THE CULTURAL
ORIGINS OF
HUMAN COGNITION
Michael Tomasello
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England 1999
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
{Individual human beings are able to create culturally significant arti-
{acts ony if they recive significant amounts of assistance from other
‘human beings and social institutlons In my ease, {was able to wete
this bookwhatever is faults and however lite its cultural sig-
pifeance—only because I received direct asistance fom the follow
ing people an institations (and, of course, indirect assistance from
all the ater people over the past 2500 years of Westen civilization
‘who have thought and seriten about the basic puzzles of human |
«cognition,
Financial support fora one-year leave of absence, during which
the majority of the ook was writen, was provided by the Guggen-
‘heim Foundation, by Emory University (Dr. Steven Sanderson, Dean
(of Emory College), and by the Max Planck Gesellschaft. Support for
-y empirical research over the past decade oe so has ben provided
by the Spencer Foundation, the National Science Foundation (Ani
ral Behavior Section), and the National Insite of Child Health
and Human Development express my deepest gratitude to all of
these people and institutions. am ever hope that they feel they
got their money’s worth
have benefited immensely from discussions of many ofthe is:
sues inthis book witha numberof friends and colleagues OF special
Importance are discussions Ihave had with Philippe Rocha, Josep
(Call, Malinda Carpenter, Nameera Akhtar, Gina Cont-Ramsden,
lena Lieven, Tricia Strano, Holger Diesel, Nancy Budi, and
‘Ann Kruger. All ofthese people also read some or all ofa deft of
the manuscript and proved extremely sel commentary. 1am
also grateful to Michael Cole and Katherine Nelson, who reviewed
the manuscript for Harvand University Press and provided very
helpful and timely feedback as wel
Capra 1 Me Toma
Prt inte Ur sate Amer
Ura of Cons Cate ation Dat
wazaee
2005-10
Finally, would lke to thank Katharina Habedl and Anke Fstr for
all of their editorial and other assistance on the home front in
Leipeig and Elizabeth Kaoll and Camille Sith for al of ther eito-
Fal and other assistance at Harvard University PresCONTENTS
1A Puzzle anda Hypothesis 1
2 Biological and Cultural Inheritance 13
5. Joint Atention and Cultural Learning 56
4 Linguistic Communication and Symbolic Representation 9
5 Linguistic Constructions and Event Cognition 13
6 Discourse and Representational Redescription 161
7 Cultural Cognition 201
Refrences 219
Index 241
A PUZZLE AND A
HYPOTHESIS
Al tert skirts of id
eb eh por fied ia
Somer in Africa, sometime about 6 millon years ago, rou
tine evolutionary event, a population of great apes became repro-
luctively isolated from is conspecifics. This new group evolved and
split into stil other groups, leading eventually to several diferent
species of bipedal ape ofthe genus Austalpthocs. lof these new
species eventually dled out except one that survives unl about 2
zilon years ago, by which time i had changed so much that it
‘eed not usta new species designation but a new genus designe
tion, Homo. Compared with i austalopthecine forebears—who
were four feet al with apesized brains and no stone tols—Homo
‘was larger physically, had a larger brain, and made stone tools. Be
{ore long, Homo began to tava the globe widely, although none of
its enly forays out of Africa suceeded in establishing any popula
tions that survives permanent
Then, somewhere stil in Africa, sometime about 200000 years
‘ago, ane population of Homo began on anew aod diferent evolu
tNonary trajectory. It began living in new ways in Africa and then
spread out across the world, outcompeting al ethee populations of
Homa and leaving descendants that are known today as Homo sapiens
{oe Figre 1-1). The individual ofthis new species had a numberof
‘new physical characteristics, ineluding somewhat larger brains, but
most striking were the new cognitive skills and products they
created:
“They began to produce a plethora of new stone tools adapted 40
specific ends with each population ofthe species eating its
own fook-use “industry”—resuting eventually in some pepula-
tions creating such things as computerized manufacturing
processes.
+ They began to use symbols to communicate ad to structure
‘heir social ives, including not only Linguistic symbols but also
tsi symbols inthe frm of stone carvings and cave paint
ingy—resuling eventually in some populations creating such
things as written language, money, mathematical notation,
ond ar
They began to engage in new kinds of social practices and onga-
izations, including everything from the burying ofthe dead
‘ceremonially to the domestication of plants and animals—result-
Ing eventually in some populations creating such things as or-
‘malized religious, governmental, educational, and commercial
institutions.
‘The basic puzzle this. The 6 milion years that separates human
beings from other great apesiss very short ime evolionaiy, ith
rmodeen humans al chimpanzees sharing something on the order
‘0f 98 percent oftheir gonetic material—the same degree of related
‘essa that of other sister genera such as lions and tigers, hoses and
2abras, and rats and mice (King and Wilson, 197). Our problem is
thus one of ime. The fc is, there simply has aot been enough time
for normal proceses of biological evolution involving genetic vara-
tion and natural selection to have eeated, one by one, each of the
cognitive skills necessary for modern humans to invent and sine
tain complex tool-use industries and technologies, complex forms of
‘symbolic communication and representation, and complex socal or
‘ganizations and institutions. An the puzzle is only magrifiod if we
lake seriously current research in paleoanthropology suggesting that
{@) forall but the last 2 milion years the human lineage showed nosigns of anything other than typical great ape cognitive sil and
() the fist dramatic signs of speciesunique cognitive skills
‘emerged only in the Ist one-quaeter ofa milion Years with modern.
“Homo sapien Foley and Lahr, 1997; Klein, 1985; Swinger and MeKle,
1996).
‘Ther s only one posible solution to this puzae. That, theses
‘only one known biological mechanism that could bring about these
kinds of changes in behavior and cognition in so short a time—
‘whether that time be thought of a5 6 million, 2 million, or onequar-
terof« million years, This biological mechanism is social or cult
transmission, which works on time scales many orders of magnitude
faster than those of organic evolution. Broadly speaking, cultural
transmission isa moderately common evolutionary proces that en-
ables individual organisms to save much time and effort, not to
mention isk, by exploiting the already existing knowledge and
sills of conspecifics, Cultural transmission includes such things a8
fledgling bids mimicking their spesies-typical song from pacent,
rat pups eating only dhe foods eaten by their mothers ants lating
food by following the pheromone tails of conspecifics, young chin
ppanzecs leaming the tool-use practices ofthe ads around them,
And man childeen acquiring the linguistic conventions of others in
their sccial groups (Mundinger, 1980; Heyes and Galt, 196), Hov-
ever, despite the fact that all of these processes may be grouped
under the general bri of cultural transmission, the precise beha-
ioral and cognitive mechanisms involved inthe different cases are
‘numerous and diverse including everything from parents eliciting
fied action pattems from thee offspring to transmission of kills by
Iniatve leaning and instruction —which suggests the posbity of
significant subtypes of eulural tanamission processes (Tomasll
1980; 1991), One reasonable hypothesis, then, is thatthe amazing
site of cognitive skills and products displayed by modern humans
isthe result of some sort of speces-unigue mode or modes of cul
tural ransmission,
‘The evidence that human beings do indeed have species unique
modes of cultural transmission is overwhelming, Most important,
the cultural traditions and artiocts of human beings accumulate
‘modifications aver time in a way that those of other animal specs
do not—so-called cumulative cultural evolution. Basically none of
the most complex human artists or social practices including tool
symbolic communication, ad socal institutions were
invented once and forall at single moment by any one indvidal
‘or group of individuals Rather, what happened was that some ini
vidal or group of individuals first invented a primitive version of
‘the artifact or practice, and then some later user or users made a
modification an “improvement” that others then adopted perhaps
‘without change for many generations at which point some other in-
dividual or group of individuals made another mosliication, which
‘was then learned and used by others, and so an over Mistrial ne
in what has sometimes been dubbed “the ratchet effec” (Tomasell,
Kage, and Ratner, 1988), The proces of cumulative cltual evel
tion requires not ony creative invention but also, and just as impor:
tantly, faithful soil transmission that can work as a ratchet to re
vent slippage backward-so that the newly invented artifact of
practice preserves its new and improved form at lest somewhat
‘aittully unt a further modification or improvement comes along,
Pethaps surprisingly, for many animal species it isnot the creative
component, but eather the stabilizing ratchet component hats the
lficult feat. Thus, many nonhuman primate individuals regularly
produce intelligent behavioral innovations and novelties, but then
their groupmates do not engage in the kinds of socal lamin that
‘would enable, overtime, the cultural ratchet to do its work (Kum
-mer and Goodall, 1985),
‘The basic fats thus that human beings are able to poo their com
nitive resources in ways that other animal species are not. Accond-
ingly, Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1983) distinguished human
cultural Ieaming from more widespread forms of soil lesening,
‘dntiving thee basic types: imitative leaning, instructed learning,
‘nd collaborative learning. These thee types of cultural learning are
made posible by a single very special form of social cognition,
namely, the ability of individual organisms to understand con-
specifics as beings like thensles who have intentional anc mental
lives like their own. This understanding enables individuals to
indus
6
Imagine themselves “in the mental shoes” of some other person, 30
that they can learn not just ro te other but Hough the athe. This
understanding of others as intentional beings lke the self crucial
in human cultural learning berause cultural artifacts and social pra
ticesexemplied protatypcaly by the use of tools and linguistic
‘symbols invariably point beyond themselves to other outside enti
ties: tools point tothe problems thy are designed to solve and ln-
