Soc Policy Adm - 2023 - Busemeyer - Knowledge Skills or Social Mobility Citizens Perceptions of The Purpose of Education

Received: 30 May 2022 Revised: 25 November 2022 Accepted: 2 January 2023
DOI: 10.1111/spol.12897
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Knowledge, skills or social mobility? Citizens'

perceptions of the purpose of education
Marius R. Busemeyer 1 | Elvire Guillaud 2
1
Department of Politics and Public
Administration, University of Konstanz, Abstract
Konstanz, Germany This article explores individual views of the purpose of
2
CES and Sciences-Po, LIEPP, University Paris education. Most existing research focuses on attitudes and
1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France
policy preferences; while these types of perceptions have so
Correspondence far been largely overlooked due to a lack of data. Our analy-
Marius R. Busemeyer, University of Konstanz,
Konstanz, Germany.
sis of original survey data in eight Western European coun-
Email: marius.busemeyer@uni-konstanz.de tries shows that personal socioeconomic factors and
Funding information
ideological predispositions shape these individual opinions.
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Individuals with higher levels of education and income are
Grant/Award Number: EXC 2035/1; H2020
European Research Council, Grant/Award more likely to view education as aimed at expanding
Number: Starting Grant 311769 knowledge as goal by itself, and less likely to view it as a tool
to promote intergenerational social mobility. Left-leaning
individuals are also more likely to regard education as a goal
by itself, and less likely to view it as conferring useful labour
market skills for the younger generation. Finally, we investi-
gate the relationship between these different views and indi-
vidual preferences for social policies. Our results show that
the perception of education as promoting intergenerational
mobility is strongly associated with support for passive trans-
fers, while the perception of education as conferring market-
able skills increases support for workfare policies. Social
investment policies, because they are widely supported in
the population, are not linked to specific views on education.
KEYWORDS
education policy, knowledge, marketable skills, social mobility,
social policy preferences
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
© 2023 The Authors. Social Policy & Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
122 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/spol Soc Policy Adm. 2023;57:122–143.

