Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Volume 4
DAVID CHEAL
Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
R
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published in 1988 by Routledge
This edition first published in 2016
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© 1988 David Cheal
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The Gift
Economy
David Cheat
li
ROUTLEDGE
London and New York
First published in 1988 by
Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London E C 4P 4E E
Published in the U SA by
Routledge
in association with Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York N Y 10001
© i q 88 David Cheal
I S B N 0-415-00641-4
The author gratefully acknowledges permission to use material from the following
sources: From Max Weber, H. H. Gerih and C. Wright-Mills, Oxford Univer-
sity Press; Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method, H. Blumer,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., © H. Blumer 1969; Prisms, pp. 19-20, T. Adrono (trans.
S. and S. Weber), M IT Press, © Theodor W. Adorno 1967; Emile Durkheim
on Institutional Analysis, p. 234, M. Traugott, University o f Chicago Press,
1978; 'The female world o f love and ritual’, C. Smith-Rosenberg, Signs 1 (1),
p. 1 1 ; ‘Reference groups as perspectives', T. Shibutani, American Journal o f
Sociology 60, pp. 562-9.
For Chris
1 9 4 8 - 19 8 3
Page Intentionally Left Blank
Contents
Preface ix
1 M oral econom y i
2 T ie-signs 20
3 Transactions and relations 40
4 L ove culture 61
5 Social reproduction 87
6 Intim acy and com m unity 106
7 G ift games 12 1
8 The social future 142
9 C onclusion 167
Notes 184
References 207
Name index 2 21
Subject index 225
Page Intentionally Left Blank
Preface
Everyo n e has given a gift at some time, and for m any people gift
giving is a frequent activity from w hich they derive a great deal
o f pleasure. A s an econom ic activity gift giving plays an important
part in our lives and in the consum er goods industries. It therefore
deserves to be better understood. O f course, gift transactions are
not responsible for the great problem s o f our age, about which w e
hear so much. Social scientists studying m odern societies have
tended to pass over the gift econom y as a subject for investigation,
preferring to address econom ic issues that have m ore serious conse-
quences. B u t in case gift giving appears to be an unserious subject,
it is im portant to realize that in it are reflected m any o f the
im portant issues o f m odern times. H o w people act in their gift
transactions is a result o f how they think about relations between
the sexes and between the generations. Also, gift practices can be
p ow erfu lly affected by econom ic and dem ographic change, and by
the hopes and fears o f ordinary people faced w ith personal crises,
including the threat o f nuclear war. In short, gift giving is as much
a part o f the struggle for existence in the modern w orld as is any
other form o f social behavior. A t the very least, studying gift
behavior gives us a w in d o w through which w e can look into
people’s lives and see for ourselves what it is that m oves m odern
men and wom en.
In this book a number o f case studies o f individuals have been
presented, beginning in chapter 3 , in w hich the connections
between gift giving and everyday life have been described in some
detail. Readers w ho are m ost interested in those materials m ay
w ish to skip the first tw o chapters, which deal with matters that
are o f special interest to the professional social scientist.
For social scientists the m ost challenging parts o f this book are
likely to be those that deal w ith the relative neglect o f the gift
econom y b y students o f modern society. In addition to the press-
ures to make research relevant to social problem s, there are tw o
additional reasons w h y the m odern gift econom y has received little
attention. One o f them is that contem porary gift giving is norm ally
X PREFACE
Moral economy
Capitalist transformations
T he theory o f political econom y shares with cultural elementarism
the assum ption that gift givin g was a uniquely important type o f
econom ic relationship in pre-capitalist societies, but that to all
intents and purposes it was destroyed b y the expansion o f the
system o f m arket exchange. This point o f view is evident in a
num ber o f influential histories, such as K arl P olan yi’s (1957)
description o f “ the great transform ation” by w hich capitalism came
into existence. It is generally assumed that the emergence o f capi-
talist society meant that morals were replaced by markets
(Thom pson 19 7 1; Zelizer 1979), and that gift transactions therefore
became o f lesser importance. Viviana Zelizer, for instance, has
show n that in nineteenth-century Am erica support for the bereaved
shifted from a gift-type o f mutual aid to an impersonal market
system served by insurance companies. She reports that fam ily
and neighborhood transactions were replaced by transactions with
organizations, and that the m anagement o f death therefore became
rationalized and form alized. This change had some fundamental
consequences for beliefs about life and death. According to Zelizer,
it broke “ a pow erful norm ative pattern: the division between the
marketable and the nonmarketable, or the sacred and the profane”
(Zelizer 19 79 :43).
It is possible to accept Z elizer’s observations, as I think w e must,
w ithout necessarily im plying that the social significance o f gift
transactions has been drastically diminished. In the first place,
people in the western societies continue to spend large amounts o f
m oney on gifts, particularly during the Christm as season (Caron
and Ward 1975; C ram er 1977). It is therefore m ost likely that what
has happened is a process o f the differentiation o f gift transactions
w ithin a changing m oral order o f economic relationships. A s a
result, gifts are no longer used principally as practical means for
mutual aid, but instead they are sym bolic media for m anaging the
em otional aspects o f relationships (Cheal 1986, 1987a).
Economic rationalization
G ift giving is often described by sociological theorists as a process
o f exchange through w hich individuals rationally pursue their self
interests. This point o f view , know n as social exchange theory
(Em erson 1976, 19 81), is evidently modelled upon the political
cconom y o f market transactions. According to the exchange theor-
ists. such as Peter Blau (1964), the generosity that w e observe in
gift giving is only an apparent altruism. In reality, Blau maintains,
giving to others is motivated by the expectation o f some reward,
whether direct (such as pow er over others) or indirect (such as
social approval). B lau ’s arguments have not gone unchallenged
8 THE GIFT ECONOMY
(Bochner 1984: $78-80; Cheal 1984), and they have recently been
criticized from a fem inist standpoint by N ancy Hartsock (1983b,
1985).
H artsock (1983a) has pointed out that grand theories derived
from the political econom y o f m arket relations have not paid
sufficient attention to the experiences o f w om en within the sexual
division o f labor. Exchange theory, for exam ple, has a male bias
tow ards com petitive interaction and cannot describe the relations
between m others and gro w in g children. H artsock has therefore
suggested that, “ one could begin to see the outline o f a very
different kind o f com m unity i f one took the mother/infant relation
rather than market exchange as the prototypic human interaction”
(Hartsock 1983b: 4 1-2 ).
H artsock has argued that the institutionalization o f m otherhood
“ results in the construction o f female existence as centered w ithin
a com plex relational nexus” (Hartsock 1985:64). The social
construction o f fem ininity has three aspects which, H artsock claims
(19 8 5 :6 5-6 ), are incom patible w ith exchange theory. Firstly, the
im portance o f em pathy in w o m en ’s self-definition contradicts the
assum ption in exchange theory that individuals are fundam entally
separate and purely concerned w ith their ow n interests. Secondly,
w o m en ’s experiences do not support the view that all social
relations conform to the m arket m odel o f voluntary transactions.
T hose w ho are responsible for small children typically have little
choice over whether or not to interact w ith them. A nd thirdly,
unlike m arket relations, w hich necessarily involve an opposition
o f interests, conflict is not at the core o f the relationships between
mothers and their children.
The generosity o f m ost parents tow ards their children, even
adult children, has been rem arked upon in a num ber o f studies
(C aplow 1982; Cheal 1983). This w ell-kn ow n pattern o f behavior
raises questions about the relevance o f exchange theory for under-
standing intergenerational transfers, w hich have not been satisfac-
torily answered (Cheal 1988c). Som e o f those questions w ill be
taken up in later chapters, and further discussion o f social exchange
w ill be postponed until then. For n ow it is sufficient to acknow l-
edge that not all social life in a capitalist society is dominated by
the rational acquisition o f goods and influence.
MORAL ECONOMY 9
It follows clearly from what we have seen that in this system o f ideas
one gives away what is in reality a part o f one’s nature and substance,
10 THE GIFT ECONOMY
upon action, in the form o f the pow ers o f social objects. W hatever
merits this m odel o f deterministic social facts m ay have for the
study o f traditional societies, it can have little value for under-
standing the open texture o f everyd ay life in m odern societies (see
for exam ple, D ouglas 19 7 1). Accounts o f social order in pluralistic
societies must take into account individuals’ choices between alter-
native lines o f action. Concepts o f subjectivity and individuality
are therefore likely to be o f some importance. This can be seen
even in the unlikely setting o f the Hutterite colonies, w here a
gro w in g gift econom y is associated w ith the expansion o f indi-
vidual freedom s and an enhanced subjective value attached to
personal relationships. W ithin the m oral econom y o f a Hutterite
colony gifts have a special place, w hich is a result o f their differen-
tiation from the background o f transactions upon which the w ell-
being o f colony m em bers depends. The nature o f that differen-
tiation is central to understanding w hat a gift econom y is, and
w h y it takes the form s that it does.
Moral economy
The proposition that gifts are redundant transactions raises a funda-
mental question for sociology. I f gifts are redundant, w hat social
value could they possibly have which w ould account for the great
im portance w hich m ost people attach to them? The answer
proposed here is that gifts are used to construct certain kinds o f
voluntary social relationships.
In the study o f m odern social life, sociologists have paid a great
deal o f attention to the netw orks o f ties that link individuals in
urban com m unities (for exam ple, L itw ak and Szelenyi 1969;
W ellm an 1979, 19 8 1, 1982; W ellm an and H all 1986; Bu lm er 1986).
These netw orks are conventionally described as social support
system s w hich have been designed to meet the needs o f their
m em bers throughout the life cycle. H o w ever, concepts o f life cycle
needs have been unable to satisfactorily account for m uch relevant
social behavior (Cheal 1987c; 1988a). It has therefore been
suggested that transfers between individuals must be explained as
outcom es o f the rules and resources that actors draw upon in
pursuing their goals (Cheal 1986; 1988c). What those goals are is
open to debate, and the present w o rk takes a particular point o f
v ie w on this question. It w ill be argued here that transfers o f gifts
from one individual to another must be understood m ainly as a
MORAL ECONOMY 15
Conclusion
Randall C ollins (1985) has draw n attention to the fact that gift
givin g in ritual exchange netw orks is a key issue in one o f the
three great traditions in social theory. That tradition o f enquiry,
MORAL ECONOMY 19
logic to this choice o f emphasis, since the most valuable gifts are
given to close kin (C aplow 1982: 386; Cheal 1986:432). Even so,
it is clear that significant numbers o f gifts are given to non-kin
(Lowes, Turner, and Wills 1 9 7 1 :9 1 ; C ap low 19 82:387). For this
reason, and because o f the difficulties that are inherent in using
“ the fam ily” as a unit o f analysis, it is necessary to look at all
anchored relations as elements in personal networks that individuals
construct as arenas for interaction (Wellman 19 81).
T hirdly, G offm an has recom mended that w e should pay atten-
tion to both the instrumental and the expressive dimensions o f
gifts, and to the w ays in which they are interrelated in everyday
life. That means collecting inform ation about the types o f gifts
that are transferred and their financial values, as C ap low did in his
pioneering M iddletow n Christm as study.
From G o ffm an ’s point o f view it is necessary to use data o f this
sort to illustrate the practical importance o f sym bolic interaction
for social organization. In recent years the importance o f studying
gifts as sym bolic objects has become clear (C aplow 1984; Cheal
1986), and ambiguities in the ceremonial idiom o f gifts have been
explored (Boholm 1983: 17 7 -8 2 ; Cheal 1987a). The most w idely
discussed issue here has been the unacceptability o f m oney as a gift
(W ebley, Lea, and Portalska 1983). D ouglas and Isherw ood have
claimed that people draw a careful line between cash and gift in
order to separate com m ercial relations from personal relations.
T hey have also stated, som ewhat contradictorily one m ight think,
that “ The right to give cash is reserved for fam ily intim acy”
(D ouglas and Isherw ood 1979: 59). Here it is only possible to agree
w ith their disclaimer that “ there are details that could be tidied
u p .” It w ould obviously be most useful to have some concrete
evidence from everyday life with which to clarify the points at
issue here.
C learly, m ore inform ation about gift transactions is needed
before w e can expect to arrive at a satisfactory understanding o f
any m odern gift econom y. In the follow ing chapters w e are going
to exam ine selected evidence from a detailed investigation into gift
giving in C anada.5 M ost o f the inform ation is drawn from a study
o f ceremonial transactions in W innipeg, know n as the W innipeg
Ritual C ycle Stu d y.6
26 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Sampling
In order to exam ine the various issues that w ere m entioned above
it is necessary to have detailed inform ation about gift transactions.
A sk in g interviewees to describe an arbitrarily lim ited num ber o f
transactions, as B elk has done (Belk 1979), is likely to introduce
biases that arise from either the investigators’ or the interview ees’
preferences. T he m ost desirable solution, then, is to collect infor-
m ation about all gift transactions that occur w ithin certain socially
defined units o f time, such as the Christm as season or the annual
cycle. T he W innipeg Ritual C ycle Study was designed to obtain
inform ation about all gifts w hich the interviewees had given or
received in connection w ith a ceremonial occasion over a tw elve
m onth period.
A n intensive study o f gift transactions such as this is very
dem anding, both for the researchers and for the interviewees, as
w e can see in one pioneering study o f Christm as gifts and kin
netw orks (C aplow 1982). T he costs o f such w o rk, and the practical
difficulties involved, mean that the sample w ill norm ally be sm all
(C ap lo w ’s sample consisted o f n o adult M iddletow n residents).
This in turn means that it is not possible to count upon having a
representative sample o f the population o f a large urban center
such as W innipeg. That disadvantage, from the statistical point o f
view , can in fact be turned into an advantage from certain theor-
etical points o f view .
In the W innipeg Ritual C ycle Study eighty adults aged 18 or
over w ere interview ed during the winter o f 19 8 2-3. A s a check
upon the validity o f the results from this sample, a study o f valu-
able Christm as gifts and w edding gifts was subsequently conducted
using a random sample o f $73 adult m embers o f the population o f
W innipeg. Som e o f the results from the latter survey, w hich w as
TIE-SIGNS 27
Church membership
Non-member 12 12 24
United 20 2 22
Anglican 3 0 3
Roman Catholic 1 6 7
Ukrainian Catholic 0 12 12
Orthodox 0 2 2
Other 4 6 10
Totals 40 40 80
TIE-SIGNS 29
Table 2.2 Winnipeg Ritual Cycle Study , Age and Sex of Sample Members
Totals 52 28 80
30 THE GIFT ECONOMY
view s w ith men, husbands often relied heavily upon their w ives
to fill in the details o f “ their” gift transactions.