_uistic symbols point to the communicative situations they are de
‘signed to represent. Therefore, to socially ler the conventional use
fof a tool ora symbol, children must come to understand Why, to-
‘ward what outside end, the other person is using the oo or symbol,
that is to say, they must come to understand the intentional sgaii
cance ofthe tol use or symbolic practice—what it “for” what
‘we, the users ofthis tool a symbol do with i
Processes of cultural leaning are especially powerful forms of
socal leaning because they constitute both (a) especially faith
forms of cultural transmission (creating an especially powerful cul
tural ratchet) and (b) especially powerful forms of soial
facts for developing children because they embody the ways that
previous generations of human beings in a scial group have found
Fr useful to categorize and construe the world for purposes of inter
personal communication. For example, in different communicative
°
situations one and the same object may be construed asa dog. an an-
Jnl, a pet, ora pest one and the same event may be construed 35
‘running, moving, Hesing, or surviving: one and the same place may
be construed asthe coast, the shore, the beach, othe sand—all de
‘pending on the communicative goals ofthe speaker. As the cil
masters th linguistic symbols of her culture she thereby acquices|
‘the ability to adopt multiple perspectives simeltaneously on one and
‘the same perceptual situation. As perspectvally based cognitive
representation, then, linguistic symbols ae based not on the ecord-
Ing of ciret Sensory or motor experiences as are the cognitive rep-
resentations of other animal species and human infants, but rather
‘on the ways in which individuals choose to construe things out ofa
‘number of other ways they might have constued them as embed
ied inthe other available linguistic symbols that they might have
chosen, but did not Linguistic symbols thus fee human cognition
‘rom the immediate perceptual situation not simply by enabling ref
ference to things outside this situation (“displacement ”; Hocket,
194), but rather by enabling multiple simultaneous representations
‘oF each and every indeed ll possible, perceptual situations
Later, a children become more skilful with theie native language
dltional possibilities for construing things in diferent ways open,
up. For example, natural languages contain cognitive resources for
‘avtoning the world into such things as events and their partii=
‘pants—who may play many and various roles in these events—and
{or forming abstract categories of event and participant types, More
‘over, natural languages also contain cognitive resources for const
ing whole events or situations in terms of one another, that sor
creating the various kinds of analogies and metaphors that are so
Important in adult cogaition—such as seeing the atom as sola s)s-
tem, love as a journey, or anger as heat (Lakot, 1987; Getner and
Markman, 197; see Chapter 5). Also, childeen’s growing sil of
linguistic communication enable thers to participate in complex dis-
«course interactions in which the explicitly symbolized perspectives
of ineratants lash and so must be negotiated and resolved. These
kinds of interactions may lead children to begin to construct some-
‘thing like a theory of mind of their communicative partners, and, in
»
some special cases of pedagogical discourse to internalize adul
structions and so begin to sel-regulate and to reflect on thelr own,
thinking perhaps leading to some types of metacogition and zep-
resentational redesripion (Karmilot#-Smith, 1992). The interalza-
tion of discourse interactions containing multiple, conflicting per
spectves may even be identified with certain types of uniquely
naman, calogical thinking proceses (Vygotsky, 1978),
In this book—for which the foregoing may be seen as a kind of
[précis attempt to spell out this general line of argumentation in
Some detail. That i, my specific hypothesis is that human cognition
tas the species-unique qualities it oes because
+ Phylogenctialy: modern human beings evolve the ability #0
iceniy” with conspecifics, which led toan understanding of
them as intentional nd mental beings like the sl
+ Historical this enabled neve forms of cultural leaning and |
_uistic symbols (and analogies ane metaphors constructed fom
these symbol) and (internalize certain types of discourse i
teractions into sills f metacognition representational re-
description, and dlalogic thinking
1 should emphasize at the outset that my’ focus is only on the
specier-unique aspects of human cognition. Of course human cogni=
Hin is in large measure constituted by the kinds of things that ap-
pear as chapter headings in traditional Cognitive Peychology text
books: perception, memory, attention, categorization, and soon. But
these are all cognitive processes that human beings share with other
Primates (Tomasello and Call, 197; Tomasello, 1988), My account
‘here simply presupposes them, and then focuses in Vygotskian fash-fon on the kinds of evolutionary, historical, and ontogenetic
processes that might have transformed these fundamental skills nto
the special version of primate cognition that is human cognition. 1
should also emphasize that I will dal with the biological and histor-
ical processes involved in the evolution of human cognition only
briefly and somewhat indivectly—mainly because the event of
terest took place deep in the evolutionary and historical past and out
information about them is very poor (Chapter 2). On the ther hand,
[will focus in some detail on human cognitive ontogeny—about
"which we know a good eal through several decades fcrct obser
vation and experimentation—and the processes by which human
children atively exploit and make use ofboth their biological and
cultural inheritances (Chapters 3-8),
Unfortunately, in tosay’s intellectual climate my argument may
be taken by some theorists to be an essentially genetic ane: the
socia-cognitive adaptation characteristic of modern humans i a
[ind of “male bullet” that diferentates human beings from other
‘primate species ut this isan erroneous view that basicaly ignores
ll ofthe sciakcultral work that must be done by individuals and
_groups of nividual, in oth historical and ontogenetic time, ore
te uniguely human cognitive skills and product. From an histori
cal perspective, a quarter ofa million years is avery long time dur
ing which much may be accomplished culturally, and anyone who
has spent time with young chien knows how many leaning ex
petiences may take place within the course of several years—or even
Several days of several hours of continuous, active engagement
‘withthe environment, Any serious inquiry into human cognition,
therefore, must include some account of these historical and onto”
_enetic processes, which ate enabled but nat in ny way determined
by human beings’ biological adaption fora spacial form of social
cognition. Ince, my-central argument in tis book is that it i these
processes, not any specialized biological adaptations directly that
Ihave done the actual workin creating many, if nt al ofthe most
distinctive and important cognitive products and. processes ofthe
species Homo sapiens. And itis worth noting inthis context that ake
ing these processes seriously enables us to explain not only the uni-
2
BIOLOGICAL AND
CULTURAL
INHERITANCE
But hres thing ao te prc of proves contin oF
bina sent fin the ut decane tt pres,
‘The overarching fact of the organic world i evolution by means of
natural selection. A key element inthis process i biological inheri=
tance, by means of which an organism inherits the basic Bruplor of
its forebears, along, with its implications for perceptual, behavioral,
and cognitive functioning. But fr all mammalian species including
all primate species, much of the ontogeny by’ means of which this
‘Balan comes into being takes place while the developing organism
4s interacting with its environment. The relatively long period of
imamaturity in which this interaction takes pice is ofcourse a very
Fishy life-history strategy, as it means that offspring are totally
dependent on ane of mare parents for food anc protection fom
predators for some time, The compensating advantage of along,
immaturity is that it enables ontogenetic pathways that incorporate
significant amounts of individual learning and cognition, svhich
Typically result in moce flexible behavioral and cognitive adapta-
tions. Flexible behavioral/cognitive adaptations closely attuned
tothe local environment are especially useful for organisms
‘whose populations live in diverse environmental niches, or whose
cenvironmental niches change relatively rapidly ever time (Bruner,
1073).
versal features of uniquely human cognition—such as the creation
and use of material, symbolic, and institutional artifacts with cc
‘mulated historios-but aso the particularities of particular cultures,
‘each of which has developed for Itself via these same historical and
‘ontogenetic processes a variety of culturally unique cognitive skill
land products during the post several dozen millennia of human,
history
In some animal species, the developing organism individually ac-
‘uires information not onty fom ts physical environment but also
ftom its socal envionment —oe from aspects of ite physical environ-
rent that have been modified in important ways by conspecifics.
For example, a alluded to above, some hie species acquire their
speciestypical song by listening to the song oftheir parents, and
‘some insets ate able to find food on their first day in the external
fenvironment Because they know instinctively how to follow the
[pheromone trails laid down by conspecifics (Mundinger, 1980;
Heyes and Gale, 1996). In its broadest definition, as used by many
evolutionary biologists, this process is eallod eultueal wansmission,
for cultural inheritance, and it produces cultural waditions. Recent
recognition of the importance of cultural transeission for many a=
tal species has led fo the creation of Dual Inheritance Theory, i
‘which the mature phenotypes of many species are seen to depend
‘on what they inherit rom thei forebears both biologically an cul=
turally (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Durham, 199).
Human beings of cours, are the prototypical species for Dual In-
hreritance Thooey, as normal human development depends crucially
‘on both biological and cultural inheritance. My particular claim is
that in the cognitive geal the biological inhertance of humans is
very much like that of other primates. Theze jst one major difer
fence, and that the fact that human beings “identify” with con-
specifics more deeply than clo other primates. This identification is
not something mysterious, but simply the process by which the
Jhuman child understands that other persons are beings like her
solfin a way that inanimate objects ae not, for example—and so
she sometimes tres to understand things from their point of view.