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BUSEMEYER AND GUILLAUD 123
1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N
There is a long tradition in comparative welfare state research studying the dynamics of individual-level attitudes
and preferences towards social policies (see Svallfors, 2012, for a comprehensive overview). After the analysis of the
institutional and political linkages between education and other parts of the welfare state had been neglected for a
long time (Busemeyer, 2014; Iversen & Stephens, 2008), there has been a surge of studies on individual-level atti-
tudes and public opinion on education policy in recent years (Busemeyer, 2012; Busemeyer et al., 2020;
Garritzmann, 2015; Lergetporer et al., 2018; West & Woessmann, 2021). These studies have provided important
insights into how policy preferences are associated with and affected by individual socio-economic characteristics
and normative views as well as macro-level institutional contexts.
This paper adds a new, but complementary perspective to these debates. While also addressing the broader
issue of the relationship between education and social policy at the centre of this special issue, our paper focuses on
public opinion as a potential arena for mitigating the ‘efficiency-inclusion tension’ (see Carstensen's &
Emmenegger's, 2023; introduction to this special issue) in education and social policy. Even if—as the research
reviewed in the introductory paper of this issue shows—education to a large extent contributes to social inclusion as
well as economic efficiency, the question remains of whether citizens actually appreciate these functions and con-
sider them to be most important aspects of education. In short, what are citizens' views regarding the purpose of
education in terms of addressing efficiency (skill formation to the labour market) and inclusion (promoting social
mobility)? And—complementing these instrumental perspectives—do citizens also perceive education in non-
functional terms, regarding the expansion of knowledge as a desired goal by itself?
This is an important issue, which has largely been overlooked in the existing literature (with very few exceptions,
such as Scharf et al., 2019). Citizens' perceptions of the purpose of education matter because they at least indirectly
influence political and public debates about education reform, reflecting cultural predispositions towards the role of
education in society and shaping the partisan politics of education reform as well as the role of interest groups
therein (Busemeyer et al., 2020). Of course, educational institutions may also shape these cultural attitudes in the
long term, and thereby partly explain cross-country differences in views about education as macro-level policies and
institutions feed back onto micro-level attitudes and perceptions. Our study, being based on cross-sectional observa-
tional survey data, takes an agnostic position regarding the causal direction of these associations focusing rather on
highlighting correlational patterns.
The lack of studies on citizens' perceptions of the purpose of education can be explained by the lack of compara-
tive survey data on this issue. In order to address this research gap, we make use of a novel data set on public opin-
ion and citizen attitudes towards education policy in eight Western European countries—the INVEDUC (‘Investing in
Education in Europe’) dataset (Busemeyer et al., 2018).1 Probing individual perceptions of the purpose of education,
we find in the empirical analysis that these perceptions are strongly influenced by past individual educational experi-
ences and material self-interest as well as the individuals' general ideological orientation. Furthermore, while noting
some cross-country differences in perceptions, we find a surprisingly large cross-national consensus in the sense that
a relative majority of citizens regards the main purpose of education to be the preparation of students for the labour
market. In contrast, relatively fewer citizens subscribe to the view that the pursuit of knowledge and education
should be regarded as a goal by itself or as a tool for intergenerational social mobility. Finally, we find that percep-
tions of the purpose of education are systematically related to social policy preferences, giving credence to our claim
that implicit views about the normative underpinnings of existing institutions infuse reform debates in a significant
manner.
In the following, we first provide a short review of the relevant literature as well as the contours of our theoreti-
cal framework. The subsequent empirical analysis first provides some descriptive data on the variation of citizens'
perceptions across countries and then delves into a multivariate regression analysis of individual determinants of
perceptions. We finally investigate the impact of citizens' perceptions on individual preferences for social policies.
124 BUSEMEYER AND GUILLAUD
2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 | The goals of education
In the following, we discuss possible determinants of individual perceptions of the purposes and goals of education.
To start, we identify three broad goals of education. The definition of these goals is inspired by literature on values
related to education (Scharf et al., 2019) and recent work on the contribution of skill formation institutions towards
both the efficiency of labour markets as well as social inclusion (Carstensen & Ibsen, 2021). The first goal relates to
the promotion of education as a goal by itself, that is, a contribution to self-actualization. Individuals can (and do)
perceive the immediate benefits of education as a resource for subjective well-being via ‘motivation, enjoyment and
the absence of boredom’ (Scharf et al., 2019, p. 6). From an instrumental perspective, education can contribute to
enhancing the efficiency of labour markets or to mitigating inequality and to balancing out ‘supply and demand for
skilled workers’ (Carstensen & Ibsen, 2021, p. 1040). Regarding social mobility, education can mitigate social inequal-
ities by expanding access to educational opportunities for children from low socio-economic status (SES) back-
grounds or lowering youth unemployment (Breen, 2019; Busemeyer, 2014). The latter two objectives—promoting
efficiency and equality—are often regarded as being in tension with each other (Carstensen & Emmenegger, 2023;
Carstensen & Ibsen, 2021).
Rather than being concerned with the actual effects of education on different outcomes—such as subjective
well-being, the efficiency of labour markets or social inequality—we are interested in how citizens actual perceive
these goals of education. Do they regard the primary purpose of education to be the acquisition of knowledge as a
goal by itself, to instill the young generation with skills that are of relevance for the labour market or to enhance
social inclusion and mobility? And which individual determinants are related to these perceptions?
2.2 | Material self-interest
In the next step, we develop theoretical expectations regarding the determinants of educational perceptions. We
build and extrapolate from existing scholarship on welfare state attitudes (Svallfors, 2012), while being aware of the
difference between attitudes, preferences and perceptions. Given the dearth of research on our topic more narrowly
conceived, the framework necessarily retains some exploratory elements. We start our discussion of determinants
with material self-interest.
There is a long tradition in research on attitudes toward the welfare state that has identified material self-
interest in terms of income, education, age, and labour market status as a crucial driving force behind attitudes
toward public policy (see, e.g., Cattaneo & Wolter, 2009; Guillaud, 2013; Guillaud & Marx, 2014; Guillaud &
Sauger, 2013; Hacker et al., 2013; Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Meltzer & Richard, 1981;
Rehm, 2009; Svallfors, 2004, 2012). Simplifying greatly, the basic thrust of this literature is that citizens support the
welfare state programs they already benefit from (or expect to benefit from in the near future). Overall, this literature
implies strong policy feedback effects: Once generous welfare states are established, it is politically difficult and
costly to dismantle them, as policymakers face opposition from powerful welfare state beneficiary groups (Brooks &
Manza, 2006; Pierson, 1993).
The core insight of this literature can be transferred to the analysis of citizens' perceptions of the purpose of
education, although some adaptations are necessary. To start, we expect that perceptions of the purpose of educa-
tion are influenced by the individuals' socio-economic (class) position, which is in turn related to and shaped by indi-
vidual experiences of the education system. To simplify matters, we regard both income and educational background
jointly as indicators of material self-interest since they are correlated, while being aware that they have partly dis-
tinct effects on citizens' perceptions. Thus, our first hypothesis is that socio-economic background factors are sys-
tematically related to perceptions of the purpose of education (Hypothesis 1).
With respect to educational background, we hypothesise that individuals with higher levels of education are
more likely to subscribe to the view that education is a goal in itself. This is because these individuals have experi-
enced first-hand the tangible and intangible benefits of education. The intangible benefits of education are related to
the above-mentioned effects of education on subjective well-being. The material benefits of education—namely,
higher income—in turn enable highly educated individuals to pursue and enjoy the material implications of these
intangible benefits of education (e.g., it is well known that attendance at ‘high culture’ events and museums is associ-
ated with social background, see O'Hagan, 1996). Similarly, one might expect highly educated individuals to be more
likely to oppose the view that the purpose of education is primarily to prepare students for the labour market, since
this instrumentalist interpretation of the role of education runs counter to the ideal of regarding education as a
means to self-actualization. In a similar vein, highly educated individuals should be more opposed to perceiving edu-
cation as a tool to promote social mobility as they are generally less supportive of instrumentalist views on
education.
The expected effects of individual income are quite similar to those of education (which is why we regard them
both as indicators of material self-interest). Higher income should be associated with a higher level of support for
the view that education is a goal in itself, if the acquisition of additional education is viewed as a status symbol
and/or a luxury consumer good. However, this association is expected to be less strong than in the case of educa-
tional attainment. In addition, we expect that high-income individuals are more likely to subscribe to the view that
the primary purpose of education is to prepare for the labour market, since they immediately perceive the material
benefits of having obtained a higher education. Finally, the association between income and support for the percep-
tion of education as a tool to promote social mobility might be more ambivalent. On the one hand, high earners
might be less likely to perceive education as a means to increase inter-generational mobility as they may be aware of
the role of luck and family networks in the success of their own careers, which would imply a negative association.
On the other hand, high-income individuals could also regard education as a tool to promote social mobility in line
with their (expected) perception of education as an instrument to prepare individuals for the labour market. Hence,
given these ambivalent theoretical expectations, we treat the issue as a matter for open empirical investigation.
2.3 | Norms, values and ideology
Beyond material self-interest, individuals' general political orientations may influence their perception of the purpose
of education. Again, we can draw on a large literature, devoted to the analysis of attitudes toward the welfare state,
which has highlighted the important influence of ideological predispositions (see, e.g., Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Jost
et al., 2009; Kangas, 2003). We conceptualise ideological predispositions in a two-dimensional space, rather than in
the traditional one-dimensional left–right distinction, following recent advances in the literature on welfare state pol-
itics and party competition (Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015). This literature distinguishes between the standard left–
right economic dimension and a newly emerging social values dimension. The extreme points of the social value
dimension are defined by the ‘green-alternative-libertarian’ and ‘traditional-authoritarian-nationalist’ viewpoints,
defining the so-called GAL-TAN scale (Hooghe et al., 2002).
Broadly speaking, we hypothesise that individual ideological predispositions are systematically and significantly
associated with different perceptions of the purposes of education (Hypothesis 2). We expect that ideological differ-
ences on the economic dimension will show up more clearly with regard to perceptions of instrumentalist views on
education. For instance, individuals identifying with a left-wing economic ideology should be less likely to view the
primary purpose of education as providing marketable skills in the labour market, but more likely to endorse the view
that the primary purpose of education is to promote social mobility (and vice versa for right-leaning individuals). This
is because individuals on the left are generally more supportive of promoting social mobility across generations and
socioeconomic classes, but at the same time are suspicious of the influence of the economy or employers on
education.
Ideological differences on the social values dimension should become more visible when it comes to support for
the non-instrumentalist view on education as this perspective is less tightly connected to the labour market: Those
who subscribe to GAL values are expected to cherish and value education as an instrument of personal self-actuali-
zation, explicitly rejecting the notion that education should take on particular functions for the welfare state or the
economy. Therefore, we expect a positive association between support for GAL values and perceptions of the pur-
poses of education as being the acquisition of knowledge. While those who hold GAL values are likely to be critical
of the emphasis on the labour market function of education, those who harbour traditional–authoritarian–nationalist
(TAN) values may be more supportive of this view of education. Therefore, we expect a statistically significant asso-
ciation between more conservative attitudes on the GAL-TAN dimension and the likelihood of viewing education as
a labour market preparation tool.
2.4 | Policy feedback and institutions
In recent years, the literature on the feedback effect of policies on individual attitudes has grown considerably (see
Busemeyer et al., 2021; Jacobs & Weaver, 2015; Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014; Svallfors, 2012, the latter for
a more critical assessment). Consistent with the notion of self-reinforcing policy feedback (Pierson, 1993), one would
expect citizens' perceptions of education to vary according to the institutional configuration of the education system.
Educational institutions can vary along many different dimensions, such as levels of spending, educational inequality,
institutional segmentation or the role of education in the broader welfare state regime (Busemeyer, 2014). For exam-
ple, in countries where the institutional link between the education system and the labour market regime is relatively
tight (as in the Scandinavian model of the social-investment welfare state, see Morel et al., 2012), citizens would be
more likely to see the primary purpose of education as preparation for the labour market. Also, citizens might be
more likely to see education as a tool to promote social mobility in more unequal countries (as shown in the works
of Alesina et al., 2018; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Mijs, 2021). Finally, citizens might support a view that the main
purpose of education is knowledge acquisition as a goal by itself in countries with a well-established tradition in
research and academic education.
Hence, if policy feedback occurs, we would expect patterns of educational perceptions that vary systematically
across countries in line with established institutional regimes. The counter hypothesis to this claim—that is, the
absence of a strong cross-national variation in perceptions—may point to the emergence of a common European
education area and associated discourse space. Compared to policy preferences, which are generally directed toward
and influenced by the particularities of existing policies and institutions, general perceptions about the purposes of
education could be more disconnected from these concrete institutional characteristics. To the extent that citizens
of Western European countries effectively constitute a kind of pan-European citizenry, these perceptions of the pri-
mary purpose of education might be relatively similar across countries. Given these ambivalences, we leave this
question open for the empirical analysis and refrain from presenting specific directional hypotheses here.
2.5 | Perceptions and social policy preferences
In the final step of our analysis, we posit that perceptions of the purposes of education are systematically related to
actual education and social policy preferences (Hypothesis 3). This step is important for our overall argument, as it
demonstrates that perceptions of education are meaningfully related to actual policy preferences and thereby shap-
ing the ‘normative’ underpinnings of education and social policy reform debates. For reasons of space, we can only
provide a rather exploratory framework here. More concretely, we posit that individuals who support the view that
the primary purpose of education is knowledge acquisition as a goal by itself are the most supportive of increased
spending on education. Conversely, those who see education primarily as a tool to confer marketable skills relevant
for the labour market are expected to be more supportive of social investment and workfare policies. They are also
expected to be less supportive of redistribution and social spending in general as they prioritise efficiency over
equality concerns when it comes to education. Finally, those who view education as being targeted primarily at
inter-generational social mobility are expected to be more supportive of more traditional welfare state policies with
a strong redistributive component, that is, passive social transfers.
3 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
3.1 | Data
For our analysis, we rely on the INVEDUC dataset (see Busemeyer et al., 2018, for an overview). The survey was
conducted in May/June 2014 by native-speakers, using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) techniques
in combination with random digital dialling (RDD) to reach individuals with only cell phones (i.e., no landline). Eight
countries were selected to reflect a variety of welfare state regimes: Denmark and Sweden for the Nordics, the
United Kingdom and Ireland for Anglo-Saxon countries, Germany and France as cases of continental European wel-
fare states, and Spain and Italy for Southern Europe. In each of these countries, the sample size (between 1000 and
1500 respondents per country) meets the usual size criteria for this type of survey.
This survey is unique for the purposes of this paper in that it provides representative, cross-national, compara-
tive data on respondents' individual opinions about the main purpose of their country's education system. Specifi-
cally, the question asked is: ‘In your opinion, what is the primary purpose of education?’ Respondents can choose
one of the following answer categories:
• To expand knowledge as a goal by itself;

