Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on

Elections
*
G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN
AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT
FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION;
SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS
(OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
“Organizations/Coalitions” of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO;
PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY;
ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under
“Political Parties” of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
respondents.
*
G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE’s COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DE
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 6, 2001 699

Elections
MOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG

PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under

both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, a challenge on the
validity of a Comelec Resolution for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion may be brought before the Supreme Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.—At bottom, petitioners
attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed,
under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; No
motion for reconsideration of a Comelec en banc resolution, order or
decision is possible, the same being a prohibited pleading.—The
assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was
possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency.”—In any event, this case presents an exception to
the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency.” Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for
it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Educative Function of the Supreme Court.
—Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on
the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve,
consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.”
700
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Procedural requirements “may be glossed

over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent.”—
Procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social
justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.”
Same; Party-List System; Under the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) 7941, political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-
list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties.—We
now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of
Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set out in RA
7941 are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”—The
foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which
will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined
constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,”
“marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Proportional representation”
does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, but
rather to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of
the law—namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.”—“Proportional representation”
here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of
the
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 701
law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.”
Same; Same; The party-list organization or party must factually
and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5, and the persons nominated
by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties.”—It is not enough for the candidate to
claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist
organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lack of well-defined
constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral groups, like voters of a congressional district or territorial
unit of government.—“Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters
of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
“marginalized or underrepresented.”
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Noscitur A Sociis; It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed
in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related.—While the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle
of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are
associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may
be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
Same; Same; The party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens.—specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected
to the House of Representatives, and the assertion of the Office of
the Solicitor General that the party-list system is not exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepre
702
sented disregards the clear statutory policy.—The declared policy of

RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens—specifically those belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be
elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG
that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that
even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates
the spirit of the party-list system.
Same; Same; Allowing the non-matginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list
system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the
law to enhance it.—Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list
system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the
law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Verba
Legis; The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that
the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself.—The fundamental
principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in
which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only
when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation,
such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or
purpose of the provision being construed.
Same; Same; Same; The function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to
reinvent or second-guess it.—When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial
agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all
judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 703
Ang Bagong Bayqni-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,—

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the
Comelec fqr the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to
participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector,
organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Second,
while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
elected to the House of Representatives. Third, the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. Sixth,
the party must not only comply with t)ie requirements of the law. Its
nominees must likewise do so. Seventh, not only candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. So also must its nominees. Eighth, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Neither Article 6, Section 5(2)
of the Constitution, nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee
representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over
only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors.—It would seem
to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining
a “sectoral party,” the enumeration was intended to qualify only
“sectoral parties” and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political
parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6,
Section 5(2), nor R,A, 7941 intended to guarantee representation to
all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will
of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to
introduce the concept of party-list representation.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Political Party,” “Sectoral
Party,” “Sectoral Organization,” and “Coalition,” Defined; The party-
list system is limited to four groups—1) political parties, 2) sectoral
parties, 3) sectoral
704
organizations, and 4) coalitions.—The party-list system is limited to

