Situational Effects of Advertising Repetition: The Moderating Influence of Motivation,

Ability, and Opportunity to Respond

Author(s): Rajeev Batra and Michael L. Ray
Source: Journal of Consumer Research , Mar., 1986, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Mar., 1986), pp. 432-
445
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/254303

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 Situational Effects of Advertising
Repetition: The Moderating Influence
of Motivation, Ability, and Opportunity
to Respond

RAJEEV BATRA
MICHAEL L. RAY*

It is argued theoretically that the attitudinal gain from advertising repetition should
continue to increase rather than level off when consumers fail to generate cognitive
responses to message arguments in earlier exposures. An experiment shows that
repetition continues to increase brand attitudes and purchase intentions in conditions
where support and counter argument production is expected to be low, but that
these attitudinal gains level off under conditions in which a high level of such pro-
duction is expected.

The effects of message repetition on attitudes and
purchase intentions have been studied often (see
Sawyer 1974 and Belch 1982 for reviews). Most studies
show that messages gain in impact for a few exposures
but that further exposures begin to have a negative ef-
fect. Such inverted-U curves for repetition impact
emerge, for example, in the literatures on the attitudinal
impact of mere exposure (Harrison 1977; Sawyer 1981;
Zajonc 1968) and on advertising wearout (Calder and
Sternthal 1980).
Common to both the wearout and mere exposure
literature is the process view that while increasing ex-
posure initially enhances learning and favorable atti-
tudinal affect, subsequent exposures-past the point of
"over-learning"-create tedium and negative affect
(Berlyne 1970; Stang 1975). Further, Cacioppo and
Petty (1979) use the cognitive response paradigm
(Greenwald 1968; Wright 1973) to show that production
of support arguments increases, then decreases with ex-
posure, while production of counter arguments de-
creases, then increases with exposure; as a result, agree-
*Rajeev Batra is Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business,
512 Uris Hall, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Michael
L. Ray is Professor of Marketing and Communication, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. This
research was funded by a grant from the Marketing Science Institute,
and additional financial support was provided by the Marketing
Management Program of the Stanford Business School and by the
Faculty Research Fund of the Columbia Business School. The authors
would like to thank the many companies and advertising agencies
who provided commercials for use but who prefer anonymity.
ment with the message (the attitudinal outcome studied)
increases, then decreases with higher exposure. Simi-
larly, Calder and Sternthal ( 1980) explain repetition re-
sults in terms of the relative production of message-
related versus "own" thoughts on repeated exposure,
with "own" thoughts-assumed to be less positive than
message-related thoughts-forming an increasing pro-
portion of total thoughts with increasing exposure.
These studies and theoretical perspectives would
suggest that, in general, intermediate levels of message
exposure (two or three) should provide higher message
effects than either very low or very high levels. This
expectation finds support in studies of advertising rep-
etition on eye movement responses (Krugman 1968),
attention (Grass and Wallace 1969), and brand attitudes
(Gorn and Goldberg 1980; Naples 1979; Ray, Sawyer,
and Strong 1971; Winter 1973).
In this paper, we extend the results of such prior re-
search by examining variations in attitudinal (and pur-
chase intention) gains from advertising repetition across
situations that vary in the antecedent conditions re-
quired for advertisements to generate cognitive respon-
ses. Such antecedent conditions include the message
recipient's motivation, ability, and opportunity to gen-
erate support arguments and counter arguments to the
message. Evidence exists that the point at which ad-
vertising repetition begins to create an attitudinal
downturn is moderated by various product, brand, user,
execution, and media factors (Naples 1979; Ray et al.
1971; Silk and Vavra 1974). Though theoretical frame-
works exist to explain why the effects of repetition are,

432
?) JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH * Vol. 12 0 March 1986

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 SITUATIONAL EFFECTS OF REPETITION 433

in general, curvilinear (e.g., Sawyer 1981), such situa- turn will occur earlier. In the latter situation, further
tional differences in where the downturn begins deserve repetition will yield no further attitudinal gain; attitudes
further research. may, in fact, decline with further repetition.'
In this article, a theoretical framework is developed
both to explain previous research results indicating such
Antecedents of Cognitive
situational differences and to make further predictions
about the differential gains from repetition for different Response Production
kinds of advertisements. In particular, hypotheses are
developed about the differential gain from repetition It is well known that the antecedent conditions for
for ads classified as being high or low on the levels of such support argument and counter argument produc-
support and counter argumentation expected on ex- tion are (1) the motivation, (2) the ability, and (3) the
posure. These hypotheses about differential repetition opportunity to respond to message arguments. The
effects are then tested experimentally. motivational antecedent-the feeling on the part of
message recipients that the content of the message is
important to them-is usually labelled '"involvement,"
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
and is the antecedent most commonly studied (Chaiken
Our "situational effects" framework builds on Ca- 1980; Roberts and Maccoby 1973; Wright 1973; see
cioppo and Petty's (1979) cognitive response explana- also Wright 1980). As shown by Petty and Cacioppo
tion of repetition effects. Cacioppo and Petty showed (1979), high levels of such motivation increase the pro-
that the typical pattern of attitudinal effects of message duction of support arguments and counter arguments.
repetition (an inverted-U curve) could be explained by The ability antecedent is discussed by Roberts and
the differential production of support arguments and Maccoby (1973), who show that increased respondent
counter arguments at different levels of message repe- knowledge about the issue leads to increased cognitive
tition. Several aspects of this process mechanism deserve response production to a message (cf., the inoculation
attention. As the authors point out, the mechanism in- research of McGuire 1964). Note that such ability, as
dicates that (1979, p. 105): usually defined in such research, depends on the issue
the repetition of the message arguments provided more
in question, and is not treated here as an individual
opportunities to elaborate cognitively upon them (sic) trait.2 In the advertising context, such response-enabling
and to realize their cogency and favorable implications. knowledge could come from generalized knowledge
Hence, counterargumentation declined at the moderate about the product category, the brand in the ad, or even
exposure frequency. At high exposure levels, however, from high prior familiarity with that specific advertising
tedium and/or reactance may have motivated the indi- execution. While the relationship is usually thought of
vidual to again attack the now offensive communication. as linear, it is possible that very high levels of prior
Thus, counterargumentation was renewed, and agree- knowledge might lead to reduced, rather than greater,
ment decreased at high exposure levels.
levels of response to message arguments (cf., Johnson
In other words, high exposure messages, having already and Russo 1984).
been thought about, become offensive. Such message- As pointed out by Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman
related thinking would involve the generation of the (1981, p. 853), the motivation and ability antecedents,
support and counter arguments studied by Petty and though theoretically distinct, are usually highly corre-
Cacioppo. lated in practice, since those motivated to find out more
Two implications follow from this explanation. First, about an issue are likely to develop greater expertise
if the point at which the message is thought about is than are those who are less motivated (cf., Markus 1977,
delayed, the point at which it becomes offensive should who found that people have a greater ability to think
also be delayed, and the curve of dependent attitudes about those things relevant to their "self"). In an ad-
should continue to rise rather than fall to the familiar vertising context, Lutz, MacKenzie, and Belch (1983,
inverted-U shape. Second, the point at which the mes- p. 534) report that respondents high in motivation were
sage is thought about is a function of the antecedent also high in knowledge. Thus, while these two anteced-
conditions for support argument and counter argument ents should be manipulated independently where pos-
production in that situation. If the antecedent condi- sible (or motivation should be varied with ability kept
tions are at low levels, such message-related thinking
would not occur extensively in the first few exposures,
the message would not become offensive until later, and 'A similar model has recently been suggested by Cacioppo and
the point of the attitudinal downturn would be delayed. Petty (1985).
Repetition would thus continue to increase attitudes. 2It could be argued that individual trait-like differences in inherent
In contrast, when the antecedent conditions create high processing ability also ought to be considered. While the argument
levels of support argument and counter argument pro- has merit, such individual differences are usually ignored in the cog-
nitive response paradigm (for exceptions see Wright 1975 and Ca-
duction at low levels of exposure, the attitudinal down- cioppo and Petty 1982). For an exhaustive review, see Wright 1980.