Interviewing
Recording
Networks o f ties
The social networks literature contains m any references to graphs
as the foundations for m odern networks analysis. Nevertheless,
there has been surprisingly little concern with how w e m ight
effectively use arrangements o f lines and points for the purposes
o f ideographic description. In particular, sociologists w ho have
taken an analytical approach to netw ork studies have usually de-
emphasized the graphic im agery o f netw ork charts in favor o f
algebraic graph theory. A s a result little attention has been paid to
the uses o f graphs as visual materials in studies o f personal
netw orks. It is therefore w orth considering what form s o f ideo-
graphic description are m ost likely to sensitize us to important
variations in ego-centered networks. H o w can we, in fact, best
display personal netw ork data for the purposes o f illustrating the
relational properties o f transactions?
Social anthropologists w orkin g with genealogical data have
developed standard ideographic techniques for describing kinship
netw orks, w hich seem to have suited their purposes rather w ell
(Barnes 1967). For sociology, anthropological kinship charts have
tw o great advantages, nam ely the specification o f intergenerational
relations and the precise description o f the chains o f ties by which
those relations are ordered. H ow ever, they also have some notable
limitations that are particularly disadvantageous for studies o f mass
societies. One o f the m ost salient characteristics o f personal
netw orks in mass societies is that they invariably contain many
different kinds o f relationships. Within such netw orks, social circles
consisting o f kinship ties m ay be segregated from those com posed
o f other ties, but that is not alw ays the case. Em otionally significant
relationships m ay be maintained with a friend’s mother, or with
the friend o f a favorite aunt, and so on.
A t present no effective technique exists for portraying networks
in which fam ily ties and other kinds o f ties are interm ixed.9 The
genealogical chart is clearly unsatisfactory in this respect, since
it excludes non-kin. O ther ideographic methods have therefore
sometimes been recom mended for use in networks analysis, such
as the star graph (Barnes 1969: 58-60). Star graphs are diagrams
consisting o f points that are all joined, directly or indirectly, to a
*45 *-40 +35 +30 +25 *20 +15 +10 *5 0 - 5 -10 "15
••
& Male (living) Fa Father
Female (living) Mo Mother
Sex unknown (living) Pa Parent (sex unknown)
• Animal (living) Br
Si
Brother
Sister
!::, Male (deceased) SB Sibling (sex unknown)
0 Female (deceased) So Son
(> Sex unknown (deceased) Da Daughter
Ch Child (sex unknown)
6. Male (vital status unknown) OK Distant kin (connection
e Female (vital status unknown)
unknown) Hu Husband
~ Sex unknown (vital status Wi Wife
unknown) BF Boyfriend
GF Girlfriend
e Age estimated Fr Friend
Ac Acquaintance
Pe Pet
Conclusion
In this chapter the discussion o f theories o f political econom y and
m oral econom y has been extended to include consideration o f the
different kinds o f research questions to which they give rise. It has
been suggested that the perspective o f political econom y focuses
upon questions that: are especially concerned w ith the material
flow s o f gift transfers as form s o f social capital; consider the tim ing
o f transactions to be o f crucial importance; and direct attention to
the possibility o f contradictions between actors’ accounts o f their
behavior and their real m otives for giving gifts. Approaching gift
givin g from the perspective o f m oral econom y, on the other hand,
leads to an emphasis upon: the ritual dimensions o f gift transactions
as events that are perform ed on occasions set aside for ceremonial
TIE-SIGNS 39
activity; the kinds o f social and personal identities that are sym bol-
ically defined in interaction rituals; and the interdependence o f
instrumental and expressive interests in the social construction o f
system s o f relationships.
T he aspects o f gift transactions that have been identified here
w ill be discussed at various points throughout the follow ing chap-
ters, as w e seek to clarify the sociologically important features o f
gift giving in a m odem society. In those discussions tw o principal
kinds o f arguments w ill be presented. T h ey are both intended to
substantiate the thesis that what is most distinctive about a modern
gift econom y is the struggle to institutionalize feelings o f solidarity
as the basis for social interaction (Cheal 1987a, 1988a).
One line o f argument insists that interpersonal gift transactions
cannot be understood solely in terms o f models o f fam ily and
kinship networks, how ever valuable that approach m ay have been
in the early stages o f research into gift rituals. The principal reason
for this should by n ow be clear. Kinship ties are sometimes only
w eakly differentiated from friendship ties, at least for certain
purposes, w ith the result that they m ay be interm ingled in personal
netw orks o f considerable com plexity. A reconstituted concept o f
“ the private” cannot easily handle this com plexity. The thematic
core o f that concept is dom esticity and the spatial seclusion o f
intimate ties, and it is therefore not much use for understanding
those form s o f “ intim acy at a distance” that are often found in the
geographically dispersed networks o f the residents o f mass
societies. It is proposed here that gift transactions are best under-
stood as outcomes o f generalized structures o f moral econom y.
The other line o f argument, to which w e turn in the next
chapter, claims that the m oral order o f personal and social relation-
ships has been unduly neglected because o f the pre-eminence o f
theories o f political econom y in recent years. It is therefore
necessary to recover m oral order as a topic for sociology by
emphasizing the fact that m oral relationships are prevalent within
the gift econom y. G ift m orality takes m any form s, but there can
be little doubt that one o f the m ost com m on is the desire to give
to others as an expression o f love for them. Social definitions o f
love are thus claimed to be o f some importance.
3
Transactions and relations
M r Fisher carried this practical attitude over into his view s about
gift giving on special occasions. He described him self as giving
gifts to people w ho had done something for him, or to those w ho
had given him gifts, because “ i f they give you a gift y o u ’re kind
o f obliged in a w ay to give them o n e.” Returning a gift was the
only reason M r Fisher could think o f for giving, in spite o f the
interview er’s attempts to probe for other reasons. We m ight there-
fore expect to find that the flows o f gifts given and received by
him are strictly sym m etrical. In fact that is not alw ays the case.
M r Fisher participated in 18 gift transactions on special occasions
in 1982 (see Figure 3 .1), in 12 o f which he was the donor. O nly one
o f his gifts (no. n ) is an unequivocal instance o f social exchange,
involving a small sum o f m oney for the boy w ho delivered his
newspapers. Five gifts (nos 6 through 10) are the reciprocals o f
gifts received from relatives (nos 13 through 16). In 1 gift trans-
action (no. 12) he and his w ife were both the givers and the
receivers. The remaining 7 o f M r Fisher’s gift transactions
consisted o f unreciprocated gifts. In 5 o f them (nos 1 through 5)
he was a donor and in 2 (nos 17 and 18) he was a recipient.
M ore than h alf o f M r Fisher’s ritual gifts involve reciprocity o f
some kind. H ow ever, his reciprocal transactions cannot be
explained sim ply as a result o f strategic considerations o f social
exchange, since they are also heavily influenced by other variables.
M r Fisher’s gift transactions are in fact highly structured, and can
be described by a few simple rules, even though he appears to be
unable to articulate them himself.
Firstly, a system atic exchange o f gifts occurs only at Christm as.
44 THE GIFT ECONOMY
·35
·30
""'0\"
·25
.20
·15
.,
.w:Foloa
__ _....
~
0
-s
•10
•15
-20
...,
::z::
-25 tT'l
Ci
......
'Tl
-30 ...,
tT'l
(")
-35 0
eSioa z
~ 0
-40 =::
><
Figure J.2 RANK graph, Melvin Fisher age 75
♦30
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS
47
• 3S • 30 • 25 • 20 •10 0
•35~--~----~--~--~---------J~_.~--~----~~~--~--~'----i
..
-30~--------------------------~ ~-------------------------v~---J
occasions for g1vmg are times for returning gifts to those who
gave to her the previous year, and they are opportunities for
"paying back" those who do a lot of things to help her, but who
refuse to take direct payment in cash. In the latter category Mrs
Atamanchuk mentioned her sister as being especially important.
My sister drives and I don't, and she does a lot of errands for me, you
know, shopping, and anything that I want. I phone her up, and if she
can do it she will. So it's little things like that that count, especially the
last year or so. I can't get out much in the evening because I can't leave
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 49
-15 "20 -25 "30 “35 "40 '45 "50 "55
my mother alone. So if [my sister] can do it, she does it, and then it
saves me the trip.
Payin g her sister back does not take the form o f givin g her m ore
gifts than she receives from her. T he num erical balance o f gifts is
in fact in M rs A tam anchuk’s favor, since her sister gave her an
unreciprocated gift at Easter (see Figure 3.5, no. 25). Instead, M rs
Atam anchuk aims to spend m ore on each gift for her sister than
she spends for other people. W ith Christm as com ing up, she said
that she had a pretty good idea o f w h o w ould get what. “ W ho
does m ore for me gets more; w ho does less gets less.” A s w e
w ould expect, she intended to favor her sister, w ith the result that
50 THE GIFT ECONOMY
M y nephews. I usually don’t get too much from them. But they always
get a fair amount from me, not only on occasions but even in between.
I do a lot o f canning and gardening and . . . I give them stuff like that
in between, too, especially if I feel they need it.
Reciprocity reconsidered
Despite her insistence upon the connection between givin g and
getting, M rs A tam anchuk’s gift givin g cannot be accounted for by
a simple m odel o f profit-seeking exchange. H er rule o f
sym m etrical giving and receiving is com bined w ith other rules for
loss-m aking in asym m etrical transactions, w hich are allow ed to
override the norm o f reciprocity in certain situations.5 Further-
m ore, the principal exchange rule that M ary Atam anchuk applied
to her gift transactions is not one o f utility m axim ization, as w e
should expect from exchange theory, but one o f debt avoidance.
In this she w as not alone. A lthough very few people in W innipeg
speak o f giving in order to get things in return, a num ber o f them
do report feeling obliged to make return gifts for ones they have
received. T h ey also often feel that it is necessary to ensure there is
a rough equivalence in the value o f presents given and received.
T he reasons for the strength o f that feeling have to do w ith the
m ore general desire to maintain balanced relationships w ith
significant others.
B lau has argued that there is a tendency towards imbalance in
social exchange, as individuals seek to impress others b y providing
them w ith superior benefits (Blau 19 6 4 :26 -7). Thus, he claims,
the mutual attraction in m ost intimate relationships is the result o f
an imbalance o f contributions that compensates for inequalities in
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 53
have its intended effect only i f its meaning as defined b y the donor
is allow ed to go unchallenged. C ostly gifts w hich are defensively
labelled b y their recipients as “ unnecessary” or “ ridiculous” (both
responses w ere recorded in the Hotel Chateau Study) do not
produce v ery m uch in the w a y o f social returns. Far from gaining
any prestige from such gifts, the donors are likely to forfeit the
respect that m ight otherw ise have been accorded to them. T his
point can be illustrated from Leonard W hite’s remarks about his
brother-in-law .
Leonard White is a 53-year-old university professor. His preju-
dices about expensive gifts are rooted in an academic subculture
that often disparages the m oney-m aking business ethic in capitalist
society. D r W hite’s brother-in-law M ichael is a businessman w ho
ow ns his o w n com pany. From time to time M ichael has em bar-
rassed them b y com ing up w ith some very expensive gifts w hich
they have felt unable to match in their ow n giving. For exam ple,
w hen Leonard m arried M ichael’s sister he gave them an expensive
picture as a w edding present. M rs White said that they w o u ld have
liked to reciprocate, but when M ichael was m arried they gave him
a place setting o f sterling silver which was w orth only about one
quarter o f the cost o f the picture. Leonard White elaborated on
this point b y saying that:
He, like some people, values a person by the dollar value, which I
don’t. He would make a big palaver o f giving something like that. I
think he paid $400 for the picture, which I think is silly, quite frankly.
I mean, I like the picture and everything, but he tends to value a thing
by the dollar value, not by the sentiment.
Conclusion
The m odern theory o f gift transactions began with M arcel M auss’s
description o f autonom ous system s o f prestations, whose principal
internal dynam ic is the obligation to provide a return gift for one
that has been received. O ur initial empirical description o f a
m odern gift econom y has therefore focused upon the reciprocity
o f gifts as a fundamental condition o f social interaction.
N o t everybody in W innipeg is prepared to recognize that there
m ay be an exchange process in the gift econom y. Some people
deny that they, or others w ho they know , ever expect to receive
a gift. Nevertheless, it is not hard to find people w ho are quite
open about the personal importance o f reciprocity, even though
they often find it hard to articulate a vocabulary o f m otive for it,
or to relate that vocabulary to their observed practices. On these
people Bou rd ieu’s unsym pathetic thesis o f a socially necessary
m ystification o f gift exchange must founder. A n illusion that is
shared by some, but not by others, is not derived from a universal
logic o f interaction. Equally serious, 2 o f the respondents discussed
in this chapter have little education, and they do not belong to that
privileged intelligentsia which prides itself on being able to uncover
the illusions o f others. W hatever the w isdom o f ordinary people
m ay turn out to be, it w ould seem to be w orth listening to.
The calculations that actors make about their gift transactions
are com plex, and there is no simple form ula that can account for
them. We have seen that in some instances (with some alters, and
on some occasions) gifts are carefully balanced, and sym m etric
reciprocity is the rule. In other instances asym m etric reciprocity is
preferred, or there m ay be no gift reciprocity at all. A more exten-
sive analysis o f cases, including the statistical analysis o f gift flows,
is necessary in order to establish the precise relationship between
these tw o patterns o f behavior (for a prelim inary investigation, see
Cheal 1986). Nevertheless, w e have seen enough here to permit
tw o conclusions that are o f general significance.
The first point to make is that imbalances in gift transactions
seem to be most likely to occur w henever an individual assumes
personal responsibility for nurturing another. Thus w e have seen
that M ary Atam anchuk expects to give m ore to her nephews than
she receives from them. Furtherm ore, she continues to supply
them w ith hom e-m ade foods even though they are now adult men
(their ages range from 22 to 30). Sim ilarly, w e have seen that
Anne B a k e r’s grandparents give generously to their 20-year-old
58 THE GIFT ECONOMY
When you stop giving gifts to someone, maybe it will be a friend that
you’ve grown apart from who lives in another part o f the country now.
Because I have girlfriends that when they lived in the city we would
always exchange gifts for birthdays, but now that they don’t live in the
city anymore, and I rarely hear from them, we just don’t do it anymore.
Hazel A nderson’s rem arks show that m aintaining fam ily ties -
and w hat is effective and what is not - are im portant practical
concerns for m any people. That is true especially (but not exclus-
ively) for w om en, w hose kinship w o rk has received increasing
recognition in recent years (C aplow et al. 1982: 230; di Leonardo
1984: 19 4 -2 18 ).1 Studies o f inform al social organization have
show n that the central ties in personal netw orks are often enduring
fam ily relationships (W ellman 1979; Fischer 1982; Bulm er 1986),
w hich are maintained largely through the kin-keeping activities o f
w om en (Rosenthal 1985).
M uch recent sociological w o rk on gender has claimed that the
position o f w om en within the fam ily is an inferior one, and that
fam ily ties are therefore significant obstacles to w o m en ’s happiness
and fulfillm ent. W hy w om en have continued to put up w ith this
situation has been an urgent political question for m any feminists.
