See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/263923793

Inner Speech in Dreaming: A Dialogic Perspective

Article in Dreaming · December 2013

DOI: 10.1037/a0033654

CITATIONS READS

2 1,748

1 author:

Patricia Anne Kilroe

California College of the Arts
9 PUBLICATIONS 94 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Dream Symbols and Their Construction View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Patricia Anne Kilroe on 06 July 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Inner Speech in Dreaming: A Dialogic Perspective
Patricia Kilroe
California College of the Arts
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Analysis of dream reports containing expressions of mental experience, refer-

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

ences to knowledge not revealed by the sensory imagery of the dream, and references
to past, future, and speculative conditional states that do not occur in the dream
suggests that inner speech has an important function in dream formation and content.
It is proposed that a dream is the product of the interplay of inner speech and imagery
organized into narrative form. A dialogic perspective of dreaming that incorporates
inner speech into the dream formation process suggests that verbal thoughts may be
transformed into images—as literal or metaphorical illustrations of those
thoughts— or they may be expressed more directly in the form of mental experience
or explicit language use such as in conversations within the dream. Images, in turn,
may occur during dreaming with or without comment from inner speech.

Keywords: verbal thinking, inner speech, internal cognitive discourse, mental experience,
dialogic perspective on dreaming

Even in dreams, the rhythm of mind in operation is never once interrupted. (Tarthang Tulku,
2005, p. 103)

We tend to think that dreams are largely composed of sensory imagery, but in
fact a considerable amount of nonsensory cognition can be shown to make up the
typical dream. By the typical dream, I mean dreams that contain perceptual,
transformative, or situational bizarreness, leaving aside the question of whether
such dreams occur in REM or NREM sleep. Studies in recent decades (e.g., Kahan
& LaBerge, 1994, 1996, 2011) have demonstrated strong support for a continuity
theory of dreaming, in which certain high-order cognitive skills long identified with
the waking state alone, such as choice, planning, focused attention, reflective
awareness, and internal commentary, were found through empirical research to
occur during dreaming as well as waking.
In alignment with continuity theory, I focus on expressions of mental experi-
ence and assertions of nonperceptual states of affairs in a sampling of dream reports
and suggest from these that verbal thinking has an important function in dream
formation and content that merits greater attention in dream studies. I also propose

This article was published Online First November 4, 2013.

My thanks go to session participants at the 2012 International Association for the Study of Dreams
conference and multiple Buddhist teachers for their contributions, direct and indirect, to the shaping of
the ideas in this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Patricia Kilroe, Writing and
Literature, California College of the Arts, 5212 Broadway, Oakland, CA 94618. E-mail: pkilroe@cca.edu

233
Dreaming © 2013 American Psychological Association
2013, Vol. 23, No. 4, 233–244 1053-0797/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0033654
 234 Kilroe

a dialogic perspective of dreaming that incorporates verbal thinking into the dream
formation process.
Even if we believe we are reporting a dream strictly as a series of images, a
little poking is likely to reveal an internal cognitive discourse at work. It is not
unlike the average moviegoer’s experience: When we watch a film, we are caught
up in the story, unconscious of or at least not attending to the fact that a
screenwriter, director, and full production crew were responsible for the actual
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

creation of the story and its appearance on film. When analyzing the film after
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

viewing it, however, we would not deny that thinking minds working together were
responsible for the film’s creation.
Mental experience in dreams, in which the dreamer experiences cognitive
states that have no connection to the ongoing perceptual events of the dream, is
often reported using expressions such as “I think about,” “I somehow know,” “I
become aware that,” “I wonder,” “I realize,” “I suddenly remember,” and the like.
The dream reports offered here are used to explore the occurrence of mental
experience in the dream, along with the related phenomena of future and
conditional statements on the one hand, and assertions of states of affairs that are
not represented by the dream’s sensory imagery on the other. The samples
constitute evidence that an internal cognitive discourse is part of the fabric of the
typical dream, and that it is the genesis for at least some of the dream’s imagery.
I propose that a dream is the product of a dialogic activity, and that the dream
report can be likened to a transcript of a conversation between two forms of
mentation—inner speech and the perceptual–imaginal. My analysis leads to the
conclusion that although much of the apparent content of dreams comprises
sensory images, it is also the case that verbal thinking operates in parallel and in
interaction with perceptual forms of mentation during dreaming.

