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Colonial and indigenous influences

on local power structure in the
Philippines
Sol Iglesias

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T he Philippines: A Case of Divergent Development

John Fabros

Anderson cacique democracy and t he philippines

Baldos John

Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy and t he Philippines Origins and Dreams" (1988)
Vicent e L . Rafael
Asia Europe Journal (2003) 1: 541–549
DOI: 10.1007/s10308-003-0061-9 ASIA
EUROPE
JOURNAL
Ó Springer-Verlag 2003

Colonial and indigenous influences on local

power structure in the Philippines
Sol Iglesias

Abstract

This article explains how colonial and indigenous influences have shaped
local power structure in the Philippines by looking at features of colonial
and governing systems that have developed over time.1 Throughout the
history of the Philippines, power structure inequality has characterised the
political process, preserving the interests of the elite. Patterns of inquality,
traditionally based on ownership and accumulation of land, can be traced
to Spanish colonial rule when control over farmlands was concentrated
within the principalia. Moreover, elite domination of electoral office had
historically been assured through limiting suffrage to the educated and
landowners. With monetisation of the economy in urban centers, patronage
systems have been eroded but elites now use other tools, including
coercion, to secure their place. Even in contemporary times, patterns of
elite domination persist through democratisation efforts, effecting the
rule of what could be considered an ‘‘elite’’ democracy in the country
today.

Spanish colonisation
When the Spanish arrived in 1521, they found thriving socio-economic units
called barangays and sovereign political units called bayans or sultanates.
With colonisation, however, local authorities no longer derived their
legitimacy from personal leadership but from a supralocal, quasi-legalistic
political order. Led by tribal chiefs or datu, settlements called barangays
clustered along sheltered bays, coasts, and river deltas. Not lineage but the
capacity to provide resources and protection determined succession to

1
The following periodisation is referred to: Spanish Colonisation (1521–1896); the Revolu-
tionary Government1 (1896–1902) including the Filipino-American War (1898–1902);
American Colonisation (1902–1935); Philippine Commonwealth1 (1935–1945) including
Japanese occupation during World War II (1941–1945); the Independent Republic (1946–
1972); Dictatorship (1972–1981); and Redemocratisation (1986–1991).
542 S. Iglesias

political leadership.2 Barangay datus or chieftains and their families formed a

ready reservoir of reliable minor civil servants whose former status was bolstered
by colonial title of principales.3 To colonise the islands, the Spanish super-
imposed a centralised colonial authority and left the administration of the
countryside to encomienderos who were given encomiendas, parcels of land, as
gifts. The encomenderos collected tribute, enforced corvee labour, and arbitrarily
usurped ownership over land.4 This later gave way to the provincias (provinces),
pueblos (municipalities) and cabildos (cities).
The Spanish governor and seat of colonial government was located in
Manila. Due to the isolation of the many localities in the mountains or in small
islands, colonial government consisted of a hierarchy of governments with
the central government at the apex; provinces as intermediaries between the
central government; and, the municipalities, which in turn supervised
the villages.5 The barangay was reduced to the status of a village, organised
for the extraction of a form of taxation called ‘‘tribute.’’ Replicating a
successful policy of reduccion in Latin American colonisation, the Spanish
applied positive inducements and pressures on the datus and their families to
move the communities from their traditional settlements and indigenous
sacred grounds. The church was the nucleus of the new territories, making the
people administratively and culturally more accessible.6
The descendants of the datus gained exemption from paying tribute
and won appointment as village headmen and town executives. With the
subsequent monetisation of the economy, those who amassed proprietary
wealth through money-lending, landownership, and marketing of commercial
crops exercised considerable influence in local politics.7
Filipino revolutionaries declared independence in 1898 and briefly estab-
lished the first Philippine republic in limited territories for three years. Its
unimplemented constitution provided for a limited form of devolution. Local
legislative assemblies, to be indirectly chosen by the people, were to be organised
at the municipal level. The municipal captains, in turn, were to elect provincial
assemblies.8 However, even this government reflected the socio-political divide
between the landed principales and the peasantry. Suffrage would have
been limited to the principales and friar lands would similarly be theirs. The
elite were rewarding themselves with the first fruits of the Revolution.9

