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The British Accounting Review xxx (xxxx) xxx
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The British Accounting Review

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Board gender composition and waste management:

Cross-country evidence
Ammar Ali Gull a, b, Muhammad Atif c, *, Nazim Hussain d
a
Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales D’Angers (ESSCA), Lyon, France
b
International School, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam
c
Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance, Macquarie Business School, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
d
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics & Business, University of Groningen, the Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
JEL classification: Extant literature on board gender diversity focuses on the main pillars of sustainability while
G30 ignoring the important subdimension – waste management. Using a sample of 8365 firm-year
G34 observations for the period 2002–2017 from 37 countries, we provide novel empirical evidence
Keywords: that board gender diversity significantly reduces (increases) waste generation (waste recycling) in
Corporate governance firms. We also note that the impact is significant with two or more female directors and is pri
Waste management
marily driven by female directors’ independence. Moreover, the relationship is moderated by the
Gender diversity
masculinity dimension of national culture and sustainable compensation policies. Our analysis
Environmental protection
also shows that waste management activities of gender-diverse boards accompany the better
financial performance. Our findings are robust to several identification strategies and estimation
techniques. Our study provides new insights into the governance–sustainability nexus and pre
sents important policy implications for regulators across countries.
“The current model is global suicide. We need a revolution. Revolutionary thinking. Revolutionary action. Natural resources are
becoming more and more scarce.“
(Ban Ki-moon, former Secretary-General of the United Nations)
1. Introduction
Climate change triggered by the release of greenhouse gas emissions and toxic chemicals poses the biggest challenge in generations
(IPCC, 2007). The situation is worsening at an alarming rate due to an increase in solid waste generation; this causes the release of
pollutants and greenhouse gasses from landfill sites worldwide, resulting in an upsurge in ground-level temperature (Prado-Lorenzo,
Rodríguez-Domínguez, Gallego-Álvarez, & García-Sánchez, 2009). According to the World Bank (2019), approximately two billion
tons of solid waste were generated worldwide in 2016: this is expected to increase to 3.40 billion tons by 2050 due to enormous growth
in the population and as a result of rapid industrialization. Corporations around the globe are playing leading roles in waste generation.
Recently, three large US-based manufacturing companies (i.e., Fuchs Lubricants Co., United Industries Corporation, and DCW Casing
* Corresponding author. Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance, Macquarie Business School, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2109,
NSW, Australia.
E-mail addresses: ammar-ali.gull@essca.fr (A.A. Gull), muhammad.atif@mq.edu.au (M. Atif), n.hussain@rug.nl (N. Hussain).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2022.101097
Received 5 May 2021; Received in revised form 8 April 2022; Accepted 14 April 2022
Available online 19 April 2022
0890-8389/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of British Accounting Association. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Please cite this article as: Ammar Ali Gull, The British Accounting Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2022.101097
A.A. Gull et al. The British Accounting Review xxx (xxxx) xxx
LLC) were penalized for releasing hazardous waste by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Kansas, Missouri, and Iowa,
respectively (EPA, 2021). It is primarily believed that poor waste management is accelerating climate change (Clifford, 2021). To
preserve the climate, waste management activities, such as the reduction in waste generation and increase in waste recycling, are
considered potential solutions.
However, such initiatives are dependent on corporate actions, as corporations are the major contributors to waste generation due to
their large-scale production of goods and services. Prior studies (e.g., Endrikat, Guenther, & Hoppe, 2014; Busch & Lewandowski,
2018) highlight the positive relationship between environmentally friendly initiatives and financial performance, suggesting a
“win-win” case for corporations and society.1 However, the implementation of costly initiatives like waste management depends on
corporate governance structure, i.e., the board of directors (Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010). In this context, extant research
shows that female directors are more empathetic about environmental concerns (e.g., Atif, Hossain, Alam, & Goergen, 2021; Liu, 2018)
and are likely to promote pro-environmental activities. This, in turn, suggests that female directors are expected to encourage cor
porations to implement waste management activities.
The link between board gender diversity (hereafter, BGD) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues has been well examined.
However, the existing literature offers heterogeneous results (Hussain, García Sánchez, Khan, Khan, & Martínez Ferrero, 2021) and
calls for more in-depth research. For instance, Atif et al. (2021), Marquis and Lee (2013), Shaukat, Qiu, and Trojanowski (2016), and
Walls, Berrone, and Phan (2012), among others, show a positive association between BGD and corporate environmental performance,
while others document a negative (e.g., Ardito, Dangelico, & Messeni Petruzzelli, 2021) or an insignificant relationship (see, for
instance, Coffey & Wang, 1998; Giannarakis, 2014). The proponents of a negative or insignificant link argue that female directors are
appointed only for the purpose of tokenism (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), whereas the advocates of a positive link are of the view
that female directors are more caring and environmentally sensitive than their male counterparts. A strand of literature concurs that
female directors discourage negative business practices (Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015; Liu, 2018), narrow their focus on CSR
practices (Shaukat et al., 2016), improve sustainable investments (Atif, Alam, & Hossain, 2020), and strongly support
pro-environmental corporate behavior (McCright & Xiao, 2014; Nadeem, Bahadar, Gull, & Iqbal, 2020). More importantly, recent
research empirically shows that female leaders support tackling climate change, as indicated by the push toward renewable energy
(Atif et al., 2021) and biodiversity initiatives (Haque & Jones, 2020). Hence, it is quite plausible to expect that female directors
promote corporate actions related to the reduction, management, and recycling of waste.
However, empirical research on the role of female directors in waste management is scant, and it is imperative to address the
existing fragmentation through an in-depth analysis of a single subdimension of environmental practices. Therefore, this study con
tributes to the growing body of literature on BGD and environmental initiatives (e.g., Boulouta, 2013; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang,
2017) by exploring a novel perspective, i.e., waste management, which is still an underexplored research area. Furthermore, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate this association in a cross-country setting.
By examining a panel of 8365 firm-year observations from 37 countries between 2002 and 2017, we answer our research questions:
Does BGD influence firms’ waste generation and recycling? Does culture play any role in influencing this relationship? Our findings
confirm that waste generation, including both hazardous and non-hazardous waste (waste recycling), is negatively (positively)
associated with the proportion of female directors as well as their number. The relationship between female directors and waste
reduction is noticeable for independent female directors compared to executive directors. This result is plausible because of the
monitoring role of independent female directors on the board. However, the relationship requires a critical mass of female directors,
particularly for the waste recycling activities, as the effect becomes stronger if there are at least two females on the board. Our results
also indicate that the relationship is moderated by the masculinity dimension of national culture and that sustainable compensation
policies for executives significantly influence environmental decision-making. Interestingly, the environmentally friendly corporate
practices, in the form of waste reduction and waste recycling, result in improved financial performance. Our results are robust to
alternative regression specifications, alternative measures of waste management, and BGD, controlling for additional corporate
governance characteristics and subsample analysis.
Our findings may be subject to potential endogeneity bias, as omitted variables render the spurious association between BGD and
waste management activities. For instance, male directors may also be responsive to environmental issues and implement waste
management activities. Moreover, female directors may self-select firms (given the availability of a small pool of female leaders)
already performing well in environmentally friendly initiatives, including recycling and reductions in the generation of waste. This
may result in a reverse causality problem. To overcome these limitations, we employ several identification strategies. First, we use
propensity score matching (PSM) to distinguish firms with and without female directors that are identical based on other firm-level
characteristics. After such matching, we document that the presence of female directors is negatively (positively) associated with
waste generation (waste recycling). Second, we use a two-step Heckman model to address self-selection bias. Our results are upheld in
the second stage after incorporating Mills Lambda as an additional variable obtained from the first stage. This implies that our results
are consistent, even after controlling for self-selection bias. Third, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach with two-stage
least squares (2SLS), and finally, we use the difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis by exploiting the introduction of board gender
balance reforms during the sample period as an exogenous event. We observe a negative (positive) relationship between BGD and
waste generation (waste recycling). Taken together, identification strategies imply that BGD has a negative (positive) causal
1
Environmentally friendly activities are rewarding from an economic perspective as well. According to the nationwide Recycling Economic
Information (REI) study conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2019), every 1000 tons of materials recycled create 1.57 jobs,
$76,030 in wages, and $14,101 in tax revenues for the US government.
2
relationship with waste generation (waste recycling).

Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study examining the relationship between BGD and
corporate waste management activities. Particularly, our study contributes to the sustainability accounting and green finance liter
ature by confirming that an effective board structure with more female directors is desirable for making firms genuinely sustainable,
which in turn can bring superior financial performance. The existing literature has generally focused on examining the main pillars of
CSR while ignoring the subdimensions of such a pillar. This may cause a CSR policy–practice disconnect and is referred as CSR
decoupling (Tashman, Marano, & Kostova, 2019). However, a few studies focus on the association between female directors and
subdimensions, such as sustainable investment (Atif et al., 2020), environmental disclosure (Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015), renewable
energy consumption (Atif et al., 2021), and biodiversity (Haque & Jones, 2020). To heed the recent calls for further examination of
sustainability pillars’ subdimensions (García-Sánchez, Gallego-Álvarez, & Zafra-Gómez, 2021; Hussain, Rigoni, & Cavezzali, 2018), we
provide novel evidence to the existing research on the relationship between BGD and waste management. From a policy perspective,
our findings offer new insights to regulators seeking sustainability and urge firms to appoint more female directors by extending the
business case of BGD.
Second, our study contributes to BGD literature by empirically examining the assumption of the critical mass of female directors.
We find empirical support suggesting that the threshold of two or more female directors is needed to influence corporate decisions,
thereby contributing to the extant literature (e.g., Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014; Owen & Temesvary, 2018). We also distinguish the channel (i.
e., independent female vs executive female directors) through which female directors influence waste management activities. We find
a more pronounced effect of independent female directors (Liu et al., 2014; Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017), suggesting a differential
effect of the channel. Moreover, our study sheds new light on the impact of sustainable compensation policies on the relationship
between female directors and waste management. Finally, we explore the combined effect of BGD and national culture dimensions, i.
e., masculinity vs femininity, on waste management activities. This perspective provides novel insights into the link between corporate
environmental initiatives and board composition by revealing that the masculinity dimension of national culture is an important
decision-making factor. Therefore, we fill the void in the fragmented gender diversity studies on green finance by considering national
culture dimensions and sustainable compensation policies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present a review of the relevant literature and hypotheses. Section 3
discusses the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical results, robustness checks, and identification strategies. Section 5
comprises additional analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
This section reviews the literature related to BGD and its connection to the business case. This section further explores the gender
socialization and ethicality theories that provide underpinnings on why females are more likely to be expected to make pro-
environmental decisions than their male counterparts. We develop our hypotheses after this discussion.
2.1. Business case for gender diversity
A strand of literature empirically shows that BGD improves the quality of corporate decision-making (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007;
Croson & Gneezy, 2009).2 Extant literature explains at least two channels through which BGD improves decision-making and, thus,
corporate outcomes. First, female directors enhance the quality of corporate governance practices. For instance, female directors
influence the monitoring function of the board, as evidenced by regular board meetings and better attendance at such meetings (Adams
& Ferreira, 2009). Female directors have been linked with dividend payout (Chen et al., 2017) for firms with otherwise weaker
governance structures.
Second, female directors reduce corporate misconduct and malpractices that may be damaging to the firm’s reputation. Female
directors also improve governance quality by increasing engaged deliberations regarding strategic decisions such as mergers and
acquisitions (Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014) and lessening male CEO overconfidence (Chen, Leung, Song, & Goergen, 2019). Prior literature
concurs that BGD reduces corporate fraud (Cumming et al., 2015), improves earnings quality by reducing earnings management
(García Lara, García Osma, Mora, & Scapin, 2017; Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, & Chtioui, 2018), and decreases corporate tax aggressiveness
(Lanis, Richardson, & Taylor, 2017). Moreover, female directors enhance a firm reputation through their emphasis on greater
stakeholder orientation (Adams & Funk, 2012; Hill & Jones, 1992), are less likely to lay off the workforce , and tend to have a greater
environmental orientation (e.g., Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016). In a nutshell, the above discussion indicates that
female directors enhance the quality of governance and decision-making and improve the firm’s reputation and environmental
orientation.
2.2. BGD, morality, and environmental concerns
Gender socialization and ethicality theories indicate that female directors are more empathetic to societal issues than their male
2
To some extent, there is a disagreement in the literature regarding the impact of board gender diversity on firm value; however, the evidence is
inconclusive (e.g., Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 2014; Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, & Lebelle, 2013; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Erhardt et al., 2003; Owen
& Temesvary, 2018).
3
counterparts for at least two reasons. First, women characterize morality and ethics in a different way than men. For instance, morality
for women is about responsibilities, including duty of care and concern for others. This concern leads to the mitigation of the “real and
recognizable trouble of this world” (Gilligan, 1977, p. 511). On the other hand, morality for men is mainly focused on the right to life,
not interfering with the rights of others and self-gratification. Second, helping behavior also varies between the genders (Eagly &
Crowley, 1986). For example, men generally focus on gallant and short-term actions, while women’s helping behavior is more often
caring and long-term in nature.
Of direct relevance to our study is the fact that tackling environmental issues requires long-term actions; thus, we conjecture that
women are more likely to take pro-environmental actions, including reducing waste generation and improving recycling activities.
Prior literature supports the notion that female managers care more about society compared to their male counterparts (Tormo-Carbó,
Oltra, Klimkiewicz, & Seguí-Mas, 2019). Female directors are not inclined to defend malpractices, including matters related to tax
evasion and bribery (Chen, Velasquez Tuliao, Cullen, & Chang, 2016), show positive attitudes towards ethical behavior (Ibrahim,
Angelidis, & Tomic, 2009), and promote renewable energy consumption (Atif et al., 2021) for environmental protection. Given these
arguments, female directors are expected to consider long-term societal issues as more important (i.e., environmental concerns) and
should therefore be inclined to reduce waste generation and promote the recycling of waste in their firms.
Consistent with the assertions of gender socialization (Dawson, 1997) and ethical theories, Boulouta (2013) supports the
compassionate nature of women, as they tend to reduce malpractices in business that result in higher CSRratings and thus increase
corporate reputation (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; McGuinness et al., 2017). Moreover, female directors are associated with voluntary
disclosures regarding CSR practices valued by the market (Nekhili, Nagati, Chtioui, & Nekhili, 2017). In addition, female directors are
more concerned about firms’ environmental bearing. For instance, Pearl-Martinez and Stephens (2016) argue that higher workforce
gender diversity is crucial for the push toward a more sustainable society. Extant literature supports this assertion, as firms with female
directors perform better on environmental performance fronts (see, e.g., Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). Finally, Liu (2018) and Atif
et al. (2021) suggest that firms with BGD are less likely to face environmental lawsuits and more likely to promote environmental
initiatives.
Based on the above discussion, we conjecture that female directors have a higher tendency to take up environmental concerns – one
of society’s long-term challenges. We anticipate that corporations with female directors are more inclined to address environmental
issues by reducing waste generation and increasing recycling activities. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1. Female directors on the board reduce waste generation and enhance recycling activities.
It is evident from the literature review that one woman is considered to be insufficient to affect corporate decision-making. The
reason lies in the distorted perceptions of male observers about women’s leadership qualities that are the result of gender role ste
reotypes (Block, 1973; Kanter, 1977; Sherrick, Hoewe, & Waddell, 2014). This kind of bias about female directors impedes them to be
influential in corporate decision-making (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Hence, Kanter (1977) presumes that a single woman is a
“token”, i.e., an individual representing a specific cohort. This perceived token significance of women underpins the stereotypes that
females lack the attributes required to serve in top positions, thus creating a glass ceiling for women’s career ladders (Lee & James,
2007). Given the perceived token status attached to women, a critical mass of female directors on the board becomes crucial to ensure
their impact on corporate decision-making.
Many prior studies support the fact that more than one female director is required to influence corporate policies (see, for instance,
Terjesen et al., 2009; Jia & Zhang, 2013; Owen & Temesvary, 2018; Atif, Liu, & Huang, 2019). Boards are expected to experience
significant change when the number of women on the board becomes larger since the women will feel stronger and less constrained
(Terjesen et al., 2009). There is an emerging consensus in the extant literature that the increased representation of women results in
better environmental decisions, as females are more likely to direct the board’s attention toward environmental issues (Al-Shaer &
Zaman, 2016).
Critical mass theory suggests that once female directors reach a certain number (i.e., two or more) on the board, they become more
influential. Kristie (2011) observes the critical mass as follows: one female director on the board is a token, two are a presence, and
three become a voice. This expectation is empirically validated by Post et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2014), and Atif et al. (2019). Therefore,
we present our hypothesis as follows:
H2. Two or more female directors on the board have a significantly negative impact on waste generation and enhance recycling
activities.
The board of directors, being the governing body of the firm, influences decision-making related to waste generation and recycling
activities given their supervisory roles (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; García Lara et al., 2017). However, the role of independent female
directors on the board is critical to board efficiency (Ahmed & Atif, 2021), as it serves as a retort to stakeholders’ pressure and ex
pectations of higher board independence. This is because stakeholders may reasonably question the effectiveness of the board if ex
ecutive directors dominate the board, given their pecuniary relationship with the firm. Extant literature concurs that independent
female directors have a pronounced impact on decision-making compared to executive directors, including in relation to firm per
formance and dividend payouts (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2014). The presence of independent female directors on the board is
related to the low rate of financial fraud incidence and higher transparency (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). In a similar context,
Atif et al. (2021) and Atif et al. (2020) show that independent female directors have a significant impact on promoting renewable
energy and sustainable investment in firms. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that independent female directors are more likely to
direct firm resources towards waste management activities than executive female directors. Therefore, we present our next hypothesis
as follows:
4
H3. The presence of independent female directors, rather than executive female directors, reduces waste generation and increases
recycling.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample
We construct our sample by extracting data from multiple sources. Our initial sample consists of firms included in the Thomson
Reuters Asset4 database, which provides waste generation and recycling data. We collect females’ board directorships and other
corporate governance data from BoardEx, accounting data from WorldScope, and gross domestic product (GDP) data from the World
Bank. We then merge the data from all sources and eliminate firm-year observations with missing data on any of the variables required
to perform our analyses. Consistent with prior literature (Chen et al., 2019), we exclude countries with less than ten firm-year ob
servations and winsorize all continuous variables at the bottom 1% and top 99% levels to remove the potential impact of outliers.
These data filters yield an unbalanced panel of 8365 firm-year observations for 1581 unique firms between 2002 and 2017 across 37
countries. The definitions of all the variables are given in Table A1 of the appendix.
Table A2 in the appendix provides the distribution of the sample and main variables: namely, female directors and waste generation
by country and year. Panel A reveals that a large number of firm-year observations are from the US (1,358), UK (1,028), and Japan
(862). The top three countries allocating more board seats to women are Norway (45.9%), France (38.7%), and Finland (28.6%). This
demonstrates that the introduction of board gender quota laws in Europe has increased the representation of women on corporate
boards. Finally, corporations in the three countries producing the most waste (average tons) are the Russian Federation (14.092),
Canada (13.370), and Ireland (11.995). Interestingly, Panel B reports an increasing trend in the number of observations and female
directors throughout the sample period. However, the level of waste produced by sample firms ranges between 10.484 and 11.178
tons, with a continuous decrease in recent years (2012–2017). This indicates to some extent that increasing trends in female board
representation may affect waste generation negatively.
3.2. Measurement of main variables
The dependent variable of interest in this study is waste management, which is operationalized using multiple proxies. In the recent
literature (Benjamin, Regasa, Wellalage, & M Marathamuthu, 2020), waste is measured as the total amount of waste corporations
generate and report. Specifically, in the main analysis, we measure waste (WASTE) as the natural logarithm of the total waste (both
hazardous and non-hazardous) generated in tons. As an alternative to our primary measure of waste, we also focus on both components
of waste, that is, hazardous and non-hazardous waste. Hazardous waste (H_WASTE) and non-hazardous waste (NH_WASTE) are
measured as the natural logarithm of the hazardous and non-hazardous waste generated in tons, respectively. We then go beyond the
prior literature (Benjamin et al., 2020) and consider another aspect of waste management, namely, waste recycling (R_WASTE), which
is measured as the ratio of the recycled waste to total waste generated. Finally, under robustness analysis, we operationalize our
measure of waste in two different ways; namely, as the ratio of the total waste in tons to total assets (WASTE/ASSETS) and the ratio of
the total waste in tons to total sales (WASTE/SALES) to incorporate size and level of production activity at the firm level.
Our independent variable of interest is BGD. Consistent with extant literature (e.g., Gull et al., 2018; Atif et al., 2021), we measure
BGD by the proportion of female directors on the board (F_PRO) in our main analysis (H1) and alternatively by the number of female
directors on the board (F_NUM), with a dummy variable capturing the presence of female directors on the board (F_DUMMY). We then
employ three dummy variables, F1, F2, and F3, to test the validity of critical mass theory (H2). Following Torchia et al. (2011) and Atif
et al. (2019), F1 is set equal to 1 if one female director is present on the board and 0 otherwise; F2 is set equal to 1 if two female
directors are present on the board, and 0 otherwise; and F3 is set equal to 1 if three or more female directors are present on the board,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, we focus on the specific role assigned to female directors on the board to disentangle the advisory and
monitoring effect (H3). This analysis helps illustrate whether female directors have a different impact on waste management based on
their role within the board of directors. Following existing literature (Atif et al., 2019; Nekhili, Gull, Chtioui, & Radhouane, 2020;
Nekhili, Bennouri, & Nagati, 2022), we measure independent female directors (FNED_PRO) and executive female directors (FED_PRO)
as the proportion of independent female and executive directors on the board, respectively.
3.3. Empirical models
To test our hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) examining the effect of BGD on waste management, we run the following models using the
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique.
∑ ∑ ∑
Waste Managementi,t = β0 + β1(F_PRO)i,t,c + β2(Controls)i,t,c + β3 (industry)i + β4 (year)t + β5 (country)c + εi,t,c (1)
∑ ∑ ∑
Waste Managementi,t = β0 + β1(F1)i,t,c + β2(F2)i,t,c + β3(F3)i,t,c + β4(Controls)i,t,c + β5 (industry)i + β6 (year)t + β7 (country)c + εi,t,c(2)
∑ ∑ ∑
Waste Managementi,t = β0 + β1(FNED_PRO)i,t,c + β2(FED_PRO)i,t,c + β3(Controls)i,t,c + β4 (industry)i + β5 (year)t + β6 (country)c +εi,t,
c (3)
where, Waste Management in three equations represents our proxies for waste management: namely, total waste (WASTE), hazardous
5
waste (H_WASTE), non-hazardous waste (NH_WASTE), and waste recycling (R_WASTE). F_PRO is the proportion of female directors on
the board. F1, F2, and F3 are dummy variables capturing the presence of one, two, and three or more female directors on the board,
respectively. FNED_PRO and FED_PRO represent the proportion of independent and executive female directors on the board, respec
tively. Controls refers to the set of control variables that may also impact the level of waste generation and recycling by the sample
firms. Our selection of control variables is based on prior studies (e.g., Ahmed, Atif, & Gyapong, 2021; Chen et al., 2017). These
variables include board size (B_SIZE), board independence (B_IND), separation of the CEO and board chair roles (SEPARATE), presence
of a CSR committee (CSR_COM), third party assurance of CSR reports (CSR_AUDIT), research and development intensity (R&D),
profitability (ROA), Tobin’s Q (TQ), financial loss (LOSS), the level of cash holdings (CASH), financial leverage (LEVERAGE), annual
turnover (SALES), firm size (SIZE), and annual GDP growth (GDP). We also control for year, industry, and country effects. The defi
nitions of all the variables are given in Table A1 in the appendix.
4. Results
4.1. Univariate results
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics based on the whole sample. Concerning several measures of waste, the mean value of
waste (WASTE), hazardous waste (H_WASTE), non-hazardous waste (NH_WASTE), and recycled waste (R_WASTE) is 10.959, 8.185,
11.074, and 60.6%, respectively. For female directors, the results show that the average proportion and number of female directors
(F_PRO & F_NUM) are 15.4% and 1.850, respectively. Furthermore, 76.5% of the sample firms have one female (F_DUMMY) on their
board of directors. Regarding the gender balance of the corporate boards, the findings reveal that, on average, 23.7%, 22.5%, and
30.1% of firms appoint one female (F1), two females (F3), and three or more females (F3) on their board of directors, respectively. The
mean percentage of independent female directors (FNED_PRO) and executive female directors (FED_PRO) is 14.1% and 1.3%,
respectively. Interestingly, these statistics indicate that the sample firms tend to appoint females as independent rather than executive
directors. Finally, the mean value of Hofstede’s cultural index on masculinity (MAS) is 57.361.
With regard to the control variables, Table 1 shows that the mean board size (B_SIZE) is 2.413 (natural logarithm value), and the
average level of board independence (B_IND) is 77.7%. On average, 34.7% of the firms have separated the CEO, and board chair
position (SEPARATE), 82.7% of the firms have set up a sustainability committee (CSR_COM), and 73.0% of the firms have assured their
sustainability/CSR reports through third party audit (CSR_AUDIT). The mean value of research and development intensity (R&D) is
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and mean difference test for firms with and without female directors.
Variables Full Sample Without Female With Female Mean Diff
N Mean SD N Mean N Mean
WASTE 8365 10.959 3.003 1961 11.141 6404 10.903 0.238***