N o t surprisingly, this has led to a renewed scholarly interest in the
question o f what m ight account for the perpetuation o f fam ily
LOVE CULTURE 65
M argaret Rose believes that these are not the true principles o f gift
giving, but that they are corruptions o f an underlying moral order
o f social relations. She thinks that, “ The basic idea o f gift giving
[is] to sort o f show your love and concern and interest in that
person, w hoever they m ight be. T o help tie a fam ily together.
A nd give them something to rem em ber you b y .”
These interlocking themes o f love, fam ily, and remembrance
recurred throughout her discussion o f gift giving. Struggling to
put her feelings into w ords, M rs R ose summarized her perception
o f her gift practices b y saying:
[I think I’m] sort o f giving something o f myself, so that people will
have something to remember me [by], and thus with family to enrich
the bonds in the family. Not necessarily that I want to be remembered,
but I want them to remember me because I hope that I’m important to
them. I think sometimes having something there to look at that came
from my mother or my sister or my son or daughter makes me think
o f them when I see it, and therefore the more you think o f a person
the richer that relationship should be. And I think that things they’ve
given me help me to think o f them, and the things I give them help
them to think o f me. It’s just sort o f to enrich the relationship.
U nfortunately there are times when gifts do not enrich relation-
ships. That happens, M rs Rose feels, when the recipients do not
value w hat they have been given. Nevertheless, it is essential to
keep on giving to them on future occasions because not to do so
w ould be to risk jeopardizing the relationship. I f the relationship
is already som ewhat strained, which is m ore likely than not in
such cases, then extra care is called for. Thus, when questioned
about the reasons w h y she felt that she had to continue giving to
people w ho had not shown any appreciation for her past gifts, M rs
R ose replied:
Oh, I don’t know. Well, you just feel because they’re going to be at
the Christmas outing or gathering, or because it’s their birthday and
you’ve always given them a gift, you just feel as if you have to continue
with this tradition. It’s expected o f you. You carry on and do it [so as]
not to create any waves. If you didn’t give the gift to somebody, say,
70 THE GIFT ECONOMY
in the family that you’ve always given to, then [they think]: “ Oh!
Mother’s mad,” or this type o f thing. So you don’t want to create
waves. You want to try to consolidate the relationship. And maybe
with a gift you can show your concern and try to bridge the gap [in
the relationship] that you might subconsciously feel isn’t as strong as it
should be.
though she feels very close to her best friends and sees them more
often. Asked to explain the reason for this difference in expenditure
patterns, her answer rests uneasily between the taken for granted
nature o f descent ties and the emotional significance o f continuing
personal relationships.
Well, it’s family and they’re important to me. And I hope I’m important
to them. [Pause] I want to for one thing, and I want to maintain. . . .
[Long pause] I don’t know whether you need a gift to maintain a bond
or not - I guess probably it’s tradition again. But they are my kids.
And yet friends are very important too. They say you can choose your
friends but you can’t choose your family.
w e’ll have it the next year, and the same with Easter and Thanksgiving
and so on, we’ll share them too. So they are sort o f my Winnipeg
family in some ways. So there again we usually give gifts to each one
o f the family, as you like to remember everybody that’s there.
The fam ily’s prom ise o f social continuity is not realized for
everyone, o f course, and m any m ore m ay fear its loss. T he tragic
thing about M argaret R o se ’s situation is that since her son is not
her natural child, she is not convinced that he has the “ natural”
feelings o f devotion tow ards her that she believes a son should
have. Furtherm ore, his incom e is sufficiently high that he already
has m any o f the things that he wants and M rs Rose does not kn o w
w hat to get him that he does not already have. She has therefore
tried sending him m oney so that he can buy things that suit his
tastes and interests. In her opinion this was not successful because
“ I f they don’t acknow ledge and tell you what th ey’ve bought, you
don’t k n o w whether th ey’ve follow ed your instructions or n o t.”
M rs R ose therefore doubts that her son w ill continue to rem em ber
her in the w a y in w hich she remem bers her o w n mother. In the
m iddle o f the interview she looked around the room and said:
M y mother just died a couple o f years ago. When I look around my
house, if it wasn’t for gifts that my mother gave me I wouldn’t have
very much. I appreciate these [things], and they mean something to me
because I remember the occasion they were given on, and that it was
from my mother, and the relationship we’ve had. And this is why I
think it’s good to give gifts, because it does sort o f cement a relationship
and [it] gives you something to remember a person by. That’s why I
object to money. Money is kind o f cold. It’s spent usually on nothing
in particular, and when it’s gone the memory’s gone.
Invented traditions
Liischen has presented an account o f gift rituals in which they are
seen as means o f stabilizing fam ily relationships that have been
threatened by the strains and stresses o f modern social change.
Thus he has claimed that, “ Families in modern societal settings
w ill adjust to separation from relatives by m aking m ore use o f such
means o f com m unication as m ailing, phoning and gift exchange”
(Liischen 1972: 86). In this structural functional theory o f gift ex-
change the focus is upon the fam ily considered as a system which
responds to changes in its environm ent. According to Liischen and
his colleagues, “ H igh strain and demands, change, and increasing
m obility in modern society m ay w ell encourage the fam ily to look
78 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Conclusion
The structural functional theory o f fam ily rituals in industrial
societies has been very fruitful (Cheal 1987a, 1987b), and it
continues to provide useful insights. The W innipeg Ritual C ycle
Study confirm s the observation made by Liischen and C ap low that
82 THE GIFT ECONOMY
events that make up the third tier o f times for gift giving. The
hum ble birthday celebration, which receives relatively little
publicity either from organized religion or from the advertising
industry, far surpasses in importance any occasion other than
Christm as. The m ost distinctive characteristic about birthday
celebrations, indeed their defining characteristic, is that they are
occasions for honoring individuals. It is true that fam ily members
are usually heavily involved in birthday ceremonial, but it is not
the fam ily as such that is the focus o f attention at a birthday party.
It is the unique existence o f a particular person that is celebrated,
as Colleen W illiams pointed out.
Birthdays are always special because [they] mean that I’m thankful that
they were born so that I can share in their being with me. If they
weren’t around and didn’t have birthdays they wouldn’t be there to be
my friend or a member of my family.
the lim its o f time and space.10 The social value o f “ the fam ily” lies
in its being a generalized social structure to w hich individuals can
turn, and return, throughout the life-course. Fam ily m em bers are
people w ho can be trusted to support one’s interests, it is thought,
because their feelings o f love can be taken for granted. G ift givin g
throughout the annual cycle o f regular occasions contributes to the
constant renewal o f those em otions. Considerable im portance is
therefore attached to gift behavior b y people such as Colleen
W illiam s, because “ show ing them you love them ” provides
concrete, visible evidence o f invisible feeling states that m ight
otherw ise be suspected o f having faded aw ay.
T here is an im portant point to be made about the social construc-
tion o f gift giving that follo w s from these observations. It w ill be
recalled that Pierre Bourdieu made the ideological m isrecognition
o f exchange the basis for his political econom y o f interpersonal
transactions. It is n ow possible to show that w hen m isrecognition
occurs it is ju st as likely to be a result o f the m oral econom y o f gift
transfers. A n explanation from the perspective o f m oral econom y is
to be preferred, sim ply because it is consistent w ith so m any other
observations about the Canadian gift econom y.
A lthough some men and w om en interview ed in the W innipeg
Ritual C ycle Study openly acknow ledged the desirability o f reci-
procity in their gift practices, m any did not. E ven some o f those
w ho stated a preference for balanced exchange were not prepared
to see it as supplying the dominant m otive in their gift transactions.
Anne Baker is one o f those w ho did not like to admit that other
individuals m ight want to receive a gift from her, or that she
herself m ight want to receive a gift from others. H er opposition
to this idea was typically voluntaristic, and vague.
[The people I give gifts to do] not necessarily expect it. I give them a
gift because I want to. There might be people who didn’t expect to get
anything from me, but it’s just that [when] a good friend has a birthday,
if they’re a good enough friend you’ll get them a gift, if you want to
and you feel you should. It’s not that it’s expected, it’s just . . . [her
voice trails off into silence]
M eyer Fortes once pointed out that the extension o f any social
system into the future entails the reproduction o f tw o kinds o f
resources upon which actors draw in constructing their w ays
o f life: human capital, that is people, with the know ledge and
skills to make them productive members o f society; and social
capital, that is the material facilities and social form s used in
action. The latter includes not only the form s o f property that are
passed from one generation to the next, but also the cultural
codes and social rules which make cooperative action possible
(Fortes 1969).
Social reproduction, in this broad sense, is the reproduction o f
system s o f relations. It is through the temporal extension o f social
relations that individuals construct their social futures. T hey do
that not only for themselves, but also for others, since otherwise
they could not plan for a social future. Social reproduction there-
fore necessarily includes altruistic behavior within m oral econ-
omies, which is w h y no society has ever existed on the basis o f a
purely political econ o m y.1 In this chapter w e are going to describe
the part that the gift econom y plays in the process o f social
reproduction.
G ift transactions occur on m any kinds o f occasions, only a few o f
w hich have been studied in any detail. Som e o f the most important
occasions have in fact been almost entirely neglected, and as a result
some fundamental mechanisms o f social reproduction through gift
giving have been overlooked. C ontem porary sociology has been
too preoccupied with issues in social stratification to pay much
attention to the m oral econom y o f social order. Gift transactions
in capitalist societies have typically been described as aspects o f the
political econom y o f consum erism or the political econom y o f
marriage. We shall see in the next chapter that neither o f these
approaches has much relevance for the explanation o f gift practices.
Gifts are investments in human and social capital. T hey are
redundant transactions em ploying resources which have been
diverted from present obligations.2 D iverting those resources m ay
88 THE GIFT ECONOMY
married, and this person would get invited [to my shower]. I think it
would only be fair to go to their shower and give them a gift if I wanted
them to come to my shower. Not only for the gift, but just for the fact
o f being there and sharing their occasion with them.
The people that Bernice is most closely involved w ith are the
other members o f the household in which she lives. T hey are the
ones she has to look after now , as she says. In addition, Bernice
likes to spend more than usual for the birth o f a baby, since “ a lot
o f people don’t have anything to start w ith .” We see in Bernice
G e n yk ’s preferred patterns o f giving that it is in the process o f
nurturing life - in biological reproduction and in the reproduction
o f everyday life - that the deepest com m itm ents to giving o f
oneself are located.
possible to think thoughts that have little place in the everyd ay life
w o rld o f w o rk and recuperation. I f ritual occasions in general, and
gift rituals in particular, are valued for this reason then w e should
expect to find that different occasions, and different gifts, are used
to think different thoughts.
A lthough the range o f gifts that m ay be given on special
occasions in W innipeg is very large, the range o f gifts that are
popular on particular occasions is m uch smaller. Five things
account for one-quarter or m ore o f the gifts given on the eight
m ost distinctive occasions. T h ey are: candy (Easter, Valentine’s
D ay); decorative vegetation (M other’s D ay, sym pathy); day
clothing (birth, reunion), m oney (pre-w edding, wedding) and food
preparation equipm ent (pre-w edding events). O n ly one o f them -
gifts o f food preparation equipm ent at engagements or bridal
show ers - is popular on one type o f occasion only. W eddings, and
the events that lead up to w eddings, are the m ost substantively
distinctive ceremonial occasions in W innipeg.
It is im m ediately noticeable that the eight m ost distinctive gift
occasions fall into four groups that are not random. O ne group is
concerned w ith m arriage (weddings and pre-w edding events), at
w hich practical gifts o f household resources (m oney and food
preparation equipment) are conveyed. A second group is concerned
w ith the physical experience o f another person’s presence within
the individual’s life w o rld (birth and reunion) at w hich items for
physical protection and com fort (day clothing) are given. T he
other tw o groups are m ore difficult to interpret, but one point is
v ery clear. The things that are given at Easter, Valentine’s D ay,
M o th er’s D ay and at times o f sym pathy are lu xu ry goods rather
than things o f practical utility. We m ay therefore suspect that their
social significance is above all sym bolic, and that they are intended
to express em otions o f certain kinds.
The evidence on types o f transfers suggests that beneath the
great variations in individual gift behavior there is an underlying
system o f meanings w ithin w hich each ritual occasion has its place.
H o w ever, w e have so far mentioned only h alf o f the types o f
occasions about w hich w e have inform ation. A truly cultural
system o f meanings should include all ritual occasions, and the
interesting question is w hether or not a sem iotic analysis can be
extended to the less distinctive times for giving. I f there is such a
system it is clearly a w eak one, since on some occasions there is
no gift type that is really popular. We have already seen that
C hristm as is an am orphous gift occasion (Table 5 .1), and the 3
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 95
most frequent gift types account for only 34 per cent o f all
Christm as gifts. A t anniversaries the 3 m ost frequent gift types
account for only 31 per cent o f gifts.
Things that are not especially popular as gifts m ay nevertheless
be typical gifts for a particular occasion i f they are given more
frequently at that time than at other times. The typicality o f gifts
has been measured in this study as a relative frequency o f giving
50 per cent or m ore above the average for all occasions. U sin g this
measure a list o f typical gifts w as produced for all ritual occasions.
The contents o f those lists often overlap, and so the groups o f
Co-operation
1) Wedding: money, food and drink equipment, decorative household
objects, household essentials, food preparation equipment
2) Pre-wedding: food preparation equipment, money, food and drink
equipment, household essentials
Sociability
1) Anniversary: relaxation equipment and services, drink, decorative
household objects, food, personal relations media, decorative
vegetation, food and drink equipment, household essentials
2) Visit: drink, food, decorative household objects, food preparation
equipment, decorative vegetation
3) Party: activities equipment and services, drink, decorative household
objects, household essentials, food and drink equipment, food
4) Father’s Day: household essentials, drink, activities equipment and
services, food, body adornments
Sentimentality
1) Mother’s Day: decorative vegetation, personal accessories
2) Sympathy: decorative vegetation, miscellaneous, money, food
Attachment
1) Valentine’s Day: candy, decorative vegetation, other clothing
2) Easter: candy, decorative vegetation
3) Farewell: money, personal accessories, candy
Presence-availability
1) Reunion: decorative household objects, day clothing, food and drink
equipment, decorative vegetation
2) Birthday: day clothing, reading equipment, personal relations media.