2
John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1999), pp.12–14
3
Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Manila: Tala Pub. Services., 1975),
p.62
4
Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution (Manila: Ilang Tala Publications, 1971),
p.12
5
Proserpina Domingo Tapales, ‘‘Devolution and Empowerment: LGC 1991 and Local
Autonomy in the Philippines,’’ Philippine Journal of Public Administration 36, no. 2 (1992):
pp.101–102
6
Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, p.93
7
By the 19th Century, agriculture was commercialised and local merchants, who extended
credit to export crops cultivators, acquired formal ownership of landholdings. See Sidel,
Capital, Coercion, and Crime, pp.14–15
8
Alex B. Brillantes, ‘‘Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,’’ Philippine Journal of
Public Administration 31, no. 2 (1987): p.134
9
Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, p.222
Colonial and indigenous influences on local power structure in the Philippines 543

Under revolutionary rule, the reorganisation and ‘‘Filipinisation’’ of the

provinces and municipalities were initiated. In the same year, Spain lost its
war with the United States of America and ceded the Philippines, as its colony.
This resulted in the Filipino-American War, which the Americans brutally
quelled by 1902. Even the Muslim areas, which the Spanish never wholly subdued,
were assimilated.10

American colonisation until Philippine independence

In the countryside, however, the Americans found that most of the towns had
secretly organised complete municipal governments that continued to cam-
paign for independence. Local governments were thus completely reorganised
to reduce mass support for these guerrillas.11 The Americans retained the
system of administrative units that the Spaniards had created, keeping them as
before under the control of a strong central government.12 The colonisers
carefully restricted the privilege of suffrage, ensuring the retention of political
power by the local elite whose support they ‘‘assiduously’’ courted.13 The
founding of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 resulted in the gradual
‘‘Filipinisation’’ of the colonial government and provided for a Filipino
president that would exercise ‘‘general supervision over all local govern-
ments.’’14 The commonwealth provided the transition from colonial to
independent rule but World War II and the Japanese occupation interrupted
this plan.
A consequence of World War II was the entry of political warlords into
politics. Guerrilla leaders who gained esteem during the war stepped into the
vacuum created by fall of the landed elite in some areas. But this challenge did
not represent an ideological rejection of the old elite power structure, rather a
desire to be incorporated into it.15 Moreover, the central government was
incapable of protecting the landlords against peasant unrest lead by the
Hukbalahap.16 The landlords formed their own private armies to fight
alongside the national army to quell the rebellion. Thus, the weakness of the

10
Benedict Anderson, ‘‘Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,’’ New
Left Review, no. 169 (1988): p.10
11
Prominent landowners influenced the process to retain ownership of the land. Constantino,
The Philippines: A Past Revisited, p.244
12
Tapales, ‘‘Devolution and Empowerment: LGC 1991 and Local Autonomy in the
Philippines,’’ p.102 Also, see Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, p.320
13
Suffrage was limited to adult males who had held public office under the Spanish, paid a
minimum amount of taxes, or was literate in English or Spanish. Constantino, The
Philippines: A Past Revisited, p.321
14
This was the result of a strong lobby against espousing local autonomy, which was
considered divisive for the country. Gaudioso C. Sosmeña, Decentralization and Empow-
erment (Manila: Local Government Development Foundation, 1991), p.32. Also, see Brillantes,
‘‘Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,’’ pp.134–135
15
Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Continuing Past (Manila: Tala Pub. Services., 1978),
pp.162–163
16
The Hukbalahap or Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People’s Army Against the
Japanese) was the largest peasant movement and most important case of agrarian unrest in
modern Philippine society. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant
Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.11
544 S. Iglesias