H_WASTE 4635 8.185 3.114 834 8.152 3801 8.192 − 0.041
NH_WASTE 4803 11.074 3.150 855 11.197 3948 11.048 0.149
WASTE/ASSETS 8365 0.595 3.196 1961 0.873 6404 0.510 0.362***
WASTE/SALES 8365 1.667 9.201 1961 2.484 6404 1.417 1.066***
R_WASTE 5933 0.606 0.284 1312 0.654 4621 0.592 0.062***
MAS 7919 57.361 20.867 1807 68.071 6112 54.195 13.876***
F_PRO 8365 0.154 0.124 – – – – –
F_NUM 8365 1.850 1.617 – – – – –
F_DUMMY 8365 0.765 0.423 – – – – –
FNED_PRO 8365 0.141 0.119 – – – – –
FED_PRO 8365 0.013 0.029 – – – – –
F1 8365 0.237 0.425 – – – – –
F2 8365 0.225 0.418 – – – – –
F3 8365 0.301 0.459 – – – – –
B_SIZE 8365 2.413 0.307 1961 2.284 6404 2.452 − 0.168***
B_IND 8365 0.777 0.218 1961 0.604 6404 0.831 − 0.227***
SEPARATE 8365 0.347 0.476 1961 0.326 6404 0.353 − 0.027***
CSR_COM 8365 0.827 0.377 1961 0.779 6404 0.842 − 0.063***
CSR_AUDIT 8365 0.730 0.443 1961 0.749 6404 0.725 0.024**
R&D 8365 0.023 0.049 1961 0.024 6404 0.022 0.002
ROA 8365 5.814 7.176 1961 5.155 6404 6.016 − 0.861***
TQ 8365 1.608 0.970 1961 1.447 6404 1.658 − 0.211***
LOSS 8365 0.083 0.276 1961 0.087 6404 0.081 0.006
CASH 8365 0.110 0.102 1961 0.132 6404 0.103 0.029***
LEVERAGE 8365 0.259 0.157 1961 0.248 6404 0.262 − 0.014***
SALES 8365 17.619 2.549 1961 18.907 6404 17.224 1.683***
SIZE 8365 16.949 2.494 1961 18.369 6404 16.514 1.855***
GDP 8365 1.749 2.094 1961 1.713 6404 1.760 − 0.047
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for all variables based on the whole sample and mean differences for the subsample of firms with and
without female directors. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in
Appendix Table A1.
6
0.023; return on assets (ROA) shows a mean percentage of 5.814; and the average value of Tobin’s Q (TQ) is 1.608. On average, 8.3% of
firms report negative earnings (LOSS), and the mean value of cash holdings is 0.110. On average, 25.9% of the assets are financed by
debt (LEVERAGE), and the mean value of turnover is 17.619. On average, the firm size (SIZE) is 16.949, and the mean percentage of
GDP growth (GDP) is 1.749.
Table 1 also provides a summary of the mean differences in the variables between firm years with and without female directors. It
shows that boards of 23.7% of sample firms are solely composed of male directors. In line with our expectations, firms without female
directors relatively generate more waste as measured by the mean difference tests based on total waste (WASTE), waste to assets ratio
(WASTE/ASSETS), and waste to sales ratio (WASTE/SALES); this difference is significant at the 1% level. Firms with and without
female directors do not differ significantly based on the level of hazardous (H_WASTE) and non-hazardous waste (NH_WASTE).
However, firms without female directors are more likely to recycle their waste (R_WASTE), and this difference is significant at the 1%
level. Interestingly, the mean value of Hofstede’s cultural index on masculinity (MAS) is also significantly high for firms without female
directors, suggesting that such firms are more likely to be found in highly masculine societies. In short, firms with and without female
directors differ significantly based on control variables, and these differences are statistically significant for all variables except
research and development intensity (R&D), financial loss (LOSS), and GDP growth (GDP).
We check the correlation among the variables and make sure that our results are not spurious due to the multicollinearity problem;
Table A3 in the appendix provides the correlations matrix. Extant literature (Atif & Ali, 2021;Atif et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2014) suggests
that a correlation greater than 0.70 or variance inflation factors (VIFs) larger than ten may indicate the issue of multicollinearity.
Table A3 shows that the correlation among all the variables is less than 0.7, except for some alternative measures of BGD and waste.
We, therefore, do not use these variables in the same model; thus, a high correlation among these variables does not affect our results.
To further explore this issue, we calculate the VIFs for all variables. The unreported VIF value for all the variables is within acceptable
limits, thus confirming that multicollinearity is not an issue in our study.
Table 2
Female directors and waste management.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
WASTE R_WASTE H_WASTE NH_WASTE
F_PRO − 1.365*** 0.132*** − 0.789** − 1.248***

(-4.99) (3.40) (-2.01) (-3.24)
B_SIZE 0.054 0.087*** − 0.205 − 0.061
(0.49) (5.45) (-1.21) (-0.36)
B_IND 0.005** − 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.018***
(2.38) (-4.82) (2.98) (4.92)
SEPARATE 0.064 − 0.006 0.167* 0.047
(1.08) (-0.75) (1.89) (0.53)
CSR_COM 0.577*** − 0.019* 0.500*** 0.673***
(7.85) (-1.70) (4.68) (6.28)
CSR_AUDIT 0.305*** 0.021** 0.208** 0.065
(4.87) (2.35) (2.26) (0.72)
R&D − 8.399*** − 0.148* 1.533* − 10.114***
(-14.37) (-1.78) (1.91) (-12.64)
ROA 0.009* 0.002*** 0.006 − 0.007
(1.86) (2.93) (0.85) (-1.03)
TQ − 0.339*** 0.018*** − 0.402*** − 0.247***
(-9.96) (3.65) (-8.44) (-5.21)
LOSS 0.447*** − 0.007 0.244 0.265*
(4.28) (-0.51) (1.63) (1.79)
CASH − 2.136*** 0.052 − 1.745*** − 2.451***
(-8.05) (1.30) (-4.29) (-6.05)
LEVERAGE 0.348** 0.011 − 0.209 − 0.354
(2.09) (0.45) (-0.82) (-1.40)
SIZE 0.403*** 0.004 0.077 0.554***
(9.34) (0.71) (1.09) (8.14)
SALES 0.218*** 0.000 0.790*** 0.084
(5.05) (0.06) (11.51) (1.27)
GDP 0.038* 0.002 0.049* 0.043
(1.87) (0.57) (1.78) (1.56)
Intercept 2.146 − 0.203 − 3.029 0.442
(0.99) (-0.71) (-1.26) (0.18)
Observations 8365 5933 4635 4803
Industry, Year & Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.487 0.238 0.449 0.454
F-statistics 101.7 24.77 50.07 52.88
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management (i.e., waste generated and recycled)
as well as the sub-components of waste, i.e., hazardous and non-hazardous waste. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
7
4.2. Multivariate results
4.2.1. BGD and waste management

We start our analysis by analyzing the effect of BGD, measured as the proportion of female directors on the board (F_PRO) and on
the level of waste generation (WASTE) and waste recycling (R_WASTE). Table 2 illustrates the results of the OLS regressions by
estimating model 1. Columns 1 and 2 present the results using waste generation (WASTE) and waste recycled (R_WASTE) as dependent
variables, respectively. As expected, the coefficient on female directors (F_PRO) is negative and significant at the 1% level under
Column 1, and positive and significant (at the 1% level) under Column 2, suggesting that female directors not only reduce the level of
waste generation but also increase waste recycling. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of female directors
on the board is associated with a 1.365 (0.132) percentage point decrease (increase) in the level of waste generated (recycled). The
economic significance of female directors on the level of waste generation and recycling is also important. For example, an increase in
F_PRO by one (sample) standard deviation (e.g., using Table 1) decreases the level of waste generation by approximately 1.91% [F_PRO
(0.154) × − 1.365/WASTE (10.959) = − 0.019] and increases the level of waste recycling by approximately 3.35% [F_PRO (0.154) ×
0.132/R_WASTE (0.606) = 0.033]. Thus, the economic significance is also high.
Additionally, we check the robustness of our main finding by re-estimating model 1 using the individual components of waste
Table 3
Females critical mass, independent vs executive female directors and waste management.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
WASTE R_WASTE WASTE R_WASTE
F1 − 0.258*** 0.014 – –
(-3.32) (1.37) – –
F2 − 0.310*** 0.026** – –
(-3.45) (2.19) – –
F3 − 0.354*** 0.035*** – –
(-3.60) (2.68) – –
FNED_PRO – – − 0.600*** 0.084**
– – (-2.63) (2.18)
FED_PRO – – − 1.157 0.161
– – (-1.64) (1.36)
B_SIZE 0.187 0.077*** 0.247*** 0.072***
(1.61) (4.94) (2.83) (4.79)
B_IND 0.006*** − 0.001** 0.003** − 0.001***
(2.93) (-2.28) (1.98) (-4.20)
SEPARATE 0.045 0.002 − 0.027 − 0.003
(0.74) (0.23) (-0.57) (-0.40)
CSR_COM 0.580*** − 0.024** 0.307*** − 0.020*
(7.67) (-2.37) (5.34) (-1.93)
CSR_AUDIT 0.328*** 0.017** 0.111** 0.024***
(5.11) (2.04) (2.25) (2.89)
R&D − 8.308*** 0.048 − 7.921*** 0.052
(-13.83) (0.42) (-15.73) (0.60)
ROA 0.009* 0.003*** − 0.005 0.003***
(1.86) (4.47) (-1.29) (4.44)
TQ − 0.337*** 0.020*** − 0.127*** 0.014***
(-9.64) (3.87) (-4.52) (2.85)
LOSS 0.463*** 0.009 0.126 0.013
(4.33) (0.67) (1.53) (0.99)
CASH − 2.204*** − 0.044 − 0.838*** − 0.046
(-8.08) (-1.11) (-3.82) (-1.19)
LEVERAGE 0.366** − 0.037 − 0.256* 0.010
(2.14) (-1.48) (-1.82) (0.42)
SIZE 0.398*** 0.001 0.344*** 0.001
(8.97) (0.11) (9.24) (0.13)
SALES 0.234*** − 0.008 0.572*** 0.000
(5.27) (-1.07) (15.34) (0.07)
GDP 0.035* 0.003 0.031** 0.002
(1.69) (1.23) (1.98) (0.87)
Intercept 2.015 0.285 − 0.977 − 0.180
(0.91) (1.10) (-0.58) (-0.68)
Observations 8365 5933 8365 5933
Adj. R2 0.486 0.471 0.708 0.362
F-statistics 98.71 14.58 151.4 26.72
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management, considering the critical mass and
status (i.e., executive or non-executive director) of female directors within the board. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
8
generation, namely, hazardous waste (H_WASTE) and non-hazardous waste (NH_WASTE). The results of this analysis, reported under
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, show that the coefficient on female directors (F_PRO) is still negative and statistically significant at the 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. In addition to female directors, R&D, TQ, and CASH have a significantly negative relationship with waste
generation. In contrast, B_IND, CSR_COM, and CSR_AUDIT have a positive relationship with waste generation. Overall, these results
lend strong support to H1 by providing empirical evidence that females are more sensitive to environmental issues (i.e., waste
management) and firms with female directors are more likely to implement environmentally friendly policies (Atif et al., 2021;
Nadeem et al., 2020).
4.2.2. The critical mass of female directors and waste management