TERMS

It will be helpful to have an overview of what is meant here by the terms verbal
thinking, inner speech, internal cognitive discourse, mental experience in dreams, and
cognitive verb.
Verbal thinking is used for the most part interchangeably with inner speech to
refer to thinking through the medium of language. One of the challenges to an
analysis of verbal thinking in dreaming is that what is meant by thinking is often not
well defined in published dream studies. For example, Hobson, Sangsanguan,
Arantes, and Kahn (2011) and Kahn and Hobson (2005a, 2005b) conflate the
meaning of thinking with that of reasoning. In the philosophical literature,
reasoning presupposes thinking through the medium of language (O. Goldin,
personal communication, March 10, 2013). Yet thinking does not presuppose the
use of language. For Vygotsky (1934/1986, p. 248), for example, “thought itself” is
“still more inward than inner speech,” and the flow of thought is not the same
process as the unfolding of speech. Thought is “engendered” by motivation, desires,
needs, interests, and emotions, and “behind every thought is an affective-volitional
tendency.” Motive leads to shaping of thought in inner speech, which transforms
into meaning of words and finally into communicable words. In accordance with
 Inner Speech in Dreaming 235

Vygotsky’s distinction, I use the terms verbal thinking and inner speech to specify
thinking by means of language.
Internal cognitive discourse encompasses the concepts, beliefs, intentions,
affect, and cognitive processes expressible through inner speech.
Mental experience in dreams here refers to occurrences of thought in which the
dreamer’s experience is not to be found in the perceptual events of the dream.
Cognitive verbs are verbs that refer to mental states or attitudes. Some
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

common cognitive verbs are know, think, suppose, guess, mean, remember, believe,
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

understand, consider, and wonder.

SAMPLE DREAM REPORTS

I now turn to sample dream reports containing expressions of mental experi-

ence as well as reports illustrating assertions of states of affairs not represented in
the dream’s perceptual imagery. The reports are drawn from several published
sources as well as from my personal dream journals and from dreams told to me
directly by family members and friends over a span of a dozen years. I reviewed
approximately 100 dream reports and closely analyzed 20 of them, but I focus on a
smaller subset here due to space considerations. I categorize these reports into
three groups: (1) reports that contain expressions of mental experience through the
use of cognitive verbs; (2) reports that contain assertions of states of affairs not
represented in the perceptual imagery of the dream; and (3) reports that include
grammatically past, future, and conditional statements—a subset of reports in the
second group.

Dream Reports Containing Expressions of Mental Experience

Female, Age 12

In class. Ms. Y. had a little booklet on a famous person. It was Martin Luther
King’s birthday. Mine was Washington Irving. I went second. Trying to read it. It
was really blurry. My eyes couldn’t focus. Ms. Y. said can you read this? I started
to read “It’s about Washington Irving, right?” Ms. Y. said yes, we know that. I was
reading really stupidly. I was thinking I might need glasses. . . .

Female, Age 12

I was with Grandma D. in a little nature thing— garden—for studying plants,

animals (she invited me). I was like, ok, not thrilled. Then I was with some people.
A sign “Danger” to go into that area. I said what is that. They said lions and
panthers in there. Everyone was scared. Grandma said yes, two lions and two
panthers. Grandma went every day. I wondered why she hadn’t been eaten,
attacked. She wasn’t afraid. . . .
 236 Kilroe

Male, Age 16

[There are] pathways to a beach on the ocean side of a bluff. . . . As I walk

down, I see people my age. . . . As I’m leaving, someone jumps in and splashes me.
. . . He’s angry . . . keeps putting me under and letting me up. He has his hands on
my neck. . . . Finally, he lets me back on the beach. I have to do something or
change something by a certain date—late August. . . . He . . . gives me a test tube
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

with white powder, says this is what will happen to me if I don’t do what he’s asking.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

. . . He says it’s poison. He explains when you put it in a drink, it cleans the cup and
kills the person who drinks it. I assume if I don’t do what he wants he’ll poison me.
I don’t know how he knows that we’ve moved or where. I make a mental note that
I should always drink from dirty cups, so if it turns clean I’ll notice it. But I don’t
have any intention of doing what he wants. I put the vial in my pocket, so I will have
evidence he was threatening and strangling me/wants to poison me. His fingerprints
are on the test tube. I intend to go to the police. I go back up the path. . . .