During early ontogeny in a process that willbe spelled out in more
lel in later chapters, the child comes to experience herself as an
Intentional agent—that i, a being whose behavioral and afentional
steatogies are organized by gotls—and so she automatically ses
‘other beings with whom she identities in these same terms. Later in
“ontogeny, the chill comes to experience herself asa mental agent
thats, being with thoughts an belies that may differ from those6
‘of other people aswell as frm realty—and so fom that time on she
‘will ee conspecifics in these new terms, For purposes of exposition
refer to this process generally a8 "understanding others as inten-
onal (or mental) agents (lke the self.”
This one cognitive difterence has many cascading effects because
it makes possible some new and uniquely powertl forms of uleral
hertance, Understanding other persons as intentional agents lke
‘the self makes possible both (a) processes of saciogeness by means
‘of which multiple individuals collaboratively crentecultral artifacts
and practices with accumulated histories, and (b) processes of cul
‘ual learning and internalization by means of which developing in-
slviduals lesen to use and then internalize aspects of the collabora
tive products created by conspeciis. This means that most if not
all of the speciessunique cognitive skills of human beings ae not
«fue toa unigue biological inheritance dvclly, but ather result fom.
1 variety of historical and ontogenetic processes that are set into
‘motion by the ane uniquely human, biologically inherited, eogaitive
capacity
Biological Inheritance
‘Human beings are primates. They have the same basic sense organs
the same basic body plan and the same basic brain plan as all other
primates, Therefore, if we are attempting to characterize the evalu
Hlonary bases of human cognition, we must begin with primates in
‘genera Inthe current context there are two questions of central t=
portance (a) How does the cognition of primates dlr fom that of
‘other mammals? and (b) How does the cogaition of humans dite
from that of other primates? My answers to these to questions il
bbe based onthe resazch of Tomasello and Call (197), who provide
_more detailed analyses of the elvan empirial studies and hearst
cal arguments as well as a more complete st of references, It must
be acknowledged at the outset, of course, that other answers to these
{questions are aso possible (se, for example, Byrne, 1985, for some
sliferent views)
6
‘Manama and Primate Cognition
All mammals ive in basically the same sensory-motor world of per:
‘manent objects aerayed ina representational space; primates, nclud-
ing humans, have no special shils in this regaed. Moreover, many
mammalian species and basically all primates cognitively represent
the categorical and quantitative relations among objets as well:
These cognitive skills are evidenced by their ability to do sch
things as
+ remember “what” is“where" in their lecal environment, 4,
‘which rit age in sehich tres (at what times)
+ take novel detours and shortcuts in navigating through space;
+ fellow the visible and invisible movements of abject (Le, pass
rigorously controlled Pagetin object permanence tets~ some
Stage 6)
+ categorize objects on the basis of perceptual similarities;
* understand and thus match small nmerosities of objets;
+ use insight in problem solving.
‘And much evidence suggests that mammals do not acquiee these
lis in some behaviorstie connecting of simul and responses, of
ia Some simple form of eote memory, but eather actually come #0
comprehend and cognitively represent spaces and objects and cate
{ories and quantities of ebjects) in ways that enable creative infer
‘ces and insightful problem saving
Similarly, all mammals lve in basically the same social word of
individually recognized conspecifis and their vertical (dominance)
and horizontal atfiliative) relationships, and they have the ability 0
predict the behavior of conspecifics in many situations based on a
variety of ues an insights. These cognitive sis are evidenced by
thei ability todo such things a=
+ recognize individuals in their social groups;
+ form disc elationships with other individuals based on such
things as kinship, feiendship, and dominance rank;
+ predict the behavior of individuals based on such things as thee
emotional state and thei direction of locomotion;
+ use many types of socal and communicative strategies out
‘compete groupmates for valued resources:
+ cooperate with conspecifics in problem-solving asks and in
forming social coalitions and alliances;
+ engage in various forms of social leningin which they len
‘valuable things fom conspecifics
‘Aad again much evidence suggests that mammalian individuals do
‘ot at blindly socially, but rather actually comprehend and cog
tively represent what they are doing when they interact with their
_groupmates in these various complex ways
There is one exception to ths overall cognitive similarity among
-mamnals, however, and thatconcers primates‘ understanding ofre-
lational categories, which manifest itself in both the social and phys
‘cal domains Inthe sccial domain, primates, but not other mammals,
understand something ofthe thied-party socal elationshps that hold
among ther individuals for example, they understand suc things as
‘the kinship and dominance relations that thi parties have with one
another. Thus, primates are selective in choosing thei coalition part
‘ers selecting as an aly, for instance, an individ whois dominant
to their potential adversary—indcatng their understanding of the
‘lative dominance ranks of these 90 individuals, They also seek ret
‘ution for attacks against themselves not just on the attacker, but
lsoinsome circumstances onthe aacke’skin—in hiscase evident
dng an understanding of third-party kinship elatons. And there is
even some evidence thal primates understand whole categories of
‘thied-party seca lationship azoss different individuals for exam
ple, many diferent instances of the relationship “mother mediating force > consequent event.
In terms of evolution, then, the hypothesis is that human beings
built directly on the uniquely primate cognitive adaptation for un
derstanding extemal relational categorie, they just added a smal
‘but important tis in terms of meaing forces sich as causes and
intentions. This scenario gains some of ts plausibility from the fet
that it provides for continuity between uniquely primate and
uniquely human cognitive adaptations. Moreover, my hypothesis is
that just as primate understanding of relational categories evolved
frst inthe socal domain to comprehend thind-party sci relation-
ships, human causal understanding also evolved first inthe sci
slomain to comprehend others as intentional agents, There is cur-
rently no way of knowing if this is tue, of couse, but many af the
‘people of the world, when they ae in doubt ast the physial cause
‘of an event, often invoke various types of animistic or deistic forces
to explain it perhaps this i the defaulk approach. And so, my y=
pothesis s thatthe uniquely human ability to understand external
‘vents in terms of mediating intentional casa forces emenge ist
in human evolution tallow individuals to predict ant explain the
Wi
Conapecitc Limb das Fruit
inten (phil fe) falls
sat
manipulates
Rockfals
Predator Subject afraid subject
sppenre (psyclogicl force) ‘se
ale
iar 21 pic epi of ne pl alone el ee
‘behavior of conspecifis and has since been transported to deal with
the behavior of inet objects,
We have no idea when this might have occured, but one possi=
bility is that i was characteristic of modern humans as they fist
evolve somewhere in Afi some 200,00 years ago, al this may
even explain why they outcompeted other hominids as they mi
grated allover the globe, The competitive advantages of inten:
tional/causal thinking are mainly two. First this kindof cognition
enables humans to solve problems in especially creative, flexible,
and foresightful ways. Thus in many eases intentional eausal un-
derstanding enables an individual to predict and control events
feven when their usual antecedent is aot present—that si there is
seme other event that may serve to instigate the mediating force.
For example, an individual night create a novel way to distract a
competitor away from something over which they are competing
{eg by placing food in the opposite retin), ofa novel tol for
generating the force needed to move an obstacle. Conversely, if an
fevent occurs in a circumstance in which the mediating forces
somehow blocked, it could be predicted that it usual consequent
‘will not follow. For example, an individual could block the visual
access of a competitor to the objet af theie competition, of could
prevent a stove fom rolling down a ill by placing another stone
tinder i, Humans causal and intentional understanding thus have
immediate consequences for effective action, a8 they open up the
possibility of finding novel ways to either manipulate or suppress
mediating forces,
The second advantage of intentional/causal understanding de-
ives from its powerful transforming role in processes of social
Tearing, That is, understanding the Behavir of ether persons as in-
tentional and/or mental dzelly enables certain very powerful
forms of cultural learning and sociogeness, and these forms of
socal leatning are directly responsible for the special forms of cul=
tural inheritance characteristic of human beings But to appreciate
this claim, we mast lok mote closely at the cultural transmission |
processes characteristic of our nearest primate relatives and then
compare these tothe human case
26
Nonhuman Primate Culture
There are many diferent forms of ultra inheritance and tansmis=
sion depending on the precise socal leaming mechanisms involved,
Among the most commonly cited ae:
+ Exposure: youngsters may be exposed to new learning experi
ences because they stay physically lose to conspecifics, without
leaming anything from the behavior of conspeciicsdirecty—as
‘when a youngster follows its mother and so stumbles upon
Water, thereby learning the water's location.
Stimulus enlancenent: Youngsters may be attracted to objets
‘with which others are interacting an hen lear things on their
‘own about those objects—as when a young chimpanzee is at
teactel stick ts mather has discarded, and the attraction sts
in motion certain individual learning experiences withthe stick,
Mimicking: youngsters have adaptive specializations fr repro
ducing the actual behavior of conspecifics, although without an
appreciation for its instrumental efficacy and typically within a
very narrowly specialized behavioral domalin—as when some
bird species acquire thelr species typi vocalizations (oe as ia
the prelingustc babbling of human infants),
Imai lerng: youngsters actly reproduce the behavior or
lhavioral strategy ofthe demonstrator, forthe same goa as the
demonsteator
To fully account for the differences of secal lesening, between
-numan and noniuiman primates we will actualy need to istinguish
4 few addtional processes, but they are best explained in context
‘Macaque Potato Washing
The most often cited case ofa nonhuman primate cultural tradition
is that of Japanese macaque potato washing (Kawamura, 195%;
Kava, 1965), The story i this In 1953 an eghteen-month-old fe-male named Imo was observed to take pieces of sweet potato, given
to her and the rest ofthe troop by researchers, an to wash the sand
‘ff them in some nearby water. About tree months afer she began
to wash her potatoes the practice was observed in Imo’s mother and
two of her playmates (and then their mothers). During the nex two
years, seven other youngsters ako began #9 wash potatoes, and
within these years of no's irs potato washing about 40 percent of
‘the trop was doing the same, The fc that it was Imo's las assoc
tes sho leamed the behavior fst, and their associates directly
ater, was thought to be significant in suggesting that the means of
propagation ofthis behavior was some form of imitation in which
‘one individual actually copied the behavior of another.
