Article 315, par.

2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when committed as
follows:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.

The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3)
the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and
was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.21

In other words, to sustain a charge and subsequent conviction for estafa under the aforecited
provision, respondent must be alleged to have actually made fraudulent representations which, in
turn, caused petitioner to part with its money. It is not enough that such fraudulent acts be presumed
from either respondent’s admission of knowledge about the alleged fraud or his relation to the
company.

The fraud must be alleged to have been personally committed by respondent prior to or

simultaneously with the payment or delivery of money. If there be no such prior or simultaneous
false statement or fraudulent representation, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent
or suspicious it may appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for that class of estafa.22

G.R. No. 162126             December 9, 2004

RCL FEEDERS PTE., LTD., petitioner, 

vs.
HON. HERNANDO PEREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice
and FELICIANO ZULUAGA,respondents.

Petitioners presented themselves to Lourdes as persons possessing the authority and capacity to
engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access Marketing. This was a clear
misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not only of Erlinda’s complaint but also of
several others as regards the failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought.
Lourdes relied on their misrepresentations and parted with her money. Almost a week passed by,
but petitioners and Rule did not deliver the said motor vehicle. They also did not fulfill their
subsequent promise to provide a replacement or to refund her payment. When Lourdes visited the
office of Final Access Marketing to demand the return of her money, it was already closed. She
could not locate any of them except for Franco who denied any wrongdoing. Consequently, she
suffered damage.

If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlinda’s complaint to petitioners and the 12
other similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" regarding undelivered vehicles should have dissuaded
petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact that they continued to offer for sale a second-
hand car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit and their complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa.
The manner in which petitioners transacted business with Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their
awareness of 12 other similar complaints with "Hoy Gising" were sufficient to establish the existence
of a modus operandi.

Franco’s attempt to escape culpability by feigning ignorance of the previously failed transactions on
the delivery of vehicles by Final Access Marketing cannot be countenanced. As gleaned from the
testimony of Erlinda, Franco was already with Final Access Marketing at the time these transactions
occurred. She was therefore familiar with the company’s procedure and policy on the sales of
second-hand vehicles. She even accompanied Lourdes to showrooms and introduced her to Besario
and Rule.

As an employee of Final Access Marketing, Franco was expected to be familiar with its daily
activities.  It would be unworthy of belief that she did not know of the complaints for the unexplained
lavvphi1

failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver vehicles to its customers. Human nature and experience
would compel her to make queries on her own to discover the reasons for the non-delivery of the
vehicles. Her continued insistence in soliciting Lourdes as a client by introducing herself as an
Assistant Administrative Coordinator of Final Access Marketing with the ability to provide financing
for a vehicle of her choice is therefore indicative of fraudulent misrepresentation.

The petitioners also contend that they are not criminally liable since the transaction with Lourdes
was a contract of sale. This contention does not deserve serious consideration. While the fact that
they entered into a contract with Lourdes cannot be denied, the transaction transpired due to their
deceit. It was their misrepresentation that induced Lourdes to sign the Sales Proposal agreement
and part with her money.

In denying any criminal wrongdoing, petitioners blame their co-accused, Torres, whom they claim to
be the owner of Final Access Marketing. The shifting of blame is common among conspirators in
their attempt to escape liability. It is a desperate strategy to compensate for their weak defense. We
are not readily influenced by such a proposition since its "obvious motive is to distort the truth and
frustrate the ends of justice."14

These four elements are present in the instant case: (1) False pretenses were employed by
petitioner and his co-accused to deceive private complainant into purchasing the stolen Nissan
Pathfinder; (2) False pretenses were employed prior to, and simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale
of the Nissan Pathfinder; (3) Private complainant relied on false pretenses of petitioner and co-
accused, inducing him to part with his money due to the misrepresentation employed by the
perpetrators of the fraud; and (4) As a result of false pretenses and misrepresentations by petitioner
and co-accused, private complainant suffered damages in the amount of P480,000.00.