Female, Age 48

In a basement art gallery (light from overhead or a high place on the

walls—possibly some of it natural), looking at paintings of the Old Masters (Dutch,
Italian), possibly including Leonardo da Vinci. Dark canvases painted in oil. I think
about how these artists were recognized but many people are doing good art and
don’t get recognized and that perhaps it’s about being in the right place at the right
time.

Female, Age 48

The kids and I are staying with [their father’s parents]. We’ve had a light
breakfast and now they’re going to take us to church (it’s Sunday), someplace far
away where their friends will be. I go to the kitchen while everyone else is in an
adjacent room. I help myself to a bowl of potato chips (filling a small bowl from a
bag of chips). But then it’s time to go and I have to leave the chips—I later think
about them and how they must be getting soggy standing in the open air. . . .

Female, Age 48

A guy who looks like he’s from India walks past me . . . and asks, you’re a
(fruit-art?) head (something related to Deadhead, incorporating something about
art). I apparently know him slightly, and he’s friends with [a male friend of
dreamer’s], in the adjacent room he just came out of. I laugh lightly and say yes, you
heard I asked [our friend] that I wanted him and friends to name these paintings.
. . . For I seem to have several paintings connected with Grateful Dead themes I’ve
painted leaning up against my knees (I’m seated in a chair or small couch). He says
they should sell well now, this is a good time for these things, lips, ear, nose, and so
 Inner Speech in Dreaming 237

forth (I think he names some fruit, too). I’m wondering why he’s mentioning my
visual art but not my poetry.

Harry Hunt (1989, p. 166)

I am traveling with my wife and children, looking for a parking place in order
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

to visit the Tibetan National Museum. . . . I realize that unless I hurry the museum
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

will close. . . .

Harry Hunt (1989, p. 134)

I am in a large building when suddenly I realize that I am in danger of being

imprisoned in it. . . . I am pursued by a man carrying a strange metal object. . . . He
throws it at me, but it misses me, landing nearby. I debate whether to pick it up and
throw it back. . . .

Male, age 25, reported in Strauch and Meier (1996) and reprinted in
McNamara (2000, pp. 240 –241)

I am in a major American city where there is a baptism of a rocket for a

manned moon capsule. People have come from all over the world and expect
something sensational to happen. My sister and Suzanne and I have been
invited. Everything took place at a harbor and there was some kind of
breakdown at the start and the rocket took off 10 or maybe a hundred meters
beyond the ramp, and then simply fell back down. And we wondered what might
have happened if it had toppled over—just plunged into the water or if it had
lifted 200 m in the air and maybe flipped over and then fallen into the water. If
it had gone as high as one kilometer it might have fallen into the city and on top
of a skyscraper. And then we fantasized whether the rocket might be propelled
by the strength of a statesmen [sic]—Giscard Estaing [sic] was there too—and
thrown upward like that, which would certainly have caused a debacle. . . .

From these sample dream reports, we have the following expressions of mental
experience, formulated for the most part as subject ⫹ cognitive verb: I was thinking,
I think about; I wondered, I’m wondering, we wondered; I assume; I don’t know
how he knows; I make a mental note; I don’t have any intention of, I intend to; I
realize; I debate whether; and we fantasized whether.
These expressions of mental experience strongly suggest that dreams can
consist of cognitive states distinct from the perceptual events of the dream. Each
sample dream report includes imagery of an unreal nature characteristic of REM
dreams (and sharply distinct from waking mentation), but the expressions of
nonperceptual mental experience in the same dream reports point to an internal
cognitive discourse at work, expressed through verbal thinking. The dreamer’s
nonperceptual cognitive states both initiate and respond to the perceptual events of
the dream, suggesting that inner speech is integral to the dream formation process.
 238 Kilroe

