INTRODUCTION 6

DEFINITION OF LAW TERMS 7

JUDICIAL REVIEW 8
MODULE 1 8
I. LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING, AND ANALYSIS 8
THE FOUR “CS” OF EFFECTIVE DECISION-WRITING: 8
AN INTRODUCTION FOR NEWLY-APPOINTED JUDGES by Artemio V. Panganiban 8
LEGAL WRITING 201 by Mark P. Painter 9
OPEN BOOK: SUCCEEDING ON EXAMS FROM THE FIRST DAY OF LAW SCHOOL by Barry Friedman & John C.P. Goldberg 15
HOW TO BRIEF A CASE by Christopher Pyle 19
Ang v. Court of Appeals 20

MODULE 2 20
II. The Executive and Legislative Branches in Relation to the Judicial Branch 20
THE EXECUTIVE 20
Tanada v. Angara 20
Discussion by Joaquin G. Bernas (An Introduction to Public International Law, 2002 ed.) 22
Marcos v. Manglapus 23
Lagman v. Medialdea 25
U.S. v. Nixon 27
Neri v. Senate 28
Soliven v. Makasiar 30
David v. Arroyo 31
Estrada v. Desierto 33

THE LEGISLATURE 34
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 34
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA 36

Page 2 of 169
 Belgica v. Ochoa 37

MODULE 3 45
III. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM 45
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW? 45
Lopez v. Roxas 45
Republic v. Sereno 47
Angara v. Electoral Commission 54
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections 56
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals 59
Fabian v. Desierto 60
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 61
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals 63
Republic Act No. 9282 (Third Level Courts: Court of Tax Appeals) 67
Republic Act No. 8249 (Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan) 67
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan 68
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Second Level Courts: Regional Trial Courts) 69
Republic Act No. 7691 (First Level Courts: Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities) 70
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 71
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals 72
De Castro v. JBC 74
Jardeleza v. Sereno 76

THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 78

Marbury v. Madison 78
Francisco v. House of Representatives 78
Tanada v. Cuenco 81
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon 84
Ocampo v. Enriquez 85
Page 3 of 169
 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan 91

JUDGES 95
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary 95
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet 95
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro 97
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 99
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, Sandiganbayan 100
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua 102
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Civil Liability) 108
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability) 109
Santiago III v. Enriquez 109
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu 111
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo 113
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen 115

LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS 115

Cayetano v. Monsod 115
Ulep v. Legal Clinic 116
In Re: Cunanan 116
Sebastian v. Calis 118
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma 119
Castaneda v. Ago 120
In Re: Edillon 121
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” 123
Burbe v. Magulta 124
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez 125
Regala v. Sandiganbayan 126

Page 4 of 169
 Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui 127

MODULE 4 128
IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW 128
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A LAND WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina DeFabritiis 128
MIXED JURISDICTIONS: COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW (CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED) by William Tetley 133
Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory Construction, 2003 ed.) 148

MODULE 5 153
V. ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS 153
STARE DECISIS 153
Fermin v. People 153
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the 154
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation 154
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v. Pagdanganan 156

RES JUDICATA 157

Facura v. Court of Appeals 157
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu 158

LAW OF THE CASE 159

People of the Philippines v. Olarte 159

LANDMARK CASE 161

Santos v. Court of Appeals 161
Ochosa v. Alano 163

LEADING CASE AND ABANDONMENT OF DOCTRINE 165

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals 165

DURA LEX, SED LEX / CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 168

Corpuz v. People of the Philippines 168

Page 5 of 169
HOW TO READ A CASE
What are the 3 main parts of a case?

The (1) facts, (2) issues, and (3) held/ratio.

What are facts?

Facts are events or circumstances that transpired. They are usually

narrated at the beginning of the case.

What is an issue?

It is the matter in dispute in the case. It is usually in question form and

begins with the phrase “whether or not”.

What are the 2 types of issues?

(1) Substantive, and (2) Procedural.

What are substantive issues?

Issues which pertain to the rights of the parties.

Give an example of a substantive issue.

Whether or not the accused is liable for murder or homicide.

What are procedural issues?

Issues which pertain to the method or manner of carrying out a legal

dispute.

Give an example of a procedural issue.

Whether or not the case is ripe for adjudication.

Do we have to read all the issues?

No. Read only the issue that is relevant to the subject matter.

A police officer, upon mere suspicion that Juan’s house is a drug

den, entered Juan’s house without a warrant and in the course of
the search, inflicted physical injuries upon Juan and destroyed his

Page 6 of 169
personal belongings. The issues present in the case are whether or
not the police officer (1) conducted a valid search, (2) is liable for
physical injuries, (3) is liable for damages for destroying Juan’s
property. Which issue should be studied?
If the subject is Constitutional Law, study the first issue since it deals
with the Bill of Rights. If the subject is Criminal Law, study the second
issue. And if the subject is Civil Law, study the third issue.
DEFINITION OF LAW TERMS
Judicial Opinion / Opinion. A judicial opinion is a court’s reasoned
explanation of its decision. It is merely an explanation of reasons for
judgment.
En Banc Opinions. A case decided by an entire court. It is the most
persuasive opinion in our judicial system, right below a Supreme Court
Opinion.
Concurring Opinion. Agreest with the result, but for different reasons.
Dissenting Opinion. Objects to the result of the majority opinion.
Majority Opinion. A majority opinion is one in which more than half the
court agrees with the result and the reasoning.
Plurality Opinions. A plurality opinion resolves an appeal in which a
majority agrees with the result but not with the reasoning.
Decree. A decree decides a motion or matter that sounds in equity.
Orders. An order is an oral or written court directive on a question of
law, as opposed to equity, punishable by contempt if disobeyed.
Rulings. A ruling is a court order made during litigation, and necessarily
before judgment.
Judgments. A judgment is the final resolution of an action or
IMPORTANT: Be sure to read and understand this section
BEFORE proceeding to the cases. This concept appears
several times throughout different cases
proceeding.
Decisions. A decision resolves a motion, application, write, or appeal.
Reversed, Affirmed, Reversed or Affirmed in Part, Remanded.
Rulings and judgments, not rules or reasoning, are affirmed or reversed.
Rules and reasonings are followed or not followed.
Affirmed. The decision of a lower court is met with approval by a higher
court. If a case has more tha one decision, one can be affirmed and
another reversed.
Reversed. The decision of a lower court is reversed.
Remanded. A case is remanded when it is returend to a lower court
with directions to redo or reconsider some aspect of the case.
Disapproved. A lower court’s opinion is disapproved, not overturned or
overruled, by a later case, not reversed or modified directly.
Upheld / Overturned. A case or issue is upheld or overturned by
another later case.
Sustain / Overrule. Courts sustain (allow) or overrule (disallow)
objections.
Granted / Denied. Motions are granted or denied.
Modified. Decisions can be modified, meaning the modifications can
cover one or more aspect of a determination, but does not reverse the
judgment of the court.
Questions of Fact. Inquiries regarding facts. Must be answered by
reference to facts.
Questions of Law. Must be answered by applying relevant legal
principles, or by an interpretation of the law.
Question of Fact vs. Question of Law
Question of Fact: Did Mrs.. Ronhilda ask Mr. Tan to stop singing?
Page 7 of 169
Question of Law: Is Mrs. Ronhilda’s action of asking Mr. Tan to stop MODULE 1
singing a violation of the latter’s right of freedom of expression.

.
I. LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW ANALYSIS

Judicial Review is an aspect of judicial power which allows the court to THE FOUR “CS” OF EFFECTIVE DECISION-WRITING:
decide whether or not a law, statute or provision is contrary to the AN INTRODUCTION FOR NEWLY-APPOINTED JUDGES
Constitution, and gives them the power to strike down the law if they find by Artemio V. Panganiban
it to be so contrary.
What are the parts of a Trial Court Decision?
The Supreme Court is not given the absolute discretion to rule on
constitutionality of laws. As a mode of check and balances, the (1) Caption and Title
Constitution itself has provided safeguards so that the Supreme (2) Introduction (optional)
Court may only exercise the power of judicial review in special (3) Statement of the Case
circumstances. Before the Supreme Court can decide on the (4) Findings of Facts
constitutionality of a statute these four requisites must be present: (5) Statement of the Issues
(6) Court’s Ruling
1. Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial (7) Dispositive Portion or Disposition
power.
What are the different methods of reporting facts?
Jurisprudence dictates that for a case to be ripe for adjudication, the
government act being challenged must have had an adverse and (1) Objective or Reportorial Method
real effect on the person challenging it. (2) Synthesis Method
(3) Subjective Method
2. Locus Standi (4) Combination of the Objective and Subjective Methods

A party has standing if he alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. Unless a person is injuriously affected
or is about to be affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of the statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
3. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity.
What is the Objective or Reportorial Method?
It is usually done by summarizing, without comment, the testimony of
each witness, and the contents of each exhibit.
What is the Synthesis Method?

It must be raised in the pleadings as it may not ordinarily be raised
at the trial, may not be raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
This means that the issue of constitutionality must first be settled for
the case to be resolved.
In this method, the judge summarizes the factual theory of the plaintiff or
prosecution, and then that of the defendant or defense.
What is the Subjective Method?
In this method, the judge simply narrates what he accepts his own
version, without explaining what the parties’ versions are.
What is the Combination of the Objective and Subjective Methods?
Page 8 of 169
 The author gives 30 rules on how to improve one’s legal writing skills.
It is when the judge reports the testimony of each witness as in the
These are:
Reportorial Method and then makes his own version as he sees fit.
RULE 1: KNOW YOUR AUDIENCE
What must be included in the disposition in criminal cases?
In all writing, the first rule is to know one’s audience. For whom are you
(1) Finding of innocence or guilt
writing? If you are communicating to a court, then know the court
(2) Specific crime
– be familiar with the local rules and practices, court members and the
(3) Penalty
preferences of such members. Are you are writing an opinion or giving
(4) Participation of the accused
advice to a highly knowledgeable person, or to a layperson or
(5) Qualifying, aggravating and mitigating circumstances
unsophisticated client? Your writing must be able to adapt to each
(6) Civil liabilities costs
individual you are writing to.
In civil cases, what should the disposition include?
Rule 1 is also concerned mainly with persuasive writing. If you are to
persuade a judge to rule in your favor, or an adversary’s lawyer to pay
(1) Whether complaint or petition is granted or denied
you money or demand less money, then you want to be persuasive. And
(2) Specific relief granted
the most important step in persuasion is communicating clearly what it is
(3) Costs
you are trying to persuade the other person to do.
According to Justice Reynato S. Puno, what is the test of
RULE 2: FRONT-LOAD YOUR DOCUMENT (CONTEXT BEFORE
completeness of a disposition?
DETAIL)
(1) The parties know their rights and obligations, As with all writing, you must organize your document to be front-loaded.
(2) The parties should know how to execute the decision under This means that you must educate you reader first as to what is coming.
alternative contingencies, Put the important material up front since readers easily understand
(3) There should be no need for further proceedings, much more easily if they have a context. Readers understand new
(4) It terminates the case by according the proper relief, and information based on what they already know, then build on that with
(5) It must adjudicate costs. each new additional piece.

What does “Ponente” mean?
It is the author of the case or the ponencia.
LEGAL WRITING 201 by Mark P. Painter
This material emphasizes on complete, clear and concise legal writing.
In this material, the author stresses how atrocious legal writing has
been. Painter also emphasizes that in writing documents
– complaints, briefs, deeds, etc. – all must be in plain and
understandable language. Documents must contain all the necessary
information, and must be as brief as it can be without sacrificing its
completeness.
You must be able to ascertain how much your audience already knows
about the facts and the law of your case. You may have lived with your
case for perhaps years, but the judge knows only what was set out in the
pleadings until you have explained what happened. You must strive to
explain the case in a way that an average person can understand. Do
not make your writing difficult to understand, even if your readers are
sophisticated readers and can understand difficult prose. Why would you
even make it difficult? Make it easy for the reader, sophisticated or not.
You must also build a container – context – in the reader’s mind, so
when you pour in your facts and the law of your case, the reader has the
container to hold the information, otherwise it leaks out. Important points
must also be put up front – context before detail. The reader learns by
building on prior knowledge. So if the reader starts with no knowledge of

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your case, you have to give them everything. Do not give the facts first
without giving the context. Tell the reader what kind of case it is.
RULE 3: FRAME THE ISSUE IN FEWER THAN 75 WORDS
The most important part of your trial or appellate brief, or even of a
memorandum to another lawyer, is framing the issue. What is the
question you are trying to answer for the court or the other lawyer? What
do you want the court to decide?
Do not start writing your brief or memo until you have a brief and concise
statement of what the case is about, and you must do this in 50- 75
words. If you cannot explain the case in 75 words, then you do not
understand it very well and neither will your reader.
Put your issue statement right up front, preferably in the first paragraph
of your brief or memo.
RULE 4: STATE THE FACTS SUCCINCTLY
In rule 3, you have already told the reader what the issue is and
generally what kind of case it is in your 75 world (or less) statement,
then expand on that. After you have done your short statement of facts,
you weave them into the discussion section of your opinion-and you can
add and expand there if you need to. Your first statement is to give
context – a roadmap.
You must be concise. The fewer the words, the more memorable the
point.
RULE 5: AVOID OVERCHRONICLING—MOST DATES ARE
UNIMPORTANT
There is nothing wrong with stating the facts in chronological order. Your
initial outline of the case should list all dates. However, in writing your
brief or memo, do not fall into the habit of starting every sentence with a
date. Over chronicling confuses the reader, because they do not know
what facts are important and what dates they should remember.
As a general rule, most dates are not important. Unless an exact date is
important, leave it out. Say “in June” rather than “on June 14, 2000,” or
“on or about June 14, 2000”. Only include the material facts, and why
they are important.
RULE 6: HEADINGS ARE SIGNPOSTS-THEY SHOULD INFORM
Headings give context. As part of the “container”, you must have
headings that tell the reader what is coming. If possible, headings
should convey information. “Facts” convey nothing. Headings are
signposts that guide the reader. If the legal argument portion of your
opinion is five pages, you may not need to break it up; but if it is longer,
separate it into numbered headings.
Headings do not just give context, they also signal the reader when to
safely take a break. The reader needs breaks in digesting complex
material. Separate the parts—and subparts—into headings.
RULE 7: WRITE SHORT PARAGRAPHS
Short paragraphs give the reader a chance to pause and digest what
has gone before. If you put three or four sentences with new information
in each paragraph, that is enough. And remember each new piece of
information should build on the old. You may have probably seen
where paragraphs are diagramed so that each sentence refers back to
something in the last sentence. That is called building on context, or
building on prior knowledge.
RULE 8: FORM IS IMPORTANT—MAKE IT LOOK GOOD
Obviously, the substance of the case is most important— but to
communicate the substance, use the best form possible. It is so much
easier nowadays to make the document look good. During the old days
of typewriters—there were only two type styles—and margins were
difficult to change. Now, our documents can look great! Just about the
most unreadable font is Courier.
We sometimes spend thousands of dollars in technology and make our
opinions and orders look like they were typed on a 1940 Underwood.
Always use a serif type for text—because the serifs direct the reader’s
eyes to the next letter. At least in America—there are some contrary
statistics for Europe (probably as a result of history)—a serif type is best
for text. Times New Roman is the standard now. Use it, or a similar
typeface. A non-serif, or sans serif, type is good for headings because it
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directs the reader’s eyes downward to the material following the
heading. Ariel is a common sans-serif type.
RULE 9: CHECK YOUR DOCUMENT CAREFULLY
Check every page of every paper that leaves your desk. Make sure that
everything is in order – check for typos, wrong margins, blank papers,
etc.
RULE 10: KEEP IT SHORT—THE PAGE LIMIT IS YOUR FRIEND
The page limit is your friend; it requires you to refine your argument. You
must strive to write succinctly. It is much harder to write a short brief
than a long one. Too much space is a temptation to write all (or more
than) you know about the subject. Make every word count, and your
document will be much more convincing—the reader might think that
you know more than you wrote, not less.
RULE 11: USE NO TALKING FOOTNOTES
If something is important enough to be in a footnote, it is important
enough to be in the text. Footnotes detract from readability. The only
proper use for footnotes is to give citations, rather than having citations
in the middle of a sentence. Proper use of footnotes is for reference
only. If something is truly parenthetical, but you believe it needs to be
mentioned, then use parentheses.
RULE 12: CITATIONS GO IN FOOTNOTES
Citations belong in footnotes. Cluttering up your document with jumbles
of letters and numbers makes it almost totally unreadable. This practice
should cease, especially now that footnoting references is simple.
Make sure you put only citations in footnotes; that is, no “talking
footnotes.” The readers must know that they do not need to read the
footnotes— they are for reference only.
RULE 13: USE THE OHIO FORM OF CITATION
Use the Ohio Supreme Court system of citation. For whatever reason,
Ohio has its own form, not the Uniform System. (The “Bluebook” is only
used when the Ohio form doesn’t cover an issue—remember the
sixteenth edition is now out and makes some important changes.) Ohio’s
system is not wholly different—the most immediately apparent change is
that the date is before the reporter, e.g., Blanton v. Internat’l Minerals
and Chem. Corp. (1997), 125 Ohio App.3d 22, 707 N.E.2d 960. Note
that there is no space between App. and 3d—the period serves as
separation. If you do not have a copy of the Ohio formbook, the
Supreme Court reporter’s office will send one.
Also, write R.C., not O.R.C. (We know it is Ohio.) Every reported case in
Ohio is published in the Ohio Supreme Court form—your brief or memo
should conform.
RULE 14: EDIT, EDIT, EDIT
Edit, edit, edit, and edit again. Typos, bad grammar, and misplaced
paragraphs take away from your argument. With new technology always
comes new pitfalls—following the “spellcheck” or “grammar check”
blindly leads to some weird words and constructions.
If you have another person do the word processing, it is even more
important to read every word. Spellcheck can substitute wrong words—
spelled correctly, but not what you mean. You may mean “constitution,”
but spellcheck reads it as “constipation.” Always do the final editing on
your own, do not let other persons do the final edit with spellcheck
without proofing very carefully again.
RULE 15: WRITE SHORT SENTENCES— THE 1818 RULE, PART I
Write short, crisp sentences. What is the most underused punctuation
mark in legal writing? The period. The most overused is the comma.
More periods, fewer commas. Sentence length should average no more
than twenty words.
Long sentences are especially difficult when strung together.
Sophisticated readers can understand longer sentences—if they are
properly constructed—but no one can wade through ten in a row. Break
up the pace—follow a longer sentence with a short one.
Readability is the goal.
RULE 16: USE MAINLY ACTIVE VOICE—THE 1818 RULE, PART II
Passive voice is not forbidden. Sometimes you do not need to name the
actor— “Many books on this subject have been published.” Or a smooth
transition from one sentence to the next requires you to put the subject
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first. Or you might want to hide the actor—“Mistakes were made;” “An
accident occurred.” But usually active is better; action is easier to
understand.
In the schoolyard, “Johnny tried to hit me.” Now, after law school, we
would probably say, “An attempt was made by Johnny to assault me.”
Somehow, the attempt becomes the focus. This is called nominalization
of verbs—taking a perfectly good action verb and turning it into a noun.
Probably because we, as lawyers, categorize and name things, “assault”
becomes a noun. “A tort was committed.”
Hunt down passive voice and nominalization. If there is no good
reason, put your sentence back the way real people would talk.
RULE 17: USE “BUT” AND “AND” TO BEGIN SENTENCES
AND do not be afraid to start sentences with “and” or “but.” This signifies
good writing. The reason your grammar-school teacher told you not to
start a sentence with “and” was because you wrote, “I have a mother.
And a father. And a dog.” Use “but” rather than “however” to start a
sentence, and see how much better it reads.
RULE 18: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN “THAT” AND “WHICH”
Use “that” restrictively, and “which” non-restrictively. (In British English,
which is used both ways.) The easy way to remember— which is
preceded by a comma; that is not.
RULE 19: USE THE DASH, PARENTHESIS, AND COMMA FOR
DEGREES OF EMPHASIS
Though you should avoid cluttering up your document with too many
incidental comments, sometimes they fit nicely. A dash provides the
greatest emphasis—it is a stronger break—next in degree is the
parenthesis, then the comma.
RULE 20: ONE WORD IS USUALLY ENOUGH
Do not use two or three or four words for one (“devise and bequeath”;
“grant, bargain, and sell”; “right, title, and interest ”; “make, ordain,
constitute, and appoint”) . This goofiness originated with the Norman
Conquest, after which it was necessary to use both the English and
French words so that all could understand. Most of us now understand
plain English. A related tendency of lawyers is to use many words when
one is more understandable (“sufficient number of” = enough, “that point
in time” = then, “for the reason that” = because).
Don’t write “filed a motion” unless the filing itself has some significance.
Write “moved.” Do not write “On October 13, 1995, plaintiff-appellant
filed a timely appeal to this honorable court.” Again, unless the
timeliness or date (or the honor of the court) is in question. You have
used so many words for nothing. “Smith appeals” is sufficient, and even
that is obvious, and hence unnecessary. Don’t write “filed of record.”
Write “filed.” Where else would it be filed?
RULE 21: NO PARENTHETICAL NUMERICALS
Especially irritating is the practice of spelling out numbers and then
attaching parenthetical numericals—a habit learned when scribes used
quill pens to copy documents. The real reason for this is to prevent
fraud, by making it difficult to alter documents. An opinion that states
“There were two (2) defendants and three (3) police officers present ” is
extremely hard to read, and also looks silly. Unless you are writing your
opinion in longhand—and unless you believe the parties will alter your
numbers—skip this “noxious habit.”
RULE 22: HYPHENATE PHRASAL ADJECTIVES
The reader is confused by nouns acting as adjectives, or two
adjectives together modifying one noun. Always hyphenate phrases
like “wrongful-discharge suit,” or “public-policy exception.”
RULE 23: ALWAYS QUESTION “OF”
Write Ohio Supreme Court, not Supreme Court of Ohio. Question
prepositional phrases—“of”—“from.” There is nothing wrong with
possessive. Write “the court’s docket,” not “the docket of the court.”
RULE 24: USE THE SERIAL COMA
In a list of three or more, always insert the serial comma. Some writers
insist on omitting the last comma, before the “and.” Do not omit the last
comma—doing so can cause misinterpretation.
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 RULE 25: AVOID UNNECESSARY PREAMBLES text if you can. The Ohio Supreme Court format puts all quotes in the
text. No matter how long. Just remember, long blocks are not read. Lead
Cut the useless preambles. Unnecessary preambles can weaken or into the quote with your paraphrase of what the quote says. The reader
hide the point they introduce. Some unnecessary preambles are: will actually read it to see if you are telling the truth.

• It is important to add that . . . RULE 29: USE PERSUASIVE LANGUAGE

• It may be recalled that . . .
• In this regard it is of significance that . . .
• It is interesting to note that…
RULE 26: PURGE LAWSPEAK
Eschew legalese. “Hereinafter,” “aforesaid ,” and the like do not add
anything but wordiness and detract from readability. Many studies show
that legalese is the number one complaint of appellate judges and
clerks. Use Latin phrases sparingly. A few— res ipsa loquitur,
respondeat superior—are perhaps acceptable, but do not litter your
opinion with what Daniel Webster called “mangled pieces of murdered
Latin.”
Use persuasive language. If you can’t explain your case, how can
you expect the readers to understand it? Similes or metaphors are
very effective to illustrate your analysis. In one recent case, the
issue was whether a pizza delivery driver was an employee or an
independent contractor. One side argued that, because he paid for
his own gas and used his own vehicle, and could use whatever route
he wished, he was an independent contractor. The other side stated
that servers in the restaurant, admittedly employees, also were not
told which way to go between tables to deliver their orders, and used
their own shoes. The driver was simply a “waiter on wheels.” That
phrase found its way into the opinion.
RULE 30: CONTINUE YOUR RESEARCH

Cut out “such,” such as “such motion.” “The” or “ that” almost always Continue your research! You might file a memorandum or a brief
works. “Pursuant to” usually may be translated as “under.” months before it is argued before the court. Check every citation
periodically, and again the day before the case is argued.
RULE 27: THE PARTIES HAVE NAMES
BAD GOOD
The parties have names. Don’t go through your whole brief calling
parties plaintiff- appellant and defendant-appellee, or the like. Appellant The Means By Which How
would be enough, but it is better to call the parties by name. When we
use procedural titles, the reader must translate to understand what we Entered A Contract To Contracted
mean. The procedural titles chance throughout the case, but the names
remain the same. Using names also humanizes your client— even Filed A Counterclaim Counterclaimed
corporate names, e.g., “Smithco,” sound much more human that
“Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.” Be sure to be consistent and Filed A Motion Moved
not switch back and forth between “appellant,” “Jones” and “plaintiff.” Filed An Application Applied
RULE 28: USE QUOTATIONS SPARINGLY Adequate Number Of Enough
You should explain how the cited cases support your theory of the case. For The Reason That Because
Do not use lengthy quotations—a few lines at most. No one reads long
block quotes. People skip that single-space block and go on. Unless the In The Event Of If
case you are quoting from is exactly on point (which is very seldom
true), just quote the most relevant and persuasive part. And do it in the In Light Of The Fact That Because
Page 13 of 169
Notwithstanding The Fact That Although Performed a search on Searched

Notwithstanding Despite Each and every Either one

Cause Of Action Claim Provide responses Respond

In Order To To Offer testimony Testify

At This Point In Time Now Make inquiry Ask

Until Such Time As Until Provide assistance Help

Whether Or Not Whether (Usually) Place a limitation upon Limit

During The Month Of May In May Make an examination of Examine
By Means Of By Provide protection to Protect
As A Consequence Because Of Reach a resolution Resolve
A Distance Of Five Miles Five Miles Bears a significant resemblance Resembles
At A Later Date Later Reveal the identity of Identify
Is Of The Opinion That Believes Makes mention of Mentions
Effectuate Cause Are in compliance with Comply
In Violation Of Violates Make allegations Allege
Is Violative Of Violates Was in conformity with Conformed
Made A Complaint Complained To effect settlement Settle
Utilize Use

A Period Of A Week A Week

Made application Applied

Made provision Provided

It is contended by plaintiff Plaintiff contends

With regard to About

In connection with With

Page 14 of 169
MANY WORDS WHEN ONE WILL DO Law is not about reciting legal rules or spouting information; it is about
reasoning cogently and making careful and convincing arguments on the
OLD LATI OLD basis of legal materials.
ENGLISH N FRENCH What Lawyers really do?
Remaind
Rest Residue er Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said that what counts as knowledge of the
law is the ability to predict whether a certain course of conduct will result
Free Clear in the person who engages in that conduct being subjected to a court-
ordered sanction or penalty.
Will Testament
Law school is not about simply learning or memorizing black-letter law. It
Final Conclusive is developing “judgment”, an informed feel how judges and other
“deciders” are going to resolve legal claims.
Fit Proper
Think in terms of arguments, not answers
Give, Bequeath Devise
Law is in equal parts knowledge and ongoing analysis. Good lawyers, no
matter what the practice setting, spend their days making and analysing
arguments. Good lawyers know the difference between an argument
OPEN BOOK: SUCCEEDING ON EXAMS FROM THE that is likely to be a winner and one that will fail. Great lawyers recognize
FIRST DAY OF LAW SCHOOL by Barry Friedman & John how to take an argument that seems weak and make it as strong as it
C.P. Goldberg can be. Star lawyers think of an argument no one ever has, or push an
argument that most others thought couldn’t possibly prevail, and in doing
Chapter 1: The What and Why of Exams so change the path of the law.

This chapter points out why law school exams look the way they do,
and to get you thinking about what that tells you about how to take
them.
“Thinking like a Lawyer”
Connecting the real world and the exam room
Taking exams is about identifying the issues presented by a set of facts,
determining the rules that guide the resolution of those issues, and
making arguments about how those rules apply to the facts.

Law school exams test a very basic, yet elusive skill: the ability to
think like a lawyer. Thinking like a lawyer refers to the ability to give a
client legal advice. It means being able to digest a set of facts (a
client’s story), to identify the legal problems or issues posed by those
facts, to apply governing legal principles to those facts, and to come
to a conclusion (or prediction) about the possible consequences for
the client under the law given those facts.
CHAPTER 2: THE PINBALL METHOD OF EXAM TAKING
How playing pinball is like taking law school essay exams
The pinball player scores points only by hitting the bumpers. Nothing
matter but hitting the bumpers. This is the only way to score points. In
exams, the professor is looking for certain things and when you write
about them, you score points. When you don’t, no points are given.

Remember, who finishes first does not matter, only how many bumpers
you hit does.

Page 15 of 169

How hitting bumpers (or not) affects grades
Professors typically grade on points. They read an exam and score it,
issue by issue. Then, they total up the points for all the issues. Next,
they prepare a list of all the exams and the points received, then another
list of all the point totals, so they can be frequencies. (This is all done
anonymously)
CHAPTER 3: IRAC: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Legal analysis can be broken down into discrete steps. IRAC represents
those steps.
IRAC stands for ISSUE, RULE, APPLICATION, and CONCLUSION.
Your primary job will be to demonstrate that you can (1) identify and
frame the issue(s) posted by a set of facts; (2) identify as relevant (and
sometimes make the case for the use of) one or more legal rules that
will govern the resolution of the issues that you have identified; (3) argue
cogently about how the rules apply to the issues raised by the facts; and
(4) accurately assess the likelihood of a given argument prevailing.
Moreover, at each step, you must be prepared to anticipate and respond
to analysis that runs counter to your own.
“I” is for issue
To “issue-spot” is to translate narratives into the language of the law.
“R” is for rule
After identifying the issues, the next thing to do is to determine the rule
or rules that provide the frame for the resolution of the issues.
“A” is for application
When it comes to rule application, the professor expects you to make
arguments on both sides of the issue to which the rule is being applied.
“C” is for conclusion
Professors almost always include a host of issues that have respectable
arguments on both sides. This is why your conclusion will and should
typically be expressed in qualified or probabilistic terms.
CHAPTER 4: ISSUE SPOTTING AND ISSUE SORTING
Of the total points one can earn on an exam, a large percentage can be
obtained by correctly identifying and framing issues, irrespective of how
those issues are analysed.
When it comes to legal analysis, the ability to isolate issues is the
necessary first step.
Closely related to issue spotting is issue sorting, which is identifying
which issues require more of your time and attention, and which require
less.
Matching
Matching is a method wherein points in list A are matched with the
points in list B.
List A (Subject list) pertains to the summary of your course outline. This
refers to all the materials covered by the course. While list B (Issue list)
refers to the fact patterns that can be found in the exam.
Scrolling
One way to think of the matching process is in terms of scrolling. As you
write your answer to a question you should be scrolling down list A
looking for the issues contained in list B.
Ignore, mention, or analyse
In answering exams, some issues are not worth raising. While some are
key issues, which should be given more focus to be mentioned and
analysed.
Deciding how much time to spend on an issue
Facts presented to you on an exam will permit a sharp contrast between
frivolous issues that require no attention, easy issues that require only a
brief mention, and hard issues that require extensive analysis.
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CHAPTER 5: RULES
Rule provide the structure for your analysis of issue that you have
spotted. On exams, you will not be rewarded for reciting rules so much
as for using or applying them.
Splits of authority
Splits between or among different jurisdictions as to the adoption or
rejection of certain doctrine are staples of law school.
Minority or outlier rules
At some point in your classes, you will read a particularly interesting and
perhaps compelling judicial opinion, only to learn in class that
the opinion is an outlier: its result and rationales have been rejected by
most other courts.
Why do we read cases that set out the wrong rule? The answer is that
one can learn something about the path on which one is traveling by
considering paths not yet taken. To learn about decisions regarded as
“wrong turns” is to appreciate at least some of the reasons for the rules
that we now have.
CHAPTER 6: APPLICATION
You must apply the rules in a thoughtful and thorough manner. There
are two keys to the application phrase of IRAC. The first is relentless
scrutiny of the facts that have been provided to you. Your professor will
not reward you for information dumps or abstract statements of legal
rules. They want you to use the rules that you have learned. The second
key is to remember that, when it comes to the application of law to all but
the most straightforward issues, argument is the name of the game.
Even if the exam instructions ask you to defend one side of these
issues, you must identify and discuss considerations on each side of any
issue.
Arguing both sides, and when to do it
To win their cases, good lawyers spend a great deal of time thinking
about how they will lose them. They try to figure out what the other
side’s arguments will be. When a case comes before a judge or jury, the
decision maker will listen to the arguments of both sides and determine
which she believes is best.
Three examples of when you should be arguing both sides:
1. Depending on the facts, the issue could go either way.
2. The rule as applied produces bizarre result.
3. The rules invite policy analysis.
Arguing from the facts
Arguing both sides is very important for two reasons. First, you will miss
bumpers if you do not argue both sides when doing so is called for,
which it usually is. This is the very heart if analysing a close legal
question. Second, knowing where these arguments exist (and where
they do not) will assist you in organizing your answer effectively.
Students routinely lose critical points by writing an abstract essay on
some point of law with no attempt to establish how that doctrine might
apply under the specific, given facts. Don’t make this mistake, argue the
facts.
Forking: Avoiding jumped ships, missed opportunities, and dead
ends
Fact patterns tend to generate a handful of decision points – forks in the
road – that you must recognize. What to do when faced with a fork? The
answer is to follow every branch of a fork to its end. There are three
things that can go wrong when forking:
1. Jumped ships – if you start down one branch, get distracted by
another issue that arises alongside it, then forget to return to the first
branch.
2. Forgotten forks – roads not taken. You move on to another part of
the question, or another question altogether, forgetting to retrace
your steps back to the fork in the road and the other path that it
presents.
3. Dead ends – What to do when one path instantly takes you to a
conclusion that eliminates the need for further analysis? Always find
for a way to include the others.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Page 17 of 169

Rarely will a professor be in a position to award points to you because
you got the right answer. Law professors tend to provide fact patterns in
which at least for the most complicated or interesting issues, there are
good arguments on both sides, you might not be able to state a definite
conclusion with any degree of certainty.
Some professors will ask you to adopt the role of a judge and to issue a
ruling definitive resolving the disputes before you. If so, your conclusion
should be stated in a decisive form that is responsive to that instruction.
Writing the conclusion might help focus your mind as you go through the
steps in your analysis. By starting with the right frame of mind: You are
reasoning and arguing, rather than simply regurgitating.
CHAPTER 13: WHAT’S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Discussing cases
The professor mentions the case that is going to be discussed, and
typically fires off a bunch of questions: who are the parties? What
happened? What was the issue? What did the court hold?
The professor wants to know the rule the court used to dispose of the
case.
Exploring rules through hypotheticals
The professor asks, “how would this case be resolved if this or that fact
were different?” The reason why professor asks hypotheticals is
because you learn the contours of, and possible justifications for, a rule.
What you’re learning
What you are learning in law school is how to make a good argument
and recognize and avoid bad arguments. You are here to learn the law,
the rules themselves, but to state basic legal rules is relatively easy. To
understand them at the level at which you can bring them to bear for
your client is difficult. Class is where you learn to think like a lawyer.
The main point of the first year is to learn the methodology of law: how
law works, how to make arguments like lawyers, how to know a good
argument from a bad one.
Preparing for class: Briefing
Most of your assignments are court decisions, collected in casebooks.
Class preparation involves reading these cases and briefing them.
Class briefs are brief summaries of cases. While lawyer’s briefs are
written arguments on behalf of a client that typically cite many.
Briefing your cases and then discussing those briefs in class is the chief
way you are going to learn how to do that law. The way you are really
going to learn this skill is by dissecting the cases when you write your
briefs.
IRAC-ing the case
The core elements of a case brief are:
-Facts: What is the story at the heart of judicial opinion?
-Procedural posture: How did the case come to this court and what
court is it precisely?
-Issue: What the legal question at the heart of the case is. What did the
parties asked the court to resolve?
-Judgment: Who won?
-Rule: How did the court explain why the prevailing party prevailed?
What is the legal rule that was relied on to resolve the legal issue?
-Rationale: Here you distill in a sentence or two the reasoning that the
court used to get to its rule, its conclusion.
“Psyching” the prof
The first-year law school curriculum is fairly standardized but you can
help yourself, though, by thinking about why your professor has chosen
to present the subject of a particular class in the way in which she has
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presented it. It will pay to make an effort to get inside the head of your He is the person who must respond to the petition, that is, the winner in
professor – to get a sense of how he thinks about the subject. the lower court.