3) Christmas: body preparation equipment
4) Birth: day clothing, night clothing, body preparation equipment,
decorative vegetation
96 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Figure 5.2 Ritual order o f the social reproduction o f small social worlds
Easter / \ Attachment I
Farewell / 7 \ 1
Reunion / / \ 1
Birthday \
/ / Presence-availability K
Christmas ' / '^Physical being
Birth / ^
Instrumental (cooperation)
1) Wedding: money, food and drink equipment, decorative household
objects
2) Pre-wedding: food preparation equipment, money, food and drink
equipment
Anniversary 31 . 1
Visit 47-1 Instrumental and
Party 43-3 expressive
Father’s Day 56.1 (sociability)
Mother’s Day 52.4
Sympathy 83.0
Expressive
Valentine’s Day 72.5 (sentimentality
Easter 72.7
and attachment)
Farewell 68.9
Conclusion
In this chapter w e have seen that there is m uch to be learned
from looking at the gift econom y as a ritual order o f the social
reproduction o f small social w orlds. Sm all social w orlds are struc-
tured b y an interlocking system o f social bonds that have been
identified here as presence-availability, attachment, sentim entality,
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 10$
Long-term relationships w ith fam ily m embers and w ith old friends
are m ore intimate than the short-term , disposable relationships
usually found am ong new friends, cow orkers, and neighbors.
Short-term relationships, how ever, can be m ore numerous and
m ore varied, because less has been invested in them and the costs
o f breaking them are correspondingly smaller. The combination
o f these com plem entary structures o f relations within one personal
netw ork provides im portant strategic advantages. Strong ties (that
is, long-term relationships) permit a synchronization o f action over
time that encourages rational life planning (P. Berger, B . Berger,
and Kellner 1973: 6 9 -73).3 O n the other hand, as Granovetter has
claimed, w eak ties (that is, short-term relationships) m ay provide
access to a greater variety o f opportunities for acquiring resources
and for engaging in shared activities (Granovetter 1973). Outside
o f the core sets o f interlocking life-courses, then, personal relation-
ships in the m odern Canadian city are characteristically organized
as sparsely knit, loosely bounded networks o f ties (Wellman 1979).
T he distinction between strong ties and w eak ties has been found
to be useful by sociologists interested in the structural analysis o f
netw orks (Wellman 19 81). It is not only o f interest to social scien-
tists, how ever. Actors, too, are aware o f the different effects o f
different kinds o f relationships, which they define in contrasting
w ays. Strong personal relationships are defined as being “ close,”
and m otives o f love and affection are ascribed to m embers. Weak
personal relationships, b y com parison, are less likely to be thought
o f as in volving positive em otion states. Instead they are typified
as consisting o f shared beliefs or interests. A t the limit, what is
shared m ay be very narrow indeed. It m ay be confined to sanc-
tioned conform ity to norm ative exchanges o f valued objects, and
to the enjoym ent o f the social occasions at w hich they are
transferred.
Long-term “ strong” relationships and short-term “ w eak ”
relationships are both em ployed in social reproduction. For
analytical purposes the social organization o f social reproduction
can therefore be described as taking tw o divergent form s. O n the
one hand there is the reproduction o f life and o f personal relation-
ships that takes place between those w ho are closely involved
in each other’s affairs. O n the other hand there is the collective
reproduction o f actors as members o f particular social statuses in
social relationships. We shall refer to these tw o types o f social
organization here as intimacy and community.
Intimate relations are those in which each actor know s a great
io8 THE GIFT ECONOMY
We have been arguing that the relationship between husband and wife
is a deferential one in that it is traditionally legitimated and hierarchical.
It appears both natural and immutable. It also has become - because it
has been in the interests of those in the superordinate position - a
“ moral” order. This “ moral” order is expressed through and by ideo-
logical hegemony. We have also argued that the contradictions within
the deferential dialectic o f identification and differentiation need careful
if not constant “ tension management” ; and that there are a number of
social mechanisms by which this is done - most notably by the “ gift” .
(Bell and Newby 1976: 164)
Conspicuous consumption
N o social scientist has had a m ore long-lasting effect upon the
sociology o f gift giving than Veblen (see, for exam ple, Schwartz
1967). His theory o f the uses o f wealth in status competition by
m embers o f the leisure class has been applied very w id ely (for
exam ple Blau 1964; Baudrillard 19 81). It has, in fact, been applied
so w id ely that it is com m only taken to apply to large sections o f
the population (Ewen 1976: 206; Leiss 1976: $7). That includes
those w ho, like M rs C hubey and the w om en w ho attend hall
showers, are a very long w ay indeed from the leisure class.
V eblen’s influential theory has been the cornerstone for a conven-
tional social science posture towards gift giving that m ay be charac-
terized as “ cynical realism .” A ccording to this point o f view a gift
is a challenge that must be answered since questions o f status and
wealth are im m ediately involved. Belshaw claims to have been
convinced that “ this is as true in our ow n society as in the
aggressive potlatch” (Belshaw 19 6 5:47).
Critics o f consumer societies have frequently described modern
gift practices as form s o f conspicuous waste. These critics include
ordinary people (particularly those with relatively lo w incomes)
w ho resent the social pressures to spend, and spend heavily, at
Christm as. T h ey also include social scientists whose alienation
from the present is so complete that it can only be theorized by
analogy with a m ythologized past. Thus Levi-Strauss has described
the N orth Am erican Christm as as seeking “ the reintegration into
m odern society o f the very general attitudes and procedures o f
prim itive cultures” (Levi-Strauss 1969: 50).
L evi-Strau ss’s rem ark echoed the position taken some time
112 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Value of Gifts*
Occasion Mean Standard
$ deviation
$
Anniversary 85.70 266.90
Birth 23.10 23.30
Birthday 27.00 40.20
Pre-wedding 44.10 114.90
Christmas 21.40 38.30
Easter 9.00 7.00
Father’s Day 21.00 16.00
Mother’s Day 34.20 100.20
Reunion 11.50 9.90
Valentine’s Day 8.60 7.20
Visit 22.10 28.10
Wedding 117 .10 394.40
Sympathy 14.80 10.80
Farewell 18.30 36.00
Party 29.00 69.90
Other 49.10 112.70
* H om e-m ade gifts excluded (interviewees made 3. $ per cent o f the gifts they
gave on all special occasions in 1982)
Visit 22.10
Party 29.00 Communal and
Father’s Day 21.00 20-35 intimate
Mother’s Day 34.20
Sympathy 14.80
Valentine’s Day 8.60
Easter 9.00 5-20 Intimate
Farewell 18.30
Reunion 11.50
Birthday 27.00
Intimate and
Christmas 21.40 20-30
communal
Birth 23.10
A t the other extrem e there are the intimate occasions w hen social
relationships and social statuses are largely irrelevant, and w hat is
valued is the personal relationship between tw o individuals. Leave-
takings and returns, and pain and grief, are things that can happen
to anyone regardless o f their social position. A t times o f sym pathy,
farew ell, and reunion it is therefore the expression o f personal
interest and concern that is enacted in ritual. Easter and Valentine’s
D ay, too, are times for acknow ledging personal relationships that
are independent o f the norm ative expectations o f social roles. A t
these times particular ties are identified as being especially close.
That som etim es means that they are defined as spiritual ties. T he
clearest exam ple o f personal ties that go far beyond social roles
INTIMACY AND COMMUNITY 119
Conclusion
In this chapter w e have seen that intimate relations and communal
relations must both be taken into account in analyses o f the gift
econom y. We have also seen that structures o f intim acy and struc-
tures o f com m unity are not autonom ous, but that they im pinge
directly upon each other through the decisions that individuals
must make about the alternative uses for such com m on facilities
as m oney. We shall have more to say about the uses o f m oney in
the next chapter.
In chapter 7 w e shall see that com m unity and intim acy are not
only different principles. In a later chapter w e w ill claim that
120 THE GIFT ECONOMY
intim acy and com m unity can be effectively com bined only under
special conditions that have had an enorm ous influence upon the
m odern gift econom y. O therw ise, it is generally the case that the
m utual gaze o f intimates separates them from the com m unity and
its collective activities, whereas the form al organization o f
com m unal occasions leaves little room for the unique interactions
o f a personal relationship. That is not to say that m ost occasions
are either com m unal or intimate in nature. O n the contrary, all
social occasions have elements o f both. The social form s o f inti-
m acy are derived from a collective system o f meanings for w hich
there is alw ays a w ider audience, and the social interactions o f a
com m unity take place between individuals w ho m ust be able to
get along w ith each other. Nevertheless, com m unity and intim acy
are often hard to reconcile. This can lead to tensions, conflicts, and
to abrupt changes in practices w hose social invention therefore
becom es com m on know ledge. The m ost visible exam ple o f the
latter in W innipeg is the current preponderance o f m oney gifts at
weddings.
7
Gift games
It has sometimes been suggested that the social life o f cities should
be seen as an ecology o f games (Long 1958). From that perspective
the structured activities that co-exist in a particular territory are
seen as com prising a set o f interlocking games which together
create the participants’ sense o f social order. These games provide
people w ith goals, and therefore a sense o f purpose, together with
criteria fo rju d g in g success or failure. Within the limits o f a game
the participants engage in rational decision-m aking which produces
for each game a set o f typical strategies. M ost games involve the
m oving o f pieces, and that is conspicuously true for a gift game.
A s in any other game the meanings o f the pieces in a gift game
are defined b y a set o f rules (Cheal 1980). One o f the important
social characteristics o f games is that they can often be played
according to several alternative sets o f rules. The same pieces there-
fore come to have rather different meanings depending upon which
rules are being follow ed. Those meanings are conveyed through
the w ords that are used in the discourse o f gift games.
The philosopher W ittgenstein observed that problem s with the
meanings o f w ords can be cleared up only when they are put back
into the contexts o f the games from which they have been drawn
(see Pitcher 1964). It is within what W ittgenstein referred to as
language games that the connections between a name and the
things named with it are established. Through language games
w ords and things are interrelated within the stream o f everyday
life. It follow s, W ittgenstein pointed out, that language games
alw ays gro w out o f particular form s o f life. In this chapter w e w ill
take a look at tw o contrasting gift games and their languages, and
their relations to com m unal and intimate form s o f social life. O ur
first clue to the existence o f these language games is that people
like Bernice G en yk sometimes have problem s w ith “ incorrect”
speech performances.
Bernice G en yk does not like giving m oney as a gift. She says:
it doesn’t really symbolize a gift. I mean, you can say it’s a gift of
money, but you can get money from a bank, you can get money from
any place, but you can’t get a present [from just anywhere]. Say, if I’d
forgotten a birthday or something, and I couldn’t get a gift there on
time, and I just send money, [then] I feel bad about sending money. I
would rather have bought a gift and sent a gift than to give money.
It’s an easy way out. [I would never give money as a gift at] Christmas,
or weddings - no - I started saying that but I forgot that presentation
is part o f a gift for a wedding. So . . . when I said wedding I was
thinking o f a wedding gift for like at a bridal shower.
gift givin g are the w rapping o f gifts b y their donors, and the
conventional expressions o f surprise, pleasure, and gratitude by
their recipients.
A presentation is alw ays m oney. It is given during the w edding
festivities, norm ally late in the evening o f the w edding day. The
transfer is a public event w hich takes place in the hall or hotel
w here the w edding function is held. Presentation is organized as a
collective ritual encounter, open to observation b y all those
attending the function. The w edding guests usually line up in front
o f the bride and groom , and they are entertained w ith m usic w hile
w aiting in line. T he bride and groom receive each presentation in
turn, and acknow ledge it w ith a return gift, usually an appreciation
scroll or a piece o f w edding cake. Since the m oney is conveyed in
an envelope together w ith a signed card the am ount transferred is
not publicized, but is later noted b y the bride and groom w ho
send the donors “ thank y o u ” cards.
Gifts and presentations are not m utually exclusive. H o w ever, few
people give both for the same w edding, and m ost couples make
know n their preference for one or the other. M ost w edding guests
give only one gift, the m ajor exceptions being close fam ily
m em bers and friends. In the case o f a presentation w edding, those
w ho are close to the bride and groom often give them a gift in
addition to the presentation. Since presentation is a collective ritual,
w hich must be organized as a distinct episode in the w edding
celebrations, it is norm ally considered essential for the bride and
groom to decide upon, and to broadcast, the preferred form o f
gift givin g for their w edding in advance. Those w ho are invited
to attend the w edding typically feel a strong obligation not only
to give som ething, but also to conform to the nature o f the arrange-
ments announced b y the bride-to-be.
T he diffusion o f the custom o f presentation w eddings has not
been w ithout opposition. In some cases the opposition from one
section o f the w edding guests can be sufficiently strong (or the
fear o f causing offence sufficiently keen) that a com prom ise
arrangem ent o f “ presentation optional” is announced. O n these
occasions some people give presentations (money) and others give
presents or gifts (goods). Either is acceptable “ i f that is their
custom .” T he division o f opinion that is found on such occasions
can be illustrated by the w edding o f Jo h n and C arol D u gald .7
GIFT GAMES 127
w hen you give m oney it’s because you don’t want to put the effort
into doing som ething, y o u ’re ju st doing it the easy w ay. A m oney
gift is ju st kind o f an easy w a y o u t.”
Despite these clear, strongly held sentiments, M rs Black has
given m oney at w eddings where a presentation was asked for.
A lthough she does not feel good about it, and complains that “ they
d on’t want m y g ift,” she did it “ because it was requested.”
In the absence o f presentation, or an equivalent social form ,
m oney gifts at weddings w ould probably exist as a penum bra o f
quasi-gifts, not quite legitim ated but tolerated as unavoidable in
certain circumstances. U nder those conditions any expansion o f
m oney giving w ould have been slow , and w ould have involved
various interaction difficulties. H ow ever, in W innipeg the social
form o f presentation has been culturally available, and so the expan-
sion o f m oney giving there has been quite rapid. Those individuals
w h o are opposed in principle to m oney gifts have neutralized the
im plications o f their o w n contradictory behavior. T h ey have done
that b y aligning their givin g o f m oney at w eddings w ith the
perception that presentation has been w id ely tolerated as a legitim ate
ethnic tradition. Anne Baker, w hose case study appeared in an
earlier chapter (see pp. 55ff.), had this to say:
I rarely give money on special occasions. I’d rather buy a gift or say to
the person: “ I’ll take you somewhere. I’ll take you to a movie, or I’ll
take you to a bar or something,” rather than give them an amount of
money. I don’t like [giving money] too much because it just shows you
don’t really have the time, either to celebrate the occasion with them,
or the time to go out and buy them something. You just say: “ Here’s
some money.” Big deal. I don’t consider money a good gift from
me. . . . On a birthday I don’t think I’d ever give money. Weddings
are different. Giving money for weddings, that’s okay, because that’s
presentation.
Symbolic gifts
Sym bolic gifts are thought to express the quality o f the relationship
between donor and receiver, and the nature o f the occasion on
which they are given. The rules regulating their use include both
prescriptions and proscriptions. Som e objects, i f given as wedding
gifts, are felt to be “ tacky” (that is, in bad taste). Gifts to the couple
are sym bolic o f their w edding, and therefore anything which m ight
reflect negatively upon that event is frow ned upon. B ab y things
for a pregnant bride definitely fall into that category. Sim ilarly,
though less forcefully, personal items (such as clothing or
jew ellery) are not appropriate since they w ill be used by only one
partner, and are “ not for the m arriage.”
