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Basic and Applied Social Psychology

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Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of

Empathy for Strangers
C. Daniel Batson , David A. Lishner , Jennifer Cook & Stacey Sawyer
Published online: 07 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: C. Daniel Batson , David A. Lishner , Jennifer Cook & Stacey Sawyer (2005) Similarity and Nurturance:
Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27:1, 15-25, DOI: 10.1207/
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 BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 27(1), 15–25
Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources

SIMILARITY
BATSON ET AL.
AND NURTURANCE of Empathy for Strangers
C. Daniel Batson, David A. Lishner, Jennifer Cook, and Stacey Sawyer
University of Kansas

What accounts for variation in empathy felt for strangers in need? Currently, one of the most pop-
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ular explanations among personality and social psychologists is perceived similarity: We feel
sympathy and compassion for others to the degree that we perceive them to be like us. Two experi-
ments designed to test the perceived similarity explanation more directly than previous research
failed to find support. Results of the second experiment instead supported a classical, but cur-
rently less popular, explanation of empathy felt for strangers: nurturant tendencies based on the
impulse to care for and protect offspring. We noted distinct theoretical and practical implications
of the similarity and nurturance explanations. In addition, we encourage increased attention to
nurturance as a possible source of empathy.

A remarkable feature of the human condition is our capacity
to feel empathy for strangers in need. Empathy in this state-
ment refers to an other-oriented emotional response congru-
ent with the perceived welfare of another (see Batson, 1991).
Empathic feelings for someone in need include sympathy,
compassion, tenderness, and the like. These feelings have
been found to be a potent source of motivation to help relieve
the empathy-inducing need (see Batson, 1991, and Eisenberg
& Miller, 1987, for reviews).
Empathy felt for someone with whom we have an ongoing
relationship—a friend, coworker, lover, or family member—
is amenable to explanation in terms of reinforcement, norma-
tive standards, and interdependence processes (Berkowitz,
1972; Berscheid, 1983; Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick,
1981; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). After all, the welfare of these
others affects our own welfare. But why should we feel for
people we have never met, will not meet, and about whom we
are likely to hear nothing more in the future? Their welfare
has no direct bearing on ours, yet it is clear that we can feel
empathy for such people.
A POPULAR EXPLANATION FOR EMPATHY
FELT FOR STRANGERS: PERCEIVED
SIMILARITY
One of the explanations most frequently offered by personal-
ity and social psychologists for why we feel empathy for
Correspondence concerning the manuscript should be addressed to C.
Daniel Batson, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence,
Kansas 66045. E-mail: dbatson@ku.edu
strangers is perceived similarity (e.g., see Davis, 1994). This
explanation claims that people feel for a stranger in need to
the degree that they perceive the stranger to be similar to
themselves. The suggestion is not simply that people are
more likely to feel empathy when they either have experi-
enced or are experiencing a similar need (Batson et al., 1996;
Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; Houston, 1990). The sugges-
tion is that perceived similarity on attributes unrelated to the
need leads to increased empathy.
An experiment reported by Krebs (1975) provided appar-
ent support for the perceived similarity explanation. Krebs
manipulated similarity between male undergraduate research
participants and a stranger (a confederate) whom they ob-
served performing a task. Reactions to observing differed for
those in the similar and dissimilar conditions. When the
stranger was ostensibly about to receive negative reinforce-
ment (electric shock), those led to believe that he was similar
to them in values and traits showed greater physiological re-
sponse (skin conductance, vasoconstriction) and reported
feeling worse than did those led to believe that he was dissim-
ilar. Those led to believe he was similar also reported identi-
fying with the stranger more, and subsequently, they were
willing to give up more money to reduce the number of
shocks that he received.
At a theoretical level, some evolutionary accounts of al-
truism also have been taken as support for the perceived simi-
larity explanation. If those with whom we share more genes
are more similar to us in appearance and attributes, then it is
not necessary to have a highly sensitive detector of degree of
genetic relatedness for kin selection to operate (Hamilton,
1964). Providing self-sacrificial care in proportion to per-
ceived similarity will suffice, as has been suggested by
 16 BATSON ET AL.

Dawkins (1976) and by Rushton, Russell, and Wells (1984).
A genetic predisposition to feel empathy for—and as a result
to be motivated to help—those who are similar would pro-
duce this effect.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PERCEIVED
SIMILARITY EXPLANATION IS LIMITED
In spite of the popularity of the perceived similarity explana-
tion, empirical evidence for it is limited. First, although re-
search by Stotland (1969), Krebs (1975), and Batson, Turk,
and colleagues (1995) indicates that experimental manipula-
tion of similarity can produce differences in empathy, it re-
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There are also several reasons to doubt that perceived simi-
larity is necessary to feel empathy for strangers. First, in
research in which a similarity manipulation has been suc-
cessfully used to induce empathy (e.g., Batson, Turk, et al.,
1995, Experiments 1 & 2; Krebs, 1975), the dissimilarity in
the dissimilar condition tended to involve strong differences
in values and tastes (e.g., the research participant’s favorite
magazine was Newsweek, whereas the target’s favorite maga-
zine was Seventeen). In addition to producing perceived dis-
similarity, such differences also may produce dislike or an-
tipathy, which may inhibit empathy. Rather than these studies
providing evidence that perceived similarity produces empa-
thy, they may provide evidence that antipathy inhibits it.
Second, it appears possible to induce empathy by perspec-