Who is an Appellant?
HOW TO BRIEF A CASE by Christopher Pyle He is the person who files a formal appeal demanding appellate review
as a matter of right.
What is an Apellate Brief?
Who is an Appellee?
It is a written legal argument presented to an appellate court.
He or she is the opponent of the Appellant.
What is the purpose of an Apellate Brief?
What are the elements of a comprehensive student brief?
Its purpose is to persuade the higher court to uphold or reverse the trial
court’s decision. This brief is geared to presenting the issues involved in (1) Title and Citation
the case from the perspective of one side only. (2) Facts of the Case
(3) Issues
Who is the Plaintiff? (4) Decisions
(5) Reasoning
The plaintiff is the one suing the defendants in a civil suit in a trial court.

Who prosecutes defendants in criminal cases? (6) Separate Opinions

(7) Analysis
It is the government that prosecutes or “People of the Philippines”.
What does the Title of the Case contain?
What is the usual ground invoked by a losing party for an apellate
court to review a case? It shows who is opposing whom.

That the trial court judge made a mistake. What does the Citation tell?

When do lawyers ask the court for a writ of certiorari?
It is usually asked if the losing party does not have a right to a higer
court review. Under this procedurethe appellate court is being asked to
exercise its lawful discretion in granting the cases a hearing for review.
Who is the Petitioner?
He is the person who seeks a writ of certiorari, that is, a ruling by a higer
court that it hear the case.
Who is the Respondent?
It tells the reader how to locate the report of the case in the appropriate
case reporter.
What are the elements of the Fact Section of a good student brief?
(1) A one-sentence description of the nature of the case, to serve as an
introduction;
(2) A statement of the relevant law, with quotation marks or underlining
to draw attention to the key words or phrases that are in dispute;
(3) A summary of the complaint or the earlier conviction plus relevant
evidence and arguments presented in court to explain who did what
to whom and why the case was thought to involve illegal conduct;
and

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(4) A summary of actions taken by the lower courts.
What is the Decision or Holding?
The holding or decision is the court’s answer to a question presented to
it for answer by the parties involved or raised by the court itself in its own
reading of the case.
What is the Reasoning or Rationale?
It is the chain of arguments which led the judges in either a majority or a
dissenting opinion to rule as they did.
Ang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed
on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for
violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he
copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy
for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008.
Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and
every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
MODULE 2
II. The Executive and Legislative Branches in Relation to
the Judicial Branch
THE EXECUTIVE
Tanada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295
May 2. 1997
(Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law)
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of
the World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos
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signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the
said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in
Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the establishment
of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and
International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialize. Instead, there was the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the
GATT that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the
reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity
provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of
member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,”
in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution. They
allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”
Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution
mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity
provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered in parts of WTO
Agreement.
ISSUE:
W/N the provisions provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene
Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987
Constitution? – NO.
RULING:
The provisions invoked are not self-executing. Said provisions
merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation
to the other sections in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
• A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
• A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
• An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life.
The provisions in WTO contains balancing provisions sufficient to
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement, thus it does not violate the constitution.
• The WTO Recognizes the need to protect weak economies
• Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and
veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are
made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote
equal in weight.
• Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
• Tariff reduction – developed countries must reduce at rate of 36%
in 6 years, developing 24% in 10 years
• Domestic subsidy – developed countries must reduce 20% over
six (6) years, developing countries at 13% in 10 years
• Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing
countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
• Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
• Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets
• The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of
trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed
grave abuse of discretion
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."
Page 21 of 169
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda —
international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken."
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals,
live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights.
Discussion by Joaquin G. Bernas (An Introduction to
Public International Law, 2002 ed.)
What is the traditional definition of international law?
It is a body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon
civilized sstaes in their relations to one another.
What is the (modern) defition of international law according to the
Third Restatement?
It is the law which deals with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of
their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.
What is the Command Theory?
In this view, international law is not law because it does not come from
a command of a sovereign.
What is the Consensual Theory?
Under this theory, international law derives its binding force form the
consent of the states.
What is the Natural Law Theory?
This theory posits that law is derived by reason form the nature of man.
International law is said to be an application of natural reason to the
nature of the state-person.
What is Public International Law?
This governs the relationships between and among states and also their
relations with intenational organizations and individual persons.
What is Private International Law?
It is really domestic law which deals with cases where foreign law
intrudes in the domestic sphere where there are questions of the
applicability of foreign law or the role of foreign courts.
How are sources of international law classified?
(1) Formal and (2) Material
What are formal sources?
It refer to the various processes by which rules come into existence.
What are material sources?
It is concerned with the substance and content of the obligation.
Sometimes referred to as the evidence if international law.
What are the sources of international law?
(1) International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states;
(2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
(3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(4) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
What is Custom or Customary International Law?
It means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.
What are the 2 basis elements of Custom?
(1) Material Factor (usus) – how the states behave
(2) Subjective Factor – why they behave the way they do
Page 22 of 169
What are the elements of usus? How does municipal and international law differ with regard to
(1) duration, what they regulate?
(2) consistency, and Municipal law regulates relations between individual persons under the
(3) generality of practice of states. state whereas international law regulates relations between states.

What is Opinio Juris?
It is the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory.
Would dissenting states be bound by custom?
Yes, unless they had consistently objected to it while the custom was
merely in the process of formation.
Who has the burden of prooving the existence of opinio juris? The
existence of opinio juris is a matter of proof. The burden of proving its
existence falls on the state claiming it.
What is Instant Custom?
It comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number of states
supporting a specific line of action.
For dualists, when international law and municipal law conflict,
which must prevail?
Municipal Law must prevail.
What is the monistic theory or monism?
Under this theory, international law and domestic law belong to only one
system of law.
How does international law become part of domestic law for
dualists?
(1) Doctrine of transformation. – for international law to become
part of domestic law, it must be expressly and specifically
transformed into domestic law through the appropriate
constitutional machinery.

If a treaty comes later than a particular custom, as between the (2) Doctrine of incorporation, - the law of natons, wherever any
parties to the treaty, which should prevail? question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction, is
The treaty. here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and it is held
to be part of the law of the land.
If a later treaty is contrary to a customary rule that has the status of
jus cogens, which will prevail? Which law prevails in a domestic court?
Custom will prevail. Municipal Law for the domestic courts are bound to apply the local law.

Is Equity a source of law? Which law prevails in an international tribunal.

Yes. The Permanent Court of Justice had occasion to use equity as a
source of law in one case. Equity, when accepted, is an instrument
whereby convetional or customary law may be supplemented or
modified in order achieve justice.
What is a Soft Law?
It is an international agreement no concluded as treaty and threfore not
covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
International Law. It is an established principle that, before an
international tribunal, a state may not plead its own law as an excuse for
failure to comply with international law.
Should a conflict arise between an international agreement and the
Philippine Constitution, which should prevail?
Philippine Constitution. The treaty would not be valid and operative as
domestic law.

What is the dualist or pluralist theory? Marcos v. Manglapus

It holds that international law and mnicpal law are essentially different
from each other.
G.R. No. 88211
15 September 1989

Page 23 of 169
 (What is the Scope of Executive Power,
Express, Implied/Residual Power)
FACTS:
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences
to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Mr. Marcos and his family.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within
the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the
view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
o. Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state.
o. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. Respondents also point out that the
decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has
international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic,
Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua were among the deposed dictators
whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed. (No)
(2) Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially,
the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights.
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from
the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." [Art. 13(2).]
Page 24 of 169
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own," [Art. 12(2)]
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate
rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the
"right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right
to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Further, the Court holds the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency.]
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.
The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If
such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to
bar their return.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be
contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic
effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial
final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return
of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return.
Lagman v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 231658
4 July 2017
Del Castillo, J:
Page 25 of 169
 (Executive’s Calling Out Power, Power to Declare
Martial Law, Power to Suspend the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus)
FACTS:
Starting May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days,
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
(Proclamation) declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The
President then submitted a Report which was required by the
constitution based on the factual basis of the Proclamation which stated
that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued by rebellious groups and
lawless violence. The Proclamation came into being because of the
siege of Marawi by the Maute group, one of the aforesaid rebellious
groups. The Report then highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City
and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the
Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible
tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the
lawless groups. Later on, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives both declared their full support for the declaration of
Martial Law. There are three main petitions in this case:
1. Lagman Petition
a) Declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any
part of Mindanao.
b) Declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because the President's Report contained"false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic accounts.
c) The declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because of the inclusion of events in the Report which had long
been resolved.
d) No sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted
alone and did not consult the military establishment or any
ranking official
e) No sufficient factual basis because it was shown that military
was able to pre-empt the Maute group in their plan to take over
Marawi
2. Cullamat Petition
a) Seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 fo being
unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that
there i rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its
declaration.
3. Mohamad Petition
a) Claims that Martial law is a solution of last resort and should be
resorted to only after the exhaustion of other remedies.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the calling out power of the President was validly
exercised. (YES)
(2) Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis and the
requirements for public safety were sufficient for the declaration of
Martial Law. (YES)
(3) Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis and the
requirements for public safety were sufficient for the declaration for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas Corpus. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary
powers of:
a) Calling out the armed forces;
b) Suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
c) Declaring martial law. These powers may be resorted to only
under specified conditions.
The president may resort to the power of the calling out of the armed forces
whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. Prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of
martial law on May 23, 2017, the President had already issued
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national
emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. It was then stated
in the case that from the intent of the framers of the Constitution, both
Congress and the Court do not have the power to interfere with the
decision-making power of the President. In other words, they have no
power to force the President to choose which of the three extraordinary
powers to wield when responding to a crisis. Thus, it was deemed that the
exercise of this power by the President was indeed valid.
SECOND AND THIRD ISSUE:
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
Page 26 of 169
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1)
actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of
such power. For rebellion to exist, the following elements must be
present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms
against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government
or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii)
any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the
Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives. Examples of the factual details which occurred in
Marawi which led the President to declare Martial Law and suspend the
writ are as follows:
1) Burning of government and private property.
2) Establishment of checkpoints.
3) Hoisting of the ISIS flag.
4) Takeover of a hospital.
5) Attacks on various facilities.
6) Taking of hostages.
7) Links and potential alliances with other terrorist groups.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that
the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
basis tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's
conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President
from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
consideration of the facts.
In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. The
declaration of Martial Law over the whole of Mindanao is allowed since
The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the
Executive Department, particularly the President as Commander -in-
Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information
necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and
military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is
happening on the ground.
Although the President is not required to impose martial law only within
the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising
actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit.
At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the
coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all,
rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Petition denied. The Court upholds the validity of all the exercised
powers of the President.
U.S. v. Nixon
418 US 683
24 July 1974
Burger, J.
(The Concept of Executive Privilege)
FACTS:
In light of the watergate scandal, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor,
a subpoena duces tucem was issued pursuant to the rules of court
where it required the production of certain tapes between Nixon and his
advisers.
The President released them but later filed a motion to quash where
such was accompanied by a claim of executive privilege.
The President also challenged the jurisdiction of the court based on a
contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable because it was between
the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-
executive" in character.
Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a
President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used
in a given criminal case. (Note: The president was the one who
appointed the Special Prosecutor to investigate the case)
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the President's right to safeguard certain
information, using his "executive privilege", entirely immune from
judicial review. (No)
(2) Whether or not the Judiciary have jurisdiction over the case. (Yes)
Page 27 of 169

HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege
in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce
the tapes and documents.
SECOND ISSUE
The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more,
has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not
depend on such a surface inquiry. The issue is the production or
nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor
to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by
one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his express
authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty
to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President.
Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type
which are traditionally justiciable." In light of the uniqueness of the
setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both parties are officers
of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability.
Neri v. Senate
G.R. No. 180643
25 March 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
(The Concept of Executive Privilege)
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner, Romulo Neri, appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for 11 hours on matters concerning
the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President
Arroyo) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege on whether President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, whether she directed him to prioritize it,
and whether she directed him to approve it. Respondent Committees
persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007.
On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. On November 20, 2007,
petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. On November
22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On
November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to respondent Committees, he
manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and
that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege. Respondent Committees found
petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. They issued an order citing
petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration insisting that he had not shown
any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. Petitioner filed
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and granted by the Court on the
ground that, first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri are
covered by the executive privilege and therefore should not be
disclosed to them. (Yes)
(2) Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system. (Yes)
(3) Whether the respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions. (No)
Page 28 of 169
(4) Whether the respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri are covered by
the executive privilege and therefore should not be disclosed to the
Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that the executive privilege which is
the Presidential communication privilege pertains to communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making
and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-
making of the President. The elements of the Presidential
Communication Privilege are, to wit:
a.) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.”
b.) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President.
c.) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In this case, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to
three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to
information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency and there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Thus, the three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri are
covered by the executive privilege and therefore should not be disclosed
to the Congress since it did not entail the right to information of the
public or diminish the public accountability and transparency’s
significance and there is no showing of compelling need for disclosure of
the information covered by executive privilege.
SECOND ISSUE:
There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system. The Supreme Court ruled that there are
certain types of information which the government may withhold from the
public, that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters; and that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. Here, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter
involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to
petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation.
Hence, there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system since there are only certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the public with
respect to military, diplomatic and other national security matters.
THIRD ISSUE:
The respondent Committees failed to show that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions. The Supreme Court ruled that the presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific
need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3)
questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to
the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to
these bills could not be determined without the said information sought
by the three (3) questions. Therefore, the respondent Committees failed
to show that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
critical to the exercise of their functions since there is only a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to
legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Therespondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order. The Supreme Court held that accused
should have been adequately informed what matters are to be covered
by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information
and documents. Another thing, while it is true that this Court must refrain
from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch
of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the
Court has the duty to look into Congress compliance therewith. We
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply
Page 29 of 169
out of courtesy. In this case, the petitioners request a copy of questions
the committee did not grant it and Subpoena Ad Testificandum made no
specific reference to any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform
petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena merely
commanded him to testify on what he knows relative to the subject
matter under inquiry. Hence, the respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order since there was
no copy of questions before the inquiry and the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum was generally issued.
Soliven v. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585
14 November 1988
Per Curiam
(Immunity of the President from Suit)
FACTS:
Luis Beltran (Beltran), along with the others (as petitioners), were
charged with libel by the then President Corazon Aquino (Cory). Cory
filed a complaint-affidavit against Beltran and others. Makasair averred
that Cory cannot file a complaint because this would defeat the
presidential immunity from suit.
Makasiar contends that the president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue, then the president would allow herself to be placed
under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself
thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE/S:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
(1) Whether the presidential immunity from suit be waived. (YES)
(2) Whether the presidential immunity from suit can be invoked by
Beltran (an individual other than the President. (NO)
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(1) Whether Beltran was denied due process. (NO)
(2) Whether Beltran’s constitutional rights were violated when RTC
judge issued a warrant of arrest w/o personally examining the
complaint and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
(NO)
HELD/RATIO:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
There is nothing in our present laws which prevents the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, the choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.
SECOND ISSUE:
This privilege of immunity from suit only pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only be the holder of the office,
and not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Consequently, Beltran, in this criminal case, in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against the accused.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal
case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.
This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect,
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
SECOND ISSUE:
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
Page 30 of 169
 shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.
However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Guitierrez, Jr., J, separate concurring:
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three
principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this
particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather
than later.
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at
this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (majority decision)
David v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396
3 May 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(Immunity of the President from Suit)
FACTS:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon
the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in- Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
"The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction ;
and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left
represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the
democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and
engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front,
to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly
magnified by certain segments of the national media;
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of
the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February
24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts
of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
Page 31 of 169
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented.”
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies
would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo
Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with
the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already
near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot
police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action
was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon
City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening,
hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held
along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen
from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila
Police District were stationed outside the building. A few minutes after
the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police
surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and
its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin
Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police
showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained
that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed
during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is
not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran,
they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were
dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the
police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon
City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into
custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine
Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur
Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative
Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna
Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in
Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of
Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in
these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021.
ISSUE/S:
Page 32 of 169
Whether or not it is proper to implead President Arroyo as a respondent.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation
of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is
not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the
mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. Nos. 146710-15
2 March 2001
Puno, J.
(Impeachment of the President)
FACTS:
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability
to the Senate President and Speaker of the House.
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as
President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175. On the same date, the
House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176.
On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to
the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC
to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.Despite the lapse of time and still
without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector
of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to
claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Estrada is only temporarily disabled to act as the
President. (No)
(2) Whether or not Estrada’s actions were considered as an
effective resignation. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he
enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Congress have recognized Arroyo as the President. Impliedly, such
recognition presupposes the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly Estrada’s claim of temporary
incapacity. The question at bar is purely political which cannot be
decided by the Supreme Court without violating the principle of
separation of powers. As such, the SC cannot exercise its judicial power
for full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative
branch.
SECOND ISSUE:
A resignation is not governed by any formal requirements, what is
required merely is that there is an intent to resign and acts of
relinquishment. Resignation canbe oral, written, expressed or implied.
Petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2000.
However, using totality test (via his acts and omissions) as to determine
whether or not he resigned has it can be shown that clearly, on his part,
President Estrada INTENDED TO RESIGN.
Acts which showed his intention to resign:
1. leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order;
Page 33 of 169
2. expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them;
3. called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
4. Recognition of the oath-taking of PGMA;
THIRD ISSUE:
What is the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President?
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will
reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. A public
office is a public trust.
THE LEGISLATURE
Araneta v. Gatmaitan
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191
30 April 1957
Felix, J.
(Law-making of the Legislature as Distinguished from
Rule-Making Authority of the Executive or Law
Execution)
FACTS:
In 1950, trawl operators from Malabon and Navotas migrated to the Bicol
region in order to fish in the San Miguel Bay, located between the
provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, which is considered
the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region.
Subsistence fisherman, in the belief that such practices caused the
depletion of the marine resources in the area, clamored to prohibit the
operation of trawls within the bay.
The Municipal Mayor’s League condemned the trawl operations as the
cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolved to
petition the President to ban or regulate the operations of trawls to
certain periods of the year. Two resolutions were issued to this effect.
President Magsaysay issued Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use
of trawls in San Miguel Bay; it was amended by E.O. No. 66 allowing
trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, E.O. No. 80
was issued which effectively revived EO No. 22.
Trawl Operators filled a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief
with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Manila restrain the
respondents and declare the EOs void.
The Governor of Camarines Sur called the attention of the Court that the
Solicitor General had not been notified of the proceeding. The Court
ordered that the trial could go on and the SolGencould be notified before
judgement was entered. The SolGen was allowed to file his
memorandum after the evidence for both parties was submitted.
Ruling of the CFI: Congress may define the conditions which the power
to close any definite area of the Philippine waters may be exercised. It is
primarily within the fields of legislation not of execution. Congress had
not intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on matters of
national importance. To accept respondents' view would be to sanction
the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees. Until the trawler
is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San
Miguel Bay by executive proclamation. The remedy for respondents and
population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the
Legislature.
Petitioners filed for a writ of injunction and respondent were ordered to
file a bond of P30,000 for the non-issuance of the injunction, pending
appeal. Respondents raised this matter to SC contending that by
requiring the bond the Republic of the Philippines was made a party
defendant which transformed the suit into one against the Government
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE/S:
Page 34 of 169
(1) Whether or not the Respondents, acting in their capacity as
Government officials, could be required to post bond in an action
against them. (No)
(2) Whether or not the E.O.s was validly issued by the President. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the above E.O.s were a valid delegation of powers of
the Congress. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The SC held that the present action being one against petitioners, acting
in their capacity as Government officials, is essentially one against the
Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be
indirectly a requirement against the Government. (Note: If they ask why
the republic cannot be a party defendant it’s because the State cannot
be sued without its consent.)
However, as the records show that respondents failed to put up the bond
allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor General's Office
but since they failed to issue bond for reasons beyond their control the
issue becomes moot and academic.
SECOND ISSUE:
First, the SolGen avers that the constitutionality of an executive order
cannot be assailed in petition for declaratory relief. However, in Hilado
vs. De la Costa, the Court in effect accepted the propriety of such action.
The SC cited various provisions of the Fisheries law. Pertinently, the law
declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking, destroying or
killing of any fish fry or fish eggs. It authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate regulations restricting
the use of any fish net or fishing device (includes the net used by trawl
fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as to set aside
and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be
administered in the manner prescribed by him.
Section 75 mentions certain streams, ponds and waters within the game
refuges, . . . communal forest, etc., which the law itself declares fish
refuges and sanctuaries, but this enumeration of places does not curtail
the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which
naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel Bay in Camarines.
From both the law and the preceding manifestations, the Court held that
even without the EO, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing come
within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal
prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or
orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.
Since the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority
to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl, the President by virtue of the
Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 10(1)) and the Administrative Code (Sections
63, 74, 79) may also exercise that same power and authority. The EOs
are therefore valid.
THIRD ISSUE:
The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in
that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall
be, while in the latter, the authority or discretion as to its execution has
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
In US v. Ang Tang Ho, the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power
to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing
more than to authorize the Governor- General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect. There is no delegation of power and it
is valid. On the other hand, if the act itself does not define a crime and is
not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a
law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the
act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
In this case, Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish
eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) it authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the
regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be
imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection
of fish fry or fish eggs ; (c) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish
refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be
prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take,
destroy or kill in any of said places, or, in any manner disturb or drive
away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs; and
Page 35 of 169
(d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in
violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not
more than P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or
both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83).
As the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned from the foregoing,
the Fisheries Act is complete in itself. Leaving to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA
G.R. No. 76633
18 October 1988
Cruz, J.
(Law-making of the Legislature as Distinguished from
Rule-Making Authority of the Executive or Law
Execution)
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985.
His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum
circular as violative of the principle of non -delegation of legislative
power issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for
the family of overseas workers.
It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or Not POEA violated the principle of non-delegation of
powers. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797:
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions
of the Administration (POEA)."
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the
law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on
the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Page 36 of 169
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566
19 November 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Undue Delegation of Legislative Power)
FACTS:
Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.
Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out
a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast
their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master. This
practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in
trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. While the advent
of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in
reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s
district and constituents. In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers
to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects
and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district. Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative
control of local appropriations.
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, as will
be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds
of the Executive.
History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines
The Congressional Pork Barrel dates back from 1922 (Pre Martial Law
Era) in the form of Act 3044 or the Public Works Act of 1922, it is
considered as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the
Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were
subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. During the Martial Law
Era, the Pork Barrel System was discontinued due to the era of one -
man controlled legislature. But in 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had
already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the
article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". At this moment, the
Congressional Pork Barrel projects under the SLDP also began to cover
not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also
"soft projects", or non-public works projects such as those which would
fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and
livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of
₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has
been documented that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAA with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
The administrations after the EDSA revolution have been consistent in
adopting the Pork Barrel System. It was in the year 200046 that the
"Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released
to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000
PDAF Article.
In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles (Aquino Administration), it is stated
that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement).”
However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who
would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.
History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that
Page 37 of 169
the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on March 22, 1976, issued PD 910. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special
fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
Controversies in the Philippines
It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums
of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators
in the form of kickbacks." He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘
(standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low
19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could
be anything from dredging, rip rapping, asphalting, concreting, and
construction of school buildings."
"The publication of the stories, including those about congressional
initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."
2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for
lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government
has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects."
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle--
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients
of PDAF funds, the whistle--blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. Thus, after its investigation on
the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three
(3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti--Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three--year audit
investigation covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose
of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under
PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) by
the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government--owned--and--controlled corporations (GOCCs). The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and
P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the
total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made
nationwide during the audit period.
Accordingly, the CoA‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012--03
(CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made
public. As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-- blowers alleged
that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian
reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." According to
incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing
"one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy. (YES)
Page 38 of 169
(2) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review. (NO)
(3) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue. (YES)
(4) Whether or not the Court‘s Decision in "Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez" (Philconsa) and in "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"
(LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis. (NO)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the "Congressional Pork Barrel"
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
(1) separation of powers (YES)
(2) non--delegability of legislative power (YES)
(3) checks and balances (YES)
(4) accountability (YES)
(5) political dynasties (NO)
(6) local autonomy (NO)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the "Presidential Pork Barrel"
(1) Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar
as they constitute undue delegation of legislative power. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Res Judicata and Stare Decisis
Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges
against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases
at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Definition of Terms
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump--sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump--sum
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a
kind of lump--sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as
a kind of lump--sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1. Separation of Powers
a. Statement of Principle
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much
more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive.
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Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law --making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it
self with details for implementation by the Executive."
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be
made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight.
b. Application
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators
to participate in the post--enactment phases of project implementation.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
identify projects post--GAA may be construed from the import of Special
Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second 2 paragraph of Special Provision
4.
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted
that legislators have been accorded post--enactment authority to identify
PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been
accorded post--enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees
is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all
request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be".
Clearly, these post--enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related
to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and
release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper
phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have,
whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non--delegability of Legislative Power
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post--enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation
is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that
the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given
a personal lump--sum fund from which they are able to dictate
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
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As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non--delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process
known as "bill presentment."
As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law--making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it
takes effect as law after the required publication.”
For the President to exercise his item--veto power, it necessarily follows
that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An
item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill."
In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,
the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself,
is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure
that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must
contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
b. Application
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears
as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump--sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written
into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration.
This kind of lump--sum/post--enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the above--described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Moreover, even without its post--enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed
since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump--sum
appropriation above--characterized.
In particular, the lump--sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated
as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump--sum budgeting
scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from
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obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."
That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to
account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is
that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.
c. Accountability.
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in
some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post--
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
4. Political Dynasties
The Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention
of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the
gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents.
In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic
indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly--urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far--
flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former.
To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party--
List Representatives –and in some years, even the Vice--President
– who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution.
Indeed, this type of personality--driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in
purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel 1.
Validity of Appropriation
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of
PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
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Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific"
purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury.
Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law
since the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an
Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a
Special Fund incidental thereto.
In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither
a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social
Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD
1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of
PAGCOR.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being
used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in
violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates
the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the
very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign,
set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written
into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate
may be gleaned from the same.
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be
the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same
for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of
the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy
resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President.
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from
this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General
Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
Analyzing the legal text vis--à--vis the above--mentioned principles, it
may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a
Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable
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amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified
public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot
be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains
post--enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations.
These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant
for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after
the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law.
As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the
2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire
PDAF, but rather the post--enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the
law.
2. Undue Delegation
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used."
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993
which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same. Nevertheless,
since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates
that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines."
The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately
curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure
development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article;
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene,
assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of
the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project
identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund
release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and
CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
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 confer/red personal, lump--sum allocations to legislators from which
they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect,
which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013
is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release
of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for
all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated,
not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are
hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the
funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund
shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that
the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on
Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited
but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any
valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to
a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the
funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress
as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate
and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
MODULE 3
III. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE LAW?
Lopez v. Roxas
G.R. No. L-25716
28 July 1966
Concepcion, C.J.
(Judicial Power Defined)
FACTS:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders Vice
President in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By
Resolution No. 2, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session
assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes then
cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines, proclaimed
petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with 3,531,550
votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent,
respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes had
been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966,
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respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET), Election
Protest No, 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as Vice-
President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said
respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said
office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court
the present original action for prohibition which preliminary injunction,
against respondent Roxas, to prevent the PET from hearing and
deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that RA
1793, creating said Tribunal, is “unconstitutional,” and that, “all’
proceedings taken by it are a nullity.”
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not RA1793 is constitutional. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not PET can recount votes. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not RA1793 violates constitutional tenure. (No)
(4) Whether or not Justices of SC can sit as PET members. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
JUDICIAL POWER is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1)
defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing
remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first
instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that
“Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts,” subject to the limitations set forth in the
fundamental law.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of
the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but
the entirety or “all” of said power, except, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
“judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of
members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives,
which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution).
RA 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate
the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President elect or
Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the
office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring
that he, not the candidate proclaimed elected by Congress, is the one
elected President or Vice-President, as the case may be, and that, as
such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office.
RA 1793 provides that the PET “shall be composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court”, it has conferred upon
such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character. It
has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon
the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The PET is not inferior to the SC, since it is the same Court, although
the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than
those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. It is
like the fact that Courts of First Instance (now RTC) perform the
functions of such ordinary Courts of First Instance, those of courts of
land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile
and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining
when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority,
pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these
instances, the court (Court of First Instance or municipal court) is only
one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such—
under the very principle of separation of powers—it belongs exclusively
to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution
provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic law
ordains that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members” (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words,
the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide such
contests relating to Members of Congress—which by nature is judicial—
from the operation of the general grant of judicial power to “the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law”.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or VicePresident, has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the
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jurisdiction vested in the PET. Congress merely acts as a national board
of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make
said declaration, on the basis of the election returns only certified by
provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII, Section 2,
Constitution of the Philippines.) Upon the other hand, PET has the
judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election
returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true
results of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of each ballot or
determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in
whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.
The authority of the PET to determine whether or not the protestant has
a better right than the President and/or Vice-President to be declared
elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the
evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really
elected President or Vice-President is the protestant, not the person
declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no
constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no
abridgment thereof.
In imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not,
through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power
of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the
creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is
constitutional.
Republic v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
11 May. 2018
Ponente: Tijam, J.
FACTS:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General initiated the case for quo
warranto asking the court to declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold
office for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and
net worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures
show that she does not possess “proven integrity” demanded of
every aspirant to the Judiciary.
2. Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of
Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from
1994 until 2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC.
3. Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986
to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel of
various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from
the UP Human Resources Development Office, Central Records
Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of
Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed
by Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11
out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were
filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal
counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she
resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when
she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August
2010.
4. The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine
probable cause. Among the Justices who appeared before the
Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted
(a) CJ Sereno’s bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary
Decentralized Office, (b) the suspicious issuance of the TRO in
the Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege of
Members of the Court to nominate for vacant judicial posts, and
(d) the clustering of the Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice
Peralta who testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson of the
Council that nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice Bersamin; (4)
Justice Tijam; and, (5) Justice Jardeleza.
5. The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available
Page 47 of 169
 remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment,
and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State.
It also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The
petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her
SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset,
from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking
the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not proven her
integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The
Republic thus concludes that since Respondent is ineligible for
the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has
no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto.
6. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice
may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of
the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively,
she argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should
have been filed within one year from the cause of ouster, and
not from the discovery of the disqualification.
7. It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers
without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not
required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the
years that she was on official leave without pay, she was
actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require
the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to
expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution.
8. Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of
Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient and
acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she
consistently filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues that the
Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude
failure to file SALNs simply because these documents are
missing in the Office of the Court Administrator's files should
likewise be made applicable to her case.
9. Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed
Motions for Leave to Intervene echoing some or all of CJ
Sereno’s arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed a
similar motion alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court
from the Senate Impeachment Court.
10. CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro,
imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified before
the House Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for
his purported insinuations of CJ Sereno’s psychological fitness
during the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also prayed that the
Motion for Inhibition be by the SC En banc without the
participation of the Justices who are asked to inhibit.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.
2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the
Associate Justices on the basis of actual bias is proper.
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto against Respondent who
is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives;
4. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of
prescription;
5. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
1. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for
nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC,
and whether such determination partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s
supervisory and review powers;
2. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law
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 and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so,
whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination
and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;
3. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice; and
4. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
6. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
RATIO:
Propriety of Motions for Intervention
1. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of
right but addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b)
that no delay or prejudice should result.
2. The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the
motions for intervention filed by several other groups. It
observed that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion; that movant- intervenors have no legal
interest in the case, as required in order to qualify a person to
intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the
people, and not in a particular group.
3. Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned
position, which is the only time when an individual
himself/herself may commence an action for quo warranto. In
this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals
claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the
ones charged with the usurpation thereof.
4. The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo
warranto proceeding, by its nature, is one brought by a person
claiming to be entitled to the usurped office.
Propriety of Motions for Inhibition
5. There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant
must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence
to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a
whole, was only to prod the Respondent to observe and respect
the constitutional process of impeachment. It does not appear
that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary
inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices
participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the impeachment of Respondent
does not disqualify them to hear the instant petition.
6. Their appearance was in deference to the House of
Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be
doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the
Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the
parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements
in the hearing should be carefully viewed within this context, and
should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against
Respondent.
7. The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give
judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is
required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
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 in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when
the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice.
8. In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for
compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact
that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings
of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the
impeachment of respondent does not make them disqualified to
hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat was in
deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional
duty to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against
respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with
the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they
faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set for the
purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully
viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted
as an adverse attack against respondent.
9. A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the
Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the
statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect
the constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the
ideals of public accountability.
10. Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi
po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador,” is clearly a
hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court
be if any of its Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the
Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin’s remark that he
was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality
of the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’
“privilege” to recommend nominees to fill vacancies in the
Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this
statement to a personal resentment as respondent regards it.
11. Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on
Justice also contradicts respondent’s allegation that Justice
Peralta’s apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent
caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA)
Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of
applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice
Peralta has made it clear during the February 12, 2018
Congressional hearing that he has already moved on from said
issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to
protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
12. Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias
and partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was
sought, respondent’s motions for inhibition must perforce fail.
Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of
a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that
the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in
accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor,
should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.
Jurisdiction over Petition for Quo Warranto
13. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified
considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue is
of transcendental importance, is one of first impression, and of
paramount public interest.
14. The origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo
warranto are materially different. Impeachment proceedings are
political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is
a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of
the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the
people in the hands of the public officer by determining the
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 public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action
for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the
eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules.
15. Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thus, there is no forum shopphing
in the instant case as the nature and purpose of the remedies
are different, and there is yet no impeachment trial.
16. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be
removed from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses
the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction,
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect. To subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to
cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which
cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
17. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment.
18. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
19. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to lose
power is to abdicate it.
Prescription does not lie against the State.
20. The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is
not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for
public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of
Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the
use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general
principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right.” In effect, when the
government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly
to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of
laches or prescription.
21. Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie
against the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108
(4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
22. Further, that prescription does not lie in this case can also be
deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto,
which is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for
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 questioning Respondent’s qualification for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster.
23. Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she
should not be required to submit the said documents as she was
considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe
considering that the same are more than fifteen years old; and
that U.P. already cleared her of “all academic/administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether
she had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing,
there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the
part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its
right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public
interest.
24. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of
the novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us
than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.
Ineligibility as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief
Justice
25. The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes
ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. The Court's
supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies
with its own rules and procedures.
26. The SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the
Constitution and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws
and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one
who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the
laws; and one who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot
rightfully claim to be a person of integrity as such equation is
theoretically and practically antithetical. The obligation of
members of the Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not
only a statutory requirement but forms part of the mandatory
conduct expected of a judge so that an “honorable competent
and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice and thus
promote the unity of the country, the stability of government, and
the well-being of the people.”
27. To be of proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the
Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a
steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line,
failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The
offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and
corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to
comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to
be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her
disqualified from holding public office.
28. Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate
integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but
whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory
requirement of filing of SALNs.
29. That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the
SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply with such is
incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty
for the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules
implemented at that time; 5) That Respondent’s compliance with
the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of
requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by
the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications which
were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should
have been disqualified at the outset.
30. The established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to
submit the required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set
by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The JBC
determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to
2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing
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 thereof during those years was already required. There was no
indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years
2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20
years as a professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years
as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent was
specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in
the U.P. College of Law.
31. In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require
only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-
2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that
the JBC En Banc did not do away with the requirement of
submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance
therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately
preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-
incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc
to have substantially complied was Respondent, who submitted
only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after
extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so. Her
justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the
SALNs are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was
able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
32. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for
her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in
obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who
submitted SALNs, or whose years in government service
correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713.
The clearance issued by UP HRDO hardly suffice as a substitute
for SALNs.
33. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
respondent of her academic and administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But
such could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as
compliance with the SALN requirement. Obviously, an
administrative officer, performing ministerial and administrative
duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance with the
filing of SALNs which is a statutory, and not merely an
administrative, requirement.
34. The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC
and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the
applicant's fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit
dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her
subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief
Justice, which are now matters of public record and also
determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment.
Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be
cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.
De facto Officer
35. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is
ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will
give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
officer.
36. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible
to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never
attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal
from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State
is proper to oust Respondent from the appointive position of
Chief Justice.
37. Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and
exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and
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 exclusion of Respondent from holding and exercising the rights,
functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
Sub judice Rule
38. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration
of justice. The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to
members of the Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance
thereof is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
39. It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate
branches of the Government and even men and women learned
in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert
the instant quo warranto action from its primary purpose. Even
worse, Respondent and her spokespersons chose to litigate
Respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to
the Court, before several media-covered engagements. Through
her actuations, Respondent appears to have forgotten that this
is a court action for quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant
rule on sub judice applies.
40. Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues
on hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to
judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind
that this is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be
stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor for judicial
independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is
called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the
uncertainty in the qualification, or otherwise, of Respondent to
occupy the highest position in the Judiciary.
41. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation
of due process when she herself chose to litigate her case
before the media. when aggressive actions are taken against the
Judiciary as an institution and clouds of doubt are casted upon
the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially so
when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this
Court cannot be apathetic to and is not helpless against such
attacks, but the prudent thing to do is to stand and deal with it
head on.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared
vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. 45081
15 July 1936
Laurel, J.
(Separation and Blending of Powers)
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner, Jose A. Angara and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, the
petitioner took his oath of office.
Page 54 of 169
On December 3, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the petitioner,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8, and
praying that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified.
On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935
On December 20, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period;
On December 27, respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutionaprovision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
facts, and in the affirmative
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments.
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in
their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts,
not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
Page 55 of 169
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater
of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner
Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot
in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei
the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728
21 July 2015
Leonen, J.
(Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts)
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to
the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti -RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark.
Team Patay: Juan Edgardo Angara, Teddy Casino, Alan Peter
Cayetano, Jackie Enrile, Francis Escudero, Risa Hontiveros, Loren
Legarda, Partylist Gabriela, Partylist Akbayan, Partylist Bayan Muna,
Partylist Anak Pawis
Page 56 of 169
Team Buhay: JV Estrada, Gregorio Honasan, Mitos Magsaysay, Koko
Pimentel, Antonio Trillanes, Cynthia Villar, Partylist Buhay Partylist Ang
Pamilya
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review. (No)
(2) Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions. (No)
(3) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens. (No)
(4) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression. (Yes)
(5) Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation. (Content-Based)
(6) Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
(Yes)
(7) Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted
upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when
the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did
have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether
an issue involves a truly political and non -justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to
free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE:
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear
that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before
a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’
speech.
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In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE:
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However,
the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised
by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid
for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is
a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE:
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and
this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify
the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE:
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE:
Page 58 of 169
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting
by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality- With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
Lemon test
-A regulation is constitutional when:
-It has a secular legislative purpose;
-It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
-It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127245
28 June 2000
Purisima, J.
(The Supreme Court: En Banc and Division Cases)
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Par. 2-3:
(1) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
(2) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
FACTS:
99 hectares of land presumptively owned by the Republic of the
Philippines was adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to
be without jurisdiction. Petitioners submitted these consolidated cases to
the SC Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc.
Under Supreme Court Circular No.2- 89, dated Feb. 7, 1989, amended
by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
Xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:
1.....Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2.....Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3.....Cases raising novel questions of law;
4.....Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5.....Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on
Audit;
6.....Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7.....Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed;
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8.....Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and
are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and
9.....All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
When the Motions were first brought to the attention of the Court on
March 7, 2000, it opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted
on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was premature for
the Court to resolve the motion.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4 -1 to deny petitioners
motion to transfer the cases to the Banc. On March 14, 2000, the Court
deliberated on the motion and voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the
banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.
This action of the Court is a legitimate and valid exercise of its
RESIDUAL POWER within within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of
the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the nine justices who voted to treat the consolidated
cases as En Banc cases did not have any cogent or compelling reason
for such action. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling
enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En banc has to act
upon and decide petitioners motions for reconsideration.
It has to be stressed that where the Court En Banc entertains a case for
resolution, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
simple means that the nature of the cases calls for an en banc attention
and consideration.
It should also not be concluded that the Court took undue advantage of
sheer voting strength.
It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion
of the majority that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance
meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is
claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
16 September 1998
Regalado, J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in a
business transaction with Nestor Agustin, the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and respondent, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, persuaded the petitioner into
having an amorous relationship with him. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for the corporation’s problems.
Page 60 of 169
Because of some misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents, Fabian
wanted to terminate their relationship but Agustin threatened her not to.
Fabian then filed an administrative case against Agustin with the
Ombudsman, but Agustin was eventually exonerated.
Fabian argues that Sec 27, of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
allows that all decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten days from
receipt of the written notice. She also argues that the Ombudsman
cannot restrict the right to appeal and cannot limit the power of review of
the SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Sec. 27 of RA 6670 is unconstitutional. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Sec. 30, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The
constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
The very provision cited by the petitioner does not include quasi-judicial
agencies such as the OMB. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Furthermore, the legislative background of RA 6770 shows that the
Conference Committee Report was aware of the provisions of Section
30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo
Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of the bill admitted that
the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court
on the matter.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
7 October 2008
Puno, C.J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Procedural
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein
respondents to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Respondents filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final
Amparo Reliefs. They prayed, among others, that:
Page 61 of 169
(1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) they be granted the interim reliefs
allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule;
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
Circumstances
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to
as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After
eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a
Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined
them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they
filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007.
Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On 25 October
2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition
as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise
granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of
Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. On 26
December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical
reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military
custody. Thus the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
(2) Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the
right to security of a person may be invoked.
HELD/RATIO:
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS Effect of the
nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of
evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of
the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of
their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by
other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation
of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to
security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of
this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In
its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some
scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
“right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom
from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of person. xxx Second, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
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disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal
law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they
are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. xxx Third, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by
the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is
a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human
rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from fear
as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom
from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with
the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character
or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom
from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in
the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be
invoked – While the right to security of person appears in conjunction
with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the
right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty.
In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for
the right to security of person to be invoked.
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF AMPARO:
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in
the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was
envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, hence
representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as
well as all the stakeholders in the justice system participated in mapping
out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of
the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was
an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 217126-27
10 November 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Third Level Courts: Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation
report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six Administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for
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violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds and
Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The TRO
was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by Binay
against the Ombudsman and various other officials for deliberately
refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to course to the
petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the case
was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance , is the Ombudsman
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (No)
(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (No)
(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and illegal. (Premature
Issue)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general rule a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can still be
considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
a) Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo
has no jurisdiction.
b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable.
d) Where under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration would
be useless.
e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief.
f) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of due
process.
h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object.
i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involves both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort to
certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is based
on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same states:
Section 14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject
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matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the Ombudsman
by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the same except for
decisions or findings taken to the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45 appeal can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts and not against
“findings” of quasi judicial agencies including the Office of the
Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides that increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence is
in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 14
of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, therefore it is concluded
that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition
should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65 petition is
the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared
unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin
in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first paragraph of
Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices independence
under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office from judicial
intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman as an authority
to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses, of the
bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman
independence covers three things:
1. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot be
abolished nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges be removed, altered or modified by law unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made
2. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its funds
for purposes germane to its function.
3. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means that
those within the ranks of the Office can only be disciplined by
internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. This is because the courts are apolitical bodies which
may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman is not exempt from
judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislative and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An
example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs of
preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’ power
to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’ constitutional
rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a court to exercise
its full functions.
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus pending deliberation on
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whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of procedure
without the consent of the Court, the CA had the authority to issue the
injunctive writs.
FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned thus
the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The purpose of
a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who is being
suspended from using the powers of his office to influence witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to nullify the
preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr re-election
in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
Project. The CA found it sufficient that the application of the condonation
doctrine was enough to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v.
Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
1. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct, also offenses committed or acts done during the previous
term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
2. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of previous
Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for these aforesaid acts.
3. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to
know the life and character of their candidates of their right to elect
officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the
legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is a
public trust. The LGC provides that an elective official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in
office etc. The LGC also provides that those officials removed from office
as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any
elective local office.
Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including the
ones cited above, the Çourt concluded that the doctrine of condonation
is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local officials administrative liability for a Misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term or another elective post. There is no support to the
statement in the case of Pascual that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to
be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal basis that election implied
condonation. There is also no presumption in any rule of law that the
electorate upon re-election an official, have disregarded or forgave the
officials faults. The electorate rarely has full knowledge of a officials
misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are shrouded in secrecy.
Condonation cannot be subscribed to because it implied forgiveness,
which requires knowledge of the acts being forgiven for and in the
absence of knowledge of these acts there can be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases after
this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also done for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office.
However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings in the resolution,
makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to comment, the CA
has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr contempt petition. Thus
in this comment, the Ombudsman may raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt to not give due course to
the same contempt proceedings. Absent any indication that the
contempt petition has been given due course by the CA it would then be
premature for the Court to rule on the issue.
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Republic Act No. 9282 (Third Level Courts: Court of Tax
Appeals)
Under R.A. No. 9282:
The Court of Tax Appeals was elevated to the same level as the Court
of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice.
It shall now consist of one (1) Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate
Justices. They shall have the same qualifications, ranks, category,
salary, emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements and
other benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. It shall sit en
banc, or in two (2) divisions with three (3) Justices each. A decision of a
division of the CTA may further be appealed by verified petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
(Due to the enactment of RA 9503 on 12 June 2008 and took effect on 5
July 2008, the organizational structure of the CTA is further enlarged by
the creation of a Third Division which has three (3) additional Justices.
Therefore, CTA is now composed of one (1) Presiding Justice and eight
(8) Associate Justices. The CTA may sit en banc or in three (3) divisions
with each division consisting of three
(3) Justices.)
The CTA’s original appellate jurisdiction was expanded to include the
following:
1. Criminal cases involving violations of the NIRC and the Tariff
and Customs Code;
2. Decisions of the RTC in local tax cases;
3. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA)
in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property;
and
4. Collection of internal revenue taxes and customs duties the
assessment of which have already become final.
Republic Act No. 8249 (Third Level Courts:
Sandiganbayan)
Under R.A. No. 8249:
Sandiganbayan is a special court, of the same level as the Court of
Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice. It
shall consist of one (1) presiding justice and (14) fourteen associate
justices who shall be appointed by the President.
Before RA 8249 was enacted, the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was
determined based on the penalty imposable on the offense or offenses
charged on the accused. Under RA 8249 Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction regardless of the penalty, so long as the offense charged
was committed by a public officer.
To determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, two (2)
criteria must be taken into consideration, namely: (1) The nature of the
offense and (2) The salary grade of the public official.
Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:
A.) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act),
B.) Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads;
b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other department heads;
c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains
and all officers of higher rank;
e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of
Provincial Director and those holding the rank of Senior
Superintendent or higher;
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 f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants;
officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
g) President, directors or trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
2. Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade
27 and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of
1989;
3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of
the Constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
C.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and
employees mentioned above;
D.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO
1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986
Sandiganbayan has Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court in:
Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the
Supreme Court
The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction in: Final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases falling
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which
were committed by public officers below Salary Grade 27.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in govemment -owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Therefore, private
individuals can be sued in cases before the Sandiganbayan if they are
alleged to be in conspiracy with the public officer.
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894
15 July 2015
Peralta, J.
(Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan)
Art. XI, Sec. 4:
Section. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case Danilo A. Duncano is the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified
under RA No. 6758. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office
of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for the violation of
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
Duncano allegedly willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for
the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in
Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and
his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol
motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P.
DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest.
Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under
Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear a case because he is
an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of
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the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those
specifically enumerated. This is so since the term “Regional Director”
and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies that
these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are
conjoined together “relating one to the other” to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies
the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding that the
position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade
27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the
executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher,
of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated
in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s
pronouncements in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan were cited.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4
(A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of
27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or
higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in
Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on
all fours with Cuyco.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)
and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though
petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary
Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious
error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26. There is no merit in the OSP’s
allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Second Level Courts:
Regional Trial Courts)
Under BP Blg. 129:
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch.
– The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts
of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
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 3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00);
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
7. In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of
by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise original jurisdiction:
1. In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions; and
2. In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional
Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the
petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of
fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases,
agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the
jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other
special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial
Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or
agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under present
laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless subsequently
amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Republic Act No. 7691 (First Level Courts: Municipal
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities)
Under R.A. No. 7691:
Section 2. Section 32 od the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
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 amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,00.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included
in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different traansactions;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That
in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
19 January 1999
Puno, J.
(Jurisdiction)
FACTS:
The Secretary of Justice filed for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily
restraining Echegaray’s execution and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Secretary of Justice claims that the decision of the case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority. It further
included in its position a copy of the House of Representatives’
resolution which advised the branches of government to immediately
implement the re-imposition of the death penalty.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Has the Court lost jurisdiction of the case at bar and hence can no
longer restrain the execution of Echegaray?
(No)
(2) After a decision has become final and executory, does the execution
enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department?
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court does not lose jurisdiction of case after a decision has become
final and executory.
The important part of a litigation is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. It bears repeating that what the Court
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restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court
with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included
in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.
SECOND ISSUE:
After a decision has become final and executory, the execution does not
enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department. The
Secretary of Justice uses Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The above provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The
suspension of the death sentence is an exercise of judicial power. It is
not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is
the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114323
23 July 1998
Martinez, J.
(Basis of Decisions)
Art. VIII, Sec. 14:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Oil and Natural Gas Comm. (ONGC) is a foreign corporation
controlled and owned by the Indian government. Respondent, Pacific
Cement Company Inc. (PCCI), is a private corporation organized under
Philippine Law.
On February 26, 1983 respondent agreed to supply the petitioner 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner
paid $477,300.00 through a letter of credit.
The oil well cement was loaded on MV SURUTANA NAVA ship at the
port of Surigao City for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. Due to a
dispute between the ship owner and the respondent, the cargo
remained in Bangkok and failed to reach its destination. Respondent
failed to give the 4,300 metric tons of cement despite petitioner’s
demands. They agreed that the respondent will replace the entire 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement cost free at the
petitioner’s designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class “G”
cement did not conform to the petitioner’s specifications.
On July 23, 1988, arbitrator, Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
petitioner’s favor amounting to $899,603.07, Foreign court issued
notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition. The
private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January 16,
1989. Foreign court refused to admit the private respondent’s objections
for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order
on February 7, 1990Private respondent refused to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly,
petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of Surigao City RTC for the
enforcement of the of the foreign court’s judgment.
CLAUSE 15 “All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out
of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
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exclusive jurisdiction of the court , within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated.”
CLAUSE 16 "All questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification, designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship of the items ordered or
as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified
to "in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract, design,
drawing, specification, etc.,"
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute under
Clause 16 of the contract. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a dispute
within Clause 16’s purview. (No)
(3) Whether or not the memorandum decisions by inferior tribunals can
be considered as facts and conclusions of law. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not due process was given to the respondent even if
there was no hearing. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute clause under Clause 16
of their contract.
ART. 1373 provides: If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is
most adequate to render it effectual.
ART. 1374 provides: The various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly.
This canon of construction states in interpreting a contract as in this
case, care should be taken that every part must be given effect, as it
was enacted by an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of
conflicting provisions. The correct interpretation is to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or
disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and
for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
The petitioner states that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a
proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling
within the ambit of Clause 16. What was referred to arbitration was the
failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the specifications of the
contract (Class “G” cement), a matter clearly within the coverage of
Clause 16.
Hence, arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute due to “specification”
in Clause 16 which is supposed to be Class G cement
SECOND ISSUE:
Non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by the
regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract.
Doctrine of noscitur a sociis, provides that the supply order/contract in
Clause 16 must be construed within its associated words, limited only to
the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract. Clause 16 should pertain only to
matters involving the technical aspects of the contract. Non-delivery of
the oil well cement does not fall here but under Clause 15 “All questions,
disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this
supply order”.
THIRD ISSUE:
Memorandum decisions of inferior tribunals can be considered as facts
and conclusions of law.
Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
In Francisco v. Permskul , this Court held that the Makati RTC’s
memorandum decision is within the ambit of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. In this case, the foreign court adopted the arbitrator’s
findings of facts and law in Award Paper No. 3/B -1. It contains an
exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties, and the arbitrator’s evaluation of the same.
Procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, state that a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings, and the
same must be respected. If the foreign court mandates that an Order of
the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary
docket fees, then Philippine courts cannot invalidate foreign court’s
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order because our rules provide otherwise. Even if Philippine courts
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise, (Award Paper No. 3/B-1) can be considered as facts
and conclusions of law.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Due process was given to respondent even if the foreign court did not
answer their concerns.
Due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence in support of one’s defense. Denial of opportunity to be heard
is contrary to due process. There is no violation of due process even if a
hearing did not occur, for the party was given a chance to explain his
side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.
Respondent does not deny that foreign court informed them to file its
objections and to pay its corresponding legal fees. Instead of paying,
respondent asked the foreign court about the correct amount of fees.
Foreign court rejected the private respondent’s objection and proceeded
to adjudicate upon the petitioner’s claims. Respondent’s claim that the
foreign court violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its
queries. Also when the foreign court rejected its objections on clearly
meritorious grounds does not violate due process. Due process was not
denied for respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard.
De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002
17 March 2010
Bersamin, J.
(The Judicial and Bar Council)
Art. VIII, Sec. 8:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and
the representative of private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments
as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
FACTS:
Chief Justice Puno’s compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010 will occur
eight days after the presidential election. The JBC began the process for
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice.
On February 8 2010, the JBC announced the names of the following
nominees to the public for any complaint or opposition to their
nomination who were namely: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice
Leonardo- De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice
Sandoval.
Although the process for filing the position of Chief Justice had begun,
the JBC had not yet submitted to the President its list so that the latter
may appoint the next Chief Justice due to the controversy in this case
being unresolved. Because of these acts of the JBC, seven different
petitions were filed in the Supreme Court which prayed either for: (1) the
JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at
least 3 nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice because the
President has to appoint the next CJ within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy in accordance with Section 4(1), Article 8 of the
Constitution; or (2) prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection
and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice in
accordance with the prohibition provided in Section 15, Article 7
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi or legal standing.
(Yes)
(2) Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. (Yes)
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(3) Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief
Justice. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Each of the petitioners in the seven different petitions have locus standi.
Each have demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the
controversy. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to
the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. The issue is
determinative of the authority of the President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who
may serve in the Judiciary. Nevertheless, to dispel any doubt on locus
standi, it should be noted that it is within the wide discretion of the Court
to waive the requirements for legal standing so that it could address and
resolve the serious constitutional questions raised.
SECOND ISSUE:
The controversy is ripe for judicial determination. The JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees for the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President,
makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the
short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as
may be needed.
THIRD ISSUE:
The prohibition under Article 7, Section 15 does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Article 7 refers to the Executive Department while Article 8 refers to the
Judiciary. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the
prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could have easily explicitly written
that the prohibition to be equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court. Since this specification was not done, it
reveals that the prohibition against the President making appointments
within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s term does not refer to the Supreme Court.
Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Article 7 are of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Sections
14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
implies that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department as
well. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section
15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Furthermore, the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because the establishment of the JBC
and the process of nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the
Judiciary.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme
Court within the 90-day period as provided by Article 8, Section 4(1) was
a true mandate for the President due to the usage of the word shall - an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced. The failure
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
Furthermore, there cannot be an Acting Chief Justice and the Court
because the framers of the Constitution intended the position to be
permanent.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. For mandamus to lie,
the following requisites must be present: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to
perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the
act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within their discretion. The object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to
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the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary,
because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an
unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against
the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to
the President.
Thus, there is no sufficient grounds to grant the mandamus against the
JBC. It is premature because the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the
latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President.
Jardeleza v. Sereno
G.R No. 213181
Aug. 19. 2014
FACTS:
Prior to Justice Abad's compulsory retirement, the JBC
announced the opening for application or recommendation for
the vacated position. The JBC received a letter from University
of the Philippines' dean nominating petitioner Francis Jardeleza,
the incumbent Solicitor General, for the position.
Sometime in June 2014, Jardeleza received phone calls from an
incumbent member of the JBC, Aurora Lagman. According to
her, Chief Justice Sereno manifested that she would be invoking
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0091 against Jardeleza.
Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice
Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious. According to the
JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza's ability to
discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal
1 Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is
challenged. – In every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not
otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote
of all the members ofthe Council must be obtained for the favourable
consideration of his nomination.
memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration
case for the government. In addition, there was also an
accusation about Petitioner's alleged extra-marital affair, and
insider trading.
A newspaper article was later published in the online portal of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s Spokesman,
Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee
could not be included because of the invocation of Rule 10,
Section 2 of the JBC rules.
Jardeleza now contends that his lack of knowledge as to the
identity of his accusers (except for the verbal information
conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against
him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him
caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and
Chief Justice Sereno.
Additionally, he contends that the Unanimity requirement does
not find application when a member of the JBC raises an
objection to an applicant's integrity. The lone objector could be
completely capable of taking hostage the entire voting process
by the mere expediency of raising an objection.
Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a
situation where all that a member has to do to veto other votes,
including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of
a candidate, without need for factual basis.
JBC denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process.
Jardeleza was informed by Lagman and De Lima about the
nature of the accusations; that it relates to his performance
during an international arbitration. It was Jardeleza who refused
to respond to the allegations, when he was given the opportunity
to.
Page 76 of 169
 JBC also contend that the unanimity rule provides that when the
integrity of the applicant is challenged, the applicant must
receive a unanimous vote to be included in the shortlist.
ISSUES: 1. W/N due process was afforded to the petitioner
2. W/N the Unanimity rule is applicable to Jardeleza.
RULING:
1. No. The right to due process is available and is demandable as a
matter of right. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special
nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal
proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is
sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified
nominees to the President cannot be compared to the duty of the courts
of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same
to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the
quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion
accorded to the JBC.
The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an
applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in
the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought
before it. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness. While the JBC vetting
proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they
must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an
applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard
on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
Jardeleza was not afforded due process because he was neither
formally informed of the questions on his integrity (he was only informed
about a general accusation on his legal strategy in the international
arbiration) nor was he provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense.
2. No. The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the
categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary
must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every
member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked toscreen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees
submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment.
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an
applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity
rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is
put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially
unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
Section 2 does not apply to Jardeleza. Sereno claims that the question
on Jardeleza's integrity arise from the disagreement in legal strategy as
expressed by a group of international lawyers. The invocation of the
"unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise ofhis
discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established
linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce
upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution. Verily,
disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of,
interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted
to him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect
the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.
A legal strategy has no direct bearing on his moral choices. As shown in
the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on
whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified
as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. These
reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear
indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have
been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different
manner of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no
showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.
Nevertheless, The rule applies due to the alleged accusation that
Jardeleza has an extra-marital affair and has engaged in insider trading.
These acts imputes a weakness in one's values, self-control, and on the
whole, sense of honor because it erodes the public's confidence in the
Judiciary. It falls under the ambit of questions of integrity. Even though
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the rule is applicable, it does not apply in this case due to the deprivation
of the petitioner's due process.
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Marbury v. Madison
1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137
(Origins of Judicial Review)
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court first declared an act of Congress
unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review.
FACTS:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President
Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating
new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in
these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the
Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices
of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the
day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the
commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President
Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State
James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver
his commission.
ISSUE/S:
Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation,
the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the
commission.Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the
Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the
executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of
mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing
therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to
the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an
original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of
jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
10 November 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Origins of Judicial Review)
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complain (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
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Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress, posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint
against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution,
to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate
has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation, prays in his petition for Injunction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for
Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to
the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the
House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that
only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint
and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending
of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as
a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the
second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
there from be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to
desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Page 79 of 169
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment
be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold
the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the
House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc.,
et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a
class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran which
was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and
the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in
the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges
in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro
at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector
L. Hofilena, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding
interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students, pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying
the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the
House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that
the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited
from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Page 80 of 169
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. (No)
(2) Whether or not the case is already ripe for adjudication. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction. (No)
(4) Whether or not the Court should exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would not
upset the system of checks and balances. The Supreme Court Ruled
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Art. VIII, Sec 1).
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution. Thus, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
SECOND ISSUE:
The case is already ripe for adjudication. In Tan v. Macapagal, it was
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. Here,
the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit.
In conclusion, the case is already ripe for adjudication.
THIRD ISSUE:
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The Supreme Court ruled
that political question refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. Here, the procedure is mostly about the wisdom of the
congress and not by court. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction over this
case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court should not exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. The Supreme Court ruled that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Thus, the court should not restrain
from deciding in cases of impeachment since judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Tanada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520
28 February 1957
Concepcion, J.
(Political Question)
FACTS:
Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and
President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal,
a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one
of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the
General elections held in November, 1955, in which several others, were
proclaimed elected in the Senate. Subsequently, the elections of this
Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the
Senate -was contested by petitioner Macapagal et. al, in the said
election. The protest is now pending before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
Page 81 of 169

Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the
Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party,
and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to
the Citizens Party. The contend that the Committee on Rules for the
Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate,
in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in
clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in
assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the
corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully,
and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal”. It
the petitioner’s stand that the appointments of respondents, Cruz,
Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private
secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado who caused said
appointments to be made as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are
threatening and are about to take cognizance of the electoral case
pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Electoral Case no. 4) , in
nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a
Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the
Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an
Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen
by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination
of the Party having the second largest number of votes and to be
designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal
packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is
the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the
said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen
in the manner described above.
Among others, petitioners pray that judgment be rendered ousting
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the court is without jurisdiction to direct or control the
action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral
Tribunal. (No)
(2) Whether or not the current case is a political question. (No)
(3) Whether or not the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens
Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate
three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly
choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by
the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate OR W/N
whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may
validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said
Citizens Party. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The courts have jurisdiction. This case is not an action against the
Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or
indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of
said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET), SET is neither part of Congress nor of the Senate. Moreover,
although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. The courts are called upon to say, on the
one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other
hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly
exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon
the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the
determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. The Legislative power is vested exclusively in
the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a
litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of
an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which
cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the
way to its eventual destruction.
Page 82 of 169
SECOND ISSUE:
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Currently, the court is called upon to decide whether the election
of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes
in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen upon nomination of the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate, and hence, is null and
void.
THIRD ISSUE:
The main question is whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and
lawful.
No, it is not valid in accordance with the intention and principle provided
by the constitution. The main argument in support of the mandatory
character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word “shall” in Sec.
11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution. The flaw in the position is that, while,
it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the
number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the
same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their
election. Respondents have not even tried to show why "shall" must be
deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral
Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure
for their selection.The intention behind the provision was to prevent the
abuse of the majority against the minority in Congress. The main
objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the
establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one
Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests
affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of
votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were
given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission
or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could
not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act
with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in
thesame body the same number of representatives as each one of said
political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and
endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. The most vital
feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the
parties. The spirit of the law prevails over its letter. Partisan
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the
majority party and either one (1) or two
(2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number
of votes in the House concerned.
The defenses of waiver and estoppel by respondents set up against
petitioner Tañada are unmeritorious. Although an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit, particularly those meant
for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending to
secure his personal liberty, the power to waive does not exist when
public policy or public morals are involved. In addition, the rule estoppel
is that whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. In the case at
bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that
Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties
specified in the Constitution and that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the
other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral
Tribunal. Neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be
nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative. Lastly, the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make
such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by
the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
Paras, dissenting:
Page 83 of 169
It is the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six
members from the National Assembly that shall be part of the Electoral
Commission.There is clearly no intention for the fluctuations in the total
membership of the Commission. The number of seats then in such
Commission must be fixed since the Constitution must have consistent
application.
As such, when there is a lack of a minority representation in the
Assembly to nominate three minority members, it follows that the only
part in the Assembly may nominate (the other members) to fulfil the
mandate of the Constitution.
LABRADOR, dissenting:
The petition violates Section 2, Article 6 of the Constitution on multiple
grounds. First, it does not fulfil the mandatory provision which fixes the
membership of the SET to nine (9) members. Second, it denies the
Senate the power granted to it by the Constitution of electing its
members to the Electoral Tribunal, specifically due to the refusal of the
minority member (Senator Tanada) to nominate. Third, the petition holds
superior a procedural provision over a substantive one, thus violating the
fixed membership of Electoral Tribunal. Fourth, the majority decision has
likewise inserted a provision that has no justification in law or in reason -
where the failure or refusal from the minority to nominate all three
members would result in the corresponding reduction of membership in
the tribunal.
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation
G.R. Nos. 203754-204418
16 June 2015
Velasco, J.
(Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, passed City Ordinance No.
LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the
City of Cebu". Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43,
Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of
theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the
City Treasurer of Cebu City.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall be
liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due
for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council. Almost
a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167, creating
the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing
the Film Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film
Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax
treatment of certain graded films as follows:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained an
“A” or “B” grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of
this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:
Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its
producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and
collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila
and other highly urbanized and independent component cities in the
Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at
the following rates:
For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film;
and
For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films.
The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue
to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant
to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the graded
film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty
(30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the Council which
shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the
graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the
present, all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as
Page 84 of 169
urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole exception of
Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
The proprietors and cinema operators, including private respondent
Colon Heritage Realty Corp. (Colon Heritage), operator of the Oriente
theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to pay the
aforestated amounts to FDCP. The demand, however, fell on deaf ears.
Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal
Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the status of its receivables for tax
rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate films along with those
which it co-produced with GMA films. This was followed by a letter from
Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate
remittance of its amusement tax rewards for its graded films for the
years 2004-2008.
Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to
remit the said amounts as FDCP demanded, on one hand, and Cebu City’s
assertion of a claim on the amounts in question, the city finally filed on May
18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-35529 (City of Cebu v. FDCP). In said petition, Cebu City sought the
declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC (Branches 5 and 14) gravely erred in declaring
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid for being unconstitutional. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
Local fiscal autonomy and the constitutionally-delegated power to
tax
The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of
sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of right, to every independent
government, and needs no express conferment by the people before it
can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated
to the executive and judicial branches of government without running
afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It, however, can be
delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the principle that
legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of
matters of local concern.19 The authority of provinces, cities, and
municipalities to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent that
such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by
statute. ch
RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress,
broad as they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of
the Constitution. 37 Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going
beyond the parameters wrought by the organic law. In the case at bar,
through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the
income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not
and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially,
despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly
overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative
of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local autonomy,
Grant of amusement tax reward incentive: not a tax exemption Both
the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are borne by the
proprietors, lessors, and operators, not by the producers of the graded
films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is actually a
monetary reward given to them for having produced a graded film, the
funding for which was taken by the national government from the coffers
of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an exemption from
payment of tax.
Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entire RA 9167 as
unconstitutional
It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case,43
which the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional.
This being the case, and in view of the elementary rule that every statute
is presumed valid,44 the declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entirety
of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is improper.
Amounts paid by Colon Heritage need not be returned
Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, the
RTC, Branch 5, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ordered the return of all
amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of
amusement tax.
Ocampo v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 225973
8 November 2016
Page 85 of 169
 (Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On 7 August 2016, National Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:
Subject: Interment of the late Former President
Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB
Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte
on July 11, 2016.
In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President
to implement his election campaign promise to have the
remains of the late former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
kindly undertake all the necessary planning and
preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and
security requirements. Coordinate closely with the
Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the
transport of the late former President’s remains from
Ilocos Norte to LNMB.
The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO
since the LNMB is under its supervision and
administration. PVAO shall designate the focal person
for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the
event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as
possible.
On 9 August 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued
directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General commanding it
to provide services, honors and other courtesies for the late Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
(1) Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. (No)
(2) Whether petitioners have locus standi. (No)
(3) Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. (Yes)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) Whether the National Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB. (No)
(2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws. (No)
(3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth
from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of
the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB. (No)
(4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of
the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines as to the conditions and procedure by which his
remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
For a question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act to be heard and decided by the Court, the following
requisites for judicial inquiry must be present:
a. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
b. person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance;
c. question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
d. issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
In this case, the absence of the first 2 requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last 2 superfluous.
Page 86 of 169
President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There
being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as
discussed below, President Duterte’s decision on that political question
is outside the ambit of judicial review.
SECOND ISSUE:
Locus Standi is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question which requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issue upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person has
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
an act complained of, such proper party has no standing. The
Petitioners have no legal standing to file such petitions because they
failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal
injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national
shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life.
THIRD ISSUE:
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. While
there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions. Petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. If petitioners would still be dismissed with
the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the
Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense.
Petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not
just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of
its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and
override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. At bar,
President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the
bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. None is
present in this case.
SECOND ISSUE:
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just
about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene
R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights law
cited by petitioners.
To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the “decent
and the brave” or “hero” would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remain
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
Page 87 of 169
The enforcement of the HRVV’s rights under RA 10368 will surely not
be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The assailed act
has no casual connection and legal relation to the law.
THIRD ISSUE:
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not.
They are governed by PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
AFP Regulations G 161-375: Who may be interred
1. Medal of Valor awardee
2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief of AFP
3. Secretary of National Defense
4. Chief of Staff of AFP
5. General or Flag Officers of AFP
6. Active and retired military personnel
7. Government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists and others
as long as approved by the C-i-C, Congress or Secretary of
National Defense
8. Widows of former presidents
Those who are not qualified:
1. Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
2. Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution nor its exercise be limited by
legislature. As the incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the
1992 Agreement between Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte. He is free to amend, revoke
or rescind political agreement entered into by his predecessors, and to
determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and
presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
J. Brion (Separate Concurring)
First, judicial review, even under our Court's expanded jurisdiction, does
not empower the Court to directly pass upon allegations involving
violations of statutes:
The Court's direct authority to exercise its expanded jurisdiction is limited
to the determination of the constitutionality of a governmental act. Grave
abuse of discretion arising from mere violations of statutes cannot, as a
rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction. The petitioner’s recourse in this situation lies with other
judicial remedies or proceedings, allowed under the Rules of Court that
may arrive in due course at the Court's portals for review
For these statutory violations, recourse may be made before the courts
through an appeal of the administrative body's ruling, or by filing for a
petition for declaratory relief before the lower court with jurisdiction over
the matter. Only when these lower courts have rendered their decisions
should these matters be elevated to this Court by appeal or certiorari;
even then, the issues the petitioners may present are limited to
questions of law, not to questions of fact.
Second, the Constitution's "faithful execution" clause cannot be made
the basis to question the Executive's manner of implementing our laws:
In the first place, it places the Court in the position to pass upon the
scope and parameters of the vague and not- easily determinable
"faithfulness" standard. Putting the Court in this position (especially
when considered with the Court's expanded jurisdiction) amounts to
placing it in a higher plane from where it can dictate how laws should be
implemented. In fact, it is hard to discern how the Court can apply a
standard for the faithful execution of the laws, without determining how
the law should be implemented in the first place.
Additionally, characterizing the failure to ensure faithful execution of the
laws as a constitutional violation can prove to be an unreasonably
restricting interpretation. It could possibly paralyze executive discretion,
and expose the Executive to constant lawsuits based on acts of grave
abuse of discretion he or she allegedly committed.
Third, the petitioners failed to specify any treaty obligation prohibiting
Marcos' burial at the LNMB;
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of The Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for instance, does not create
new international or domestic legal obligations
Page 88 of 169
Without any specific and legally binding prohibition limiting the
President's actions, no basis exists to nullify his order and to disregard
the presumption of regularity that exists in the performance of his duties.
While critical of the Marcos regime hardly amount to a prohibition barring
the interment of his remains in a resting place duly reserved by law for
soldiers; former President Marcos indisputably was a soldier during his
lifetime and was one long before the human rights violations attributed
to him took place. To deny him now, despite the law entitling him to a
LNMB resting place, may only lay the petitioners to the charge that they
are now doing to another what they have accused former President
Marcos of doing -denying another of the rule of law.
Fourth, the Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos regime,
should not be interpreted in a way that would prevent reconciliation and
the country's move towards national unity;
Finally, the necessity of Marcos' burial at the LNMB is a political
question that the President has decided, and is not without support from
the Filipino electorate.
Bersamin, J., separate concurring:
1. The interment of the remains of President Marcos in the LMNB is a
matter that exclusively pertains to the discretion of President Duterte
as the Chief Executive.
The character of the LMNB as the resting place for the war dead and
other military personnel under the care and control of the APP has
placed the LMNB under the control of the President. Plainly enough, the
President thereby exercised such control through the APP Chief of Staff
2. In the context of the LNMB being a military facility, the AFP has
issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 to prescribe guidelines that
enumerate the persons whose remains may be interred therein:
• The exercise by President Duterte of his discretion upon a
matter under his control like the interment of the remains of
President Marcos in the LNMB is beyond review by the Court.
He has not thereby transgressed any legal boundaries.
President Marcos -being a former President of the Philippines, a
Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former
Senator and Senate President, and a former Congressman -is
one of those whose remains are entitled to be interred in the
LNMB under the terms of AFP Regulations G 161-375.
• President Duterte was far from whimsical or arbitrary in his
exercise of discretion. I believe that interment of any remains in
the LNMB is a political question within the exclusive domain of
the Chief Executive
Carpio, J., dissenting:
1. Marcos is disqualified from being interred at the LNMB:
• AFPR G 161-375, which respondents rely on to justify the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, specifically provides that
"personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" are not
qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Marcos, who was forcibly
ousted from the Presidency by the sovereign act of the Filipino
people, falls under this disqualification.
• Marcos was focrcibly ousted from Presidency by the Filipino
People (People Power Revolution) which is the strongest form
of dishonorable discharge
• TAKE NOTE: Respondents argue that because Marcos was not
dishonorably discharged in accordance with the procedures and
guidelines prescribed in Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment (Circular 17, dated 2 October
1987, Series of 1987, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines),
Marcos was honorably separated from service. ( J. Carpio
disagree)
• Marcos was separated from service with finality, having been
forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986.
Circular 17, issued more than one year after such separation
from office, cannot be made to apply retroactively to Marcos.
• When Circular 17 was issued, Marcos had already been finally
discharged, terminated, and ousted -as President and
Commander-in-Chief -by the Filipino people. Circular 17
requires certain administrative procedures and guidelines in the
discharge of incumbent or serving military personnel. There is a
physical and legal impossibility to apply to Marcos Circular 17
since it was issued long after Marcos had been separated from
office.
Page 89 of 169
2. There is no substantial distinction between the military and civilian
personnel, for purposes of interment at the LNMB that would warrant
applying the disqualifications to military personnel and not to civilian
personnel.
• To submit to respondents' view that the disqualifications under
AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military personnel, and that the
President, even as Commander-in-Chief, is not a military
personnel subject to such disqualifications, 10 negates the
purpose for which the LNMB was originally established, which is
to honor Filipino soldiers who fought for freedom and democracy
for our country. Indeed, Marcos is
the very anti-thesis of freedom and democracy because he was
a dictator as declared by this Court.
• Applying only to military personnel the disqualifications will
unduly favor non-military personnel who will always be eligible,
regardless of crimes committed against the State or humanity, to
be interred at the LNMB as long as they are included in the list
of those qualified.
• Under the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are in like
circumstances and conditions must be treated alike both as to
the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case, as
those enumerated in the AFPR G 161-375 are all granted the
privilege of being interred at the LNMB, consequently, the
disqualifications must also be made applicable to all of them
1. Marcos is the "very antithesis of freedom and democracy because he
was a dictator as declared by the Supreme Court."
2. Burying Marcos at the national shrine is also contrary to public policy,
based on Republic Act 10368 or the Human Rights Victims
Reparations Act.
Leonen, J., dissenting:
Based on the Constitution, only the Filipino people "can determine a
President's place in history"
Marcos is not a hero or "an exemplary public officer" because of the
human rights atrocities committed under his regime
The orders to bury him at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violate Republic
Act 289, which created the National Pantheon. Section 1 of the law says
that only those "who have led lives worthy of emulation" can be buried at
the heroes' shrine.
Duterte's order to allow the burial contradicts his oath of office "because
they encourage impunity, which is the result of rewarding the person
who presided over human rights violations and who personally
participated in the plunder of public treasury."
The government failed to show factual basis to prove that Marcos' burial
would not violate RA 289 in relation to the findings of the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). The NHCP earlier
released a study disputing the claims that Marcos was a soldier and war
veteran.
Serreno, C.J., dissenting:
1. The court has the authority to resolve this controversy under the
expanded concept of judicial review in the 1987 Constitution.
• With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no
longer utilize the traditional political question doctrine to impede
the power of judicial review.
• In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has
decided issues that were traditionally considered political
questions.
• The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an
election renders the matter non-justiciable.
2. The president acted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of
his duty to faithfully execute the laws when he ordered the burial of
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
• Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy to condemn
the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively
prohibits the incumbent President from honoring him through a
burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
• The AFP does not have the power to determine which persons
are qualified for interment in the Libingan.
• The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the
President's residual powers; it is not unfettered, and such power
can only be exercised in conformity with the entire Constitution.
Page 90 of 169
3. To allow Marcos to be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani would
violate international human rights law ad an independent source of
state obligations, and would negate the remedies provided by
Republic Act 10368.
• Under international law, the Philippines is obligated to provide
effective remedies, including holistic reparations, to human
rights victims.
• The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to
provide reparations to victims of human rights violations during
the Marcos regime.
• The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to combat
impunity.
1. Public funds and property cannot be used for the burial as it serves
no legitimate public purpose.
• The burial would contravene the purpose of the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
• Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve the
avowed policy of national unity and healing.
• The burial would promote only the private interest of the Marcos
family
Caguioa, J., dissenting:
The burial of former President Marcos does not raise a political question
beyond the ambit of judicial review.
For the same reasons that the interment serves no legitimate public
purpose, no use of public property or public funds can be made to
support it.
The President may validly order the interment of former President
Marcos in the LNMB pursuant to his power of control and his duty to
faithfully execute laws, provided that no contravention of the
Constitution, laws, executive issuances, public policy, customs and
international obligations arises therefrom or is committed.
The Solicitor General failed to show any contingency for the valid
exercise of the President's residual powers, and likewise failed to
demonstrate sufficient factual basis to justify the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB.
The interment of former President Marcos constitutes a violation of the
physical, historical and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
and the Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 220598
19 July 2016
Bersamin, J.
(Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); PCSO Budgets and
Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriate; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors
Sergio O. Valencia; and Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, etc.
with plunder.
They were able to unlawfully acquire a total amount of
P365,997,915.00. They were able to amass this amount by:
▪ Diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of
PCSO to its Confidential/ Intelligence Fund
▪ Raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several
instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts.
▪ Taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influences to unjustly enrich
themselves.
Several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail.
On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of
Valenica, Morato, and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt is
not so strong against them. However, in the case of petitioners GMA
and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the resolution dated November
5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of
guilt against them was strong. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail, which is unresolved to
date.
Page 91 of 169
Funds were withdrawn by several members of the board from the CIF
and were approved by President GMA in several occasions each with
different amounts. GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero
and Villar separatelyled their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence
of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against
them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board
of Directors were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to
themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by conveying and
transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from
PCSO account. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of
GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence
showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the
Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of malversation against
Valencia, pertinently saying: Demurrer to evidence is an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges,
the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court then
ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. To be considered sufficient
therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and
(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused (Gutib v.
CA, 110 SCAD 743,312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
Hence, these consolidated petitions of certiorari brought to assail and
annul the resolutions April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015, whereby
the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to evidence, and
their motions for reconsideration, asserting such
denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Procedural Issue:
(1) Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail
the denial of the demurrers to evidence. (Yes)
Substantive Issues:
(1) Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
(2) Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of
the crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (No)
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to correct grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for
certiorari because the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The special civil action for
certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave
of court to le demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that
did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction
they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts
of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII. The exercise of this
power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or
for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court
has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
Page 92 of 169
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this
jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to
commit a crime. As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law
considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is
exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason),
Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or
insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the
Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it
is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the
conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and
competently shown. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture,
but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her
having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional
CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder
by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its
conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did
not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her
handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely
unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid
practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , the Court recognized two nuances of
appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel
conspiracy and the chain conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs
when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically
interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that
the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists
when there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of
Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any
design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate
and acquire ill -gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the
information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA's approval
of Uriarte's requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any
criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering
that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal. The
Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under
those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and
signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money
because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs.
Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
(2a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
the petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established
all the elements of plunder. After a review of the records, we find and
rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must
allege and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in
connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts:
Page 93 of 169
 a. through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
b. by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer;
c. by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
d. by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
e. by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
f. by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill- gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that
either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution
showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had
been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(2b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — . . .
xxx. xxx xxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury,
the key is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis,
by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be
made by considering the company of the words in which the word or
phrase is found or with which it is associated.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;"
and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common
thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used
the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the
company of the four other terms that require the use of the property
taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use
of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use
the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money
went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally bene
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ted from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate
act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
JUDGES
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 177721
3 July 2007
Azcuna, J.
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Gregory S. Ong was appointed as associate justice of the Supreme
Court by the Executive Secretary. However, Petitioner, contested this
appointment by saying that Ong is not a Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines that he is a Chinese citizen, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship, thus he is not qualified to be a
member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioners cited Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which provided that "No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
On the other hand, Respondent contended that Ong was appointed from
a list of candidates given by the JBC and that Respondent has referred
back to the JBC to determine the issue of Ong’s citizenship. They cited
SEC. 9 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, “The Members of the
Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation”.
Ong maintains that he is a natural born citizen, following a series of
changes of nationalities with respect to his ancestors which ended with
his mother being a Filipino citizen at birth and his father eventually
becoming naturalized along with him and his siblings. He also
maintained that the petitioners have no standing to file their claim.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the Petitioners have standing. (Yes)
(2) W/N Ong is a natural-born Filipino. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importance,
the qualification and the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court.
SECOND ISSUE:
Ong is only a naturalized Filipino citizen. The court took judicial notice of
Ong’s petition to take the Bar. In the petition he alleged that that he is
qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen,
and that he became a citizen because his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his
evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers
of his father. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the
submitted evidence that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a
lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
However, according to the case of Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, no
substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial change. Thus the factual assertions
detailing the events and changes of Ong’s ancestors would have to be
proven in a proper action, especially the fact that Respondent Ong’s
mother was a Filipino citizen contrary to what still appears in the records
of the court. Until this fact is proven, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
8 August 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.
(Role and Standards: Independence)
FACTS:
The case stemmed from four (4) articles that appeared in the “Business
Circuit” column of Amado Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of
general circulation. The articles contained statements and innuendos
Page 95 of 169
about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, which came out
in 4 issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007.
September 18, 2007 Article:
▪ Talked about a lady Justice (did not confirm whether from the SC or
the CA) who did not report for a day the week prior to the article.
▪ Stated that the Justice’s secretary received a gift-wrapped box the
size of two-dozen milk cans.
▪ As she thought the contents were perishable, the secretary opened
the box and indeed it was full of cash estimated at P10M.
▪ Said secretary informed the Justice. For doing so, the Justice fired
her.
▪ The writer criticized how the “bribe-giver” should have made sure
that the recipient was at least in the office or that he/she should
have delivered the cash instead to the recipient’s home.
▪ Also criticized how the justice system is dirty.
▪ The identity of the Justice was not disclosed to the writer of the
article.
September 19, 2007 Article:
• Revealed that the bribe money was given by a Fil-Chinese
businessman who has been criminally charged.
• That the said bribe-giver was acquitted as the lady Justice subject of
the previous article was the ponente of the case.
• That apparently, the secretary who was fired made five trips to the
guard house to pick up the boxes. The writer of the article now
corrected his previous statement that there was only 1 box.
• Dropped that the name of the justice’s secretary is Cecilia.
September 20, 2007 Article:
▪ Called for Cecilia to reveal the truth as to the bribery – “to save the
sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.”
September 21, 2007 Article:
▪ The writer now corrected his previous statement as to the time of
the occurrence of the event – The secretary was fired in March
2007, not the week prior to the first article.
▪ Also disclosed the identity of the Justice’s secretary – Cecilia
Munoz-Delis.
▪ The writer also declared that the whereabouts of the said secretary
is unknown and that the Supreme Court should investigate such
case.
Since the first article was published, the attention of Assistant Court
Administrator was already caught. As the information was still vague as
to which court was being referred to, he opted to just note the article.
Cecila Munoz-Delis apparently was part of the staff of Justice Ynares-
Santiago, but as Judicial Staff Officer, not Secretary, as respondent
Macasaet wrote.
An online article was likewise published in Newsbreak containing the
same allegations against Justice Ynares-Santiago. Justice Ynares-
Santiago requested the Chief Justice to have the articles included in the
agenda of the Court En Banc.
The Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution ordering Amado
Macasaet to explain why he should not be cited in Contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Macasaet’s explanations
were included in the case records and an Investigation Committee was
formed.
The Investigating Committee found that the articles were groundless and
were declared to be hearsay, and so concluded that there are sufficient
grounds to cite respondent Macasaet for indirect contempt as his articles
tend to indirectly impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. Respondent Macasaet poses that citing him in contempt for his
published articles would be tantamount to violating the right to freedom
of the press. Respondent Macasaet likewise claims that his right to due
process has been violated as no formal charge has been filed against
him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the articles writing and publishing by the respondent
are to be considered as valid exercise of the rights to freedom of
expression (which includes freedom of the press). (NO).
(2) Whether or not the failure to file a formal charge against respondent
as required by Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a violation
of his right to due process. (NO).
Page 96 of 169
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Macasaet’s diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the
administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting
respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate the avowal of the
highest Court of the land. Nowhere in his columns can there be found a
single word of respect for the Court on the integrity and honor of the
Court.
To allow respondent to use freedom of the press as an excuse to
damage the Court would be to make a mockery of such liberty. Without
bases for his publications (he admitted that the articles were products of
his conclusions), he has committed acts that degrade and impede the
orderly administration of justice.
SECOND ISSUE:
Under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated by the Court on its own volition. In the dissenting
opinion of Justice Carpio, he mentioned that the proceedings of the
Investigating Committee were fatally defective for patent denial of due
process because when the witnesses of the Committee testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the
witnesses, denying Macasaet of such right. This is not the case based
on 3 reasons:
o. First, that the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be
regular. The burden to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet.
o. Second, assuming that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine
his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due
process of law was violated.
▪ The right of the accused to cross-examine the witness
against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right
to meet “face-to-face,” can be waived if not asserted timely.
o. Third, the Court cannot invoke the right to cross-examine on behalf
of Macasaet. Otherwise, the Court would be acting as his counsel,
which is absurd.
Criticism at every level of Government is certainly welcome – as it is part
of the checks and balances in our republican system of government.
However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral
component of our republican institutions from discharging its
constitutionally-mandated duties.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
31 March 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(Role and Standards: Integrity)
FACTS:
In 1995, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation by the Supreme Court Clinic Services
(SC Clinic) revealed "evidence of ego disintegration" and "developing
psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports
concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background the Judicial Bar
Council (JBC) allowed him to get a second opinion from a private
practitioner. The second opinion appeared, hence, Atty. Floro’s
appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73,
Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
An audit was conducted on Judge Floro’s sala, which the audit team
reported the following to the OCA:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open
court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule
36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he
is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
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(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
up”;
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which
he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when
he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to perform the duties and functions of a
judge. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The court held that Judge Floro is unfit to perform the duties and
functions of a judge.
The court, however, would like to point out that among the 13 charges
against the respondent judge, the court has not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts of corruption. But nonetheless, the findings of
psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case
indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
For charge “a”: the court found him guilty of simple misconduct in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition.
For charge “b”: the court found nothing improper in having allowing
another person to rest in his chambers for short periods of time during
office hours.
For charges “c” and “g”: the court three fundamental errors in Judge
Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor
thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release.
Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on
recognizance was not reduced into writing.
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his
failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.
For charge “d”: the court found respondent guilty of unbecoming conduct
as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding
the public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to
apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be
impartial, independent and honest" as well.
For charges “h” and “j”: The court pointed out that it was well within the
discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling
and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we
find no basis for the charge of dishonesty under paragraph "j" of the
complaint.
Regarding the charge in “h” that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy
to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385- MN (for
frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case,
by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same
must likewise fail for lack of basis.
Page 98 of 169
For charge “i”: the court found that it was within the powers of Judge
Floro to order the assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial.
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an
accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is
within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by
reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until
his faculties are recovered.
For charges “e” and “f”: “private practice" is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer. In this case, the court found that Judge Floro did
not file other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in
connection with his personal cases, except for a “Motion for Entry of
Judgment”. Hence, Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of
judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute
private practice of law.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge
Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing
for leave of absence.
For charges “k” and “l”: the court stated that although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said,
nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as
well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his
way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of
Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.
For charge “m”: Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of
Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course
and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Circular No. 13 does not define or punish an offense. It is merely a
guideline to be followed in administering justice.
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118882
26 September 1996
Melo, J.
(Role and Standards: Impartiality)
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review with urgent
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
31733 in so far as it denied People’s prayer for the inhibition of Judge
Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, and enjoining
the judge from conducting further proceedings in such criminal cases,
before the Supreme Court.
On 3 April 1995, the Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and Roger
Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to comment
within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro S. Espina from taking further
action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until further orders from
the Court.
Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and Go failed to file their respective
comments within the reglementary period, nor within the second
deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that sanction relating
to delay in the submission of the comments may not amount to much,
and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-01-38
and 93-01 -39, the Court resolved to dispense with the latter's comments
and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to render the Judge to be partial
or bias in the present criminal case. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus,
every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. Due process is intended to insure confidence in the
judiciary by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
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waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. The Judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of
the established facts and the pertinent law. Herein, Judge Pedro Espina
cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by
the prosecution
and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action
92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the principal
accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's
decision in favor of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis
for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. It would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013
against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
23 September 2014
Villarama, J.
(Role and Standards: Propriety)
FACTS:
In the course of the investigations conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee with regard to the PDAF scams, certain names of
government officials where mentioned by “whistle-blowers” who were
former employees of Napoles. One of the officials mentioned was
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong, the respondent in this
case. The whistle blowers were Benhur Luy, a cousin of Napoles who
worked for her for several years, Marina Sula, an employee of Napoles,
and Aries Rufo, a reporter from Rappler. The SC ordered an
investigation to be conducted by Justice Sandoval Gutierrez regarding
the possible transgressions committed by Respondent.
It was found by the investigation that, two criminal cases were filed with
the Sandiganbayan in 20001 for Falsification of Public documents and
AntiGraft Law against officers of the military and civilian employees
including Napoles. These cases were referred to as Kevlar cases since
the subject matter were Kevlar helmets supposedly for the military
purchased from companies owned by Napoles. Napoles was acquitted
in the Kevlar cases since she was found by the court not one of the
dealers/suppliers in the transaction in question.
Benhur Testimony
During the investigation, Benhur Luy testified that Napoles mentioned to
him the Kevlar case and that she had a “connect” in the Sandiganbayan.
When asked who the connect was, Benhur said that it was Respondent.
He further testified that Napoles told him that she “fixed” the case
because of her connect in the Sandiganbayan. Probed further as to the
meaning of “fixed”, Benhur testified that PHP100 million pesos was listed
as an expense in the ledger of the company owned by Napoles and that
such were given to different people during the pendency of the case and
that she also gave money to respondent but the amount was not
mentioned to Benhur. Further, Benhur testified that respondent went to
the office of Napoles twice in Ortigas and gave a check to Napoles
amounting 25.5 million to be placed as a loan to the AFPSLAI and which
would receive a very high interest rate and that respondent received 11
checks in return each amounting to PHP 282K as advanced interest
earned from the loan of his money to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association (AFPSLAI) which
Napoles had a personal account paying 13% interest annually.
Sula Testimony
Sula, the long- time employee, corroborated the testimony of Benhur, by
stating that Napoles told her and other employees that she has a contact
with the Sandiganbayan which was Respondent and that they should not
be worried in case a suit was filed against Napoles regarding the PDAF
funds. She also testified that Napoles told them that Justice Ong will
help Napoles in the Kevlar case.
Rufo, the Rappler reporter, procured a picture showing Respondent
beside Napoles and Jinggoy Estrada and he testified that when he saw
the picture, he knew that Respondent was one of the members of the
division that handled the Kevlar case and that he knew that the Justice
should not be seen or be going to a party with Napoles who was a party
in a case under his Division.
Respondent in his defense denied all the imputations against him. He
asserted that he did not meet Napoles during the pendency of the
Page 100 of 169
Kevlar case, that the Kevlar case was denied based on the merits of the
case, and that the testimonies had no evident proof of what was
asserted. Respondent alleges that the picture was taken at the birthday
party of Jinggoy Estrada in 2012 and that Respondent and Napoles
talked about the Black Nazarene and that Napoles arranged for the
Black Nazarene robe to be put over respondent as he was suffering
from cancer. Then, the arrangement was indeed fulfilled and that he
thanked Napoles for such an opportunity and personally went to her
office twice to thank her.
The investigating Justice, Sandoval -Gutierrez found credence in the
testimonies of Benhur and Sala and that the picture showed
respondent’s disregard of the dictum of propriety essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
ISSUE/S:
WON respondent can be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and impropriety. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
The SC adopted the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice.
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the
Kevlar case
2. Respondent fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money form
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the Kevlar case
4. Respondent visited Napoles where he received 11 checks
amounting to PHP 282k each as advanced interest
5. Respondent attended Napoles’ parties and was photographed
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and
corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after
her acquittal in the said case. He is also charged for dishonesty for
failing to disclose with Chief Justice Serreno that he had actually visited
Napoles in her office as he denied having attended any social event
hosted by her.
In administrative proceedings like this one, the amount of evidence
needed is only of substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act or
bribery committed by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case. The testimonies establish that Napoles had been in contact
with Respondent during the pendency of the Kevlar case. Napoles
revealed to the witnesses that she has a contact with the
Sandiganbayan and that person will help her “fix” the case. The
revelation was further confirmed when she was acquitted in 2010 and
that Respondent was seen visiting her office in 2012. Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez rejected the claim of Respondent that he went twice to the
office of Napoles was merely to say thank you for the Black Nazarene
robe. Justice believed that the meeting was because of the financial
transaction between the two parties with regard to the money loaned to
the AFPSLAI. This financial transaction is supported by the testimony of
Benhur that 100M pesos were used to “fix” the Kevlar case.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on
two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4
(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on
June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Previous cases have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing
with persons who have pending cases before their court. It does not
mean that judges should live in retirement or seclusion, it but advised
that they be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that the relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.
Page 101 of 169
In the report of Justice Sandoval- Gutierrez the testimonies of the
witnesses were more plausible and believable and corroborate each
other compared to the denials and excuses of Respondent. It is a settled
rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given
great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. Thus the SC
concurred with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the
credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagreed with respondent's claim that
these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with
Napoles.
Respondent’s conduct of visiting the office and being in social events
with Napoles gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and undermined the
integrity of the courts of justice.
The SC also found that Respondent was guilty of dishonesty for not
being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint
was filed against him in violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
The SC found respondent guilty of a serious charge and adjudged him a
penalty of dismissal form service and forfeiture of all benefits.
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
23 April 2010
Per Curiam
(Role and Standards: Competence and Diligence)
Notes by Digest Author: This is a long case since it is composed of
numerous cases, all targeted at respondent judge Arcaya-Chua, and 1
case at her and her accomplice.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases stemmed from the administrative complaints
filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
Francisco P. Ocampo (Ocampo) charged respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the
law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo (Milan), filed a petition claiming the
sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P.
Ocampo (Francesca), and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima).
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge
issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their
daughters outside the country without the court's permission and
directing him to allow, Milan visitation rights over their daughters in their
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered
voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Ocampo then served interrogatories to
his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove
that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.
In an Order, respondent Judge denied the MTD. Ocampo questioned
the dismissal of his MTD since Milan never presented any evidence to
controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to
dismiss. Ocampo thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration (MR),
which was likewise denied by respondent Judge.
Respondent judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),
requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence (1211 West
Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City), to refrain from
committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an
unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor
daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to
their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication
and education.
Ocampo faulted the judge in issuing the TPO since the former’s period
to file an answer hasn’t expired yet. Moreover, he was directed to give
financial support to his wife and 2 daughters even if the wife herself
alleged that the kids were not his and without considering his financial
resources/capacity. Ocampo further stated that the judge, in issuing the
TPO, did not take into account the wife’s infidelity. Ocampo also stated
that the sheriff responsible for the TPO’s implementation, was
disrespectful and insensitive. It was
Page 102 of 169
a Maundy Thursday, when the sheriff arrived in Ocampo’s house, woke
everyone up while they slept and demanded that Ocampo pay the P50k
amount for support right then and there.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang/RCBC” Case
In this case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief
Justice in a Memorandum of the reports about the rampant selling of
TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua.
These reports were confirmed by judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-
Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled
Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody
case.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent judge issued a TPO,
granting among others the custody of the subject minor Rafi Pulliam
(Rafi), to therein petitioner Albert Chang Tan (Albert), and prohibiting
Stephanie Pulliam (Stephanie) to stay away from the home and office of
Chang Tan as well as from the school of Rafi. As per the sheriff’s return,
said TPO was not properly implemented insofar as Rafi’s custody was
concerned. This irked Albert which led to a heated argument between
him and the OIC of Branch 144. On the same day, respondent judge
issued an Order authorizing the sheriff to enter the premises where Rafi
may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to Albert.
According to the OCA, although it was not shown that respondent judge
received money from Albert in exchange for TPO’s issuance, the facts
clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing said TPO. The OCA also
stated that this was not the only case where the judge displayed unusual
interest. The judge also displayed the same unusual interest in another
case, RCBC v. Moreno, where she ordered a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of RCBC. According the OCA, what was highly
suspicious was the judge’s actuation where there was no real urgency in
the application of said writ.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141: The “Judicial Audit” Case
A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC Makati
Branch 144, which is the sala of respondent judge, following reports of
alleged irregularities committed by her. In a memorandum by the OCA to
CJ Reynato Puno, the Court Administrator Christopher Lock submitted
the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an
incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in respondent judge’s sala.
This initial report stated that as early as May 12, 2007 (Saturday), the
Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards
thereat on a 24 -hour basis. The members of the audit team made it
clear to OIC Victoria Jamora and court personnel that actions on the
records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no
records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
On May 17, guards Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap noticed
Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic
bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a
trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was
surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain copies of
marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua
numbering to hundreds.
When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents
upon respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could
not offer any explanation why he chose to dispose of the documents that
morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that there
were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where the
stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office. The
other bags when retrieved, contained more copies of marriage
certificates.
In this case, respondent judge was charged in connection with the 1,975
copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized from
January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly
ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., to dispose of the said copies of marriage
certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of 1,809
marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office
of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City,
thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of
P542,700.00 at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos P300.00 per marriage;
and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of
Cases.
A.M. No, RTJ-07-2093
Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge
Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty.
Page 103 of 169

Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband, alleged that in the
first week of September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding
the cases of her friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme
Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of
Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme
Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some
Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would
give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the said
cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent
P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s chamber. When complainant
followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there
was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the
Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00;
however, respondent could no longer be contacted.
The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to
Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007,
complainant manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her
complaint against respondent. In a Verified Manifestation, complainant
stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a
long and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between
them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant
that her accusation against respondent was brought about by
misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning
the incident subject of the present administrative case; that for the sake
of unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and
respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations with each
other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer
interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of the charges against
her.
HELD/RATIO:
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
The investigating Justice in this case was Justice Salazar-Fernando
(JSF, for brevity). Regarding the denial of the MTD, JSF believed that
respondent judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion
vested upon her as a judge. Assuming the same was erroneous, no
administrative liability could attach to the judge in the absence of
sufficient evidence that she ruled in a corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent or
malicious manner.
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, JSF
found respondent judge’s explanation acceptable. The order setting the
case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8,
2006, and there was an interim of at least five days from the issuance of
the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that
respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to
the complainant. JSF held that respondent judge could not be
faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a
prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that
respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness
can be attributed to respondent Judge. The actions of respondent judge
is in accord with Sec. 15 of RA 9262: “ x x x The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents for the service. x x x x”. Hence, the issuance of said TPO was
neither irregular nor improper.
As to the complaint by Ocampo on the insensitive implementation of the
TPO on a Maundy Thursday, JSF found nothing improper or wayward in
the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case. There was no
evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the
TPO during Holy Week, as it was Ocampo's counsel himself who,
wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the urgency
and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent
Judge caused its immediate implementation. JSF also believed that
respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in
which the TPO was served by the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco,
who was administratively charged by Ocampo for the allegedly offensive
manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge,
such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco only.
Lastly, JSF found that campo's allegation of bribery against respondent
Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by JSF on October
Page 104 of 169
24, 2007, Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the
alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
JSF recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07- 2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case) should be dismissed. JSF stated that in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang Tan/RCBC” Case JSF
stated that the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by
respondent Judge could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262,
because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A.
No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and their
children," not to men. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued
in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be
absurd. Hence, JSF found respondent Judge’s error in this regard to be
gross ignorance of the law.
With respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
respondent Judge’s reasons for granting custody over Rafi to Albert
Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the
evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor
of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie
determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and would
serve her paramount interest. JSF found nothing improper in respondent
Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia
Rodriguez and the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject
minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie has not
been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the latter's
paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person
to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent
Judge’s award of temporary custody to the father could be justified.
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent
Judge allegedly displayed in the said case, JSF found no substantial
evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself
admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received money
from Albert. Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed
having personally witnessed the alleged heated argument between
Albert Chang Tan and the OIC of respondent judge’s sala except only
for secondhand accounts that they heard that such incident actually
transpired. JSF stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no
personal or actual participation in that incident, because the "heated
argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria
Jamora.
As regards respondent Judge’s issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in the RCBC Case, JSF found no evidence against
respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent
convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which she
studied and evaluated the application for the writ.
JSF was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed
speedily issued, the ex parte hearing on the application having been
held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the
succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible
or irregular in such feat. Per respondent’s account, she had been
unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did
not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling
on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering respondent's
habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court, JSF
found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance to the speedy
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. JSF also found
respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment to be apt.
JSF found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in
respondent Judge’s solemnization of marriages in her court and failure
to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports. JSF
stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage
certificates, which were said to have been contained in four
(4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time
the judicial audit was being conducted.
Respondent Judge admitted the fact that she ordered Indicio, her utility
worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags.
However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she
ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of May,
days before the judicial audit.
Page 105 of 169
JSF stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose
of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why
such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic
bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could
tarry for several days. The logical implication is that the order to dispose
could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when
the judicial audit was already being conducted.
JSF also did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why
the plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the
stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which
she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge theorized
that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who
harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow
money from her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic
bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers to the
stenographer's room before her courtroom was padlocked. According to
her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative
investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she
had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s
machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig
could have taken out the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the
small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's
room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can
along the corridor, the documents would be discovered by the audit
team.
JSF did not believe the reasons of respondent judge. According to JSF,
it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to
Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts being
attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of
weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the
difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to
do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do,
per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.
As regards to the non-payment marriage solemnization fees and the
certifications issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of
Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge, only 166 marriages were paid the
corresponding solemnization fees. JSF was convinced and found no
reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of said certifications, the
contents of which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila
Ticman, the same persons who personally verified from their records
whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge were paid.
JSF disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge that the anomaly
attributed to her was the work of Umipig. JSF found it incredible that
since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three
years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme.
In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, JSF
found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her
JSF held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by any
dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge is
entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties.
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case Re: Marriage Certificates and
Monthly Reports signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign
ignorance as to the correct number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge. Jamoras’ justification that “she could not have
questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua” even if there were
erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself pregnant with
admission that something anomalous could have indeed been
taking place.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Justice Buzon, the investigating justice in this case, recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon
which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by
Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the
allegations in her Complaint.
The Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed
the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in the
same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded verified
Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent. The Court then
Page 106 of 169
resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more
severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of
the same offense.
FINALLY, the Supreme Court’s Ruling:
The SC agrees with the findings of JSF, the investigating justice.
Settled is that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt,
but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the solemnization of Marriage case), there is
substantial evidence that respondent Judge did not report in her
Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she solemnized during
her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did
not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by
her. The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-
Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her
compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office.
Various court personnel testified that there were indeed numerous
marriages solemnized by respondent judge, but only few had their
payments/fees properly remitted to the court. In the light of the
substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel
Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the
Monthly Reports.
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch
144 from July 2005 to April 2007. It is incredible that Victoria Jamora,
as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068
marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in
the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever
solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice JSF, correctly stated that
she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect,
but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if
she was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of JSF in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that
respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of
gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court
upholds the finding of JSF that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner
Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be
issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court
sustains the recommendation of JSF that the case be dismissed in the
absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
is liable for the charge of harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita
Muoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during the
proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims against
her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present
case. The Court is not persuaded.
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and
her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the
administrative liability of respondent.
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the
findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be
based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, while
disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on
Page 107 of 169
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
appointment to any public office, including government-owned
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
o. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or; A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal
for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
(The Judicial Audit Case).
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Chang/RCBC case)
and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judges motion for
reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
To Conclude the Supreme Court’s Rulings:
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S.
Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is
DISMISSED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six
(6) months without salary and other benefits.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge
Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of
SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without
salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
as prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or
or instrumentality.
or
of In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of
grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Civil
Liability)
Article 27
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant
or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action
that may be taken.
Article 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) Right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Page 108 of 169
 (7) Right to just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) Right to equal protection of the laws;
(9) Right to be secure in one’s, person, house, paper and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) Liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) Privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) Right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) Right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances;
(14) Right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) Right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) Right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witness face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution, and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code (Liabilities of a
Judge: Criminal Liability)
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence.
Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to
him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary
special disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutor order.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be
manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
Santiago III v. Enriquez
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J
13 February 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability)
FACTS:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title
No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas
Fajardo.
Quezon City RTC granted the petition. The Republic of the to the Court
of Appeals and was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison.
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report
however the respondent expressed his dissent to the Report
Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested
Justice Gonzales-Sison to take a second look at respondents
Dissenting Opinion, as the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are
strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality.
Page 109 of 169

Respondent requested the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals to
designate two associate justices to complete the composition of a
Special Division of five. The Raffle Committee designated Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Lucas P. Bersaminas additional members of the
Special Division.
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondents
Dissenting Opinion. Justice Bersamin expressed his concurrence with
the Report of Justice Gonzales-Sison, while Justice Cruz expressed his
concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of
the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison
with which Justice Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed the decision of the
Quezon City RTC.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges that Associate Justice
Enriquez deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to grant
the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant. For this reason, this
administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS
INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against respondent.
Respondent contends that the administrative complaint was filed
prematurely considering that complainants motion for reconsideration of
the Decision was pending.
Respondent also contends that the administrative complaint is not the
proper forum for the determination of whether the Decision is erroneous
or contrary to law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Associate Justice Enriquez is Guilty of ignorance of
the law or gross incompetence. (NO)
(2) Whether or not Filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is appropriate. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices of
superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.To hold
otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
could be infallible in his judgment.
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in support of the
Decision, since there is no showing that the Decision is tainted with
fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order
to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative complaint
is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud,
malice, or dishonesty.
In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, it is a general principle of
the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal
application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from the highest
judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
SECOND ISSUE:
According to Bautista v. Abdulwahid:
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was
not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The
Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is unjust cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of
charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is
inappropriate.
Page 110 of 169

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
22 November 2016
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Discipline of Members of the
Bench)
FACTS:
1st complaint:
CJ Corono issued A.O. No. 19-2011 assigning night courts in the city of
Pasay and Manila. Judge Yu was assigned to be the judge every Friday
to which she opposed and sent multiple letters demanding the
establishment of night courts be abolished for lack of research,
compensation, security, and its alleged illegality due to the violation of
the Rules on Summary Procedure.
OCA submitted a memorandum recommending the Judge Yu’s
insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct be docketed as an administrative complaint against
her.
Judge Yu argued that there was no insubordination because she was
merely expressing her opinion to the matter and that she has a
constitutional right to freedom of speech.
2nd complaint:
Lopez’ appointment
Judge Yu requested for the position of Clerk of Court III in her sala to be
filled. There were three applicants, Serrano, Lopez, and Bernardo.
Judge Yu wanted Bernardo to be her clerk but the Selection and
Promotion board assigned Lopez to be the clerk. Judge Yu still
requested for Bernardo to be temporarily assigned and she claims that
Lopez is not qualified because Lopez does not have the needed
indorsement from the court where she will be assigned.
Still, Lopez was eventually appointed Clerk of Court III. Because of this,
Judge Yu filed her formal protest to the Supreme Court, but the court
dismissed the case.
Lagman’s appointment
Judge Yu filed a complaint against Lagman, the legal researcher of
MTC-Pasay branch 47, for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of
judicial functions and dishonesty.
Lagman requested to be transferred to another court pending the
hearing of her case. Later on, Lagman was appointed as the Clerk III of
RTC-Pasay branch 108.
Lagman’s appointment was assailed by Judge Yu claiming that it was a
“fast appointment”, hence, Judge Yu threatened to file formal charges
against the members of the OCA-SPBLC.
The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing Judge Yu’s conduct.
The court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she should
not be disciplined for her actions.
Judge Yu claims that she was merely expressing herself and that her
letters are privileged communication and could not be used against her,
pursuant to her constitutional right against self-incrimination.
3rd complaint:
4 MeTC judges and 70 MeTC personnel filed 2 affidavit- complaints
accusing Judge Yu with: (1) gross insubordination; (2) refusal to perform
official duty; (3) gross ignorance of the law or procedure; (4) serious and
grave misconduct constituting violations of Canon 3, Rules 3.0 and 3.08
of the Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to Canon 6 of The New Code
of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary; Sections 1 and 2, Canon
2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and Sections 1 and 2, Canon 4
of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (5) violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars; (6) violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (7) violation of the Lawyer's Oath and her
oath of office as judge; (8) oppressive conduct; and (9) violation of
Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code
1) The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of
Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of
the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances, and
her manner of disposing cases.
2) Judge Yu issued a show cause order against the judges and
personnel, requiring them to explain why they should not be cited in
contempt for using court documents as attachments in their
complaint.
Page 111 of 169
4th complaint:
Judge Emily San Gaspar filed a complaint against Judge Yu for sending
her lewd messaged on facebook and her yahoo account. In their
correspondence, Judge Yu kept on referring to a MEAL STUB and that it
entailed to a “69” meal. A few months later, Judge Yu discovered that
the meal stub message she received from Judge Emily was just a
facebook scam. Judge Yu then apologized and requested that her
emails and messages be deleted. Judge Emily then deactivated her
account, to which Judge Yu was relieved. When Judge Emily reactivated
her account, Judge Yu was alarmed by her reactivation and kept
messaging Judge Emily about her previous emails. Judge Emily finally
filed the complaint when she discovered that Judge Yu created a fake
facebook account of Judge Emily and when Judge Yu messaged Judge
Emily’s bestfriend.
The OCA recommended for the court to find Judge Yu guilty of GUILTY
of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
REFUSAL TO PERFORM OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, GROSS
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
OPPRESSION, and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, and be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any Public office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The OCA agreed with the recommendation and findings of Justice
Abdulwahid to consider Judge Yu's actuations towards Judge San
Gaspar- Gito as conduct unbecoming of a judge, but clarified that Judge
Yu's use of the official letterhead of her court in summoning the brother
of Judge San Gaspar-Gito to a conference demonstrated her abuse of
power, and constituted a violation of Section 8, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her.
Non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
The court ruled that Judge Yu resisted the implementation of A.O. No.
19-2011 because of her unresolved protest against the issuance. Her
unresolved protest was not a sufficient justification for her to resist the
implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011. She was quite aware that A.O. No.
19-2011 was issued pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers to the Court the power of administrative
supervision over all courts, and was for that reason an issuance to be
immediately implemented and unquestioningly obeyed by the affected
Judges.
According to Himalin v. Balderian, the refusal of a Judge to comply with
any resolution or directive of the Court constituted insubordination and
gross misconduct, viz.:
A judge who deliberately and continuously failed and refused to comply
with a resolution of this Court was held guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination, the Supreme Court being the agency exclusively vested
by our Constitution with administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. The Court can hardly discharge such
constitutional mandate of overseeing judges and court personnel and
taking proper administrative sanction against them if the judge or
personnel concerned does not even recognize its administrative
authority.
Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnels The
court ruled that Judge Yu’s opposition was unwarranted.
First, the Selection and Promotion Board explained to Judge Yu the
selection process that had resulted in the appointment of Ms. Lopez.
She could not impose her recommendee on the SPB which was legally
mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the
applicants based on performance, eligibility,
education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials.
Also, Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just
as unwarranted.
Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, a pending administrative complaint shall not
disqualify an employee from promotion.
Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court
personnel
Page 112 of 169
The court said that respondent Judge Yu acted as if she was the
investigating authority instead of being the respondent. She took undue
advantage of her position as a judge and used the judicial process for
her own benefit. Such action clearly depicts an abusive character which
has no place in the judiciary.
By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for
contempt of court, Judge Yu wielded a power that she did not hold.
Hence, she was guilty of gross misconduct.
Sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer Judge Yu denied sending the messages to Judge San
Gaspar -Gito, and countered that it was the latter who first sent the
"meal stub" message. She maintained that the messages were
confidential and inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Judge Yu's reliance on the exclusionary rule fails.
The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents of the
Govemment, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined
under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution refers to the prohibition
against the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers
to go on fishing expeditions.
Moreover, the barrage of messages, most of which were sent within the
same day, makes us believe that they had all come from Judge Yu.
Although she insisted that Judge San Gaspar-Gito had sent the "meal
stub," Judge Yu did not offer any plausible explanation on the other
messages containing sexual innuendos.
The court ruled that Judge Yu is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer for sending inappropriate messages with sexual
undertones to a fellow female Judge, and for using the official letterhead
of her judicial office in summoning a lawyer to a conference.
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17
8 February 2011
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
FACTS:
Members of the Malaya Lolas Organization sought reconsideration of
the decision of the Court that dismissed the charges of plagiarism,
twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano
Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote in Vinuya v.
Romulo (GR 162230, April 28, 2010).
To be precise, Justice Del Castillo was charged of copying without
acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent , Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark
Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005)
Petitioners claimed that the Court has, by its decision, legalized or
approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.” The presentation of another person’s ideas
as one’s own must be deliberate or premeditated – a taking with ill
intent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by the
Supreme Court. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
While the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the
writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare
decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
procedures, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength
Page 113 of 169
of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the
precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
In contrast to academic or scholarly writing, decisions of courts are not
written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of work or
art. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted, but that they are fair and correct in the context of the
particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is
the object of every decision of a court of law.
Joyce C. George observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
• A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words, or
phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a
legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without
giving attribution. Judges are free to use whatever sources they
deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear
of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to
decide cases for two reasons: (1) The judge is not writing a
literary work and, (2) The purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to
a claim of legal plagiarism.
Although Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors
materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision
for the Court in the Vinuya case, the evidence, as found by the Court’s
Ethics Committee, showed that the attribution to these authors appeared
in the beginning drafts of the decision.
Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-
employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she
was cleaning up the final draft.
The passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed
on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo,
but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
Carpio, dissenting:
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to decide in an administrative
case whether a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in
office as this power belongs exclusively to Congress.
Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all impeachable
officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. In writing judicial
decisions, a judge must comply with the Law on Copyright, as the judge
has no power to exempt himself from the mandatory requirements of the
law.
Sereno, dissenting:
Judges need not strain themselves to meet inapplicable standards of
research and attribution of sources in their judicial opinions, not seek to
achieve the scholarly rigidity or thoroughness observed in academic
work. They need to answer to only two standards - diligence and
honesty.
On the use of the excerpt from Joyce C. George’s Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook quoted in the majority Resolution: In no wise does
George imply that the judicial function confers upon judges the implicit
right to use the writing of others without attribution. Neither does George
conflate the possible lack of sanctions for plagiarism with the issue of
whether a determination of judicial plagiarism can be made. Rather,
George is careful to make the distinction between the issue of whether
judicial plagiarism was committed and the issue of whether a sanction
can be imposed for an act of judicial plagiarism. In George’s
terminology, the latter issue may also be framed as a question of
whether judicial plagiarism is “subject to a claim of legal (that is,
sanctionable) plagiarism”, and it has no bearing whatsoever on the
former issue.
Carpio Morales, separate dissenting:
Justice Carpio Morales joins Justice Carpio’s thesis in his Dissenting
Opinion on the commission of plagiarism or violation of intellectual
property rights in the Vinuya decision, as well as with his other thesis
that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide an administrative case where
a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in office, with
qualification.
The Court may wield its administrative power against its incumbent
members on grounds other than culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust, and provided the offense or misbehavior does not carry with
it a penalty, the service of which would amount to removal from office
either on a permanent or temporary basis such as suspension.
Page 114 of 169
 Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
30 June 2008
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and beratingǁ him during
a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al.
where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen
asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane answered that he
came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him:
―Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me
because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are
created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created
equal in His form and substance.
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person,
seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon
evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were unwarranted and
inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during
the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations
which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of
the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to
discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the
counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being
―assaulted,ǁ he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain
why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds,
however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal
discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of
boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct
themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.
LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
3 September 1991
Paras, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be
a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural- born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Page 115 of 169
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,
a lawyer -negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and
the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic
B.M. No. 553
17 June 1993
Regalado, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
The petitioner complained the 2 advertisements made by the Legal
Clinic. The respondent entity is staffed purely by paralegals.
One advertisement shows P 560 for a valid marriage and info on
Divorce, Absence, Annulment and VISA.
The other advertisement shows Guam Divorce, an Attorney in Guam, is
giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic.
Services include info on Guam divorce, annulment, immigration problem,
VISA extension and among others.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the services advertised by the respondent
constitutes practice of law. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the services advertised can properly be subject of
the advertisement. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. In our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. The canon of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct.
There are two exceptions of advertising or solicitation. One is the
publication or reputable law list and the second is the ordinary
professional card.
In Re: Cunanan
18 March 1954
Diokno, J.
(Admission to the Practice of Law)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
Page 116 of 169
FACTS:
The case is related to the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
To pass the Bar, a candidate must obtain a general average of 75% in
all subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject.
Due to varying degrees of difficulties of the exams, the court adjusted
the passing average per year, with 74% being the passing average
needed in 1949.
In 1950-53, the passing average needed was 75%. Bar candidates who
failed sought the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which will reduce the
passing grade needed to 70%, to be effective since 1946. Senate Bill
No. 12 was eventually vetoed by the President. Nevertheless, Senate
Bill No. 371, which embodied substantially the provisions of Senate Bill
No. 12, passed into law due to the President’s inaction and became
Republic Act No. 972 (RA 972).
RA 972 adjusted the passing rate as follows:
• 1946-51: 70%
• 1952: 71%
• 1953: 72%
• 1954: 73%
• 1955: 74%
Several postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking RA 972, some of them claiming that they suffered from
“insufficiency of reading materials” and of “inadequacy of preparation.”
(Note: The years affected is right after World War 2)
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
RA 972 is unconstitutional.
The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates
who had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
reflected by the results of their exams.
• Public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult.
• Insufficiency of legal reading materials is exaggerated, citing
mimeographed copies of Supreme Court decisions, continuous
publication of the Official Gazette, unrestricted entry of imported
books and magazines since 1945, law books being printed
locally during the affected time period,
and a new set of Philippine Reports that started publication on
1946.
The law has no precedent in its favor.
• Similar laws in other countries have been immediately
declared without force or effect by the judiciary.
The case of Cooper cited is inapplicable.
• The law of New York does not require a candidate who failed
the exams to be admitted to the bar.
• The law of New York does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
• Constitution of New York at that time and of the Philippines are
different regarding matters of admission to the practice of law.
Admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers, as
well as their supervision, are judicial functions and responsibilities.
• The function requires (1) previously established rules, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles, in
effect making it a judicial function of the highest degree.
US Cases:
• Admission to practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the court.
The disputed law is not a legislation, it is a judgment revoking those
promulgated by the Supreme Court during the affected time period.
Only this court may revoke such judgment, not the legislative nor
executive department.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of judicial functions, as in the case of the law in question.
Page 117 of 169

The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the Supreme Court
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law, it
continues to reside solely in the Supreme Court.
The law in question has also been found to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
If there is no motive given of the nature indicated for the classification,
then it is fatally defective. The law is not curative, its purpose being to
attempt to amend and correct the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(1) They are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact,
or Congress has exceeded its powers.
(2) They create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles.
(3) Their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles.
The contested law suffers from the above stated fatal defects.
Part of the law referring to exams from 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 are
unconstitutional.
Part of the law referring to subsequent examinations after its approval,
from 1953 to 1955 is valid.
Labrador, J., concurring and dissenting:
Right to admit members to the Bar is exclusive privilege of the Supreme
Court.
Power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its
exercise.
Rules on the holding of exams, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power, but the
power to determine has or has not made the required grade is judicial.
Votes to declare the whole law as unconstitutional for not being
embraced within the rule making power of Congress, for being an undue
interference with the power of the Supreme Court to admit members
thereof, and for discriminating against those who failed in the time
periods not embraced by the law.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:
Under Art. VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, the Congress has the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court concerning the admission of attorneys to the practice of
law.
Sebastian v. Calis
A.C. No. 5118
9 September 1999
Per Curiam
(Nature of the Lawyer’s Oath)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sebastian alleged that sometime in November 1992, she was
referred to the respondent who promised to process all the necessary
documents for Sebastian's trip to the USA for a fee of 150k Php. A
partial payment was done on December 1, 1992 in the amount of 20k
Php which was given to the wife of Calis, Ester, for which a receipt was
issued.
On June 20, 1994, too expedite the processing of her travel documents
complainant issued Planters Development Check No 12026524 in the
amount of 65k Php in favor of Calis who issued a receipt. However it
turns out that the documents that Calis planned to give Sebastian were
spurious. The complainant demanded the return of her money, however
she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about
for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with
promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Complainant was given a passport and visa issued in the name of
Lizette R. Ferrer. Upon arrival at the Singaporean International Airport
though, she was apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for
carrying spurious travel documents: Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her
predicament. Complainant was deported back to the Philippines where
respondent fetcher her from the airport. The respondent took
Page 118 of 169
Sebastian's documents with a promise that he will secure new
documents for her. Complainant opted not to pursue with her travel and
demanded for the return of her money in the amount of 150k Php.
Partial refunds were given by Attorney Calis but in the end the petitioner
found out that respondent had transferred to an unknown residence in
order to evade responsibility.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Calis is guilty of committing gross misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the
complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents: that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would
happen: that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to
refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness, and candor.
This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and
keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires the he
should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in
his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.
Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant
when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondents
acts illegal, they are detestable from a moral point of view. His utter lack
of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the
administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We
must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior .He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to
be heard.
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply
with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued
by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct.
Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from
the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable
conduct toward complainant.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma
A.C. No. 2474
15 September 2004
Per Curiam
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Eduard Cojuanco, Jr (complainant) was a client for Angara Concepcion
Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and Atty. Leo J. Palma
(respondent) was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
Atty. Palma developed a close relationship with the complainant’s
family. Travelling and dining with them abroad. He frequented their
house and even tutored complainant’s 22 year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuanco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, Atty Palma would marry Lisa in hongkong.
Respondent would only inform the family the following day adding that
everything was legal.
Complainant came to know that respondent represent himself as a
bachelor to the Hong Kong authorities and that respondent was married
to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
Page 119 of 169
The complaint filed a petition for the declarion of nullity of the marriage
with the CFI. CFI declared the marriage void ab initio. Complainant
would subsequently file a case for disbarment.
The CFI decision was set aside and remanded to the CFI and has not
reached an outcome at this point.
Respondent motions to dismiss the disbarment proceeding to lack of
cause of action. He likewise would argue a suspension of the
proceeding since the final outcome of the Civil case has not reached a
final outcome posing a prejudicial question.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the respondent’s actions constitute grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the pending decision in the Civil Case concerning the
validity of the marriage poses a prejudicial question. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
There is no distinction as to whether a transgression is committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, even the private life of a lawyer may reflect upon his good name
and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry.
Complainant admits that respondent is a good lawyer, however,
professional competency does not make a lawyer a worthy member of
the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.
Undoubtedly, his actions constitute grossly immoral conduct under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He contracted a
marriage while his marriage with Elizabeth was still valid. He made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His actions in contracting the second marriage are contrary
to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Immorality as defined by the court is that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
Respondent’s action is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
He used his complainants trust in him to initiate a relationship with Lisa.
Instead of his legal affairs, he would court Lisa behind his back. He even
used complainant’s resources to get a plane ticket.
He justifies the marriage since he really loves Lisa. This shows a
distorted mind with disregard to the sanctity of marriage. How could he
observe mutual respect and fidelity when he was still married to
Elizabeth.
SECOND ISSUE
The judgement of annulment of marriage has no bearing on the instant
disbarment proceeding. In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis
for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The result of the
case would not affect current proceedings as long as there is a clear
preponderance of evidence.
Castaneda v. Ago
G.R. No. L-28546
30 July 1975
Castro, J.
(The Lawyer and Society)
FACTS:
In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a
replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Ago failed to redeem,
and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes
Yu Ago, as his co -plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale.
Page 120 of 169