four groups—1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral
organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of
citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated
in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and
women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A
sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or
similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
Same; Same; A feature of the party-list system is that political
parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and
aggrupation acquire the status of “candidates” and their nominees
relegated to mere agents.—A feature of the party-list system is that
political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and
aggrupation acquire the status of “candidates” and their nominees
relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies,
becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party
or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during
his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the
remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in
the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration.
Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person
changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election,
he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under
his new party or organization.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction;
Judicial Legislation; Courts are bound to suppose that any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions
according to their plain terms and import have been considered in
advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
compensated by countervailing advantages; The ponencia itself, in
ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial
review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and
more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.—The polestar in
the constructions of constitutions always remains—“effect
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 705
must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it.” The law, in its clear formulation cannot give
this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to
suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of
constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import
have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable
than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly,
be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous
waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional
amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is
understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when
better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Constitutional Law; Statutory
Construction; The most important single factor in determining the
intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is the
language in which it is expressed; Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) of the
Constitution provides no basis for petitioners’ contention that whether
it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to
provide exclusive representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which
term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.—“The most
important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is
expressed.” The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a
party-list system of “registered, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations,” not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and
only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art.
VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners’ contention that whether
it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to
provide exclusive representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which
term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that it assures parties
or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects
their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to obtain seats in the House of
Representatives.—Under the partylist system, a party or candidate
need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the
other hand, in the “winner-take-all” single
706
seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only
those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then
that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the
legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system
enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but
not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the
House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not
guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not
limited to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred
to by petitioners, but that it is a type of proportional representation
intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary
number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give
them a seat nationwide.—The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred to by
petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of
proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may
not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are
sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore,
misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that “Although
Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as
to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within
the framework that the party-list system is for the ‘marginalized’ as
termed by Comm. Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as termed by
Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are “always third
or fourth place in each of the districts.”
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot hold that the
partylist system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth without
changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it
provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject
to the provisions of this Article.”—A problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing “winner-take-all” one-
seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two
solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list
system or proportional representation. The Constitutional
Commission chose the party-list system, This Court cannot hold that
the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 707
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and

youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of
the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the Opposite of the
reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that “A free
and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for
the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Neri, Javier, Colmenares for petitioner Bayan Muna.
The Solicitor General for COMELEC.
Chan, Robles and Associates for Citizens Drug Watch
Foundation, Inc.
Cruz, Cruz & Navarro III for Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga.
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez
Law Offices for The True Marcos Loyalist Association of the
Philippines.
Fracis A, Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap, Crisanto, Salvador & Calderon and Fornier &
Fornier Law Office for Chamber of Real Estate Builders
Association.
McAskell, Equilla, & Associates for Ang Lakas ng
Overseas Contract Workers.
Juan Carlos T. Cuna and Antonio Dollete & Associates
for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buhag, Kapunan, Migallos & Perez for Aksyon
Demokratiko.
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Afundo Law
Office and Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani
Organization.
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Elections
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only

to give more law to the great masses of our people who have
less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to
make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State’s benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy.
Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those
which now dominate district elections, to have the same
opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the 1 Rales of

Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001.
This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the
party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received

several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
“[verifications were made as to the status and capacity of
these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled
day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number
of these petitions and the
_______________
1 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda

G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurrecion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 709

Elections
observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review

of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer
process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two
(2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These numerous
petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition [s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus
Resolutions of the 2Divisions which were promulgated only on
10 February 2001.”
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations
filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 151 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which we quote:
“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that

this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage
multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral
parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
“It will be noted that as defined, the ‘party-list system’ is a
‘mechanism of proportional representation’ in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.
“However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we
must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable
level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and
_______________
2 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
710

more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations

3 or evidence on
the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.”
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before
the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the ‘Certified List of
Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001
Elections’ and that said certified list be accordingly amended.”
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, 4 and that the
latter’s nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001,
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration
5 and Nomination against some of
herein respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents
in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three
days from
6 notice. It also set the date for hearing 7on April 26,
2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely 8
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec,
9 Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this
Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No.
147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution10 No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition 11 within a non-
extendible period of five days from notice.
_______________
3 Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
7 See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8 TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
10 Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
11 Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos
Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the
Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philip
711
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On April 17, 2001, Petitioner

12 Bayan Muna also filed before this
Court a Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
13 No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed
respondents named in the second Petition to file their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred
the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of
the Court. 14
Thereafter, Comments on the second Petition were

received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda 15 simultaneously within a non-extendible period of
five days.
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the
parties to address the following issues:
“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper

under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
_______________
pine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens Drug

Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and
Sports and Health Foundation.
12 Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13 Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14 These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, The
Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
15 Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga,
CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General,
and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by
Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
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“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the

partylist elections.
“3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
“4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion
16 in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.”
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be

remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as
specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners

under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, 17
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners
should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to
Sections
18 19, 20, 21 and 22 of
19 Comelec Resolution No. 3307-
A dated November 9, 2000.

