provincial
governorswho might communicate directly
with Rome. Some of theseofficials
were Lessona's personal appointees, whom Graziani found already in office
upon his appointment as Viceroy.He had complained bitterlytoRome about
thatstateof affairs,and in 1936 had repeatedlyattempted to cancel Lessona's
instruction that the governors were free to report, in effect, behind Graziani's
back.20 Indeed, this was one of the causes of his conflict with Lessona. Only
four days before the assassination attempt, Graziani had telegraphed Gelosa,
governor of Galla and Sidama, insisting, inter alia, that all communications
regarding matters of a politico-military nature were to be sent exclusively to
him, itbeing his responsibilityalone to correspond on such questions with
Rome.21

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 RECONSTRUCTING THE FASCIST OCCUPATION OF ETHIOPIA 127

It is thus apparent that the Graziani

t?l?grammes and those of General
Maletti, particularly during the period after the assassination attempt until
Graziani's removal from office inDecember of the same year, were an attempt

by the Viceroy to put an orderly and rational front on a policy of terror fuelled

principally by his personal paranoia and fear. Although some of the data was
? as
certainly accurate such dates of key events, major military action and
?
troop movements much of their contents are so distorted by Graziani's
concern for secrecy, his troubles with Lessona's anti-Graziani lobby, and his
uncertain relationshipwithMussolini, as to renderthemof only limitedvalue
for purposes of historical reconstruction. They must be used with considerable
caution, and thenonly in thecontextof fieldresearch,fortheytellus onlywhat
was reported toRome, which is not necessarily what actually happened. In the
case of themassacre of Debre Libanos, the t?l?grammes not only leave a great
deal unreported, but also contain a significant amount of false information,
the implications of which are self-evident.

Notes
1
The monastery of Debre Libanos was accused by Graziani of being in league
with his would-be assassins, who struck on 19th of February, 1937. Del Boca, A.,
1969, p. 221.
2
None of thewitnesses interviewed by the author had ever been asked to recount
the events concerned.
3Lee
Hourerou, F., 1994, p. 823.
4
Telegramme from Graziani toRome, 1stMarch, 1937,Ministry of Justice, 1949,
Doc. 27, pp. 16-17.
5
Telegramme from Graziani toRome, 17thMay, 1937,Ministry of Justice, 1949,
Doc. 20, p. 13.
6
Telegramme fromGraziani toRome, 29thMay, 1937,Ministry of Justice, 1949,
Doc. 52, p. 29.
7
Telegramme from Graziani toRome, 1stMarch, 1937,Ministry of Justice, 1949,
Doc. 8, p. 7.
8 1997.
Campbell, IX. and Degife Gabre-Tsadik,
9 1999.
Campbell, IX.,
10
Pankhurst, R.K., 1997, pp.16-17, citing R.Graziani, Ho Difeso la Partria, Roma,
1937, p. 109.
11
See, for example, Graziani t?l?gramme to Governo Generale dell'Africa
Orientale Italiana, Doc. 28,Ministry of Justice, 1949, pp. 17, 51.
12
This t?l?gramme setting out the justification for the execution of monks and
priests of Debre Libanos runs to some 700 words, while the facts of the operation itself
run to scarcely two lines of text.Ministry of Justice, 1949, pp. 51-52, 54.
13
Pankhurst, R.K., 1997, pp. 130-1.

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 128 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES

14
Pankurst, R.K., 1997, pp. 9 and 30, citingA. Lessona, Memoire, Firenze, 1958,
pp. 312-13.
15
Pankurst, R.K., 1997, pp. 9 and 30, citingA. Lessona, Memoire, Firenze, 1958,
pp. 312-13.
16
Mussolini was never particularly sympathetic to Lessona's insistence on greater
circumspection. Much to his dismay, Lessona was to find himself dismissed on the
same day thatGraziani was notified of his dismissal as Viceroy.
17
Ciro Poggiali was a member of the fascist press office inAddis Ababa who later
published his diaries in Poggiali, C, 1971.
18 of
Document 32,Ministry Justice, 1949, pp. 20, 53; Campbell, I.L. and Degife
Gabre-Tsadik, 1997, p. 110.
19
For example, Graziani's t?l?gramme toRome of 31stMay 1937 confirming the
death of the deacons uses the term provvedimento rigore (lit., 'rigorous punishment')
where the death penalty was meant. The editor of theWar Crimes Documents was of
the opinion that this type of coded wording was possibly adopted to avoid shocking
subordinate officials, many of whom were Eritrean or Ethiopian. Ministry of Justice,
1949, p. 18.
20On Graziani's
attempts to stop the provincial governors' direct reporting to
Rome see Pankhurst, R.K., 1997, pp. 9-10.
21
Pankhurst, R.K., 1997, p. 14, citing USA, The National Archives, 821/472/75.

Work Cited
Campbell, IL. and Degife Gabre-Tsadik, 1997: "La repressione fascista in Etiopia:
La ricostruzione de massacro di Debre Libanos," Studi Piacentini, 21,
Piacenza, pp. 79-128.

Campbell, I.L., 1999: "La repressione fascista in Etiopia: ilmassacro di Engecha,"

Studi Piacentini, 24-25, Piacenza, pp. 23-46.

Campbell, I.L., forthcoming: There Remains No Trace: The True Story of the
Massacre of Debre Libanos, Tsehai Publishers and Distributors.
Del Boca, A., 1969: The Ethiopian War 1935-1941, tr.P.D.Cummins, Chicago.
Le Hourerou, E, 1994: "Portrait of a Fascist: Marshall Graziani" New Trends in
Ethiopian Studies Ethiopia 94: Papers of the 12th International Conference
of Ethiopian Studies, Volume I, Ed. Harold Marcus.

Ministry of Justice 1949: Documents on Italian War Crimes Submitted to theUnited

Nations War Crimes Commission by the Imperial Ethiopian Government,
Volume I: Italian Telegrams and Circulars, Ministry of Justice, Addis
Ababa.

Pankhurst, R.K., 1997: "The Secret History of the Italian Fascist Occupation of
-
Ethiopia 1935-1941," African Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. IV,April 1997.
?
Poggiali,C, 1971:Diario AOI (15giugno 1936 4 ottobre1937),
Milan.

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