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  • Class Note Class 7 English

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    Aftab Zafar
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    This document provides a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for a pressure reducing valve (V-13) in a hydrogen fluoride (HF) supply system. The analysis examines two failure modes: 1) the valve opening too far, which could result in high nitrogen pressure leading to a vaporizer rupture and release of HF into the environment, and 2) the valve closing too far, stopping nitrogen pressure and HF flow to downstream equipment. Compensating provisions and severity classifications are identified for each failure mode.

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    Class note class 7 English

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    This document provides a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for a pressure reducing valve (V-13) in a hydrogen fluoride (HF) supply system. The analysis examines two failure modes: 1) the valve opening too far, which could result in high nitrogen pressure leading to a vaporizer rupture and release of HF into the environment, and 2) the valve closing too far, stopping nitrogen pressure and HF flow to downstream equipment. Compensating provisions and severity classifications are identified for each failure mode.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    4 views2 pages

    Class Note Class 7 English

    Uploaded by

    Aftab Zafar
    This document provides a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for a pressure reducing valve (V-13) in a hydrogen fluoride (HF) supply system. The analysis examines two failure modes: 1) the valve opening too far, which could result in high nitrogen pressure leading to a vaporizer rupture and release of HF into the environment, and 2) the valve closing too far, stopping nitrogen pressure and HF flow to downstream equipment. Compensating provisions and severity classifications are identified for each failure mode.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 2

    CHEMICAL PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS

    FAILURE MODE
    AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
    FMEA
    PRACTICAL EXAMPLE #2
    CHEMICAL PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS

    FMEA PRACTICAL EXAMPLE #2


    FAILURE
    FAILURE FAILURE COMPENSATING SEVERITY
    CAUSE(S) DETECTION ACTIONS
    MODE EFFECTS PROVISIONS CLASS
    METHODS
    - Consider adding a PT
    - High N2 pressure at HF with visual or audible
    - Local pressure
    cylinders / vaporizer alarms
    indication on N2
    Internal valve - Vaporizer vessel Rupture - PRV-3 at V-13 outlet - Confirm that N2
    line
    malfunction, valve - HF released to environment - PRVs on N2 feed lines II discharge is not located in
    V-13 open too far - Local pressure
    calibration error, - HF supplied at higher pressure to HF cylinders (critical) a confined space
    indication
    operator error to the Fluidized Bed Reactor - PRV-4 at HF vaporizer - Investigate the
    between rupture
    (FBR) consequences of supplying
    disk and PRV-4
    - Potential HF liquid HF to FBR HF with entrained liquid to
    the downstream FBR

    Internal valve
    - No N2 pressure to HF Cylinder Local pressure
    malfunction, valve IV
    V-13 closed too far - No HF flow to HF vaporizer indication (PI) on None
    calibration error, (minor)
    - No HF flow to FBR N2 line
    operator error

    Item : Pressure Reducing Valve V-13 System : HF Supply system

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