Next, we examine the effect of the critical mass of female directors, measured by dummy variables, indicating one female director
(F1), two female directors (F2), and three or more female directors (F3), on the level of waste generation and recycling. Table 3
(Columns 1 and 2) presents the results of this analysis by estimating model 2. This analysis intends to examine whether the influence of
female directors on the level of waste generation and recycling increases with an increase in their representation on the board.
The results reported under Column 1 of Table 3 show that F1, F2, and F3 are negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated
with the level of waste generation (WASTE). However, the coefficient on F3 (− 0.354) is larger than the coefficient on F2 (− 0.310),
while the coefficient on F2 (− 0.310) is larger than the coefficient on F1 (− 0.258), thus suggesting that the magnitude of the negative
relationship between BGD and the level of waste generation increases with an increase in the number of female directors on the board.
We then check the difference in the coefficients by performing the Wald test: the unreported results reveal that the coefficients on F1,
F2, and F3 are significantly different from each other.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents the results of equivalent regression for the level of waste recycled (R_WASTE). As predicted, one
female director (F1) has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on the level of waste recycled. However, the positive rela
tionship is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels with two (F2) and three or more (F3) female directors on the board,
respectively. Consistent with prior studies (Atif et al., 2019; Torchia et al., 2011), these findings lend support to Kristie’s (2011, p. 22)
review of critical mass theory by showing that “one is token, two is presence, and three is a voice”. Specifically, we find the insig
nificant coefficient on F1 consistent with tokenism, while the coefficient on F2 (0.026) in Column 2 is significant but smaller than the
coefficient (0.035) on F3, which is consistent with the level of presence and voice (Kristie, 2013). We also perform differences in the
coefficients test, and the unreported results of the Wald test confirm that the coefficients on F1, F2, and F3 are significantly different
from each other. Taken together, these results support H2.
4.2.3. Independent and executive female directors and waste management

So far, our findings show that the presence of female directors is negatively (positively) associated with the level of waste gen
eration (recycling). Another important question that needs to be addressed is whether all-female directors behave similarly. In other
words, we try to investigate the channel through which female directors influence the level of waste generation and recycling. To do so,
we follow existing literature and explore the monitoring and executive power channel (i.e., independent vs executive female directors).
Independent female directors are expected to impact strategic decisions, such as waste management activities, via the monitoring
channel because of their independent status and advisory role, while executive female directors might affect strategic decisions
through their involvement in ongoing managerial issues and policy implementation (Liu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Atif et al.,
2019). We report the results of this analysis under Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 by estimating model 3: independent female directors
(FNED_PRO) have a significantly negative (positive) impact on the level of waste generation (recycling). However, executive female
directors (FED_PRO) have neither any significant impact on the level of waste generation (WASTE) nor on the level of waste recycling
(R_WASTE). As expected, the impact of BGD on the level of waste generation and recycling is driven by independent female directors
supporting H3. These findings are consistent with extant literature (Atif et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2017).
4.3. Robustness tests
In this section, we re-examine the main findings using several robustness tests, including alternative measures of female directors;
alternative measures of waste; one-year lagged board variables; excluding board-level variables; excluding dominating countries from
the sample; subsample analysis based on corporate governance quality and the environmental orientation of the firms; and dividing the
firm-years for the G10 and rest of the sample countries.
First, to test whether our results are sensitive to the choice of BGD measures, we conduct this check using the number (F_NUM) and
presence of female directors (F_DUMMY) on the board (Panel A). Second, to test whether our results are sensitive to the measures of
waste, we use the ratio of waste to total assets (WASTE/ASSETS) and the ratio of waste to sales (WASTE/SALES) as alternative
measures of waste generation (Panel B). Third, we employ one-year lagged board variables to check whether our results are stable
(Panel C), as one may argue that the presence of female directors may take time to influence corporate policies. Fourth, our main
findings may be driven by the board-level variables: the board of directors is the main decision-making body within the organization
and might play an active role in the implementation of waste management activities. We, therefore, re-estimate model 1 and exclude
all board-level variables to alleviate this concern (Panel D). Fifth, we check whether our results are driven by the countries with a
higher number of observations in the sample. To conduct this check, we re-estimate model 1 after excluding firms from the UK and US
(Panel E), given the highest firm years from these countries. Sixth, we check whether our results are contingent on firm-level
governance quality. To conduct this check, we re-estimate our model by splitting the sample into strong (High-CG) and weak
governance (Low-CG) firms based on the industry-year average of the corporate governance score by country from the Thomson
9
Reuters database (Panel F). Seventh, we check whether our results are contingent on the firms’ level of environmental orientation, as
some firms may be more environmentally friendly than others. To conduct this check, we re-estimate our model by dividing the sample
into high (High-ENV) and low environmental orientation (Low-ENV) based on the industry-year average of the environmental per
formance score by country from the Thomson Reuters database (Panel G). Finally, we split our sample based on G10 and non-G10
sample countries, as one may argue that firms in advanced economies are more environmentally friendly than those in other econ
omies. Moreover, the large number of firm-years from G10 countries may raise concerns. To address such issues, we re-estimate model
1 based on the split sample and present the results in Panel H. Table 4 reports the regression results for these sensitivity tests, including
the control variables, industry, year, and country effects. In line with our main results, we find that female directors reduce (increase)
the level of waste generation (recycling) across Panels A to H. Additionally, the results of the subsample analysis (Panels F and G)
highlight that the relationship between female directors and the level of waste generated and recycled is relatively more visible in firms
with robust governance mechanisms and higher environmental orientation.
4.4. Identification strategies
We acknowledge that our main findings might be subject to endogeneity concerns due to self-selection bias and reverse causality. In
line with extant studies (Gull et al., 2018; Hossain, Atif, Ahmed, & Mia, 2020; Nadarajah, Atif, & Gull, 2021), we use four identification
strategies; namely, PSM, the Heckman selection model, 2SLS, and DiD to alleviate endogeneity concerns.
Self-selection bias refers to the possibility that effective waste management activities may be in place because of some firm-specific
factors (i.e., control variables) rather than BGD. We, therefore, follow recent literature (Alam, Atif, Chien-Chi, & Soytaş, 2019; Nekhili
et al., 2022) and apply the PSM technique in two steps to control for firm-level factors that may affect the implementation of waste
management activities. First, we create a treatment dummy variable (F_DUMMY), which takes the value of 1 if the firm has at least one
female on the board and 0 otherwise. Based on F_DUMMY, we define firm-years with and without female directors as the treatment and
control groups, respectively. We then proceed to estimate the probability that a firm has female directors. We run a probit regression to
explain F_DUMMY with the same explanatory variables used in model 1, including industry, year, and country effects. Panel A (Column
1) of Table 5 reports the results for the probit regression. The pseudo-R-square for the regression is high (0.468), and most of the
independent variables are (highly) significant.
We use the matching procedure without replacement and set the caliper distance at the 1% level to ensure that firms in the
treatment and control groups are sufficiently identical. We then estimate the predicted value of having a gender-diverse board by
running a probit regression for the dummy variable (F_DUMMY) with the control variables specified in model 1, including industry,
year, and country effects. These estimates are the propensity scores for each firm-year observation. In the second step, based on the
propensity scores, we form two similar subsamples based on different criteria, such as the treatment and control groups. Finally, we
have a matched sample based on which we can examine the association between BGD and the level of waste generation and recycling,
respectively.
To verify that the firm-year observations in the treatment and control groups are indistinguishable in terms of observable char
acteristics, we conduct two diagnostic tests following Chen et al. (2017) and Atif et al. (2019). The first test consists of re-estimating the
probit regression for the post-match sample. The results (Column 2 in Table 5) suggest that none of the coefficients on the explanatory
variables is statistically significant, indicating that there are no significant differences between the two groups. Moreover, the co
efficients in Column 2 are typically smaller in magnitude than those in Column 1, indicating the decline in the degrees of freedom in the
restricted sample. The pseudo-R-square declines from 0.468 to 0.017. This suggests that PSM removes all observable differences other
than the difference in the presence of female directors. The second test examines the differences in the mean of each observable
characteristic between the treatment and control firm-year observations both in the pre-match and post-match samples. Panel B of
Table 5 shows significant differences in the pre-match sample; however, none of the differences in the observable characteristics
between the treatment and control groups is statistically significant in the post-match sample. Overall, the two diagnostic tests suggest
that PSM removes all the observable differences in the explanatory variables other than those relating to BGD. Panel C reports the
results of the PSM estimator, which are also aligned with our main findings. Finally, we rerun the regression based on the matched
sample of firm-year observations (Columns 3 and 4, Panel A in Table 5). The coefficient on WASTE (R_WASTE) is significantly negative
(positive), suggesting that female directors have a strong impact on waste management (i.e., the level of waste generation and
recycling).
As discussed earlier (in subsection 3.1), our sample is restricted to firms included in the Thomson Reuters Asset4 database who
report waste data (i.e., waste generated and recycled). All firms do not report waste data due to the voluntary nature of such disclosure,
suggesting that firms who report waste data may differ from those who do not. For instance, firms that disclose waste data are likely to
care more about stakeholder concerns and may also have gender-diverse boards to seek legitimacy from stakeholders. Alternatively,
qualified female directors, due to their limited pool, may deliberately choose to sit on the boards of firms that are more sensitive to
stakeholder concerns, such as waste management. This suggests that our findings may suffer from bias.
Consistent with García Lara et al. (2017), Nadeem et al. (2020), and Gull, Atif, Issa, Usman, and Siddique (2021), we use Heckman’s
two-step selection model to address this concern. In the first step, we estimate the likelihood of having a gender-diverse board using
F_DUMMY as the dependent variable and include the female to male directors’ ratio by headquarter city as an additional control
variable, which is expected to influence the tendency of firms to have gender-diverse boards (Usman, Gull, Zalata, Wang, & Yin, 2022)
but not necessarily affects the level of waste generation or recycling (our dependent variables); therefore, we do not add it in the
second-stage model. We also control for variables, including year, industry, and country effects, in the first step. The results of the first
step probit regression are reported under Column 1 of Table 6. We then calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (MILLS) and re-estimate model
10
Table 4
Robustness analysis.
Panel A: Alternative measures of female directors
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE
F_NUMB − 0.087*** – 0.012*** –

(-3.88) – (3.88) –
F_DUMMY – − 0.279*** – 0.024**
– (-3.77) – (2.18)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8365 8365 5933 5933
Adj. R2 0.486 0.486 0.239 0.237
F-statistics 101.2 101.2 24.83 24.66
Panel B: Alternative measures of waste
VARIABLES (1) (2)
WASTE/ASSETS WASTE/SALES
F_PRO − 2.363*** − 6.546***

