11111 Environmental Manager
Common Mistakes When Conducting a
HAZOP and How to Avoid Them
AA important part of ensuring the success of a HAZOP study is to understand the
errors that can cause the team to lose focus
Arturo Trujlllo, Walter$. Kessler
and Robert Gaither
Ch1lworth. a DEKRA Con1)any
S
ince its inception in the 1960s
and its fvst offiaa publica­
tion in 19n, lhe Hazard m fromtheperspactiveof'howshould
Operability Study (HAZOP)
has become one of the most power-
ful tools for lden1ifying process haz·
ards in the chemical process irrlJs.
tries (CPI) . Utiizing sys1ems that are
qualrtatJl/8 or even simplified semi­
quanti1ative, the HAZOP method has
been increasingl>J used, not only as a
tool for identifyrlg process hazards,
equipment deliClen<:ies or failu-es and
operabity problems and assessilg
their risks, but also as a tool for priori­
tizing actJons Md recorrvnendabons
for process risk
- reduction. Reducilg
risk is especialy i� in ensur­
ing lhe safely of the personnel who
irust wort< in the plant mvironmen1
each day (Figure 1).
TheHAZOP methodology is a sys-
1ematic 1eam-based teclrique that
can be used 10 effectively identify
and anayze the risks of potentially
hazardous process operations. It is
the most widely used process hazard
analysis (PHA) teclnque in nurner•
ous industries worldwide, including
petrochemicals, pharmaceullcals,
oi-and-gas and nuclear, and is used
cbing the design stages of new pro­
oesses or pro,ects. for map- process
modifications and for periocic rE!lliew
of existing operations.
A HAZOP is a time-<Xll'ISU"T1ing ex­
ercise and should be cxinducted in
such a � to ensure that the results
;;istify the effort. This artlde presents
some common mistakes tha t can
jeoparcize aHAZOP team's task. Fre­
quent or chronic occurence of these
mistakes indicates po1enbal gaps in
the Site's proc:ess-nw,a,gement sys­
tem. However, it is lltimately the re­
sponsblity of the HAZOP facitator
-1. HAZOP-.. uselllt tools in .-,g....,..... risk. aod 11,ey .,.- safogu,rds agmSI
-OCMarioslorllepenoooelwbomus1..-nn1-111ep1an1
to carect these mistakes if or when
1118'( occur during the course of the
HAZOP study. Therefore, the selec·
1ion of an experienced f.acitator is
an essential element for assuring 1he
suocess of the HAZOP. Wi1hout an
adequate depth of knowtedge and
experience, the HAZOP can become
a 'check the box" exerase.
Benefits of a HAZOP
The advantages offered by HAZOP
OV8' Other process-risk analysis
tools are numerous, and include
the following:
• It is a ngorous process;� isslru::lured.
systemallc and coo,,preheiisj,;e
• It is adaptable to the majority of CPI
and manufac1\.llng operations, in-
duding 1hose in petroleum refiner·
,es (F,gure 2) and other oi-and-gas
processing plants, nuclear faci­
ties, and specialty chemical, phar­
maceutical and even high-speed
manufacturing plants
• It is team-based and alows the
in1erchanga of know1edge and ex­
penence between the participan ts
• It helps to anticipate potential ac­
cidents or harm to ernployaas. the
facitity, the enwonment and the
surrounding community
• It furlctions as a type of training for
the team's participants and leader,
who are required by the nature of
the method 1o look at the process
from a new perspective - not just
it run?," but also 'how can it fail to
run correctly?"
A HAZOP is time-consuming be­
cause it requires the participa1ion
of a rnutr-discipinary team over ex­
tended timeframas. This investment
of t,rne and persotVlel, often involv­
ing third parties, means that the per­
formance of theHAZOP needs to be
opbmized to maximize rts value. The
folowing seclions detail some com­
monly found mistakes that occur
dunng the planning, execution and
folowup stages of a HAZOP.
Planning stage
Mistake 1: Mismanagement of
time-allotment issues. One of the
most frequen1 mistakes of a HAZOP
is failure to manage the bme allot­
ted for the study. A HAZOP is often
schedlAed for a set amom1 of time.
nerthet by the HAZOP faaktator nor
the 1eam, and sufficient time may not
have been allocated. Furthemlore,
there may be little or no flexibility in
the schedule. AA insufficient amoun1
of time for the HAZOP limits discus­
sion and brainstorming and reduces
the quaity of the analysis, in tum
leading to some of the mistakes dis­
cussed in more detail below.
