Tanada vs Tuvera - ARTICLE 2

Tananda vs Tuvera showcases the importance of the publication of laws.

Tanada et al, through a writ of mandamus, compels hon. Tuvera to publish the the multiple
unpublished presidential decrees by invoking the right to be informed on matters of public
concern. However, the respondents contended that the publication in the official gazette is not a
requirement when the law itself provides for its own effectivity date

The issue is whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is a requirement for laws and acts
to be valid and enforceable. (YES)

The ruling here is Article 2 of the New Civil Code does not dispense with the publication
requirement in the Official Gazette of laws that provide for its own effectivity date. Publication is
an indispensable requirement for laws to be valid and enforceable

In the context of the sentence you provided, "does not dispense with" means that Article 2 of the
New Civil Code does not eliminate or do away with the requirement. It's indicating that the
mentioned article does not remove or exempt the necessity of the publication requirement.

In legal terms, "dispense" is often used to mean waiving, exempting, or eliminating a

requirement or obligation. When a law or regulation "does not dispense with" a particular
requirement, it means that the requirement still stands and is not being excluded or waived. In
other words, the requirement remains in effect and must be adhered to.

PHILSA vs CA - ARTICLE 2

Three individuals—Mikin, de Mesa, and Leyson—were recruited by a company called Philsa to

work in Saudi Arabia. They had to pay fees for this opportunity. After they left for Saudi Arabia,
their foreign employer forced them to sign a contract that changed their work terms and
conditions. When they refused to sign the third contract, they were fired and sent back to the
Philippines.

Upon returning, they demanded their fees and unpaid salaries from Philsa. Philsa refused,
leading them to file a complaint with the POEA. They claimed illegal dismissal, payment of
salary differentials, withholding of salary, refunds of placement fees, and contraction
substitution. The POEA found Philsa guilty of improper fees, but Philsa argued that they
shouldn't be held responsible due to the lack of publication of a particular memorandum

Mikin, de Mesa, and Leyson were hired by Philsa to work in Saudi Arabia but faced issues with
their employer's changes. They demanded money from Philsa, and even though they won their
case, Philsa argued against it based on regulations not being properly published.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philsa may be held liable for illegal exaction by virtue of POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 11. (NO)

RULING: Philsa is not liable.n Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court held that xxx Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Applying this doctrine, as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11
was not published, Philsa cannot be held liable.

PNCC VS ASIAVEST -ARTICLE 3

This case started with a money dispute between a Malaysian company (respondent) and a
Philippine company (petitioner) at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

The Philippine company, PNCC, along with Asiavest Holdings, formed a company called
Asiavest-CDCP to build roads and bridges in Malaysia. PNCC got guarantees from Asiavest
Merchant Bankers to make sure they complete the work. The guarantees were under Malaysian
law.

But PNCC didn't fulfill its part, so the State of Pahang in Malaysia asked for the money
guaranteed by Asiavest Merchant Bankers. They paid a reduced amount to settle. Then, they
asked PNCC for the money they paid.

Asiavest Merchant Bankers sued PNCC in a Philippine court, using Malaysian laws as the
basis. PNCC asked for more time to respond but eventually was declared in default by the
court.

The trial court decided in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers, saying they proved Malaysian
laws correctly. PNCC appealed to the Court of Appeals, which said they could only raise legal
questions in the higher court. So, PNCC filed this Petition.

ISSUE: whether our courts can handle a case where a Malaysian company sues a Philippine
company for money, even though the contract and work happened in Malaysia. Also, we need to
decide if the forum non conveniens principle applies

RULING: The issue of jurisdiction is based on the law. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
specifies the jurisdiction of our courts, saying that civil cases involving sums of money fall under
the jurisdiction of trial courts. The Regional Trial Court in Pasig has the authority to handle the
case involving the Malaysian corporation's claim for Malaysian Ringgit 3,915,053.54.

The "forum non conveniens" principle deals with situations where choosing the right place for
the trial is important. This principle allows a court to decide not to handle a case if there's a
more suitable forum available. It ensures fairness and prevents parties from using tactics to gain
an advantage.
When deciding whether to accept a case, the court must consider various factors, like
convenience for both parties and the court's ability to make a fair decision. Just saying "forum
non conveniens" doesn't automatically move the case to another court. The court must look at
the specific circumstances and determine if it's appropriate to transfer the case.