(-6.87) (-6.75)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 8365 8365
Industry, Year & Country Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.302 0.331
F-statistics 47.42 54
Panel C: Lagged board variables
VARIABLES (1) (2)
WASTE R_WASTE
F_PROt-1 − 1.316*** 0.156***

(-4.13) (3.64)
Controls Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.499 0.248
F-statistics 84.51 21.96
Panel D: Excluding board-level variables
VARIABLES (1) (2)
WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO − 1.205*** 0.103***

(-4.35) (2.70)
Controls Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.483 0.231
Panel E: Excluding US and UK firms
VARIABLES (1) (2)
WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO − 1.061*** 0.132***

(-3.13) (3.01)
Controls Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.495 0.395
Panel F: Controlling for firm-level corporate governance (CG) quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-CG Low-CG High-CG Low-CG
VARIABLES WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE

F_PRO − 1.557*** − 0.339 0.154*** 0.063
(-4.71) (-0.68) (3.44) (0.82)
(continued on next page)
11
Table 4 (continued )
Panel F: Controlling for firm-level corporate governance (CG) quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-CG Low-CG High-CG Low-CG

Observations 6249 2116 4470 1463
Adj. R2 0.499 0.503 0.257 0.246
F-statistics 81.93 28.82 21.06 7.607
Panel G: Controlling for firm-level environmental (ENV) orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-ENV Low-ENV High-ENV Low-ENV

F_PRO − 1.162*** − 0.695 0.103** 0.349***
(-3.98) (-0.83) (2.55) (2.89)
Observations 7424 941 5363 570
Adj. R2 0.497 0.530 0.252 0.285
F-statistics 95.02 14.94 24.19 4.240
Panel H: G10 and the rest of the countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
G10 Non-G10 G10 Non-G10

F_PRO − 1.607*** − 1.063** 0.148*** 0.155**
(-4.95) (-1.97) (3.16) (2.22)
Observations 5530 2835 4003 1930
Adj. R2 0.510 0.493 0.230 0.401
F-statistics 124.31 38.97 25.65 11.41
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management, using alternative measures of
female directors, alternative measures of waste, excluding board characteristics, excluding firm-years from countries dominating the sample, firm-
level corporate governance quality and environmental orientation, and firms operating in G10 (G10 countries include Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Control variables are included in the
regressions; however, for purposes of brevity, results of the main independent variables are provided. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
1 in the second step using MILLS as an additional control variable to correct for sample selection bias.3 We report these results under
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6, which are consistent with the results reported in Table 2. Hence, this confirms our main findings are not
subject to sample-selection bias.
Our findings provide evidence that female directors affect waste management. However, firms with poor waste management ac
tivities (i.e., more waste generation and less recycling) in place may wish to hire female directors on their boards to seek legitimacy
from stakeholders. This suggests that the presence of female directors on the board affects waste management activities or vice versa,
causing reverse causality. We corroborate our findings using 2SLS. Following the spirit of extant studies (Nadeem et al., 2020; Usman
et al., 2022; Zalata, Ntim, Choudhry, Hassanein, & Elzahar, 2019), we use two IVs, i.e., the industry average of female directors (FD_IA)
and the female to male directors’ ratio by headquarter city (FM_RATIO). Chen et al. (2017) and Atif et al. (2021) have used female to
male workforce participation as an instrument. However, we follow Usman et al. (2022) and use the female to male directors’ ratio by
headquarters city. The rationale behind the use of this IV is that it is highly unlikely that firms will appoint female directors from the
general workforce because all female workers are not qualified to be appointed to the board of directors. However, firms are more
likely to appoint female directors from the pool of available female directors. We, therefore, use the female to male directors’ ratio over
the ratio of female to the male workforce participation rate, as it is more relevant IV. Additionally, both IVs (FD_IA & FM_RATIO) are
likely to meet the exclusion criterion by (not) being correlated with the (dependent variables, i.e., WASTE & R_WASTE) female di
rectors on the board (F_PRO).
The results of the first-stage estimation are reported under Column 1 of Table 7, where the proportion of female directors on the
board (F_PRO) is the dependent variable. Column 1 shows that the coefficients on both IVs (FD_IA & FM_RATIO) are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The value of the F-statistic is also high. The Anderson canon. corr. LM-statistic is statistically
3
The results reported under Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 show that the coefficient on MILLS is statistically insignificant, indicating the non-
existence of sample-selection bias.
12
Table 5
Propensity score matching.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-match probit Post-match probit Post-match OLS Post-match OLS
VARIABLES F_DUMMY F_DUMMY WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO – – − 1.117** 0.163**

– – (-2.51) (2.06)
B_SIZE 1.271*** − 0.075 − 0.263 0.128***
(13.33) (-0.37) (-1.46) (4.02)
B_IND 0.018*** − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.001
(10.15) (-0.16) (-0.51) (-1.21)
SEPARATE 0.252*** − 0.093 − 0.064 0.005
(4.74) (-0.87) (-0.65) (0.28)
CSR_COM 0.242*** − 0.101 0.328*** − 0.037*
(3.95) (-0.99) (2.95) (-1.78)
CSR_AUDIT 0.075 − 0.045 0.058 0.006
(1.31) (-0.42) (0.57) (0.32)
R&D 0.363 0.525 − 9.079*** − 0.627***
(0.57) (0.38) (-7.94) (-3.52)
ROA 0.006 − 0.002 − 0.015* 0.002
(1.41) (-0.34) (-1.90) (1.37)
TQ 0.074** − 0.020 − 0.202*** 0.010
(2.19) (-0.32) (-3.19) (0.87)
LOSS 0.028 − 0.009 − 0.133 0.007
(0.30) (-0.07) (-0.76) (0.22)
CASH − 1.299*** 0.070 0.197 0.017
(-5.10) (0.16) (0.42) (0.22)
LEVERAGE 0.222 0.269 − 0.451 − 0.038
(1.36) (0.81) (-1.50) (-0.74)
SIZE 0.107** − 0.046 0.461*** 0.020
(2.45) (-0.55) (5.74) (1.41)
SALES 0.043 0.053 0.483*** − 0.025*
(1.00) (0.63) (6.14) (-1.85)
GDP 0.028* − 0.020 0.040 − 0.004
(1.70) (-0.96) (1.38) (-0.82)
Intercept − 7.088*** 0.182 4.131*** 0.365
(-15.37) (0.20) (4.88) (1.62)
Observations 7952 2096 2096 1320
Pseudo R2 0.468 0.017 – –
Adj. R2 – – 0.717 0.329
F-statistics – – 46.80 10.25
Panel B: Pre- and post-matched sample analysis
Variable Original sample Propensity score-matched sample
Control group Treatment group Mean Control group Treatment group Mean
(F_DUMMY=0) (F_DUMMY=1) differences (F_DUMMY=0) (F_DUMMY=1) differences
N=1961 N=6404 N=1048 N=1048
Mean Mean Mean Mean
B_SIZE 2.284 2.452 − 0.168*** 2.345 2.345 0.001

B_IND 0.604 0.831 − 0.227*** 0.713 0.715 − 0.002
SEPARATE 0.326 0.353 − 0.027*** 0.301 0.284 0.016
CSR_COM 0.779 0.842 − 0.063*** 0.752 0.751 0.001
CSR_AUDIT 0.749 0.725 0.024** 0.698 0.692 0.007
R&D 0.024 0.022 0.002 0.020 0.019 0.000
ROA 5.155 6.016 − 0.861*** 5.250 4.842 0.408
TQ 1.447 1.658 − 0.211*** 1.501 1.463 0.038
LOSS 0.087 0.081 0.006 0.094 0.101 − 0.008
CASH 0.132 0.103 0.029*** 0.118 0.118 0.000
LEVERAGE 0.248 0.262 − 0.014*** 0.261 0.269 − 0.007
SIZE 18.907 17.224 1.683*** 17.838 17.911 − 0.073
SALES 18.369 16.514 1.855*** 17.219 17.279 − 0.060
GDP 1.713 1.760 − 0.047 1.708 1.682 0.026
Panel C: Propensity score matching estimator
Control group (F_DUMMY=0) Treatment group (F_DUMMY=1) Control group (F_DUMMY=0) Treatment group (F_DUMMY=1)
(continued on next page)
13
Table 5 (continued )
Panel C: Propensity score matching estimator
Control group (F_DUMMY=0) Treatment group (F_DUMMY=1) Control group (F_DUMMY=0) Treatment group (F_DUMMY=1)
N Mean N Mean Mean differences N Mean N Mean Mean differences
N Mean N Mean Mean differences N Mean N Mean Mean differences
WASTE 1961 11.141 6404 10.903 0.238*** 1048 11.140 1048 10.746 0.394***
R_WASTE 1312 0.654 4621 0.592 0.062*** 1048 0.596 1048 0.613 − 0.017
Note: Panel A presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management using Propensity score matching
(PSM). Panels B and C present the mean differences in firm-level (i.e., control variables) variables and estimators (i.e., main dependent variables) for
the treatment and control groups based on the pre-and post-match samples. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance
at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
Table 6
Two-step Heckman model.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
F_DUMMY WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO – − 1.018*** 0.150***

– (-3.25) (3.54)
MILLS – 0.054 − 0.004
– (0.83) (-0.40)
FM_RATIO 13.605*** – –
(27.48) – –
B_SIZE 1.672*** 0.118 0.082***
(14.56) (0.96) (4.82)
B_IND 0.022*** 0.007*** − 0.002***
(10.83) (3.07) (-4.88)
SEPARATE 0.155** 0.020 − 0.007
(2.52) (0.32) (-0.86)
CSR_COM 0.326*** 0.580*** − 0.025**
(4.50) (7.39) (-2.15)
CSR_AUDIT − 0.056 0.286*** 0.020**
(-0.84) (4.25) (2.11)
R&D 1.519* − 8.138*** − 0.111
(1.90) (-13.29) (-1.32)
ROA 0.009* 0.010** 0.002***
(1.68) (1.98) (2.70)
TQ 0.094** − 0.344*** 0.019***
(2.33) (-9.58) (3.72)
LOSS 0.033 0.434*** − 0.003
(0.30) (3.92) (-0.18)
CASH − 1.298*** − 2.037*** 0.072*
(-4.36) (-7.25) (1.78)
LEVERAGE 0.617*** 0.363** 0.016
(3.16) (2.06) (0.66)
SIZE 0.097* 0.392*** 0.008
(1.88) (8.56) (1.29)
SALES 0.027 0.254*** − 0.002
(0.52) (5.57) (-0.36)
GDP − 0.003 0.038* 0.003
(-0.17) (1.76) (0.88)
Intercept − 9.011*** 3.603*** 0.239
(-15.64) (6.64) (1.52)
Observations 7952 7952 5642
Industry, Year & Country Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.611 – –
Adj. R2 – 0.488 0.247
F-statistics – 107.8 27.02
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management using the Two-step
Heckman model. FM_RATIO is the average female to male directors’ ratio by headquarters city used as an instrument in the probit
regression of two-step Heckman. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels,
respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
14
Table 7
Two-stage least squares (2SLS).
(1) (2) (3)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage
VARIABLES F_PRO WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO – − 0.591** 0.083*