• To provide young people with the skills they need to be successful on the labour market;
• To enable young people to have a better life than their parents;
• None of the above.
The first answer category appeals to the belief that the provision of education should be largely independent of
market forces, that is, that education should not be seen as a utilitarian instrument, but as a goal in itself. The second
category represents the opposite view by emphasising the link between education and the labour market. In this per-
spective, education is seen as an investment whose benefits will be reaped in the labour market, rather than as a
right of citizenship. The third response emphasises the potential of education to promote intergenerational upward
social mobility.
In interpreting the answers to this question, it is important to keep in mind that popular perceptions about the
purpose of education may be influenced by the particular institutional context in which individuals live, and their per-
sonal experience of the education system. Thus, citizens' responses are most likely a mixture of general normative
predispositions toward education on the one hand, and more concrete demands on their country's education system
on the other. After all, the wording of the question does not ask for a personal opinion on what the purpose of edu-
cation should be, but rather on what it currently is.
3.2 | Descriptive analysis of cross-national variation in perceptions
Because the dataset used in the empirical analysis below includes only eight Western European countries, it is not
possible to employ sophisticated statistical methods such as multilevel regression analysis to probe the association
between macro-level institutions and microlevel perceptions. We therefore address the issue of cross-national
variation in perceptions in an exploratory manner (see Section 2.4 above). The descriptive analysis in Figure 1 indeed
provides mixed evidence on the role of policy feedback.
To begin with, the figure shows a remarkably similar distribution of perceptions across countries, particularly in
the ranking of the different goals of education. A relative majority of citizens across all countries in the sample sub-
scribes to the idea that education is an instrument to prepare the young generation for the labour market (57.3% for
the whole sample, excluding missing values). Education aimed solely at knowledge expansion is the second most pre-
ferred choice of individuals (except in Ireland), while a relative minority sees the main purpose of education as pro-
moting inter-generational mobility (only 18.6% on average).
At the same time, the cross-country variation in perceptions provides some indication of the influence of
country-specific institutional contexts. For example, support for the labour market view of education is particularly
strong in the social-investment welfare states of Northern Scandinavia, like Denmark and Sweden (Nikolai, 2012).
Conversely, support for the view that knowledge is a goal in itself is particularly strong in Germany, a country often
considered to hold a long tradition of research-oriented academic education (Ash, 2006). Remarkably, the view that
education is primarily a tool for promoting inter-generational mobility receives the greatest support in liberal welfare
states (Ireland and the United Kingdom)—countries in which the notion of upward social mobility through education
may be particularly embedded in the creed of the national welfare state (Goldthorpe, 2013; Martin &
Chevalier, 2022) and the dominant meritocratic ideology (Mijs, 2021). This view is also strongly supported in South-
ern European countries, consistent with the actual role of education in upward mobility in Spain (Gil-Hernandez
et al., 2017).
3.3 | Operationalization of variables and methods
To measure the determinants of individual views on the purpose of education, we conduct a multivariate economet-
ric analysis of respondents' perceptions. The dependent variable is the opinion on the purpose of education, which
has three modalities (knowledge by itself, marketable skills, social mobility).2 We run multinomial logit regressions
with robust SEs and country dummies, and calculate average marginal effects for each of our independent variables.
In the baseline model, we include two variables as indicators of material self-interest: First, as indicator of
income, we take the monthly household total net income expressed in country-specific income quintiles.3 Second, the
F I G U R E 1 Distribution of views across countries. The figure shows citizens' perceptions of the objectives of
education in different European countries. Population and design weights applied. Source: INVEDUC data
individual education level is operationalised as the highest degree obtained. It is recorded in three categories that are
comparable across countries: basic education, upper secondary education, and higher education. The analysis also
includes age and gender as control variables. Summary statistics and a correlation matrix can be found in the
Appendix.
In the extended model, we add as explanatory factor the ideological predispositions of individuals, measured in a
two-dimensional space using a number of variables included in the survey. Again, following Garritzmann et al. (2018)
we derive the two ideological dimensions from a factor analysis of a range of attitudinal items. The first economic
left–right dimension captures attitudes about the role of the state versus market forces in the economy. The second
factor relates to the individual's social values: This dimension distinguishes between GAL values on the one hand and
TAN values on the other. Starting with a full sample of 8905 respondents, our baseline model uses 7765 observa-
tions (a 12.8% attrition rate) while our extended model uses 7065 observations (an additional 7.9% attrition rate,
due to missing values for the economic left–right and social values indices).
Finally, we run an econometric analysis to measure the explanatory power of education perceptions on social
policy preferences. We use the following variables, widely studied in the literature, as general measures of social pol-
icy preferences: support for social spending, education spending and government redistribution.4 Additionally, as in
Garritzmann et al. (2018), we measure support for three latent dimensions of welfare state preferences (social invest-
ment, passive transfers and workfare policies), which are derived from a principal component factor analysis based
on six policy reform proposals. The first dimension (social investment) refers to support for skills-enhancing policies
such as education, active labour market policies and research support. The second one indicates support for tradi-
tional consumptive social policies, in particular more generous pensions and early retirement scheme. The last dimen-
sion captures support for labour market policies that put pressure on the unemployed to accept jobs or further
qualification measures. In this regression analysis, individual characteristics such as income, education, age or gender
are not included as they already determine views on education. However, incorporating them does not fundamen-
tally change the results (see Table A2), which provides evidence that perceptions have an independent effect among
individuals with similar sociodemographic backgrounds.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | What determines perceptions of the purpose of education?
Table 1 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the determinants of perceptions of the purposes of educa-
tion (average marginal effects are reported). As can be seen from Column 1a, the rich and well-educated are signifi-
cantly more likely to subscribe to the view that the primary purpose of education is to create and nurture knowledge
as a goal by itself rather than preparing youths for the labour market or promoting social and inter-generational
mobility (supporting Hypothesis 1). The size of the effect is substantial: The predicted value for someone with a basic
education only to support this statement about the purpose of education is 14%, compared to 30% for a person with
a tertiary education background (Figure 2, North-West graph). In the case of household net income, the effect size is
less pronounced: 19% for a poor individual (first quintile of income) compared to 28% for a rich individual (fifth quin-
tile of income).5
The complimentary mirror image is given in Column 3a of Table 1, which analyses the determinants of support
for the statement that education is primarily about social mobility. Wealthy and well-educated individuals are
opposed to such a view, but the magnitude of the effect is slightly smaller compared to the previous one: The
predicted probability of someone with a basic education supporting the statement about social mobility is 28%, com-
pared with 14% for someone with a high-education background (Figure 2, South-West graph). As a corollary, our
model predicts that the poor will support the statement with a 25% probability, compared to 11% for the rich.
TABLE 1 Determinants of citizens' views on education (baseline model, marginal effects)
(1a) (2a) (3a)