In this case, the trial court decided to keep the case because it would be more convenient for
the Philippine corporation. The company's main office and records are in the Philippines, and
most of the people involved in the contract are likely here too. The court believes it's in a good
position to handle the case fairly and efficiently.

The Philippine corporation hasn't shown a real and immediate problem where another
jurisdiction is already handling a similar case, and it's important to consider this to justify moving
the case elsewhere..

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL v. CA - ARTICLE 4

In July 1989, Villegas and Magallanes suggested forming a student council at the school. They
were told by Dr. Moral not to proceed, as the school didn't allow such groups. As a result,
Villegas and Barroa were not allowed to enroll for breaking the school's rules. Later, they were
given different reasons for their rejection.

The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) because
of a previous case, Ariel Non, et al. v. Hon. Dames. This case changed the way contracts were
viewed, moving away from the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz, et al. v. PSBA. The
school used the Alcuaz case to support its argument. The Non case highlighted that the contract
between the school and students isn't a normal contract – it's special because education is
highly valued in the Constitution. Also, Paragraph 137 of the Manual Regulation for Private
School, following BP 232, acknowledges students' rights to choose their field of study and
continue until graduation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Non doctrine should be applied retroactively to govern and invalidate
the legal effects of incidents that took place prior to its adoption which are valid under the Alcuaz
doctrine which was prevailing at the time said incident took place. (NO)

RULING: The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose
before its promulgation. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other
schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, which recognized the
termination of contract theory.
CO VS COURT OF APPEALS -ARTICLE 8

Albino Co gave a postdated check to a salvaging firm in 1983, but it bounced when it was
deposited in 1984 due to a "CLOSED ACCOUNT." Albino Co was convicted based on a
previous court decision that said checks used to guarantee obligations are still covered by the
law against bouncing checks.

Co appealed this decision, saying the court shouldn't have relied on the previous ruling because
when he issued the check in 1983, using a check to guarantee wasn't considered a crime yet
according to a circular from the Ministry of Justice. However, this circular was later reversed in
1984.

The Court of Appeals didn't agree with Co's argument, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first dismissed his appeal but later decided to reconsider and look at the
case again.

ISSUE: Issues involving vested rights, legal status, past decisions, and public policy are
complex and have been challenging for courts. These issues have been discussed extensively
in various court decisions, both at the state and federal levels. It's clear from these decisions
that a blanket rule of retroactive invalidity cannot be universally applied.

RULING: Regarding jurisdiction, the law determines which court can handle a case. The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, also known as Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is one such law
that outlines court jurisdiction. Based on this law, civil cases involving the payment of a sum of
money fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of trial courts.

According to Section 19 of the law, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in
various cases, including those where the amount in question exceeds certain thresholds. These
thresholds have been adjusted for certain areas. For instance, in Metro Manila, the jurisdictional
limits are higher. As a result, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has the authority to handle a
complaint filed by the respondent, seeking to recover a sum of money in Malaysian Ringgit
(MYR) 3,915,053.54.

The doctrine of "forum non conveniens" refers to the principle that courts have the option not to
take jurisdiction over a case if it's not the most suitable forum. This applies in situations where
it's more convenient for parties to seek resolution in another jurisdiction. Courts can choose
whether to take jurisdiction based on certain factors, like the convenience of the court and the
parties, the ability of the court to make informed decisions, and its power to enforce its rulings.

Courts must carefully evaluate whether they should entertain a case or not. Simply mentioning
the doctrine of forum non conveniens or pointing out foreign elements is not enough to remove
jurisdiction. It's important for courts to assess if special circumstances exist that justify not taking
jurisdiction.
In this particular case, the trial court decided to assume jurisdiction and explained its reasoning.
Trying the case in the Philippines was considered more convenient for the defendant
corporation, as its main office and relevant records are located here. Most of the people
involved in the construction contract in Malaysia are likely accessible in the Philippines. It was
unexpected for a Philippine corporation like the petitioner to prefer pursuing the case in
Malaysian courts. Our courts are better equipped to enforce judgments in this scenario.

