Court Supreme Court Third Division

Citation GR No. 118883

Date January 16, 1998
Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes, represented by Vice Mayor Nonito
Aquino and Mayor Lydia Romano
Respondents CA and Augusto Antonio
Ponente Panganiban, J.
Relevant Resignation
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres,
Catanduanes in March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) 5 for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant
to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.
 Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of
Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in which private respondent was a voting
member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became
necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15,
1990.
 In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
He tendered his resignation6 dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres,
Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG and the municipal
treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code7 (B.P. Blg. 337 ), Nenito
F. Aquino, then vice president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sangguniang Bayan 8 in place of private respondent. Aquino
assumed office on July 18, 1990 after taking his oath.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN there was a complete and effective resignation NO, but there was still a voluntary abandonment

 Ortiz vs. COMELEC, 28 we defined resignation as the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competence and lawful authority." To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish
a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. 29
The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.

 Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom

they should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or body. 31 Private
respondent, therefore, should have submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his
alter ego, the DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his letter,
there is no showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third
requisite being absent, there was therefore no valid and complete resignation.
  Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. 32 Indeed,
abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal
relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. 33 Nonuser refers
to a neglect to use a privilege or a right (Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an
easement or an office

 We agree with petitioner. Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent
to abandon his position: (1) his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position, (3) his failure to
object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his
prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the
Supreme Court had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention: (1) his
letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan, 41 (2) his assumption of office as member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions as member of
said Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the remuneration for such post.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. prcd SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Romano, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court First Division
Citation GR No. 149356
Date March 14, 2008
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DTI
Respondents Winston Singun
Ponente Carpio, J.
Relevant topic Resignation
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Respondent wanted to resign from DTI and retire, however, his resignation was never expressly
nor implicitly accepted.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN respondent validly resigned NO

 Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and
lawful authority. 28 To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there
must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority.
 In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. 30
Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by
something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. 31 A public
officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is
subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 32 of the Revised Penal Code. 33 The final or
conclusive act of a resignation's acceptance is the notice of acceptance. 34 The incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had
been duly notified therefor.
 Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable. 36 And the resignation
is not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted.
RULING:
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective.
Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. 30 Resignation to be effective
must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance,
such as the appointment of the successor. 31 A public officer cannot abandon his office before his
resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 32 of the
Revised Penal Code. 33 The final or conclusive act of a resignation's acceptance is the notice of
acceptance. 34 The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his
resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 133132
Date January 25, 2000
Petitioner Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, and Rogelio Pureza
Respondents Hon. Alexander Aguirre as Executive Secretary, Hon. Emilia Boncodin, as Sec. Of Budget
and Management, Jose Percival Adiong, Romeo Cairme, and Virginia Cristobal
Ponente Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Relevant Abandonment
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An Act
Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And
Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM
were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent
Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991
for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado
was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which
ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was re-appointed for another six
years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a similar term of six years. Respondent
Adiong's appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had
expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by congress YES

 The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. 9 It is acknowledged
that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in
the position held 10 and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack
of funds 11 or in the interest of economy. 12 However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must
be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 13
 An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently,
as the word "abolished" denotes. 14 Where one office is abolished and replaced with another
office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
 Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the
power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or
holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account.
It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom
invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and
salaries or emoluments.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring Section 8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners' right to security of tenure. The removal from office
of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment
of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to
REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were
removed from office. 35
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago andDe Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court First Division
Citation GR No. 138965
Date June 30, 2006
Petitioner Public Interest Center Inc., Laureano Angeles, and Jocelyn Celestino
Respondents Madangal Elma, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the PCGG, and
Ronaldo Zamora, Executive Secretary
Ponente Chico-Nazatio, J.
Relevant Acceptance of incompatible office
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 This is an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed on 30 June 1999. 1 This action seeks to
declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, 2 Article VII and Section 7,
par. 2 , 3 Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. In addition, the petitioners further seek the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Elma from holding and discharging the duties of both
positions and from receiving any salaries, compensation or benefits from such positions during
the pendency of this petition. 4 Respondent Ronaldo Zamora was sued in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary.
 On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of
the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent
Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived
any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the position of PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition First one NO.
against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Second one
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution YES