Dream Reports Containing Assertions of States of Affairs Not Represented in

the Perceptual Imagery of the Dream

Let us now look at several dream reports containing descriptions of events that
have no connection to the imagery reported for the dream and that can therefore
be inferred to result from an internal cognitive discourse. The first two dreams have
been published in the context of dream studies; the third is my own.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

The first report was published in Hobson et al. (2011, p. 3), part of the report
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

of J. Allan Hobson’s “A Big Dream” recorded on January 2, 1991:

I am in a European city answering a newspaper ad for a tree pruning job, I have arrived at
the (undesignated) address on my bicycle. The seven digit phone number is my only location
parameter but I can’t see the actual numbers. I have a long branch trimmer across my handle
bars. I approach a Georgian stoop (as on Beacon Hill or Wimple St. London) and ask a
12-year-old girl (in period ruffle dress and cap) if her father is at home. I have seen the tree
which needs pruning: it is a small, leafless, shrub growing on a high bank inside the fence. The
father, who is Van Dyke-bearded and elegantly frock-coated, emerges up a granite stair from
the sous sol. He is swashbuckling and gay and strides on down the walk to discuss the job.

How does the dreamer know he’s in a European city and not a city outside of
Europe with the look and feel of a European city? Why is the city simply European
rather than a specifically named city? Because the report does not describe the
dreamer searching the wants ads of a newspaper, how does he know that he is
answering a newspaper ad, or that the newspaper ad is for a tree-pruning job? How
does he know that the seven digits constitute a phone number, especially given that
he cannot see the actual numbers? How can a phone number be his location
parameter, by which he arrives at the otherwise undesignated address? How does
he know the girl is 12, not 11 or 13 or some other age? How does he know the man
who emerges is the girl’s father? How does he know the man is striding toward him
to discuss the job? Unless the dream report leaves out something the dreamer
experienced in imagery, none of these questions can be answered by the imagery
alone. Only the dreamer’s internal cognitive discourse, operating outside the reach
of the dreamer’s awareness, can explain these aspects of the dream.
Our second example is a dream reported by Harry Hunt in his 1989 book The
Multiplicity of Dreams (p. 110):
I was being taken on a tour through a very large insane asylum. In the very center of the vast
building in a room normally kept in total darkness, I saw what on awakening I could only
term the “Ur-gorilla”—a huge, dark apelike/manlike beast chained to the wall. It was lying
full-length and motionless but full of a pent-up and starkly masculine vital force unable to
express itself.

Again, we can ask questions about the imagery–narrative interface: How does
the dreamer know the building he is in is an insane asylum? How does he know the
room is in the very center of the building or that the building is vast? How does he
know the room is normally kept in total darkness? If the beast is motionless, how
does he know it is full of a pent-up and starkly masculine vital force? As with
Hobson’s dream, the only response is that unless Hunt’s report leaves out
numerous details about the dream’s imagery, the dreamer simply “knows” these
aspects of the dream to be true through an internal cognitive discourse. These “I
just know” aspects of the dream narrative are unfolding through an inner speech
imperceptible in dreaming consciousness.
 Inner Speech in Dreaming 239

The third example is a dream I had in December 2011. The full report is as
follows:
I’m on a sidewalk next to a row of parked cars. Open space, grassy field on the other side of
sidewalk. I’m with F., who has turned into a cat-sized turtle, but he looks like Claude
[dreamer’s cat]. He’s in the street next to the curb, closely behind a parked car. (Somehow
I see him as a turtle too, even though he looks like Claude.) I pick him up (as Claude the cat)
and ask him if he wants me to carry him to where we’re going, a block or two away. He says
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

no, he’d rather walk. I put him down on the sidewalk before the dream ends.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Somehow I “just knew” that our destination was a block or two away, even
though the destination is neither seen nor named in the dream. But more
interesting, how did I know during the dream that this animal who appeared as both
a cat and a turtle was actually my friend, when no visual image of the friend ever
occurred during the dream? I even talked to the animal, and it answered me in
human language. Although through later dream work I became aware of several
metaphorical connections between these animals and the dreamed-about friend,
the short answer is that I knew it was my friend because my internal cognitive
discourse asserted it was him.