M oney was not a preferred sym bol because its capacity to
sym bolize personal relationships was considered to be too weak.
The Hotel Chateau interviewees were norm ally m ore prepared to
receive m oney than they were to give it, but in one w om an ’s
opinion it was the only thing that should never be given at a
w edding. M oney is regarded as an inferior sym bolic gift because
it does not require much thought or time to give, and thus cannot
sym bolize a caring relationship. With a gift, “ T here’s a little bit
m ore behind it than ju st taking m oney out o f your w allet.”
Objects that were m ost highly valued were those w hich w ill
evoke the m em ory o f the donor, and o f the occasion, long after the
event. Gifts were therefore preferred, rather than m oney, because
“ When you use a gift you think o f the person w ho gave it to
y o u .” The m ost evocative gifts are objects not intended for daily
use w hose distinctiveness claims attention.
Expen sive china and crystal ware, silver tea services, and costly
ornaments and art objects are considered to be especially desirable.
These objects have several qualities which make them particularly
potent sym bols. In the first place they are, o f course, accoutrements
o f domestic life, and therefore sym bolic o f the m arriage and the
form ation o f a new domestic group. Secondly, they have a high
conventional aesthetic value. T hey are “ nice things” which “ most
people w an t.” T hirdly, they are lu xury goods, things whose utility
132 THE GIFT ECONOMY
It was nice that people showed that they cared, that they had an interest
in our marriage. A lot o f people were really wishing us well, and giving
us their congratulations and best wishes, and the gift was sort o f a
symbol o f that.
and attachment towards one or both o f them. Sym bolic gifts are
therefore also used to define, and to redefine, the relationships
between the guests and the bride and groom . The nature o f a
sym bolic gift is expected to be related to the level o f intim acy
between donor and recipient, and it can therefore be used to help
establish that level in relationships which m ight otherwise lack
sym bolic supports. One couple, for exam ple, described their ow n
experience w ith friends as follow s: “ Y o u can see how much they
care, and then you can show you care, and it goes from there.”
Gifts were seen as particularly potent sym bols and were often
carefully chosen for their effects. For those w ho thought that gifts
w ere important, the ideal object was one which demonstrated that
thought and care had been taken in selecting something that the
recipient w ould like, and w hich at the same time reflected salient
characteristics o f the donors. In this w ay the gift is sym bolic o f the
donor as an interested person, and m ay becom e part o f a reality
defining order o f objects within the home. In the Hotel Chateau
Study interviews, several new brides expressed pleasure at being
able to look around their homes and to identify particular things
w ith the individuals w ho had given them. That is not how people
think about practical gifts.
Practical gifts
reflect the cost o f the meal, drinks, and entertainment (norm ally
m usic and dancing) that has been provided. For the guests to meet
the expenses incurred on their behalf is seen as being “ the least
that they can d o .” It follow s from this that guests should adjust
the value o f their presentation according to the quality, and therefore
costliness, o f the w edding arrangem ents. That point o f v iew was
expressed in such com m ents as: “ Y o u feel that yo u should at least
pay for your m eal.” O r m ore forcefully: “ T he w edding party is
put on for the guests, and i f the guests don’t put in enough to pay
for that then th ey’re not givin g [the couple] an ythin g.”
Presentation is not the only form o f practical assistance, how ever.
W edding gifts, too, m ay be defined as a real financial help, as long
as they are articles that the couple w ould otherwise have had to
b uy on their ow n. W edding guests are therefore expected to find
out w hat the couple really need or want, and they are expected to
avoid buying things that w ill never be used. Gifts that are not
useful are a burden since they must be stored. T h ey take up space
in the hom e that could be used for other things, or they must be
left w ith parents. It is therefore believed that gift givers should try
to buy things according to the tastes o f the recipients, as expressed
in the intended decor o f the new hom e. C areful choice o f patterns
and colors is required, and gift givers were not expected to buy
things sim ply because they liked them themselves. Finally, i f they
are to be o f any assistance gifts should be “ practical” rather than
ornate or decorative. T hin gs o f the latter sort w ere som etim es
described as being essentially useless, since their main purpose is
display.
Practical gifts are valued for the contribution they are expected
to m ake to the econom ic cooperation o f husband and w ife w ithin
an independent household. For youn g people w ho have never been
m arried before w edding gifts often provide much o f the capital
investm ent that goes into setting up a new home. T he main
concern in givin g practical gifts, therefore, is the rationalization o f
capital accumulation. From that point o f view gifts m ay be seen as
m ore o f a hindrance than a help because people don’t alw ays get
w hat they need or can use. Presentation is the m ost efficient means
for the rationalization o f capital accumulation, because it is the
only sure w a y “ to eliminate the problem w ith g ifts.” A s one new
husband put it, “ It makes it a lot easier for everybody. Y o u don’t
k n o w w hat to buy people, and don’t kn o w w hat they already
have, and this w ay you get the things you really need.”
Couples w ho thought about w edding gifts in this highly
GIFT GAMES 13$
Conclusion
Attitudes towards gift givin g at presentation weddings seem to be
far rem oved from the love culture that was discussed in chapter 4.
Indeed it m ay be w ondered i f the tw o sets o f ideas even belong in
the same econom ic system . It is certain that our observations about
m oney gifts do not accord w ith D ouglas and Isherw ood’s descrip-
tion o f the gift econom y. T h ey have claimed that gift transactions
are hedged around b y rules w hich maintain a boundary between
the com m ercial exchanges o f the m arket and the social exchanges
o f personal relationships (D ouglas and Isherw ood 1979: 58-9). It
is for this reason, they suggest, that a careful line is drawn between
cash and goods. In W innipeg that is obviously not the case. The
haphazard m ixin g o f m oney and goods at C arol and Jo h n D u gald ’s
w edding is unusual, but not unique. It is clearly inconsistent w ith
any theory o f the gift econom y as a boundary maintaining system .8
The position advanced in this study has been that, rather than
maintaining the boundaries o f preform ed social units such as “ the
fa m ily ,” gifts are in fact used to construct a w ide range o f possible
social w orlds as stable arenas for social interaction. G ift givin g is
not sim ply a reflection o f social structure, but it is a form ative
social process in its o w n right.
I have argued that the gift econom y is an autonom ous m oral
econom y consisting o f redundant transactions. Sym bolic gifts and
practical gifts both belong in that econom y. In the first place, both
GIFT GAMES 137
sym bolic gifts and practical gifts are elements in a m oral econom y
o f transactions. T hey are used to produce, and to reproduce, social
w orlds as system s o f relations. Sym bolic gifts and practical gifts
are also both redundant transactions. References to this point have
been made in several places, but they have not yet been drawn
together, nor have w e com m ented upon their general significance.
It is therefore time to return to the theory o f redundancy.
It w ill be recalled that there are five w ays in which gifts m ay be
redundant: when they are not produced by conform ity to norm s;
when they bring no advantage to their recipients, and thus add
nothing to their w ell-being; when they bring no net benefit to their
recipients, as a result o f sym m etrical reciprocity; when they transfer
resources w hich the recipients w ould otherwise have provided for
themselves; and when they take the form o f m any ritual offerings
where one w ould have sufficed for the purposes o f interaction
courtesy. The last o f these types o f redundancy is different from
the first four, since it has to do with expressive redundancy.
Redundancy here takes the form o f a superfluity o f messages within
the ritual process (Cheal 1987a: 16 1). We w ill see in the next chapter
that this form o f redundancy has been o f some importance in the
internal expansion o f the gift econom y. But it is not a basis for
the gift econom y as such. The first four types o f redundancy, on
the other hand, are constitutive o f the gift econom y. T hey are
truly fundamental because they establish the manner in which ritual
transactions are superfluous to the requirements o f other systems
o f action.
I Instrumental redundancy
1) Surplus to normative requirements
2) No addition to well-being
II Substantive redundancy
3) No net gain
4) Resource transfers unnecessary
In the last five chapters original data have been presented about
variations in gift behavior, and a num ber o f ideas have been
advanced to account for them. O ur investigations into the gift
econom y are not yet com plete, but enough inform ation has n ow
been presented for us to begin to see h o w som e o f it fits together.
It is therefore possible to pay m ore deliberate attention to inte-
grating a num ber o f the issues raised in the preceding pages, as w e
have in fact ju st done for the theory o f gift redundancy.
A t the beginning o f this study D urkheim ’s science o f social order
was introduced as the historical base from w hich the m odern
anthropology o f the gift has grow n. I shall argue here that his
w o rk still has a useful place in the sociology o f gift transactions,
only it does not lie in the direction that M auss took. We shall see
that there is much to be learned from D urkheim ’s sociology o f
m orality.
D urkheim claimed that m odern society had created a form o f
m oral individualism w hich he referred to as “ the cult o f the indi-
vidu al” (D urkheim 19 53: 59).1 He argued that as the influence o f
collective religions has declined, so “ the individual becom es the
object o f a sort o f religion” (D urkheim 1964a: 172). In his v iew
this “ cult in behalf o f personal d ign ity” was a consequence o f the
grow th o f large urban populations, integrated at the societal level
b y the law s o f the nation state. H e was convinced that at the level
o f everyd ay life, increased population size and the falling barriers
to association between groups had produced a dynam ic environ-
ment o f expanded social interaction, into w hich all individuals
w ere increasingly drawn. In turn, this state o f affairs had brought
about both a greater integration o f the individual into society,
and an increase in the freedom o f individuals from detailed social
regulation o f their activities (D urkheim 1964a: 2 6 2 -3 0 1,
1964b: 1 1 3 - 1 5 ) . B oth circumstances, he thought, had raised the
m oral status o f the individual m em ber o f society. O n the one
hand, the individual citizen participated in the societal culture and
thereby benefited from the idealization o f hum anity in m odern
THE SOCIAL FUTURE 143
the person of our father, our mother, our wife, or our children. It was
quite different formerly, when the links which derived from things took
precedence over those which derived from persons.
(Durkheim 1978: 234)
The fact that gifts for all occasions are chosen according to what
the individual recipient w ill like has had enorm ous consequences
for the ritual cycle in m odern society. Regardless o f the type o f
occasion, a w ide range o f things w ill be given whose variety reflects
the projected likes and dislikes o f the intended recipients. This is
the principal cause o f the w eak sym bolic differentiation o f ritual
occasions that was noted in chapter 5 (see pp. 93ff.)- There it was
observed that seven (almost half) o f our ritual occasion categories
are not marked by distinctive gifts. The modern gift econom y is
a de-differentiated ritual system , in which the semiotic order o f
objects is defined m ainly at the level o f interpersonal relations,
rather than at the level o f societal values or o f mass media corpor-
ations (see Cheal 1987a).
The first point to be made about the cult o f the individual, then,
is that it is responsible for the absence o f a coherent culture o f
differentiated occasions such as anthropologists have described for
non-western societies (see, for exam ple, W ilson 1957). This is to
be expected, for, as D urkheim stated, the cult o f the individual
turns attention aw ay from society and therefore aw ay from societal
values (Durkheim 1964a: 172). The relevance o f his analysis o f the
cult o f the individual can be shown to go further than that,
how ever. It can also help us to explain w h y it is that some ritual
occasions are more important than others.
In chapter 4 w e saw that the tw o great times for giving are
Christm as and birthdays (see Table 4 .1). Their importance so far
outranks that o f any other occasion that it is tempting to treat
146 THE GIFT ECONOMY
com m unity and intim acy have typically coexisted with little
difficulty.
O ur earlier analysis o f intim acy and com m unity (chapter 6)
concluded that Christm as and birthdays are am ong a number o f
occasions w ithin w hich intimate and com m unal form s o f social
organization are linked. The foci o f these occasions are individuals
and the relationships between individuals. A t the same time they
are occasions for visiting, and hence for collective rituals. T h ey are
also times when individuals w ho are living so far aw ay that they
cannot be present in person send gifts as signs o f their continued
attachment. These ceremonial occasions are therefore both
com m unal (in the m obilization o f members) and individual (in the
structure o f attention). T h ey are, in other w ords, relatively pure
form s o f the cult o f the individual.
I f that conclusion is accepted, there remains only one obstacle
to accounting for the extraordinary importance o f Christm as and
birthdays. A ccording to our earlier analysis there are seven types
o f occasions in which intimate and com m unal principles o f social
organization are linked (see Figure 6 .1). T h ey are, in addition to
birthdays and Christm as: visits, parties, Father’s D ay, M other’s
D ay, and births. W hy are the first 2 o f these 7 occasions so much
m ore im portant than the last 5? B y com parison w ith some o f our
earlier problem s, the answer to that question is quite straightfor-
ward. Birthdays and Christm as are diffuse calendrical rites. That
is to say, they occur in annual cycles and their relational contents
are unlimited. T hey therefore provide regularly recurring oppor-
tunities for individuals to recognize any or all o f their significant
others. The transaction possibilities for visits, parties, Father’s D ay,
M other’s D ay, and births are much m ore limited.
A t Christm as and on birthdays anybody w ho has an appropri-
ately close relationship w ith an individual can give something to
him or her, and expect to have it accepted. That is because they
are diffuse occasions. M other’s D ay and Father’s D ay, on the
other hand, are much m ore specific occasions. In principle, their
relational contents are restricted to the bonds between children
and their parents. In practice, children m ay also give to their
grandparents (because they are the parents o f their parents) and
spouses m ay give to one another (in so far as they have shared the
parenting o f each other’s children). The possibilities for further
expansion o f these occasions w ould seem to be limited, how ever.
C ertainly they could never approach the generality o f that most
148 THE GIFT ECONOMY
are the sym pathy rites, which deal m ainly with passages into and
out o f the sick role, or the role o f bereaved person, sometimes
accompanied by rites o f territorial passage into and out o f hospital.
Rites o f passage m ay com prise a m ajority o f the special occasions
that have been described here, but they are not responsible for the
m ajority o f gift transactions. U sin g the most generous estimate,
they account for only 18 .7 per cent o f all gifts recorded in the
W innipeg Ritual C ycle Study (see Table 4 .1). The other occasions,
and the overw helm ing m ajority o f gifts, belong to a different ritual
system . These are the rites o f progression (Cheal 1988a).
Anniversaries, birthdays, Christm as, Easter, Father’s D ay,
M other’s D ay, and Valentine’s D ay together account for 8 1.5 per
cent o f all gifts, and 72.8 per cent o f all gift expenditures, as
recorded in the W innipeg Ritual C ycle Study. T h ey therefore
deserve to be placed at the forefront o f any theory o f ritual in
m odern society. These ritual occasions are, in the first place, calen-
drical rites. H ow ever, that is only a form al property. It tells us
that they occur in annual cycles, rather than irregularly, but it tells
us nothing about their social contents or social significance. The
important question is: w h y are these calendrical rites so highly
valued? Certain possibilities can be dismissed im m ediately. These
are not the rites o f an agrarian society, dependent upon the natural
cycle o f the seasons. N o r are they prim arily religious rites
(although tw o o f them have their origins in religious rites). T hey
are, in fact, rites that affirm the maintenance o f social bonds. T hey
confirm the continued physical being o f individuals (birthdays,
Christm as), or their continued involvem ent in a personal relation-
ship (Easter, Valentine’s D ay), or their continued occupancy o f a
role in a social relationship (M other’s D ay, Father’s D ay, anniver-
sary). T h ey are therefore the opposites o f rites o f passage.