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 434 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

constant, as in Petty and Cacioppo 1983), such orthog- Situational Implications

onal manipulations are often difficult in some settings.
Combined with the process view on repetition pre-
The effects of the third antecedent-response oppor-
sented earlier, the literature on the three antecedents
tunity-are shown most clearly in the literature on dis-
of cognitive response production suggests that repetition
traction effects (cf., Festinger and Maccoby 1964; Os-
of a message will lead to increases in brand attitudes
terhouse and Brock 1970), where high levels of distrac-
only if these antecedents are at low levels. Such a sit-
tion (implying low opportunity) reduce the support and
counter argumentation evoked by a message.3 Addi-
uational framework is supported by and helps organize
results reported in much previous research on repeti-
tionally, Krugman (1967) and Wright (1981) have ar-
tion. Thus, Ray et al. (1971) reported that repetition
gued that television, unlike print, is a low "opportunity"
continued to increase intention to buy in ads for low-
medium since the message pace is higher and the re-
price "convenience" goods, but not for high-price
spondent control over exposure is lower. Wright (1981,
p. 276) has shown that, as a consequence, print messages
"shopping" goods, and for soft-sell "non-grabber" ads,
but not for hard-sell "grabber" ads-a result also re-
usually evoke more cognitive response production than
TV messages. From a different perspective, Calder, In- ported by Silk and Vavra (1974). Rothschild and Ray
(1974) found that while political advertising for a state
sko, and Yandell (1974), Chaiken (1980), and Petty and
Cacioppo (1984, p. 76) have shown that when messages
assembly race did lead to an increase in voting inten-
themselves contain more arguments, the number of
tions as a function of repetition, advertising for a pres-
idential race did not. These results support the situa-
support and counter arguments is higher than when the
tional framework suggested because more motivated
messages contain fewer arguments. The presence of
more arguments within the message thus provides more
message processing can be expected for shopping goods,
"opportunity" to the respondent for support and coun- grabber ads, and presidential elections. Similarly, the
ter argumentation: all other things being equal, a re- reason that Belch (1982) found no significant effects of
cipient should be able to generate a greater number of repetition using TV commercials may be that respon-
such responses to a message that contains more argu- dents were told before exposure that they would be
ments than to one that contains fewer. asked questions about the commercials, thus increasing
These antecedents are discussed further in Wright the motivation to generate message-related thoughts.
(1974, 1975, 1980, 1981) and Roberts and Maccoby Next, since high ability (from greater knowledge and
(1973). While these antecedents do interact, the nature prior familiarity) should enable more message-related
of the interactions is not fully understood. Wright initial processing,4 this should reduce the positive at-
shows, for instance, that while motivational differences titudinal effects of further repetition. Supporting this
impact on support argument production only if the op- expectation, Calder and Sternthal (1980) report that
portunity to do so is already high (as in the print me- higher exposure led to more total (both positive and
dium; 1974, 1981), counter argument production does negative) thoughts for an unfamiliar product, but to an
not show this interaction. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) increase (for high exposure levels) only in negative
show that the existence of more arguments within a thoughts for a well-known product.
message serves as an attitude-increasing "peripheral Finally, since Krugman (1967) and Wright (1974,
cue" under low motivation conditions, regardless of 1981) have argued that print, unlike TV, is a medium
their quality, but increases attitudes under high moti- that allows greater opportunity for attribute-based re-
vation conditions only if the arguments' "cogency" is sponse, the framework developed would suggest that
high. Clearly, therefore, three-way interactions are of the attitudinal downturn should occur earlier in print
interest, but no comprehensive theory of such inter- than in TV. Mitchell and Olson (1977) did find that
actions yet exists. repetition of two kinds of print ads did not have a pos-
itive effect on belief strength, attitudes, or purchase in-
tentions, while most studies using TV ads have found
3Some writers have combined the "ability" and "opportunity" positive repetition effects. Thus, there seems to be sub-
variables (e.g., Petty 198 1), including the effects of distraction under
stantial prior research suggesting that the antecedents
"ability." Some others, however (e.g., Wright 1980), use "opportu-
of such support argument and counter argument pro-
nity" as another antecedent, using it to understand the effects on
cognitive response production of low respondent control over ex-duction should moderate the attitudinal effects of mes-
sage
posure time, message length, the number of arguments in the message repetition, with continuing attitude gains in situ-
(as in Calder et al. 1974), distractor thoughts evoked by competing
ations wherein such message-related thinking is re-
messages (as in Wright 1981), etc. Cacioppo and Petty (1979) con- duced.
ceptualize repetition as providing "opportunities" for message re-
sponse. While "opportunity" could, therefore, be subsumed under
"ability," we prefer to keep them distinct, including under "oppor- 4Other studies, however, suggest that minimal familiarity is nec-
tunity" those response-enabling variables not under the respondent's
essary for any repetition impact: Ray et al. (1971) found that while
own control (e.g., the number of message arguments), and includingwell-known brands have positive repetition functions, brands that
under 'ability" those that are so controllable (e.g., generalized product
are not well known have flat repetition functions for at least eight
knowledge). exposures.

