Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429

www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Borderline personality traits correlate with death penalty

decisions
P.J. Watson*, David F. Ross, Ronald J. Morris
350 Holt Hall – 615 McCallie, Psychology Department, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga,
Chattanooga, TN 37403, USA

Received 7 January 2002; received in revised form 3 June 2002; accepted 28 June 2002

Abstract
This study tested the hypothesis that borderline personality characteristics, including the use of splitting
as a defense mechanism, would predict support for the death penalty. A sample of 262 undergraduates
responded to the Self-, Other- and Family-Splitting factors of the Splitting Index along with the Borderline
Syndrome Index (BSI), the Juror Bias Scale, and a number of instruments measuring support of capital
punishment. Instead of the hypothesized direct relationships, Family-Splitting and the BSI correlated
inversely with death penalty support. Males were slightly more likely than females to favor capital pun-
ishment, and only males displayed an inverse association of Other-Splitting with death penalty support.
These unexpected outcomes suggested that complexities in relationships and processes associated with
identity formation might require additional research attention as potentially important sources of bias in
capital jury trials.
# 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Death Penalty; Borderline personality traits; Splitting

Unbiased decision-making is the ideal in all legal deliberations, but potential deviations from
that ideal are especially troubling in death penalty cases. Luginbuhl and Burkhead (1994) state
the obvious concern, ‘‘Given that death is a possible punishment in a capital trial, one would
hope to see little arbitrariness or bias in the capital jury trial’’ (pp. 103–104). ‘‘Unfortunately,’’
as they also point out, ‘‘data gathered over the past several decades challenge this assumption’’
(p. 104).
Among those data are demonstrations that juror characteristics are a potential source of bias.
Males more than females favor capital punishment (Harvey, 1986; McKelvie & Daoussis, 1982;

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: paul-watson@utc.edu (P.J. Watson).

0191-8869/03/$ - see front matter # 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0191-8869(02)00204-0
422 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429

Moran & Comfort, 1986). Numerous individual differences also predict support for the death
penalty, including, for example, authoritarianism (Moran & Comfort, 1986), extraversion
(McKelvie, 1983; McKelvie & Daoussis, 1982), immature moral reasoning (De Vries & Walker,
1986), lower tolerance and greater dominance (Valliant & Oliver, 1997), attitudes that a person’s
life belongs to the individual or to the state rather than to God (Ross & Kaplan, 1993–1994), and
belief systems that are less open, more judgmental, and less cognitively complex (Harvey, 1986).
Interactions between gender and individual differences have been reported as well (McKelvie &
Daoussis, 1982; Valliant & Oliver, 1997).
The present study tested the hypothesis that borderline personality traits would be another
individual difference variable that predicts support for the death penalty. Masterson (1981)
argues that successful therapy with borderline personalities requires a ‘‘mastery of the talionic
impulse’’ (p. 182). Such personalities, in other words, display an extreme tendency to follow the
Law of Talon, ‘‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’’ In theory, early developmental
deprivations, usually at the hands of parents, produce a helpless and passive acceptance of suf-
fering by the future borderline personality. The result is ‘‘a resolve (a) never to permit this passive
acceptance of pain again and (b) to pay back the real and/or imagined perpetrators of this and
other pain’’ (Masterson, 1981, p. 182). Complexities appear in this resolve because the child also
identifies with parental aggressors. The desire for revenge, therefore, is directed both at the self
and at others with the result being a broadly punitive form of psychosocial functioning. Mas-
terson further claims that the borderline personality establishes a mature conscience only through
a triumph over the talionic impulse, ‘‘By overcoming and mastering his talionic urge for revenge,
he lays the groundwork for the beginning of an objective sense of morality’’ (Masterson, 1981, p.
188).
At no point does Masterson explicitly say that the talionic urge predisposes borderline person-
alities to favor capital punishment. Numerous research findings do suggest the possibility, how-
ever. Borderline individuals display higher levels of anger (Gardner, Leibenluft, O’Leary, &
Cowdry, 1991) and exhibit an ‘‘outwardly directed negativism’’ that may underlie their ‘‘paranoid
ideas, distrust of others, recurrent hostility and anger with seemingly little provocation’’ (Kurtz &
Morey, 1998, p. 360). Indeed, borderline personalities are more likely to represent others as being
‘‘hostile’’ (Benjamin & Wonderlich, 1994) and ‘‘malevolent’’ (Baker, Silk, Westen, Nigg, & Lohr,
1992; Nigg, Lohr, Westen, Gold, & Silk, 1992).
Reliance upon the defense mechanism of splitting also typifies the borderline personality (Berg,
1983; Kernberg, 1985). Splitting theoretically reflects an immature development of the ego in
which the self and others are cognitively represented with overly simplified schemas that fail to
include both ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ elements. As a consequence, self and others are perceived as ‘‘all
good’’ or ‘‘all bad’’ based upon the vicissitudes of circumstances rather than upon longer-term
experience. A chaotic instability in perceptions of self and others can be the result. As the ten-
dency to see self and others as ‘‘all good’’ or ‘‘all bad,’’ splitting perhaps suggests the more
judgmental and less cognitively complex psychological processes that have been associated with
support of the death penalty (Harvey, 1986).
In short, observations from both therapy and research suggested that borderline personality
traits might predict support for capital punishment. In testing this hypothesis, the assumption
was not that the relationship would appear only in those with a formal diagnosis of borderline
personality disorder. If true, such an outcome would have trivial implications with regard to
 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429 423