Knowledge by itself Marketable skills Social mobility
Education level (ref. Basic education)
Upper secondary education 0.0582*** 0.00863 0.0668***
(0.0132) (0.0171) (0.0144)
Higher education 0.145*** 0.0442** 0.100***
(0.0141) (0.0177) (0.0148)
Household net income (ref. Quintile 1)
Household net income Q2 0.0326** 0.000577 0.0321***
(0.0140) (0.0159) (0.0123)
Household net income Q3 0.00597 0.0381** 0.0441***
(0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0135)
Household net income Q4 0.0446*** 0.00560 0.0502***
(0.0163) (0.0188) (0.0149)
Household net income Q5 0.0343* 0.0462** 0.0805***
(0.0177) (0.0203) (0.0156)
Demographics
Female 0.0146 0.0134 0.0280***
(0.00971) (0.0113) (0.00872)
Age 0.00160*** 0.000374 0.00122***
(0.000310) (0.000357) (0.000276)
Observations 7767 7767 7767
Pseudo R2 0.0346 0.0346 0.0346
Note: The dependent variable is the opinion on the purpose of education, which has three modalities. Multinomial logit
regression. Country fixed effects included. Education level relative to Basic education, Household net income relative to the
First income quintile. Average marginal effects are reported, with robust SEs in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
The determinants of the statement that education is about imbuing young people with skills for the labour
market (Column 2a) are not clear-cut. This is not surprising, given that this statement is consensual across
populations (see Figure 1 above). The regression results show it is also the case across income levels, age and gender.
Highly educated people are the most critical of viewing education as a labour market-supporting instrument (Figure 2,
North-East graph), as discussed above in the context of Hypothesis 1. Somewhat against expectations, the data do not
support our expectation of a positive association between income and the ‘marketable skills’ view on education.
In our extended model (Table 2), the analysis reveals some interesting correlations between ideological variables
and people's views on education. Largely as expected (Hypothesis 2), individuals who places themselves on the right
of the economic left–right scale are more likely to endorse the idea of ‘marketable skills' and less likely to view edu-
cation as a tool for promoting social mobility. Somewhat at odds with our expectations outlined above, these individ-
uals are also less likely to subscribe to a non-instrumentalist view of education. Here, we posited that the social
values dimension should matter more than the economic dimension. This is strongly confirmed, as those with a GAL
ideology are much more likely to see education as a goal by itself. Our expectation that individuals holding traditional
social values view education as a labour market preparation tool is also confirmed. Moreover, the two dimensions of
ideology matter less in the case of the redistributive view of education as promoting social mobility, as Table 2 makes
clear.
F I G U R E 2 Predictive margins of educational background on views on education. Based on Table 1 (baseline