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 SITUATIONAL EFFECTS
HYPOTHESES
Hi: Repetition will lead to continuing gains (in-
creases over control) in purchase intentions
and attitudes for ads evoking a low number
of (claimed) brand thoughts (support argu-
ments and counter arguments) in early (first
or second) exposures, but not for ads evoking
many such thoughts.
The following sections will describe how the ante-
cedent variables of support argument and counter ar-
gument production were operationalized in this study.
In terms of manipulations, the motivation and ability
antecedents-which are expected to be highly correlated
(as described earlier)-were combined as one factor,
and opportunity was treated as the other variable of
interest. While it would have been preferable to keep
them distinct, pilot testing (see Batra 1984) showed that
a manipulation of motivation through the product cat-
egory of the advertised brand also varied the ability an-
tecedent, since respondents knew more about those
product categories they cared more about. Hypothesis
1, which relates to the effects of support and counter
argumentation on repetition responses, is thus extended
to these antecedent factors individually. Specifically:
H2: Repetition will lead to continuing gains in
brand purchase intentions and attitudes for
ads low in antecedent motivation/ability, but
not for ads high in such antecedent motiva-
tion/ability.
H3: Repetition will lead to continuing gains in
brand purchase intentions and attitudes for
ads low in antecedent opportunity, but not
for ads high in such antecedent opportunity.
As will be explained later, the opportunity manipu-
lations were conducted in terms of the execution styles
of the stimulus ads, with ads containing more attribute
arguments providing greater opportunity for support
and counter argumentation. Notice that no interactions
are posited between the motivation/ability antecedent
and the opportunity antecedent in their responses to
different exposure levels. This is because of recent re-
search suggesting that the number of message arguments
(the opportunity antecedent here) acts to raise attitudes
under conditions of both high and low motivation/
ability, although through different "routes." Petty and
Cacioppo have recently shown (1984, p. 78) that as long
as the messages are "cogent" (strong rather than weak),
the presence of more arguments in the message increases
attitudes either by increased support argument produc-
tion (in high motivation/ability situations) or by acting
as a peripheral cue facilitating attitude change (in low
motivation/ability conditions). We thus do not expect
any three-way (repetition X motivation/ability X op-
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OF REPETITION 435
portunity) interactions, though the interactions of rep-
etition with the opportunity variable may occur through
different mechanisms in the two motivation/ability
conditions: cognitive response production in the high
motivation/ability level, and the just-described periph-
eral route in the low motivation/ability level.
Finally, though data were also collected on measures
of brand salience (recall and familiarity), repetition ef-
fects on attitudes and purchase intentions via cognitive
response mechanisms are expected to be unrelated to
effects on measures of salience (cf., Cacioppo and Petty
1979, pp. 103-104, who found no interactions with fre-
quency on recall measures, and very low correlations
of recall with cognitive response production). Thus we
do not hypothesize any interactions of repetition with
these salience measures.
METHOD
In this study, 131 housewives were exposed to three
30-second TV test commercials each in a design that
varied product category and brand usage (manipulation
of antecedent motivation/ability), ad execution (ma-
nipulation of antecedent opportunity), and frequency
level. The ads were embedded in program context with
an appropriate cover story, and the exposures were dis-
tributed over two sessions, one week apart. The gains
over an internal, zero-exposure control group were an-
alyzed for brand purchase intentions, attitudes, and fa-
miliarity; differences in ad recall were also studied.
Design
The objective of the study was to study differences
in repetition effects across different levels of the ante-
cedents of support/counter argument production: the
motivation, ability, and opportunity to respond to the
ad in such attribute fashion. However, as mentioned
earlier, the motivation and ability antecedents are ex-
pected to be correlated, since high motivation to make
careful brand choices would lead respondents to in-
crease their knowledge about how such better choices
could be made. Thus, in this study both were treated
as one antecedent variable. The design used was a 2
X 2 X 3 factorial, with the first two factors (between
subjects) being antecedent motivation/ability (high,
low) and antecedent opportunity (high, low). The third
factor was a within-subjects frequency treatment, with
each respondent seeing each ad (a 30-second TV com-
mercial) either one, two, or four times. (As a conse-
quence of the scheduling patterns to be described later,
the repetition treatment in this experiment is necessarily
confounded with some scheduling operationalizations
used; see section on scheduling.) The choice of a within-
subjects treatment for frequency was made primarily
on statistical grounds: it would control for individual
differences and thus increase the power of the test.
 436 THE JOURNAL OF
Table 1 presents the design. To increase generality,
and to make possible the administration of ads at dif-
ferent test frequencies to the same individual, the three
repetition levels within each between-subjects cell each
used three different replicates of the ad type representing
the between-subjects treatment of that cell (e.g., high
motivation/ability product category, low opportunity
execution). A subject would thus see three test ads rep-
resenting her between-subjects treatment: the first
would be seen once, the second twice, the third four
times. To avoid confounding a frequency level with a
particular ad (replicate), these ads were partially coun-
terbalanced across frequency levels using a latin square
design (making the total design a split plot). Each be-
tween-subjects cell thus had three replicate-frequency
groups, with an average of 12 respondents per group
(before no-shows and dropouts; actual n's are slightly
lower). Each of the three within-cell replicate-frequency
groups was run in two separate subgroups of six re-
spondents each to avoid intergroup history confounds
(see also Footnote 6). The sessions were balanced across
day of week and time of day.
In addition to providing data on the three test ads in
their treatment, respondents also provided data on the
three brands used in the experiment that did not appear
in their cell, thus providing a control (zero exposure)
condition for the analysis of treatment effects through
gain scores. Since these were real ads for real brands,
with differing pre-exposure attitude and intentions
scores, a "pre-post" rather than "post-only" dependent
variable is clearly appropriate. However, a pre-exposure
measurement could be reactive, and so this "internal
control" strategy was employed for the computation of
gain scores.
Stimuli
Antecedent motivation/ability was first manipulated
through the choice of the product category in the ad,
and selection was made on the basis of data collected
from another study not described here (Batra and Ray
1985) that measured the extent to which respondents
rated the category as one in which brand choices mat-
tered to them (motivation) and the extent to which they
considered themselves knowledgeable about that cate-
gory through usage or otherwise (ability). As expected,
such antecedent motivation and ability were signifi-
cantly correlated in the earlier study (r = 0.49, p < 0.01,
n = 480). Three different brands, representing three dif-
ferent product categories, were used as replicates within
each of the two (high/low) motivation/ability treat-
ments. For high motivation/ability the product cate-
gories were photographic film, deodorants, and facial
moisturizers; for low motivation/ability, the categories
were instant coffee, instant chocolate drink mixes, and
frozen pizzas. For reasons of confidentiality, brand
names cannot be disclosed. Thus, six different brands
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CONSUMER RESEARCH
TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR REPETITION STUDY
Ad execution ("opportunity")a
High (many arguments) Low (few arguments)
Motivation/
Abilitya 1 b 2b 4b 1b 2b 4b
High HM, c HM2 HM3 HF1 d HF2 HF3
HM2 HM3 HM, HF2 HF3 HF,
HM3 HM, HM2 HF3 HF1 HF2
Low LM1 LM2 LM3 LF1 LF2 LF3
LM2 LM3 LM, LF2 LF3 LF1
LM3 LM1 LM2 LF3 LF1 LF2
Between-subjects: Antecedent motivation/ability (2 levels) X Antecedent opportunity (2
levels).
b Within-subjects: Frequency of exposure.
c To be read: High motivation/ability, many arguments, replicate ad execution # 1
to be read: High motivation/ability, few arguments, replicate ad execution #1.
NOTE: The experimental design had two between-subjects factors at two levels each (mo-
tivation/ability and opportunity) and one within-subjects factor at three levels (frequency of
exposure). Each between-subjects oell in this design had three "replicate groups," using
latin square counterbalancing. Data for each of these replicate groups was collected in two
sessions, from equal sub-groups.
(product categories) were used in all. Data from the
pilot study showed the selected stimuli differing signif-
icantly across both the motivation and ability measures.
To further add to the potency of this "ability" manip-
ulation, the specific brands chosen for the high moti-
vation/ability treatments were market leaders, implying
a high probability that the respondents would have used
them before and thus have high usage-based knowledge
about them; those brands chosen for the low levels were
not market leaders. Pilot study data showed such dif-
ferences for prior usage for the selected brands to be
directionally as desired. These data also showed that
while higher usage brands had higher pre-exposure at-
titudes (r = 0.50, p < 0.01), such higher usage did not
appear to raise total support and counter argument
production by itself (r = 0.03, n.s.). (The possibility of
usage differences confounding results is discussed later.)
Antecedent opportunity was manipulated through
the choice of the execution of the ad, with a "many
attribute arguments" execution considered high in an-
tecedent opportunity, and "few attribute arguments"
executions considered low in such opportunity. The
presence of more attribute statements within the ad
provides greater opportunity for the viewer to generate
support arguments and counter arguments (cf., the re-
sults of Chaiken 1980 and Petty and Cacioppo 1984).
The ads were categorized based on pilot data (Batra
1984, p. 383) on how much attribute information was
perceived to be in them: the mean informativeness rat-
ing was 2.79 for low opportunity and 3.88 for high op-
portunity (p < 0.01, n = 142). Results from this pilot
study confirmed that ads rated as more informative
generated significantly more total support and counter
 SITUATIONAL EFFECTS OF REPETITION 437