Additionally, the petitioner didn't provide evidence of a real and immediate threat that another
jurisdiction started litigation and the foreign court decided to take jurisdiction.

PRINCIPLES: The principle of making laws apply only to future events has been used in many
cases.

This principle has also been used for administrative rules and circulars. For instance, in
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, the court said that a circular from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue can't negatively affect taxpayers retroactively.

The same principle has been applied to court decisions too. While court decisions aren't laws
themselves, they show how laws should be understood. This is why Article 8 of the New Civil
Code says that court decisions interpreting laws become part of the legal system. When a court
interprets a law, it's like making that interpretation a part of the law from the time it was passed.
This is why people say "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet," which means the court's
interpretation of the law has the power of the law.

For example, in Tañada v Tuvera, decided in 1985, the court said that presidential orders of
general importance, if not published, don't have legal force. This caused concerns about how it
might affect actions taken based on those orders. But the court maintained its decision.

REPUBLIC VS. MANALO - ARTICLE 15

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011,
was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from
the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Issues:

1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce
instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that the intent of the law is important when interpreting it. The amendment
aims to avoid an odd situation where a Filipino is considered married to a foreigner who's no
longer married to them. The Court said that Article 26 of the Family Code doesn't specify who
should file for divorce, so discrimination based on who files it isn't right. Even if you consider the
nationality principle, it shouldn't unfairly hurt some people. The Court said that Article 26 violates
the equal protection rule. Treating divorces differently based on who initiated them is arbitrary
and unjust.

The Court can't decide due to a lack of evidence. Foreign laws need proof. There are two types
of divorce: one ends a marriage, the other just suspends it. Just showing a divorce decree isn't
enough. The fact of divorce must be proven. So, the Japanese divorce law needs to be proven.
The case was sent back to the original court for more evidence on Japanese divorce law.

MEDINA VS KOIKE - ARTICLE 15

Facts: Medina married Koike in the Philippines. They got divorced in Japan. Medina wanted the
divorce recognized in the Philippines so she could remarry. She filed a petition for this. No one
opposed it. She presented divorce papers and documents from Japan. The court denied her
petition, saying she didn't prove Japan's divorce law.

Summary: Medina married Koike, divorced in Japan, and wanted the divorce recognized in the
Philippines. The court denied her petition because she didn't prove Japan's divorce law.

ISSUE: Did the RTC make a mistake by refusing to recognize the foreign divorce through the
petition?

RULING: At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree
between Medina and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the
matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this
regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court

FUJIKI VS MARINAY - ARTICLE 15

Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese man, married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines. Fujiki's
parents were unhappy with the marriage, so he couldn't take Marinay to Japan where he lives.
They lost touch. Marinay then married another Japanese man named Shinichi Maekara without
ending her first marriage. She faced abuse and contacted Fujiki. They reconnected in Japan,
and Fujiki helped Marinay get a Japanese court to declare her marriage to Maekara invalid due
to bigamy.

Later, Fujiki went to a Philippines court to have the Japanese court's decision recognized.
However, the court dismissed the case, saying Fujiki couldn't legally file it.

ISSUE: Can a person who was previously married file a petition to recognize a foreign court's
judgment that declares their spouse's later marriage to someone else invalid due to bigamy?

RULING: Yes, a person who was previously married can file a petition to recognize a foreign
court's judgment that declares their spouse's later marriage to someone else invalid due to
bigamy. This can be done through a special legal process called a "petition for cancellation or
correction of entries" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This rule allows any person with a
direct interest in matters related to civil status to file such a petition. In this case, the prior
spouse, Fujiki, has a clear interest in upholding the validity of his marriage and property rights.
The court granted his petition
CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY - ARTICLE 4

Cui studied law at Arellano University. He began with a preparatory law course and then went to
the College of Law there. He switched to Abad Santos College of Law later, where he
graduated. Throughout his time at Arellano, he received scholarships based on his good
grades, which meant he got his tuition fees back after each semester.