Dream Reports Containing Past, Future, and Conditional Statements

Finally, I return to several reports from among those containing expressions of

mental experience that also contain sentences whose verb structures express past,
future, and conditional states of affairs, none of which occur during the dream.

Female, Age 48

The kids and I are staying with [their father’s parents]. We’ve had a light
breakfast and now they’re going to take us to church (it’s Sunday), someplace far
away where their friends will be. I go to the kitchen while everyone else is in an
adjacent room. I help myself to a bowl of potato chips (filling a small bowl from a
bag of chips). But then it’s time to go and I have to leave the chips—I later think
about them and how they must be getting soggy standing in the open air. . . .

The phrases they’re going to take us to church and someplace far away where
their friends will be express future events not occurring perceptually in the dream
but presumed to occur at some later time.

Harry Hunt (1989, p. 166)

I am traveling with my wife and children, looking for a parking place in order
to visit the Tibetan National Museum. . . . I realize that unless I hurry the museum
will close. . . .

In addition to the expression of mental experience I realize, this report

contains a predictive statement that expresses a future probability: Unless I hurry
 240 Kilroe

the museum will close. The “action” of the museum closing does not occur in the
dream but is rather predicted to be about to happen, expressed through the future
tense verb phrase will close.

Male, age 25, reported in Strauch and Meier (1996) and reprinted in
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

McNamara (2000, pp. 240 –241)

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

I am in a major American city where there is a baptism of a rocket for a manned

moon capsule. People have come from all over the world and expect something
sensational to happen. My sister and Suzanne and I have been invited. Everything took
place at a harbor and there was some kind of breakdown at the start and the rocket
took off 10 or maybe a hundred meters beyond the ramp, and then simply fell back
down. And we wondered what might have happened if it had toppled over—just plunged
into the water or if it had lifted 200 m in the air and maybe flipped over and then fallen
into the water. If it had gone as high as one kilometer it might have fallen into the city and
on top of a skyscraper. And then we fantasized whether the rocket might be propelled
by the strength of a statesmen [sic]—Giscard Estaing [sic] was there too—and thrown
upward like that, which would certainly have caused a debacle. . . .

The verb tense of the statement I have been invited is present perfect (and
passive voice—the subject I is the recipient of the action, not the doer of it), and
as such it expresses a state of affairs resulting from a past action—that of
inviting—that has not occurred during the dream. (To invite, moreover, is to
perform a speech act, an act accomplished by means of language use alone; see
Austin, 1970.) Other statements in this report are expressed as unreal condi-
tionals speculating on past possibilities that did not occur: if it had toppled over
(it did not); . . . if it had lifted 200 m in the air and maybe flipped over (it did not);
. . . if it had gone as high as one kilometer (it did not); and the imagined result,
which also does not occur: what might have happened . . . it might have fallen into
the city and on top of a skyscraper. These statements follow a standard
grammatical pattern for speculative conditionals, composed of a subordinate
“if” clause with the verb in the past perfect tense (If X had Y-ed) and a main
clause whose verb phrase is structured as past modal ⫹ present perfect (X
might/would have Z-ed).
Near the end of the report, we find we fantasized whether the rocket might be
propelled . . . which would certainly have caused a debacle. . . .This variant
conditional structure also expresses an imagined possibility with the main clause
verb in simple past tense (fantasized) and subordinate clause composed of past
modal ⫹ passive voice (might ⫹ be ⫹ past participle propelled). The sentence
concludes with an additional dependent clause comprising past modal ⫹ present
perfect ⫹ noun phrase (would ⫹ have caused ⫹ a debacle) used to express the
speculative result of a possibility that did not occur.
From these examples, we note that dream reports containing past, future,
and conditional sentences warrant inclusion as a subset of reports containing
assertions not represented by the perceptual events of the dream.
 Inner Speech in Dreaming 241