arguments (p < 0.01), though the absolute magnitude TABLE 2

of this correlation was low (r = 0.13). (Such low cor- SCHEDULING OPERATIONALIZATIONS
relations should be expected because for these real ads
on real brands, such cognitive responses are the out- Week I Week II
comes of message content interacting with prior atti- "Too Close for Comfort" "The Jeffersons"
tudes and knowledge structures, and are thus dependent (Daytime rerun break pattern) (Prime time break pattem)

on much more than just how many arguments there

Station ID Station ID
were in the ad.) The executions used across the two
Public service announcement Promotional spot
opportunity levels were pairs for the same brand, so Ad #4A (TEST)
that "number of arguments" execution differences were Filler ad

not confounded with differences in brands. However, PROGRAM PROGRAM

the pilot testing did reveal that real ads having few ar-
Ad #4A (TEST) Filler ad
guments also tended to be more "affective" in their ex-
Filler ad Filler ad
ecution, thus having a greater "emotional impact" Filler ad Filler ad
(mean emotional rating for low opportunity ads = 4.17
PROGRAM PROGRAM
and for high opportunity ads = 2.22, p < 0.01). To help
correct against such confounding, data were also col- Ad #1 (TEST) Ad #2 (TEST)
lected in the study on emotional impact and liking for Filler ad Filler ad
Filler ad Filler ad
the ad for possible use as covariates.
PROGRAM PROGRAM

Ad #4B (TEST) Ad #4B (TEST)

Scheduling Filler ad Filler ad
Filler ad Filler ad
As mentioned earlier, the test ads (embedded in pro-
PROGRAM
gram content) were distributed over two different ses-
sions, one week apart. The across-program and within- Ad #2 (TEST)
Filler ad
program scheduling operationalizations are presented
Filler ad
in Table 2. It should be noted that (1) within each rel-
evant commercial string, the test ads were given first End credits, etc. End credits, etc.

position to both equalize position string effects and to Total: 12 :30 ads Total: 11 :30 ads
create stronger manipulation effects for the test ads, (2) (4 test) (3 test)
the one-exposure ad was always shown in the first week, + ID + PSA + Promo + ID

while the two- and four-exposure conditions were evenly

divided between the two weeks, (3) the two exposures
within each weekly program for the four-exposure con-
dition are at least one commercial string apart, and (4)
the positions of the four-exposure and two-exposure ads
across the last two strings are counterbalanced across
the two sessions.
The interval between last exposure and effect mea-
surement is thus under 30 minutes for the two- and
four-exposure conditions and is one week for the one-
exposure condition. The result of the frequency/time-
of-measurement confound built into this scheduling
choice is that the two- and four-exposure levels of de-
pendent measures could exceed the one-exposure levels
either because of higher frequency or because they were
closer to the time of measurement. This confound
would not, however, explain away differences among
the two- and four-exposure conditions themselves
(which is where the downturn in dependent measures
is expected) or differences across cells in the location
of the downturn, since the time-of-measurement con-
found would apply equally to all cells. Further, in the
analysis to follow, any interactions significant in the
total design were also tested for significance in the un-
confounded two-to-four exposures part of the design.
Subjects and Procedure
One hundred and forty-four respondents were re-
cruited-36 for each of the four between-subjects cells;
after no-shows and dropouts, 131 provided usable data
for both sessions. These were housewives and working
women aged 20 through 55 from the South San Fran-
cisco, California and nearby areas. They were paid $20
for their participation in the two one-hour sessions. Not
necessarily representative of American women gener-
ally, their assignment to different cells was randomized.
The study was described as one in which university
researchers were studying the factors that influenced
how consumers felt about the content of TV broadcasts
(program content, network announcements, advertise-
ments, etc.). Respondents were told that the videotaped
programs they would watch were actual TV programs
already broadcast, and that since the researchers were
interested in finding out how consumers felt about the
programs in conditions as similar as possible to watch-
ing them at home, the programs would be shown to
them complete with the sorts of announcements and
ads with which they would be seen at home.