The interpretation of these observations in terms of culture and
{imitation has two main problems, however. The fist problem is that
polato washing is much less unusual a Behavior for monkeys than
‘was originally thought Brushing sand of food turns out to be some-
thing tat many monkeys do naturally, and indeed thishad been ob-
served in the Koshima monkeys prior to the emergence of washin
Tes dhs not surprising that potato washing was alo observed in
four other troops of human-provisioned Japanese macaques soon
ater the Koshima cbservations (Kawai, 1965)—implying at least
four individuals who learned on their ow, Als, in captivity ind
viduals of ther monkey species lesen quite rapidly, on thee ven, to
wash their food when provided with sandy frits and bowls of
‘water (Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 1990). Te second problem has to
«fo with the patter ofthe spread of poato-vashing Behavior within
the group. The fact i thatthe spread ofthe behavior was relatively
slow, with an average time of over two years for acquisition by the
‘members of the geoup sso learned it (Calet, 192}. Moreover, the
rate of spread did not increase asthe numberof users increased. I
the mechanism of transmission were imitation, an increase in the
rate of propagation would be expected as more demonstrators be-
«ame available for observation over ime. In contrast if processes of
individual learning were at work, a slower and steadier rate of
spread would be expected—hich was infact observed. That Imo's|
friends and telatives were frst to learn the Behavior may be due to
the fact that eens and relatives stay close to one another, and thus
Io's friends may have followed her tothe water mor often during
feeding than other group members increasing their chances for ind
dual discovery.
Chimpanzee Tool Use
Perhaps the best species to examine in the curent context isu
rane’ closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, which is by far and
way the most cultural of nonhuman primates (McGrew, 182, 1998
Boesch, 198, in pres). Chimpanzees in thee natural habitats have a
numberof population-specific behavioral traditions that virtually all,
‘group members acquire and that persist across generations, iclud=
Ing sch things as food choice tool use, and gestural signaling For a
‘arety of reasons, genetic explanations for these population difer
cnces of behavior are unlikely fg, populations living lose together
Aare no more similar than populations living far apse) and 0 they
have been widely talked about as chimpanzee cultural trations
(eg, Wranghametal, 199)
The best-knovn example is chimpanzee tool use, For example,
chimpanzees in some populations of eastern Aftia fish for termites
by probing termite mounds with small, thin sticks. Some other pop-
ulations of chimpanzees in westen Africa, however, simply destroy
termite mounds with age sticks an allem to scoop up the insects
by the handful. Field researchers such as Boesch (192) and MeGrew
(1902) have claimed tht specific tool-ase practices such a these are
culturally transmuted” among the individuals ofthe various cout
munities, But there is «competing explanation that i also quite
‘losile. The fact is thatthe termite mounds in western rca are
rch softer, owing to larger amine of ean, than those of eastern
Arie, The strategy of destroying the moun with a lange stick is
thus available only tothe western populations. Under this hypoth-
ss then, there would be group differences of behavior superficially
resembling human cultural differences, but with no type of socal
»
Jearning involved at all. tn such cases the “culture” simply a result,
of individual learning driven by the different local ecologies of the
diferent populations—and so this process i caled simply enirn-
‘mental shaping.
Although environmental shaping i probably a part of the expl=
nations fr group differences of behavior for al primate species, in
cluding humans, extensive ecological analyses by Boesch et al
(1994) make this an unlikely explanation fr al ofthe dtferences of
‘behavior among different chimpanzee groups. Experimental anal
sts alo confirm that more than environmental shaping is at workin
chimpanzee tool use. Tomasello (1962) reviewed all ofthe experi-
‘mental studies of chimpanzee social learning of tol use and con-
cluded that chimpanzees are very good at leaming about the d
‘amie atfordances of obs that they discover through watching
‘others manipulate them, but they are not skilful at learning fom
others a new behavioral strategy per se. For example if mother
rolls log and ents the insects unereath, her child will very likely
follow suit. This is simply because the child leamed from the
mother’s act that there are insscts under the log—a fact she didnot
know and very likely would not have discovered on her own, But
she didnot lea from her mother how to rll og o oe insets
these are things she already knew how fo door cul learn how to
do.on her owa. (Thus, the Youngster would have leaned the same
thing if the wind, rather than her mother, had cause he og, ol
‘over and expose the ants.) This hasbeen calle emulator learning be
‘cause it is learning that focuses on the environmental events in-
volved—te changes of state inthe environment tat the other pro-
tuced—not on a conspecifics behavior or behavioral strategy
{Temasllo 190, 19%).
Emulation learning is a very intelligent and creative leasing
process that in some czcumstances, isa more adaptive steategy than
imitative learning. For example, Nagel, Olguia, and Tomasello
(1998) presented chimpanzees and tworvearold human children
‘witha rakelike tool and an outreach object. The too could be
used in ether of two ways leading to the same result of obtaining
»
the object. Fr each species one group of subjects observed a demon-
steator employ one method of ool use (less efficient) and another
{ou of subjects observed the other method of tool use (more efi
lent). The result was that whereas human children in. general
copied the method ofthe demonstratr in each ofthe to observa
tion conditions (imitative leaning), chimpanzees id lots offer
cent things fo obtain the objet, and these were of the same type no
matter which demonstration they observed (emulation leaning).
‘The interesting point i that many children insisted on this e_pro-
luction of adult behavior even In the case of the less efficent
method—leading to less successful performance than the chin
‘panzees in this condition. native laening i thus nota “higher” oF
moe ineligent” leening strategy than emalation learnings its
simply @ moce social strategy—which, in some eicumstances and
for some behaviors, has some advantages. This emulation learning
explanation also applies to other studies ofchimpanzce social lear
ing of tool use suchas those of Whiten eta, (199) and Russon and
Galdikas (1959).
‘Chimpanzees age thus very intelligent and creative in using tks
and understanding changes inthe environment brought about by
the tool use of others, but they donot seem to understand the nse
rental behavior of conspecifics in the same way as do humans. For
Iharnans the goal or intention of the demonstatoe sa central part of
‘what they perceive and indeed the goal s understood as something
scparate fom the various behavioral means that may be used tac
complish the goal Observers’ ability to separate goal and means
‘serves ta highlight for them the demonstratr's method or stay
‘of tol use as an independent entity the behavior she is using in an
attempt to accomplish the gos, given the possibly of other means
‘of accomplishing it In the absence of this ability to understand goal
‘and behavioral means as separable in the actions of others, chit
ppanace observers focus onthe changes of state including changes of
spatial position) ofthe objets involved daring the demonstration,
‘with the ations of the demonstrator being in effect, just other phys
ical motions. The intentional tates of the demonstrator, and this hera
‘behavioral methods a5 distinct behavioral entities, are simply not
att of their experience.
(Chimpanzee Gestural Signaling
‘The other well-known case isthe gestural communication of chim
ppanzoes, Although there are few systematic studies of chimpanzee
{estes in the wil, by al indications there are some population:
specific behaviors that might be called cultural (Goodall, 19865;
‘Tomaselo, 1980; Nishida, 1980). In captivity much more systematic
"work has been done in which the specific gestures used by specifi
Individuals over time have been documented—allowing for infer-
fences about the social leaning processes involved. In a series of
studies, Tomasllo and colleagues have asked whethee youngsters
acquire their gestural signals by imitative learning oe bya process of
‘ontogenetic ritaaliation (Tomasell et a, 1985; 1989; 1994; 1997). In
ontogenetic ritualization a communicator signal s created by #90
‘organisms shaping ech other's behavior in repeated instances ofa
‘socal interaction. For example, an infant may initiate nursing by
going directly forthe mother’s nipple, perhaps grabbing and mov~
ing her arm inthe proces. In some future encounter the mother may
anticipate the infant's impending behavioral efors at the fist touch
‘of her arm, and so become receptive at that point—leading the infant
‘om some future occasion stil to abbreviate is behavior toa touch on
the arm while waiting fora response ("arm-toueh 35a so-alled in-
tention movement) Note that theres no hint here that one individ-
uals seeking 1 reproduce the behavior of another; dere nly =
ciprocal socal interaction over repeated encounters that resulls
‘eventualy i a communicative signal. This is presumably the way
‘that most human infants lear the “armroverhend” gesture to re-
quest that adults pick them up, that first as a direct attempt to
craw up the adult's body, and then, as the adult anticipates thee de>
‘iw and picks them up, as an abbreviate, ritualized version ofthis
crawling. activity performed for communicative purposes only
(Lock, 197).