 The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to
hold more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position." In the
case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, 12 this Court ruled that, "[t]here is no legal objection to a government
official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is
no incompatibility." The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices was laid out in People v. Green 13 — whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. EIaDHS
o [I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; . . .
Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other
such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the
law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the
word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other,
of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and
antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. . . . The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one
with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. . . .
  In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations
involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees.
The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department
 It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition under
Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of
officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of
the Constitution.
 Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to
the present case, the defect in respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible
offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the
more stringent requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. In the aforecited case
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 17 the Court stressed that the language of Section
13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or
employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple
offices: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing
the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court partly GRANTS this petition and declares respondent
Magdangal B. Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Panganiban, C.J., is on official leave.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 147870
Date July 31, 2002
Petitioner Ramir Pablico
Respondents Alejandro Villapando
Ponente Ynares-Santiago, J.
Relevant topic Removal of elective public officials
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against
respondent, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of
the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement, on behalf of the municipality, with a
defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1988 elections, which consultancy agreement allegedly
amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period
under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from the service, which decision was affirmed by the Office of the President.
Consequently, petitioner, then Vicemayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as
Municipal Mayor. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent, the Court of
Appeals declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the President and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente
Palawan. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the YES
penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

 The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
o Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. — An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
o xxx xxx xxx
o An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above
by order of the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
 It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from
service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in
Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., 11 we held that "[t]he Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.

 It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is
lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority"
to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in
whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for
what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice
 or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the
power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law
by usurping the power to remove.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court Third Division
Citation GR No. 170626
Date March 3, 2008
Petitioner The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Municipality of
Bayombong, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, represented by Barangay Kagawad Jose Cenen
Santos, Mario Bacud, Walter Francisco, Rosita Sebastian, Laureta Cabauatan, Cecilia
Alindayu, and Mely Simangan
Respondents Punong Barangay Severino Martinez
Ponente Chico-Nazario, J.
Relevant Removal of elective public officials
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such
under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent
Punong Barangay of the said local government unit. 3
 On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and
Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan
as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 4 of Rep. Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang
Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for
Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office NO

 In Pablico v. Villapando, 19 the court declared that:

 It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is
lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125) 20 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
"disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being
repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the
authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by
the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given
only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate
the law by usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.) TEDaAc
 The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from
office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining
authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief
executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to
implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or
partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioner's interpretation would defeat the
clear intent of the law
 The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments.
 It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. 21 Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, provides that:
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)
 The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied
in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective
officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public.
Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the
local government units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather,
they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.

RULING:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Bayombong RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED. ASTcaE
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 Court Supreme Court Second Division
Citation GR No. 131255
Date May 20, 1998
Petitioner Hon. Eduardo Nonato Joson, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva
Ecija
Respondents Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, the DILG, represented by Sec. Robert Barbers and
Usec. Manuel Sanchez, Mr. Oscar Tinio, in his capacity as Provincial Vice Governor of
Nueva Ecija, and Mr. Loreto Pangilinan, Mr. Crispulo Esguerra, Ms. Solita Santos, Mr.
Vicente Palilio, and Mr. Napoleon Interior, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members of
Nueva Ecija
Ponente Puno, J.
Relevant Removal of elective public officials
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato
Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-
Governor of said province while private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra,
Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the suspension order of Secretary Torres is valid NO

 Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the
Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces,
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila." In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the
Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.
 Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds
for which an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. Section
60 reads:
o "Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. — An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence; or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission
of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application
for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of
another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other
laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court."
 The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials-are markedly
different from appointive officials. 87 The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local
officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
 administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those
elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that
elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office.
When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the
man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services
of the elective official of their choice. 88 Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the
elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their
imposition.
RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public respondent Executive Secretary is
declared null and void and is set aside. No Cost.
SO ORDERED. dctai
Regalado, Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 154095
Date November 17, 2004
Petitioner Francisco Rosales, Jr.
Respondents Miguel Mijares
Ponente Callejo, Sr., J.
Relevant topic Implied removal from office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Respondent was previously the municipal engineer. However, upon petitioner’s assumption of
office, he unleashed a barrage of machinations to get rid of respondent since the latter was a
staunch supporter of the rival party. Among his actions include: promising respondent that his
verbal request for transfer was approved, etc.
 Ultimately, resdondent complained for illegal termination.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN YES

 Indeed, in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, 9 we held that:

o A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer
that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be done
without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no
permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from
the position held, and then appointed to another position.