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of
Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate
_______________
16 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization’s Memorandum, pp. 3-4;
Aksyon Demokratiko’s Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD’s Memorandum, pp.
3-6.
18 Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and
local elections.
19 OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
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in the party-list
20 elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no
motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited
pleading under
21 Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed
before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
22
and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The

Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought
succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner’s action; to this date, the Comelec has
not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution
may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy
_______________
20 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: “Judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
21 SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.—The following pleadings
are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx
22 Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the
Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2,
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp.
250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
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23
and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is

available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
“where the issue raised is one purely of law,24where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency.” Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of
20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and
controlling
25 constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules.”
Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be
set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely
urgent and26 certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.”
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends

that “the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is
27
the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.”

For its
_______________
23 Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222,

October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998;
GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v.
CA, GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 208; Sahali v. Comelec,
GR No. 134169, February 2, 2000, 324 SCRA 510.
24 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per
Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission
on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811; Central
Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per
Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997;
Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26 ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA
811, per Panganiban, J.
27 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No,
147589), p. 18.
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part, Petitioner Bayan 28Muna objects to the participation of

“major political parties.” On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits
that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-
list system is, in fact, open to all “registered
29 national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations.”
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that
members of the House of Representatives may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.
“Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or

coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.
“Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voter’s
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, 30they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.”
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,

Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants
in the party-list system may “be31 a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional
party in Min-
_______________
28 Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.

29 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30 Emphasis supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31 It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early
days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
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32
danao.” This was also clear from the following

33 exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
“MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay

pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party-list system
sa lahat ng mga partido.”
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the

party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give
a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth 34 in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. He
explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the
past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist
system.”
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x.” Section 3
expressly states that a “party” is “either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” More to the point, the
law defines “political party” as “an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to
the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below:
_______________
32 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 717

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“x x x x x x x x x
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
“x x x x x x x x x
Indubitably, therefore, political parties—even the major ones—

may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections

does not mean, however, that any political party—or any
organization or group for that matter—may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
“(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of

not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a

distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
give “genuine power
718

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to our people” in Congress. Hence, when the provision was

discussed, he exultantly announced: “On this first day of
August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to
our national history,
35 by giving genuine power to our people in
the legislature.”
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-
executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like “in
accordance with law” or “as may be provided by law”; it was
thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.”
The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting
proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
partylist system, which will “enable” the election to the House
of Representatives of Filipino citizens.
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented

sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
_______________
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 719

Elections
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment

of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,”

“marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-
defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The
party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and 36 underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituency]” refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the “marginalized or
underrepresented.”
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only
those Filipinos who are “marginalized and underrepresented”
become members of Congress under the party-list system,
Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the imple-
_______________
36 Infra.
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Elections
menting law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino

citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members
of the House of Representatives.” Where the language of the
law is37 clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register

as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented

sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the
law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection
with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified
38 or specialized by those in immediate
association.
_______________
37 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez

v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
38 82 C.J.S. Statutes §331.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 721

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The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office
of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 “does not
limit the participation in the party-list system to 39the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.” In
fact, it contends 40that any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmarinas 41 Village could participate in the party-list
elections.
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the
party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens—
specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be
elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the
OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law grafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence,
the OSG’s position to treat them similarly defies reason and
common sense. In contrast,
42 and with admirable candor, Atty.
Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could
not join the party-list
43 system as representatives of their
respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor un-
_______________
39 OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

40 Infra.
41 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
42 Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
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Elections
derrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic

clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not
necessarily emanate from the size of one’s constituency;
indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one’s bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-
list system was enacted—to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected
and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope
for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past—the farm hands, the fisher folk,
the urban poor, even those in the underground movement—to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out
and participated during the last elections. The State cannot
now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not
been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In
arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80
percent of the seats in the House could participate in the
party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and
the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between
the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose
44 of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in
the House of
_______________
44 Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: “A
free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 723

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45
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.

Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it—those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
“simplest scheme possible” to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been
within it—those privileged sectors that have long dominated
the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
“open house,” which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the
facilities. Obviously, the “open house” is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same
vein, the open party-list system is only for the “outsiders” who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is
not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already
fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented
to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention
of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given
the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to
be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate
every discussion of the qualification of political parties and
other organizations under the party-list system.
_______________
45 Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: “x x x. Towards this end,

the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.”
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Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions46are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed
light on and ascertain the 47 true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court 48 stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary that “the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution
x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are
of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.
We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face’ The
_______________
46 JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,

February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990
ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil.
259,264(1938).
47 See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
48 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, C.J.; quoting
Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl. 220.
725
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 725

Elections
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was

understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof.”
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore
look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction
be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious
and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to “enable underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole x x x.” The criteria for
participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for
recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers’
deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and
purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of
Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they
remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and
simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the

Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have
ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above.
The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any
group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could
field candidates in the party-list elections.
726

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When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the

Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down49 by this Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of
all judicial and quasijudicial instrumentalities is to 50apply the
law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately
pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties—Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP
—on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073,
they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-
Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the “advantage of
getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of
Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.” We note, however,
that this accreditation does not refer to the partylist election,
but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the
purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however,
is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and,
for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have
the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list
elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because “it
is a government entity using government resources 51 and
privileges.” This Court, however, is not a trier of facts, It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such
factual allegations.
_______________
49 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314
SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12,
1999.
50 Veterans Federation Party, et al v. Comelec, et al., GR No. 136781,
October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.
51 See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999;
Inciong, Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257
SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring,
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Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents

should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they
can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to
the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court
finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it
must show—through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record—that
it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen
or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives.” In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The
counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other simi-
_______________
Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sebreño v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco,
Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
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larly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral

Argument, as the following quote shows:
“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my

question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
52
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.”

53
Third, in view of the objections directed against the

registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system. The extent of the
constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
“MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with

nationwide and even international networks of members
and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition,
decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration
and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will
that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to
go around the prohibition, then54certainly the Comelec can
pierce through the legal fiction.”
The following discussion is also pertinent:
“MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed

“EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS,” he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected
by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their
group.
_______________
52 TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.

53 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 19.
54 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
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REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who

represents the Iglesia ni Kristo,
55 the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera.”
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that “religious 56
denominations and sects shall not be 57 registered.” The

prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: “[T]he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That
is not prohibited here;58 it is the registration of a religious sect
as a political party.”
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections
59 for the constituency in
which it has registered.”
_______________

56 §2 (5), Article IX (C).
57 Christian S. Monsod.
58 Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. I, p. 634.
59 See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
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Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a

party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election
laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA
7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to “enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to
become members of the House of Representatives.” A party
or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this
policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or
a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the
party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government. The participation of the government or its
officials
60 in the affairs, of a party-list candidate is not only
illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations
to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements
of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA
7941 reads as follows:
“SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.—No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age
of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.”
_______________
60 See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP
881.
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Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must

represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties.” Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor
or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is
to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee
proceedings that “the nominee of a party, national61or regional,
is not going to represent a particular district x x x.”
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the
law: “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.”
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental
social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the
great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power.
It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even
to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
_______________
61 The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of

Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
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Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of

the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list
system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position
does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It
would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling
the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate
their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-
list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble
intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention
of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec,
which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last partylist elections, the Comelec is directed
to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify
for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing
the Comelec “to refrain from proclaiming any winner” during
the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance
with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections’ receipt thereof. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-

Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Bellosillo, J., In the result.
Vitug, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
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Mendoza, J., See dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., Join the dissenting opinion of Justice V. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Abroad on Official Business.
SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION

VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of

the 1986 People Power had barely subsided, recognized the
vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform
and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in
daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-
unlikely perpetuation of a single party in power—a convenient
contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5,
subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter—
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE

TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY
LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE
SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE
FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION
FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER
SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE
RELIGIOUS SECTOR.—
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress,
then president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory
appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the
Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth
sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of
names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors
would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next
three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an
electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.
734