concerns about bias in capital jury trials. The assumption instead was that borderline character-
istics also exist as a continuous individual difference variable in the population as a whole. In
addition to hostility and splitting, borderline traits include fear of abandonment, volatile inter-
personal relationships, disturbances in identity, self-destructive impulsivity, suicidal tendencies,
persistent feelings of emptiness, and temporary stress-related symptoms of paranoia and dis-
sociation (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Scales for measuring splitting and borderline
traits have in fact been developed for general use and do indeed predict maladjustment in non-
clinical samples (e.g. Gould, Prentice, & Ainslie, 1996).

1. Method

1.1. Participants

Undergraduates enrolled in Introductory Psychology classes served as the research participants.

These 89 males and 173 females were 19.1 years old on average (S.D.=2.6). All received extra
course credit for their voluntary contributions to the project. The sample was 84.4% Caucasian,
11.8% African-American, 1.9% Asian, 1.1% Hispanic, and 0.8% ‘‘Other.’’

1.2. Measures

All measures were presented in a booklet that began with the Juror Bias Scale (JBS: Kassin &
Wrightsman, 1983). This 22-item instrument included five filler items plus 17 others that oper-
ationalized a bias in favor of the prosecution. Scale validity has been established in several pre-
vious studies (Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997; Kassin & Garfield, 1991). Subjects responded to each
statement along a ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (0) to ‘‘strongly agree’’ (4) Likert scale. The JBS first was
scored using the dimensions confirmed by Myers and Lecci (1998), but these factors along with
those of Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) proved to be internally unreliable (
s <0.48). The full
JBS, therefore, was re-examined. Five statements were dropped because of item-to-total corre-
lations of less than 0.15, leaving items 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21 (Myers & Lecci,
1998, p. 241). A coefficient alpha of 0.63 was obtained for this measure. An exploratory factor
analysis uncovered three components, but none of these offered any noteworthy contrasts with
data for the full scale, which was used instead for the sake of brevity. The average score on the
revised JBS was 23.8 (S.D.=5.1).
A Death Penalty Crimes Scale simply asked respondents to indicate which crimes deserved to
be punished with the death penalty. Twenty-eight crimes were listed, ranging from more minor
offences like arson, theft, burglary, mutilating a corpse, aircraft piracy, planting a bomb, and
carjacking at one extreme and to killing different types of people (e.g. a spouse, fellow inmate,
elected official, policeman) under various conditions (e.g. in self-defense, in defense of another,
during a domestic dispute) and being a hit man or mass murderer at the other extreme. For each
crime, the subject indicated with a ‘‘yes’’ (1) or ‘‘no’’ (0) whether the death penalty was appro-
priate. The average score on this internally reliable measure (
=0.92) was 14.2 (S.D.=6.1).
Ten statements were combined to create a Mitigating Circumstances Scale. Each statement
made reference to a circumstance that might argue against application of the death penalty in a
424 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429