mains unclear whether similarity per se or some concomitant

tive-taking instructions (i.e., by asking research participants
of similarity, such as liking, accounts for this effect. It also re-
to imagine how the person in need feels about his or her situa-
mains unclear whether similarity is a necessary condition for
tion) without a concurrent increase in perceived similarity
empathy, as those advocating the perceived similarity expla-
(Batson, Sager, et al. 1997). Further, path analyses indicate
nation often imply.
that the effect of perspective-taking instructions on helping is
Second, Hornstein and his colleagues (e.g., Sole, Marton,
mediated by self-reported empathy, not by perceived similar-
& Hornstein, 1975) provided evidence that people are more
ity (Batson, Sager, et al., 1997). There is also evidence that
likely to help a stranger when doing so promotes their own
the effects of perspective taking on allocations to an un-
values or when the stranger is a member of their ingroup
known stranger in a social dilemma are a function of
rather than of an outgroup (see Hornstein, 1978, for a re-
self-reported empathy for the stranger, not of perceived
view). However, the studies demonstrating this relationship
shared group membership (Batson, Batson, et al. 1995).
included no measures of empathy; therefore, the mediating
Third, empathy appears to be induced successfully for a
role of empathy is not clear. Hornstein (1978) himself pre-
wide range of strangers. The list of targets for whom under-
ferred an explanation in terms of cognitive unit formation
graduates have been led to feel empathy includes a young
(social categorization or “we-ness”) rather than emotional
woman with AIDS, a homeless man, a convicted murderer, a
empathy.
heroin addict, and even whales (Batson, Chang, et al., 2002;
Third, Cialdini and his colleagues provided evidence that
Batson, Polycarpou, et al, 1997; Shelton & Rogers, 1981). It
people report a greater willingness to feel empathy for—and to
appears unlikely that undergraduates perceive high levels of
help—family and friends rather than strangers (Cialdini,
similarity with these targets. Although these results do not
Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). Their research partic-
suggest that similarity cannot affect empathy, they do suggest
ipants also reported more self–other overlap with family and
that similarity is not necessary for people to experience em-
friends than with strangers, and this overlap, rather than re-
pathy for strangers. At a minimum, the similarity explanation
ported feelings of empathy, appeared to mediate observed dif-
appears insufficient.
ference in willingness to help. However, this research relied on
In summary, perceived similarity is a popular explanation
self-reports of anticipated response to hypothetical need situa-
of variation in empathy felt for strangers. Yet the empirical
tions, which may not have evoked much real empathy or accu-
support for this explanation is limited. A more direct test is
rate judgments of willingness to help. In addition, responses to
needed, one in which (a) all research participants are pre-
a stranger in need were compared with responses to known
sented with a stranger in need, (b) similarity of this stranger
others, a comparison that would appear to introduce reinforce-
to participants is varied in a way that does not create a form of
ment, normative, and interdependence confounds. Degree of
dissimilarity that might arouse antipathy, and (c) empathy is
similarity or merging was not varied within the stranger cate-
measured as the dependent variable. We sought to provide
gory itself. In a less-confounded design, Maner, Luce,
such a test in Experiment 1.
Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, and Sagarin (2002) found that a
similarity manipulation affected perceived oneness with a
stranger in need independent of empathy.
EXPERIMENT 1

SOME REASONS TO DOUBT THE
PERCEIVED SIMILARITY EXPLANATION
The evidence typically cited as supporting the perceived sim-
ilarity explanation is, then, not as clear as one might expect.
Experiment 1 included three experimental conditions that var-
ied the similarity to participants of a stranger in need. Ostensi-
bly as part of a pilot test of a new feature on volunteer experi-
ences being considered for inclusion in a student-run
university newspaper, female introductory psychology stu-