model). Source: INVEDUC data
The effect sizes of the ideological variables are quite large. The predicted probabilities to support the ‘market-
able skills’ view of education range from a low of 44% for left-wing individuals to a high of 70% for right-wing
respondents. The gap is even more impressive when considering the association between the social value dimension
and perceptions: the predicted probability more than doubles from 30% for GAL individuals to 75% for TAN individ-
uals. In the case of the non-instrumentalist view on education, the social values dimension is particularly influential.
People holding GAL values have a 58% probability of supporting the idea that education is primarily about knowl-
edge acquisition as a goal by itself, while people on the opposite end of the spectrum have only an 8% chance of
supporting this idea (Figure 3).
Finally, some of the control variables are worth mentioning. Female respondents are less supportive of the state-
ment that education is about social mobility in all our specifications. This might be explained by the gender wage gap
they face in developed countries (for a recent survey, see Kunze, 2018). Therefore, they might be less inclined to
believe in the power of education to increase social mobility. Women are also known to be more risk averse and less
competitive (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011), which might elucidate why they rationally do not value
the social mobility argument. Older respondents, in turn, are more supportive of this statement, but more opposed
to regarding education as a pure exercise in knowledge creation. The probability of considering education as a means
of promoting social mobility ranges, in our sample, from 12% for an 18-year-old to 25% for a 96-year-old, all else
being equal.
4.2 | Are perceptions related to social policy preferences?
In the next step of the analysis, we probe to what extent views on the purpose of education are related to actual pol-
icy preferences. Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of preferences for educa-
tion and social spending, redistribution, social investment, passive transfers and workfare policies.
TABLE 2 Determinants of citizens' views on education (extended model, marginal effects)
(1b) (2b) (3b)

