Kantian Categorical Imperative: Death Penalty

The Kantian categorical imperative (CI) is very thorough on the need for legal

institutions and punishment systems. Kant surmises that, if logical agents cannot circumvent

interacting, they are categorically needed to make legal institutions. These constitutional centers

are a necessary environment for exercising external freedoms. Thus, the categorical need to set

up statutory institutions as rational beings stems from the necessity to value freedom and our

commitment to actualize it. Now, the presence of legal institutions means the need for laws,

including a punishment system. The punishment must generate harm to the offender proportional

to the damage done to their victims. For instance, if we graded crime on a scale of 1-10, a 10-

rated crime deserves a 10-rated punishment. However, the sentence must be morally permissible.

I argue that execution is not a morally justifiable punishment. Kant's whole argument is

that legal institutions ensure external freedoms, and executing a prisoner removes external

freedom, essentially going against the law’s intention. The death penalty is thus contradictory in

itself. Similarly, citizens have a duty not to take life. Kant’s CI forbids taking persons as a mere

means to an end. Taking another person’s life is immoral as it destroys an end in itself. It

transforms a moral agent into a corpse, which translates into treating humans as mere means.

Likewise, even if the execution was morally acceptable, Kant's legal systems are composed of

fallible actors. Although Kant's reasoning may be legitimate in theory, it falls short to justify

capital punishment in the imperfect real world. To put it bluntly, it assumes the guilt of the

prisoner is always a foregone conclusion.

Reference
Yost, B. S. (2010). Kant’s justification for the death penalty reconsidered. Kantian Review,

15(2). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415400002417