dents (virtually all 18–20 years old) read a brief article describ-
ing the plight of “Kathy.” Kathy was being helped with rehabil-
itative exercises after a severely broken leg. In the similar
condition, Kathy was described as a 20-year-old student at the
university; in the dissimilar condition, she was described as a
40-year-old clothing store clerk from a small town in the area.
Because the dissimilar target differed from the similar target
on two dimensions—age and occupation—we also included a
moderately similar condition. In this condition, Kathy was de-
scribed as a 20-year-old clothing store clerk from the small
town. Questionnaires assessing participants’ reactions to the
pilot article contained (a) measures of empathy felt for Kathy
and (b) measures of perceived similarity to her.
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Predictions
Predictions from the perceived similarity explanation were as
follows. Assuming the age and occupation information led to
differences in perceived similarity, reported empathy for
Kathy should be higher in the similar condition than in the
dissimilar condition. Predictions for the moderately similar
condition depended on the level of perceived similarity in
that condition. If participants focused primarily on Kathy’s
age, they should perceive her to be similar to themselves in
the moderately similar condition, much as in the similar con-
dition. As a result, they should report feeling relatively high
empathy for her. If participants focused primarily on Kathy’s
occupation, they should perceive her to be dissimilar to them-
selves in the moderately similar condition, much as in the
dissimilar condition. As a result, they should report feeling
relatively low empathy for her. Attention to both age and oc-
cupation should produce intermediate perceptions of similar-
ity and an intermediate level of empathy.
Method
Participants. Participants for Experiment 1 were 45 fe-
male introductory psychology students at the University of
Kansas (KU); these participants received credit toward a
course requirement. Using a randomized block procedure,
we assigned 15 participants to each experimental condition:
similar, moderately similar, and dissimilar. Based on both in-
direct and direct probes during debriefing, we excluded and
replaced 1 additional student because she expressed suspi-
cion about the true purpose of the research. We also excluded
and replaced 8 other students because they reported in de-
briefing that they had experienced an injury and rehabilita-
tion similar to Kathy’s (3 reported having had a broken leg, 1
a broken ankle, 2 a broken foot, 1 a broken toe, and 1 rehabili-
tation after an automobile accident). We excluded these stu-
dents because we were concerned that their similar experi-
ence might introduce a source of empathy other than our
experimental manipulation of attribute similarity and could
obscure the effects of the manipulation.
SIMILARITY AND NURTURANCE 17
Only women were included in the sample because both
the target, Kathy, and the experimenter were women. We
wished to keep the gender of the participant and target the
same to avoid a confound with our similarity manipulation.
We wished to keep the gender of the participants and experi-
menter the same to minimize cross-gender self-presentation
concerns (Jones & Pittman, 1982).
Procedure. Each participant was scheduled for an indi-
vidual experimental session. On arrival, she was greeted by
the experimenter, escorted into a research cubicle, and left
alone to read a written introduction. The introduction pre-
sented the study as a pilot test being conducted as a service
for the University Daily Kansan (UDK), the student-run uni-
versity newspaper.
The UDK is considering introducing a new feature article,
“Helping Hands.” Helping Hands will be a column in which
KU students report their experiences serving as volunteers in
the local community. The goal is to provide other students
with a window on the range of needs in the Lawrence area,
and on the volunteer opportunities that exist to respond to
these needs.
The introduction went on to explain that participants in the
study would read and react to two randomly selected pilot ar-
ticles (of eight possible) of the sort that might appear in
Helping Hands. Ostensibly, each article had been written by
a student who recently served as a volunteer in the Lawrence
area. The article recounted the student’s first day as a volun-
teer. Participants were assured that the articles described real
events, but were prepared only as pilots for use in the study.
All participants read the same two articles. The first de-
scribed a student’s experience volunteering for Habitat for Hu-
manity. It was used to familiarize participants with the proce-
dure and to mask our special interest in responses to the second
article. We did not analyze responses to the first article.
Similarity manipulation. The second article described
a female student’s experience serving as a volunteer at Law-
rence Memorial Hospital. The student had been assigned to as-
sist Kathy, a postsurgery patient, with her rehabilitation exer-
cises. In the similar condition, the description read as follows:
I was a bit nervous, not knowing what might lie ahead. As it
turned out, what I encountered that first day was a badly hurt
and struggling 20-year-old junior at KU, Kathy. Kathy was
recovering from a severely broken leg. The leg had been
splintered in one place and broken in two others.
Kathy had had reconstructive surgery on the leg 2 days
before. The surgeon put in four pins to secure the bone, and
then the leg was put in a plaster cast from the hip down.
Kathy could not move without experiencing considerable
discomfort, and often, sharp pain. Still, it was important that
she try to walk with the cast to get used to it and to build up
strength in her muscles.
 18 BATSON ET AL.
Kathy’s rehabilitation exercises sounded like a real ordeal,
but when I went to get her she was more than ready. Soon she
was hobbling around the therapy room as best she could with
that bulky cast. She would try to walk without assistance, but
the pain was so great that she could only take 3 or 4 steps. Yet
she kept trying. Once she slipped and fell, and let out a cry of
pain. Still, she got up and tried again. Kathy just wouldn’t quit.
The article was identical in the other two experimental condi-
tions, except for information about Kathy’s age and occupa-
tion. In the dissimilar condition, Kathy was described as “ …
a badly hurt and struggling 40-year-old clothing-store clerk
from Eudora” (a small town approximately 10 mi from Law-
rence, the city in which KU is located); in the moderately
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similar condition, Kathy was described as “ … a badly hurt
and struggling 20-year-old clothing-store clerk from
Eudora.” The experimenter was unaware which version of
the article each participant read.
Empathic response to Kathy’s plight. After reading
each article, participants completed several questionnaires.
First, on an emotional response questionnaire, participants
were asked to indicate how much they experienced each of a
number of emotions while reading about the need of the per-
son(s) whom the volunteer helped (1 = not at all, 7 = ex-
tremely). Included among these adjectives were six used in
previous research to measure empathic emotional response:
sympathetic, compassionate, softhearted, tender, warm, and
moved (see Batson, 1991; Batson, Sager, et al., 1997). Re-
sponses to these adjectives provided an index of empathy felt
for Kathy.
Perception of similarity to Kathy. Second, on a per-
ception questionnaire, participants were asked a number of
questions about their perception of the person(s) whom the
volunteer was helping. Among these were four items de-
signed to assess perceived similarity to Kathy. The first three
of these items were as follows:
1. How similar to you did you perceive the person(s)
whom the volunteer was helping to be? (1 = not at all
similar, 9 = very similar)
2. To what extent did you perceive yourself and the per-
son(s) whom the volunteer was helping to be part of
the same group? (1 = not at all, 9 = very much)
3. To what extent would you use the term “we” to de-
scribe yourself and the person(s) whom the volunteer
was helping? (1 = not at all, 9 = very much)
The fourth item was a modified version of the Inclusion of
Other in Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Instruc-
tions read as follows:
4. Below are seven pictures that depict possible ways of
viewing the relationship between two people. Please
circle the one of these seven pictures that best indi-
cates the extent to which you feel that you and the
person(s) whom the volunteer was helping are con-
nected.
These instructions were followed by seven pictures in which
two circles, one representing Self and one representing
Other, were in different degrees of overlap. The pictures,
photocopied from Aron et al. (1992), ranged from circles
touching but not overlapping at all to circles almost com-
pletely overlapping. Cialdini et al. (1997) and Maner et al.
(2002) had used Items 3 and 4 (worded to fit their research
context) to assess perceived “oneness” of self and another
person.
Perception of need. Also included on the perception
questionnaire was an item to assess perceptions of the magni-
tude of Kathy’s need: “How great was the need of the per-
son(s) whom the volunteer was helping?” (1 = not at all
great, 9 = very great). We assumed that Kathy’s need would
be perceived to be moderately high and would not differ reli-
ably across the three experimental conditions. We thought it
wise, however, to check this assumption. Differences in per-
ceived need across conditions would introduce a confound,
one that could easily affect empathy felt for Kathy.
Debriefing. After participants read and responded to
the second article, the experimenter interviewed them about
their reactions to the Helping Hands feature. This interview
led to a full debriefing in which the true purpose of the re-
search was revealed. Once debriefed, participants were
thanked and excused.
Results and Discussion
Perception of need. As expected, participants in all
three conditions perceived Kathy’s need to be moderately
high (cell means ranged from 6.33 to 7.07, overall M = 6.60
on the 1–9 scale), and there were no reliable differences
among the cells, F(2, 42) = 0.89, p > .40. It appeared unlikely,
then, that any differences in reported empathy across condi-
tions could be attributed to differences in perceived need.
However, to be sure, we repeated all analyses reported, in-
cluding need as a covariate. The pattern of significant effects
was always exactly the same as in analyses not including
need as a covariate. For simplicity, we have only reported
analyses without the covariate.
Effect of the similarity manipulation on perceived
similarity. Given that responses to the four items designed
to measure similarity were highly correlated (all r > .70), we
created a similarity index (Cronbach’s α= .93) by averaging
responses to all four (after standardizing each). The mean on
this similarity index in each experimental condition is re-
ported in the first row of Table 1. An analysis of variance