post-war government strengthened the impulses for local political autonomy of

armed warlords.17 However, it was the ‘‘pro-land reform’’ image of Ramon
Magsaysay, credited for finally breaking down the Hukbalahap resistance,
which catapulted him to the presidency. However, the three laws enacted under
his presidency i.e. Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954, an act creating the Court
of Agrarian Relations, and the Land Reform Act of 1955, were watered down by
Congress with many legal loopholes preventing any substantial land reform.18
Subsequently, under an independent and sovereign government, several
laws shaping the Philippine local government system were passed. The first
local autonomy act was passed in 1959, vesting greater fiscal, planning and
regulatory powers to the cities and municipalities. The Barrio Charter of 1959
made the barrio, a different name for the barangay or village, a quasi-
municipal corporation vested with greater taxation authority. Barrios were to
be governed by an elected council with legislative powers. The Decentralisation
Act of 1967 broadened local government decision-making over fiscal, person-
nel, and other administrative matters.19 Provinces and cities were allowed to
retain greater amounts of revenue previously contributed to the national
government and the provincial governor could appoint some positions.

Dictatorship
In 1972, however, Martial Law was declared by then president Ferdinand
Marcos.20 Unfettered by former constitutional checks and balances, the Marcos
dictatorship ruled by presidential decree. The passage of laws was expedited,
paving the way for administrative reforms that were previously blocked by
bureaucratic inertia. A new Constitution was ratified and Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1 implemented the Integrated Reorganisation Plan that, among other
things, delegated the president’s power of general supervision over local units
to the Department of Local Government and Community Development.
This period was marked by an upsurge in legislation, including laws that
formally rationalised and clarified local government operations. The
authoritarian regime, with its ability to simultaneously legislate and execute
sweeping administrative reforms, can also be credited for its efforts at
deconcentration. The government enhanced the role of regional units of the
national line ministries to decongest the central government of many
administrative functions.21

17
Amado Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the
Philippines, 1946–1972 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.91–95
18
Expropriation could be undertaken only if majority of tenants petition for it and, given
economic control of landlords over their tenants as well as their influence over local
governments the landlords could ‘‘easily cow all but the most militant peasants into
submission.’’ Moreover, Magsaysay’s success over the popular Hukbalahap is attributed to
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counter-insurgency assistance: Constantino,
The Philippines: A Continuing Past, pp.234-264
19
See Brillantes, ‘‘Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,’’ p.136
20
Marcos was elected president in 1965 and by 1972 he was serving a second, and final, term.
By declaring Martial Law and implementing a new constitution, he prolonged his stay in
office indefinitely.
21
Brillantes, ‘‘Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,’’ p.138
Colonial and indigenous influences on local power structure in the Philippines 545

On the other hand, central controls operated during Marcos’s dictatorship

including discretionary power over local governments, a centralist direction in
development programme planning and implementation, and the proliferation
of central agencies with supervision over local governments in different aspects
of local affairs.22 Moreover, the gains of formal decentralisation policies were
neutralised by the authoritarian rule that ‘‘made a mockery of citizen’s
participation in the selection of their own leaders.’’23
Marcos had cultivated a group of loyal elites and ensured that all patronage
emanated from him alone.24 He applied a similar tactic to local-level elites by
selectively undermining the business interests of some while dispensing
favours to rival factions.25 Marcos also employed Martial Law powers to
legislate further land reform, ostensibly to strike at the core of the oligarchy’s
resource base. However, after attacking two or three prominent clans that
posed potential threats to his supremacy, Marcos abandoned the reform
crusade.26 Similarly, the government confiscated loose firearms at the local
level but effectively demobilised only the private armies of clans whose loyalty
he doubted. Marcos staged a referendum authorizing him to replace elective
local officials with his vassals. Local elections were frozen for eight years,
throughout Martial Law. Even when local elections were held in 1980, they
resulted in ‘‘landslide victories’’ of his hand-picked candidates. In a few years,
governors and mayors were almost all totally under Marcos’s control. This
meant that he could summon grassroots support without having to deal with
the traditional elites. The traditional political clans either capitulated or
abstained from active politics until the eventual return of the old system.27