– (-2.22) (1.85)
FD_IA 0.651*** – –
(61.82) – –
FM_RATIO 0.314*** – –
(51.93) – –
B_SIZE − 0.001 0.245*** 0.072***
(-0.50) (2.84) (4.87)
B_IND 0.000*** 0.003** − 0.001***
(8.39) (2.01) (-4.25)
SEPARATE 0.006*** − 0.026 − 0.003
(4.05) (-0.55) (-0.40)
CSR_COM 0.007*** 0.307*** − 0.020*
(4.05) (5.37) (-1.93)
CSR_AUDIT 0.001 0.110** 0.024***
(1.00) (2.24) (2.95)
R&D 0.015 − 7.904*** 0.050
(1.01) (-15.83) (0.58)
ROA 0.000** − 0.005 0.003***
(2.26) (-1.33) (4.50)
TQ 0.002** − 0.127*** 0.014***
(2.44) (-4.53) (2.85)
LOSS 0.000 0.124 0.014
(0.19) (1.53) (1.01)
CASH − 0.031*** − 0.838*** − 0.046
(-4.73) (-3.85) (-1.21)
LEVERAGE − 0.000 − 0.258* 0.010
(-0.00) (-1.85) (0.43)
SIZE 0.004*** 0.345*** 0.001
(3.24) (9.33) (0.09)
SALES 0.002 0.572*** 0.000
(1.43) (15.47) (0.05)
GDP − 0.001 0.031** 0.002
(-1.58) (1.98) (0.88)
Intercept − 0.106** − 0.995 − 0.176
(-2.08) (-0.60) (-0.68)
Adj. R2 0.846 0.713 0.337
F-statistics 334.05 152.5 26.92
Anderson canon. Corr. LM statistic 5428.615 – –
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 7606.643 – –
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% maximal IV size 19.93 – –
Sargan (P-value) – 0.559 0.161
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
FD_IA (the industry average of female directors) and FM_RATIO (the average of female to male directors by headquarter city) are used as instruments
in the 1st stage. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables
are defined in Appendix Table A1.
significant (under-identification test), and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is also higher than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical
value at the 10% IV size. All the diagnostic tests suggest that our IVs are valid. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 report the results of the
second-stage estimates using the predicted proportion of female directors on the board from the first-stage regression to estimate the
level of waste generation and recycling. These results also validate a negative (positive) and statistically significant relationship be
tween female directors and the level of waste generation (recycling). Therefore, we can reliably infer that female directors not only
reduce the level of waste generation but also increase waste recycling.
Finally, we test the influence of BGD on waste management around an exogenous event, the introduction of board gender balance
reforms between 2002 and 2017,4 to address the potential issue of endogeneity.5 We employ a DiD analysis around the board gender
4
Board gender balance reforms refer to either mandatory (i.e., board gender quotas) or voluntary initiatives (i.e., board gender balance rec
ommendations) introduced in sample countries aimed at improving the gender balance of the board of directors during the sample period.
5
We are grateful to the Editor, Professor Wenxuan Hou for this suggestion.
15
balance reforms during our sample period. We define our treatment group based on firms that are subject to board gender balance
reforms (i.e., 3561 firm-year observations), while the control group consists of firms not subject to such reforms (i.e., 4804 firm-year
observations). The control firms are matched using the same procedures as noted in PSM.
Table 8 presents the results of the DiD analysis. We start with a univariate analysis to ensure that the treatment and control groups
are comparable in terms of observable characteristics, except regarding their association with female directors. Panel A reports the
results of mean differences between the treatment and control groups’ characteristics and shows that both groups are identical. We
follow Zaman, Atawnah, Baghdadi, and Liu (2021) and Atif, Liu, and Nadarajah (2022) to run the DiD estimator and evaluate the
impact of board gender balance reforms on waste management. In Panels B and C, we calculate the change in waste generation
(WASTE) and recycling (R_WASTE) from the pre-event period (i.e., the three years before the introduction of board gender balance
reforms) to the post-event period (i.e., the three years after the introduction of board gender balance reforms) for both the treatment
and control groups. The average change during the three-year period in WASTE (R_WASTE) for the treatment group is − 0.375 (0.020),
while the change for the control group is 0.006 (− 0.041). The DiD estimator for WASTE (R_WASTE) is − 0.381 (0.061) and significant
at the 10% (1%) level. This confirms our main findings.
5. Additional analyses
5.1. Moderating role of national culture
In line with critical mass theory, extant studies (Atif et al., 2019; Jia & Zhang, 2013; Owen & Temesvary, 2018; Torchia et al., 2011)
suggest that an inclusive and gender-balanced board is required to garner the real benefits of BGD. By performing a meta-analysis of
140 articles published on the nexus of female directors and firm performance, Post and Byron (2015) show a negative association
between female directors and firm performance in countries with less gender equality in terms of human capital and vice versa,
suggesting that women find it difficult to work in male-dominated societies. Inspired by these conjectures, we examine whether the
association between female directors and waste management (i.e., the level of waste generation and recycling) is also contingent on
male dominance in society (i.e., masculinity vs femininity – a dimension of national culture). To perform this analysis, we mainly rely
on Hofstede’s cultural index of the masculinity and femininity dimension due to its direct relevance to our research.6 However, we
control other dimensions of Hofstede’s cultural index, such as power distance (PD), individualism (IND), and uncertainty avoidance
(UNCERT), in our empirical model. To model the relationship between female directors (F_PRO), masculinity (MAS), and waste
management (WASTE & R_WASTE), we use the following model.
Waste Managementi,t = β0 + β1(F_PRO X MAS)i,t,c + β2(F_PRO)i,t,c + β3(MAS)i,t,c + β4(PD)i,t,c + β5(IND)i,t,c + β6(UNCERT)i,t,c +β7(Controls)i,t,
∑ ∑ ∑
c+ β8 (industry)i + β9 (year)t + β10 (country)c + εi,t,c (4)
where the dependent variable is waste management, measured by WASTE and R_WASTE. The independent and control variables are
similar to those in model 1 except for the national culture dimensions; namely, masculinity (MAS), power distance (PD), individualism
(IND), uncertainty avoidance (UNCERT), and the interaction between female directors and masculinity (F_PRO X MAS), which is our
main variable of interest. We estimate the model using OLS regressions and report the results under Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. The
results show that the coefficients on the interaction term for waste management (i.e., WASTE & R_WASTE) are statistically insignif
icant, suggesting poor waste management by female directors in countries high on masculinity. This confirms that the relationship
between BGD and waste management is moderated by the masculinity dimension of national culture.
5.2. Female directors, waste management, and firm performance
In this section, we examine whether waste management and female directors affect firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ).
Given the positive effect of female directors on waste management, we expect that there might be a spillover effect on firm perfor
mance. To model the relationship between female directors (F_PRO), waste management (WASTE & R_WASTE), and firm performance
(TQ), we use the following model.
Firm Performancei,t = β0 + β1(F_PRO)i,t,c + β2(Waste Management)i,t,c + β3(F_PRO X Waste Management)i,t,c + β4(Controls)i,t,c +

∑ ∑ ∑
β5 (industry)i + β6 (year)t + β6 (country)c + εi,t (5)
where the dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ). The independent and control variables are similar to
those in model 1, except for the interaction terms between female directors and waste management (F_PRO X WASTE & F_PRO X
R_WASTE), which are our main variables of interest. We estimate model 5 using the OLS regressions and report results under Columns 1
and 2 of Table 10. The coefficients on the interaction terms under both columns are positive and statistically significant at the 10%
6
A higher value on masculinity indicates male dominance in society.
16
Table 8
Difference-in-differences analysis.
Panel A: Post-matched sample mean differences
Variables Treated (N=2477) Control (N=2477) Mean Differences t-statistics
WASTE 10.841 11.113 − 0.272*** − 3.11

R_WASTE 0.616 0.545 0.071*** 7.43
B_SIZE 2.419 2.433 − 0.014 − 1.56
B_IND 0.839 0.849 − 0.010 − 1.47
SEPARATE 0.349 0.331 0.019 1.38
CSR_COM 0.856 0.855 0.002 0.16
CSR_AUDIT 0.740 0.731 0.009 0.74
R&D 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.26
ROA 5.944 6.076 − 0.132 − 0.62
TQ 1.658 1.672 − 0.013 − 0.46
LOSS 0.084 0.087 − 0.003 − 0.36
CASH 0.106 0.106 0.000 0.05
LEVERAGE 0.265 0.262 0.003 0.68
SALES 17.066 16.973 0.093 1.61
SIZE 16.357 16.267 0.090 1.51
GDP 1.904 1.877 0.027 0.45
Panel B: Waste generation
VARIABLES Before Reform After Reform After – Before Reform
Control Firms 11.091 11.097 0.006

Treated Firms 11.152 10.777 − 0.375***
Treated – Control Firms 0.061 − 0.320*** –
Difference-in-Differences – – − 0.381* (− 1.86)
Panel C: Waste recycling
VARIABLES Before Reform After Reform After – Before Reform
Control Firms 0.591 0.550 − 0.041

Treated Firms 0.589 0.609 0.020***
Treated – Control Firms − 0.002 0.059*** –
Difference-in-Differences – – 0.061*** (2.85)
Note: This table presents the difference-in-differences (DiD) regression results of waste management around the introduction of board gender balance
reforms during the sample period (2002–2017). The treatment group consists of firms that are subject to the board gender balance reform, and control
firms are those which are not subject to such reform. Panel A shows the post-matching mean differences for treatment and control firms’ charac
teristics. Panels B and C present the DiD estimators for waste generation and recycling, respectively. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, ***
represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
level, suggesting better firm performance because of the effective waste management activities implemented by female directors.
Collectively, our results signal a positive impact on the firm performance.7
5.3. Female directors, sustainable compensation, and waste management
Finally, prior literature (e.g., Haque, 2017) suggests that board characteristics, including gender diversity, focus on carbon
emission reduction initiatives to improve the environment and environment, social, and governance (ESG) based compensation
policies are also considered favorable in this regard. Likewise, we examine whether BGD influences environmentally friendly practices
through the design of executive compensation contracts. To do so, we first run a probit regression using SUS_COMP (a dummy variable
set equal to 1 if the company has a sustainable compensation policy for executives and 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable and
F_PRO (the proportion of female directors) as the independent variable, along with all the control variables used in the main analysis.
The results of this analysis, reported under Column 1 of Table 11, show that the coefficient on F_PRO is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, thus suggesting that firms with female directors are more likely to consider sustainability issues while
designing executive compensation contracts. Next, we examine whether BGD influences waste management through the design of
executive compensation. To do so, we create a new variable, F_PRO X SUS_COMP, which is the interaction term between female di
rectors and the likelihood of having a sustainable compensation policy for the executives. We then include F_PRO X SUS_COMP and
SUS_COMP, along with F_PRO and control variables, and re-estimate model 1. The results of this analysis, reported under Columns 2
and 3 of Table 11, demonstrate that the coefficient on F_PRO X SUS_COMP is significantly negative (positive) for waste generation
7
We thank the reviewer for the suggestion regarding identifying the constraints of the relationship. We run an additional analysis based on a
subsample of firms experiencing profit or loss. Our results, reported in Table A4 in the appendix, indicate that the relationship between board gender
diversity and waste management is more pronounced in profit-making firms compared to those experiencing loss, hence suggesting that the eco
nomic health of a firm is a constraint of the relationship.
17
Table 9
Female directors and waste management: the moderating role of national culture.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO X MAS 0.020 0.004