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new
ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of
May 26, 1966.
The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court of
Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court.
The Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8,
1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals
where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson
filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process
to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted
by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and
prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment,
to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly
resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). The Court condemn the
attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of
a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.
In Re: Edillon
A.M. No. 1928
03 August 1978
Castro, C.J.
(The Lawyer and the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
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not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not compelling him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the court may compel him to pay the corresponding
dues to be a member of the IBP. (YES)
(3) Whether or not enforcement of the penalty provisions amounts to a
deprivation of his right to property. (NO)
(4) Whether or not the court has the power/ jurisdiction to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate.
• Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.
• Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.
• Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion
is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
SECOND ISSUE:
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
THIRD ISSUE:
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
•
(1) But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
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and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained
of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Atty. Edillion is hereby disbarred.
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
8 March 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
(The Lawyer and the Courts)
FACTS:
The Ponencia of Justice Mariano Del Castillo in the case of Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated April 28, 2010. On May 31,
2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al filed a motion for reconsideration on
the said decision raising two issues:
(1)Jurisprudence and the Constitution reject the Court’s decision that the
executive’s foreign policy are unlimited, and
(2) that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of citizens.
Thereafter, Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, counsel for Vinuya, et al.
filed a supplemental MR alleging that the decision on the said case
plagiarised 3 sources namely:
(3) an article by Evan Criddle and Even Fox-Decent entitled “A
fiduciary theory of jus cogens,”
(4) a book by Christian Tam entitled “Enforcing erga omnes
obligations in international law,” and
(5) an article by Mark Ellis entitled “Breaking the silence: on rape as
an international crime.”
On August 9 2010, Atty. Marivic Leonen and 36 other lawyers, all
members of the UP College of Law, published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism relative to the Court’s decision in the Vinuya, et
al. v. Exec. Sec case. Essentially, they call for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo in the face of the allegations of plagiarism in his work.
The Court then directed Atty. Leonen and the 36 other lawyers to show
cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violating Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression. (NO)
2. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors. (NO)
3. Whether or not the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain
why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar under the
Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the CPR. (YES
and NO)
4. Whether or not the separate compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a member
of the bar under canon 10, rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03. (NO)
5. Whether or not respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, whether
respondents are entitled to require the production or presentation of
evidence bearing on the plagiarism issues in the Vinuya case and
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo and to have access to
the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Misconception that the Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as
a "legitimate public issue.”
It was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" when it was
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"[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely
to determine the truth of such allegations." The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement
that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive.
SECOND ISSUE
There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary
action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing
proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar
may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom
of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with
greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
THIRD ISSUE:
Only the Compliance of Professor Lynch, as a visiting professor, and
Professor Vasquez, for his candor and honesty and conceding to the
wisdom of the Court were satisfactory.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court said that they were surprised that someone like Dean Leonen,
with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual
honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated
as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal
communication of an intent to sign.
The Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in
judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
as required under Canon 10.
FIFTH ISSUE
Disciplinary proceedings are neither criminal nor civil but administrative,
and the essence of administrative due process is only the right to be
heard, not a full trial.
The Court said that it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. As
respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do
not require a trial type hearing. We have held that: The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had
been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process,
the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
Burbe v. Magulta
A.C. No. 99-634
10 June 2002
Panganiban, J:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client
Relationship)
FACTS:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a
claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters
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for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated
that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer
his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any
feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups
in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case
has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the
Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait
for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the
Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the
petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the
office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and
only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed
the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to
reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited
by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent
was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.”
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez
A.C. No. 8243
24 July 2009
Per Curiam
(The Lawyer and the Client: Conflict of Interest)
FACTS:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) for the violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after
becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee deposited at Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of the Respondent and a lawyer-client
relationship was established.
Complainant found out that the respondent have clients in Multitel after
receiving a demand letter from the latter.
Respondent continued to help the complainant with the latter paying an
amount and transferring properties to the former to settle liabilities when
he went to the US.
Upon returning, complainant was informed by the respondent that he
has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent also said that
she was willing to return the amount given after all the legal fees has
been deducted. Complainant accepted.
However, Complainant noticed that respondent has been avoiding him.
He sent a letter to the latter asking for a full accounting of all the money,
documents and properties given but the respondent failed to provide a
clear audited financial report.
Complainant filed a complaint against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking the disbarment of the respondent.
ISSUE/S:
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Whether or not respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility representing conflict of interest. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Respondent is DISBARRED for representing conflicting interest and
for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.”
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and,
more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s
case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by
arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was
ever forged. However, the absence of a written contract will not preclude
the finding that there was a professional relationship between the
parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938
20 September 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client Privilege)
FACTS:
Members of ACCRA law firm acting attorneys delivered to their client
documents representing financial transactions regarding shares,
dealings and deeds of trusts, assignments and information relative to
their clients personal and business circumstances
On July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants,
for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations, He was one of the clients of ACCRA
law firm mentioned above
The PCGG’s case included ACCRA law firm however they wanted to cut
a deal that they would be excluded from the corruption case if they just
revealed the identity of their client
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the PCGG Is allowed to violate attorney-client privilege In
pursuit of their mandate to crack down on ill-gotten wealth by revealing
the identity of their client. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
The Rules of Court provide that the attorney-client privilege is defined as
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The following is the General rule and exception regarding Attorney client
privilege
1) The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
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 2) The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client.
3) Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
4) Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however
qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if
it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistant.
3) Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential
Disclosure would therefore reveal client confidences ,revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link
that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the client of a crime.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG
of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG
Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui
G.R. No. 152072
31 January 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney’s Fees)
FACTS:
The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land
belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area of
1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less.
Eventually, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H.
Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as
"partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of
1,790,570. 36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal." On even date,
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui
in the amount of P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986, the amount of
P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On 14 February
1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt for receiving the amount of
P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00 given to them
last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis,
through Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for
the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds. The total amount in NHA
bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis
amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that
the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel,
Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter
deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the
NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September 1987
explaining their side of the story. They stated therein, among other
things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it
just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the lawyer's fee is excessive and unconscionable. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
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Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule
of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the
same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable
fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if
the same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.
– An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power
to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of
attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which
was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation
case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is,
undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its
reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in
the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo, where we reduced the
amount of attorney’s fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent
(15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield
that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
MODULE 4
IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A LAND
WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina DeFabritiis
How is the focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction designed?
The focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction is designed to allow
the judges in that system to be the primary lawmakers with previously
decided cases as their source of law.
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Professors direct students to read series of cases to provide them
with the data they are to use to deduce the governing legal norms.
How does this teaching method affect students?
This method of teaching affects how students develop their advocacy
skills in law school and how they ultimately argue before appellate
bodies as practitioners.
What are the 2 main central concepts in the common law legal
system?
1. Statutory interpretation; and
2. Precedent.
What comprises the core of the civil law legal system?
It is the language of the Code and the writings of scholars.
What are the social objectives similar to common-law and civil law
legal system?
1. Individualism.
2.Liberalism, and
3. Personal rights.
Is a traditional common law oral advocacy style suitable for a civil
law argument?
No.
What is common law?
Common law, in its most basic form, is a body of law comprised of
precedent
What does “precedent” mean?
It means a prior decision, or a consistent group of decisions which
represent a model to be followed by subsequent decisions.
More precisely, it refers to the binding decisions of higher courts of the
same jurisdiction.
It may also mean the law created and molded by judges with legislation
serving a supplementary function.
What binds a common law court in the United States?
It is formally bound by prior reported rulings on specific disputes,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court or higher courts within the state or
federal jurisdiction.
What is the “Doctrine of stare decisis et quieta non movere” or
Stare Decisis?
It means “to stand by things decided and not disturb settled law”.
How does Stare Decisis work?
It commands judges to apply the law as it has been set out in a prior
case when a higher, or sometimes equal, court made the prior decision.
It is necessary that the new case be the same as the precedent?
Yes. It is required that the new case be the same OR substantially the
same as the precedent.
Must the question of the case be the same too?
Yes. A decision has a stare decisis effect with regard to a later case
only if the question on which the decision in both cases rests is the
same, or substantially the same.
In general, will the doctrine apply if the facts between the cases are
essentially different?
No.
What is the role of stare decisis in maintaining consistency?
Present day common law systems rely on stare decisis to maintain
consistency when judges are filling in gaps in the law.
How is ambiguity cleared in one court’s decision?
It may be cleared up when that same court or another court within that
jurisdiction decides another case on different facts while addressing the
similar issues.
In common law systems, what is the judge’s role?
It is to make laws.
What is the proper construction where some statutory provisions
appear to be in conflict with a deeply rooted rule of the common
law?
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The provision must be interpreted in such a way as to evade the conflict
for statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. When do usually judge resort to the rulemaking method in
deciding a case?
What is the effect when a court interprets or applies a statute to a
Such method is resorted in cases where a gap in the Code exists
dispute?
because statutory concepts or rules are contradictory or entirely lacking.
The court’s decision becomes part of the body of law on the topic the
statute addresses.
How does a judge render decision in this kind of method?
Where did civil law originate from? He renders decision by using his assessment of social, economic, and
Civil law is a legal tradition originating in Roman Law, as codified in the moral factors and following the guiding ideas or values pervading the
Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and subsequently developing on Code and the legal system as a whole.
continental Europe.
What is the extent of the law “created” by the judge?
What are the exclusive sources of law in civil law jurisdiction? A civil judge creates a law only to the extent that the judge makes
(1) Written constitutions concrete what was a general and abstract rule in the code.
(2) Codes
In this kind of method, are other judges required to follow the
(3) Specific statutes or decrees, and
decision?
(4) International treaties.
No. The judge’s decision does not become a source of law, nor do other
What are the 5 basic codes found in a civil law jurisdiction? judges have to follow the decision.
(1) Civil code
Are judicial decisions a source of law in a civil law system?
(2) Commercial code
(3) Code of civil procedure No.
(4) Penal code, and
Does this mean that if a case has been decided already by a higher
(5) Code of criminal procedure.
court, a lower court may decide differently?
Do civil law statutes provide specific definitions? Yes. In theory, even if the highest court has already spoken on a
No. Instead, they state principles in broad, general phrases. question and indicated a clear view of its proper resolution, the lowest
court in the jurisdiction can decide differently.
Are code principles explained precisely?
What is the Doctrine of jurisprudence constant?
No. rather, they are stated concisely so that they may be exhaustive.

Does a civil law judge create laws? It refers to a series of decisions forming a constant stream of uniform
and homogeneous rulings that have the same reason. This doctrine
No. The judge applies the law due to his function of a civil law judge as
affords the cases considerable persuasive authority and justifies, without
a civil servant.
requiring, the court in abstaining from new inquiry because of its faith in
What is the value of scholarly texts in civil law? the prior decisions.
Scholarly texts are not a primary source of law. They are doctrinally
definitive and indispensible to the systematic and comprehensive
understanding of the code.