Redemocratisation
With Corazon Aquino’s ascendancy through a popular revolt in 1986, the
primary charge of her government was redemocratisation, albeit narrowly
interpreted as annihilation of all the vestiges of Marcos’s rule.28 Part of the
Aquino government’s ‘‘de-Marcosification’’ campaign was a purge of local
governments. Local officials associated with Marcos were unseated and
officers-in-charge were appointed. These officers-in-charge held office until
the next election in 1988. During Aquino’s term, experiments in decentrali-
sation were initiated and the 1991 Local Government Code was passed in her

22
Raul De Guzman, ‘‘The Evolution of Filipino Political Institutions: Prospects for
Normalization,’’ Philippine Journal of Public Administration 26, no. 3-4 (1982): p.217
23
Brillantes, ‘‘Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,’’ p.138
24
Anderson refers to him as the ‘‘supreme cacique.’’ Anderson, ‘‘Cacique Democracy and the
Philippines: Origins and Dreams,’’ p.22
25
Rigoberto Tiglao, ‘‘The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,’’ in Dictatorship and Revolution:
Roots of People’s Power, ed. Aurora javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-
Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), p.41
26
Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines,
1946-1972 pp.168–170
27
Francisco Nemenzo, ‘‘From Autocracy to Elite Democracy,’’ in Dictatorship and
Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, ed. Aurora javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and
Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), p.226
28
Pigoberto Tiglao, ‘‘All in the Family,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1995, p.2
546 S. Iglesias

last year of office29 The law renewed the regularity of elections with two
important provisions: first, elected officials’ terms were shortened from six
years to three years and, second, they could serve a maximum of three
consecutive terms.30
It is argued, however, that the country merely reverted to pre-Marcos elite
democracy in terms of the continued dominance of traditional clans in local
politics.31 Agrarian reform legislation was left to a landlord-dominated
legislature unwilling to represent the interests of the rural majority and, as
in the past, was consequently riddled with loopholes that protected land from
meaningful redistribution.32 Moreover, landowners adopted a strategy of
parcelling land among their relatives or, through collusion with local
government officials, re-classify their lands from agrarian to industrial, thus
circuiting redistribution requirements.33 As a result, tracts of land larger than
100 hectares remained under the control of 3,235 owners while small parcels,
three hectares and smaller, were redistributed to 1,021,446 people.34 In short,
80% of the land remained in the hands of 20% of the rural population. In terms
of local politics, it has been found that these landowning clans continued to
dominate local elections.35

Summary and Analysis

Throughout the history of the Philippines, power structure inequality has
characterised the political process in a manner that protects the interests of
elite groups. This has been done through overt means during times of great
political centralism, such as colonial rule and presidential dictatorship, and
even during times of constitutional democracy. Local governments, in
particular, have been used to consolidate broad-based support for the ruling
regimes and local elites have been rewarded for such behaviour. Although

29
See Alex B Brillantes and Jocelyn C. Cuaresma, ‘‘Assessment of the Aquino Pilot
Decentralization Project,’’ Philippine Journal of Public Administration 35, no. 1 (1991)
30
See 1991 Local Government Code of the Philippines (Book I Section 43)
31
The only difference is that patronage was no longer highly centralised within a
dictatorship. See Ariel Lacson, ‘‘The Curse of Political Violence,’’ The Philippine Graphic
Weekly Magazine, 5, no. 20 March 1995, pp.10–12. Also, see Tiglao, ‘‘All in the Family.’’
32
The law fixed land retention limits to a variable level of five to 11 hectares, protected
corporate lands from reform, thus exempting almost 75% of available farmland. Jr. Francisco
Lara and Jr. Horacio R. Morales, ‘‘The Peasant Movement and the Challenge of Rural
Democratisation in the Philippines,’’ The Journal of Development Studies 26, no. 4 (1990)
33
The 1991 Local Government Code gives the municipal or city councils the authority to
reclassify for industrial use up to 15% of farmlands in the territory. All lands classified for
industrial use are exempted from distribution. Landowners have used this loophole by
converting their lands and approximately 371,000 hectares may have been indiscriminately
reclassified by 1992, according to the Department of Agrarian Reform. Ces S. Ochoa,
‘‘Diminishing farms, dimming hopes for the Filipino farmer,’’ Farm News and Views 5, no. 6
(1992): p.3
34
‘‘National Summary of Landholdings by Farm Size,’’ Farm News and Views (1988)
35
See Eric U. Gutierez, Ildefonso C. Torrente, and Noli G. Narca, All in the Family: A Study of
Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy,
1992)
Colonial and indigenous influences on local power structure in the Philippines 547