particular case. Subjects were asked to ‘‘indicate how much importance you would place on each
factor when deciding to give the death penalty.’’ Among these factors were, for example, no prior
history of crime, the committing of a crime while under duress or under the domination of
someone else, and an inability to understand the crime because of mental retardation. Reaction to
each circumstance was made along a five-point scale ranging from ‘‘not at all important’’ (0) to
‘‘extremely important’’ (4). The coefficient alpha for this instrument was 0.86, and the average
was 19.8 (S.D.=7.8).
A Death Penalty as Communal Immorality Scale recorded reactions to three questions. These
questions were preceded by a brief statement which suggested that advocacy of the death penalty
reflects morality and that ‘‘the level of communal morality will continue to rise until the reasoned
moral response of the people . . . will be, if it is not already, that the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment.’’ Presentation of this view was followed by the three questions: ‘‘Do you
agree with this statement?’’ ‘‘In your opinion, is the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment
(regardless of the crime that was committed)?’’ ‘‘In your opinion, would you like to see the death
penalty abolished?’’ Answers to each question were made with a ‘‘yes’’ (1) or a ‘‘no’’(0). The three
responses were summed together. The average was 0.76 (S.D.=1.23), and the coefficient alpha
was 0.79.
Responses to two questions were added together to create a death penalty support measure.
One statement said, ‘‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statement, ‘A person convicted
of murder should be executed because that is what he deserves?’’’ Responses ranged from ‘‘I
strongly agree’’ (4) to ‘‘I strongly disagree’’ (0). A second question asked, ‘‘In general, do you
approve or disapprove of the death penalty?’’ At one extreme, the option was ‘‘I am definitely in
favor of the death penalty’’ (4). At the other, it was ‘‘I am definitely against the death penalty’’
(0). As scored, both statements expressed personal support for the death penalty, and the corre-
lation between these two items was 0.66 (P<0.001). The average score on this Death Penalty
Support Scale was 5.30 (S.D.=2.21).
The 24-item Splitting Index (Gould et al., 1996) was presented after the death penalty measures.
Reactions to all statements were made along a five-point ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (0) to ‘‘strongly
agree’’ (4) scale. Analysis focused on the Self-Splitting (
=0.88, M=13.19, S.D.=7.12), Other-
Splitting (
=0.86, M=9.12, S.D.=5.83), and Family-Splitting (
=0.84, M=5.52, S.D.=5.46)
factors. Each factor contained eight items. Illustrative of Self-Splitting was the self-report that
‘‘my feelings about myself are very powerful, but they can change from one moment to the next.’’
An example of Other-Splitting was the reverse-scored statement that ‘‘my feelings toward those
close to me remain constant.’’ Family-Splitting was obvious in such claims as ‘‘it is impossible to
love my parents all of the time.’’ Evidence confirming the validity of these factors has been
reported (Watson, Morris, & Miller, 2001), with direct relationships between splitting and mea-
sures of the borderline personality being most relevant to the present project (Gould et al., 1996).
Finally, the Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI: Conte, Plutchik, Karasu, & Jerrett, 1980) pre-
sented subjects with a list of 52 characteristics typical of borderline functioning (e.g. ‘‘I never feel
as if I belong’’ and ‘‘I feel empty inside’’). Respondents indicated with a ‘‘yes’’ (1) or ‘‘no’’ (0)
whether a characteristic applied to them. Conte et al. (1980) demonstrated that the percentage of
‘‘yes’’ responses for each item was highest for those diagnosed with borderline personality dis-
order in comparison to depressed, schizophrenic, and normal groups. The temporal consistency
of BSI has been documented (Fine & Sansone, 1990), and research has confirmed that the scale
 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429 425

records disturbed psychological functioning (e.g. Dolan, Evans, & Norton, 1992). With the pre-
sent sample, the BSI was highly reliable (
=0.94), and the mean was 7.55 (S.D.=9.15). These
BSI data exhibited an obvious positive skew with 58.8% of the sample displaying a score of 5 or
less. This was an unsurprising outcome given that the research participants were undergraduates.

1.3. Procedure

Questionnaires were administered to groups of varying size that ranged from 5 to approxi-
mately 100. Participants entered all responses on standardized answer sheets that subsequently
were read by optical scanning equipment into a computer data file. Data analysis occurred in two
phases. First, correlations among all measures were determined and then clarified with multiple
regression procedures. Second, possible ambiguities associated with the skewed BSI data were
addressed by creating High and Low Borderline Groups. The High Borderline Group (N=69)
included the participants in the top quartile of the BSI distribution (BSI scores 59). Those in the
Low Borderline Group (N=66) fell in the bottom quartile (BSI scores 41). Group differences in
all other variables then were examined along with gender and gender-by-group interactions.

2. Results

Significant correlations appeared between the BSI and Self- (0.54, P<0.001), Other- (0.39,
P<0.001), and Family-Splitting (0.42, P<0.001). Self-Splitting predicted higher levels of Other-
(0.44, P<0.001) and Family-Splitting (0.39, P< 0.001), and these latter two factors also displayed
a direct covariance (0.45, P<0.001). Table 1 presents the linkages among the death penalty
measures. No reliable associations were observed for the Mitigating Circumstances Scale, but
correlations confirmed the validity of all other death penalty variables. Specifically, Death Pen-
alty Support, Death Penalty Crimes, and the JBS correlated positively and were associated with
lower Communal Immorality scores.
Males scored slightly higher than females on Death Penalty Support ( 0.14, P<0.05) and
Death Penalty Crimes ( 0.15, P<0.05), but no gender differences appeared with any other vari-
able. Table 2 reviews the linkages of the BSI and splitting with the death penalty measures. No
significant relationships appeared for Self- or Other-Splitting; however, Family-Splitting and the
BSI displayed negative rather than the expected positive associations with death penalty support.