TABLE 1
Perceived Similarity and Empathy in Each
Condition of Experiment 1
Experimental Condition
Moderately
Measures Similar Similar Dissimilar
Similarity index 0.34 0.19 –0.54
Individual similarity items
Similarity to you 5.47 5.47 3.33
Same group 5.93 5.33 3.60
Describe as “we” 4.53 4.27 2.93
IOS 4.13 3.73 2.60
Empathy 4.02 3.70 4.08
Note. N = 15 women in each experimental condition. The similarity in-
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dex is a standardized average of the four individual similarity items. The sim-
ilarity to you, same group, and describe as “we” items were all measured on
1–9 scales (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). The response scale for the Inclu-
sion of Other in the Self (IOS) item ranged from 1 (no overlap) to 7 (consid-
erable overlap) (Aron et al. 1992). Empathy was measured on a 1–7 scale (1
= not at all, 7 = extremely).
(ANOVA) revealed that these means differed significantly,
F(2, 42) = 4.54, p < .02 (as did the means for each individual
similarity item—all ps< .03). Between-cell comparisons re-
vealed, as expected, that the mean on the similarity index was
significantly higher in the similar condition (M = 0.34) than
in the dissimilar condition (M = –0.54), t(42) = 2.86, p < .01.
(For convenience, all statistical tests are reported two-tailed,
even for directional predictions; all between-cell compari-
sons use a pooled error term.) The mean in the moderately
similar condition (M = 0.19) differed significantly from the
mean in the dissimilar condition, t(42) = 2.38, p < .03, but not
from the mean in the similar condition, p > .50.
As intended then, participants perceived Kathy to be
more similar to themselves when she was a 20-year-old KU
student than when she was a 40-year-old clothing store
clerk. Further, given that the description of Kathy in the
moderately similar condition differed from the similar con-
dition in occupation but not age and differed from the dis-
similar condition in age but not occupation, it appeared that
participants weighted age more heavily than occupation in
their judgments of similarity.
Effect of the similarity manipulation on empathy. Em-
pathy felt for Kathy was assessed by participants’ responses
to the six empathy adjectives (sympathetic, compassionate,
softhearted, warm, tender, and moved) on the emotional re-
sponse questionnaire. Paralleling much past research (see
Batson, 1991, for a review), we averaged responses to the six
adjectives to create an empathy index (Cronbach’s α = .85).
(No attempt was made to measure vicarious personal distress
because past research had indicated that reports of distress in
response to nonimmediate, chronic need situations—like the
one used here—reflect empathic distress for the person in
SIMILARITY AND NURTURANCE 19
need, not vicarious personal distress; see Batson et al., 1991,
and Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997.)
As can be seen in the last row of Table 1, scores on this
7-point empathy index (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) were
somewhat lower in the moderately similar condition (M =
3.70) than in the similar condition (M = 4.02) but were actu-
ally somewhat higher in the dissimilar condition (M = 4.08)
than in the similar condition. An ANOVA revealed no reli-
able difference across conditions, F(2, 42) = 0.44, p > .60,
and none of the between-cell comparisons approach statisti-
cal reliability, all ps > .35. Thus, we found no support for the
predictions of the perceived similarity explanation. Partici-
pants in the similar condition perceived Kathy to be more
similar to themselves than did participants in the dissimilar
condition, but they did not report more empathy for her. Par-
ticipants in the moderately similar condition also perceived
Kathy to be more similar to themselves than did participant
in the dissimilar condition; they too did not report more em-
pathy for her.
The risks of overinterpreting null results are well known
(but see Greenwald, 1975, for a more balanced view). Lack
of a significant difference across experimental conditions can
occur for several reasons. It can occur because the independ-
ent variable does not have the predicted effect on the depend-
ent variable (i.e., the hypothesis is wrong). It can occur be-
cause measurement of the dependent variable is insensitive.
It can occur because of low statistical power. It can occur be-
cause manipulation of the independent variable is ineffective.
Insensitivity of our measure of empathy appeared un-
likely. The mean in each condition was close to the midpoint
of the response scale (4), providing no indication of a floor or
ceiling effect. Moreover, the six-item index we used proved
sensitive (and reliable and valid) in several dozen previous
experiments (see Batson, 1991, for a partial review). The fail-
ure to find a significant mean difference on this measure can-
not be attributed to low statistical power. The mean on the
empathy index was higher in the dissimilar condition than in
the similar condition, so there was not even a trend in the pre-
dicted direction that might become significant were the sam-
ple size increased. Finally, failure can not be attributed to an
ineffective similarity manipulation. Responses to the four
items designed to measure perceived similarity appeared to
rule out this possibility. With these three possibilities ruled
out, our results cast further doubt on the role of perceived
similarity in accounting for empathy felt for strangers.
Correlations of measures of perceived similarity with
empathy felt for Kathy. An internal analysis provided an-
other opportunity to test the perceived similarity explanation.
If this explanation is valid, then collapsing across experimen-
tal conditions, the amount of empathy reported for Kathy
should be positively correlated with the level of perceived
similarity to her. Once again, there was no clear support for
this prediction. Scores on the similarity index were not sig-
nificantly correlated with scores on the empathy index, r(43)
 20 BATSON ET AL.
= .19, p > .20. Squaring this correlation coefficient indicated
that scores on the similarity index accounted for less than 5%
of the variance in reported empathy. More than 95% of the
variance was caused by other factors. A higher correlation
would be expected if differences in perceived similarity were
an important source of differences in empathy felt for a
stranger in need.
Based on the results of Experiment 1, should we conclude
that the perceived similarity explanation is wrong? Such a
conclusion would be premature. One failure to find a pre-
dicted effect should not be the basis for rejecting a widely ac-
cepted explanation. The results of Experiment 1 did, how-
ever, cause us to have increased doubts about the importance
of similarity in producing empathy felt for strangers. They
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also encouraged us to consider whether there might be some
other explanation for this empathy.
A LESS POPULAR EXPLANATION:
NURTURANT TENDENCIES
Nurturant tendencies have been mentioned only rarely as a
possible source of empathy in recent psychological discus-
sions, but they were frequently mentioned a century ago. At
that time, psychologists were strongly influenced by Darwin
(1871), who spoke of instinctive love based on parental and
filial affections and “the all important emotion of sympathy”
(p. 308). The suggestion that nurturant tendencies may be a
source of empathic feelings has recently resurfaced outside
psychology in the writings of primatologist Frans de Waal
(1996) and philosopher Elliott Sober and biologist D. S. Wil-
son (Sober & Wilson 1998).
These scholars suggest that feelings of tenderness and
compassion may be grounded in the strong impulse for mam-
malian parents to provide care for their vulnerable and de-
pendent offspring. If mammalian parents were not intensely
interested in the welfare of their young—so interested as to
put up with endless hassles, exhaustion, and even risks to
their personal safety—these species would quickly die out
(also see Bell, 2001; MacLean, 1990; Zahn-Waxler &
Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Sometimes, these nurturant tenden-
cies have been referred to as “caregiving” or “the caregiving
system,” especially within the context of attachment theory
(e.g., Bell, 2001). We have used the terms nurturance and
nurturant tendencies, borrowed from de Waal (1996), to
avoid the rather specific attachment theory connotations of
caregiving.
Long ago, William McDougall (1908) provided what is
perhaps the most systematic argument for nurturance as a basis
for empathic feelings. He described the “parental instinct,”
which he considered to be the most powerful of all instincts,
and associated “tender emotion.” McDougall did not think of
instincts as automatic, reflexive responses. He believed that all
instincts include a cognitive, an affective, and a motivational
component. The cognitive and motivational components were
modifiable by experience and learning, but the affective com-
ponent was not; it defined the character of the instinct. Thus,
the tender emotion defined the character of the parental in-
stinct. According to McDougall (1908), this instinct
… is primarily to afford physical protection to the child, es-
pecially by throwing the arms about it; and that fundamental
impulse persists in spite of the immense extension of the
range of application of the impulse …. Tender emotion and
the protective impulse are, no doubt, evoked more readily
and intensely by one’s own offspring, because about them a
strongly organized and complex sentiment grows up. But the
distress of any child will evoke this response in a very intense
degree in those in whom the instinct is strong …. By a further
extension of the same kind the emotion may be evoked by the
sight of any very young animal, especially if in distress …. In
a similar direct fashion the distress of any adult (toward
whom we harbor no hostile sentiment) evokes the emotion.
(pp. 61, 63)
In contrast to exponents of the perceived similarity ac-
count of empathy, who typically assume that the motivation
evoked by empathy is egoistic, McDougall believed that the
motivation to help evoked by the tender emotion was altruis-
tic: “From this emotion and its impulse to cherish and protect
spring generosity, gratitude, love, pity, true benevolence, and
altruistic conduct of every kind; in it they have their main and
absolutely essential root without which they would not be”
(McDougall, 1908, p. 61).
Nurturant tendencies involve a desire to care for and pro-
tect the other. To be effective, they also involve a clear recog-
nition of the distinctiveness, even possible dissimilarity, of
self and other. Parents must recognize that a child’s needs
may be quite different from their own needs and that the
child’s capacity to deal with these needs may be quite differ-
ent from their own.
THREE ASSUMPTIONS OF
A NURTURANCE EXPLANATION
A nurturance explanation of the variation in empathy felt for
strangers rests on three assumptions. First is the basic as-
sumption made by McDougall (1908) that the tender emo-
tion—what we are calling empathy—is an integral part of the
instinctual impulse of humans to care for and protect their
young (also see Bell, 2001; MacLean, 1990).
Second is the assumption that humans are capable of gen-
eralization whereby nonkin, even strangers, can be re-
sponded to in something like the way we respond to our own
offspring. We must be capable of caring about the welfare of
strangers and of wanting to protect them in the same way, if
not to the same degree, that we do our own children. The
prospect of such generalization may appear implausible be-