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 438 THE JOURNAL
Respondents viewed the 30-minute videotape and
then answered questions on the cover story (e.g., pro-
gram liking, viewing habits, the viewer's lifestyle),
within which were embedded manipulation checks (see
section on Measures) on the motivational and ability
antecedents. Note that the procedure and measures were
identical for all frequency conditions and that no de-
pendent measures were collected in this first session in
order to minimize possible reactivity.
In their second session, exactly one week later, an-
other videotape with another program and embedded
commercials was played with identical viewing instruc-
tions. Questions on prior episode viewing, episode rat-
ings, and episode likes and dislikes were then admin-
istered as before. The next set of questions measured,
in sequence, ad recall, brand familiarity, brand atti-
tudes, purchase intentions, and brand usage. These were
embedded within cover story questions (e.g., program
content recall, liking, and videotaping intentions), and
included test, control, and filler brands.
Finally, they were told that since "how you feel about
the ads (in the programs) could influence your feelings
about the program" their ratings of certain ads were
desired. The three test ads in their cell were then shown
again, in sequence, and ratings were obtained for each
on (1) prior exposure to the ad (before the experiment),
(2) the number of "thoughts about product claims" they
had while they watched the ad (manipulation check on
the degree of support/counter argument production),
(3) informativeness (manipulation check on the "op-
portunity" variable), and (4) emotional impact and like-
dislike (possible covariates for an "affective-rational"
confound). Before leaving, they were told to write on
the back of the questionnaire any comments they had
about either the purpose of the study or specific ques-
tions. These comments were used to assess the incidence
of demand artifacts.
Measures
The manipulation check on the motivational ante-
cedent asked the respondent how important it was to
her, when buying any brand in each of the categories
listed, that she bought exactly the brand that she did
(five-point scale, "most important" to "least impor-
tant"). The check on the ability antecedent (category
knowledgeability) asked for a self-rating of her knowl-
edge about which features one might look at, in choos-
ing among different brands, with such knowledge com-
ing not only from usage but also from magazines, ads,
and friends (five-point scale, "very knowledgeable" to
"quite unknowledgeable"). Prior brand usage was mea-
sured via classification of that brand as having been
used most often, frequently, occasionally, at least once
before, or never before.
Ad recall was either reported correctly or not, and
was analyzed subsequently as the percentage of respon-
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OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
dents in that treatment who recalled that test ad. Re-
spondents were asked to mention the names of brands
for which they remembered seeing ads in either the first
or second session. Brand familiarity was measured on
a seven-point "very unfamiliar" to "very familiar"
scale, with such familiarity coming not only from usage
but also from magazines, ads, family and friends, and
so on. The seven-point familiarity measure is expected
to be a somewhat more sensitive measure of brand sa-
lience than the dichotomous recall measure. Brand at-
titudes were assessed through six semantic differential
items: pleasant-unpleasant, useful-useless, cold-warm,
poorly made-well made, friendly-unfriendly, and the
best (in the category)-the worst.5 The mean for all six
items was used in the analysis; factor analyses revealed
one major factor, and the Cronbach alpha was 0.93.
Brand purchase intentions were assessed on a seven-
point scale anchored with "definitely would buy" and
"definitely would not buy." (The use of a single inten-
tions measure could pose potential problems of unre-
liability, though the measure selected is one used fre-
quently.)
The test ads were rated on prior exposure (before the
study) as having been seen never, once or twice, quite
often, or very frequently before the experiment. The
number of thoughts subjects had about the claims the
ad was making about the product-either positive or
negative (support arguments or counter arguments)-
were rated on a seven-point "many thoughts" to "few
thoughts" scale; this served as a manipulation check
on the differences in the generation of such responses
across the four cells. It should be clearly understood
that this is a measure of claimed-not independently
validated-support argument and counter argument
production. Such a measure is not without precedent,
however: Cacioppo and Petty ( 1985, p. 106) cite a study
by Schumann (1983) that also used a 10-point scale of
self-reported cognitive response production frequency
in a study of repetition effects. Our pilot study (reported
in Batra 1984) found a significant (p < 0.0 1) correlation
between this self-reported measure and a count by a
judge (from a retrospective verbal protocol of the pro-
portion of ad-evoked thoughts that dealt with the
brand), although the absolute magnitude was low
(r = 0.24).
The ads were also rated on the amount of product
information (seven-point scale from "had no infor-
5The choice of items used was based on the requirements of another
investigation into the dimensionality of brand attitudes. The pleas-
ant-unpleasant, useful-useless, poorly made-well made, and best-
worst items are clearly evaluative and have been used extensively in
prior research. The cold-warm and friendly-unfriendly items were
used to see if they would respond as a distinctly more "hedonic"
attitudinal factor; they did not in fact do so. For further details and
for reasons why the usual "good-bad," "like-dislike," and other items
were not used here, see Batra 1984.
 SITUATIONAL EFFECTS OF REPETITION 439

TABLE 3
mation" to "had a lot of information"), (positive) emo-
tional impact (seven-point scale from "no emotional MANIPULATION CHECKS (OVERALL)
effect" to "strong emotional effect"), and liking or dis-
liking of the ad (seven-point scale). The first served as p-value
a manipulation check on the "opportunity" antecedent Measure Low High (d.f. = 385)
(ad execution style) variable, and the others served as
Motivation/Ability
possible covariates for the "affective-rational" con-
Motivation 2.64 3.62 <.001
founding noted earlier. Ability 2.77 3.47 <.001
Prior usage 2.81 3.42 <.001

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS Few Many

arguments arguments
Opportunity
Demand Artifacts Informativeness 4.02 4.73 <.001

Of the 131 respondents who attended both sessions, Execution covariates

two indicated that they may have suspected its stated Emotional impact 4.06 3.80 .096
intent. For this reason, analysis was restricted to the Liking of ad 4.81 4.29 .003

other 129 respondents. Claimed number of cognitive responses produced

(support/counter arguments)

Manipulation Checks Motivation/Ability

Low 3.33 (1)* 4.15 (3)
Manipulation checks (Table 3) indicated that the low High 4.53 (2) 4.23 (4)
motivation/ability cells were significantly lower than
the high motivation/ability cells on both the motivation NOTE: 'Scheffe mulple comparison tests indic
different were 1 and 2, 1 and 3, and 1 and 4.
measure (low = 2.64, high = 3.62, p < 0.001, 385 df.)
and the ability/knowledge measure (low = 2.77, high
= 3.47. p < 0.001, 385 d.f). Further, as intended, prior
indicated that this highest level was not significantly
usage was in fact higher for the high motivation/ability
different from the level for the high motivation/ability
level than for the low level (3.42 vs. 2.81, p < 0.001,
many-arguments cell (the one expected to be highest).
385 d.f).
The hypothesized differences in response between high
Analysis of the low and high "opportunity" marginals
and low "claimed cognitive response production"
showed that the "more argument" ads were seen as sig-
(CCRP) cells were therefore tested as planned, using
nificantly more informative ("few arguments" = 4.02,
cell contrasts between the high motivation/ability
"many arguments" = 4.73, p < 0.001, 385 d.f). Further,
many-arguments execution cell (high CCRP) and the
tests of the affective/rational confound showed that
low motivation/ability few-arguments cell (low CCRP).
while the "few argument" ads were significantly more
likeable ("few arguments" = 4.81, "many arguments"
= 4.29, p = 0.003, 385 df.), they were only directionally Tests of Hypotheses
stronger in emotional impact ("few arguments" = 4.06,
The repeated measures analysis of variance assump-
"many arguments" = 3.80, p = 0.097, 385 df).
tion of "compound symmetry" (Winer 1971, p. 596)
However, while the motivation/ability difference held
was tested through the hypothesis that the covariance
significantly not only for the marginals but also across
matrix of the dependent variable is a diagonal matrix
relevant individual cells, this was not true of the "num-
(Bock 1975, p. 459), using Box's M analog of Bartlett's
ber of arguments" difference. While the "informative-
test for sphericity. Since this homogeneity assumption
ness" rating was different (p < 0.001, 190 df.) across was upheld in every case to be reported here, only the
the "opportunity" cells within the low antecedent mo-
univariate results are given here. Further, since sample
tivation/ability treatment, it was not different within
sizes were slightly unequal across cells, unbalanced es-
the high antecedent motivation treatment. Probably as
timation was performed, using the unweighted means
a result, the four cells did not order as expected on the
regression approach (Winer 1971, p. 600).6 Tests for
claimed level of cognitive response production, as mea-
sured by the self-rating of whether the viewer had few/
many thoughts about the claims made by the ad about
6Note that the number of respondents rather than the number of
the brand. While the lowest cell mean was for the low experimental subgroups is used as the unit of observation, since in-
motivation/ability few-arguments execution cell, as ex- dividuals were allocated randomly to subgroups, which were allocated
pected, the highest cell mean was not for the high mo- randomly to treatments, with two subgroups per group to minimize
tivation/ability many-arguments execution cell but for inter-group history confounds. Further, experimental occasions were
randomized across time of day and day of week. (ANOVA runs using
the high motivation/ability few-arguments execution experimental sessions as covariates showed the covariates to be in-
cell (see Table 3). However, multiple comparison tests (Continued p. 440.)