(0.0151) (0.0184) (0.0152)
Higher education 0.104*** 0.0105 0.0936***
(0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0158)
Household net income (ref. Quintile 1)
Household net income Q2 0.0245* 0.00678 0.0313**
(0.0148) (0.0168) (0.0129)
Household net income Q3 0.00828 0.0491*** 0.0408***
(0.0153) (0.0179) (0.0140)
Household net income Q4 0.0248 0.0165 0.0413***
(0.0170) (0.0195) (0.0157)
Household net income Q5 0.0178 0.0484** 0.0662***
(0.0185) (0.0214) (0.0168)
Demographics
Female 0.0142 0.0129 0.0271***
(0.0101) (0.0117) (0.00903)
Age 0.00115*** 0.000368 0.00152***
(0.000330) (0.000379) (0.000296)
Ideological predispositions
Economic left–right (right) 0.0249*** 0.0374*** 0.0124***
(0.00449) (0.00518) (0.00413)
Social values (traditional) 0.0633*** 0.0583*** 0.00497
(0.00486) (0.00555) (0.00448)
Pseudo R2 0.0490 0.0490 0.0490
regression. Country fixed effects included. Education level relative to Basic education, Household net income relative to the
First income quintile. Average marginal effects are reported, with robust SEs in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
First and foremost, our data verify key findings in the literature on social policy preferences.6 To be short, high-
income and high-educated people, as well as those holding right-wing and traditional social values clearly oppose
social expenditures and government redistribution (see, for instance Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Alesina &
Giuliano, 2011; Guillaud, 2013; Rehm, 2009). Our findings regarding the determinants of preferences for passive
transfers, workfare policies and social investment policies are consistent with those of Garritzmann et al. (2018). Pas-
sive transfer policies are most supported by low-income and low-educated people, individuals leaning towards tradi-
tional social values and by those subscribing to left-wing economic attitudes. Workfare policies are most popular
with high-income individuals and those subscribing to economically conservative and traditional authoritarian values.
Social investment policies, far from dividing citizens, enjoy wide-spread support among the different strata of the
population: we do not find a clearly defined group supporting those policies. Instead, our results show that social
F I G U R E 3 Predictive margins of social values on views on education. Based on Table 2 (extended model). Source:
INVEDUC data
investment policies are only slightly more supported by individuals with higher educational backgrounds and left-
libertarian views.
Our novel contribution here is to investigate how perceptions of the purposes of education might be related to
social policy preferences. As expected (Hypothesis 3), we do find statistically significant associations: Individuals
who regard education as a tool to promote social mobility are also more likely to support redistribution and passive
social transfers, but—somewhat against expectations—they are not significantly more likely to support social or edu-
cation spending. They are also more likely to support workfare policies, although slightly so. Only partly confirming
our expectations, individuals supporting the ‘marketable skills’ view on education are clearly less likely to support
social spending, more likely to support workfare policies, but not more supportive of social investment. The latter is
probably due to the fact that, as argued above, social investment policies are broadly supported across the board. A
similar non-association can be found between those subscribing to the non-instrumentalist view on education and
support for social investment. However, our analysis confirms that these individuals are more likely to demand
spending on education, relative to those who subscribe to the ‘marketable skills’ view. They are also less prone to
support workfare policies, as expected. Figure 4 displays the predictive margins of education views associated with
Table 3.
5 | DISCUSSION
Our theoretical framework on the determinants of perceptions of the goals of education focused on three issues:
the role of material self-interest, the role of ideological predispositions, and the association between educational per-
ceptions and actual policy preferences. Even though the analysis also includes some unexpected findings, by and
large, our theoretical expectations are confirmed.
134
TABLE 3 Impact of citizens' views on education on policy preferences (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Education spending Income difference Social spending Social investment Passive transfers Workfare
Education views (ref. Knowledge)
Educ = Marketable skills 0.0351*** 0.00604 0.0344*** 0.0130 0.0366 0.0878***
(0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0274) (0.0265) (0.0273)
Educ = Social mobility 0.00459 0.0639*** 0.00919 0.0383 0.200*** 0.0632*
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0357) (0.0350) (0.0348)
Economic left–right (right) 0.0320*** 0.0912*** 0.0841*** 0.0460*** 0.143*** 0.136***
(0.00412) (0.00422) (0.00437) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Social values (traditional) 0.0338*** 0.0194*** 0.0389*** 0.105*** 0.168*** 0.209***
(0.00437) (0.00459) (0.00488) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0108)
Observations 7764 7709 7588 7441 7441 7441
(Pseudo) R2 0.0799 0.0920 0.142 0.0697 0.128 0.0873
Note: The dependent variable is the support for general or specific social policies. The first three models fit binary logit regressions, while the last three models fit ordinary least-squares
linear regressions. Country fixed effects included. Education views relative to Knowledge by itself. Average marginal effects are reported, with robust SEs in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
BUSEMEYER AND GUILLAUD
F I G U R E 4 Predictive margins of views on education on preferences for social policies. Based on Table 3. Source:
INVEDUC data
Regarding material self-interest (Hypothesis 1), highly educated, high-income individuals are more likely to view
the pursuit of education as a goal in itself and less likely to view it as a tool for promoting social mobility across gen-
erations. The highly educated are also less likely to see the primary purpose of education as conferring labour market
skills on the younger generation. Thus, individuals that are well endowed with resources (income, human capital)
seem to more inclined to cherish the value of education as a means to self-actualization, whereas less well-endowed
individuals rather subscribe to more instrumentalist views on education.
With respect to ideology (Hypothesis 2), we find that individuals on the left are more likely to view education as
a goal by itself or as a tool to promote social mobility, but less likely to support views of education that emphasise its
contribution to the acquisition of marketable skills. Thus, left-wing individuals value education in particular as a
means to promote self-actualization and upward mobility. Following established scholarship, we conceptualised ide-
ology in a two-dimensional map, but our analysis reveals that in the case of educational perceptions, these two
dimensions tend to point in a similar direction to some extent. However, the social values dimension seems to play a
stronger role in this regard.
Our analysis also confirms that different views on the goals of education are significantly related to social policy
preferences (Hypothesis 3), whether these refer to general public spending measures, or to more targeted measures.
Even though we deliberately refrain from postulating expectations on the direction of causality between perceptions
and preferences, we would like to emphasise that expanding the analytical perspective from studying preferences to
analysing perceptions of the purposes of education is important in order to gain a deeper understanding of the nor-
mative underpinnings of political reform debates in these domains, and thereby the complex association between
education and social policy that is at the focus of this special issue.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.4, we find some evidence for cross-national differences in perceptions, but also
substantial similarities, in particular regarding the relative ranking of goals of education. Somewhat surprisingly, we
found that citizens across Europe hold a rather instrumentalist view of the purposes of education, which they see as
important tools for labour market integration and, to a lesser extent, for social mobility. Thus, in mediating the
efficiency-inclusion tension, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper and the special issue as a whole, a relative
majority of European citizens lean toward the efficiency pole.
6 | C O N C L U S I O N A N D OU TL O O K
This article contributes to our understanding of support for educational policies by analysing individual views of edu-
cational goals. While offering a new perspective on the study of popular support for national education systems, our
empirical work certainly has limitations. We see two main drawbacks to this work. First, like most research using
opinion surveys, identifying causal effects remains tricky. We believe, however, that the kind of correlational analysis
we have done in this paper still adds value to debates about the deeper lying relationships between socio-economic
background, perceptions and policy preferences. A second limitation is that our measure of views on education in
the data does not clearly distinguish between normative views (what is the intended goal) and descriptions of the
current status quo (to what extend does the current education systems meet the expected goals). Nevertheless,
these opinions do reflect personal views about the education system in the country in which the individual lives, and
the very clear link we show between these views and individuals' social policy preferences seems to us to validate
the relevance of these data.
Regarding political and policy implications, our paper shows that the current trend towards a social investment
welfare state (Morel et al., 2012) is indeed to a large extent congruent with citizens' perceptions of the purposes of
education. Regarding the acquisition of education as a goal by itself seems to be a view that is largely supported by
well-endowed individuals with high levels of income and education who can ‘afford’ to take this view, but the larger
majority of citizens in different countries support more instrumentalist views, in particular emphasising the link
between education and the labour market.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
DATA AVAI LAB ILITY S TATEMENT