cause it may appear contrary to the theory of natural selec-
tion. However, within the small, closely knit hunter–gatherer
bands in which our genetic predispositions for social behav-
ior are thought to have evolved (Caporeal, Dawes, Orbell, &
van de Kragt, 1989), an impulse to provide nurturant care not
only for our own offspring but also for others’ offspring and
even for adults may have been adaptive (see Sober & Wilson,
1998, for further discussion of this possibility). In contempo-
rary society, the prospect of such generalization appears
more plausible when thinking of the tender care typically
provided by nannies and workers in day care centers, adop-
tive parents, and pet owners.
Third is the assumption that the strength of this impulse to
care for and protect can vary in intensity. If nurturant tenden-
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cies account for variation in empathy felt for strangers, then
they must be stronger in response to the plight of some
strangers than others. Presumably, nurturant tendencies
would be stronger toward those who are more childlike, who
appear more vulnerable, or who appear to need protection.
Is there any evidence, other than anecdotes and examples
such as those just mentioned, to support the idea that
nurturance might account for the variation in empathy felt for
strangers? We know of no research that has provided direct
empirical support. Indeed, we know of no research that has
even tried to test the idea.
To provide an initial test, as well as to provide another test
of the perceived similarity explanation, we conducted a sec-
ond experiment. In this experiment, we varied similarity in a
more extreme manner than we had in Experiment 1. Further,
we varied it in such a way that the most similar target should
evoke the least nurturance. As a result, the perceived similar-
ity and nurturance explanations made opposite predictions
for the amount of empathy that should be felt in the different
experimental conditions.
EXPERIMENT 2
The procedure for Experiment 2 was much the same as for Ex-
periment 1. In Experiment 2, however, we manipulated both
the age and the species of “Kayla,” the patient being assisted
with rehabilitation exercises. Some participants read that
Kayla was a 20-year-old KU student (replicating the similar
condition of Experiment 1); others read that she was a
3-year-old child; others read that she was a 5-year-old dog; and
still others read that she was a 4-month-old puppy. Capital-
izing on the effect of age on perceived similarity found in Ex-
periment 1, as well as on the obvious dissimilarity across spe-
cies, we reasoned that perceived similarity would be greater
for the university student Kayla than for the other three Kaylas.
In contrast, we reasoned that nurturant tendencies would
be less for the student Kayla, who was a young adult and not
in need of special protection, than for the other three Kaylas.
Following McDougall (1908), we assumed that an unrelated
SIMILARITY AND NURTURANCE 21
child would evoke relatively strong nurturant tendencies. We
assumed that both the 5-year-old dog and the 4-month-old
puppy would evoke relatively strong nurturant tendencies.
Regardless of age, dogs are typically in the role of pet, and so
dependent on humans for nurturant care. Using targets from a
different species was admittedly unusual (but not without
precedence, see Shelton & Rogers, 1981); however, our ap-
proach had two important virtues. First, it provided an even
more powerful manipulation of similarity than the one used
in Experiment 1. Second, it provided a stringent test of the
generalization assumption of the nurturance explanation. As
in Experiment 1, measures were taken of empathic feelings
and of perceived similarity.
Predictions from the perceived similarity explanation
were essentially the same as for Experiment 1. Perceived
similarity to Kayla should be higher in the student condition
than in the other three conditions, and as a result, empathy
should be higher in this condition than in the other three. The
empathy prediction from the nurturance explanation was just
the opposite. Empathy should be lower in the student condi-
tion than in the other three conditions. We made no explicit
predictions about perceptions of similarity based on the
nurturance explanation.
Method
Participants. Participants for Experiment 2 were 64 fe-
male introductory psychology students at KU who received
credit toward a course requirement. Using a randomized
block procedure, we assigned 16 participants (8 per experi-
menter for two female experimenters) to each of our four
Kayla conditions: student, child, dog, and puppy. Based on
both indirect and direct probes during debriefing, we ex-
cluded and replaced 1 additional student because she ex-
pressed suspicion. We also excluded and replaced 1 student
because she reported in debriefing that she had experienced
an injury similar to Kayla’s (a broken leg). Only women were
included in the sample because, once again, we wished to
hold gender constant to avoid a confound.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to the proce-
dure of Experiment 1 except for the contents of the second ar-
ticle. In the student condition, this article was the same as the
second article in the similar condition of Experiment 1, with
two minor changes. First, the patient’s name was changed
from Kathy to Kayla, a name that could plausibly be used for
either a person or a dog. Second, instead of saying that Kayla
had received reconstructive surgery on her leg “2 days be-
fore,” the article said the surgery took place “9 days before.”
We reasoned that a longer hospital stay would increase per-
ceptions of need and, as a result, the level of empathy felt for
Kayla. (In Experiment 1, Kathy’s need was, on average, per-
ceived to be only moderately high, and reported empathy for
Kathy averaged 3.93, which was slightly below the midpoint
 22 BATSON ET AL.