2
All of the available evidence suggests that ontogenetic stualiza-
tion not imitative learning, is responsible for chimpanzees’ acquis
ion of communicative gestures Fist, there area numberof diosyn-
crate signals that are used by only one individual (se also Goodall,
1986); these signals could not have been learned by imitative
processes and #0 must have been individually invented and tual
eed. Second, longitadinal analyses have revealed by both quit
tive and quantitative comparisons that there is much individual
variability, both within and across generation, in chimpanzee ges"
tural signaling suggesting something other than imitative learning,
‘which generally produces homogeneity of behavior. Itsalso impor-
tant that the gestures that are used in common by many” youngsters
fare gestures that ate also used quite frequently by captive young:
Ssters raise in peer groups with no opportunity to observe older
conspecifis. Finally in an experimental study, Tomasello and col-
leagues (1997) removed an individual from the group and taught
‘er two diferent arbitrary signals by means of which she obtained
desired food from a human. When she was then selured t0 the
‘roup and used these same gestures to obtain fool from a human,
there was not one instance of another individual reproducing either
ofthe new gestures—even though ll ofthe other individuals were
‘observing the gestures and highly motivate for the food.
‘The clear conclusion is thus that chimpanzee youngsters acquire
the majoety,ifnot the totality, of ther gestures by individually tu
alizing them with one another. The explanation fr this learning
process analogous othe explanation for emulation learning inthe
‘case of tool use. Like emulation learning, ontogenetic ritualization
doesnot requie individuals to understand the Behavior of others as
‘separable into means and goals in the same way as does imitative
lesening,Inittvely learning an “amt-ouch” as a solicitation for
ng Would requite that an infant observe another infant sing
fan “armtouch” and know what goal it was parsing (vi, nur
ing)—s0 that when itd the same goal itcoulel use the same behav=
ioral means. Ritulizing an “armetouch,” in contrast, only requires
the infant to anticipate the future behavior of» conspecific na can:
text in which tthe infant) already has the goal of nursing, Ontoge-
=
‘etc stualizaton s thus, lke emulation laening avery intelligent
‘and creative socal learning process that is very important in all 30-
fal species, including humans But i isnot a learning process by
means of which individuals atlempt to reproduce the behavioral
strates of other.
Chimpanzee Tenching
“These two domains thus provide us with two very diferent sources
‘of evidence about nonhuman primate socal tring. Inthe case of
tool use its very likely that chimpanzees acquire the ool-use skills
to which they are exposed by a process of emulation laening Inthe
‘ase of gestural signal it is very likely that they aequice their com>
_municative gestures through a process of ontogenetic itvaization
Both emulation learning and ontogenetic ritualization requice skills
‘of cognition and seca learning, each in ts own way, but nether re-
quires skills of imitative learning in which the learner (a) compre
Ihends both the demonstrator’ goal and the strategy being used 10
‘pursue that goal, and then (bin some way aligns this goal and stat-
gy with her owa, Indeed, emulation leaning and ontogenetic t=
ation are precisely the kinds of social leaming one would expect
‘oF onganisns that are very inteligent and quick to learn, but dat do
rot understand others a8 intentional agents with whom they can
align themselves
The other main process involved in cultural transmission as trai
tionally cfind is teaching, Whereas social learning comes from the
bottom up,” as ignocant oF unskilled individuals seek to become
mote knowledgeable or skilled, teaching comes from the "top
down,” as knowledgeable ot skilled individuals seek to impart
inowidge or skills to others. The problem in this case is that there
‘are very fw systematic studies of teaching in nonhuman prtaten
‘The most thorough study is that of Boesch (1991) in which ehim-
_panace mathers and infants were bserved in the context of oo vse
{nut cracking), Boesch discovered that mothers do a number of
‘things tat serve to facilitate the infant's activities with the tool and
ruts such as leaving thom ile so the infant can use them while she
a
goes to gather more nuts (which she would not do if another adult
were present), But the interpretation of the mother’s intention in
such eases is fa from straighforward. Moreover in the category of
sctive instruction.” in which the nother appears to be actively at-
tempting to instrct her child, Boesch abserve ony two possible n-
stances (over many years of observation). These two instances are
also ficlt to intrpet in the sense thatthe mother may or may
‘ot have ad the goal of helping the youngster lar to use the too,
(On the other hand, although there is much variability across difer-
ent societies, adult humans in all cultures actively instruct their
young on a regular basis in one way of another (Kruger and
‘Tomaselo, 1995) Along with imitative learning, the process of ac-
tive instruction is very likely crucial othe uniquely human pattern
‘of eultural evolution a well
Enculturated Apes
Iemay be object that there ate a numberof very convincing obser
‘ations af chimpanzee imitative lening in the Ierature, and i
ded there are sme Its inersting, however, that basicaly al of
the clear eases concern chimpanzees that have had extensive human
contac. many cases this as taken the form of intentional instrac-
tion ineolving human encouragement af behavior and attention, and
«even direct reinforcement for imitation for many months for exam
pile Hayes and Hayes (1952) provide their chimpanzce Viek ith
seven months of systematic waining, and Custance, Whiten, and
Bard (1995) provided their two chimpanzees with four months of
systematic uaining, This rises the posuibliy that imitative learning,
shill may be infuenced, or even enabled, by ertain kinds of social
interaction during early ontogeny
‘Confirmation for this point of view is provided in a shady by
‘Tomaselo, Savage-Rumbauigh, and Krager (199). This study’ com>
pared the imitative learning abilities of mother-teared captive chim
anzees, enculturated chimpanzees (aise ike human children and
exposed to a languagetike system of communication) and o>=
{year-old human children. Each subject was shown twenty-four df=
ferent and novel actions on objets, and each subject's behavior on
each ial was Scored a5 to whether it succesfully reproduced (1) the
fend result of the demonstrated action, and/or (2) the behavioral
means used by the demonstrator. The major result was that the
tmotherreared chimpanzees almost never succeeded in reproducing
bods the end and means ofthe novel actions (i, they didnot ita
tively lear them). In contrast, the enculturated chimpanzees and
‘the human children imitative learned the novel etons much more
requently, and they didnot differ fom one another inthis learning,
Relatedly, some humaraised chimpanzees sometimes learn 10
‘communicatively point for humans, and even to use something re-
sembling human linguistic symbol, through ich social interactions
‘with humans but without any systematic taining per se (Savage
Rumbaugh etal, 1988)
“These studies show that apes raised by human beings in a human
‘ike cultural environment-sometimes with and sometimes without
explicit teaining—ean develop some humalike skills eat they do
‘ot develop in their natural habitats or under more typical captive
conditions: What exactly ae the effective factors that produce these
‘outcomes i not knoven a this time, but one plausible hypothesis =
thatin humamike cultural entronments apes receive a kindof “s0-
alization of attention.” That is, apes in their natural habitats do not
hhave anyone who points fr them, shows them things teaches them,
‘rin general expresses intentions toward thei attention (or other in-
tentional states) In a human-like cultural environment, in conta
they are constantly interacting with humans who show them things,
point to things, encourage (even reinforce) imitation, and tach them
Special skils—all of which involve a referential tangle between,
‘human, ape, and some third entity. Perhaps itis this socialization
into the referential triangle—of «type that most human children =
ceive—that accounts fo the special cognitive achievements of these
special apes
‘But it is important to recognize that apes raised in human cultural
environments do not thereby turn inte human beings. Although si
1%
cents have not probed to any great extent the limitations of human
raised apes’ cognitive sil, some differences frm human children
fare readily apparent. For example, It seems that tis sila rare event
for an enculturated ape to simply show something to a human ot
ape companion declarative, oto point to something just forthe
‘ike of sharing afention to it. They do not participate in extended
joint attentional interactions in the same way’ as human children
(Carpenter, Tomasello, and SavageRumbaugh, 195), and when
‘compared with the skills of human children their sil ith human |
Iangage are limited in a number of important ways (Tomasllo,
1994), In tas in which they must cooperate with conspecifics, with:
‘ut specific human training, ape sil of collaborative learning are
curiously limited, and there is till very ite, ifany, behavior of en-
culturated apes that one would want to call intentional teaching sce
CClland Tomasello, 196, fea review),
“The moat plausible conclusion is thus that the learning skis that
chimpanzees develop in the wild in the absence of human inter:
action (Le, sills involving individual learning supplemented by
emulation learning and ritualization) are sufficient to create and
maintain their speiestypcal cultura activites, but they are not su
ficient to crate and maintain humane cultural activites display
ing the ratchet effect and cumulative cultral evolution. And it is
ppethaps worth noting that in their natural habitat chimpanzees’ sis:
ter species, bonabos (Pan psu), have nots far been observed t0
shovt anything resembling the population specific behavioral tadi-
tions of chimpanzees—which may suggest thatthe common ances
tor to humans and these two sister species did not have well
developed cultural leaning sil either, The fact that chimpanzees
and bonabos raised fom an ealy age an for many’ years ip human
lke cultural environments may develop some aspects of human s0-
‘ial cognition and cultural learning demonstrates the posse of cul
tural processes in ontogeny in a particularly dramati way, and the
fact that other animal species da not respond in this manner demon-
strates the impressive socal laming skills of the great apes. But re-
sponding toa culture and crating culture de noo are te ferent
things
Human Cultural Evolution
We may concde, then, that whereas chimpanzees clearly create
and maintain cultural traditions broadly defined, these very likely
rest on different processes of socal cognition and socal learing
than the cultural taditions of human beings. In some eases this i=
ference of process may not lead to any concrete differences of ou
‘come in socal organization, information transmission, oF cognition
But in other eases a crucial difference emerpes and this manifests
self in processes of cultural evolution, that i, processes by which a
cultural tradition acumilates mosifications overtime.