Rites o f passage socially define an individual’s separation from
one social position in order to enter into another social position.
The thematic core o f a rite o f passage is therefore always the
contrast between that which is in the process o f being left behind
and that w hich is to be taken up. Rites o f progression are similar
to rites o f passage in so far as they are both concerned with changes
that occur over time, but there is an important difference o f
emphasis. In a rite o f progression what is emphasized is not change
through opposition to what went before, but change through the
potential for grow th in what already existed. Rites o f progression
are therefore rites o f extension rather than contrast. T hey are, in
fact, pure rites o f extended social reproduction.
150 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Relationships in time
Som e relationships are stronger and last longer than others. Put
m ore form ally, som e relationships have higher levels o f presence-
availability, attachment, sentim entality, sociability, and econom ic
cooperation for longer periods o f time than do others. These
elemental social bonds are now here m ore po w erfu lly com bined
than they are am ong individuals w ho have chosen to live together
in the same household, for it is here that presence-availability is at
its peak.4 Enduring relationships within the household are thus the
m ost socially influential relationships in time.
D urkheim believed that the greatest force for change in the
m odern fam ily had been the lessened dependence o f adult children
upon their parents. A s a result, he noted, children leave their
parents at a com paratively early age in order to set up independent
households, and the only permanent m embers o f the household
are the husband and w ife (D urkheim 19 78 :230 ). It is thus the
conjugal, or spousal, relationship that is the basis for m odern
fam ily life, he concluded.
D urkheim does not seem to have attached m uch significance to
conjugal love as a social force, since he thought that spouses
THE SOCIAL FUTURE 15 1
interview she laughed, shook her head, and said, “ But it was a
gift. A nd a beautiful one to o .”
T he behavior o f M rs E. makes sense once it is know n that the
Je h o v ah ’s Witnesses are strongly opposed to gift exchange, and to
other “ pagan” customs such as Christm as festivities, because they
distract the faithful from Jeh ovah and his w o rk (Stroup 1945: 14 1;
R ogerson 1969: n o ; Botting and Botting 19 84:29 , 120). It makes
even m ore sense when w e consider that from within the dialectic
o f intim acy and com m unity a strong m ove towards one pole or
the other inevitably creates its ow n opposition. D urkheim
observed that the grow th o f the cult o f the individual “ is possible
only by the ruin o f all others” (Durkheim 1964a: 172). We should
not be surprised to find that the threat posed by m oral individu-
alism has been recognized, and that it has been resisted in socialism
and in Christianity.
Je h o v ah ’s Witnesses are not the only Christians in Canada w ho
are critical o f secular gift rituals. The secularization o f Christm as
is deplored by m any people, although opposition to it within the
mainstream churches is usually phrased in terms o f objections to
“ com m ercialism .” From the religious view point the com m ercial-
izing o f C h rist’s birth is seen to have created tw o m ajor problem s.
Firstly, there is the fact that religious messages have been used to
sell consum er goods, w ith the result that their contents have been
trivialized. O ne interviewee apparently refused to enter department
stores in N o vem ber and D ecem ber because she was disgusted by
their constant playing o f Christm as carols and hym ns over the
heads o f busy shoppers. The other objection that devout Christians
often have to secular Christm as is that the expansion o f gift giving,
and related interpersonal rituals, has resulted in an enormous
collective expenditure that serves no religious purpose. Liberal
Christians, such as m embers o f the U nited Church o f Canada,
sometimes neutralize the implications o f this for their ow n
consciences by adding to their “ Christm as lists” gifts to churches
and to other good causes such as foreign aid agencies. The radical
solution has been to undercut the prim ary gift econom y at its base.
In the W innipeg Ritual C ycle Study that econom ic ethic was most
evident in the interview s w ith members o f Protestant sects.
N o sociologist has contributed more to our know ledge o f the
econom ic ethics o f religion than Weber. B y the term “ economic
ethic” he meant “ the practical impulses for action which are
founded in the psychological and pragm atic contexts o f religions”
(Weber 1948: 267). The psychological context o f religion usually
156 THE GIFT ECONOMY
Once freed from the bonds o f intim acy, this economic ethic o f
love and service has been capable o f developm ent in m any different
directions. The overall tendency, Weber thought, was for brother-
liness to be generalized into an im personal ideology o f love. Weber
thought that in the western societies a rational ethic o f depersonal-
ized and objectified love achieved its purest form in Protestantism,
and particularly Puritanism (Weber 1958). Y et there is an inconsist-
ency in W eber’s w o rk here. He him self pointed out that C alvinism
replaced the universalism o f love w ith a “ vocational asceticism .”
Puritanism therefore produced a “ standpoint o f unbrotherliness”
that “ was no longer a genuine ‘religion o f salvation’ ” (Weber
1948: 333). T od ay a genuine religion o f salvation can still be found
am ong the Jeh o v ah ’s Witnesses, which is w h y their numbers have
continued to g ro w in troubled times. One o f their members in
W innipeg is Verna Rom aniuk.
158 THE GIFT ECONOMY
and for w hose resurrection they w ill prepare. Verna Rom aniuk is
personally convinced that the “ perfect peace and harm ony under
G o d ’s rule” w hich prevailed in the Garden o f Eden w ill return:
“ It’ll come back. The Bible promises it w ill com e b ack.”
M rs Rom aniuk says that her beliefs are related to her gift giving,
because: “ We all strive to live according to Bible principles.”
A ccording to the requirements o f her faith, M rs Rom aniuk does
not give gifts at Christm as or at the other calendrical rites that are
celebrated by m ost other Christians in W innipeg. In fact the most
distinctive feature o f her gift behavior sociologically speaking is
that she never gives gifts at rites o f progression. A ll o f her gifts
on special occasions were given at rites o f passage - sym pathy at
an illness (2), farewell (2), pre-w edding (bridal shower), wedding,
and birth (baby shower). That is not the end o f her gift giving,
how ever, since she says o f herself and her fellow congregation
members that:
The important thing about gift giving is that we don’t wait until a
particular time o f the year. We give gifts whenever the need arises or
whenever the occasion arises. Like, for instance, if somebody should
get ill, or [go] in a hospital or in a home, or if we go away on trips.
Or if we happen to be shopping and we see something that a friend or
family member would like, we buy it. So it’s no special time or
occasion. We give because we love the person.
We’re living at the time where our money’s not worth very much, and
there’s so many people that don’t have jobs any more. I have the
tendency to make do with what I have, and when I buy gifts for
somebody I tend to buy gifts that will last and that’ll be useful -
something really practical.
It is above all the practical, domestic side o f fam ily life that M rs
Rom aniuk thinks o f as doing what she is supposed to do. For most
o f her married life she has not w orked outside the home. Although
she does not give her husband gifts, she says that she makes it up
to him in other w ays. “ I make up his favorite dishes. R ight now
he’s hooked on all sorts o f sweet desserts. I’m alw ays baking for
h im .”
There is, surely, a paradox in M rs R om an iuk’s life. B y her ow n
account her relationship w ith her husband has not been a happy
one, yet she continues to provide domestic services for him. M ore
than that, she finds w ays o f serving him that w ill bring him
pleasure. M rs R om an iuk’s life history has been presented in greater
detail than usual here, not ju st because o f its intrinsic interest, but
because the nature o f that paradox is theoretically important. It is
THE GIFT ECONOMY
the final piece in our theory o f intim acy and com m unity in the
gift econom y.
Conclusion
In chapter 6 the question was raised o f whether or not the gift
econom y m ight contribute to the reproduction o f patriarchy
through asym m etrical transactions within m arriage. It was pointed
out that a w o m an ’s dependence upon her husband could not have
a total effect upon her social life i f she w as integrated into a w ider
netw ork o f transactions w ith female kin and friends (see also B ott
1957). A t that time it was argued that focusing on either structures
o f intim acy or structures o f com m unity alone w ould inevitably
give an inadequate picture o f the social organization o f the gift
econom y. We can n ow return to that issue w ith the benefit o f
additional data, and w ith the benefit o f the broader perspective
that w e have developed in this chapter. Intim acy and com m unity
are not sim ply the alternative poles o f a universal axis o f the
differentiation o f social system s. T h ey are units o f social construc-
tion that are used, and sometim es com bined, in com plex w ays
w ithin a dynam ic interactive process. Som etim es com m unity is
subordinated to intim acy, as it is in the cult o f the individual. A n d
som etim es intim acy is subordinated to com m unity, as it is in
m illenial sects. Som etim es, too, both structures are linked in a
continuous chain, or cycle, o f social reproduction (see Figure 8 .1).
1 }
Community Intimacy
t ___________________________ _______ 1
Cult o f the moral community
purchase has been deepened b y the know ledge that the one thing
she did not get from her econom ic independence was freedom . We
are therefore throw n back upon the paradox that M rs Rom aniuk
continues to act in the w a y that she is “ supposed to beh ave,”
despite the fact that she is unhappy w ith her life. That paradox
is only the reflection o f a deeper contradictory consciousness o f
com m unity and intim acy.
M rs R om aniuk subscribes to a universalistic ideology o f helping
her “ n eigh b o r,” w hoever that neighbor m ight be. Her transaction
practices are rather different, how ever. In practice, m ost o f her
help is given to very particular persons, and m ainly to her husband
and her daughter still livin g w ith her. A s M rs Rom aniuk put it:
We’re all different people with all different personalities and nature, and
so we can’t love or like everybody to the same degree. The more you
know a person, and if you like him just a little bit more than you like
somebody else, that has a deciding factor [on giving to him].
Ritual process
Ritual form Rite of passage Rite of progression
Ritual motive Instrumental Expressive
Ritual object Practical gift Symbolic gift
CONCLUSION 171
“ the gift econ om y” rather than “ the gift” in order to avoid any
confusion w ith that idea.
T he m ajor advantage o f abandoning M auss’s elementarist soci-
o lo gy is that it has been possible to distance the theoretical
approach developed here from his m odel o f a system o f total
prestations, w hile at the same time incorporating what is valuable
in that m odel into a broader view o f the gift econom y. In
particular, w e have taken very seriously the fact that the numbers
o f givers and receivers participating in gift exchanges in N orth
Am erica is different from the situation that he described for prim i-
tive societies. He claimed that “ In the system s o f the past . . . it
is groups, and not individuals, which carry on exchange” (Mauss
I 954: 3)- We have seen that in N orth Am erica it is m ainly individ-
uals and couples, and not groups, that conduct gift transactions.
M auss’s assumption about the actors in gift transactions imposed
a fundamental limitation upon the kind o f theory that he could
produce, as a result o f which his claims are today o f very little
value for sociology. Once it has been assumed, as Mauss did,
that all transactions are intergroup exchanges, then any distinction
between social and personal relationships is unavailable, and the
entire argument developed in the present study is made impossible.
His follow ers have paid insufficient attention to this limitation in
his w ork. Its effects have been most serious for the sociology o f
gift transactions in the western societies, .which is to say those
societies whose cultures have been heavily influenced by moral
individualism , and by the associated ideology o f personal love.
Central to this female world was an inner core o f kin. The ties between
sisters, first cousins, aunts, and nieces provided the underlying structure
upon which groups o f friends and their network o f female relatives
clustered. Although most o f the women [studied] would appear to
be living within isolated nuclear families, the emotional ties between
nonresidential kin were deep and binding and provided one o f the
fundamental existential realities o f women’s lives.
(Smith-Rosenberg 1975: 11)
extended female netw orks o f love. We have seen in the case studies
o f Pat C hubey, and especially o f M elvin Fisher, that in the social
reproduction o f structures o f intim acy and com m unity men are
often m erely auxiliaries in the life-course plans o f wom en. O ur
final case study illustrates how strong female solidarity can be
under such circumstances.
E ven though G ord is not alw ays hom e for Christm as, he has
m ore fam ily life than G eo rgin a’s father has enjoyed. G eorgin a’s
father w o rks at a m ilitary establishment in the far north, and he
comes hom e for six w eeks once a year. For the rest o f the year he
w orks and lives in a w o rld o f men, separated b y distance and social
organization from his w ife and daughters. Georgina has there-
fore gro w n up in a female w orld , w hich she assumes w ill continue
to m ake a place for her. G eorgin a’s m arriage to G ord w as
accom panied b y her inclusion in a new w o m en ’s w orld, nam ely
that o f her husband’s female relatives. She says:
When you’re married you’ve got his family to hope to God you’re
going to like. And they love me. It’s funny really, because Gord’s
family (I hate to say this, but he knows it) they love me a lot more
than they love him. Because he is family, [but] I’ve really won them
over. We’re very, very close. I see [Gord’s sister] all the time. And she
complains about him - “ That brother o f mine” - so I told him, you
know. And his mom. I got a note from her - “ You come and see me
and you leave Gord at home. We need some time together, just me and
you. We’ll spend a week together.” I’m closer to his family than Gord
is. Gord doesn’t sit and talk with his parents or pop in for coffee to see
his sister. I’m always over there complaining. That’s what family’s
good for is to complain, you know. And having his nieces and in-laws
liking me as much as they do it’s even better. Before I only had my
own family. But with Gord’s family I’ve got twice as much as what I
had before. They love me and I love them. It’s better to have more
people love you. Having his family also is twice as better.
I always get nice little letters from my mother-in-law. She signs them.
“ Love Joe” - but it’s not Joe talking, it’s her. And my mother, we’re
very, very close. M y dad and I are close in one way where we’re friends
more than daughter and father, ’cause he was never really home for us
to say “ Dad” [to]. For me to say “ Dad” is really funny. M y mom,
we’re sort o f pals, but I respect her because she’s my mother and I’d
never argue with her. As much as I’d love to. [Me and my sisters] we
stick together no matter what. In other words, if the husband does
something (to her older sister, who is also married) we’d kill him. We
love him, but before they got married we told him - “ you never hurt
my sister. If you ever do any damage to my sister you’ll be sorry.”
And the same thing with [her younger sister, whose fiance lives in
Alberta]. She’s engaged now to be married, and I told him over the
phone - “ If you ever hurt her, don’t you ever come to Winnipeg.” And
it’s the same thing with me, they said the same thing to Gord. . . .