of the 1–7 scale and somewhat lower than the mean in most TABLE 2
Perceived Similarity and Empathy in Each
prior research using the same empathy measure.)
Condition of Experiment 2
Except for the description of Kayla, the text of the second
article was exactly the same in the other three conditions. (A Experimental Condition
look back at the text, presented when describing the proce- Measures Student Child Dog Puppy
dure for Experiment 1, will show that the article could apply
to a child as well as to an adult, to a dog as well as to a human. Similarity index 0.73 0.28 –0.43 –0.58
Individual similarity items
This wide range of applicability was not happenstance; the
Similarity to you 6.25 4.19 2.44 2.38
article used in Experiment 1 had been constructed to be ap- Same group 6.44 4.94 2.38 1.81
propriate for use in Experiment 2 as well.) In the child condi- Describe as “we” 4.94 4.56 2.63 2.19
tion, the article described assisting “ … a badly hurt and IOS 4.56 3.88 2.94 2.56
struggling 3-year-old child, Kayla”; in the dog condition, “ Empathy 4.25 5.42 5.22 4.84
… a badly hurt and struggling 5-year-old adult dog, Kayla”; Note. N = 15 women in each experimental condition. The similarity in-
and in the puppy condition, “ … a badly hurt and struggling dex is a standardized average of the four individual similarity items. The sim-
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4-month-old puppy, Kayla.” In the student and child condi-
tions, the article was entitled, as before, “Lawrence Memo-
rial Hospital.” In the dog and puppy conditions, it was enti-
tled, “Lawrence Veterinary Hospital.”
ilarity to you, same group, and describe as “we” items were all measured on
1–9 scales (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). The response scale for the Inclu-
sion of Other in the Self (IOS) item ranged from 1 (no overlap) to 7 (consid-
erable overlap) (Aron et al., 1992). Empathy was measured on a 1–7 scale (1
= not at all, 7 = extremely).