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Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing,

would wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law.
Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in
Article 6, Section 5(2).—First, the system should only apply to
the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of
Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory
proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow
participating parties and organizations to be represented in
voter’s registration boards, board of election inspectors,
parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as “An
Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor,” was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996,
prescribing the “Rules and Regulations Governing the
Elections of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-
List System.” In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the
sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political
mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups
and organizations under a party-list system. While the
elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of
public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent
2001 multiparty list elections, however, were different. This
time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied
for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation
from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups were established
political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO,
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S
COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA
PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major
parties on the ground that their participation does not level the
playing field for less known and less organized sectoral
groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery.
Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and
marginalized sectors, as well as other parties but only on the
condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves,
herein petitioner sought the disqualification of the large major
political parties and groups which do not represent any
“genuine” sectoral interest.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 735

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A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the

Constitution into the electoral system, would show the
pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications
of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list
system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory
enactment to provide for the system’s focal particulars, which
now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941
reads—
“The State shall promote proportional representation in the election

of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.”
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI,

Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off
from two staunch positions—the first headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum
of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal
was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be
represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing
babes in the lion’s den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A.
7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five
major political parties on the basis of party
736

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representation in the House of Representatives from

participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting
with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats
for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise—that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal
was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats
under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors
which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The
only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was
an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather
and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the
multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political
groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as
possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower
House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the
three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number 1 of
seats that may be gained by a party or organization. Votes
garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle
the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the
enabling law that disallows major political parties from
participating in the party-list system and, at the same time,
from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of
the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it
gives the impression of being a combination of proportional
representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral
representation. The first, proportional representation, on one
end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the
electoral process for broader participation and representation.
Sectoral representation on the other,
_______________
1 Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 737

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presupposes that every underrepresented sector be
represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based
representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section
5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating
specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list
system is open only to the underrepresented and
marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on
Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register

regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
“The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
“The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.”
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of

the statute, defining a “sectoral party,” the enumeration was
intended to qualify only “sectoral parties” and not the other
eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations
and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941
intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society
and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of
the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce
the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups—1) political
parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4)
coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of secur-
738

Elections
ing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of

its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A
sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6,
Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities
and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk,
elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens
who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an
aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system
is required to register with the COMELEC, together with a list
of its five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged
according to the group’s order of preference. In every election
for the House of Representatives, each voter casts two votes
—one for the district representative of his choice and another
for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for
the parties and organizations are totaled nationwide. In
contrast to the election of all other officials where the rule of
plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes
wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the party-list
system depends on the number of votes received in
proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On
the basis of the number of registered voters in the recent
elections, a group under the party-list system, should get
approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political
parties themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an
important feature in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that
control political power, parties add an important element of
stability to a political system and also help organize the
government and electorate by recruiting candidates,
conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and
generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation
and providing varying degrees of policy direction to
government. The idea could also be seen as a good training
and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates
commend the multi-party
739
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 739

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as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many

interests of a complex society, including a range of ideological
differences, conflicting political values and philosophies.
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit—“A free and
open party system shall be allowed
2 to evolve according to the
free choice of the people.” The multi-party system of
proportional representation broadens the composition of the
House of Representatives to accommodate sectors and
organizations that do not have well-defined political
constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small
parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same3
qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates,
with the exception of the additional requirement that he be
nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not
a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for4 an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. A
nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport5
to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation.
A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least
25 but not
6 more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his7
term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof.
Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same
term, rights and privileges as do district representatives,
except that
_______________
2 Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3 The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives
apply to party-list nominees—
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day
of the election, at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the elections.
4 Sections 8, R.A. 7941.