Table 1
Correlations among death penalty measures

Measures 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1. Death Penalty Support – 0.67*** 0.53*** 0.09 0.62***

2. Death Penalty Crimes – 0.44*** 0.05 0.51***
3. Juror Bias Scale – 0.11 0.34***
4. Mitigating Circumstances – 0.04
5. Communal Immorality –

***P< 0.001.
426 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429

Table 2
Correlations of borderline syndrome index and splitting with death penalty measures

Measures Borderline Syndrome Splitting factors

Self Other Family

Death Penalty Support 0.16* 0.05 0.01 0.17**

Death Penalty Crimes 0.16* 0.04 0.10 0.22***
Juror Bias Scale 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.15*
Mitigating Factors 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.07
Communal Immorality 0.34*** 0.07 0.07 0.28***

*P< 0.05. **P< 0.01. ***P< 0.001.

Multiple regressions were utilized to clarify these relationships. Gender, Family-Splitting, and
the BSI were entered on the first step of these analyses, followed by all two-way and then the
three-way interactions on the second and third steps, respectively. With the JBS, an outcome of
borderline significance appeared on the first step (Multiple r=0.16, P=0.078), with Family-
Splitting serving as the lone reliable predictor (= 0.16, P<0.05). Being female (= 0.18,
P<0.01) and Family-Splitting (= 0.21, P<0.05) predicted lower scores on the Death Penalty
Crimes Scale (Multiple r=0.29, P<0.001). The BSI (=0.27, P<0.001) and Family-Splitting
(=0.17, P<0.01) both exhibited positive linkages with Communal Immorality (Multiple
r=0.38, P<0.001). On Death Penalty Support (Multiple r=0.25, P<0.01), males scored higher
(= 0.16, P<0.05), and Family-Splitting once again emerged as an inverse predictor (= 0.14,
P<0.05). No other outcomes for these three variables proved to be reliable, nor were any of their
interactions significant.
Multiple regressions also examined the possibility that the two other Splitting factors might
interact with gender and/or the BSI. One significant outcome was observed with Other-Splitting
interacting with gender to predict Death Penalty Support (=0.45, P<0.01). This effect appeared
because Other-Splitting correlated negatively with Death Penalty Support ( 0.24, P<0.05) in
males, but a nonsignificant positive linkage was evident for females (0.11, P>0.15).
A 2  2 (Gender  Borderline Personality Group) MANOVA examined group differences in
the death penalty and splitting variables. Significant outcomes did not appear for gender or for
the gender-by-group interaction (Ps >0.50). However, the borderline groups did display highly
reliable contrasts [F (8, 126)=19.72, P<0.001]. The High Borderline Group scored higher on all
three measures of splitting and on the Communal Immorality Scale [Fs (1, 133) > 17.07,
Ps <0.001]. They also exhibited lower values on the Death Penalty Support and the Death Pen-
alty Crimes Scales [Fs (1, 133) > 5.03, Ps <0.05].

3. Discussion

This study tested the hypothesis that borderline personality traits and splitting would predict
support for the death penalty. Observations from therapy about the talionic impulse of border-
lines (Masterson, 1981) and research into their anger, negativism, malevolence, and splitting (e.g.
Gardner et al., 1991; Kurtz & Morey, 1998; Nigg et al., 1992) all suggested a punitive orientation
 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429 427