DISCUSSION

With these examples from dream reports pointing to the occurrence of verbal
thinking during dreaming through assertions of mental experience, nonperceptual
states of affairs, and states of past, future, or hypothetical affairs, we can now
consider the role of inner speech in the formation and content of dreams. I take the
perspective that dreams are a product of what our individual minds are capable of,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

just as waking thoughts and daydreams are. We dream according to the capacity of
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

the human brain/mind we have. Differences in brain activity between the wake and
sleep states cause mentation to take distinctly different forms (see, e.g., Antrobus
& Bertini, 1992; Ellman & Antrobus, 1991; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000;
Hobson & Stickgold, 1994; Pace-Schott, Solms, Blagrove, & Harnad, 2003; Solms,
1997, 2000). But whatever preoccupies us in waking also does so in dreaming.
However multifaceted, we have one mind, a mind capable of imagining possibilities,
creating metaphors, solving problems, and thinking verbally (see, e.g., Domhoff,
2011; Foulkes, 1985). As Kahan (2011) explains regarding the continuity theory of
dreaming and waking, “The basic proposal is that the same structures and processes
involved in the construction of waking experience are involved in the construction
of dreaming experience” (p. 113). Kahan and LaBerge (2011) report from their
studies that “[n]one of the high-order cognitive skills that we assessed is absent in
dreaming and individuals reported the same range of cognitive activities in their
dreaming and waking experiences” (p. 508).
In the waking state, we can bring conscious awareness to our experience of an
inner speech monologue or dialogue. Although awareness of inner speech may not
be immediately accessible for all people or for any one person at all times, it is a
common enough phenomenon that we can ask, What happens to the stream of
inner speech while we sleep? Does it simply cease? Does it continue incessantly
whether we are awake or asleep? Perhaps during the cycles of sleep in which we
dream, inner speech is activated in the same form it takes in waking, but we simply
cannot “hear” it. Or perhaps it changes form to the point that we fail to recognize
our dream interlocutor as ourselves. I propose a dialogic perspective of dreaming
in which inner speech serves an essential directive function as well as an interactive
function with respect to dream imagery. In this, I follow Hunt (1989), in which
dreaming is characterized as
an interaction between the capacity to translate propositional, inner speech processes into
imagery and a more spontaneous and intuitive imagery, likely to be bizarre and inherently
novel, which is more variable in its appearance and may at times direct or redirect the
propositional capacity of the left hemisphere. (p. 172)

In one highly simplified configuration, we can look at dreaming as the interplay

of mentation typically associated with each of the brain’s hemispheres, ignoring, for
the sake of the present discussion, the functioning of neural networks. Functions
generally associated with the brain’s right hemisphere include the processing of
sensory stimuli into the perception of forms, formation of relationships within and
among percepts, and imagination. I use the term perceptual–imaginal to refer to the
relevant form of right-hemispheric mentation here, the processing of sensory
images during dreaming.
 242 Kilroe

Among the functions generally associated with the brain’s left hemisphere are
linguistic processing, numerical calculations, analysis, reasoning, planning, organiz-
ing, and narrative construction. For the present discussion, the relevant form of
left-hemispheric mentation during dreaming is inner speech.
In the waking state, left-hemispheric mentation analyzes and organizes sense
data processed by the perceptualizing aspect of mind during interaction with the
physical environment. The left hemisphere is also the realm of external communi-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

cation, primarily but not limited to speech. Inner speech may certainly be active in
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