Results and Discussion
Perception of need. On the perception questionnaire,
participants indicated the magnitude of Kayla’s need. As ex-
pected, participants in all four conditions of Experiment 2
perceived Kayla’s need to be high, somewhat higher than
Kathy’s need had been perceived to be in Experiment 1 (cell
means in Experiment 2 ranged from 7.06 to 7.38, overall M =
7.17 on the 1–9 scale; in Experiment 1, overall M = 6.60),
with no reliable difference among the cells, F(3, 60) = 0.13, p
> .90. Once again, it did not appear that any differences in
empathy across conditions could be caused by differences in
perceived need. However, to be sure, we again repeated all
analyses including need as a covariate and always found ex-
actly the same pattern of significant effects as in analyses not
including need as a covariate. For simplicity, we have re-
ported only analyses without the covariate.
Effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived
similarity to Kayla. Also as expected, participants per-
ceived the student Kayla to be more similar to themselves than
they perceived the child, dog, or puppy Kayla to be. Once
again, we created a similarity index by averaging responses to
the four items after standardizing each (Cronbach’s α = .91).
The mean on this similarity index in each condition of Experi-
ment 2 is reported in the first row of Table 2. An ANOVA re-
vealed that these means differed significantly, F(3, 60) =
11.55, p < .0005 (as did the means for each individual similar-
ity item—all ps < .02). Tests of the factorial effects revealed a
highly significant main effect for species, F(1, 60) = 31.14, p <
.0005, a marginal effect for age, F(1, 60) = 2.77, p < .11, and no
interaction, F < 1.0. Between-cell comparisons revealed, as
expected, that the mean on the similarity index was much
higher in the student condition (M = 0.73) than in either the dog
(M = –0.43) or the puppy (M = –0.58) conditions, t(60) = 3.34
and 5.12, p < .001 and .0005, respectively. The mean in the
child condition (M = 0.28) was not significantly lower than the
mean in the student condition, t < 1.0, largely because of the
“we” item (see Table 2); it was significantly higher than the
mean in either the dog or puppy conditions, t (60) = 2.77 and
4.55, p < .01, and .0005, respectively. Clearly, species had a
very strong effect on perceived similarity.
Effect of the experimental manipulation on empathy.
To assess the effect of the experimental manipulation on em-
pathic feelings for Kayla, we again used participants’
self-reported empathy on the emotional response question-
naire. As before, we created an index by averaging responses
to the six empathy adjectives (Cronbach’s α = .87). Scores on
the 7-point empathy index (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) were
higher in Experiment 2 (overall M = 4.93) than Experiment 1
(overall M = 3.93), presumably because of the longer hospital
stay and greater perceived need.
Across conditions, did the means on the empathy index
pattern as predicted by the perceived similarity explanation?
As can be seen in the last row of Table 2, they did not. Re-
ported empathy for Kayla in the student condition (M = 4.25)
was not higher than in the other three conditions (M = 5.13).
Rather, as predicted by the nurturance explanation, it was
lower. An ANOVA revealed a significant difference across
experimental conditions, F(3, 60) = 2.80, p < .05, and a facto-
rial ANOVA revealed that although neither the main effect
for species nor the main effect for age was significant, Fs <
1.75, the interaction between these two independent vari-
ables was significant, F(1, 60) = 6.33, p < .02. A planned
comparison using coefficients –3, 1, 1, 1 revealed that the in-
teraction was of the form predicted by the nurturance expla-
nation. The difference between the student condition and the
other three was statistically reliable, F(1, 60) = 6.61, p < .02,