5 Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56 (1990).
6 Section 9, R.A. 7941.
7 Ibid.
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Elections
they are8 not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund

(CDF).
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties,
sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation
acquire the status of “candidates” and their nominees
relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative
dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office
by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is
disqualified during his term, his party can send another person
to take his place for the remaining period, provided the
replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees
submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a
party-list representative who9 switches party affiliations during
his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his
sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will
not be eligible for nomination 10in party-list representative under
his new party or organization.
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to
have been overlooked as they precisely were the same points
subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the
members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions
always remains—“effect must be given to the intent of 11 the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.” The
law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-
room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional
provisions according to their plain terms and import have been
considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than
those avoided, 12 or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and
_______________
8 See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
9 Section 15, R.A. 7941.
10 Ibid.
11 Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank, 176 US 559, 44 L. Ed. 587, 20 Set.
477.
12 People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289 St. 126, 110 NE
485.
741
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 741
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treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more

importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament
of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not
with this Court but with the people themselves through an
amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my
colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for
the dismissal of the petitions.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently

explain my vote, but before I do so it seems to me necessary
to state briefly the facts and the issues.
The Facts
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for
short) is the political agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers
Movement, a non-stock and non-profit organization. On the
other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party
representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other
marginalized sectors. Both were accredited by the
Commission on Elections in connection with the election for
party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits—in G.R. No. 147589, for
certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus—for the purpose of seeking the annulment of
the registration of the following parties classified as “political
parties” and “organizations/coalitions” by the Commission on
Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples’ Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-
LABAN),
742

Liberal Party (LP),

Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG

WATCH),
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO
PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment
and Peace
(JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association

(CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc.
(SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or

coalition desiring to participate in the party-list system must
apply to the COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days
before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law
requires that any party, organization, or coalition which is
already registered with the COMELEC should declare its
intention to participate in the party-list system 90 days before
the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the
COMELEC passed upon the applications for registration or
manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations,
and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of
parties, organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in
the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties,
organizations, and “coalitions were accredited, including
private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-
list system is exclusively for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors of the Philippine society and that
there is no way by which other sectors not so identified, much
less the major political parties, can participate in the party-list
elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to
the fact that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP,
Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and
LP) are actually the major po-
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 743

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litical parties in the country today as determined by the

COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001,
and charges that the rest of private respondents are “pseudo
party-list organizations” which are actually satellites of the
major political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to
address the problem of ineffective representation of
underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct people’s
action and participation in the decision-making process to
counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the
House of Representatives, and that to allow participation in
the party-list system of respondent political parties and
parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose because
these parties do not 1 represent “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. For this reason, Bayan Muna
prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the five major
political parties from participating in the party-list system only
in the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in
subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow,
and they do not prohibit, the participation of “registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” to participate in the
party-list system, whether or not said parties or organizations 2
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector,
as proof that ““marginalized” sectors are not entitled to

permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In any
event, it is contended
_______________
1 Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna, 17-18.

2 Memorandum for the COMELEC, 23-24.
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that petitioners’ recourse is not to this Court but to the

COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition
represents “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a
question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The
COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan
Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based on this
ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP,
LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
The Issues
The issues in these cases actually come down to the
following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be

dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors of
society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
Discussion
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions
for the disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when
the petitions in these cases were filed on April 16 and 17,
2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was
doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications
was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on
May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners,
therefore, had no other “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law” within the meaning of Rule 65,
§§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified in
resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners
to await formal resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC
had already indicated in press statements its stand that
parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not
representing “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors,
could participate in the elec-
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 745

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tion for the party-list system—a fact confirmed by it in its

comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no
basis for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted
administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the
statement of the second issue above plainly shows. It is only if
the question whether the party-list system is limited to,
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is answered in
the affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of
respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following
provision of the Constitution:
ART. VI, §5(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of

not more than two hundred fifty members, unless Otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress

enacted the Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the
pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party.—The State shall promote proportional

which will enable Filipinp citizens belonging to marginalized and
well-defined po-
746

litical constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, bsectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.—The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked

from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
The most important single factor in determining the intention

of the people from whom the Constitution
3 emanated is the
language in which it is expressed.” The text of Art. VI, §5(1)
(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
“registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,”
not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive
terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with
respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation.
Textually, Art. VI, §5(1X2) provides no basis for
_______________
3 Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration

Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
747
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 747

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petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral

representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide
exclusive representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which
term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical.
Party-list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot
win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections
a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a
nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
“marginalized and underrepresented.”) Under the party-list
system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in
proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the
“winner-take-all” single-seat district in which, even if a
candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate
need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature.
On the other hand, in the “winner-take-all” single-seat district,
the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then
that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in
the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list
system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors
(such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors)
to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise,
the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors
seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the
Constitution as answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the
“marginalized and underrepresented sectors,” petitioner
Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in adopting
the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.
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Elections
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated4

by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give Us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers’ understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P.

Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we
could discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in
the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not
say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or
beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else
they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory.
They may sit in at our5 councils. There is no reason why we should
eavesdrop on theirs.
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional

Commission speaks clearly against petitioners’ reading of Art.
VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional
Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to
proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the
Legislative Department read:
_______________
4 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111

Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 (1886).
5 LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
749
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 749

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SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected from the sectors and party list. The
sectoral or party list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty
percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that
each city with a population of more than two hundred thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional

representation in the House of Representatives were
submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department: one
for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner
Villacorta, and another one for party-list system, advocated by
Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the
proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the
members of the sectors. . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the
Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector
because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited
were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So
these are the nine sectors that were identified here as “sectoral
representatives” to be represented in this Commission. The problem
we had in
_______________
6 Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (emphasis added).
750

trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was

whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors . . . .
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. . . . A
doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is
up to the discretion of the person to say “I am a farmer” so he would
be included in that sector.
. . .Under the party-list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors . . . .This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need
not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers’ party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At
the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that
had been garnered by each party or each organization—one does
not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party—and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of
the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.
....
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those who
really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a
chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or
these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a
legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a
district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they
would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the

phrase “shall be elected from the sectors and party list” in §5
by replacing it with the following
_______________
7 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session

of Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (emphasis added).
751
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 751

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THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, 8
REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight
modification it later became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the

proposed amendment, the Committee would like to get
some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of “OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS,” is he referring to any sector which the law may
subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD: . . . The party list system that is being

advocated by this amendment is a system that opens up
the list to any regional, national or sectoral party. . . .
....
MS. AQUINO: The Committee would like to be clarified on
this. Do we understand the proponent correctly that this
party list system is not necessarily synonymous to sectoral
representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it
does include the right of sectoral parties or organizations to
register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties or
organizations.
MS. AQUINO: And that it does not likewise reserve any
institutional seat for any sector? In other words, it only
enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity
to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD:9 Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve
seat system.
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed

by Commissioner Villacorta, which included Commissioners
Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I

am objecting to this amendment because it is possible that
the la
_______________
8 Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

9 Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
752

Elections
bor sector will not be represented considering that those

who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other
words, the representative of labor will be chosen-by all the
electors of the Philippines, and that is not correct. My
contention is that the sectoral representative must be selected
by his own constituents,
10 and for that reason, I am objecting to
this amendment.
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if

allowed to participate in the party-list system, the major
political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO. . . . .Kapag inilagay natin ang party list,

papasukin ng political parties. Mangigibabaw
11 at kakainin
din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo
ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin
itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system

because it would not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-

government at the start of this century, our legislators were elected
based on their promise that they would represent the little people of
our land. With the exception of a few patriotic legislators, some of
whom are in our Commission today, members of the National
Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not
devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition
of our country’s poor and lower classes.
....
_______________
10 Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

11 Id. at 254.
12 Id. at 257.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 753

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These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and

legislators who can best represent the poor, the underprivileged,
13 the
marginalized than those coming from within their ranks.
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the

sectors would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED
NATIONAL, RE GIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to
this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that
the seats reserved for the party list representatives will be
14
reserved for the sectors.
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25,

1986, on §5 was suspended to allow the commissioners to
come to an agreement. After one week, a compromise formula
was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary
session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the
phrase “shall be elected from the sectors and the party list,” it
was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the Draft
Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,

REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS
PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED
THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE
FILLED BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW
FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH
SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been

reached, the advocates of sectoral representation were not
satisfied that it
_______________
13 Id. at 255.
14 Id. at 258.
754

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would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives.
Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following
amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED

NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW THE PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED
TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND YOUTH SECTORS
When put to vote, however, Aquino’s proposal was defeated

with-nineteen
15 (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting
against.
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment
of Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it
was approved 16 by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners
against none. As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR

ELECTION, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND
SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,
EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show

that the party-list system is not limited to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e.,
labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may not
have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are
sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It,
therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1) (2) to say
that “Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed
in their proposals as to the details of the
_______________
15 Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

16 Id. at 589.
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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 755

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party-list system, both proponents worked within the

framework that the party-list system is for the ‘marginalized’ as
termed by Comm. Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as
termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those 17which
are ‘always third or fourth place in each of the districts.’ ”
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically
different, and they do not have the same basis. What the
advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent
reserved seats for “marginalized sectors” by which they mean
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the
House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the
other hand, the “third or fourth place(rs)” in district elections,
for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those
who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be
sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the
House. They may include Villacorta’s “marginalized” or
“underprivileged” sectors, but they are not limited to them.
There would have been no need to give the “marginalized
sectors” one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private
respondents are the same ones raised by Commissioners
Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod
proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely,
that certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House
under the party-list system; that the big parties might gobble
up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve
the problem of ineffective representation of the
“underprivileged sectors.” These objections, however, did not
carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is
noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections
now would be to overrule the Constitutional Commission and
in effect amend the Constitution.
_______________
17 Memorandum for petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
756

Elections
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional

Commission that the existing “winner-take-all” one-seat district
system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented.
To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were
proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or
proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission
chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the
party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as
petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of
the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite
of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6
that “A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.”
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields
support for the view that the party-list system is designed
exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioners
Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties
and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we
have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they
should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations
so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed
through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of
the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido
ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they
will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition
parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact
mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of
such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment
will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations
and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them.
So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have
in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian
757
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 757

Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a

transforming
18 effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under

the party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioners’ allegations that certain parties or organizations,

such as private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, are disqualified under this provision are for the
COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They
are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
_______________
18 II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
758

Elections
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional

provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
....
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list
system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall
be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. . .
. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to “enable
the nation as a whole . . .”
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the

meaning of §2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party.—The State shall promote proportional

which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the

party-list system is to promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and, that to achieve this end, “a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives” shall be guar-
759
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 759

Elections
anteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say

that the party-list system is intended “to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation” to win
seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the
policy of the law is “to promote proportional representation
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation” to win seats in the House. For while the
representation of “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose.
As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is
to enable those who cannot win in the “winner-take-air district
elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor,
peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups
can possibly include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a “full, free and open party
system” if the election for the party list system is to be limited
to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e.,
labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all, what
is provided for is “a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” each of which
is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is
also clear from §5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register

regional or
760

sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or

organiza tions, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
youth, veterans, overseas work ers, and professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors

if the party-list system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these
cases should be dismissed.
Case remanded to COMELEC for further proceedings.
Notes.—Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and

academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
(Alunan III vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 [1997])
To have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system,
the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
(Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections, 342
SCRA 244 [2000])
——o0o——
761
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Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC

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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on

G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

VOL. 359, JUNE 6, 2001 699

MOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG

Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; Procedural requirements “may be glossed

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 701

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

sented disregards the clear statutory policy.—The declared policy of

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 703

Ang Bagong Bayqni-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,—

VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:

704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

organizations, and 4) coalitions.—The party-list system is limited to

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 705

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:

706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 707

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the 1 Rales of

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received

1 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 709

observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review

“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that

710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations

directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

3 Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 711

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner

Thereafter, Comments on the second Petition were

“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper

pine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens Drug

712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the

The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners

speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

A dated November 9, 2000.

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 713

and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The

20 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: “Judicial power

714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is