efforts toward asset redistribution, administrative, and political reform have

been implemented over time, these require careful evaluation in order to
separate the rhetoric from the substance.
Local power structure has traditionally been based on the ownership and
accumulation of land within particular families. These patterns of inequality
can be traced to Spanish colonial rule when control over farmlands was
concentrated within the principalia, the same class that had capitulated to
American rule upon conquest. With increased integration into the world
capitalist system, it was the landed class that had the capital to transform into
the entrepreneurs that founded the largest businesses operating to this day.36
Although majority of the Philippines is still rural, the commercialisation of
agriculture and monetisation of the economy has given rise to other sources of
local power, including the use of coercive means.
Local governments, political office having been effectively ‘‘captured’’ by
local elites, have served regime purposes throughout colonisation and
independence, both as an administrative instrument and loyal intermediary
between the regime and the people. In terms of citizen participation in
grassroots decision-making, it is clear that the rhetoric of democracy is often
used by regimes.37However, in substance, community consultations may be
used to further entrench elites.
Regarding local services, local governments have been used as agencies of
extraction and assimilation, particularly during colonial rule. A more
contemporary rationale for political decentralisation has been fiscal pressure,
giving the central government incentives to off-load its functions and
expenditures to local governments.38 However, benefits have not been
distributed in a way that improves the status of the marginalized and
impoverished. Land reform, for instance, has been a thorny issue for decades.
Time and again, the protection of elite interests has frustrated efforts toward
land redistribution by making it either technically or political impossible to
effect significant reform.
Local accountability has been impaired by the impunity with which local
office may be used for elite interests. Apart from the historical role that the
military and police have played to suppress resistance, the government has
been known to sponsor official peasant organisations that served its purposes:
In addition to providing support for government land reform and
production programmes, these ‘company unions’ lent legitimacy to
the regime, and became beneficiaries of foreign-funded projects and
aid programmes. They were central to the government’s attempt to

36
See Temario C. Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine
Manufacturing (Quezon City: University of the Philippines (UP)Press, UP-Center for
Integrative and Development Studies, 1994), pp.31–33
37
Victoria A. Bautista, ‘‘Trends and Patterns in Social Development Efforts of the Philippine
Government,’’ in A Reader in Philippine Social Development Administration, ed. Victoria A.
Bautista (Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1997),
pp.16–24
38
See Raul De Guzman, ‘‘Decentralization as a Strategy for Redemocratization in the
Philippine Political System,’’ Philippine Journal of Public Administration 32, no. 3–4 (1988):
pp.219–220
548 S. Iglesias

divide organised peasants, and they participated in the military’s

persecution of militant peasant and activist communities.39
Finally, there has been a clear pattern across various regimes to conserve
elite domination of electoral office through limiting suffrage to the educated
and landowners, before it became universal in 1937. This was evident
throughout Spanish and American colonisation, even including the first
indigenous revolutionary government. Patron-client relations determined
electoral results until commerce eroded feudal relationships. Thereafter, votes
were ensured by coercive means, if necessary. Under Martial Law, local elites
who supported the Marcos dictatorship gained political power in return for
patronage emanating from the president’s office. The restoration of constitu-
tional democracy notwithstanding has been referred to by some scholars as the
return of elite democracy, retaining the traditional political inequality
structures that have its roots in how government and society were organised
during colonial rule.

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