the waking state, as for example when we mentally rehearse or react to an

interaction or direct our own immediate actions.
During dreaming, left-hemispheric mental functions are also active, including
inner speech, although with the exception of expressions of mental experience and
explicit language use in dream content, the stream of inner speech is inaccessible to the
dreamer’s awareness. Overlapping in many respects with waking mental functions,
inner speech during dreaming comments on recent experience, compares the dreamer’s
recent past with the more distant past, articulates emotions, imagines conversations,
and rehearses future scenarios. Inner speech may also react to sensory images
generated spontaneously by the perceptual–imaginal function during dreaming.
The perceptual–imaginal function, meanwhile, is expressed through sensory
percepts alone. The images it produces in a dream may be replicas of recent waking
percepts, may belong to the dreamer’s distant past, may condense present and past,
or may be completely novel (producing percepts ranging from anticipated experi-
ence to that which is completely without reference to the dreamer’s conscious life).
Dream images may also illustrate what is generated by inner speech, either as
direct, “literal” illustrations or as visual metaphors or other tropes. Although not
concerned with the subject of inner speech, Lakoff (1997) demonstrates how an
unconscious conceptual metaphor system plays a key role in dream formation, and
how that same system gets expressed through ordinary language use. And as Lakoff
reminds us (p. 102), Freud (1900/1953, p. 351) also recognized that the “unconscious
ideation” of dreams was shared by, among other forms of expression, language-
based phenomena such as idioms and jokes.
If left-hemispheric functions dominate the waking mind as a means of negotiating
through a potentially dangerous physical environment, during dreaming the balance of
mental functioning seems to shift to the perceptual–imaginal, for in sleep our vigilant,
evaluative interface with the physical environment is suspended. We have a general
impression of dreams as perceptual experiences, composed of a series of visual or other
sensory images. But although the volume on left-hemispheric mentation is turned down
during dream sleep, from a dialogic viewpoint it is not extinguished, hence the
occurrence of conversations, voiceovers, and less frequently written language in dreams
produced by inner speech, as well as high-order cognitive functions identified in studies
such as those reported in Kahan and LaBerge (1994, 1996, 2011) and Kozmová and
Wolman (2006). The narrative quality of dreams can likewise be attributed to
left-hemispheric mentation, which organizes the interaction of imagery and inner
speech into rudimentary story form. (See Hunt, 1989, and Foulkes, 1978, 1985, on the
relationship of thought and narrative in dreaming.)
Taking the dialogic perspective to a preliminary conclusion, our response to the
question concerning the role of inner speech during dreaming is that inner speech
continues. It contributes to dream content in the form of language use and expressions
 Inner Speech in Dreaming 243

of mental experience, and it contributes to dream formation by triggering or reacting

to images formed by the perceptual–imaginal function and by organizing the dream
into narrative form. A dream results from the interplay of verbal thoughts and sensory
images: Verbal thoughts, which may express all manner of mental activity from
emoting to reasoning, may be transformed into images, either as literal illustrations of
verbal thoughts or as concretized metaphors— or they may be expressed more directly
in the form of mental experience or explicit language use such as in conversations
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

within the dream. Images may likewise occur in the dream with or without comment
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

from inner speech.

From this perspective, a dream is the result of an interaction in which aspects
of the mind engage during sleep, and a dream report is akin to a transcript of that
interaction. On waking, we often recognize some but not all of the elements of a
dream from our waking experience, and those that we do not recognize often seem
bizarre—amusing, puzzling, frightful, or astoundingly beautiful. Because by defini-
tion we are not conscious of the functioning of our own unconscious imagination,
we resist recognition that the bizarre elements of our dreams are produced by our
own minds. When the waking mind relaxes into a nonvigilant state during dream
sleep, free from the need to engage in external interaction, left-hemispheric
processing ceases to dominate mentation, and perceptual–imaginal mentation
becomes prominent. If we are habituated to repressing our perceptual–imaginal
voice in order to function in the world of waking consciousness, that voice will seem
alien to us, and we will be baffled by our own dreams. That bafflement is hardly
lessened by the fact that the inner speech that reacts to dream imagery offers up its
own stream of emotive and analytic mentation, and directs the dream narrative
beyond the reach of awareness both during the dream and after waking.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not we are engaged with our physical environment at a given

moment, in the waking state we can be preoccupied with multiple aspects of our
internal reality at the same time; we may be thinking simultaneously about logical
problems, sensory phenomena, and emotional concerns all while revisiting recent
or distant memories. Numerous layers of thought are active concurrently, even if
we are only aware of being focused on one topic at a time. Recent research suggests
that much the same may be said of the dream state.
Dream reports are a rich source for observing that inner speech is at work in
dreams. The evidence presented here has taken the form of expressions of mental
experience, references to knowledge not revealed by the sensory imagery of the dream,
and references to past, future, and speculative conditional states that do not occur in
the dream.
Without denying the fundamental role of imagery in dreams, I have followed
Hunt (1989) in suggesting that inner speech is a significant component of dream
formation, that verbal thoughts may be transformed into dream images and may in
turn arise in response to images. In addition to carrying forward the work of Hunt
and his contemporaries such as Edelson (1972) and Foulkes (1978), I believe it is
time to revisit the structuralist vision of Jacques Lacan (e.g., 1957/1970) and
embrace the notion that verbal thought is an important component of the dream’s
 244 Kilroe

architecture. From a dialogic perspective, dreams result from the interaction of

inner speech and sensory imagery, organized into narrative form.