 The Court also held that unconsented transfer is anathema to security of tenure. 11 A transfer
that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal. 12
An employee cannot be transferred unless for causes provided for by law and after due process.
13 Any attempt to breach the protective wall built around the employee's right to security of tenure
should be slain on sight. The right of employees to security of tenure should never be sacrificed
merely at the whims and pleasure of some unscrupulous and heartless politicians. As we held in
Nemenzo v. Sabillano:
o There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon
assumption of office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing
employees with their own proteges, regardless of the laws and regulations governing the
civil service. Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of
such illegal acts.
 In this case, the petitioner, who perceived that the respondent was a well- known supporter of the
political party opposed to his candidacy, coerced the respondent into resigning and even
threatened to have his position as Municipal Engineer abolished
 It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer
sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of
the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate application of
Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.
RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
appellate court is AFFIRMED. However, the award for costs is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval- Gutierrez, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., is on official leave.
Austria-Martinez, J ., took no part. Concurred in CA Decision. Corona and Tinga, JJ ., are on leave.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 133132
Date January 25, 2000
Petitioner Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, and Rogelio Pureza
Respondents Hon. Alexander Aguirre as Executive Secretary, Hon. Emilia Boncodin, as Sec. Of Budget
and Management, Jose Percival Adiong, Romeo Cairme, and Virginia Cristobal
Ponente Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Relevant Abandonment
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An Act
Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And
Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM
were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent
Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991
for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado
was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which
ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was re-appointed for another six
years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a similar term of six years. Respondent
Adiong's appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had
expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by congress YES

 The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. 9 It is acknowledged
that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in
the position held 10 and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack
of funds 11 or in the interest of economy. 12 However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must
be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 13
 An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently,
as the word "abolished" denotes. 14 Where one office is abolished and replaced with another
office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
 Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the
power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or
holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account.
It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom
invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and
salaries or emoluments.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring Section 8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners' right to security of tenure. The removal from office
of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment
of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to
REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were
removed from office. 35
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago andDe Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 142801-802
Date July 10, 2001
Petitioner Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, Cesar Posada, Remedios Princesa, Benjamin Kho, Benigno
Manga, Lulu Mendoza
Respondents Hon. Exec. Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Hon. Secretary Jose Pardo Dept. Of Finance,
Hon. Sec. Bejamin Diokno, DBM, Hon. Sec. Artemio Tuquero, Dept. Of Justice
Ponente Sandoval-Gutierrez J.
Relevant Abolition of office
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Ministry of Finance was created
on June 30, 1987 by Executive Order No. 127. On January 7, 2000, then President Joseph
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 deactivating the EIIB. Its function was transferred to the
newly created Task Force Aduana which utilized the personnel, facilities and resources of
existing departments, agencies and bureaus. Thus, no new employees were hired. Its personnel
came from other agencies and detailed with the Task Force. On March 29, 2000, Executive Order
No. 223 was issued separating all EIIB personnel from the service effective April 30, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioners, employees of the EIIB, without exhausting administrative remedies and
the hierarchy of courts, resorted to this recourse challenging Executive Orders Nos. 191 and 223
as violative of their right to security of tenure and usurpation by the President of the power of
Congress to abolish public office.
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the President can abolish an office (EIIB) YES, by way of exception

 The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.
Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the
same legislature that brought it into existence.
 The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary.
 We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this
law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive
Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates,
missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b)
identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section
78 ends up with the mandate that theactual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency
organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty
to sustain. But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight
 of the very source of the power — that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there
is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines
of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize.
 In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. CHDaAE
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing and Panganiban, JJ., concurs in the result. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., is on leave.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A