In a contract he signed, Cui agreed that in exchange for the scholarship, he wouldn't transfer to
another school without paying back the equivalent of the scholarship money. After he graduated
from Abad Santos University, he wanted his transcripts from Arellano to take the bar exam.
Arellano said he needed to repay them P1,033.87 before they'd release the transcripts. Since
he needed the transcripts to take the bar exam, he paid the money under protest.

In 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued a memo that said recipients of scholarships
shouldn't be charged for tuition and fees if they decide to leave the school.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in their contract whereby Cui waives his right to transfer to
another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid.
(NO)

RULING: The agreement in the contract that says Cui can't switch schools without paying back
the scholarship money is not valid because it goes against public policy. In the context of
contract law, courts won't support agreements that harm public welfare, morals, or honesty.

If Arellano University understood the true purpose of scholarships and why Memorandum No.
38, issued in 1949, was created, they wouldn't have made this agreement with Cui. That
contract directly contradicts the memorandum and challenges the authority of the Director of
Private Schools. This is because the contract goes against good morals and honesty.

The policy outlined in Memorandum No. 33, also from 1949, is a good policy. Scholarships are
given to recognize merit, not to keep top students in a school for its reputation. The university's
idea that scholarships are a business strategy to make more money doesn't just go against
good policy but also against morals.

Scholarships should be given not just to attract and keep impressive students for show, but to
reward skill and support gifted students who are important to society.
LHDC VS. ESQUILLO - ARTICLE 6

Esquillo got a job as a structural engineer with ABV Rock Group in Jeddah, and a local agency
called Land & Housing Development Corporation helped with his work documents. His job
contract was ended early because they said there were fewer jobs available. He got some
money from ABV as payment and was told to go back to the Philippines.

Because of this, Esquillo filed a complaint against ABV for breaking the contract and possibly
firing him unfairly. The case went to the POEA and then the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter said ABV needed to pay Esquillo for the time left on his contract. But ABV
appealed, and the NLRC disagreed with the Labor Arbiter. Esquillo's request for reconsideration
was also denied.

The Court of Appeals said that even though Esquillo didn't clearly say he disagreed with the
payment he got for signing a quitclaim, previous cases supported his right to demand what he
deserved under labor laws. So, he should get the difference between what he was paid and
what he should have been paid. The Court of Appeals also said the NLRC wrongly used a
certain law in the case. They decided that Esquillo should get paid for the time left on his
contract, along with what he already got. This is why the case reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to be granted his additional monetary claims, despite having
executed a quitclaim? (Yes)

RULING: The fact that employees have signed a release and/or quitclaim does not necessarily
result in the waiver of their claims. The law strictly scrutinizes agreements in which workers
agree to receive less compensation than what they are legally entitled to.

CA: “The fact that employees have signed a release and/or quitclaim does not necessarily result
in the waiver of their claims. The law strictly scrutinizes agreements in which workers agree to
receive less compensation than what they are legally entitled to.”

Palanca v CA

—--------------
PEOPLE v. JABINAL - ARTICLE 8

In 1964, Jabinal was found with a gun and bullets but didn't have the required license. He said
he should be cleared because he had special appointments as a Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent that let him have the gun. He believed he should be found not guilty based on past court
cases. But, he was found guilty by the trial court because of a different court ruling in 1968.

ISSUE: Whether or norJabinal should be acquitted based on the rulings in People v.

Macarandangand People v. Lucero. (YES)
RULING: Even though court decisions aren't laws themselves, they show us how to understand
the laws. This is why Article 8 of the New Civil Code says that court decisions that explain laws
become part of the legal system. When the court interprets a law, it's like adding to the law itself
from the time it was made. It helps us know what the law was meant to do.

The ideas from the Lucero and Macarandang cases were part of the law when the person was
caught with the gun and went to trial. Even though the Mapa case in 1967 changed these ideas,
when a court changes its view, the new view should be used for new cases, not cases that were
already settled based on the old view. This is especially true in criminal laws, where it's
important for people to know what they might be punished for

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO -ARTICLE 15

Van Dorn, a Filipino, and Upton, an American, got married in Hong Kong. They lived in the
Philippines and had two kids. They got divorced in Nevada, USA, and Van Dorn married
Theodore Van Dorn.