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 440 THE JOURNAL OF
linear and quadratic trend were done using non-equal
spacing intervals for the repetition levels, i.e., as 1, 2,
and 4 exposures.
For brand familiarity, brand attitudes, and brand
purchase intentions, the dependent measure used was
the extent to which the treatment condition observa-
tions were higher than the mean for the control (zero
exposure) level, in absolute terms. Since three replicates
are involved in each cell, each with its own pre-exposure
level, and with these replicates differing between the
motivation/ability levels, it is clearly more appropriate
to make between-cell comparisons using the mean of
each replicate's growth over its own control than to
compare absolute post-exposure cell means, which de-
pend on the specific replicates used in each cell. These
gain scores (averaged between replicates) were thus used
in the analyses.7 Ad recall was analyzed as the per-
centage of respondents recalling the test ad. Several
studies have shown that analysis of variance can be per-
formed safely on nominal data if the number of obser-
vations per cell is 30 or more (Cochran 1947; Mande-
ville 1969), though the practice is controversial.
Only the within-subjects ANOVA results are reported
below, since the between-subjects results are not of hy-
pothesized interest. Only two of the twelve between-
subjects tests conducted were significant at p < 0.05;
on both brand familiarity and recall, the differences be-
tween the high and low motivation/ability treatments
were significant. The mean square error terms in these
between-subjects tests, with 125 d.f, ranged from a low
of 0.14 (for recall) to a high of 5.0 (for purchase inten-
tions).8
Purchase Intentions. As can be seen from Table 4,
the mean gain over control in purchase intentions is
0.145 for one exposure, 0.128 for two, and 0.457 for
significant.) It could be argued that since subjects were run in such
subgroups rather than individually, within-cell error variance was
reduced artificially, and that the experimental sub-groups rather than
individuals should be the units of observation. In this study the effects
of interest (interactions of frequency with the antecedents) are within
subjects, so any reduced variance would not be correlated with across-
subjects variables. The effect of using individuals as data points would
thus be to use an inappropriately small error term. An adjustment
for this can be made by using individuals as the unit but increasing
the F required to achieve significance through adjusting the degrees
of freedom to reflect subgroup level analysis. While the use of
subgroups in the within-subjects statistical tests would reduce the
error degrees of freedom to 20 (there were six subgroups in each of
four cells), the test F statistic does not change markedly (for p < 0.05,
from 3.04 to 3.49 and from 2,250 to 2,20 d.f), and the results reported
in this article stay essentially unchanged.
7An alternative to such "gain score" analysis would be to use ab-
solute post-exposure levels as the dependent variables, with pre-ex-
posure levels serving as covariates. Such analyses were also conducted,
but are not reported, since they gave results virtually identical to
those reported here.
8Full results are available from the authors, and are omitted here
for the sake of brevity.
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CONSUMER RESEARCH
four. Frequency is thus not significant as a within-sub-
jects factor (see Table 5), though the linear trend by
itself approaches significance at p < 0.10 (F = 3.09, d.f
1,125).
Of the interactions with frequency, only the inter-
action between frequency and motivation/ability is sig-
nificant, at p < 0.05 (F = 4.30, d.f 2,250). While the
intentions gain for high motivation/ability rises from
0.289 for one exposure to 0.394 for two, it then drops
to 0.140 for four; for low motivation/ability, however,
it shows almost no gain over control for one or two
exposures but then rises dramatically to 0.778 for four.
(It should be noted that here, as at other points discussed
later, every reported mean that falls below the control
mean actually has a 95 percent confidence interval that
includes zero gain, indicating that, for that level, the
mean growth was not significantly different from zero.
Obviously, this did not happen for all levels, for oth-
erwise there would be no significant results.9) Hypoth-
esis 2, therefore, is supported: the gain is greater for low
(than for high) motivation/ability. Further, this inter-
action is significant even when analysis is restricted to
the unconfounded two to four frequency range (F
= 7.97, p < 0.01, d.f = 2,250), and this level would
stay significant even if the experimental subgroups were
used as the denominator in the F-test (F to attain sig-
nificance at p of 0.95 with 2, 20 d.f = 3.49). However,
Hypothesis 3 (greater gain for low opportunity) is not
supported (F = 1.75, d.f = 2,250), though the results
are directionally consistent. This interaction fails to
reach significance even when the emotional impact and
liking covariates are used.
The contrast between high and low claimed cognitive
response production (CCRP) cells, as stated in Hy-
pothesis 1 (greater purchase intentions gains for low
than for high levels of claimed support argument and
counter argument production) is significant at p < 0.05
(F = 3.62, d.f = 2,250). (As mentioned earlier, the high
and low claimed cognitive response production cells
are, respectively, the high motivation/ability, many ar-
guments cell and the low motivation/ability, few ar-
guments cell.) While intentions gains for high CCRP
falls from 0.35 for one to 0.08 for two exposures, before
falling further to -0.23 for four, intentions gains for
low CCRP starts at -0.25 for one exposure, rises to
-0.02 for two, and keeps rising dramatically to 0.77
for four. The interaction approaches significance at p
9For purchase intentions, the 95 percent confidence intervals for
all cell mean gains were as follows: at frequency level one, -0.19 to
0.48; at frequency level two, -0.19 to 0.45; and at frequency level
four, 0.12 to 0.80. For attitudes at the corresponding frequency levels,
the figures were -0.22 to 0.23, 0.00 to 0.43, and 0.04 to 0.53. For
brand familiarity at the same frequency levels, these were -0.36 to
0.23, -0.32 to 0.33, and 0.14 to 0.70. Figures for individual cells are
omitted for brevity, but with sample sizes per cell ranging from 31
to 33, standard deviations ranged from 1.08 to 2.1 1 for these measures
and frequency levels.
SITUATIONAL EFFECTS OF REPETITION 441

TABLE 4

LEVELS OF REPETITION IMPACT ON "GAIN OVER CONTROL"

Low motivation/Ability High motivation/Ability Motivation/Ability Opportunity

Low High Low High Low High All

arguments' arguments arguments argumentSb Low High arguments arguments
Frequency (n =31) (n =33) (n =33) (n =32) (n =64) (n =65) (n =64) (n =65) (n =129)

Purchase Intentions

1 -.246 .231 .233 .348 -.000 .289 .001 .288 .145

2 -.023 -.254 .696 .084 -.142 .394 .348 -.088 .128
4 .768 .788 .497 -.228 .778 .140 .628 .287 .457

Attitudes

1 -.295 .195 .176 -.084 -.043 .048 -.052 .058 .003

2 -.009 .137 .546 .178 .066 .365 .277 .157 .217
4 .499 .507 .330 -.206 .503 .066 .412 .156 .283

Ad Recall (%)

1 00.0 15.2 12.1 3.1 7.8 7.7 6.3 9.2 7.8

2 32.3 33.3 21.2 18.8 32.8 20.0 26.6 26.2 26.4
4 96.8 90.9 84.9 81.3 93.8 83.1 90.6 86.2 88.4

Brand Familiarity

1 -.744 -.079 .299 .226 -.401 .263 -.206 .071 -.067

2 -.576 -.380 .748 .195 -.474 .476 .107 -.097 .004
4 .339 .342 .538 .470 .340 .504 .442 .405 .423

Lwclaimed cognitive response production (CCRP).

b High CCRP.