When we were kids we were always together, and then when you’re
older you’re not together as much as you used to be. Y ou’re starting
to go out with boys, and you miss out on a lot o f family dinners because
your boyfriend asked you to go out. It’s a choice, a toss-up between
family and boyfriend. Well, you got to go with the boyfriend. And
then when you get married it’s, “ Should we go to his family’s house
for dinner at Christmas, or should we go to mine?” You miss being
that family you used to be. Y ou’re not together as much as you once
were. We were together every day. You get up in the morning, and
there were three o f us all fighting for the washroom. When you get
older you don’t have to fight for the washroom and, like, who’s using
whose stuff. Here I’ve got Gord. Gord doesn’t wear any make-up [so]
I can’t argue with him about that, or about who’s wearing my clothes
again. God, you lose so much when you get married, when you actually
think about it.
I Moral economy
1 Such gifts may be willingly accepted and politely, even enthusiastically,
acknowledged. But they are not likely to arouse deep feelings o f
gratitude. For this reason the gift economy cannot be understood
simply as an “ economy o f gratitude,” as Hochschild (in press) has
proposed. Gift giving is usually institutionalized (Befu 1968; Lebra
1976), and it is therefore governed by rules which define what individ-
uals can expect to receive from others, and when they can expect to
receive it, and how much it will be worth. In an institutionalized gift
economy it is only “ surprise gifts” or “ generous gifts” which achieve
the ideal o f normative redundancy, and which are therefore framed as
extraordinary transactions within an economy o f gratitude.
2 The position taken here should be clarified in relation to the problem
o f the autonomy o f agency, or put more simply the problem o f agency,
as it has been discussed in recent years (see, for example, Giddens
1976, 1979). Autonomy is not a property o f subjects considered as
social actors. Rather, it is a property o f action within a certain context,
or frame, as Goffman demonstrated in his comparison o f front regions
and back regions (Goffman 1959). It is, therefore, gift transactions and
not gift givers that may be described as possessing (relative) autonomy.
3 At this point certain claims for the universality o f political economy
can be anticipated, according to which the laws o f political economy
are seen as the necessary foundations for an integral social science (see,
for example, Fraser 1985). The position taken here is quite different,
since it is not assumed that one theoretical framework can answer all
o f the questions that are worth asking.
The work presented in this study follows Weber’s method o f investi-
gation by means o f ideal types (see Hekman 1983). Weber maintained
that sociological explanation involves constructing concepts whose
various elements are abstracted from reality and recombined in a logi-
cally integrated fashion. Because o f this logical integration by the
observer an ideal type may never be found in real life. It is a theorist’s
concept, to which actual events will correspond with different degrees
o f approximation. The classical concepts o f economic theory are, there-
fore, all instances o f ideal types (Weber 1947: 96, m ) .
The advantages o f such concepts, Weber pointed out, are their
precision and clarity, and thus their aid to reasoning. They facilitate
the working out o f general explanatory principles and provide
NOTES 185
2 Tie-signs
1 Goffman himself disavowed any interest in the structural dimensions
o f anchored relations (Goffman 1971: 193). In contrast, the concept of
moral economy advanced here presupposes that gift transactions are
partly structured by rules which define the existence o f a differentiated
system o f classes o f actors (Cheal 1980: 39-40). Structural arrangements
based on socially defined kinship and gender statuses are therefore
likely to be o f some importance for tie-signs such as gifts (Caplow
1982, 1984; Cheal 1986).
In a typically understated shift in approach, Goffman did in fact take
up studies o f the ritual order o f gender statuses in the latter part of
his career (Goffman 1977, 1979), although they have generally been
overlooked (for example, by Collins 1980). There is still much to be
learned from his work about microstructural models o f interaction
processes (Cheal 1988b).
2 Collins has extended this idea o f Goffman’s by arguing that social
structure consists o f repetitive actions which are organized as interac-
tion ritual chains (Collins 1981a, 1981b). His development o f this idea
has been controversial, partly because it is conceptually loose and
imprecise (J. H. Turner 1986), and partly because he has argued that
all macrophenomena should be translated into combinations o f micro-
events (Giddens 1985: 290-2; Ritzer 1985). Among the objections to
be made to this oversimplified conception o f sociology is the necessity
to explain the different forms that interaction rituals take. As Berger
and Luckmann have pointed out, in the microanalysis of everyday life
interaction must be studied as a dialectical process in which intersubjec-
tive meanings constructed at one point in time are reified and therefore
define the probabilities for actions at later points in time (P. Berger
and Luckmann 1966). In practice this involves making reference to the
limits to the extension o f interaction ritual chains that arise from the
differentiation o f structures o f action (see, for example, Cheal 1987a,
1987b). It is for this reason that the present monograph begins with a
macroanalysis o f the gift economy considered as a structure of action
that has been differentiated from other structures.
3 Goffman defined ritualization as “ the standardization o f bodily and
vocal behavior through socialization, affording such behavior - such
gestures, if you will - a specialized communicative function in the
stream o f behavior” (Goffman 1983:3). Ritualization is therefore an
19 0 THE GIFT ECONOMY
4 Love culture
1 The concept o f “ work” used here refers to the deliberate effort that is
involved in constructing, or building up, a line o f action together
with the resources and social arrangements that are necessary for its
production (see, for example, Wadel 1979). This constructionist
approach stands in sharp contrast to the critical theory o f Baudrillard
who has attempted to separate political economy and semiotics by
claiming that a “ rupture” exists “ between symbolic exchange and
work” (Baudrillard 1975:45). From a constructionist point o f view,
NOTES 193
symbolic exchange as well as economic exchange involves acts of
production in which pre-existing conditions are transformed through
human effort. That effort may properly be identified as “ w ork.” In
the absence o f a comprehensive concept o f work, such as that outlined
here, Baudrillard is unable to theorize a pragmatic semiotics (compare
Baudrillard 1981:66, 123 with Cheal 1987a). It is this lack which is
ultimately responsible for the failure o f his account o f autonomous
transactions, since if the gift economy cannot be seen as work it can
only be seen as waste (compare Baudrillard 19 8 1:3 1-3 , 75-8 with
Cheal 1986: 429-32, 1987a, and with the critique o f Veblen in this
volume).
2 The problem o f the universality o f the family posed in functional
theory is not only an empirical question about the relations between
structures and their functions, it is above all a question o f definition. A
classic illustration o f this point can be found in Weigert and Thomas’s
analysis o f the universality question. After a careful, logical discussion
they arrived at a concept to which, they say, “ we will somewhat
arbitrarily apply the label ‘family’ ” (Weigert and Thomas 1971: 193).
In that “ arbitrary” decision lies a host o f unstated assumptions about
words and life, and the relations between the two (see especially Flan-
drin 1979:4-9; Leonard and Speakman 1986). As this example illus-
trates, the key concepts used in sociology are always culture-bound to
some degree. It is therefore necessary to pay explicit attention in theory
construction to the fact that social theories are ultimately grounded in
the linguistic usages and shared meanings o f some society or subculture
(Winch 1958; Coulter 1979; Cheal 1980).
3 Recent Marxist theorizing on family and gender has often employed
a functionalist logic, as a number of commentators have noted (Bruegel
1978; Kuhn 1978; Barrett and McIntosh 1982; Harris 1983; Elliot 1986).
It has therefore retraced the familiar set o f difficulties arising from the
indeterminacy o f social needs, which had earlier been demonstrated
with respect to structural functionalism (Cheal 1975). This reworking
o f old ground under new slogans is perhaps one o f the most distressing
signs o f the contemporary crisis in sociological theory (see especially
Pedraza-Bailey 1982;}. H. Turner 1986).
4 For recent discusssions o f social constructionism and social construc-
tivism see Delia, O ’Keefe, and O ’Keefe (1982), Mehan (1982),
Thomason (1982), Gergen (1985), and Harre (1986). See also Cheal
(1988c).
5 It is worth pointing out, by way o f comparison with Foucauldian
discourse theory, that neither Mrs Rose nor any o f the other people
interviewed in the Winnipeg Ritual Cycle Study sought to legitimate
their family practices with reference to the professional ideologies
emphasized, for example, by Donzelot (1979). Whatever influence
medical and psychoanalytic ideologies may have had upon state policies
in Canada, they have not been extensively incorporated into the routine
accounts o f everyday family life used by most people in Winnipeg,
even by those o f them who have been trained in social work (see the
194 THE GIFT ECONOMY
case study o f Colleen Williams below). The reasons for this interesting
state o f affairs have not been explored here, but they may have some-
thing to do with the fact that although professional ideologies can be
designed for the rationalization o f interpersonal relations, they are not
well-suited to the legitimation o f systems o f long-term relationships.
Put simply, professional ideologies are open to continuous revision on
the basis o f new forms o f technical knowledge, and so they cannot
present even the appearance o f stability that is achieved in invented
traditions (see pp. 80-1). It can be argued that it is especially important
for professional ideologies to avoid the appearance o f stability, even
when at the same time occupational closure is enforced through rigid
professional practices.
6 The commonsense ideology o f familism described here has been the
basis for much psychological theorizing about family relations, such
as “ attachment theory” (Cicirelli 1983a, 1983b). According to this
theory attachment is understood as an emotional or affectional bond
between two people that is formed early in life and which typically
persists throughout life. The sociological approach taken here is
different. It begins with the fact that the persistence o f sentiments itself
has to be explained. From a constructivist point o f view, attachment
is a positively valued state (in oneself and in others) within intimate
relationships, which actors must work to maintain through the
management o f emotions. The interpersonal rituals performed on
special occasions such as Christmas are examples o f this attachment
work.
7 Analogizing about modern societies is the temptation to which all
elementarist theories eventually fall prey. It consists o f drawing an
analogy between complex events and selected phenomena in simpler
societies which are better understood and for which more powerful
models are available. This can be seen on a grand scale in Pamela
Shurmer’s claims that the preoccupations o f individuals in potlatching,
N ew Guinea pig exchanges, and the Kula trade in the Trobriand Islands
are power, prestige, political alliance, indebtedness, speculation, and
brinkmanship, and that “ all this applies to [gift giving in] our own
societies just as much as to New Guinea or to Indian potlatching”
(Shurmer 1971: 1242).
The attraction o f the analogical mode o f theory construction is that
it enables social scientists to draw broad conclusions with relative ease.
If the models are well-chosen, this can lead to significant advances in
the prediction o f some aspects o f the phenomena under investigation.
However, a facile transposition o f models from one social system to
another cannot be justified. The analogical method ultimately suffers
from the disadvantage that an analogue model can only handle those
features o f the subject under investigation which are indeed similar to
the system from which the model was abstracted. Features o f the
subject which are peculiar to local socio-temporal conditions must be
described in some other way, through grounded theory (Glaser and
Strauss 1967).
NOTES 195
8 The relevance o f structural functional family models for understanding
the moral economies o f advanced industrial societies would seem to
have declined during the past three decades. In particular, fewer people
are now living in co-resident nuclear families, and that trend seems
likely to continue (Kobrin 1976; Wargon 1979:40-2; Harris
1983: 218-19; Glick 1984). Feminist critics (for example, Eichler 1981;
Thorne 1982), and others (for example, Cheal 1987c) have questioned
the dominance o f concepts o f family functioning in mainstream social
theory. It is especially necessary at the present time to describe the
intimate ties o f women living non-traditional life styles. This includes
single women living in non-family households, such as Anne Baker
whose case was discussed in chapter 3, as well as women living alone,
such as Margaret Rose and Colleen Williams whose cases have been
examined in some detail in this chapter.
The epistemological position taken here is that for sociology (as
opposed to other forms o f social thought) these life styles, and any
others, are not to be understood as “ deviant” or as “ liberated,”
although they are “ alternative.” The analysis presented here follows
the structural method o f theorizing transformations, whose utility has
been demonstrated elsewhere (Cheal 1983). A variety o f life styles are
presented in this monograph as consequences o f the same underlying
system o f rules and resources for constructing relationships as that
which is employed in the “ normal” family.
9 See, for example, Colin Turnbull’s account o f the Ik (Turnbull 1972).
10 It should be clear that the approach taken here follows the common
distinction drawn between family and household (Yanagisako 1979;
Elliot 1986:4).
11 The concept o f “ plausibility structure” was introduced into sociology
by Berger. It refers to the social base which reproduces a social world
by ensuring its subjective plausibility as a fact o f life. This state of
affairs is brought about by the systematic provision o f experiences in
everyday life which confirm the reality o f that social world. Since any
event may be experienced in a number o f different ways, plausibility
structures depend crucially for their effects upon the continuous mutual
definition of experiences in the closed interaction ritual chains o f dense
social networks. In a pluralistic mass society the most effective plausi-
bility structures are therefore segregated subsocieties (groups or
communities) whose closure is the result o f a continuous, conscious
attention to the boundaries between inner and outer worlds. The
private nuclear family is one such plausibility structure. (See P. Berger
1967:45, 48- 9 , 133—4)-
5 Social reproduction
1 Sociological theory has had little to say about altruism. An attempt to
rethink this problem in non-functionalist terms, and in response to
developments in other disciplines, has been made in Cheal (1988c).
2 The redundant nature o f gift giving (and thus its relatively high degree
196 THE GIFT ECONOMY
transactors (that is, the person or persons to whom the gift was given)
and P = ego’s partners (that is, the person or persons, if any, with
whom the gift was given).
9 It might be surmised that since the major part o f giving is from 2 or
more persons acting together, predatory giving could take the form
o f rivalry between corporate groups (especially kinship groups) as
found in some tribal societies. That cannot be the case here since only
13 per cent o f gifts are from 4 or more people acting in concert. The
overwhelming majority o f gifts (four-fifths) are given by 1 or 2
persons. They are, in other words, interpersonal gifts between individ-
uals and couples and not group gifts (see Table 8.1).
10 The corollary o f this point is that the power o f advertising executives
as “ captains o f consciousness” (Ewen 1976; Ewen and Ewen 1982)
NOTES 201
7 Gift games
1 Money is one o f the most important cultural constructs in capitalist
society. The pursuit and possession o f money, the benefits derived
from it, and the deprivations suffered from the lack of it have all been
intensively studied. The interactional uses o f money, on the other
hand, have received comparatively little attention, and sociological
discussions o f money have tended to be metaphysical in nature (see,
for example, Simmel 1978; Smelt 1980). We have been too much
concerned with the essence of money, and not concerned enough with
situated variations in its usage. The study of variations is important if
we are to understand the social organization of economic relations
under different historical conditions. Cutler and his colleagues have
suggested that sociologists should be less concerned with what money
represents and more concerned with “ the analysis of the concrete
conditions under which money exists, the form it takes, and the role
it performs under particular conditions” (Cutler et al. 1978: 14). What
is most needed, however, is not more grand theory but knowledge of
transactions drawn from field research. For some pertinent remarks
on this point by an anthropologist see Crump (1981). For work on
the psychology of money see Furnham and Lewis (1986).