REFERENCES

Antrobus, J., & Bertini, M. (Eds.). (1992). The neuropsychology of sleep and dreaming. Hillsdale, NJ:
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Erlbaum.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Austin, J. L. (1970). How to do things with words. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Domhoff, G. W. (2011). The neural substrate for dreaming: Is it a subsystem of the default network?
Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1163–1174. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.001
Edelson, M. (1972). Language and dreams: The interpretation of dreams revisited. The Psychoanalytic
Study of the Child, 27, 203–282.
Ellman, S., & Antrobus, J. S. (Eds.). (1991). The mind in sleep: Psychology and psychophysiology (2nd
ed.). New York, NY: Wiley.
Foulkes, D. (1978). A grammar of dreams. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Foulkes, D. (1985). Dreaming: A cognitive–psychological analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Freud, S. (1953). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 4). New York, NY: Avon Books. (Original
work published 1900)
Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickgold, R. (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a
cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 793–842.
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00003976
Hobson, J. A., Sangsanguan, S., Arantes, H., & Kahn, D. (2011). Dream logic—The inferential reasoning
paradigm. Dreaming, 21, 1–15. doi:10.1037/a0022860
Hobson, J. A., & Stickgold, R. (1994). Dreaming: A neurocognitive approach. Consciousness and
Cognition, 3, 1–15. doi:10.1006/ccog.1994.1001
Hunt, H. (1989). The multiplicity of dreams: Memory, imagination, and consciousness. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Kahan, T. L. (2011). Possible worlds, possible selves: Dreaming and the liberation of consciousness. In
S. Kakar (Ed.), On dreams and dreaming (pp. 109 –206). New Delhi, India: Viking.
Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. (1994). Lucid dreaming as metacognition: Implications for cognitive science.
Consciousness and Cognition, 3, 246 –264. doi:10.1006/ccog.1994.1014
Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. (1996). Cognition and metacognition in dreaming and waking: Comparisons
of first- and third-person ratings. Dreaming, 6, 235–249. doi:10.1037/h0094459
Kahan, T. L., & LaBerge, S. (2011). Dreaming and waking: Similarities and differences revisited.
Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 494 –514. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.002
Kahn, D., & Hobson, J. A. (2005a). State-dependent thinking—A comparison of waking and dreaming
thought. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 429 –438. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.005
Kahn, D., & Hobson, J. A. (2005b). Theory of mind in dreaming: Awareness of feelings and thoughts
of others in dreams. Dreaming, 15, 48 –57. doi:10.1037/1053-0797.15.1.48
Kozmová, M., & Wolman, R. N. (2006). Self-awareness in dreaming. Dreaming, 16, 196 –214.
doi:10.1037/1053-0797.16.3.196
Lacan, J. (1970). The insistence of the letter in the unconscious (J. Miel, Trans.). In J. Ehrmann (Ed.),
Structuralism (pp. 101–137). New York, NY: Anchor Books. (Original work published 1957)
Lakoff, G. (1997). How unconscious metaphorical thought shapes dreams. In D. J. Stein (Ed.), Cognitive
science and the unconscious (pp. 89 –119). New York, NY: American Psychoanalytic Association.
McNamara, P. (2000). Counterfactual thought in dreams. Dreaming, 10, 237–246.
doi:10.1023/A:1009485008327
Pace-Schott, E. F., Solms, M., Blagrove, M., & Harnad, S. (Eds.). (2003). Sleep and dreaming: Scientific
advances and reconsiderations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Solms, M. (1997). The neuropsychology of dreams: A clinico-anatomical study. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Solms, M. (2000). Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 23, 843–850. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00003988
Strauch, I., & Meier, B. (1996). In search of dreams: Results of experimental dream research. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press.
Tarthang Tulku. (2005). Milking the painted cow: The creative power of mind and the shape of reality in
light of the Buddhist tradition. Berkeley, CA: Dharma Publishing.
Vygotsky, L. (1986). Thought and language (A. Kozulin, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Original work published 1934)

View publication stats