(Cumulative Cultural Evolution and the Ratchet Effect
‘Some cultural tsions accumulate the modifications made by dit
{erent individuals overtime so that they become more complex, and
1 wider range of adaptive functions is encompassed—what may be
Called cumulative cultural evolution or the “ratchet elect” (se Fig
ure 22) For example, the way human beings have used objects as
‘hammers has evolved significantly over human history. This is evi=
dence in the artifactual record by various hammertike tools that
sradually widened! their Functional sphere as they were melifed
again ad again to meet novel exigencies, gong from simple stones,
to compasite tools composed of a stone tied 10a stick, to various
types of modern metal hammers and even mechanical hammers
{ome with nail-removing functions as wel: Basal, 1988). Although
|we do not have such a detalle artifactual recor, its presumably
the ease that some cultural conventions and rituals eg, uma a=
‘guages and religious rituals) have become more complex over ime
as well as they were mode to meet nove communicative ad 30
‘ial needs. Tis process may be more characteristic of some human,
cultures than others, or of some types of activities than others, bt al
cultures would seem to have at least some aticts produced by the
ratchet effect. There donot seem tobe any behaviors of other animal
species including chimpanzees, that show cumulative cultural evo-
tion (Boesch and Tomaselo, 1958)
*
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Tomaselo and colleagues (1999) argued that cumulative cultural
evolution depends on imitative leaening, and perhaps active instruc-
ion oa the pat of adults, and cannot be brought about by means of
“weaker” forms of social learning such as local enhancement, emnula-
tion learning, ontogenetic stualzation, or any form of individual
learning, The argument is that cumulative cultural evolution de-
pends on vo processes, innovation and imitation (possibly supe
rented by instruction), that must take place in a dialectical process
‘overtime such that one step in the process enables the next. Thus if
‘one individual chimpanzee invented a more ficient way’ of fishing,
{or termites by using a stick in a novel way tat induced more ter
mites to crawl onto it, youngsters who learned to fish via emulation
ofthis individual would not reprodice this precise variant because
they would not be focused on the innovator's behavioral techniques
‘They would use their own method of fishing to Induce mone ter-
rites onto the stick, and any other individuals watching them
‘would use thei own methods also, and so the novel steategy would
simply die out with the inventor. (This precisely the hypothesis of
Kummer and Goodall, 1985, who believe that many acts of creative
intelligence on the part of nonhuman primates go unbserved by
Jhumans because they are not faithfully preserve in the group.) On
the other hand, if observers were capable of imitative learning they
might adopt the innovator’s new static variant for termite fishing,
_more or les fithuly. This new behavior would then pu them into
new cognitive space, soto speak, in which they could think about
the task and how to solve it in something like the manner of the in-
rovatr (standing in her "cognitive shoes”) All of the individuals
‘who had done this would then be ina pesiton, possibly, to invent
‘thee variants that bul on the inital one—which then others might
adopt faithfully, or even build on, as well. The metaphor of the
ratchet in this contest is meant 49 capture the fact that imitative
learning (ith oF without active instrcton) enables the kind of
faithfo transmission that is necessary to hold the novel variant in
place in the group so as to provide a platform for further innova-
tione—with the innovations themselves varying in the degree to
‘which they are individual r socal /cooperative.
In general, then, human cultural traditions may be most readily
lstinguished fom chimpanzee cultural traditions—as wel asthe
few other instances of culture observed in ober primate species—
precisely by the fot that they accumulate modifications over tine,
that i to say, they have cultural “histori” They accumulate mod
fications and have histories because the cultural learning processes
that support them are especially powerful. These culfural learning
processes are especially powerful because they are supported by the
uniquely human cognitive adaptation for understanding others as
intentional beings like the sel awhich creates forms of social lse
ing that act as 9 ratchet by faithfully preserving newly innovated
stratgies in the social group until there is another innovation to re-
Place them,
I should acknowledge that things may not be quite as Black and
‘white as Ihave made them out tobe. Ina very interesting paper enti
Hed “Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is eae,” Boyd
and Richerso (1995) hypothesize hat humans and other pemates
both engage inthe same kinds of soil and imitative leaning, but
there may be a quantitative diffrence. Thus chimpanzees may have
‘some iative leaning abilities, but they may display them ss con-
istetly than humans or in a narrower range of contexts than hit
rmans—oritmay even be that ony some chimpanzee individualshave
these sills Boye and Richerson argue thata rarity of keysecial eae
ing processes could make cultural evolution ofthe cumulative type
impossible. The basic problem would be that theres too much slip-
[page inthe atchet, 35, for example, one individual might imitatively|
Jeam another's innovation but then no other individuals could imitate
ter, othe individuals who did altempt to imitate her would do so
‘only very pooty. The arguments thus tht theresa quantitative dt
ference in socal leaning kis that leads toa qualitative difference in
the historical rajctories ofthe resulting cultural traditions. In ether
‘case, however—whether the difference betecen human and ape |
‘al learing skills more qualitative and abso or more quantita
tive and relaive—the effec is that human beings currently have the
social-cognitive and cultural learning skis to create asa species,
lnique cognitive products based on cumulative cultural evolution,
The Sociogenesis of Language and Mathematics
‘The process of cumulative cultural evolution may be seen as an es
pecially powerful form ofcllaboraive inventiveness or sociogene-
Ss In human societies there are two base forms of saciogeness in
which something new is created through the social interaction of
two oF more individuals in cooperative interaction, and indeed in
many cases the news prosct could not have been invented by any of
the individuals ating alone. The fist form of saciogenesis is simply
the form implied by the ratchet effect as described above for such
things as hammers and linguistic symbols. An individual confronts
fan artifact or cultural practice that she has inherited frm others,
along witha novel situation for which the artifact does not seem
Tully suited. She then assesses the way the artifact is intended to
work the intentionality of the inventor) relates this to the current
situation, and then makes a modification to the artifact. In this case
the collaboration is not actual, n the sense that feo or mor individ-
ual are simultaneously present ancl collaborating, but rather virtual
inthe sense that it takes place across historical teas the curent in
lvidual imagines the function the artifact was intended to fll by
previous users, and hov it must be modified to meet the current
problem situation,
The second Kind of sociogeness i the slnltaneous collaboration
‘oF two or more individuals as they work ona problem together. i=
rmltaneity snot absolute in such cases as what typically happens is
that the individuals engage in some kindof dialog interaction in
"which one’s inventive suggestions are responled to bythe other,
and so on ina manner that leads toa product that nether individual
‘ould have invented on its own. The collaboration is thus not vet
but actual, and it therefore has some special qualities, for example,
in terms ofthe kin of immediate feedback that an individual may
receive for hs or her creative suggestions, The two forms of collabo
ration may occur together, ofcourse, as when a small group of peo-
ple attempt collaboratively to modify an artifact or practice they
have inherited from others inorder to meet nes exigencies, and in
led this is probably the typical situation. It is also the ease that
many important cultural changes on a lage scale involving such
things as religions or governments or economic ystems rel from
many’ people “cooperating” both simultaneously and successively
‘over generations ina way tht no one person or group of people
tenet or could ave forescen (this may bea third kind of “colabo-
ration”). For example, macket economies, although based on indi
‘dual intentional acts, are not a cutusal cutcome that any one
petson envisioned or intended at the outset These group-level
processes are not well understood from a psychologial point of
View, but they clearly interact with the intentional level in interest-
Ingand important ways See Hutchins, 1995)
‘The process of socogenesis may be clealy seen in two very iat
portant cognitive domains: language and mathematics. begin with
Tnnguage. although ona general level ll languages share some fet-
tures in concrete terms each of the thousands of languages of the
‘world has its own inventory of linguistic symbols, including com
plex linguistic constructions, that allow its users to share experience
‘with one another symbolically. This inventory of symbols and con-
structions is grounded in universal structures of human cognition,
‘human communication, and the mechanics ofthe Vocalauditory ap
paratus, The particularities of particular languages come from dit.
ferences among the various peoples of the world in the Kinds of
things they think it important otalk about and the ways they think
it useful to talk about them-—along with various historical “acc-
lens” ofcourse. The crucial point for eurent purposes i that all of
the symbols and constructions ofa given language are net invented
atonee, and once invented they often do not stay’ the same for very
Jong. Rather, linguistic symbols and constructions evolve and
change and accumulate modifications over historical time as hu
‘mans use them with one another, thas, thrugh processes of soco-
{genesis The most important dimension of the historical process ia
the curent contexts grammaticzation or syntactcization, which
volves such things as freestanding words evolving into grammatical
markers and loose and redundantly organized discourse strctures
‘ongeaing int ght and less redundantly organized syntactic con-*
structions (see Traugott and Heine 19913, 1991b; Hopper and Teau-
1983), Some examples will help to lily
+The future tense marker in virtually al languages rammat-
ized fom Freestanding worl for sch things as volition or
‘maverent toa goal So in English the original verb was el. 8
in Il to happen, on this became grammaticies into Il
Jiype (wit the volitional component “bleached” out). Simi-
larly, the original use of go was for movement asin I'm going f9
the tore and this was grammaticized into I'm going fo sod fo
‘morrow (with the movement bleaches out—see alsa com, a in
Come Thurs, it be 45.