2 The implications of that conclusion for sociology may be illuminated
by comparing Smith (1973) and Cheal (1987a). In the one case the
semiotics of consumption is seen as being legislated by corporations,
and in the other it is seen as the unintended outcome of pragmatic
decisions made by individuals acting within an environment of late
capitalist consumerism.
3 Ofrecijo is one o f several local names for this practice (Brandes
i 973: 73);
4 Klymasz’s investigations were concentrated in the Dauphin area of
Manitoba, the Yorkton area of Saskatchewan, and the Vegreville area
of Alberta.
5 In an open and pluralistic urban environment, like that of contem-
porary Winnipeg, many social meanings are likely to be problematic
202 THE GIFT ECONOMY
and relative. That is particularly true for meanings derived from ethnic
cultures, which can be taken for granted as unquestionable routines
only in a context o f residential and occupational segregation (see, for
example, Suttles 1968). That does not mean that ethnic meaning
systems must disappear in the absence o f social separation. They may
continue to exist so long as a number o f culture carriers remain in
contact with each other (Fischer 1975: 1325-6). It does mean, however,
that few subcultural patterns o f behavior will be regarded as the only
possible ways to act (P. Berger and Luckmann 1966: 115 ; P. Berger
1967: 150-1). When group boundaries break down a variety o f schemas
become psychologically available as alternatives between which indi-
viduals can choose. Furthermore, the experience o f choice as a funda-
mental condition o f existence frequently leads to the realization that
other options can be made available through acts o f individual creation.
In isolated rural communities social forms drawn from ethnic
cultures may be part o f a coherent normative order. In cities, however,
we are less likely to find such customs than we are to find reworked
“ traditions” which define how a social occasion is to be constructed,
for those who happen to have an interest in doing so. These “ recipes”
are part o f the individual’s stock o f knowledge, available for use on
occasions to which they are deemed relevant. In this way individuals
are able, within the limits o f the negotiated expectations o f significant
others, to take up and adapt social forms derived from various groups
as they construct lines o f action to suit their purposes at hand. These
practices make social life possible, and are therefore valued
“ traditions.” At the same time their authentication is only conditional
and provisional, and they cannot prevent innovative and unconven-
tional interaction patterns from emerging.
Faced with this apparently chaotic situation, with its seemingly
endless individual variations, it has sometimes been assumed that the
principal characteristic o f urban life is the absence o f a framework of
meanings (Durkheim 1964b: 297-301). Urban life may, however, be
construed as a dialectical order o f choices and means-end relations.
One o f the tasks o f urban sociology is to identify the cultural ecology
at work in such situations, as I have attempted to do here.
6 In the 1984 Winnipeg Area Study’s random sample survey 90 per cent
o f those expressing an opinion (78 per cent o f the total sample) stated
that presentation weddings had become more common during the last
ten years. That finding is particularly interesting in relation to the
pluralistic ethnic composition o f Winnipeg. In the 1984 survey the
most popular self-designation o f ethnic identity was simply Canadian.
Those identifying themselves in this way comprised 38.5 per cent o f
the sample. Other notable self-identifications were: English, Scottish,
or British 9.7 per cent; Ukrainian 7.2 per cent; French or French-
Canadian 5.4 per cent; German 4 per cent. No other ethnic identity
was cited by more than 3 per cent of the respondents.
7 The observation that opposed ritual preferences sometimes provoke
tensions within families leads to a different conclusion about the place
NOTES 203
If it turns all wills towards the same end, this end is not social.
It thus occupies a completely exceptional place in the collective
conscience. It is still from society that it takes all its force, but it is
not to society that it attaches us; it is to ourselves. Hence, it does
not constitute a true social link.
(Durkheim 1964a: 172)
In claiming that the cult o f the individual has no part to play in the
reproduction o f social life he was certainly wrong. His mistake was to
assume (in this passage, if not elsewhere) that the only social attach-
ments are those to society, that is, to macrostructures. That argument
overlooks the possibility o f interpersonal attachments, and therefore
the importance o f microstructures (Cheal 1988b). It can be argued, as
I have done elsewhere (Cheal 1988a), that any decline in the structuring
o f the life course at a macrolevel is likely to have been accompanied
by its restructuring at microlevels. There is little evidence to suggest
that the members o f modern societies have lost interest in having
predictable social futures. On the contrary, increased longevity is likely
to have increased the salience o f those relationships, such as kinship
ties, that have the longest terms (Riley 1983).
4 We must be very clear about what exactly this statement means, and
what it does not mean. It means that the possibilities for developing,
and the consequences for everyday life o f having, bonds o f attachment,
sentimentality, sociability, and economic cooperation are greater in
conditions o f high presence-availability than they are in conditions o f
low presence-availability. It does not mean that the nuclear family
household is an adaptive system for meeting individuals’ develop-
mental needs. We shall see below that it is possible for a nuclear family
relationship to have high levels o f presence-availability and economic
cooperation together with low levels o f attachment and sentimentality,
where one member feels that some, but not all, o f her personal needs
are being met.
One o f the problems with the structural-functional theory o f the
family has been the tendency to assume that the elemental social bonds
o f presence-availability, attachment, sentimentality, sociability, and
economic cooperation are all positive, and are positively combined,
within the family (nuclear or extended). Eichler has pointed out that
it is necessary to deconstruct this monolithic model of “ the family”
NOTES 205
9 Conclusion
1 The rejection o f Gregory’s and Collins’ energy flow models o f society
does not mean that we should stop investigating the flows o f social
objects between social actors. On the contrary, the justification for
transactional sociology is precisely that there is much to be learned
about social life from studying how positively valued objects move.
However, there are two important reasons why a transactional soci-
ology grounded in the theory o f action is to be preferred to energy
flow models. Firstly, the metaphorical use o f concepts such as
emotional charge obscures the fact that the objects which circulate are
utilities and symbols, for which particular methods o f analysis are
required (see, for example, Cheal 1987a). Secondly, it is important to
recognize (as I implied in an earlier comment on Collins - chapter 2,
note 2) that “ social energy” does not usually flow in an undirected
process o f contagion (see especially Collins 1981a). Socially valued
objects normally flow along well-defined paths within identifiable
systems o f social organization. The process by which transaction paths
are constructed is the process o f institutionalization, as demonstrated
in chapter 3. The consequence o f that process is social closure, as
described in this chapter.
2 Eichler has claimed that the connection between women’s domestic
labor and female love within the nuclear family is due to the economic
dependence o f non-employed housewives upon their husbands.
Personal dependence has asymmetric consequences for affective
relations, she has argued, so that, “ For the dependent, the attitudes
considered proper are a mixture o f gratitude, awe, obedience, submiss-
iveness, loyalty, and love” (Eichler 1973: 49).
3 Overing (1986) has suggested that the notion o f separate spheres o f
public and private activities cannot capture the complexity o f gender
relations in primitive societies either. For relevant ethnographic
materials on rituals among Aboriginal women in Australia see Bell
( I 9 8 3).
4 The comparative concepts o f political economy and moral economy
that have been used here have certain similarities to the concepts o f
system integration and social integration adopted by Habermas
(1975: 4-5). In Habermas’s usage social integration refers to life worlds
which are symbolically organized, which may include ritualization.
The differences between Habermas’s views on ritual and those outlined
in this study deserve a separate discussion.
5 On the concept o f relational culture see Wood (1982).
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,
Atamanchuk, Mary, 42, 45-52, Bourdieu, P., 2, 20-2, 24, 41, 42,
56-60, 176 57 84
Bradac, J., 17
Baker, Anne, 55-6, 58-60, 84, 128, Brandes, S., 123, 201
144, 176 Brown, Barry, 15 1-2
Balakrishnan, T., 124 Brown, Carol, 15 1-2, 176, 178
Bales, R., 102 Bruegel, I., 65, 66, 193
Baran, Georgina, 178, 179-81 Bulmer, M., 14, 64
Baran, Gordon, 179-81 Burstyn, V., 67
Barker, D., 91, 97
Barnes, J., 33, 191 Cancian, F., 198
Barrett, M., 6, 66, 74, 175, 193, Cantor, M., 198
198 Caplow, T., 3-4, 8, 15, 22, 24, 25,
Baudrillard, J., 4, i n , 192-3 26, 29, 41, 64, 78, 81, 92,
Beechey, V., 74 109-10, 122, 144, 189, 190, 197,
Befu, H., 13, 184, 198 202, 203
Belk, R., 26 Caron, A., 5
Bell, C., 109, n o, 117 , 198, 206 Caruk, Orysia, 42, 154-5, 176
Bell, D., 206 Cheal, D., 5, 6, 7, 8, n , 13, 14,
Belshaw, C., 2, 41, i n 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25,
Benn, S., 17 27, 29, 41, 53, 57, 58, 61, 67,
Bennett, J., 186 68, 71, 75, 81, 83, 88, 90, 100,
Berg, E., 74 102, 108, 109, n o , i n , 117,
Berger, B., 65, 107, 185 121, 122, 137, 139, 145, 149,
Berger, C., 17 153, 162, 167, 175, 182, 185,
Berger, P., 17, 18, 65, 74, 91, 107, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192,
185, 189, 195, 202 193 , 195, 19 6 , 1 9 8 , 199, 2 0 1 ,
Bernardes, J., 74 203, 204, 205, 206
Black, Mrs, 127-8 Chodorow, N ., 65
Blau, P., 7, 40, 52, i n Chubey, Pat, n o - n , 176, 178,
Bloch, M., 40-1, 19 1-2 179
222 NAME INDEX
Sarason, I., 197 van Gennep, A., 91, 100, 115 , 148
Sarsby, J., 152 van Velsen, J., 32
Schwartz, B ., i n Veblen, T., 10 1, m - 1 5 , 117 , 124,
Scott, J., 15 193, 199, 200
Shanas, E., 29
Shibutani, T., 186-7, 188, 189, 201
Shils, E., 102 Wadel, C ., 192
Shurmer, P., 3, 41, 194 Walker, Philip, 84
Simmel, G., 3, 201 Wallerstein, I., 186
Smart, B ., 67 Ward, S., 5
Smart, C ., 67 Wargon, S., 129, 195
Smelt, S., 201 Wearing, B., 67
Smith, D., 65, 201 Weber, M., 137-9, 154-7. l66>
Smith, J., 186 184-5, 203
Smith-Rosenberg, C., 177-8 Webley, P., 25
Speakman, M., 193 Weigert, A., 66, 75, 193
Stacey, M ., 1 Weir, T ., 190
Stephens, R., 198 Wellman, B., 14, 16, 25, 31, 61,
Stokes, R., 192 64, 67, 101, 107, 187, 197, 198
Strathern, M ., 16 Wenger, G. C., 197
Strauss, A., 27, 148, 194 Westwood, S., 90, 205
Stroup, H., 155 Whitaker, I., 10
Stuchlik, M ., 42 White, Leonard, 54-5, 113
Sussman, M ., 40, 66 White, Michael, 54-5, 113
Suttles, G., 202 Williams, Colleen, 80-1, 83, 84,
Swanson, G., 201 85, 93, 176, 194
Syme, S. L., 197 Williams, R. G. A., 65
Szelenyi, I., 14, 66 Williamson, J., 101
Wills, G., 22, 25, 41
Thomas, D., 66, 193 Wilson, M., 145
Thomason, B., 193 Winch, P., 193
Thompson, E. P., 5 Wittgenstein, L., 121
Thorne, B ., 74, 195 Wolfe, D., 197
Tiryakian, E., 102 Wolff, K., 3
Turnbull, C., 195 Wood, J., 206
Turner, B ., 204
Turner, J., 22, 25, 41 Yanagisako, S., 66, 195
Turner, J. H., 189, 193 Yeatman, A., 6
Turner, J. P., 16
Turner, V ., 205
Zelizer, V., 5
Unruh, D., 187
Subject index
Easter: gift expenditure, 82, 115 , women; homemade, 52, 63, 82,
118 -19 ; gift types, 92, 94-5, 115 ; motives for, 53; nature of,
103-4; ritual, 96-7, 149-50, 153; 125-6; numbers, 31; organized,
unreciprocated gift, 50 84-5, 100-1; practical, 133-5,
economy, moral/political, see 138-9, 161; ritual specialization,
moral, political 102-4; ‘shower’, 99; symbolic,
Edmonton, Canada, 124 96, 13 1-3 , 138-41; to impress,
education, 57 52-5, see also domination, status;
elementarism, 2-4, 9, 172-3 types, 92-8, 103; value, 100-1,
equivalence, 52 105, 113 -16 , 118 , 139; see also
ethnic subcultures, 27-8, 202 anniversaries, birthday,
exchange: Bourdieu on, 20-2, 41, Christmas, Easter, farewell,
42, 57, 84; definition, 10, 192; Mother’s/Father’s Day, reunion,
strategies, 41; theory, 7, 52-3 sympathy, wedding; food,
extravagance, 12 money, presentation
graduation ceremonies, 2 3 ,116 ,14 8
family: basis for, 170; celebration, gratitude, 18, 184, 206
83; gifts, 24-5; life, 3-4, 5, 60,
71-7, 143-4; love, 61-2, 75, 84; Hotel Chateau Study, 53, 54,
preserving, 165, 169; rituals, 125-36, 138
77-80; theory, 65-8; ties, 64-5 Hutterite colonies, 10 - n , 12
farewell: gift expenditure, 82, 115 ,
118 -19 ; gift types, 95, 103-4; illness, 44, 149, 159, see also
ritual occasion, 96-7, 148, 159 sympathy
Father’s Day: gift expenditure, 82, incorporation, rites of, 91
115 , 118 ; gift types, 95, 103-4; indebtedness ideology, 198
ritual occasion, 9 7-8,147,149-50 individual, cult of, 143-8, 171
feminist standpoint, 8,64,67-8, 74 individualism, 83
fetishism, 9-10 interaction: analysis, 168;
Flin Flon, Manitoba, 175 instrumental/expressive, 102-4;
flowers, 92-7, 119 rituals, 167
food, 52, 58, 63, 81, 92-5, 104 interdependence, n
friendship: buying, 53, 69; drifting interpretation, 17
apart, 59-60; inspires giving, intimacy: cult o f individual, 153-4;
18; network o f love, 38; definition, 107-8; ritual
structures, 17 1; ties, 39 occasions, 117-20; structures of,
funerals, 23, 50 146, 162, 170, 171
gender, 29, 64, 175, 179, 182-3, see Japanese society, 198
also men, women Jehovah’s Witnesses, 154-5, I 57“ 9,
genealogical charts, 33, 36 165
generosity, 8, 85 justice, distributive, 56
gift: economy, 12, 19, 87, 105,
173; games, 12 1-3 ; redundancy, kinship: gift expenditure, 24-5;
137-4 1; rituals, 130 -1 networks, 16, 26, 33, 66, i n ;
gifts: combination, 114, 140; ties, 39, 60, 62; see also family
communal forms, 88; gender o f
givers, 179, see also gender, legal status o f gifts, 11
SUBJECT INDEX 227