that might be expressed in support for capital punishment. Data from this study not only failed to
confirm the hypothesis. They revealed significant relationships in the opposite direction. The
observed associations were small, but the discovery of unexpected outcomes may point toward
important personality influences that deserve further research attention.
Of potential importance was the finding that Family-Splitting in particular predicted opposition
to the death penalty. Being committed to family members within the context of ambivalent or
‘‘split’’ feelings may promote a greater understanding or acceptance of people who are perceived
to be ‘‘difficult’’. This greater understanding then may generalize to other ‘‘difficult’’ people,
including defendants in capital trials. Even if true, this cannot be the whole story, however. A
multiple regression analysis demonstrated that both Family-Splitting and the BSI predicted
higher Communal Immorality scores. Borderline characteristics beyond Family-Splitting, there-
fore, seemed relevant and apparently require additional study.
Hypotheses of this project were based upon therapeutic and research observations of borderline
patients. The discovery of inverse rather than direct relationships with death penalty support
might be challenged on the grounds that expected outcomes would have been observed if a truly
clinical population had been sampled. The most obvious response to this claim is that it very well
may be true, but at least two additional points need to be made as well.
First, as noted previously, a relationship evident only in the borderline personality disorder
presumably would have few implications for understanding potential bias in capital jury trials.
The prevalence of the borderline personality disorder is only around 2% (Swartz, Blazer, George,
& Winfield, 1990). Millon (1999, p. 640), nevertheless, argues that borderline characteristics are
evident in a broad array of personality disorders. Even more importantly, the use of splitting and
other defense mechanisms certainly is not limited to psychologically disturbed individuals (e.g.
Cramer, 1998, p. 931). Again, the empirical concern was whether borderline traits within the
general, non-clinical population might have any noteworthy implications. As it turned out, they
did, but in a direction opposite from expectations.
Second, comparisons between the High and Low Borderline Personality Groups yielded no
evidence that the highest levels of borderline traits were associated with a reversal of observed
relationships. Across the entire range of observed values, borderline characteristics predicted
death penalty opposition in this sample. With regard to any possible concerns about how repre-
sentative these undergraduates might have been, it should be noted that their median and quartile
BSI scores essentially matched those of the normal sample examined by Conte et al. (1980), which
contained adults who had an average age of 33. At the same time, however, some interpretative
caution may still be required because the death penalty decisions of university students may not
fully generalize to the population as a whole.
As in previous investigations (e.g. Harvey, 1986; McKelvie & Daoussis, 1982; Moran & Com-
fort, 1986), males more than females supported the death penalty. This gender difference, never-
theless, was small. Gender has interacted with personality traits in predicting death penalty
support in some previous research (McKelvie & Daoussis, 1982; Valliant & Oliver, 1997), and an
inverse correlation in fact appeared between Other-Splitting and Death Penalty Support in males
but not females. The reason for this gender difference was unclear, but the Other-Splitting inter-
action once again may have revealed the central role of ‘‘difficult’’ relationships. The fact that
among the splitting factors only Self-Splitting failed to exhibit linkages with the death penalty
variables also may have documented the importance of relational issues.
428 P.J. Watson et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003) 421–429

Capital punishment is controversial and relevant to the deepest convictions of anyone con-
cerned about the issue. The present empirical findings presumably can be integrated within the
conceptual frameworks of those on both sides of the controversy. These data are perhaps more
easily assimilated into the pro capital punishment position. Schoenfeld (1983) defended the death
penalty by claiming that the Law of Talon is built into human nature. The legal system, therefore,
must respect this natural human desire by using capital punishment when appropriate. To do
otherwise would risk the collapse of social life into the chaos of vendetta and private wars of
vengeance. Schoenfeld also used psychoanalytic theory to claim that opponents of the death
penalty have failed to develop a normal identity. This deficit supposedly causes death penalty
opponents to identify unconsciously with the defendant rather than with the victim in a capital
trial, a fact that explains their opposition to the death penalty. Such an analysis obviously
receives some confirmation in observations that borderline personalities display an unstable
identity (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and that borderline traits correlated inversely
with death penalty support in the present project.
On the one hand, opponents of the death penalty might emphasize the small magnitude of the
observed relationships. Borderline traits and perhaps poor identity formation do not seem to
explain much variance in the opposition to capital punishment. On the other hand, an even more
radical reaction might accept the idea that these data do indeed reveal and may even under-
estimate an important linkage between normal identity formation and death penalty support.
Such a relationship would conform with theoretical speculations that humanity evolved an ability
to achieve social solidarity through the discharge of pent up communal violence against a scape-
goat victim (Girard, 1979, 1987). Seen in this light, state executions look a lot like primitive reli-
gious rituals that use human sacrifice to help consolidate the group identity (Bailie, 1995, pp. 79–
85). The irrationality of the process leaves it open to all kinds of abuse and serves as a critique of
at least this foundation of normal identity development.
In summary, the present study tested the hypothesis that borderline personality traits would
correlate directly with death penalty support, but inverse relationships appeared instead. The
magnitudes of the observed effects were small, but these unexpected findings may have uncovered
a previously unsuspected source of potential bias in capital jury trials that deserves further
research attention. Complexities in family and perhaps other relationships and also processes
associated with identity formation, in particular, may require a deeper empirical analysis.

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