The data used in this paper is publicly available at: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/SDesc2.asp?DB=E&no=6961.
ORCID
Marius R. Busemeyer https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4085-1689
ENDNOTES
1
The dataset is available for general scientific use at: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/SDesc2.asp?DB=E&no=6961
(accessed March 19, 2021)
2
Missing values and ‘none of the above’ responses are removed from the sample (respectively, 1% and 1.36%).
3
Since the monthly household total net income has numerous missing values (13%), as is often the case in surveys, we use a
subjective income variable, which is fairly correlated with objective income data (0.51) and has less than 4% missing
values, as a robustness check. The question reads ‘Which of the following options best describes your household's current
income situation? Would you say that you are… Living comfortably on present income? Coping on present income? Or is
it difficult on present income?’. The joint distribution of income measures is provided in the Appendix, while results with
the subjective income variable are reported in Table A1.
4
The questions read as follow. For social spending: ‘A share of the national government's annual budget is spent on social
benefits and social services. Please tell me if, according to you: Should the government spend much more, more, the same,
spend less or much less on social benefits and social services?’ For education spending: ‘In the following, I will name sev-
eral areas of government activity. Please tell me whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each
area. Keep in mind that “more” or “much more” might require a tax increase’. Several items are proposed, including Educa-
tion. For government redistribution: ‘The next few questions concern the role of government in society. Please indicate
whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements.
The government should… reduce income differences between the rich and the poor’. Responses are dichotomized
(1 = more or much more spending/agree or strongly agree).
5
The gap in predicted probability drops slightly if one considers subjective income instead: 21% for a person having difficul-
ties in making ends meet compared to 27% for an individual leaving comfortably in income (see Table A1, which provides
results from the extended model with a subjective income variable).
6
See Table A2 for results with the full set of controls typically used in the literature.
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How to cite this article: Busemeyer, M. R., & Guillaud, E. (2023). Knowledge, skills or social mobility?
Citizens' perceptions of the purpose of education. Social Policy & Administration, 57(2), 122–143. https://doi.
org/10.1111/spol.12897
APPENDIX
SUMMARY STATISTICS
N Mean SD Min Max

Views on education
Knowledge 8693 0.24 0.43 0 1
Skills 8693 0.58 0.49 0 1
Mobility 8693 0.18 0.39 0 1
Education level
Basic 8856 0.16 0.36 0 1
Upper secondary 8856 0.37 0.48 0 1
Higher 8856 0.47 0.50 0 1
Subjective income
Difficulties 8843 0.19 0.39 0 1
Making it through 8843 0.45 0.50 0 1
Comfortable 8843 0.36 0.48 0 1
Household net income
Quintile 1 7982 0.27 0.44 0 1
Quintile 2 7982 0.25 0.43 0 1
Quintile 3 7982 0.20 0.40 0 1
Quintile 4 7982 0.15 0.36 0 1
Quintile 5 7982 0.13 0.33 0 1
Gender
Female 8904 0.54 0.50 0 1
Continuous variables
Age 8881 54.31 16.72 18 96
Economic left–right (right) 7964 0.54 1.16 3.43 2.10
Social values (traditional) 7964 2.28 1.14 1.10 5.61
CORRELATION MATRIX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

(1) Education level 1.00
(2) Subjective income 0.252* 1.00
(3) Household net income 0.350* 0.514* 1.00
(4) Female 0.00 0.055* 0.115* 1.00
(5) Age 0.147* 0.03 0.112* 0.02 1.00
(6) Economic left–right (right) 0.00 0.153* 0.137* 0.108* 0.106* 1.00
(7) Social values (traditional) 0.302* 0.206* 0.243* 0.053* 0.109* 0.041* 1.00
* p < 0.01.
JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME MEASURES
Household total net income per month?a
Household's current income Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile

situation? 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Difficulties 915 424 146 44 20 1549
43.20 21.42 9.07 3.60 1.95 19.47
Making it through 952 1093 840 470 203 3558
44.95 55.23 52.17 38.46 19.77 44.72
Comfortable 251 462 624 708 804 2849
11.85 23.35 38.76 57.94 78.29 35.81
Total 2118 1979 1610 1222 1027 7956
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a
First row has frequencies and second row has column percentages.
TABLE A1 Determinants of citizens' views on education including subjective income (extended model, marginal
effects)
(1c) (2c) (3c)