Upton filed a lawsuit saying a business owned by Van Dorn is shared property and asked for an
accounting of it. Upton also wanted the right to manage this shared property. Van Dorn tried to
stop the case, saying Upton can't sue because of the divorce judgment in Nevada. In that
judgment, Upton agreed they didn't have "community property."

The lower court said the case can continue. They said the business is in the Philippines, and the
divorce from Nevada can't go against the laws in the Philippines..

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino. (YES)

RULING:

The divorce ruling applies to Upton because he's an American citizen. According to Article 15 of
the NCC, only Filipinos follow the rule of no-divorce because it goes against our public policy
and morals. But foreigners can get divorced in other countries if it's allowed by their own laws.
Upton's divorce in Nevada means he's not married to Van Dorn anymore under his national law.
So, he can't sue as Van Dorn's husband.

For Van Dorn, it's not fair to say she's still married to Upton. She shouldn't be forced to stay with
him, respect, or support him. Treating her this way in her own country is unfair and doesn't serve
justice.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. - ARTICLE
17

Edward E. Christensen made a will giving a part of his property in the Philippines to his
daughter, Maria Helen Christensen. He was a US citizen from California but lived in the
Philippines when he died. Lucy, his other child, said that California law doesn't let acknowledged
children inherit. Lucy also pointed out Article 16 of the Civil Code, which says the rules for who
gets what in a will depend on the law of the deceased person's country.
Helen disagreed and said that there's no specific American law for this, so we should follow
California law. California law says personal property follows the owner's domicile, so it should
follow the law of the deceased person's domicile. Helen also mentioned renvoi, which means
the question of the will's validity should go back to the law of the deceased person's domicile,
which is the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case. (YES)

RULING: The Doctrine of Renvoi is used in legal cases where different laws from different
places need to be considered. In this situation, it's like looking at the rules of one place to figure
out what the rules of another place should be. For example, Article 16 of the Civil Code talks
about how who gets what from a will depends on the laws of the deceased person's country. In
California, their laws say that a person can decide what happens to their property in a will. Also,
California law says that personal property goes along with the owner's home, which means it
follows the rules of the place where the owner lived.
In the case of Christensen, the Doctrine of Renvoi applies because he was from California but
lived in the Philippines. According to California law, the rules about his will should follow
Philippine law because that's where he lived. The Supreme Court found that the rules from the
Philippines, where he lived, should apply to the situation, not the rules from California.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, respondent. -
ARTICLE 17

Audrey and Richard were American citizens who lived in the Philippines for 30 years. They had
an adopted daughter, Kyle. When Audrey passed away in 1979, she left a will leaving
everything to Richard. Later, Richard married Candelaria and had two children. When Richard
died in 1984, he left everything to Candelaria, except for some shares left for Kyle. Both
Audrey's and Richard's wills were submitted for approval in different court proceedings.

In one case, a motion was filed by a person named petitioner to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey. A partition plan was also presented, and it was approved by the court.
Meanwhile, in another case involving Richard's will, there was a dispute about how his property
should be divided. Respondent argued that under the laws of Maryland, the state where they
were previously citizens, a legacy means the entire interest of the deceased. Respondent
claimed the full 3/4 undivided interest in a property in Makati. The court agreed with respondent
and awarded the property to her..

ISSUE: Whether or not Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. (YES

RULING:

Audrey Guersey was an American citizen from Maryland, USA. Her will was validated in a
proceeding, showing she was living in the Philippines but was a resident of Maryland, USA. Her
will was accepted by the Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, USA. The validity of her will,
especially who her heirs are, is determined by her national law – the law of Maryland, according
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

While our courts can't automatically know foreign laws, the petitioner, as the estate's
administrator, was responsible for presenting the relevant laws from Maryland. Unfortunately,
the petitioner didn't do this, leading to a mistake that unfairly affected the respondent's rights
over a property in Makati.

In situations like this, courts have a duty to help parties who are unjustly denied their rights. In
this case, the court should consider the laws of Maryland that have been provided to make sure
Audrey's and Richard's estates are distributed according to their wills, not the partition proposal
by the petitioner. This means the Makati property belongs to the respondent. The petitioner's
good intentions can't change this outcome.