TABLE 5
= 0.065 when restricted to the unconfounded two- to
REPETITION IMPACT ON "GAIN OVER CONTROL": four-exposures portion of the design (F = 3.45).
WITHIN-SUBJECTS ANOVA

Brand Attitudes. The average attitude gain over

Purchase
Source df. intentions Attitudes Recall Familiarity
Frequency
Total 2,250 1.55 2.08 201.32c 4.78c
Linear 1,125 3.Q9a 3.78a 544.33c 10.71c
Quadratic 1,125 0.37 .77 3.79b .33
Motivation/Ability with frequency
Total 2,250 4.30b 3.44b 1.35 2.63a
Linear 1,125 7.46c 5.42b 1.57 3.68b
Quadratic 1,125 1.87 1.94 1.22 1.85
Opportunity with frequency
Total 2,250 1.75 .86 .43 .98
Linear 1,125 1.95 1.82 1.14 .63
Quadratic 1,125 1.59 .13 .02 1.24
action stays
Motivation/Ability with opportunity
Total 2,250 .13 .10
Claimed cognitive response production with frequencyd
Total 2,250 3.62b 3.15b 1.44 1.56
*p 0.10.
bp ?0.05.
Cp ? 0.01.
d Cell 1-4 contrast.
F-value
control was zero for one exposure, +0.22 for two ex-
posures, and +0.28 for four. The main effect for fre-
quency is not significant (F = 2.08, d.f = 2,250), with
the linear trend alone significant at p < 0.05 (F = 3.78,
df = 1,125). The interactions of frequency with the
within-subjects variables are significant only for moti-
vation/ability, at p < 0.05 (F = 3.44, d.f = 2,250). Hy-
pothesis 2, predicting greater attitude gains for low than
for high motivation/ability, finds support. While the
attitude gain for high motivation/ability rises rapidly
from 0.05 for one exposure to 0.37 for two, it subse-
quently drops to 0.07 for four; for low motivation/abil-
ity, on the other hand, the attitude gain for one exposure
is -0.04 over control, rises somewhat to 0.07 for two,
but then continues to rise rapidly to 0.50 for four ex-
posures. When analysis is restricted to the uncon-
founded two- to four-exposure levels only, this inter-
withsignificant at p < 0.05
frequency (F = 6.19). Incon-
1.35 .62
sistent with Hypothesis 3, however, high and low
opportunity ads do not respond significantly differently
to frequency (F = 0.86, d.f 2,250), even when the "af-
fective" ratings of the ads are used as covariates.
Hypothesis 1 predicted greater attitude gains for low
CCRP levels. The contrast between the high and low
claimed cognitive response production (CCRP) cells is
significant at p < 0.05. Attitude gain for high CCRP