+The Eaglish past perfective, using ave ery likely derived
from sentences sich a tea ron fig ot Ue the prisoners
ound (in which hae verb of posession) into something ike
broke a igo in which te possesion meaning of hae is
blached out and it now only indicates perfective aspect
+ English phrases sch sn the tof and inthe sid of evolved
into top ofan inside ofan eventually into aap an inside In
some languages although notin English relator words such as
thes spatial prepositions may also Become attached to nouns a6
‘case markers in this instance as posible lcative markers
+ Loose discourse sequences suchas He pla the door ani pend
say become synlatcized into He pla the door pen (a resultar
tive construction,
+ Loose discourse sequences suchas My buried... He plays
ian... He play na and may become My boxfindplas pian
‘na bad. Or, similarly, My gfe. He rides arses. He ts
‘on them may become My bid, ie hors, bl tom
+ Similarly, if someone expresses the bli that Mary will wed
John another person may respond with an asent, ic that,
followed by a repetition of the expressed belie that Mary will
td joln—which become syntactiized into the single statement
lice at Mary wild ob
+ Complex sentences may also derive from discourse sequences of
Initially separate utterances asin [mau i. Thuy it evolving
nto unt to uy it
Systematic investigation into processes of grammaticization and
syntacticization iin its infancy (See Givén, 197, 1985), and indeed
the suggestion that languages may ave evolved fom stracturally
simpler to structurally more complex forms by means of processes
‘of grammatczaton and syntacticization is somewhat novel inthis
content—these process are most often thought of by linguists a5
sources of change only. But grammatczation and syntactiization
are able to effect serious changes of linguistic stucture in elatvely|
short periods of ime—for example, the main diversification of the
Romance languages took place during some hundreds of yeats—
and so [see no reason why they could aot also work to make asin
ples language more complex syntactically in some thousands of
‘yeas Exactly how grammaticization and syntactcizaton happen in
the concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of
human beings, and hove these processes might relate tothe other
processes of sociogenesis by means of which human socal intr
action changes cultural artifacts, isa question for future linguistic
research
(One possible implication of this view is that the earliest modern
‘human, originating in Aca some 20,000 years ago, were the indi-
viduals who fist began to communicate symbalicaly—perhaps
using some simple symbolic forms analogous to those used by
Inuman children. They then dispersed throughout the world, so thal
all curcent languages derive ultimately from that single proto-
language—elthough if that peoto-language was very simple each
culture may have syntacticized and geammaticized discourse se-
{quences in some fundamentally different ways from very early in
the proces. For those therists oho think this hypothesis is fa
fetched, we nee look no further than alphabetic writing to see a cul
tural invention that happened only once and that has retained some
ofits essential characteristics while atthe same time taking on ditfer-
tent forms in diferent cultures and this has happened in only afew
rllennia insted of several scores of millenia as would have been
the ese for natural languages
The case of the other intellectual pila of Wester chlization,
mathematics, s interestingly differen from the ease of language (and
indeed it bears some similarities, but also some differences, writ
Jing). Lik language, mathematics clearly rests on sniverslly human |
"ways of experiencing the word (many of which are shared with other
primates) and ako on some processes of cultural ration and soci
‘genesis. Bu in this case the divergences among cultures are much
{greater than inthe case of spoken languages. Al cultures have com-
ples forms lingulsticcommunicaton, with Variations of complesty
‘nasiealy negligible, whereas some cultures have highly comple sy
tems of mathematics (practiced by only some oftheir members) as
compared with other cultures thathave fy simple systems of num
bers andl counting (Sone 1981). Ths great variation means that no one
thas propose thatthe structure of modern complex mathematisisan
innate module, as they havein thecase of language although it would
‘be logically possible to propose a theory along the ines of Chomsky's
principles and parameters in which certain environmental variables
thatarenot presentinsomecultures may in oter cultures rigger cer
‘ain innate mathematical structures)
In general, the reasons for the geen cultural diferences in mathe-
matical practices are not dificult discern. is, different cultuces
and. persons have different needs for mathematics. Most cultures
and persons have the nce to keep track of goods for which few
‘number words expressed in natural language will sce. When a
culture ora person needs to count objects or measure things more
precisely for example in complex bullding projects orthelike—the
‘ned fora mone complex mathematics arises, Moder scence as an
enterprise, practiced by only some people in some cultures, presents
' whole host of new peoblems that require complex mathematical
techniques for thie solution. But—and this the analogy to wit
ing—complex mathematics as we know it ela ca ony be accom
plished through the use of certain forms of graphic symbols In par
ticular, the Arabic sytem of enumeration is much superior to older
‘Wester systems for piposes of complex mathematics (ex, Roman
“
‘numerals, and the use of Arable numerals, Including 2er0 and the
place system for indicating diferentsized units, opened up for
‘Wester cients and other persons whole new vistas of mathemat-
ical operations (Danzig 1954)
‘The history of mathematics is an area of study in which detailed
‘examination has revealed myriad complex ways in which ndvid
ls and groups ofinividls, take shat is passed on to them by
previous generations and then make medications as needed to deal
‘with new practial and scientific problems more efficiently (Eves,
161). Some historians of mathematics have detailed some of the
specific processes by means of which specifi mathematical symbols
and techniques were ivented, used, and modified (eg, Danzig,
195; Eves, 1961; Damezow, 1995) As just one wellknown example,
Descartes invented the Cartesian conedinate system in which he
‘combined in a creative way some ofthe spatially based techniques
used in geometry sth some of the more arithmetically based tech:
niques in other areas ofthe mathematics of his ime—with the infin
tesimal calculus being a variation on this theme. The adoption ofthis
technique by other scientists and mathematicians ratchet up the
mathematical universe almost immediately, and thereby changed
‘Wester mathematics forever. And so, in general the sclogenesis of
rmodeen Western mathematics as protced by only a minority ofthe
‘people in these cultures, may be see as aFrction ofboth the math
‘ematical needs of the particular people involved and the cultural
resources availabe to them, This assumes teas the primate nder-
standing of small quantities as foundational, but modern mathe:
matics very likely requires more than this, My hypothesis, to be
labora! in Chapter is that buling on the basic primate sense
fof quantity, human beings also use their formidable skills of
perspectivetaking and allemative construals of concrete objects
And collections of objects (which have a social basis in skills of
perspective taking and linguistic communication to construct com
‘plex mathemati In some cultures the recruitment ofthese skills for
mathematical ends needed more than in others
Inboth the cases of language nd mathemati, then, the strcture
‘ofthe domain a= it now exists has cultural history (actualy, manylferent cultural histories), and there are processes of sociogeness
that historical linguists and historians of mathematics have the op-
portunity to study (although most ofthese scholars are not diecly|
Interested in questions of psychology). The diferences between the
two cases are instructive. Although complet takes many different
forms in enodern langusges, complex language is a universal among
all he peoples of the world. This i either because the original inven
tion of many of the spoken symbols that makes language possible
took place before modern humans diverged ito different popula:
tions or because the ability tocreate spoken symbols comes Sonat
rally to humans that the diferent groups all invented them in simi
la though not identical ways after they diverged. “Complex
mathematics is not universal among cultures, or even among people
{nthe cultures that have it, Ths is presumably because the cll
needs for complex mathenuties and/or the invention of the re-
{uired cultural resources came only after modern people had begun
living in diferent populations, and apparenly these nceds and/or
resources are not universally present forall peoples of the world
today. And s0 one ofthe ental facts about langage that Is led
some linguists to hypothesize that some madern linguistic strac-
tures are innato=the fac that they are species unique and species
universal whereas many mathematical and other cognitive skill are
not (eg Pinker, 1994}—may just be the result of the vagaries of
-human cultural history in the sense that, for whatever reason, skill
of linguistic communication evolved before moder humans di-
‘verges into separate populations
The place where intellectual needs meet cultural resources most
liecelly is of course in human ontogeny. Indeed, socogenesis and
cultural story may be seen a a series of ontogenies in which both
Immature and mature members ofa culture lear to act effectively
1s they are expose to problems and provided with resources, n>
‘ling social interactions with siled problem solvers. The most
‘sie cognitive sills required forthe acquisition of language and the
learning of complex mathematics as two especially interesting ex
amples, are universally available to human beings. But the many
land various structures ofthese tro cultural artifacts as manifest in
the many diferent human societies ofthe world are nt, nde ca
rot be, dinstly encoded in the genes ahead of time, The overall,
rode! fs thus that human beings have cognitive skills that result
feom biologial inheritance working in phylogenetic time; they use
these skills fo exploit cultural resources that have evolved over hi
toca ime; anu they do this during ontogenetic tine
Human Ontogeny
Following Vygotsky and many other cultural psychologists I con-
tend that many ofthe mast interesting and important human cogni-
tive achievements, suchas language and mathematics, require hi
torical time and processes for their eslization—even if most
cognitive scentit largely ignore these historia processes. In adl-
tion, 1 would claim, along with other developmental psychologist,
that many of the most interesting and important human cogaitive