and the residual variance across the child, dog, and puppy
conditions did not approach significance, F(2, 60) = 0.90.
Further, between-cell comparisons revealed that the amount
of empathy reported for Kayla in the student condition was
significantly lower than that reported in either the child con-
dition (M = 5.42), t(60) = 2.69, p < .01, or the dog condition
(M = 5.22), t(60) = 2.24, p < .03, and was lower, but not sig-
nificantly lower, than that reported in the puppy condition (M
= 4.84), t(60) = 1.37, .15 < p < .20. These results were quite at
odds with the perceived similarity predictions but quite con-
sistent with the nurturance predictions.
Correlations of measures of perceived similarity with
empathy felt for Kayla. As in Experiment 1, perceived
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similarity was not clearly associated with empathy. Across
conditions, scores on the similarity index were not signifi-
cantly correlated with scores on the empathy index, r(62) =
.14, p > .25. Once again, scores on the similarity index ac-
counted for less than 5% of the variance in reported empathy.
In sum, Experiment 2 again provided no support for the
claim that perceived similarity is an important source of vari-
ance in the empathy felt for strangers. Indeed, the pattern of
empathy scores was the opposite of what the perceived simi-
larity explanation predicted. It was the pattern predicted by
the nurturance explanation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Lack of Evidence That Perceived Similarity
Underlies Empathy Felt for Strangers
In spite of the popularity of the perceived similarity explana-
tion of empathy felt for strangers, a review of the literature re-
vealed that the empirical evidence for this explanation is far
from clear. In two experiments, we sought to provide clearer
evidence by (a) presenting all research participants with a
stranger in need, (b) varying the degree of similarity of this
stranger to participants, and (c) measuring perceived similar-
ity and empathy felt for her. We were unable to provide clear
evidence. There was evidence from each experiment that the
similarity manipulation affected perceived similarity as ex-
pected, but in neither experiment was empathy higher in the
similar condition. Nor did perceived similarity correlate reli-
ably with reported empathy.
To the best of our knowledge, these experiments are the
first to provide direct tests of the perceived similarity expla-
nation of empathy felt for strangers. That is, they provided
the first tests free of the confounding effects of one or more of
the following: degree of personal contact, personal relevance
of the other’s need, interdependence, and anticipated future
interaction. Our two experiments produced no evidence that
perceived similarity accounts for the variability in empathy
felt for strangers. Perhaps perceived similarity should be ac-
SIMILARITY AND NURTURANCE 23
corded a more modest role in accounting for empathy than
the prominent role it currently plays.
A More Modest Role for Similarity:
Moderator Rather Than Source
Even if similarity is not the key source assumed by perceived
similarity explanations, it may serve as a moderator of em-
pathic response to strangers. Consider two possibilities.
First, as already noted, certain forms of dissimilarity—espe-
cially those that evoke dislike or antipathy—may inhibit em-
pathy. Second, especially when a target’s need is ambiguous
or unclear, similarity may provide a basis for inferring the na-
ture and extent of need. If we perceive another person to be
like us, then beliefs about the way we would feel in his or her
situation provide a basis for inferring how he or she feels.
Perceived need is, in turn, a necessary condition for the em-
pathic feelings at issue (Batson, 1991). This proposal is quite
different from the claim of the perceived similarity explana-
tion that similarity leads to a generalization or expansion of
self-interest to include the target. To use similarity as an aid
to help us understand the other’s plight requires no decrease
in self-other differentiation or any expansion of self-interest.
It requires only a recognition of conditions under which our
own reactions may be a useful source of information about
the target’s reactions (Jarymowicz, 1992).
In our two experiments, the target’s need was clear and
unambiguous. As a result, the use of similarity as an aid to
understanding may have been rendered moot. Had the tar-
get’s need been more ambiguous and less clear, similarity
might have been associated with perceptions of need and, as
a result, with empathic feelings. The possibility that similar-
ity contributes to empathy indirectly as a moderator of per-
ceptions of need has not, as far as we know, been subjected to
direct empirical test. It probably should be.
Evidence That Nurturance Underlies Empathy
Felt for Strangers
The results of Experiment 2 supported the nurturance expla-
nation rather than the perceived similarity explanation. At
first glance, a nurturance explanation appears relatively im-
plausible. It assumes that empathic, tender feelings are inte-
gral to the human impulse to care for and protect offspring. It
also assumes that empathic feelings and the associated
nurturant impulse generalize from this specific context to af-
fect reactions to strangers as well. Finally, it assumes that the
degree to which strangers evoke nurturant concern varies,
producing variation in empathy felt for strangers. These as-
sumptions are quite bold. However, the results of Experiment
2 were remarkably consistent with predictions derived from
this explanation. Dissimilar targets likely to evoke nurturant
concern (a child, dog, and puppy) evoked significantly more
 24 BATSON ET AL.
empathy than a similar target less likely to evoke nurturant
concern (a fellow university student).
Of course, a university student, child, dog, and puppy dif-
fer in many ways. We have not been able to think of a differ-
ence other than the difference in nurturant concern that
would produce less empathy for the fellow university student
than for a child, dog, and puppy. Nevertheless, because this
possibility remains, we consider the support we found for the
nurturance explanation suggestive and intriguing but cer-
tainly not conclusive. Moreover, participants in both experi-
ments were all female. Whether males respond similarly re-
mains to be seen.
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Theoretical and Practical Implications
At the same time that we counsel against premature accep-
tance of the nurturance explanation, the support we found for
that explanation and the lack of support we found for the per-
ceived similarity explanation should not be ignored. Poten-
tially, there are important theoretical and practical implica-
tions. Theoretically, as noted earlier, nurturance explanations
such as McDougall’s (1908) are quite consistent with the
claim that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation,
that is, motivation with the ultimate goal of benefiting the
person for whom empathy is felt. There is now considerable
empirical evidence for this claim (see Batson 1991, for a par-
tial review). In contrast, perceived similarity explanations
typically claim that the motivation to help associated with
empathy is egoistic (i.e., motivation with the ultimate goal of
benefiting oneself). From the similarity perspective, the im-
pulse to benefit the other is a product of generalization of
self-interest to include the other. Support for the nurturance
explanation rather than the perceived similarity explanation
is quite consistent with the existing evidence that empathic
emotion evokes altruistic motivation.
The nurturance explanation also may shed some light on
the effect of one form of perspective taking on empathy.
Starting with the classic experiments of Stotland (1969), in-
structions either (a) to imagine how a person in need is think-
ing and feeling and is affected by his or her situation (imag-
ine–other perspective) or (b) to imagine how one would feel
in that person’s situation (imagine–self perspective) have
been used by researchers to induce vicarious emotion. Im-
portantly, both Stotland (1969) and Batson, Early, &
Salvarani (1997) found that the vicarious emotions evoked
by these two forms of perspective taking were not always the
same. An imagine–other perspective appears to evoke rela-
tively pure other-oriented empathic emotion, a “feeling for”
the person in need. An imagine–self perspective can, at
times, evoke other-oriented empathy, but it also can evoke
self-oriented feelings of vicarious personal distress. An
imagine–other perspective, with its focus on the target’s
thoughts and feelings, appears closely aligned with the
other-oriented sensitivity and vigilance that are characteristic
of nurturance. This perspective may be adopted without in-
struction when nurturant tendencies are aroused, as in par-
ents. In contrast, an imagine–self perspective may be more
closely aligned with perceptions of similarity, as long as one
has no reason to think that one’s own and the other’s reaction
to the situation differ. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) pro-
vided some data consistent with this latter possibility.
Practically, to the extent that variation in empathy felt for
strangers is a function of nurturance rather than of perceived
similarity, the best strategy to increase empathic feelings is
very different from the one usually recommended. Rather
than highlighting commonalities with the target in an attempt
to increase perceived similarity, it may be more effective to
evoke protective, nurturant concern. We suggest that two
conditions may be necessary to evoke nurturant concern: (a)
the target must be perceived to have some need for care and
protection, and (b) the potential empathizer must value the
target’s welfare (Batson, Turk, et al., 1995). These two condi-
tions, when combined with perception of a specific need,
might not only serve to stimulate empathy in practical set-
tings but also be used in future research as the basis for a
more direct experimental manipulation of nurturance.
CONCLUSION
We began with the observation that the human capacity to
feel empathy for strangers is quite remarkable. We conclude
with the observation that the source of this capacity may be
quite remarkable as well. Rather than the product of a percep-
tual shift in which, because of perceived similarity, the plight
of some strangers is treated as one’s own, our results raise the
possibility that this capacity may be a product of generalized
nurturant tendencies. Certainly, much more research is
needed before this remarkable possibility is accepted as true.
We hope the initial test reported here helps stimulate that re-
search.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
David Lishner, who is now at Vanderbilt University, was sup-
ported by NIMH Training Grant #T32-MH18921 during a
portion of the preparation of this article. The authors thank
Angela Frahm for assistance in writing the Helping Hands
articles and Nadia Ahmad, Luis Oceja, Adam Powell, and
Eric Stocks for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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