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 442 THE JOURNAL OF
rises from -0.08 for one to +0.18 for two exposures
before falling to -0.21, while attitude gain for the low
CCRP cell keeps rising from -0.30 for one, through
-0.01 for two, to +0.50 for four. When tested for only
the two- to four-exposure levels, this interaction stays
significant at p < 0.05 (F = 4.41).
Ad Recall and Brand Familiarity. On average, across
all four cells, ad recall rose from 8 percent for one ex-
posure to 26 percent for two exposures and 88 percent
for four. The main effect of frequency is therefore
significant (F = 201.3, d.f = 2,250, p < 0.001). The
linear trend is significant at p < 0.001 (F = 544.3, d.f
= 1,125) and the quadratic trend is significant at p =
0.054 (F = 3.79, d.f = 1,125). For familiarity, average
gain over the control condition was -0.07 for one ex-
posure, 0.00 for two and 0.42 for four. The main effect
for repetition is thus significant at p < 0.01 (F = 4.78,
d.fJ = 2,250). When partitioned into a linear and qua-
dratic trend, only the linear trend is significant (p <
0.01; F = 10.71, df = 1,125). As expected, no signifi-
cant interactions exist (at p < 0.05) between frequency
and either antecedent motivation/ability or antecedent
opportunity (ad execution style) for both recall and fa-
miliarity. However, the motivation/ability antecedent
interacts with frequency on brand familiarity at a mar-
ginally significant level of p = 0.074 (F = 2.63, d.f
= 2,250).
DISCUSSION
The results support the hypothesized interactions of
repetition effects (on attitudes and intentions) with the
levels of the motivation/ability antecedent of support
argument and counter argument production, and sup-
port the interactions of repetition with the cells having
the highest/lowest levels of such claimed production.
Although they are directionally consistent with the hy-
potheses, however, the results for the opportunity an-
tecedent of such production (operationalized through
the number of arguments in the ad execution) are not
statistically significant. It is important to note that the
motivation/ability results are significant even if analysis
is restricted to the two repetition levels (two and four)
that do not suffer from the time-of-measurement con-
found mentioned earlier, as are the results for the con-
trasted levels (high, low) of claimed cognitive response
production.10 Thus, while interpretation of the gain
from one to two exposures is confounded, the statisti-
cally significant crossover interaction of interest occurs
between the two- and four-exposure levels and is not
'0Post hoc contrasts showed the miotivation/ability treatment in-
teracting with frequency for both intentions and attitude gains at p
< 0.10 for the one-to-two exposures contrast and at p < 0.05 for the
one-to-four exposures contrast. When just the high and low CCRP
cells were compared, the interactions with frequency were not sig-
nificant across frequency levels one and two, but were significant at
p < 0.05 when frequency levels one and four were contrasted.
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CONSUMER RESEARCH
subject to those caveats. Some rival hypotheses, pur-
porting to explain these results, are now discussed.
Rival Hypotheses
First, it might be argued that the ads for the high
motivation/ability conditions were also different from
the ads in the low motivation/ability conditions in
evoking more negative reactions to either message ar-
gumentation, execution style, or both, such that with
highly
repeated exposures, such ads would be more likely to
show downturns rather than upturns in the dependent
measures of interest. This is not supported, however,
by data from the pilot study (Batra and Ray 1985) in
which the ads were pre-tested for the valence and quan-
tity of various mediating responses they evoked (the
data are not repeated here, for the sake of brevity).
Second, it might be argued that ceiling effects pre-
vailed differentially between the high and low motiva-
tion/ability conditions, such that ads in the high level
reached them first and thus failed to show further growth
between the second and fourth exposures. Note that for
this to explain the observed results, the data must show
a pattern where the absolute levels of the dependent
variables for the high motivation/ability level reached
their ceiling at the four exposure level but those for the
low motivation/ability level did not.
Table 6 presents the absolute levels of post-exposure
attitudes and purchase intentions-as well as the gain
figures-for the two motivation/ability levels, by ex-
posure frequency. The mean absolute levels for the
"high" product categories are significantly higher (p
< 0.05, d.f = 127) than the ones in the "low" level on
the 1-7 scale of measurement for both attitudes and
purchase intentions for the one- and two-exposure lev-
els. This is so because more responses for the "high"
level came from (presumably more satisfied) users, as
was intended in manipulating "ability." However, the
means are not significantly different for the four-ex-
posure level (p = 0.537 for attitudes, 0.868 for inten-
tions, df = 127), so that if the dependent variables
bumped into their ceilings at four repetitions, they must
have done so for both the high and low motivation/
ability cells, and a differential ceiling effects explanation
would not hold. Further, the absolute values are at least
a scale point away from the highest value (7). Finally,
the high motivation/ability cell did show significant
growth (p < 0.05 for both attitudes and intentions) over
control at the two-exposure level at the absolute ratings
shown, so these two-exposure absolute levels are not
yet at the ceiling. Since the four-exposure absolute levels
are directionally lower than these two-exposure absolute
levels, the four-exposure absolute levels, too, must be
below the ceiling. Thus a ceiling effect explanation is
unlikely, if still possible.
Third, it might be speculated that the ""high" moti-
vation/ability ads may have had higher exposure levels
prior to the experiment than the "low" ads, leading to
 SITUATIONAL EFFECTS
TABLE 6
CEILING EFFECT TESTS: ATTITUDES AND
PURCHASE INTENTIONSa
Frequency
Measure 1 2
High motivation/Ability
Purchase intentions 'gain' 0.29 0.40 0.14
Attitudes "gain" 0.05 0.37 0.07
Absolute post-exposure P.l. 5.14 5.28 4.89
Absolute post-exposure attitude 5.31 5.63 5.26
Low motivation/Ability (n = 64)
Purchase intentions "gain" 0.00 ? -014b 0.78b
Attitudes "gain" -0.04 0.07 0.50b
Absolute post-exposure P.l. 4.23c 4.08d 4.95
Absolute post-exposure attitude 4 59d 4.68d 5.10
*Mean levels per cell, averaged across replicates.
For tests across levels of motivation/ability, p s 0.10.
c For tests across levels of motivation/ability, p s 0.05.
d For tests across levels of motivation/ability, p s 0.01.
lower measured growth within the experiment. Analysis
that compared the self-reported prior (to the experi-
ment) exposure levels for the test ads between high and
low motivation/ability levels showed, however, that no
significant differences in such prior exposure are de-
tectable.
These three rival hypotheses, therefore, do not con-
vincingly explain the observed results. While the theo-
retical mechanism stated earlier for these results (the
differential production of support arguments and
counter arguments) was not tested in this study, some
process evidence is available, though of a different kind.
(Evidence on the differential production of support and
counter arguments as a function of repetition has been
provided by studies cited earlier, such as Cacioppo and
Petty 1979.)
Data from Table 4 showed that the greatest effects of
repetition are quite obviously on ad (brand name) recall,
which rises to 88 percent for four exposures, overall.
Correlational analyses now show that such recall has a
significant (p = 0.01) relationship (r = 0.164) with
brand attitude gain only in the low motivation/ability
level, being low and insignificant in the high level (the
difference between the two coefficients is significant at
0.05 by Fisher's z statistic, z = 2.02). Since purchase
intention gain is related most of all to brand attitude
gain (r = 0.84 overall), similar differential linkages are
found between recall and purchase intention gain (r
= 0.15 for low, r = -0.06 for high, z = 2.06, p < 0.05).
Similarly, the relationship between brand familiarity
gain and ad recall is much higher (r = 0.26) in the low
than in the high motivation/ability level (r = -0.02, z
= 2.79, p < 0.05), with the relationship between fa-
miliarity gain and purchase intentions gain accordingly
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OF REPETITION 443
higher in the low (r = 0.52) than in the high motivation/
ability level (r = 0.35, z = 2.06, p < 0.05).
These differential relationships could be due to lower
variances for some of these dependent "gain" measures
in the high motivation/ability cell (F's for lower recall
and intentions gain variance differences are n.s. at 0.05,
4
but those for attitude and familiarity gain variance dif-
ferences reach significance, with 191, 194 df ). Still,
(n = 65)
they raise the possibility that even though recall and
brand familiarity do not respond differentially to rep-
etition as a function of the level of antecedent moti-
vation/ability, their linkages to dependent measures of
interest may be different, and the high impact of rep-
etition on such "salience" measures may be transmitted
differentially to the dependent measures of interest,
leading to differential impact of repetition on those de-
pendent measures themselves. These data agree with
earlier results suggesting such differential impact of sa-
lience in high and low motivational involvement con-
ditions, such as the "three hierarchies" research pre-
sented in 1973 by Ray et al. (see also Beattie and Mitch-
ell 1985). This mechanism may operate in addition to
the cognitive response mechanism suggested by Ca-
cioppo and Petty (1979). Just as individuals appear to
determine their preferences on the basis of other pe-
ripheral cues only in conditions of low motivation and/
or ability, so also may they use brand salience as an
heuristic, or peripheral cue, only in such conditions.
This "familiarity heuristic" thus deserves further re-
search.
CONCLUSION
The motivation/ability interactions just discussed do,
of course, require replication. This study combined
motivation and ability as one antecedent; as pointed
out earlier, the two are conceptually distinct, and ought
to be studied as separate antecedents where possible.
Further, the operationalizations of these antecedents
ought to be different in future studies. High usage
brands, one of the ability operationalizations in this
study, might have added more than just ability; it might
also have increased support argumentation and reduced
counter argumentation, and such a potential confound
should be avoided. Such studies could also then inves-
tigate three-way interactions: how do the interactions
of frequency with motivation depend on the levels of
response opportunity prevailing within different levels
of ability?
Note also that this study did not collect mediating
process information, in terms of the levels of support
and counter argumentation produced, relying instead
on self-reports about such production which were not
independently verified. We are therefore not in a po-
sition to tell why the hypothesized opportunity inter-
actions with frequency did not achieve statistical sig-
nificance. It appears most likely that this occurred be-
cause of a manipulation that was not strong enough, or
 444 THE JOURNAL OF
that it was confounded with an "affective-rational" dif-
ference that could not be statistically controlled through
the covariates used. Indeed, such differences in the "af-
fective" nature of the executions could have influenced
the mediating response process in complicated and un-
known ways: a highly affective execution might, through
raising the level of arousal, raise cognitive response
production even though the number of message argu-
ments is low (see Ray and Batra 1983 for a review),
though this is obviously a speculative interpretation.
Future studies in this area could thus usefully include
a check on actual cognitive response production to ex-
amine hypothesized mediating processes.
[Received December 1984. Revised July 1985.1
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