What is Advocacy? It is the process of trying to convince your audience through the
technique of persuasion.
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What should be the mantra of advocates in both common law and
civil law jurisdictions?
They should have a mantra that reduces their case to the bare essence.
That is, to advocate should have a central theme that she will approach
from different angles: facts, law, intent, and policy.
What are the components of the traditional structure of an oral
argument?
(1) Opening Statement,
(2) Road Map,
(3) Body of the Argument, and
(4) Conclusion.
What must the advocate do in his opening statement?
He should cordially greet the judges, and introduce himself as counsel
as well as co-counsel where appropriate.
What must the advocate do at the conclusion of the introduction?
An advocate should ask if the court would like a brief statement of the
facts.
What does an advocate do in the presentation of the Road Map?
The advocate gives the court a concise outline or road map of the
issues he will argue to support his position.
What is the purpose of the Road Map?
The Road Map lets the judges know the order in which the advocate has
organized the issues.
What does an advocate do in a rebuttal? How long should it be?
The advocate should use rebuttal time to make two or three concise
points in response to the most injurious points of the opponent’s
argument. He must not raise points that the he neglected to make in his
main argument.
An advocate should not reserve more than two or three minutes for
rebuttal.
What should the advocate do in the conclusion?
He should briefly summarize the important points of the advocate’s
argument in light of the theme he set forth at the beginning of the
argument.
What is the dominant style of reasoning in the common law
jurisdiction?
Inductive style of reasoning.
What is the Inductive style of reasoning?
Courts interpret and synthesize earlier court decision to create general
legal principles and then apply those principles to the facts of the case
before them.
How must a common law advocate present the body of his
argument?
He must analyze cases presenting similar but not identical facts. He
must, form those cases, extract the specific rules, and then through
deduction, determine the often narrow scope of each rule, and sometime
proposes new rules to cover facts that have not yet presented
themselves.
How must a common law advocate fashion the body of the
argument to make a connection between two cases?
It is enough for an advocate referencing a particular case to make a
general statement of what the case holds and why the court should
apply its reasoning to the present case, or in the alternative decline to do
so.
What is a Precedent?
It is prior decisions functioning as model for later decisions.
In the judge’s endeavour to fit a case into the body of precedent,
what are the three steps in judicial reasoning?
1.Recognition of a similarity between cases;
2.Interpretation of a rule fashioned from the material facts of the first
case;
3.Application of the rule to the second case.
Is it the precedent itself which tells the Court which line to follow?
No. It is the advocate’s arguments that must persuade the court to
select one line over the other.
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What does an argument from precedent seek to happen?
That the court give weight to a particular prior result regardless of
whether that court believes it to be correct or believes it to be valuable in
any way to rely on that prior result.
Generally, when does a court overrule its precedent?
Only for good reasons that outweigh the policies of certainty,
predictability, and fairness underlying stare decisis.
To which does the success of an advocate depend?
It will depend on persuading the court of the accuracy of the analogies
the advocates suggests between his client’s situation and that of the
precedent he cites.
What is the core of an advocate’s argument?
It is not merely by drawing the court’s attention to favorable precedent. It
is equally important to demonstrate why unfavourable precedent is not
relevant
What is the dominant style of reasoning in the civil law
jurisdiction?
Deductive style of reasoning.
What is the Deductive style of reasoning?
It is when the courts apply general legal principals to specific situations
by reasoning with guidance from scholars.
How must a civil law advocate build the body of his argument? He
must build it around legal principles tracing their history, identify their
function, determining their domain of application, and explaining their
effects in terms of rights and obligations.
How does a civil law judge decide a case?
In deciding a case, civil law requires a judge to search for legal concepts
in the Civil Code delineating a pattern of competing interests closely
resembling the interests pressing for recognition in the instant case.
What is the primary goal of an advocate?
It is to convince the court that his client should prevail.
What must the advocate do to achieve this goal?
The advocate must understand and appreciate the main goals of an oral
argument – persuasion and education.
What are required to create an effective civil law argument by
transferring common law advocacy skills?
(1) An understanding of the purpose of the oral argument, as well
as the governing rules of the court or tribunal hearing the
argument;
(2) An appreciation for the role of the judge hearing the argument;
(3) A broader grasp of what the common law considers secondary
authority; and
(4) An awareness of the applicability of non-binding precedent.
To which must an advocate familiarize himself in order to achieve
the main objectives of oral argument?
He must familiarize himself with the governing rules of the court or
tribunal before which he is appearing.
What binds a common law court?
A common-law court is formally bound by prior reported rulings on
specific disputes, decided by the Supreme Court or higher courts within
the state or federal jurisdiction.
Does the doctrine of stare decisis apply in the civil law system?
No. Lower courts are not bound to follow decisions of higher courts in
the same jurisdiction.
What must be the focus of the body of argument of a civil law
advocate?
The focus must be to make the applicable code and treaty provisions
the central of the body.
Should his body of argument rely solely on making reference to
decisions of other courts?
No. His arguments must also find support in scholarly doctrines and
notions of customary international law, consisting of rules of law derived
from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law
required them to act that way.
How must this advocate respond to a judge’s question?
He must respond in a way that allows the court to adhere to existing
jurisprudence, legal science, and scholarly developed doctrine and in so
doing apply the relevant Code provisions to the case before it.
How does a civil law judge decide a case?
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By applying general legal principles to specific situations by reasoning
with guidance from scholars.
Are secondary sources binding in a common law jurisdiction?
No.
Are scholarly texts considered a primary source of law in civil law
jurisdiction?
No. But they are doctrinally definite and indispensable to the systematic
and comprehensive understanding of the code.
What is the “trifecta” that an advocate must achieve?
(1) An advocate must be clear so that the court understands her
argument.
(2) An advocate must be interesting so that the court pays attention
to her argument.
(3) An advocate must be persuasive so that the court rules in favor
of her argument.
MIXED JURISDICTIONS: COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW
(CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED) by William Tetley
What is the classic definition of a mixed jurisdiction?
Mixed jurisdiction are legal systems in which the Romano-Germanic
tradition has become suffused to some degree by Anglo-American law.
(Maurice Tancelin, Introduction, in F.P.Walton, The Scope and
Interpretation of the Civil Code I)
Mixed jurisdictions are really political units (countries or their political
subdivisions) which have mixed legal systems. Common law/civil law
mixed jurisdictions include Louisiana, Quebec, St. Lucia, Puerto Rico,
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Scotland.
What is the modern definition of a mixed legal system?
“…a legal system which, to an extensive degree, exhibits characteristics
of both the civilian and the English common law traditions.” (Robin
Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of
the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q.R. 228, 228, 1998)
What are the two different forms of civil law traditions that Walton
and Evans-Jones refer to?
Walton is concerned with codified systems, such as Quebec and
Louisiana, while Evans-Jones is dealing with jurisdictions such as
Scotland and South Africa, which received Roman law over a
considerable period of time without ever adopting a code.
The distinction is important when one analyzes such new branches of
the common law as “restitution.”
What is a legal system?
A legal system, as that term is here used, is an operation set of legal
institutions, procedures, and rules. In this sense there are one federal
and fifty state legal systems in the United States, separate legal
systems in each of the other nations, and still other distinct legal
systems in such organizations as the European Economic Community
and the United Nations.
Each law in fact constitutes a system: it has a vocabulary used to
express concepts, its rules are arranged into categories, it has
techniques for expressing rules and interpreting them, it is linked to a
view of the social order itself which determines the way in which the law
is applied and shapes the very function of the law in that society.
What is a legal order?
It is a body of rules and institutions regulating a given society.
Synonyms: juridical system, legal system, system of law
What is a legal tradition?
A legal tradition is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and
the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system,
and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected
and taught. The legal tradition relates the the legal system to the culture
of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural
perspective. It is thus the general culture underlying a family of similar
legal systems.
What are the three highly influential legal traditions in the
contemporary world?
Civil law, Common law, and Socialist law What is Civil Law?
Civil Law may be defined as that legal tradition which has its origin in
Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and as
subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the world. It
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is highly systemized and structured and relies on declarations of broad,
general principles, often ignoring the details. Civil Law eventually divided
into two streams: the codified Roman law (as seen in the French Civil
Code of 1804 and its progeny and imitators-Continental Europe,
Quebec, Louisiana being examples); and uncodified Roman law (as
seen in Scotland and South Africa)
What is Common Law? Common law is the legal tradition which
evolved in England from the eleventh century onwards. Its principles
appear for the most part in reported judgments, usually of the higher
courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising in disputes which
courts have adjudicated. The common law is usually much more detailed
in its prescriptions than the civil law. Common law is the foundation of
private law, not only for England, Wales and Ireland, but also in forty-
nine U.S. states, nine Canadian provinces and in most countries which
first received that law as colonies of the British Empire and which, in
many cases, have preserved it as independent States of the British
Commonwealth.
What is Statutory Law?
Statutory law, or law found in legislation other than civil codes, is basic
to both the civil and common law. In common law jurisdictions, most
rules are found in the jurisprudence and statutes complete them. In civil
law jurisdictions, the important principles are stated in the code, while
the statutes complete them.
What is a Mixed Legal System? Give an example
A mixed legal system is one in which the law in force is derived from
more than one legal tradition or legal family. For example, in the Quebec
legal system, the basic private law is derived partly from the civil law
tradition and partly from the common law tradition. Another example is
the Egyptian legal system, in which the basic private law is derived partly
from the civil law tradition and partly from Moslem or other religiously-
based legal traditions.
What is a Mixed Jurisdiction? Give an example
A mixed jurisdiction is a country or a political subdivision of a country in
which a mixed legal system prevails. For example, Scotland may be
said to be a mixed jurisdiction, because it has a mixed legal system,
derived in part from the civil law tradition and in part from the common
law tradition.
This definition of "mixed jurisdiction" is very similar to those of Walton
and Evans-Jones cited above, except that the term as used here
describes only the territory in which a mixed legal system exists, rather
than the mixed legal system itself.
What is Maritime Law?
Maritime law is a mixed legal system in its own right, found in all
jurisdictions, including those belonging to only one major legal tradition.
Maritime law is civilian in its origin and has benefited greatly, in the last
two centuries at least, from the infusion of certain English common law
principles and innovations.
Maritime law also consists of modern international Conventions,
including Conventions on collision, salvage, the carriage of goods by
sea, maritime liens and mortgages, and ship owners’ limitation, for
example.
What are the forms of Civil Law Jurisdictions and how did they
develop?
To understand civil law one must realize that Scotland and South Africa,
for example, received Roman law and have retained it without benefit of
codification. Continental Europe received civil law from ancient Rome
and then retained it by codification, imposed for the most part by
victories of Napoleon and later on by the example and great influence of
the French Civil Code of 1804.32 Other jurisdictions, particularly the
countries of Latin America, as well as Egypt, imitated the French Code
(or other codes based upon it) in enacting their own codifications.
Quebec and Louisiana, for their part, received civil law and retained it by
codifications developed internally, while also incorporating into their
codes certain elements of common law origin.
Civil law jurisdictions often have a statute law that is heavily influenced
by the common law.
What did the French Civil Code of 1804 reflect?
It reflected the achievements of the French Revolution. The French Civil
Code of 1804 was no mere consolidation or systematization of existing
law, but rather was intended to be a "revolutionary code." In fact,
however, the revolutionary content of the Code (e.g. principles such as
freedom and equality of all citizens and the inviolability of property) was
balanced with more conservative notions, reflected especially in the pre-
existing customary law of France's northern provinces, which earlier
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scholars such as R.J. Pothier (1699-1772) had striven to harmonize
before the Revolution.
How did the French Civil Code influence other areas? Napoleon's
victorious armies imposed the French Civil Code on various territories,
notably the French-occupied German-speaking areas on the left bank of
the Rhine, as well as the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and the Hanseatic
cities. Political suasion led to its introduction into various other German
principalities, as well as Danzig, Warsaw and the Swiss cantons. After
the downfall of the Emperor, the Code's prestige caused the adoption of
similar codifications, in the form of either direct translation of the French
Code or national codes based on the French model but with local
modifications. These codes include those of Parma (1820), Sardinia
(1837), the Netherlands (1838), Modena (1852), unified Italy (1865),
Romania (1864), Portugal (1867) and Spain (1889).11
In Latin America, the French Code was introduced into Haiti in 1825,
while the codes of Bolivia (1830) and Chile (1855) follow the
arrangement and copy much of the substance of the Code Napoléon.
The movement towards codification which the French Civil Code set in
motion also gave birth to the German Civil Code of 1896 (in force in
1900), although its terminology is more academic and technical and its
rules more precise than those of the French Code. The Swiss Civil Code
of 1912, by comparison, is simple and non-technical, relying heavily on
general principles. The combined French, German and Swiss influence
influenced the codifications of Brazil (1916), Mexico (1928), pre-
Communist China(1931) and Peru(1936). Japan adopted the German
Civil Code in 1898 and Turkey, a translation of the Swiss Code in 1926.)
What are the four periods which reflected the Scots Law?
Scots Law has been divided into four periods:
a. the feudal period, extending from the Battle of Carham
establishing Scotland's present boundaries in 1018 to the death
of King Robert the Bruce in 1329;
b. the "dark age" until 1532, when the Court of Session was
established;
c. the Roman period from 1532 until the Napoleonic Wars, when
the great reception of Roman Law occurred;
d. the modern period saw influence of English law which had been
given authority by the Union of the Parliaments in 1707 and the
establishment of the House of Lords as the final court of appeal
of Scotland in civil matters.
Is Scottish Law a mixed legal system?
Yes. Scottish law is truly a "mixed legal system" because of the diversity
of its main sources: feudal law, Roman law, Canon law, English
common law (in part) and statutes." In the words of Enid Marshall:
While, however, Scots law is a distinct legal system, it is far from
being an original legal system in the sense of having developed
independently of outside influences: there is little in Scots law
which is purely native to the country; most of the Scots law has
been contributed to Scotland by other legal systems, and the
distinctiveness of the Scottish legal system springs from the
original way in which the law-makers of Scotland have over past
centuries formed a coherent body of law out of these diverse
contributions.
A similar conclusion has been reached by Robin Evans-Jones in his
more recent study of Scots private law.' Evans-Jones points out,
however, that the civil law tradition in Scotland is in constant danger of
being overwhelmed by English common law, because the process of
reception of that law is ongoing, the common law continuing to exercise
a strong influence on Scots lawyers and judges.
What kind of mixed jurisdiction is the Republic of South Africa?
The Republic of South Africa is a mixed jurisdiction whose legal system
reflects elements of both civil and common law, as well as African tribal
customary law. The civilian heritage is "Roman-Dutch law," brought to
the Cape of Good Hope by the first Dutch settlers about 1652 when the
colony, then under the administration of the Dutch East India Company,
served primarily as a "refreshment station" for Dutch merchants and
seafarers on the long journey between the Netherlands and the East
Indies. In the new Republic of South Africa, where South African
legislation and precedents are lacking, Roman-Dutch and English
sources are given approximately equal weight, in a kind of pragmatism.
There is a considerable respect for both the institutional writers and
more recent authors on Roman-Dutch law (a civilian trait), mixed with a
view of judicial precedent as of very great importance (a common law
characteristic)."' There is also are cognition of African customary law
("indigenous law") which under the present Constitution must be applied
where applicable, subject to the Constitution and any relevant
legislation.
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Describe the new Civil Code of Québec.
The new Civil Code gives full recognition to the human person and
human rights as the central focus of all private law, while also
consolidating the position of the Code as the iuscommune of Québec. Its
specific rules give expression, in more contemporary language, to the
social changes in Quebec society since the "Quiet Revolution." The new
Code continues to reflect the impact of certain English principles and
institutions (e.g. freedom of testation, trusts (now called "foundations"-
and "moveable hypothecs"--an adaptation of the English chattel
mortgage), while still respecting the basic structure and terminology of
civilian codification. It takes account of contemporary technological
developments (e.g. computerization of registers of civil status and
registers of personal and moveable real rights). It also includes a very
important Book X on private international law, which is marked by recent
developments in the conflict of laws in Europe (e.g. the Rome
Convention 1980" and the Swiss Statute on Private International Law
1987'9), and which also incorporates a number of common law
concepts, such as forum non conveniens, into what is essentially a
civilian codal regime. The French and English versions of the new Code
are official, and may be used to assist in interpreting ambiguous
provisions.
What is the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808?
The Digest of 1808, known as the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, was
largely inspired by the revolutionary ideas of France, gleaned from the
French Civil Code of 1804 and its preparatory works, approximately
70% of its 2,156 articles being based on those sources. The remainder
of the text was derived from Spanish law and institutions, which rules
were retained in the event of conflict with French-inspired provisions.
How did the Digest of 1808 came about?
Louisiana was first subjected to French Edicts, Ordinances and the
Custom of Paris by charters issued to companies of merchant
adventurers in 1712 and 1717, which laws remained in force when the
territory became a royal colony in 1731. After Louisiana's cession to
Spain in 1763, French laws remained in force until 1769, when they
were officially replaced by Spanish laws and institutions.
Following the territory's retrocession to France in 1800, Spanish law
continued in force, because France assumed sovereignty for only twenty
days in 1803 before the United States took
possession of Louisiana on December 20 of that
year.
After the transfer to the U.S., pressure came from the incoming
Americans to impose the common law in Louisiana, particularly because
six different compilations of Spanish laws existed and it was unclear
which of over 20,000 individual laws of Spain applied in the territory.
Thanks, however, to the leadership of Edward Livingston, a New York
common lawyer who had become a convert to the superiority of the civil
law after moving to New Orleans, and following a political crisis
surrounding the matter, a two-man committee was mandated by the
Louisiana legislature to prepare a compilation of the civil law applicable
in the "Territory of Orleans."" The product was a digest,9 3 known as the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, which was approved even by Governor
Claiborne, who had formerly been a major advocate of the common law.
Why is there a Louisiana Civil Code of 1825?
Despite the Digest, confusion persisted as to which specific laws applied
in Louisiana.' Another committee was therefore instructed by the
legislature to revise the civil code and add to it any missing laws still
found to be in force. The result was the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825,
which was modelled very closely on the French Civil Code, most of its
3,522 articles having an exact equivalent in that Code.' It was designed
to replace all pre-existing law, although the courts refused to give it quite
the sweeping effect that had been intended.
The 1808 and 1825 Codes were both drafted in French and translated
into English, after which they were published in both languages, both
versions being official. The enabling statute of the 1808 Code" required
consultation of both language versions in the event of ambiguity of any
provision. The 1825 Code, on the other hand, was merely published in
both French and English, without any provision in its enabling statute for
resolving conflicts.
What law prevailed over Egypt after the Roman law?
Islamic law. Prior to the arrival of Islam in 641 A.D., Roman law
prevailed in Egypt. The Islamic conquest led, however, to the imposition
of Islamic Sharialaw, consisting of a compilation of Islamic
jurisprudence, rooted in the Koran (the Islamic Holy Book), the Sunna
(the Prophet's traditions),the ijma (the consensus of opinion of Moslem
jurists) and other sources. This law was administered by Shariacourts,
empowered to hear civil, criminal and family matters within their
assigned territories."e Sharialaw prevailed for approximately eleven
hundred years, but, interestingly, permitted non-Moslems to apply their
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own religiously-based family law systems, so that, in that domain, Egypt
may be said to have been a mixed legal system for centuries.
What kind of legal system did Egypt have after the accession to
power of Mohammed Ali as ruler of Egypt in 1805?
“Mixed codes”. The accession to power of Mohammed Ali as ruler of
Egypt in 1805 resulted in the increasing influence of European law, and
particularly of French law, in the country. Beginning in 1856, a system of
fourteen judicial councils was created to administer non-Moslem family
law in Egypt (especially for the benefit of foreign residents). In 1875, a
system of "mixed courts" was established, to administer the so-called
"mixed codes," being different civil, commercial, penal and procedural
codes governing the relations between foreigners or between foreigners
and Egyptians. These codes, notably the Civil Code of 1875, were
modelled on the corresponding codes in force in France. In fact, the
Egyptian government would only adopt them after their approval by
those foreign countries (principally Britain and France) which enjoyed a
privileged status in Egypt."
Did it prevail?
No. Not surprisingly, considerable confusion and jurisdictional conflict
arose out of this complex legal and judicial structure, leading to
demands for simplification and rationalization. The mixed courts were
abolished in 1949 and the Sharia courts and religious judicial councils in
1955, their jurisdiction being transferred to the national courts, which
came to be known as "ordinary courts."' The old “mixed codes" were
replaced by national codes of universal application to Egyptians and
foreigners alike, notably the new Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 and the
Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure of 1968, which continued to reflect
French influence. Significantly, however, family law, although now
administered in a unified judiciary, continued to be subject to the
"personal law" of each of the principal religious groupings within the
population, in accordance with the "Personal Status Law" of 1929
What is the principal source of legislation in Egypt?
Today, under Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, as amended
in 1980, Islamic Sharia law is the principal source of legislation in Egypt.
Both Moslem and civilian legal systems coexist, however, as illustrated
in a decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1985, "1 holding that
Article 226 of the Civil Code, permitting interest to be charged on
overdue debts, was not, as alleged, unconstitutional under Article 2 of
the Constitution, because that provision was not retroactive, and
because its implementation in specific fields of private law was not
automatic, but required express amending legislation.
Is the Modern Egyptian law a mixed legal system?
Yes. Modern Egyptian law is therefore an intriguing mixed legal system,
blending civilian rules fashioned, in style, structure and content, on the
model of the French Civil Code of 1804, with the law of Islam and, in
family law areas (such as marriage, divorce, filiation and, alimentary
obligations), with a variety of religiously-founded personal laws.
Civil Law and Common Law: Differences in Sources, Concepts, and
Style
A. Order of Priority: Jurisprudence and Doctrine
Priority in Civil Law is given to doctrine (including the codifier’s reports)
over jurisprudence.
Priority in Common Law is given to jurisprudence over doctrine
This difference in priority can be explained by the role of the legislator in
both traditions. French civil law adopts Montesquieu’s theory of
separation of powers, whereby the function of the legislator is to
legislate, and the function of the courts is to apply the law. Common law,
on the other hand, finds in judge-made precedent the core of its law.
B. Doctrine: Functions
The civil law doctrine's function is "to draw from this disorganized mass
[cases, books and legal dictionaries] the rules and the principles which
will clarify and purge the subject of impure elements, and thus provide
both the practice and the courts with a guide for the solution of particular
cases in the future."
The common law doctrine's function is more modest: authors are
encouraged to distinguish cases that would appear incompatible to a
civilist, and to extract from these specific rules.
C. Doctrine: Style
The civilist focuses rather on legal principles. He or she traces their
history, identifies their function, determines their domain of
application, and explains their effects in terms of rights and
obligations. At this stage, general and exceptional effects are
deduced. Apart from requiring some statutory analysis, determining
the area of application of a principle involves some induction from
the existing case law, while delimiting exceptions involves some
deduction.
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The common law author focuses on fact patterns. He or she
analyzes cases presenting similar but not identical facts, extracting
from the specific rules, and then, through deduction, determines the
often very narrow scope of each rule, and sometimes proposes new
rules to cover facts that have not yet presented themselves.
D. Jurisprudence: Function
Civil law jurisprudence applies general principles, and that is only a
secondary source of law of explanation
Common law jurisprudence sets out a new specific rule to a new
specific set of facts and provides the principal source of law
E. Stare Decisis
The English doctrine of stare decisis compels lower courts to follow
decisions rendered in higher courts, hence establishing an order of
priority of sources by “reason of authority." Stare decisis is unknown
to civil law, where judgments rendered by judges only enjoy the
"authority of reason.
F. Jurisprudence: Style
Civil law judgments are written in a more formalistic style than common
law judgments.
Civil law decisions are indeed shorter than common law decisions, and
are separated into two parts- the motifs (reasons) and the
dispositif(order). This is because civil law judges are specially trained in
special schools created for the purpose, while common law judges are
appointed from amongst practicing lawyers, without special training.
The method of writing judgments is also different.
Common law judgments extensively expose the facts, compare or
distinguish them from the facts of previous cases, and decide (if not
create) the specific legal rule relevant to the present facts.
Civil law decisions first identify the legal principles that might be relevant,
then verify if the facts support their application (only the facts relevant to
the advanced principle thus need be stated). (In Québec, the common
law methodology is followed.)
G. Statues: Functions
Civil law codes provide the core of the law-general principles are
systematically and exhaustively exposed in codes" 6 and particular
statutes complete them. Finally follows the jurisprudence.
Common law statutes, on the other hand, complete the case law,
which latter contains the core of the law expressed through specific
rules applying to specific facts.
H. Style of Drafting of Laws
Civil law codes and statutes are concise Common law statutes are
precise.
Civil law statutes provide no definitions, and state principles in broad,
general phrases
Common law statutes provide detailed definitions, and each specific
rule sets out lengthy enumerations of specific applications or
exceptions,preceded by a catch-all phrase and followed by a demurrer
such as "notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing.”
This difference in style is linked to the function of statutes.
Civilian statutory general principles need not be explained, precisely
because they are not read restrictively (not being exceptions), but need
to be stated concisely if the code is to be exhaustive.
Common law statutory provisions need not be concise, because they
cover only the specific part of the law to be reformed, but must be
precise, because the common law courts restrict rules to the specific
facts they are intended to cover.
Those styles can be found in international conventions.
The Hamburg Rules were drafted in a civilian style with the rule of
responsibility in-one sweeping article The Hague Rules, by
comparison, were drafted in a common law fashion, with responsibility
in three very long and detailed articles.
I. Interpretation of Laws
In civil law jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous law,
according to Mazeaud, is to discover the intention of the legislator by
examining the legislation as a whole as well as the provisions more
immediately surrounding the obscure text.
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In common law jurisdictions, by comparison, statutes are to be
objectively construed according to certain rules standing by themselves,'
such as that an enactment must be read as whole, and that special
provisions will control general provisions, so as to meet the subjects'
reasonable understandings and expectations.
Two reasons can be advanced to explain this difference in
interpretation.
Firstly, common law statutes have to be read against a case law
background, while civil law codes and statutes are the primary source of
law under Montesquieu's theory.
Secondly, civil law judges are influenced by Rousseau's theory that the
State is the source of all rights under the social contract, while English
judges favour Hobbes' theory that the individual agreed to forfeit to the
State only certain rights.
J. The Appointment of Judges
Common law judges, who are called to play an important role in
deciding what the law is, are appointed from among experienced
practicing lawyers.
Civil law judges, whose main function is adjudicating, are appointed
fresh from specialized schools. (Québec judges, in the common law
tradition, however, are all appointed from practicing lawyers, this
being another example of the common law tradition in Québec.)
K. Consequences – Evolution of the Law
Civil law principles are frozen into codes and often rigid doctrine and
are imposed on courts
Most common law rules can be changed from time to time, subject
to the doctrine of stare decisis.
On one hand, the realities of modern life can be addressed in a
timelier fashion through the common law, e.g. the salvage lien and
repairer's lien.
On the other hand, common law judges are sometimes hesitant to
change a rule, where the consequences of doing so in relation to the
whole of the law are not clear."
Less timid to reform, civil law jurisdictions have sometimes hired
learned authors to assist in effecting major legal changes.
L. Concept of the Legal Rule
Civil law systems are "closed," in the sense that every possible
situation is governed by a limited number of general principles,' while
common law system are "open," in the sense that new rules may be
created or imported for new facts.
Civil law allows for wider rules than does the common law in private
law matters (those rules that can be avoided by contract), in that
civil law rules are suppletive (the parties are deemed to know the
law and hence to be aware of those rules), while common law rules
are presumptive of the intention of the parties when relevant facts
are present
M. Categories of Laws
Civil law categories are based on the rules themselves, e.g. private law
and public law,"' while common law categories were founded on the law
that was administered by different courts, e.g. common law courts and
the court of Equity.
Adjectival law (which includes the rules of procedure and evidence) was
traditionally given considerable attention in common law jurisdictions,
while substantive law habitually received more attention in civil law
jurisdictions.
N. Rights versus Remedies
Civil law focuses on rights and obligations, while common law is oriented
toward the jurisdiction of particular courts to grant the sought-after
remedy ("remedies precede rights")."
It follows that the civil law does not have a clearly defined system of
remedies, but relies rather on the courts to choose or even create the
appropriate remedy. Conversely, the common law does not have a
unitary system of rights and obligations.
Civil law and Common law: Resulting Differences in Law
A. Economic Loss
Civil law's unitary system of obligations provides for the same means
of enforcement whatever the obligation (patrimonial or not,
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contractual or not), including performance by equivalence, i.e.
damages, which include losses of profits."
Common law, while allowing consequential damages in contract,
used to be unwilling to award pure economic loss (i.e. damages in
tort when there is no physical damage).
B. Pre-judgment Interests
Pre-judgment interests are recoverable as of right in civil law,
because they are understood as part of the lucrum cessans.
On the contrary, pre-judgment interest has been awarded only in
relatively recent times in common law systems, except in maritime
law.
C. Lex Mercatoria
The modem lex mercatoria finds its strength in civilian jurisdictions,
as was pointed out by Thomas Carbonneau:
It is not surprising that the strongest advocates of the new law
merchant are from civil law jurisdictions where general legal
principles constitute the primary source of law and specialized
courts have long handled commercial disputes at an intermediary
level of the legal system. Nor is it astonishing that the most virulent
critics of lex mercatoria and delocalization are steeped in the
common law tradition of narrow rules and holdings, where decisional
law is the foremost source of law and courts are its oracles.
D. Conflict of Laws
Terminology-In common law, "conflict of laws" includes choice of law,
choice of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments. In civil law,
the appropriate translation is "private international law" because conflict
of laws merely governs choice of law rules.
History-While private international law dates back to the Roman times,
common law conflict of laws rules are relatively new, because the
procedural requirement of service used to be sufficient to limit the
jurisdiction of the court to domestic conflicts.
Emphasis- Civil law, being essentially substantive instead of adjectival,
puts more emphasis on its choice of law rules, while common law, being
essentially procedural, focuses on the rules of jurisdiction
Traditional method -The civil law traditional method (imported into many
common law systems) consists in characterizing the dispute as
belonging a defined category, and then identifying the applicable internal
law in relation to points of attachment of the category concerned. Even
with similar categories (e.g. procedural versus substantive issues), the
characterization of issues is always influenced (if not mandatorily
governed) by the lex fori; hence a delay to sue issue would be
characterized as substantive in civil law (relating to prescription) and
procedural in common law (relating to limitation periods). The same is
true of maritime liens, which are procedures in England, and substantive
rights in civil law, as in certain common law jurisdictions.
Special methods--Civil law and common law developed similar rules to
limit the scope of the traditional method when its strict application led to
undesirable results. The civil law notions of fraude à la loi and fraude au
jugement” are similar to the common law rule of "no evasion of the law";
the same is true of civil law's international public order and common
law's public policy. The civil law concept of Ioi d'application
immédiate(mandatory rules) is also making its way outside the civil law
jurisdictions.
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court,
which has jurisdiction to hear a claim, refuses to do so, because it
believes another court of another state also has jurisdiction to hear the
claim and can better render justice in the circumstances.' This principle
was unknown to civil law courts, which are often required by the
constitutions of their respective countries to hear an action, although
they may suspend it. Scotland was first to develop the concept of forum
non conveniens and now Quebec and Louisiana'" have adopted the
principle.
F. Forum Conveniens
Forum conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court, which
does not have jurisdiction over a claim, nevertheless accepts
jurisdiction, because there is no other appropriate jurisdiction to hear the
claim and justice would not otherwise be done.
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The principle is not known in civil law.
G. Arbitration
A common law equity clause in an arbitration agreement “purports
expressly to dispense the arbitrator from applying the law either wholly
or in part."
In civil law, these are called amiable compositeur clauses. While strict
equity clauses (also known as ex equo et bono clauses) are suspect in
England, amiable compositeur clauses are generally permitted in civil
law jurisdictions and are found in civilian codes.
H. Arbitration and Interpretation/Construction of Contracts
The common law objective contract theory dictates that contractual
promises be interpreted according to the reasonable expectation of the
promisee (an objective standard).
Civil law, which is based on the autonomy of free will, requires actual
consent (a subjective standard), but presumptions of fact are available
to the trial judge.
Some Civilian Principles Now in the Common Law
A. Restitution
Terminology- While the principle of unjust enrichment now unites
restitutionary claims at common law, unjust enrichment at civil law is but
one of the quasi-contracts (others being negotiorum gestio and solution
indebitii) which triggers restitution.
It is interesting that today the three basic requirements of unjustified
enrichment under both civil law and common law are: 1) an enrichment
by the receipt of a benefit, 2) that this benefit be gained at the plaintiff's
expense, and 3) a lack of legal cause.
B. Negligence: Delict – The General Tort of Negligence
Civil law, on the contrary, always recognized the general obligation
not to act unreasonably in situations not governed by contract.
Donohue v. Stevenson created, amongst the special duties of care
already sanctioned by the action in negligence, a general duty of
care similar to that of civil law: "you must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbor," neighbors being "persons who are so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."''
Since then, "obligations" are now taught in common law schools and
books are written on the subject.
C. Foreseeable Contractual Damages
In civil law, it is not sufficient that contractual damages be the
immediate and direct consequence of the non-performance; they
must have been foreseen or foreseeable at the time that the
obligation was contracted unless there is intentional or gross fault.
D. Pre-Judgment Interests
Civil law, the general principle of restitutio in integrum entails that
pre- judgment interests be granted as a loss of profit. Interest is
even payable as of right when the debtor has delayed in performing
an obligation to pay a sum of money, and are calculated from the
date the obligation was due.
Pre-judgment interests were gradually awarded in common law.
E. Proof of Foreign Law
Common law is more adversarial, while civil law is more inquisitorial,
when it comes to proving the substance of a foreign law, a question of
fact arising in a choice of law or recognition of foreign law situation.
At common law, foreign law was proven by the testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, who were summoned to court, and subject to
examination as to both their qualifications as experts and their
knowledge and interpretation of the foreign law in question.
In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, foreign laws needed usually
be proven only by the production of a certificate, prepared by a diplomat
of the relevant state or an expert in the foreign law concerned, who,
however, was not called to testify as a witness at trial. Moreover, judicial
notice was possible and is now compulsory.
Other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States
of America have taken an even more civilian route in adopting less
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formalistic means of proof and permitting judicial notice as a general
rule.
F. Contributory Negligence and Last Opportunity Rule
While at common law, contributory negligence has always been a
complete bar to an action in tort, civil law has always dealt with this
issue as a mere question of causation, thereby apportioning liability
according to the gravity of the concurrent faults.
By way of statute, most common law jurisdictions have now limited, if
not abolished, the contributory negligence rule, and adopted the more
equitable "proportionate fault" (comparative fault) rule.' The Supreme
Court of Canada even took the matter of reform in its own hands and
eliminated the contributory negligence bar in respect of torts aboard a
single ship under Canadian maritime law."'
Moreover, the common law developed the "last opportunity rule" (known
as the "the last clear chance rule" in the U.S.) in order to avoid triggering
the contributory negligence rule against an otherwise faulty claimant.
As to the "last opportunity rule," it was held to be incompatible with the
new proportionate fault system and hence fell obsolete.
G. Marine Insurance
Common law speaks of an undertaking to indemnify "marine losses,
that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure."
Civil law is concerned instead with the guarantee of "risks in respect of
a maritime operation."'
Despite this different wording, however, common law marine policies
cover risk interests as well as property rights.
The Lex Mercatoria
A. The Influence of the Lex Mercatoria
In medieval Europe, beginning as early as the ninth century and-
continuing up until the sixteenth century, there existed a remarkably
uniform body of customary mercantile law which was applied by
merchant courts in commercial disputes. This transnational custom was
known as the lex mercatoria, or in English, the "Law Merchant."' ' The
lex mercatoria incorporated a body of customary private maritime law,
the lex maritima, or "Ley Maryne" as it was called in French. The two
were interrelated because of the importance of seafaring commerce in
medieval Europe.
The Law Merchant, including maritime law, thus constituted a legal
system, with rules and institutions of its own, which relied upon codified
principles in the civilian manner, and which was burdened with little
conflict of laws because of its Europe-wide character.
But in addition there is what has been called the "new" Law Merchant,
the modem lex mercatoria, which many scholars believe is gradually
beginning to take shape in international commerce. The 1993 Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP
500) published by the International Chamber of Commerce is one
example, being a compilation of modern banking practices which
enjoy near universal acceptance and "will readily be treated by the
court as impliedly incorporated into the various documentary credit
contracts as established usage." The 1990 Incoterms of the
International Chamber of Commerce also provide a transnational
set of conditions on price and delivery applied uniformly in
international sale of goods contracts.
Another significant development is the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention
which "seeks to maintain a delicate balance between the contrasting
attitudes and concepts of the civil law and of the common law...”in
harmonizing law on the sale of goods between States party to the
Convention. It is noteworthy that the Convention has been applied as
part of the modem lex mercatoria by the Iran- United States Claims
Tribunal.
In shipping, the influence of the contemporary Law Merchant may be
seen in the use by shippers and ship-owners and their respective
agents of a multitude of standard-form contracts, particularly standard-
form bills of lading and charter parties, as well as in certain normative
documents frequently incorporated by reference into carriage of goods
by sea contracts.
One of the areas in which growth of a modem lex mercatoria is most
visible is in international commercial arbitration. With each passing
year, there is an ever-increasing volume of reported arbitral awards
(particularly in civil law jurisdictions, as well as in the United States),
and arbitrators are tending more and more to refer to previous awards
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rendered in similar cases, thus gradually developing a system of
arbitral precedent."
B. The 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts
A major step forward in the development of a modern lex mercatoria
was taken in 1994 when the Governing Council of the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome, Italy
adopted the "Principles of International Commercial Contracts."' This
document was the fruit of some fourteen years of labour by a working
group comprising some of the most respected specialists in contract
law and international trade law from the civil law, common law and
Socialist legal systems in different countries of the world. Its drafters
took account of both common law and civilian compilations and
codifications. Together with the Comments, the UNIDROIT Principles
set forth some of the fundamental concepts underlying international
commercial contracts in the modem world.
Accordingly, the Principles constitute more than just a checklist or
guide to negotiators in concluding transborder trade agreements. They
are autonomous in character, in that they permit issues which are not
addressed specifically to be resolved in harmony with their basic
tenets. Most importantly, the Principles may be applied as constituting
the lex mercatoria when the parties to the contract have agreed that it
should be applicable, thus giving added credibility to the existence of
the new Law Merchant itself.
Finally, it is immensely significant that the Principles can be, and are
being, applied as models for national and international lawmakers in
drafting new legislation on commercial contracts.
Among the reasons for the rapid acceptance of the UNIDROIT Principles
is their accessibility in many languages. “They have also found a place
in the curricula and teaching materials of literally dozens of law faculties
in Europe. North America, South America, Africa and Asia." Another is
the fact that they represent a consensus of over seventy specialists from
all major legal systems. Finally, as one experienced American lawyer
has commented:238 "The great importance of the (UNIDROITJ
Principles is that the volume exists. It can be taken to court, it can be
referred to page and article number, and persons who are referred to its
provisions can locate and review them without difficulty. This alone is a
great contribution towards making lex mercatoria definitive and
provable."
The UNIDROIT Principles, in the few years since their approval, have
achieved an impressive synthesis of the law of international trade,
reconciling different legal traditions in a creative and beneficial fashion,
to the benefit of the international business community.
Statutes to Unify or Reconcile the Two Systems
A unique initiative in the reconciliation of the common law with the civil
law by statute is underway in Canada. In June 1998, the federal Minister
of Justice introduced in the Canadian House of Commons, Bill C-50,
entitled Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1.
In Canada, where nine provinces and three territories are common law
jurisdictions, and only one province (Quebec) is a civil law jurisdiction,
there has been a regrettable tendency in the past for federal statutes to
be drafted using the vocabulary and style of the common law alone.
Bill C-S0 seeks to correct such distortions in present federal law and to
prevent their repetition in the future. The major purpose of the Bill is to
"ensure that all existing federal legislation that deals with private law
integrates the terminology, concepts and institutions of Quebec civil
law."
Since 1993, the Department of Justice of Canada has reviewed
approximately 700 federal laws to identify those whose content or format
would be most affected by changes in the Quebec Civil Code, and has
identified approximately 300 such statutes which will require further
review over the next nine years. The challenge of effective
harmonization is therefore one of considerable magnitude. It remains to
be seen to what extent the high hopes underlying Bill C-50 will be
realized.
Nevertheless, harmonizing two legal systems by statute, in a manner
designed to respect the essence and genius of each system, is a
creative undertaking, and a development which, if successful in the
Canadian/Québec context, might well be of interest to other mixed
jurisdictions around the world.
What did the author experience in Practicing in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“As lawyers, we understood we had been trained as civilians, but in
corporate, tax, criminal and administrative matters, the law was common
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law in both its nature and its drafting. The judges and lawyers had no
difficulty in adapting to both systems, so that imperceptibly one legal
tradition impinged on the other.
In consequence, in our day-to-day work, we found no major problem in
practising civil law in Québec and then moving over to the common law
of another province or of the Federal courts. In other words, lawyers and
judges are not concerned with practising and adjudging law in the mixed
jurisdiction of Québec. Rather, if they aware of the dual legal systems,
they rejoice in them.”
What did the author experience in Legislating in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“Today, one of the purposes of the nationalist movement and of
separatist politicians in Quebec is the protection of the civil law of
Quebec, along with the French language and culture. It is my view that
they can be protected as well, or perhaps better, in a federal system.”
What did the author experience in Teaching in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“Professors in mixed jurisdictions are much more concerned with the
distinction between the civil law and the common law than are
practitioners. The latter consider the other tradition merely as a different
law, or a foreign law, with which they must contend.
In Quebec, the civil law is very important as a major part of Quebec's
distinctive nature. The civil law, like the French language, must be
protected from the intrusions of the common law. Professors lead the
charge in this regard, whether or not they are separatists politically.”
What is the view of the author in the creation of Mixed
Jurisdictions?
“It is my view that mixed jurisdictions are created when one culture,
with its law, language and style of courts, imposes upon another
culture, usually by conquest. The imposition on Quebec of the English
common law, together with England's administrative, judicial and
legislative system, leaving the French civil law to continue unchanged,
is an example Mixed jurisdictions may also be created by the voluntary
"reception" of foreign law.' The classic example of this process may be
found in Scotland.”
Survival of Mixed Jurisdictions
“It is my very strong view that it is very difficult for a mixed
jurisdiction to survive if it has only one language, one legislature
and one court system. The two legal systems in such a mixed
jurisdiction are soon melded together as one.”
A. Language
1. Québec
Under Canada's Constitution Act, 1867, all provincial laws and
regulations of Quebec, as well as all federal laws and regulations, must
be adopted in both French and English, so that Canada and Québec
have, in fact, two languages of legislation. Both languages may be
used in the debates and must be used in the records of both the
federal Parliament and the Quebec National Assembly. Either of those
languages may be used in any court of Canada (i.e. the Supreme Court
of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada), as well as in the courts of
Quebec. French, of course, is a major language of the civil law,
Quebec's system of private law. English, on the other hand, is
traditionally the language of the common law, which forms the basis of
Québec's public law, as well as of many spheres of federal law (e.g.
criminal law, maritime law, etc.).
Both the historic languages of the civil law and the common law in fact
continue to be read, understood, spoken and written by Quebec's
legislators, judges, lawyers and scholars. The decisions of Quebec
judges frequently contain quotations from both civil law sources
(generally in French) and from common law sources (generally in
English).
A clear commitment to the preservation of the civilian legal tradition of
Quebec law, even in the context of Canadian federal legislation, is seen
in the draft Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. I discussed
above.
This "bijuralism" and bilingualism also cause Quebec lawyers (especially
graduates of the "National Programme" offered by the Faculty of Law of
McGill University) to be in great demand in international law firms and
international organizations, as well as in the Canadian federal civil
service, where both their language skills and their knowledge of the two
principal legal systems of the Western world are highly prized.
2. South Africa
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South Africa's mixed legal system also thrives largely because both
Afrikaans and English are recognized as official languages of the
Republic, together with a number of indigenous languages."
Historically, the fact that Dutch and German were languages accessible
to so many Afrikaners also contributed, particularly in the later
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the survival of Roman-
Dutch law, at a time when it risked being totally undermined by the
common law and the English language.
This practice brought much modern civilian learning into South African
law, a process greatly facilitated by virtue of the fact that the Afrikaans -
speaking academics enjoyed a linguistic affinity to at least two of the
most influential European countries.
The laws of the Republic are enacted in both Afrikaans and English,
which languages are also official in the courts. Law students require a
knowledge of both those tongues to pursue their studies and to practise
effectively afterwards. Judgments are written in both languages, and
both civil law and common law authorities are cited in them. Legal
publishing is also done in both Afrikaans and English, with much of the
writing on Roman-Dutch law appearing in Afrikaans. There is also a
recognition of customary law in the new Constitution of 1996.
3. Louisiana
The state's first Constitution in 1812 was actually drafted in French,
and only a duly authenticated English translation was sent to
Washington, to comply with the requirements of the Enabling Act of the
U.S. Congress, which permitted Louisiana to accede to statehood.
Under Louisiana's 1845 Constitution, the Constitution and laws of
Louisiana were required to be promulgated in the English and French
languages (Article 132), The Constitutions of 1845 (Article
104) and 1852 (Article 101) also obliged the Secretary of the State
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives to be
"conversant" with both French and English, and permitted
members to address either House in French or in English.
The State Constitutions of 1879 (Article 154), 1898 (Article 165) and
1913 (Article 165), however, all contained provisions requiring the laws,
public records and judicial and legislative written proceedings to be
promulgated reserved and conducted in English. Eventually under the
1921 Constitution, the English language alone came to prevail in the
legislature and the courts of Louisiana, as it did also in public education.
Under Louisiana's present Constitution of 1974, there is no provision on
the official language or the language of the legislature or the courts, but
in fact English alone is the official tongue.
4. Scotland
A similar situation prevails in Scotland, where language, and culture
generally, played a role in the "reception" of Roman law into Scots law in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and more recently, in the
reception of much English common law, thus making Scotlanda "mixed
jurisdiction."
Robin Evans- Jones attributes the first reception largely to the influence
of Scottish lawyers who received their legal education in continental
European universities and then went home with "an intellectual and
cultural preference for the Civil law in which they had been trained."
At that time, such studies were undertaken in Latin, French and/or
Dutch. In the nineteenth century, however, as a result of a "cultural
shift in Scotland from continental Europe towards England," Scottish
lawyers ceased being trained on the Continent and began to see
themselves as part of a worldwide community of English-speaking
lawyers sharing with English and American jurists a legal heritage
associated with justice and freedom. The result of this cultural
transformation has been a slow erosion of the civilian heritage of
Scots law, in favor of its English common law component.
Evans-Jones cites the example of the concept of condictio indebiti,
or unjustified enrichment, which Scottish judges have increasingly
refined and interpreted in accordance with English, rather than
modern civil law.
He observes that the general principle of unjustified enrichment, as
a source of obligations, is really the creation of the later civilian
tradition (not generally taught in Scottish law schools), rather than of
Roman law, and notes:
The fact that English is the only official language in Scotland
obviously makes it much harder to secure the kind of widespread
knowledge of the modern European civil law among Scots lawyers
which Evans-Jones sees as vital to shoring up the foundation of
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Scots law. Nor does it appear likely that any traditional civil law
language (e.g. Latin or French) will be made official by Scotland's
new Parliament, which assumed its legislative powers on July 1,
1999.
It is therefore clear that the presence of two (or more) official and "living"
languages in a mixed jurisdiction makes a major contribution to the
flourishing of the two (or more) legal systems of that jurisdiction, as well
as to the preservation of the genius and tradition underlying each
system.
Conversely, the existence of only one official language in a mixed
jurisdiction tends to foster the erosion of any legal system other than the
one of which that language is the principal medium of expression.
5. Other Jurisdictions
It would be interesting to study the effect on the law of Israel of the
presence in that country of two languages (Hebrew and English), and
the effect on Egypt of the presence of two legal systems (Sharia law
and French civil law) in that country, which has only one official
language (Arabic).
B. Separate Legislatures
Where a mixed jurisdiction has its own legislature separate from the
legislature of the federation (if any) of which it forms part, and separate
from the legislature of any other country, it is easier to secure the future
of the divergent legal traditions of the jurisdiction than it is where only
one assembly exercises legislative power.
Quebec has had its own legislature, separate from the federal
Parliament in Ottawa, from the beginning of Canadian Confederation in
1867. This feature of Canadian federalism has not only helped maintain
Québec's distinct cultural identity as the one jurisdiction in North
America where the language and culture of the majority of the people is
French; it has also served to safeguard and to foster the development of
the civil law tradition of the province, as a mixed jurisdiction, within
Canada.
Louisiana too possesses its own legislature, but the less extensive
legislative authority of the states of the American Union compared to
the provinces of the Canadian federation, coupled with the power of the
federal common law of the United States, makes it more difficult for
Louisiana than for Quebec to preserve and enhance its civilian
tradition.
South Africa, with its own national and provincial legislatures, is also able
to protect and stimulate the growth of its mixed legal system.
Scotland has its own Parliament again after nearly two hundred years
during which its legislation has been enacted by the United Kingdom
Parliament sitting at West minister. It should therefore be able to take
action to develop both the civilian and common law components of
Scots law by legislation. With respect to the civilian heritage, it is to be
hoped that Scots legislators, now that the new Parliament has assumed
its functions, will set in motion a planned process for the codification of
Scottish civil law, entrusting this task to a carefully-selected group of
experts, who will have the general civilian background and language
skills necessary to permit them to draw inspiration from contemporary
codifications in the States of the European Union, as well as from
Louisiana, Québec, Japan, and the Latin American countries, in
drafting a code responding to the needs of contemporary Scotland.
It should be noted, however, that where a mixed jurisdiction lacks its
own legislature, the protection and promotion of its different legal
traditions can nevertheless be supported beneficially by the
involvement of an active law commission or other specialized legal
agency. Separate legislative structures, or at least separate law
enforcement and law reform agencies, are vital to the survival of mixed
jurisdictions.
C. Separate Courts
Apart from distinct languages and separate legislatures, another major
support for a mixed jurisdiction is a separate court system.
In Canada , the administration of justice in the provinces generally falls
under the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. The federal
Government nevertheless has the power to appoint judges of the
superior courts of the provinces (including the provincial courts of
appeal), with the appointment of judges of inferior courts being the
responsibility of the provincial governments. The provincial courts
(superior and inferior) adjudicate all claims within their respective
monetary jurisdiction, whether those claims arise under federal or
provincial law. For this reason, Canada is said to have a "co-operative"
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court system (sometimes called a "unitary" court system, not to be
confused with a unitary State).
There are also two federal courts established by Parliament for the
"better administration of the laws of Canada": the Supreme Court of
Canada(the final court of appeal for Canada since 1949 in all cases
decided by the provincial courts of appeal) and the Federal Court of
Canada (which has both a Trial Division and an Appeal Division and is
a statutory tribunal deciding disputes in a limited number of fields of
federal law, such as industrial property, admiralty matters and
immigration appeals).
As a Canadian province, Quebec has the Court of Quebec (an inferior
court with provincially-appointed judges), as well as the Quebec
Superior Court (a superior court of general jurisdiction) and the Court of
Appeal of Quebec (a superior court of appeal), both of which have
federally appointed judges. These judges decide civil cases arising
under both federal and provincial law, and therefore under both of
Quebec's legal systems. The judges are appointed from among
practising lawyers trained in Quebec civil law, and who are also familiar
with common law, at least to the extent that it underlies much statutory
law, both federal and provincial, which they are called upon to apply.
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest
court of appeal in both civil and criminal cases, ordinarily has three
justices from Quebec who are jurists trained and experienced in the
civil law of the province. They sit with six judges drawn from the
common law provinces. The Quebec justices normally write the leading
decisions in all appeals in cases involving Quebec civil law. The
common law justices are in most cases well versed in the civil law,
however, as are the Quebec judges in the common law. The two legal
traditions therefore continue to be living realities in the highest court of
the land, and they interact with one another without compromising the
integrity of either system.
Louisiana, like other American states, has both federal and state
courts of first instance and appeal. Most of the civil litigation involving
the Louisiana Civil Code is tried in the state courts, whose elected
judges are former lawyers with at least five years of practice in the
state."' As former lawyers, they must have passed Bar examinations
testing their knowledge of civil law before being admitted to legal
practice, as well as those aspects of common law which apply in
Louisiana. Appeals to that Court from decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in disputes governed by the civil law of the state are
usually heard and decided by justices schooled and experienced only
in the common law.
In South Africa , under the 1996 Constitution, the judicial structure of
the Republic consists of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the High Courts, including any high court of appeal that may be
established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts,
the Magistrates' Courts and any other court established or recognized
in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status similar
to either the High Courts or the Magistrates' Courts. The judges of
these courts are trained ex-practitioners of both Roman-Dutch and
common law, as are those of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the
Republic's final court of appeal, and of its Constitutional Court. The
legal profession consists of "advocates" (similar to English barristers)
and "attorneys" (similar to English solicitors). The advocates are
organized into Bar associations or societies (one each at the seat of the
various divisions of the Supreme Court), with the General Council of
the Bar of South Africa acting as the coordinating body of those
associations. The attorneys are organized into one law society for each
province, with the Association of Law Societies playing the coordinating
role. Advocates must pass the National Bar Examination of the General
Council of the Bar, and attorneys must meet certain degree
requirements.
The key part which the South African courts play in maintaining the
country's distinct legal heritage is recognized officially in the 1996
Constitution, which provides at Section 173: "The Constitutional Court,
Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law,
taking into account the interests of justice." (italics added for emphasis).
"Common law" is taken to mean the full South African law, including
both its English and Dutch legacies, as they have evolved in the
Republic.
Scotland too has long had a separate court system, including sheriffs'
courts and the Court of Session, with its Outer and Inner Houses. The
fact that the House of Lords is the final court of appeal for Scotland in
civil cases has sometimes been invoked by authors concerned over the
maintenance of the civilian heritage of Scots law. It is significant that the
Scotland Act 1998 provides that judicial appointments are a devolved
matter, in the sense that although the Lord President of the Court of
Session and the Lord Justice Clerk shall continue to be recommended
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by the Prime Minister to the Queen for appointment, such
recommendations must be based upon a nomination by the Scottish
Executive. The other judges of the Court of Session, sheriff’s principal
and sheriffs shall be recommended for appointment to the Queen by the
First Minister (of Scotland), after consulting the Lord President."
Egypt no longer has its Sharia courts administering Sharia law,
separate from the national courts administering its codes.
Nonetheless, the judges of the unified, national courts possess expertise
in both Sharia and codal law, so that Egypt's mixed legal heritage
appears to be safeguarded for the future.
The survival of mixed jurisdictions is immensely aided by the existence
of separate judicial structures, staffed by judges possessing a
thoroughgoing understanding of the different legal traditions concerned.
Such separate court structures exist in virtually all mixed jurisdictions
today. It is desirable to ensure as well the representation, in the highest
court of the State in which a mixed jurisdiction exists, of a certain
number of judges trained in the two legal systems, especially where
one of the systems applies to a minority population and/or to only one
particular region (e.g. Quebec, Louisiana and Scotland).
Conclusion
This paper has identified some of the principal mixed jurisdictions in the
contemporary world and has sketched (very briefly) the historical
development of their respective mixed legal systems. Special attention
has been devoted to systems combining elements of the common law
tradition with elements of the civilian tradition in either uncodified form
(e.g. Scotland and South Africa) or in codifications (Louisiana and
Quebec).
Some major differences in content, structure and style as between these
two traditions have been explored, and some examples of differences
between the substantive law rules of each have been presented.
The contribution of the lex mercatoria (both ancient and modem) to
reconciling differences between legal traditions has been surveyed.
In this domain, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts 1994, that remarkable synthesis of fundamental values and
ideas on international- trade law achieved by specialists from different
legal systems, is of particular importance, because it is increasingly
accepted as a guideline and applied as a substantive restatement of
supranational commercial norms.
The paper has also noted the recent Canadian project of harmonizing
federal legislation (reflecting common law) with Quebec civil law by
statute. I have also made personal observations on mixed legal
systems, from the viewpoint of a practitioner, a legislator and a law
teacher.
Finally, I have warned that mixed jurisdictions can best survive if each
legal system has its own language, courts and legislature.
The preservation of different languages, cultures and institutions
(legislative and judicial) within a mixed jurisdiction, high quality legal
education and the enactment of codes and statutes, can all be of
significant assistance in the continuance and evolution of a mixed
legal system, in the face of globalization and pressure for
standardization.
Equally important to the survival and development of any mixed legal
system, however, is the awareness of judges, lawyers, legislators and
academics of the distinctiveness of the legal traditions underlying the
system. This must be coupled with a profound commitment to defend,
and indeed to celebrate, the integrity of each of those traditions, so that
they may make their particular contributions to the system as a whole.
For those of us living and practising in mixed jurisdictions, the fate of our
mixed legal systems at the turn of the millennium depends, in the final
analysis, not on our stars, but on ourselves.
Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory Construction,
2003 ed.)
What is a Law?
In its jural and generic sense, it refers to the whole body or system of
law.
In its jural and concrete sense, it means a rule of conduct formulated
and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state.
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Are executive issuances of the President and the rulings of the
Supreme Court be considered laws?
Yes. Laws includes statues enacted by the legislature, presidential
decrees and executive orders issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power, other presidential issuances in the exercise of his
ordinance power, rulings of the Supreme Court construing the law.
Are rules and regulations promulgated by administrative officers
included?
Yes. Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or executive
officers pursuant to a delegated power are considered laws. Same
applies to ordinances passed by sanggunians of local government units.
What is a Statute?
It is an act of the legislature as an organized body, expressed in the
form, and passed according to the procedure, required to constitute it as
part of the law of the land.
Who enacted statutes by the legislature?
1. Philippine Commission
2. Philippine Legislature
3. Batasang Pambansa
4. Congress of the Philippines
What are the executive issuances made during the (1) martial law
and (2) the revolutionary period under the Freedom Constitution?
(1) Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power
(2) Executive Orders issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power
What is a public statute?
It is one which affects the public at large or the whole community.
What is a private statute?
It is one which applies only to a specific person or subject.
What is a general law?
It is one which applies to the whole state and operates throughout the
state alike upon all the people or all of a class.
It is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit
any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.
What is a special law?
It is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a
particular community, individual or thing.
What is a local law?
It is one whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality.
What is a permanent statute?
It is one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until
repealed. It does not terminate by the lapse of a fixed period or by the
occurrence of an event.
What is a temporary statute?
It is a statute whose duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the
statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event.
What are Public Acts?
Statues passed by the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Legislature from 1901 to 1935.
What are Commonwealth Acts?
Laws enacted during the Commonwealth from 1936 to 1946.
What are Republic Acts?
Laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines from 1946 to 1972 and
from 1987 under the 1987 Constitution.
What is a Batas Pambansa?
Laws promulgated by the Batasang Pambansa.
What is Legislative Power and to whom is this power vested?
Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws. It is
vested in the Congress.
Do sanggunians of local government units have legislative power?
Yes. Sangguniang barangay, sangguniang bayan, sangguniang
panlungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan have legislative powers,
within their respective jurisdictions, to enact ordinances enforceable
within the local government units concerned.
Is the legislative power of Congress plenary in character?
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Yes. The legislative power is plenary for all purposes of civil
government, subject only to such limitations as are found in the
Constitution.
Is there a procedure that must be followed for a bill to be passed
as a law?
Yes. A bill may be enacted into law only in the manner the Constitution
requires and in accordance with the procedure therein provided.
Congress also provides in detail the procedure by which a bill may be
enacted into law. Detailed procedures are embodied in the Rules of
both Houses of Congress.
What is a bill?
It is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of
Congress for enactment into law.
Can a bill embrace more than one subject?
No. A bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
Can a private bill originate from the Senate?
No. It must originate from the House of Representatives. Appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives.
May a bill be approved in 2 readings?
No. The Constitution provides that no bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days.
What happens in the (1) First Reading, (2) Second Reading, and (3)
Third Reading?
First reading consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed
by it referral to the appropriate Committee for study and
recommendation.
On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments
proposed by the Committee, if any, unless copies thereof are distributed
and such reading is dispensed with. The bill is subject to debates,
pertinent motions, and amendments.
On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be
submitted for final vote by yeas and nays.
What happens if the other House approves the bill without
amendment?
The bill is passed by Congress and the same will be transmitted to the
President for appropriate action.
What is the function of the Conference Committee?
It settled the differences if the other House introduces amendments and
the House from which it originated does not agree with said
amendments.
When may a bill passed by Congress becomes a law?
(1) When the President signs it;
(2) When the President does not sign nor communicate his veto of
the bill within thirty days after his receipt thereof;
(3) When the vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by two-thirds vote
of all its Members, each House voting separately.
How is the Bill authenticated?
The system of authentication devised is the signing by the Speaker and
the Senate President of the printed copy of the approved bill.
What is the purpose of the authentication?
It is to signify to the President that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by the legislature and is ready for his approval or
rejection.
What is the value of a Journal?
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect.
What is an Enrolled Bill?
It is the bill passed by Congress, authenticated by the Speaker and the
Senate President and approved by the President.
What is the Enrolled Bill Doctrine?
It provides that the act as passed and approved is deemed importing
absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Why is the enrolled bill accorded with conclusive verity?
It is because of the fact that the enrolled bill carries on its face a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
Page 150 of 169
government, charged respectively with the duty of enacting and
executing laws, that it was passed by the assembly.
In case of a discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled bill,
which will prevail?
The enrolled bill prevails, particularly with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered into the legislative journal.
When may there be withdrawal of authentication?
The Speaker and the Senate President may withdraw their signatures
from the signed bull where there is serious and substantial discrepancy
between the text of the bill as deliberated in the legislature and shown
by the journal and that of the enrolled bill.
What is the effect of the withdrawal of authentication?
Such withdrawal renders the bill without attestation and nullifies its
status as an enrolled bill. In such a case, the bill is no longer accorded
absolute verity as regards its text.
What are the two constitutional limitations upon the legislature
with regard title of statute?
(1) The legislature is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
(2) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
What are the purposes of the constitutional requirement that a bill
shall embrace only one subject?
(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation;
(2) To prevent or surprise fraud upon the legislature, by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gave no information, and
which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted;
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of the
legislation that are being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise,
if they shall so desire; and
(4) The title of a statute is used as a guide in ascertaining
legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly
expresses its purpose.
How is the constitutional requirement as to title of a bill construed?
It shall be construed liberally. It should not be given a technical
interpretation.
It is necessary that the Legislature employ precise language in the
title of an enactment?
No. The language used will suffice if the title should meet the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed measure and its operation.
For amendatory acts, is it needed to state the precise nature of the
amendatory act?
No. A title which states that it is an act to amend a specific statute is a
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
Does the constitutional requirement that a bill shall embrace only
one subject have a retroactive effect?
No. The requirement only applies to bill which may thereafter be
enacted into law. It does not apply to laws in force and existing at the
time the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The constitutional requirement has also no application to municipal or
city ordinances.
What is the effect of non-compliance by a statute to the
constitutional requirement on title?
A statute whose title does not conform to the constitutional requirement
or is not related in any manner to its subject is null and void.
Is the effect the same if the subject matter of a statute is not
sufficiently expressed in its title?
No. Where the subject matter of the statute is not sufficiently expressed
in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not expressed therein
is void, leaving the rest in force. UNLESS the invalid provisions are
inseparable from the others, in which case the nullity of the former
vitiates the latter.
What is an Enacting Clause?
It is that part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof which
states the authority by which the act is enacted.
What is a Preamble?
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It is a prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the
purpose, reason, or occasion of remaking the law to which it is prefixed.
What is the Purview of Statute?
The purview or body of a statute is that part which tells what the law is
all about. It should embrace only one subject matter.
What is a Separability Clause?
It is that part of a statute which states that if any provision of the act is
declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby.
It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision
shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act.
What are Presidential Issuances? What do they include?
Presidential issuances are those which the President issues in the
exercise of his ordinance power.
They include executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special
orders.
What are Executive Orders?
Executive Orders are acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers.
What are Administrative Orders?
Administrative Orders are acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head.
What are Proclamations?
Proclamations are acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
statute or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend.
What is a Memorandum Order?
It is the act of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concerns a particular
officer or office of the Government.
What are Memorandum Circulars?
They are acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration which the President desires to bring to the attention of all
or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance.
What are General or Specific Orders?
They are acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
May the Supreme Court promulgate rules which are substantive in
nature?
No. Unlike legislature which may enact laws which are substantive and
procedural, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
does not have the power to promulgate rules which are substantive in
nature.
Is a rule or regulation which restricts or enlarges a statute valid?
No. The rule-making power of a public administrative agency is a
delegated legislative power. It may not issue rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of the statute which
created it.
What are the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power?
(1) It must be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and
(2) It must fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
What are examples of adequate standards?
(1) Simplicity and dignity;
(2) Public interest;
(3) Public welfare;
(4) Interests of law and order;
(5) Justice and equity and substantial merit of the case;
(6) Adequate and efficient instruction.
Can there be a rule promulgated to amend an Act of Congress? No.
The power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.
Page 152 of 169
Its terms must be followed for an administrative agency cannot amend
an Act of Congress.
In case of a discrepancy between the law and an implementing rule
and regulation, which will prevail?
The law prevails.
What is the difference between the (1) promulgation of rules and
regulations by the administrative agency, and (2) rendition of an
opinion by an administrative agency?
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. On the other
hand, when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law.
What is the value of an administrative interpretation of the law?
It is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.
What is the smallest legislative body?
Sangguniang barangay.
Which bodies review a barangay ordinance?
A barangay ordinance is subject to review by the sangguniang bayan or
sangguniang panlungsod, as the case may be, to determine whetherit is
consistent with the law or with municipal or city ordinance.
To whom is the power to enact municipal ordinance given?
The power to enact municipal ordinance is lodged with the sangguniang
bayan.
What is the require vote for the passage of an ordinance? Majority
vote of the members of the sangguniang bayan present and voting,
there being a quorum.
Can the veto of the mayor be overridden?
Yes. The sangguniang bayan may, by two-thirds vote of all members,
override the veto of the mayor. In which case, it shall become effective
for all legal intents and purposes.
Who reviews the approved municipal ordinance?
The sangguninang panlalawigan.
To whom is the power to pass city ordinance given?
The power to pass city ordinance is vested in the sangguniang
panlungsod. The required vote to pass an ordinance is the same as that
of the municipal ordinance.
To whom is the power to pass provincial ordinance given?
The power to pass provincial ordinance is vested to the sangguniang
panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the province.
Can the sangguniang panlalawigan override a vetoed ordinance?
Yes. A vetoed ordinance may be repassed by the sangguniang
panlalwigan by a two-thirds vote of all its members.
MODULE 5
V. ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS
STARE DECISIS
Fermin v. People
G.R. No. 157643
28 March 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo
Gutierrez, 2 criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli
Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
Fermin was charged being the publisher of “Gossip Tabloid” while Tugas
was editor-in-chief.
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is
improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that
she is evading her conviction in an estafa case here in the Philippines
for she and husband Eddie Gutierrez have more problems/cases to
confront there. This was said to be due to their, especially Annabelle's,
using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to remit proceeds to the
manufacturing company of the cookware they were selling and not being
on good terms with the latter.
Page 153 of 169
The Court of Appeals acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation
but Fermin's conviction was affirmed.
Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition. She
argues that she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of
the article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom
of the press.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cristy Fermin is guilty of libel. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is not required,
if the accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or
proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication. Petitioner was not
only the “publisher,” but also the “president” and “chairperson.”
Petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had
actual knowledge and participation. The elements of libel were present.
1) Evident imputation of the crime of malversation (converting
money for personal use), of vices or defects for being fugitives
from the law (evading prosecution in America) and of being a
wastrel
2) Attribution made publicly. Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
circulation.
3) The victims were identified and identifiable.
4) The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
5) Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself; the imputations
were false.
6) Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill against complainants
during the electoral campaign as Fermin is a close friend of
Eddie's opponent in the Congressional race.
While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities
in the entertainment business, media people do not have the unbridled
license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing
fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in
print, about their personal lives.
Note: CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the
SC cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas
because with his acquittal by the CA as that would run afoul of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation
G.R. No. 159422
28 March 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Remington steel leased units 963, 964 and 966 of a building owned by
the Manila Downtown YMCA in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila.
Units 964 and 966 were on the ground floor which also served as
passageway to the second floor unit 963.
The lease contract over unit 963 was terminated by YMCA on February
27, 1997.
On March 24, 1997, Remington filed with the MeTC a case for Fixing of
Lease Period over unit 963.
On April 8, 1997, YMCA filed in the same court an action for Unlawful
Detainer involving unit 963 against Remington.
On June 23, 1998, Remington filed a Formal Surrender of the Leased
Premises, opting to surrender possession of units 964 and 966.
Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966
as passageway to second floor unit 963. It kept the premises padlocked
and failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises.
On August 11, 1998, MeTC rendered a decision extending the lease for
three years from finality of the decision the lease period on second floor
unit 963 and dismissed YMCA’s complaint for ejectment.
On August 21, 1998, Remington filed in the MeTC a Motion to
Continue Passageway alleging that it had no means of ingress or egress
to second floor unit 963.
Page 154 of 169