(1.52) (1.34)
F_PRO − 2.495*** − 0.103
(-3.34) (-0.63)
MAS − 0.279 − 0.065***
(-1.37) (-7.91)
PD − 0.152** − 0.012***
(-2.38) (-4.48)
IND − 0.007 − 0.008***
(-0.47) (-3.58)
UNCERT − 0.055 − 0.025***
(-0.76) (-8.01)
B_SIZE 0.154 0.076***
(1.41) (2.82)
B_IND 0.005** − 0.001**
(2.06) (-2.54)
SEPARATE 0.057 − 0.001
(0.92) (-0.10)
CSR_COM 0.585*** − 0.030*
(7.50) (-1.85)
CSR_AUDIT 0.373*** 0.023
(5.68) (1.54)
R&D − 8.296*** 0.072
(-13.67) (0.39)
ROA 0.009* 0.003***
(1.77) (3.34)
TQ − 0.319*** 0.014
(-8.95) (1.59)
LOSS 0.464*** 0.018
(4.25) (1.19)
CASH − 2.287*** − 0.051
(-8.26) (-0.80)
LEVERAGE 0.442** 0.017
(2.53) (0.36)
SIZE 0.424*** 0.003
(9.40) (0.22)
SALES 0.189*** − 0.003
(4.20) (-0.22)
GDP 0.048** 0.003
(2.23) (0.99)
Intercept 30.726* 6.502***
(1.91) (7.88)
Adj. R2 0.493 0.376
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste
management after controlling for the moderating effect of the masculinity dimension of national
culture. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
(recycling), suggesting that female directors are likely to promote environmentally friendly initiatives by aligning executive
compensation with sustainable business practices.
6. Conclusion
Climate change is a matter of concern for the entire world. Enormous waste generation due to rapid industrialization is exacer
bating the situation. Extant literature (e.g., Atif et al., 2021; Shaukat et al., 2016) looking at the impact of BGD on corporate envi
ronmentally friendly initiatives has largely ignored the consequences of the waste management dimension towards sustainable
growth. In addition, national culture and sustainable compensation policies for executives are relevant decision-making factors related
to sustainability (e.g., Haque, 2017). The recent literature confirms that firms may focus on a single dimension of sustainability at the
expense of other dimensions, leading toward policy–practice decoupling (Sauerwald & Su, 2019; Tashman et al., 2019). Our study,
therefore, fills the void in corporate governance and sustainability accounting literature by providing robust empirical evidence on
how and through which channels BGD affects waste management activities in different countries.
18
Table 10
Female directors, waste management, and financial performance.
VARIABLES (1) (2)
TQ TQ
F_PRO 0.636*** 0.079

(2.72) (0.45)
WASTE − 0.014*** –
(-2.82) –
F_PRO X WASTE 0.035* –
(1.74) –
R_WATE – 0.025
– (0.49)
F_PRO X R_WASTE – 0.457*
– (1.89)
B_SIZE 0.091*** 0.129***
(2.83) (3.42)
B_IND 0.000 − 0.000
(0.34) (-0.11)
SEPARATE 0.017 0.036*
(0.94) (1.67)
CSR_COM 0.012 − 0.027
(0.54) (-0.98)
CSR_AUDIT 0.061*** 0.046**
(3.20) (2.02)
R&D 2.286*** 1.868***
(11.56) (8.00)
ROA 0.067*** 0.065***
(49.60) (41.45)
LOSS 0.530*** 0.522***
(16.89) (14.48)
CASH 0.757*** 0.903***
(8.87) (8.70)
LEVERAGE 0.081 0.222***
(1.48) (3.37)
SIZE − 0.218*** − 0.273***
(-15.10) (-16.07)
SALES 0.146*** 0.191***
(9.93) (10.94)
GDP 0.023*** 0.021***
(3.75) (2.88)
Intercept 2.500*** 2.337***
(3.81) (3.30)
Adj. R2 0.582 0.618
Note: This table presents regression results for the female directors, waste management and financial
performance nexus. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
This study, employing a panel of 8365 firm-year observations from 37 countries between 2002 and 2017, finds a negative (positive)
impact of BGD on waste generation (waste recycling), and this effect is mainly observed if there are two or more female directors on the
board, consistent with critical mass theory. The impact is primarily driven by independent female directors rather than executive
directors. Moreover, we document that the relationship is moderated by a national culture dimension, i.e., masculinity vs femininity,
and observe the positive impact of sustainable compensation policies on waste management. We find improved financial performance
for firms engaged in waste management activities, and this finding contributes to the open question, “Does it pay to be green?” Our
results are robust to the use of alternative econometric specifications, alternative measures of BGD and waste management, the
exclusion of dominating countries in terms of firm years, exclusion of board characteristics, and subsample analysis. We also employ
several identification strategies, including PSM, Heckman’s selection model, 2SLS, and DiD and document consistent results. Overall,
our analysis indicates that female directors lead firms towards better waste management policies to outperform their counterparts.
This makes waste management activities a pathway for creating sustainable business models.
Our study offers essential guidelines for policy formulation and academic research. Given the global drive in fostering sustainable
development goals, our study provides important empirical evidence to policymakers, which can inform their decision-making on
developing environmentally friendly initiatives (i.e., waste management activities) by promoting gender diversity on corporate
boards. Future research benefitting from extended disclosure may consider the association between BGD and various sources of
corporate controllable and non-controllable waste. Such a study may also be able to distinguish the trade-off between waste generation
and firms’ production of goods and services. Future studies may also consider other research methods (i.e., interviews or
19
Table 11
Female directors, sustainable compensation, and waste management.
(1) (2) (3)
Probit OLS OLS
VARIABLES SUS_COMP WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO 0.633*** − 0.576* 0.062

(3.35) (-1.74) (1.35)
SUS_COMP – 0.619*** − 0.038***
– (6.34) (-2.82)
F_PRO X SUS_COMP – − 2.145*** 0.171***
– (-4.92) (2.85)
B_SIZE − 0.233*** 0.113 0.085***
(-2.84) (1.00) (5.37)
B_IND 0.006*** 0.005** − 0.001***
(3.70) (2.39) (-4.62)
SEPARATE − 0.072* 0.054 − 0.006
(-1.68) (0.90) (-0.76)
CSR_COM 0.306*** 0.553*** − 0.018
(5.58) (7.34) (-1.59)
CSR_AUDIT 0.260*** 0.318*** 0.022**
(5.94) (4.96) (2.42)
R&D − 0.925** − 8.190*** − 0.160*
(-2.15) (-13.68) (-1.93)
ROA − 0.001 0.010** 0.002***
(-0.18) (2.02) (2.93)
TQ − 0.050** − 0.331*** 0.018***
(-2.02) (-9.49) (3.65)
LOSS 0.106 0.457*** − 0.007
(1.45) (4.28) (-0.47)
CASH 0.175 − 2.196*** 0.049
(0.90) (-8.08) (1.23)
LEVERAGE − 0.124 0.364** 0.010
(-1.07) (2.13) (0.41)
SIZE 0.167*** 0.396*** 0.005
(5.58) (8.94) (0.76)
SALES 0.039 0.231*** 0.000
(1.28) (5.23) (0.05)
GDP 0.006 0.040* 0.002
(0.42) (1.95) (0.52)
Intercept − 3.979*** 2.078 − 0.199
(-11.20) (0.94) (-0.70)
Pseudo. R2 0.286 – –
Adj. R2 – 0.494 0.249
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management after controlling for the
moderating effect of a sustainable compensation policy. SUS_COMP is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company has a sustainable
compensation policy for executives and 0 otherwise. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1,
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
questionnaires) to offer direct evidence on the mechanisms that female directors employ to shape waste management activities. This
would substantially advance research on gender diversity and corporate sustainability.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors, Gull, Atif, and Hussain, declare that they have no conflict of interest.
20
Acknowledgement
We are grateful to the Editors (Professor Wenxuan Hou and Professor Jason Xiao), Associate Editor, and two anonymous reviewers
for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also appreciate valuable comments from the participants of the ECR research showcase
at Macquarie University. All remaining errors are our own.
Appendix
Table A1
Definitions of variables
Variable name Notation Definition Source
Waste WASTE Natural log of the total waste generated in tons. Asset4
Hazardous waste H_WASTE Natural log of the total hazardous waste generated in tons. Asset4
Non-hazardous waste NH_WASTE Natural log of the total non-hazardous waste generated in tons. Asset4
Waste–assets ratio WASTE/ The ratio of the total waste in tons to total assets. Asset4 &
ASSETS Worldscope
Waste–sales ratio WASTE/ The ratio of the total waste in tons to total sales. Asset4 &
SALES Worldscope
Recycled waste R_WASTE The ratio of recycled waste to total waste generated. Asset4
Masculinity MAS Hofstede’s cultural index on masculinity. Hofstede (2001)
Power distance PD Hofstede’s cultural index on power distance. Hofstede (2001)
Individualism IND Hofstede’s cultural index on individualism. Hofstede (2001)
Uncertainty avoidance UNCERT Hofstede’s cultural index on uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede (2001)
Proportion of female F_PRO The proportion of female directors on the board. BoardEx
directors
Number of female F_NUM The number of female directors on the board. BoardEx
directors
Presence of female F_DUMMY The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has at least one female director and 0 otherwise. BoardEx
directors
Independent female FNED_PRO The proportion of independent female directors on the board. BoardEx
directors
Executive female FED_PRO The proportion of executive female directors on the board. BoardEx
directors
One female director F1 The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has one female director and 0 otherwise. BoardEx
Two female directors F2 The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has two female directors and 0 otherwise. BoardEx
Three female directors F3 The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has three or more female directors and 0 otherwise. BoardEx
Board size B_SIZE Natural log of the number of directors on the board. BoardEx
Board independence B_IND The proportion of independent directors on the board. BoardEx
CEO–chair separation SEPARATE The dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO and chairman positions are separate and BoardEx
0 otherwise.
CSR committee CSR_COM The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a CSR committee and 0 otherwise. WorldScope
CSR audit CSR_AUDIT The dummy variable equals 1 if the CSR report was externally audited and 0 otherwise. WorldScope
Research and R&D The ratio of research and development expenditure to sales. WorldScope
development
Profitability ROA Net profit/loss divided by total assets. WorldScope
Tobin’s Q TQ The ratio of the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus the book value of WorldScope
shareholders’ equity divided by total assets.
Loss LOSS The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm reported a loss in the current year and 0 otherwise. WorldScope
Cash holdings CASH The ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. WorldScope
Financial leverage LEVERAGE The ratio of a firm’s total debt to total assets. WorldScope
Turnover SALES Natural log of total sales. WorldScope
Firm size SIZE Natural log of total sales. WorldScope
GDP growth GDP The percentage increase in the gross domestic product of a country. WorldBank
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom 1% and top 99% levels.
21
Table A2
Sample distribution by country and year
Panel A: Sample distribution by country
Country N F_PRO WASTE Country N F_PRO WASTE
AUSTRALIA 373 0.194 11.695 JAPAN 862 0.027 10.972

AUSTRIA 62 0.125 10.798 MALAYSIA 40 0.211 8.815
BELGIUM 100 0.178 10.497 MEXICO 49 0.069 11.741
BRAZIL 180 0.061 11.705 NETHERLANDS 195 0.282 11.867
CANADA 324 0.156 13.370 NORWAY 99 0.459 11.648
CHILE 48 0.059 10.406 PHILIPPINES 31 0.072 8.950
CHINA 39 0.096 10.712 POLAND 37 0.210 11.173
COLOMBIA 37 0.103 9.975 PORTUGAL 52 0.079 9.823
DENMARK 112 0.180 10.381 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 114 0.054 14.092
FINLAND 183 0.286 10.897 SOUTH AFRICA 271 0.222 11.632
FRANCE 679 0.387 10.838 SOUTH KOREA 206 0.016 10.872
GERMANY 470 0.197 11.341 SPAIN 308 0.236 9.945
GREECE 35 0.073 9.824 SWEDEN 218 0.281 10.961
HUNGARY 14 0.060 9.931 SWITZERLAND 266 0.116 10.257
INDIA 169 0.069 11.630 THAILAND 71 0.108 10.756
INDONESIA 17 0.107 11.367 TURKEY 34 0.082 10.958
IRELAND 15 0.150 11.995 UNITED KINGDOM 1028 0.153 10.775
ISRAEL 21 0.149 10.952 UNITED STATES 1358 0.189 10.986
ITALY 248 0.188 10.962 All Countries 8365 0.154 10.959
Panel B: Sample distribution by year

Year N F_PRO WASTE Year N F_PRO WASTE
2002 55 0.075 10.484 2010 577 0.128 11.001

2003 82 0.084 11.007 2011 654 0.134 11.045
2004 115 0.088 10.561 2012 686 0.145 11.111
2005 219 0.105 10.779 2013 807 0.144 11.066
2006 252 0.112 10.877 2014 842 0.158 10.992
2007 299 0.119 11.086 2015 897 0.179 10.940
2008 403 0.112 11.178 2016 932 0.198 10.855
2009 506 0.115 11.097 2017 1039 0.213 10.716
All Years 8365 0.154 10.959
Note: This table presents the distribution of the sample by country and year. The final sample consists of 8365 firm-year observations from 37
countries between 2002 and 2017.
22
Table A3
A.A. Gull et al.