(0.0146) (0.0175) (0.0145)
Higher education 0.0916*** 0.00530 0.0969***
(0.0149) (0.0178) (0.0146)
Subjective income (ref. Difficulties)
Making it through 0.00775 0.0143 0.0221*
(0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0122)
Comfortable 0.0332** 0.0112 0.0444***
(0.0152) (0.0174) (0.0133)
Demographics
Female 0.0170* 0.00696 0.0240***
(0.00967) (0.0112) (0.00862)
Age 0.00119*** 0.000430 0.00162***
(0.000309) (0.000357) (0.000283)
Economic left–right (right) 0.0258*** 0.0392*** 0.0133***
(0.00432) (0.00497) (0.00393)
Social values (traditional) 0.0632*** 0.0554*** 0.00775*
(0.00465) (0.00532) (0.00428)
Pseudo R2 0.0459 0.0459 0.0459
regression. Country fixed effects included. Education level relative to Basic education, Subjective income relative to
Difficulties in making ends meet. Average marginal effects are reported, with robust SEs in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
TABLE A2 Impact of citizens' views on education on policy preferences (full controls, marginal effects)
142
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Education views (ref. Knowledge)
Educ = Marketable skills 0.0328*** 0.00542 0.0392*** 0.0265 0.0158 0.0889***
(0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0287) (0.0277) (0.0287)
Educ = Social mobility 0.0107 0.0382** 0.00971 0.0204 0.155*** 0.0681*
(0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0377) (0.0368) (0.0371)
Education level (ref. Basic)
Upper secondary education 0.00751 0.0100 0.0144 0.000917 0.0198 0.0449
(0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0178) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0369)
Higher education 0.0162 0.0363** 0.0479*** 0.125*** 0.237*** 0.0537
(0.0166) (0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0391) (0.0381) (0.0387)
Household net income (ref. Q1)
Household net income Q2 0.0226 0.0145 0.0631*** 0.0189 0.0442 0.0888***
(0.0140) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0337) (0.0325) (0.0339)
Household net income Q3 0.00902 0.0413*** 0.0850*** 0.0597 0.138*** 0.133***
(0.0150) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0367) (0.0347) (0.0363)
(0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0183) (0.0401) (0.0383) (0.0391)
(0.0172) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0437) (0.0411) (0.0440)
Demographics
Female 0.0112 0.00682 0.0371*** 0.0391* 0.118*** 0.0413*
(0.00986) (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.0234) (0.0227) (0.0234)
Age 0.000198 0.00238*** 0.000348 0.00456*** 0.00301*** 0.000930
(0.000309) (0.000324) (0.000343) (0.000748) (0.000713) (0.000735)
TABLE A2 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Economic left–right (right) 0.0291*** 0.0884*** 0.0789*** 0.0526*** 0.124*** 0.135***
(0.00438) (0.00445) (0.00466) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0112)
Social values (traditional) 0.0310*** 0.0346*** 0.0553*** 0.0866*** 0.118*** 0.222***

(0.00481) (0.00504) (0.00529) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0120)
Observations 7045 6990 6884 6767 6767 6767
(Pseudo) R2 0.0818 0.119 0.160 0.0786 0.163 0.0970
Note: The dependent variable is the support for general or specific social policies. The first three models fit binary logit regressions, while the last three models fit ordinary least-squares
linear regressions. Country fixed effects included. Education views relative to Knowledge by itself, Education level relative to Basic education, Household net income relative to the First
income quintile. Average marginal effects are reported, with robust SEs in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
143

Soc Policy Adm - 2023 - Busemeyer - Knowledge Skills or Social Mobility Citizens Perceptions of The Purpose of Education

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Soc Policy Adm - 2023 - Busemeyer - Knowledge Skills or Social Mobility Citizens Perceptions of The Purpose of Education

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Received: 30 May 2022 Revised: 25 November 2022 Accepted: 2 January 2023

Knowledge, skills or social mobility? Citizens'

Marius R. Busemeyer 1 | Elvire Guillaud 2

122 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/spol Soc Policy Adm. 2023;57:122–143.

2.1 | The goals of education

2.2 | Material self-interest

2.3 | Norms, values and ideology

2.4 | Policy feedback and institutions

2.5 | Perceptions and social policy preferences

• To expand knowledge as a goal by itself;

3.2 | Descriptive analysis of cross-national variation in perceptions

3.3 | Operationalization of variables and methods

4.1 | What determines perceptions of the purpose of education?

TABLE 1 Determinants of citizens' views on education (baseline model, marginal effects)

(1a) (2a) (3a)

F I G U R E 2 Predictive margins of educational background on views on education. Based on Table 1 (baseline

4.2 | Are perceptions related to social policy preferences?

TABLE 2 Determinants of citizens' views on education (extended model, marginal effects)

(1b) (2b) (3b)

TABLE 3 Impact of citizens' views on education on policy preferences (marginal effects)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

DATA AVAI LAB ILITY S TATEMENT

N Mean SD Min Max

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME MEASURES

Household total net income per month?a

Household's current income Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile

(1c) (2c) (3c)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Social values (traditional) 0.0310*** 0.0346*** 0.0553*** 0.0866*** 0.118*** 0.222***

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Social values (traditional) 0.0310* 0.0346* 0.0553* 0.0866* 0.118* 0.222*