As reported by a Commissioner who conducted an ocular inspection,
Remington was still in possession of the keys to units 964 and 966
because YMCA failed to provide adequate passageway to unit 963.
The records of the case were forwarded to the RTC in connection with
the appeals taken by the parties.
RTC granted a longer extension period of five years for unit 963 and
ordered YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between unit 964
and 966.
YMCA appealed to the CA, which held that the lower courts had
authority to fix an extension of the lease period.
However, CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, as the
continuation of the lease was no longer tenable after the lapse of six
years, since the parties’ formal contract had already expired.
In the meantime, that the case in the CA was pending, YMCA filed in
MeTC-Manila two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to evict
Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966. The cases were initially
consolidated but eventually, they were tried separately.
Both MeTC-Manila branches which tried the two cases ordered
Remington to vacate the premises.
Remington appealed both decisions to the RTC-Manila, who both held to
reverse the respective decision of the lower court and dismissed the two
complaints for unlawful detainer.
YMCA filed separate motions for reconsiderations, which were denied.
YMCA then filed separate petitions for review in the CA.
CA dismissed outright the petition involving unit 964 on the ground that
William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and Certification on
Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of authority to file the
petition for review.
YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration, appending thereto a
Secretary’s Certificate executed by YMCA’s Corporate Secretary
attesting to a Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William
Golangco to prepare and file the petition for review.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Citing Spouses Melo v. CA,
the CA underscored the mandatory nature of the requirement that the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should be annexed to, or
simultaneously filed with the petition and that subsequent compliance
therewith cannot excuse a party’s failure to comply in the first instance.
Thus, YMCA appealed to SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in dismissing YMCA’s petition
for failure to attach a proof of authority of the signatory to the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court require that a petition for
review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a
certificate of non-forum shopping.
These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is
sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.
The rule against forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different
fora, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirements for Verification vis-a-vis Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.
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Non-compliance with the Verification does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective, hence, the court may order its correction, or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be better served. On
the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
petition.
However, jurisprudence instructs that the rule on certification against
forum shopping may be relaxed on the grounds of “substantial
compliance” or “special circumstance or compelling reasons.”
As with previous jurisprudence, YMCA rectified its failure to submit proof
of Golangco’s authority to sign the Verification and Certification on Non-
Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its Motion for
Reconsideration a Secretary’s Certificate issued by its Corporate
Secretary stating that Golangco had been authorized by YMCA’s Board
of Directors.
CA’s reliance on Melo was misplaced because in Melo there no
rectification made as compared with this case.
Due to a favorable decision obtained by YMCA in the case involving unit
966, the present case is also ruled in YMCA’s favor due to stare decisis
et non quieta movere which means “to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established.”
Under the doctrine, when the SC has once laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same.
Stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved, as
compared with res judicata which is based upon the judgment.
Since the facts of the case at hand are substantially the same with the
facts of the case involving unit 966, the petition is granted.
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v. Pagdanganan
G.R. No. 167866
12 October 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) approved and supervised under-the-crown promotional
campaign entitled Number Fever sometime in 1992. It undertook to give
away cash prizes to holders of specially marked crowns and resealable
caps of PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e., Pepsi, 7-Up, Mirinda and
Mountain Dew.
On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the
notorious three-digit combination 349 as the winning number for the next
day, 26 May 1992. On the same night of the announcement, however,
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO learned of reports that numerous
people were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable
caps with incorrect security codes L- 2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. Upon
verification from the list of the 25 pre-selected winning three-digit
numbers, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI learned that the
three-digit combination 349 was indeed thewinning combination for 26
May 1992 but the security codes L-2560- FQ and L-3560-FQ do not
correspond to that assigned to the winning number 349.
Respondent Pagdanganan demanded from petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO and the DTI the payment of the corresponding cash prize of
each of his 349 bearing crown, specifically, four 7- Up crowns and two
Mirinda crowns, each displaying the cash prize of P1,000,000.00 in
addition to one 7-Up crown showing the cash prize of P100,000.00.
Respondent filed Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of Pasig
City but the case was dismissed. Their Motion for Reconsideration is
also denied and they appeal to the Court of Appeals that reversed and
set aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from raising STARE DECISIS.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De
Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts
concerning the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and
Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning 349 Pepsi/7-
Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps.
Said crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be
cashed in by petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the
correct security code assigned to such winning combination. As a result,
the rejected crown and/or resealable cap holders filed separate
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complaints for specific performance/ sum of money/ breach of contract,
with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is well
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit;
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial
pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed
reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory
decisions those decisions considered to have attained the status of
judicial precedents in so far as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For
it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In
the case at bar, therefore, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling
that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in
order to become entitled to the amount printed on a 349 bearing crown
and/or resealable cap.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle
or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.
This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is
even said that such decisions assume the same authority as the statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of
those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
RES JUDICATA
Facura v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 166495
16 February 2011
FACTS: Local water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-
owned and controlled corporation chartered under Presidential Decree
(P.D) No. 198, as amended. Atty. Rodolfo De Jesus was the Deputy
Administrator for Administrative Services while Atty. Edelwina Parungao
was the Manager of the Human Resources Management Department.
De Jesus was dismissed from service.
Under the CSC Accreditation Program, LWUA has been granted the
authority to take final action on appointment papers effective January 1,
1997. LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Jamora (Jamora) granted De Jesus
the authority to sign/approve and issue appointment papers of
appointees to vacant plantilla positions in LWUA which have been
previously cleared or approved in writing by the Administrator or the
Board of Trustees.
Prior to the grant of authority to De Jesus, Jamora requested the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for authority to hire
confidential staff for the LWUA Board of Trustees, an exemption from
Administrative Order No. 5 which prohibited the hiring of new personnel.
While waiting for the reply of DBM, Jamora directed the office headed by
De Jesus and to process payment of salaries and allowances of (2)
newly appointed confidential staff in an inter-office memorandum dated
23 October 2001.
On 11 December 2001, the DMB granted the request of Jamora. On the
same day, LWUA board members issued memoranda containing the
retroactive appointments of their confidential staff.
It was explained that the appointment papers with retroactive effectivity
dates violated the provisions of CSC Res. No. 967701 and Rule 7,
Section 11 of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments. For said
reason, LWUA accreditation could be cancelled and the Administrator be
held personally liable for the invalidated appointments.
The appointments of the Board’s (9) confidential staff were re-issued
bearing the date 12 December 2001 to meet the requirements of the
CSC. The appointed employees started rendering services as early as
August even though their appointments were effective only as of
December. Their appointments cannot be retroactive and thus,
overpayments were made.
A Joint Affidavit-Complaint before the Ombudsman was filed against De
Jesus and Parungao charging them with 1) violation of Section 3(e) of
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R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave
misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously
undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous
employees of LWUA.
Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers
were fabricated and fraudulent as they were made to appear to have
been signed/approved on the dates stated, and not on the date of their
actual issuance.
They questioned the issuance of the fraudulent appointments in favor of
the nine (9) confidential staff, to the prejudice of the government in the
amount of P692,657.31, as these were used as basis for the payment of
their back salaries.
De Jesus argues that the determination of probable cause for the filing
of criminal charges should bind the disposition of the factual issues in
the administrative case.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman contends that the dismissal of the
criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the administrative charges. It is argued that the
absence of criminal intent was the only issue resolved and it is not a
mandatory requirement for a finding of the falsification of official
documents as an administrative offense.
As to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by
the Ombudsman, and nine (9) informations for falsification of public
documents were separately filed against De Jesus and Parungao with
the Sandiganbayan. The evidence was found to be insufficient to sustain
a prima facie case. The decision in favor of De Jesus stated that there
was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or
mens rea was present, finding that nothing in the two sets of
appointment papers constituted an absolutely false narration of facts.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of res judicata applies – Yes
HELD:
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules:
(1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and
their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal; and
(2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject
matters of the two suits are the same.
Rule 1 is referred to as “bar by former judgment” as found in section 47
(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court while Rule 2 as found in Section 47
(c) of said rule is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”
In the case at hand, a proceeding for the determination of probable
cause and an administrative case, necessarily involving different
causes of action, the applicable principle is conclusiveness of
judgment.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim
or cause of action.
Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers
constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts is binding on this case,
but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public documents is
concerned, and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the
other acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in
the complaint.
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu
G.R. No. 157557
10 March 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
This case is the result of two previous cases. In the first case of
Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), it was ruled that therein petitioners,
Francisca Valdehueza, et al ., were not entitled to recover possession of
lot 939 in Cebu City but only to demand its fair market value. In the
second case of Yu v. Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals annulled the
subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, et al., to herein
respondents, Ramon Yu, et al., and held that the latter were not
purchasers in good faith.
Page 158 of 169
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and
remanded the case to the trial court. Now the case is before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the action barred by res judicata. (YES)
(2) W/N the respondents entitled to reversion of the expropriated
property. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on
the ground of res judicata and maintains that respondents are bereft of
any right to assert ownership as the sale in their favor was invalidated in
Yu v. Republic.
Petitioner further asserts that the expropriation of Lot No. 939 was
absolute and unconditional. Thus, no reversion could be legally claimed
despite the subsequent sale or reversion of the other nearby lots.
Respondents counter that the action is not barred by res judicata
because the abandonment of the government of the public purpose
constitutes a new cause of action. Further, respondents contend that the
determination of their right to reacquire or repossess the lot necessitates
a full blown trial.
Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Only the first three elements are present in this case. The identity of the
causes of action is at issue here.
Res judicata has two concepts:
1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c)
Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because
respondents again seek to enforce a right based on a sale which has
been nullified by a final and executory judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to
reversion has been nullified, they no right over the property and thus,
have no legal personality for the action of reversion of expropriated
property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the respondents
are not the real parties-in -interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of
the case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no
cause of action.
PETITION GRANTED. DECISION OF CA SET ASIDE.
LAW OF THE CASE
People of the Philippines v. Olarte
G.R. No. L-22465
February 28, 1967
FACTS:
This is the second time the present case is brought on appeal to this
Supreme Court on the identical issue of prescription.
The antecedents of this case are briefly stated in the decision of the
previous appeal (L-13027):
• Defendant 'Ascension P. Olarte is charged with libel. It is alleged
in the information that on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 and
subsequently thereafter said defendant had willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously written certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous and
derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris.
• It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris lodged the
corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan,
Page 159 of 169
who assigned it to an assistant provincial fiscal; that upon the latter's
advice, on February 22, 1956, she filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against Ascencion
P. Olarte that the defendant waived her right to a preliminary
investigation, whereupon the justice of the peace court forwarded the
case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in which the
corresponding information was filed on July 3, 1956; that the defendant
seasonably moved to quash the information upon the ground of
prescription of the offense; and that, after due hearing, the court of first
instance granted said motion and dismissed the case, with costs de
oficio. Hence, the appeal by complainant Miss Meris.
This Court, likewise, stated in said previous appeal:
• The issue in the lower court, as well as in this appeal, is whether
the statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint
with the justice of the peace court on February 22, 1956, as claimed by
appellant, or continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information
was filed with the court of first instance, as contended by the defendant.
His Honor, the trial Judge adopted the latter alternative, and,
accordingly, held that the prescriptive period had expired before the filing
of said information. (Emphasis supplied)
Resolving the issue thus posed on the basis of the abovequoted facts,
this Court, rendered a decision, promulgated on June 30, 1960, the
dispositive portion of which reads: filing of compliant interrupted the
running of the statute of limitations, thus not extinguished and thus
order appealed from is reversed.
The above ruling became final and executory, and, pursuant thereto, the
lower court set the case for hearing on the merits and the prosecution
started presenting its evidence.
However, on August 26, 1963, the defense presented anew a motion to
quash the information, supplemented by another motion of September 5,
1963, on the ground of prescription of the offense charged in the
information. In said motions, the defense invoked the subsequent ruling
of this Court in the case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456,
promulgated on June 29, 1963.
After due hearing on this incident, the lower court issued the appealed
order, dated January 16, 1964, sustaining the defense's new motion to
quash upon the ground of prescription.
In this order, the lower court, after comparing and finding that the set of
facts obtaining in the case at bar is practically identical with those of
the Coquia case, opined that inasmuch as the latter is inconsistent with
or contradicts the previous decision (L-13027) in the case at bar,
promulgated on June 30, 1960, the 1963 ruling in the Coquia case
indicates that this Supreme Court intended to abandon the one made in
1960 in the first appeal of this same case (L-13027). Hence this appeal.
Issues: The only issue presented for determination in this appeal is the
effect of this Court's ruling on the first appeal to this very same case (L-
13027) and whether the decision in the later case of People vs. Coquia,
G.R. No. L-15456, June 29, 1963, warrants the dismissal of the
information in the case at bar on the ground of prescription. No.
Held:
Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered on the first
appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if erroneous, it may no
longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago. A
subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but
certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined (People
vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).
• 'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330). (cited in Pinuila case, supra)
More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court in Pomeroy vs.
Director of Prisons, 1,14284-85, February 24, 1960 which this Court
quoted and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts from People vs.
Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, jam cit.:
• 'The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government
from the order of dismissal, holding that said appeal did not place the
appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and
concurred in by six justices as against three dissenters headed by the
Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long
become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on
double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so,
it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the law
may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and
Page 160 of 169
conclusively determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in that
appeal is now the law of the case.'
It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not
retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same
proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case
should be civil or criminal in nature.
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that
there are two lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining
whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted.
One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the
justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the
prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases
cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs.
Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of decisions declares that to
produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in
the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People
vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-
15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance
for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case
on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
"shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense
may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted
prescription " shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby
indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed
must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on
the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise.
But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the
proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court
should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been
shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the
doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del Rosario L-15140, December 29,
1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.
And it having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the
criminal action here was not barred, the issue of prescription is utterly
foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the
merits.
Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and
reversed, and the records of this case ordered remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings conformably with this decision. With costs
against defendant-appellee.
LANDMARK CASE
Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019
4 January 1995
FACTS:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before a MTC judge, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents in Iloilo City. They eventually gave birth to a boy, named Leouel
Santos, Jr.
However, the marriage did not last, because of the frequent interference
by Julia's parents into the young spouses' family affairs. Occasionally,
the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's
Page 161 of 169
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Julia
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
but he failed.
Returning to the Philippines without Julia, Leouel filed with the RTC, a
complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code".
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that
it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Julia was psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
Although, the Family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity," the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee provides an insight on the import of the provision.
Indeed, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application.
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances.
Thus, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
Page 162 of 169
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If such psychoses should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano
G.R. No. 167459
26 January 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J:
FACTS:
Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the
AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-
out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy
and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge
Cesar S. Principe in Basilan.
The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any
debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found
an abandoned and neglected one-year -old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit
with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan.
Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in
the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she
had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her
ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male
visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass
from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona
away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to
Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is
currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97 -2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
who testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the
petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in
no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition
and nullified the parties’ marriage on the finding that the evidence
presented Gravity, Antecedence, and Incurability.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the
Court of Appeals which sided with the OSG’s contention that the trial
court erred in granting the petition despite Jose’s abject failure to
discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2000.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court
of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10,
2005.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE/S:
Page 163 of 169
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the
trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
• A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outburst" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
Page 164 of 169
 General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9 (Citations omitted.)
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and
not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by
judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.
Petition Denied.
LEADING CASE AND ABANDONMENT OF DOCTRINE
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 217126-27
10 November 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation
report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six Administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for
violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds and
Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The TRO
was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by Binay
against the Ombudsman and various other officials for deliberately
refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to course to the
petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the case
was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance , is the Ombudsman
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari. (YES)
(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. (YES)
(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (NO)
(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and illegal. (Premature
Issue)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general rule a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can still be
considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
Page 165 of 169
j) Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo
has no jurisdiction.
k) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
l) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable.
m) Where under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration would
be useless.
n) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief.
o) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
p) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of due
process.
q) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object.
r) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involves both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort to
certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is based
on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same states:
Section 14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the Ombudsman
by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the same except for
decisions or findings taken to the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45 appeal can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts and not against
“findings” of quasi judicial agencies including the Office of the
Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides that increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence is
in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 14
of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, therefore it is concluded
that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition
should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65 petition is
the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared
unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin
in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first paragraph of
Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices independence
under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office from judicial
intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman as an authority
to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses, of the
bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman
independence covers three things:
4. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot be
abolished nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges
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 be removed, altered or modified by law unless the Constitution itself
allows, or an amendment thereto is made
5. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its funds
for purposes germane to its function.
6. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means that
those within the ranks of the Office can only be disciplined by
internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. This is because the courts are apolitical bodies which
may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman is not exempt from
judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislative and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An
example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs of
preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’ power
to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’ constitutional
rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a court to exercise
its full functions.
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of procedure
without the consent of the Court, the CA had the authority to issue the
injunctive writs.
FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned thus
the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The purpose of
a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who is being
suspended from using the powers of his office to influence witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to nullify the
preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr re-election
in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
Project. The CA found it sufficient that the application of the condonation
doctrine was enough to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v.
Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
4. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct, also offenses committed or acts done during the previous
term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
5. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of previous
Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for these aforesaid acts.
6. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to
know the life and character of their candidates of their right to elect
officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the
legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is a
public trust. The LGC provides that an elective official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in
office etc. The LGC also provides that those officials removed from office
as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any
elective local office.
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Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including the
ones cited above, the Çourt concluded that the doctrine of condonation
is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local officials administrative liability for a Misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term or another elective post. There is no support to the
statement in the case of Pascual that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to
be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal basis that election implied
condonation. There is also no presumption in any rule of law that the
electorate upon re-election an official, have disregarded or forgave the
officials faults. The electorate rarely has full knowledge of a officials
misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are shrouded in secrecy.
Condonation cannot be subscribed to because it implied forgiveness,
which requires knowledge of the acts being forgiven for and in the
absence of knowledge of these acts there can be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases after
this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also done for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office.
However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings in the resolution,
makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to comment, the CA
has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr contempt petition. Thus
in this comment, the Ombudsman may raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt to not give due course to
the same contempt proceedings. Absent any indication that the
contempt petition has been given due course by the CA it would then be
premature for the Court to rule on the issue.
DURA LEX, SED LEX / CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 180016
29 April 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lito Corpuz met with complainant Danilo Tangcoy at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olangapo City. Corpuz approached Tangcoy
and offered for him to sell his jewelry on a commission basis. Tangcoy
agreed.
Tangcoy gave Corpuz a diamond ring, 2 bracelets and a necklace,
collectively amounting to P98,000.00 for the latter to sell. It was agreed
that Corpuz would have to return the items if unsold within 60 days.
The period expired, however Corpuz neither paid Tangcoy nor returned
to jewelry.
Tangcoy then filed a case for estafa against Corpuz.
The RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt; the CA affirmed
such decision. The case was thus elevated to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when they accepted as evidence mere
machine copies, as violation of the Best Evidence Rule. (NO)
(2) Whether or not CA erred in accepting the information even though
the date of occurrence written was different from the date of
occurrence testified. (NO)
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in finding the demand for the return of
the jewelry was proved. (NO)
(4) Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the accused was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and applying the penalty stated by the
RTC. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Page 168 of 169
FIRST ISSUE:
The petitioner is right in stating that the receipt presented as evidence of
the transfer of the jewelry was not the best evidence as such were
merely photocopies. However, the petitioner was not able to timely
object to the admissibility of the photocopied receipt during both the
marking of the evidence as well as the formal offer of such evidence.
Such non-objection renders the evidence admissible.
SECOND ISSUE:
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner
and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime,
hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence
of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. Moreover, the said date (July 5, 1991) is also near the due
date within which petitioner should have delivered the proceeds or
returned the said jewelry as testified upon by Tangcoy, hence, there was
sufficient compliance with the rules.
The elements of estafa are as follows: The elements of estafa with
abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender. Such elements do not render the date of occurrence/time as
material to the consummation of the crime.
THIRD ISSUE:
During the testimony of Tangcoy, the court inferred that Tangcoy was
able to demand from Corpuz twice the jewelry albeit orally. This is
allowed since there is no need for a written demand for the return of the
objects in question.
When the law does not qualify, we should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The issue in question relates more to the penalty to be adjudged to
Corpuz than the finding of guilt. The penalty was discussed as it was
raised that the values stated in the law under the crime of estafa was
pegged based on the values during the creation of the law in 1930.
Thus, there is a difference in the application due to the change in the
purchasing of the power since then. Some justices would not want to
dwell in the issue as they justified that such may be tantamount to
judicial legislation and would therefore violate the separation of powers
in the government.
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in
the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise,
amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction
which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court
should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-
equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of
judicial legislation.
It was further discussed that any acceptable solution could not be solved
by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value
of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors
and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and
properly adjusted. It is up to the legislative branch to correct the values
indicated in the laws but for now, the courts would only interpret and
provide the penalty as indicated in the current writing of the law.
Page 169 of 169