competences require significant ontogenetic time and processes for
their realizationeven though these processes are alo ignoced by
many cognitive scientists, Cognitive scientist’ underapprecation of
“ontogeny and its formative role in the cretion of mature forms of
-numan cognition is cue in lage part to their overappreciation fora
hoary philosophical debate that has outlived its usefulness, ndeed
it was ever useful (Elman et al, 1957). And so before proceeding to
4 deta acount of human cognitive ontogeny, I should at Teast
‘vey adres this debate
Philosophical Nativisms and Development
Modem discussions of nature versus nurture and innate versus
learned take their structure from the debates in eightenth-century
Europe between rationalist and empiricist philosophers arguing
bout the human mind and human moral qualities. These framing,
‘debates tok place before Charles Darwin gave the scientific com
munity new ways of thinking about biological processes. The inro-
suction of Darwinian ways of thinking about phylogeny, and about
the role af entogeny in phylogeny, should have rendered the debate
°
obsolete. But It did not, and indeed the rise of modeen genetics has
‘iven ita new and concetized life in the form of genes versus en
ronment, The reason the debate has not died out is that tis the nat
1 to answer the question: Wat determines trait Xin adult
wan beings? Asking the question inthis manner even aloes for
attempts to quantify the relative contributions of genes and env
ronment fora giver adult trait, such as “intelligence” (Scare and
McCarthy, 198), Asking and answering the question inthis way is
analogous to asking what determined the outbreak of the French
Revolution, and then quantifying the relative coateibutions of eo-
‘homies, polis, religion, and so forth. But Darwinian thinking Is
process thinking in which we do not think of ealegores of factors
in some static alemporal “now.” Although there
processes such a5 genetic variation an natu selection, if we as
hhow a given species came toe what it is nove (or how the French
Revolution came about), the answer is a aratve that infos in
time with dtferent processes working in diferent ways a diffrent
points along the way
This Darwinian way of thinking is the way we should think if we
‘wish to understand the phylogeny and ontogeny of human beings
1h phylogeny, Nature selects for ontogenetic pathways that lad to
certain resus in the sexually mature phenotype. Iepeat, Nature se
lets for ontogenetic pathways that lead to certain phenotypic
sls These pathivays may rely either more or lesson the expt
tion of exogenous materials and information for their realization,
and mammals in general, and primates and humans in particular,
have evolved many ontogenetic pathways that simply could not de-
velop without such exogenous materials and information. But re
sgardless ofthe degree of exogenous material involved, under any
‘ontogenetic scenario ou goal as developmental, whether biologi-
cal or psychological, sto understand the entize pathway fora given
‘Phenomenon and how it works.
tis wer teling that there are essentially no people who cal them
selves biologists eho also call themsives nativst, When develop-
rental biologists lok atthe developing embryo, they have no use
{or the concept of innatenes, This isnt because they underestimate
tral w
Py
the intuence of genes—the essential ole ofthe genome is assumed
‘25 a matter of course—but rather because the categorical judgment
that a characteristics inate simply does not help in understanding
the process. It would not be helpful to biologists, for example, to say
that the emengence of limb buds in the tenth week of human embry
‘logical development is innate, If we ae interested in the entice
process by which limbs are formed in embryological development,
‘we want first to map out steps in the development of limbs, andl then
to determine how processes of proein synthesis, cell ferentiation,
the interaction of the organism with intrauterine en2ymes, and so
‘on, participate at various points inthe progression. If we would like
to label as “innate” processes that shate a ceriain set of characteris
ties—for example, that they depend ver litle on the existence of i
trauterine enzymes for their operation sve may certainly do that
and it may be useful fr some purposes But forthe most pat such
labeling is simply not helpful in understanding the ontogenetic
processes involved (see Wittgenscin’s, 1953, argument tht
formed philosophical problems are not solved —we simply cute our
selves of them),
‘at in cognitive scence there has always been a stain of navi
that poses the question in essentially the same terms as the eigh-
teenth-eentury European philosophers, with very litle indication
that Darwinianstyle process thinking has had an impact (3%,
(Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 198). Since these theorists mostly do not
study directly the genetic proceses involved ut rather sok to infer
them from logical considerations omy, this theoretical perspective is
perhaps bes called philosophical nativism. This isnot tosay thatthe
Search for innate aspects of human cognition has not led to some
‘ery important insights, As jst one example, this search has extab-
lished that the ontogenetic process that Paget hypothesized as ceu-
al foe infans’ understanding of objects in space—namely, the man
val manipulation of objecte—cannot be a erucial ingredient since
infants understand objects in space before they have manipulated
them manually (Spelke, 1980; Baillageon, 195). This ruling out of
‘one potential developmental process isa significant sientifc dscov-
ery But this discovery should not stop the process of inquiry—aeeshould not simply say that X is innate and s0 our jb is done—ut
rather it should lead us to ask other questions for example, the role
‘of visual experience by itself in the absence of manual manipulations
Inthe development ofa concept of object. This procedure i the one
that developmental biologists follow, although ofcourse they have
more powerful methods at their disposal as they aze able to inter
vene inthe ontogeny of animal embryos ina way that cannot be
lone with human children. But through whatever means (ea,
studying the abjct concept in bind children), the goal isnot to de
de whether some truce sor not “inate” bt rather to deter
-mine the processes involved in its development. The search forthe
Jnnate aspects of human cognition is scientifically fuifl othe ex-
tent, and only tothe extent, that it helps us to understand the devel
‘opmental processes at work during human ontogeny, including all
ofthe factors that play a roe, a what time they play thei ole, and
precisely how they play thelr oe
The Individual and Cultural Lines of Development
Instead of innate versus learned I prefer another dichotomy that
some may conser just as troublesome: the Vygotskian dichotomy
‘betwen the individual and the cultural lines of development. This
listinction is essentially that between biological inheritance and cul-
tural inheritance, although it concerns ontogeny instead of phy-
Jogeny. In my interpretation of this distinction, the individual line of|
cognitive development (what Vygotsky calls the “natural” ine) con-
‘cer thowe things the organism kaows and lennon is own with-
‘out the direct influence of other persons oF thee artes, whereas
the cultural line of cognitive development concerns those things the
‘organism knows and learn that are derived rom act in which itt
tempts tose the world through the perspective of other persons (in-
cluding perspectives embodied in artifacts). I must emphasize that
this sa somewhat idiosynratc way of conceptualizing cultural in
Ihritance and development, much narrower than the conceptaliza-
tions of most cultural psychologists. Tam not counting a cultural in-
Iheritance those things thatthe organism knows and learns on is
2
‘own from its particular cultural sting of “habitus,” for eample,
the chil individually earning about the ways houses ate lak out in
her local environment (Kruger and Tomasello, 196). My narrower
dlfinition of cultural inberitance and therefore cultural learning,
‘and the cuurl line of development—Is focused on intentional phe
‘nomena in which ove onganis adopts another's behavior or per-
spectvecn some thied entity.
‘The prblem, ofcourse is that these two lines of development be
come inextricably intertwined very early in human development,
and virtually every cognitive act of children after a certain age incor
Porates elements ofboth. For example in later chapters Iwill docu-
rent that in many ways children between the ages of ane and three
are “imitation machines” in that their natural sponse to many it
tons isto da what those around them are doing, an indeed they
fare very limited in what they individually create for themselves in
tos! situations, However, some ofthe most interesting aspects of
development during this period concem precisely the interactions
between the individual and cultural ines of development, a the
child takes the cultural conventions she has learned va imitation oF
some other form of catural learning and then makes some creative
leap that goes beyond them by discerning all on her own, some cat
«gorial or analogical rlationship-—based on general primate skills
‘of categorization. It is true that these creative leaps themselves
sometimes rely more or less diretly on some cultural tool such a5|
language or mathematical symbols or conventional ionic images
that help chldren tose categorical or analogical relationships, Nev-
ertheless all evidence points tothe fact that by four to five years of
‘age the balance between children’s tendency to imate others and.
thele tendency to use ther own creative cognitive strategies has
sited, since by ths age they have interalized many «liferent
points of view, mostly through Kinguistic discourse, enabling them
to elect an pln fr themselves in a more self-reglated manner
although again the tools with which they do this are sometimes cul>
tural in origin.
“Many cultural psychologists boiove that trying to make this dis
tinction is utile Because the individual and the cultural are part of
=
the same developmental process, and at any'given age the child pos-
sesses Knowledge and skills that are the result of a long dialectal
‘Process involving both sels of factors. I agree with this exitique to
Some extent, but Isl elieve that atempting to isolate an assess
the effects of the uniquely human adaptation for culture daring
Jhuman ontogeny isa useful enterprise. Its useful fist of all be
‘cause it helps ustoansieer the comparative-evelutionary question of
how and why human beings difer cognitively from their nearest
primate relativee—who develop in ther own species-ypical way
‘without anything ke the human version ofthe cultural in of de-
‘elopment in which historically constituted artifacts and socal prac
tices ae intenalized by the developing Young, Moreover, is useful
‘8 well because it helps to capture what is perhaps the fundamental