Correlation matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. WASTE 1.000
2. H_WASTE 0.624* 1.000
3. NH_WASTE 0.983* 0.550* 1.000
4. WASTE/ 0.497* 0.197* 0.535* 1.000
ASSETS
5. WASTE/ 0.478* 0.164* 0.519* 0.953* 1.000
SALES
6. R_WASTE − 0.149* − 0.239* − 0.233* − 0.272* − 0.258* 1.000
7. F_PRO − 0.057* − 0.029 − 0.041* − 0.059* − 0.060* − 0.033* 1.000
8. F_NUM − 0.029* 0.004 − 0.009 − 0.069* − 0.071* − 0.006 0.882* 1.000
9. F_DUMMY − 0.034* 0.005 − 0.018 − 0.048* − 0.049* − 0.091* 0.684* 0.633* 1.000
10. FNED_PRO − 0.053* − 0.020 − 0.039* − 0.046* − 0.047* − 0.053* 0.953* 0.836* 0.656* 1.000
11. FED_PRO − 0.042* − 0.036* − 0.043* − 0.028* − 0.030* 0.028* 0.255* 0.233* 0.165* 0.050* 1.000
12. F1 − 0.014 0.014 − 0.016 0.011 0.016 − 0.031* − 0.254* − 0.294* 0.309* − 0.224* − 0.073* 1.000
13. F2 0.000 − 0.019 0.005 − 0.001 − 0.004 − 0.068* 0.142* 0.050* 0.299* 0.133* 0.030* − 0.302* 1.000
14. F3 − 0.018 0.009 − 0.005 − 0.054* − 0.056* 0.007 0.737* 0.811* 0.364* 0.692* 0.192* − 0.367* − 0.355* 1.000
15. B_SIZE 0.071* 0.096* 0.053* − 0.074* − 0.079* 0.042* 0.051* 0.381* 0.232* 0.039* 0.027* − 0.079* − 0.017 0.302*
16. B_IND 0.017 0.040* 0.023 0.024* 0.023* − 0.221* 0.357* 0.395* 0.440* 0.362* 0.033* − 0.001 0.146* 0.273*
17. SEPARATE 0.009 0.026 − 0.021 − 0.069* − 0.056* 0.028* 0.015 0.027* 0.024* 0.045* − 0.108* − 0.010 0.027* 0.006
18. CSR_COM 0.119* 0.080* 0.157* 0.077* 0.078* 0.026* 0.120* 0.131* 0.071* 0.109* 0.033* − 0.069* 0.020 0.111*
19. CSR_AUDIT 0.083* 0.096* 0.051* − 0.026* − 0.043* 0.100* 0.073* 0.102* − 0.023* 0.051* 0.060* − 0.105* − 0.043* 0.115*
20. R&D − 0.115* 0.044* − 0.167* − 0.077* − 0.074* 0.079* − 0.020 − 0.021 − 0.010 − 0.013 − 0.064* − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.005
21. ROA − 0.054* − 0.052* − 0.118* − 0.096* − 0.120* 0.071* 0.052* − 0.003 0.051* 0.038* 0.044* 0.008 0.058* − 0.014
22. TQ − 0.134* − 0.144* − 0.171* − 0.039* − 0.046* 0.051* 0.100* 0.037* 0.092* 0.090* 0.031* 0.000 0.070* 0.021
23
23. LOSS 0.089* 0.051* 0.104* 0.120* 0.137* − 0.076* − 0.016 − 0.023* − 0.009 − 0.011 − 0.006 0.018 − 0.005 − 0.021
24. CASH − 0.119* − 0.054* − 0.127* 0.003 − 0.003 0.087* − 0.099* − 0.112* − 0.119* − 0.084* − 0.061* 0.005 − 0.037* − 0.081*
25. LEVERAGE 0.045* − 0.033* − 0.002 − 0.082* − 0.081* − 0.038* − 0.002 0.007 0.036* − 0.002 0.012 0.033* 0.007 − 0.004
26. SALES 0.165* 0.248* 0.132* − 0.140* − 0.158* 0.161* − 0.268* − 0.182* − 0.315* − 0.259* − 0.055* − 0.067* − 0.146* − 0.096*
27. SIZE 0.081* 0.150* 0.088* − 0.113* − 0.118* 0.118* − 0.232* − 0.119* − 0.280* − 0.226* − 0.039* − 0.085* − 0.146* − 0.046*
28. GDP 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.014 − 0.023 0.012 − 0.007 0.009 0.019 − 0.008 0.014 0.015 − 0.017
Variables 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
15. B_SIZE 1.000

16. B_IND 0.169* 1.000
17. SEPARATE 0.067* − 0.022* 1.000
18. CSR_COM 0.019 − 0.099* 0.002 1.000
19. CSR_AUDIT 0.077* − 0.127* − 0.063* 0.261* 1.000
The British Accounting Review xxx (xxxx) xxx

20. R&D − 0.023* 0.002 0.138* − 0.064* − 0.060* 1.000
21. ROA − 0.082* 0.060* 0.033* − 0.069* − 0.069* 0.085* 1.000
22. TQ − 0.105* 0.120* 0.070* − 0.073* − 0.110* 0.255* 0.480* 1.000
23. LOSS − 0.025* 0.022* − 0.032* 0.021 − 0.023* 0.035* − 0.428* − 0.138* 1.000
24. CASH − 0.104* − 0.059* 0.087* − 0.025* − 0.074* 0.381* 0.152* 0.266* 0.004 1.000
25. LEVERAGE 0.067* 0.049* 0.038* 0.031* 0.077* − 0.165* − 0.154* − 0.140* 0.068* − 0.223* 1.000
26. SALES 0.117* − 0.426* 0.077* 0.109* 0.238* 0.015 − 0.050* − 0.157* − 0.070* 0.017 − 0.048* 1.000
27. SIZE 0.169* − 0.384* 0.050* 0.136* 0.276* − 0.029* − 0.151* − 0.265* − 0.058* − 0.060* 0.011 0.424* 1.000
28. GDP − 0.065* 0.046* − 0.022* − 0.069* 0.001 − 0.029* 0.148* 0.142* − 0.088* 0.029* − 0.061* 0.111* 0.102* 1.000
Note: This table presents the correlation coefficients for all variables based on the whole sample.
All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
*shows significance at the 0.05 level.
Table A 4
Female directors and waste management using subsamples of profitable and loss-making firms
VARIABLES Profitable Firms Loss-making Firms Profitable Firms Loss-making Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE
F_PRO − 1.303*** − 1.522 0.150*** 0.039

(-4.66) (-1.31) (3.71) (0.27)
B_SIZE 0.037 0.234 0.075*** 0.223***
(0.33) (0.50) (4.54) (3.73)
B_IND 0.006*** − 0.008 − 0.002*** − 0.000
(2.95) (-0.82) (-4.81) (-0.10)
SEPARATE 0.087 − 0.206 − 0.012 0.058*
(1.45) (-0.81) (-1.32) (1.85)
CSR_COM 0.587*** 0.165 − 0.022* 0.004
(7.88) (0.47) (-1.90) (0.08)
CSR_AUDIT 0.308*** 0.131 0.015 0.038
(4.82) (0.49) (1.62) (1.17)
R&D − 9.227*** − 6.113*** − 0.282*** 1.018***
(-14.44) (-3.42) (-3.18) (3.62)
ROA 0.016** 0.005 0.002** 0.002
(2.44) (0.48) (2.53) (1.17)
TQ − 0.365*** − 0.419* 0.018*** − 0.055*
(-9.88) (-1.93) (3.38) (-1.90)
CASH − 1.838*** − 4.225*** 0.062 − 0.060
(-6.80) (-3.46) (1.51) (-0.37)
LEVERAGE 0.401** 0.148 0.008 0.122
(2.33) (0.22) (0.32) (1.47)
SIZE 0.331*** 0.924*** 0.007 − 0.010
(7.43) (5.31) (1.01) (-0.40)
SALES 0.303*** − 0.227 0.001 − 0.003
(6.77) (-1.41) (0.10) (-0.14)
GDP 0.034* − 0.006 0.000 0.010
(1.66) (-0.07) (0.14) (0.94)
Intercept 1.818 4.869** − 0.120 0.025
(0.86) (2.46) (-0.41) (0.06)
Observations 7670 695 5438 495
Adj. R2 0.488 0.499 0.223 0.377
F-statistics 94.85 11.32 21.24 5.671
Note: This table presents regression results for the relationship between female directors and waste management (i.e., waste generated and recycled)
using subsamples of profitable and loss-making firms. T-statistics are given in parenthesis. *, ** and, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The British Accounting Review

Board gender composition and waste management:

relationship with waste generation (waste recycling).

2. Literature review and hypothesis development

2.1. Business case for gender diversity

2.2. BGD, morality, and environmental concerns

3. Data and methodology

3.2. Measurement of main variables

3.3. Empirical models

4.1. Univariate results

N Mean SD N Mean N Mean

WASTE 8365 10.959 3.003 1961 11.141 6404 10.903 0.238***

WASTE R_WASTE H_WASTE NH_WASTE

F_PRO − 1.365*** 0.132*** − 0.789** − 1.248***

4.2. Multivariate results

4.2.1. BGD and waste management

WASTE R_WASTE WASTE R_WASTE

4.2.2. The critical mass of female directors and waste management

4.2.3. Independent and executive female directors and waste management

4.3. Robustness tests

4.4. Identification strategies

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)

WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE

F_NUMB − 0.087*** – 0.012*** –

Panel B: Alternative measures of waste

VARIABLES (1) (2)

F_PRO − 2.363*** − 6.546***

Panel C: Lagged board variables

VARIABLES (1) (2)

F_PROt-1 − 1.316*** 0.156***

Panel D: Excluding board-level variables

VARIABLES (1) (2)

F_PRO − 1.205*** 0.103***

Panel E: Excluding US and UK firms

VARIABLES (1) (2)

F_PRO − 1.061*** 0.132***

Panel F: Controlling for firm-level corporate governance (CG) quality

(1) (2) (3) (4)

High-CG Low-CG High-CG Low-CG

VARIABLES WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE

(1) (2) (3) (4)

High-CG Low-CG High-CG Low-CG

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes

Panel G: Controlling for firm-level environmental (ENV) orientation

(1) (2) (3) (4)

High-ENV Low-ENV High-ENV Low-ENV

VARIABLES WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE

Panel H: G10 and the rest of the countries

(1) (2) (3) (4)

G10 Non-G10 G10 Non-G10

VARIABLES WASTE WASTE R_WASTE R_WASTE

Pre-match probit Post-match probit Post-match OLS Post-match OLS

VARIABLES F_DUMMY F_DUMMY WASTE R_WASTE

F_PRO – – − 1.117** 0.163**

Panel B: Pre- and post-matched sample analysis

Variable Original sample Propensity score-matched sample

N=1961 N=6404 N=1048 N=1048

Mean Mean Mean Mean

B_SIZE 2.284 2.452 − 0.168*** 2.345 2.345 0.001

Panel C: Propensity score matching estimator

F_PRO − 1.365* 0.132* − 0.789 − 1.248*

F_NUMB − 0.087* – 0.012* –

F_PRO − 2.363* − 6.546*

F_PROt-1 − 1.316* 0.156*

F_PRO − 1.205* 0.103*

F_PRO − 1.061* 0.132*

F_PRO – – − 1.117 0.163

F_PRO – − 1.018* 0.150*

F_PRO − 1.303* − 1.522 0.150* 0.039