Estimating the duration of a
HAZOP is not an exact science, and
it requires a good knowledge of the
me1hodology, the complexity of the
process, the nature of the risks that
can be identified up front and the id­
iosyncrasies of the group. Mhou,gh a
HAZOP should not be open-ended 1n
time allotment, the ideal HAZOP has
some flexibility buit into the sched­
<Je. The team leader should make an
FIGUIE 2.11:inJ processes in 1he CPI.,. polelmlly h""'11ous ff,.. """aged c,or,ec:dy. HAZOP studies
-1Dpriorilize-1Droduceproa,sslilb. n aeodoptlbleacroosowide r.,ngeol
indUSlial .......
estimate of the time required for the Mistake 3: lnco"ect size of HAZOP
1eam based on the process descrv­ team. The HAZOP team should be
tion and preliminary count of HAZOP hmlled in size, ideally five to seven
nodes (specific portions or topics of people, exdudng the HAZOP facii­
the study process) so that managers tator and the HAZOP scribe or sec­
are aware of the degree of persomeJ retary. A team that is too large can
commtment that will be requ,reci. aas,Jy Jose focus, dwell on a subject
Mistake 2: lnoomplete, inaccurate or issue too long, or be dsn.ptive. It
or unavailable process safety in­ is human na1ure that all participan1s
formation. Another common mis­ seek to present t* perspect,ves,
take during a HAZOP is not having but this can lead to excessive dis­
al the prereqtaSite process safety cussion. A grCX4) that is too small wiU
information (PSI) and other valuable not likely include the right expert,se
information available, including out­ or prOllide enough dffetent perspec­
of-date or incomple1e information. tives to evaluate the process haz.
This is especialy critical regarding ards and controls adequately or in
piping and instrumentabon cfiagrams the right detail.
(P&JDs), current standard operating
procedures (SOPs) and appropriate Execution stage
data on flammability, combusbbity, Mistake 4: Lack of focus during
reactivity, toxicity and electrostatic the meeting. A HAZOP is a com­
properties of materials in al forms plex exercise that requires the con­
arid phases, as well as �tbl­ centra1ed and coordina1ed contribu­
ity of chemicals wrth each other arid tion of al the members of the team.
with the processing equipment. If the Distractions should be minimized
HAZOP is conducted by an external in order to ensure and maintain the
faciitator, it is the responsi:)iity of the team's focus. Therefore, team mem­
cmner of the process to verify the in­ bers shoud not be alowed to come
tegrity of the PSI. and go into and out of the meeting,
Related to tm. it is not acceptable take phone calls, answer emails.
tha1 participants attend the HAZOP or discuss issues not related to the
for the purpose of obtaining informa­ HAZOP during the sessions. Use of
tion on a process or project. HAZOP an offsite venue may be �ful to
participants should be well prepared prevent plant operations from be­
to contribute to the ciscussion and coming a distraction.
have all requisite background in/or- It is the responsibiity of the HAZOP
mation with them. It is the respon· faolita1or to maintain the focus of the
sibiity of the faciitator to instruct all group and keep the HAZOP process
participants that they must come to moving by allowing some open dis­
theHAZOP prepared. cussion on the issue, node and con·
�
�
- ..
Fl&URE 3. I is aucial Im a H.IZOP be e,q,licilly tlrgeled for 1llo Sl)eclic process in quesoon. and not
based on pmious H.IZOP> forsinlilor....-,es. •- solety idormalion and c-. may 11a,e
recenu, dlaoged
sequence at hand, but not letting it
get out ol control. Sufficient (but not
exc:8SSM!) breaks for partiqpants to
eat and drink and conduct activities
not related to the HAZOP, such as
checking the<r emails and voioe­
rnails, should be planned and ooor•
dinated. The HAZOP room should
be free from CEiiphones, and cistrac­
tions [Ike texting during the HAZOP
exercise should be fotbodden.
Mistake 5: Preventing the team
from brainstorming. Another fre­
quent mstake in HAZOPs ,sto re­
strict the brainstorming exercise,
v.nch is, after al, the basis (and the
power) of the method. 1he most
common issues on this area onclude
the folowing:
• Omitmg key words, parameters
or even nodes, with the argument
that an upper bound for lhe con­
sequences in this node can be
easily identified, and these maxi­
mum consequences are protected
by safeguards. This dearly means
that steps or phases of the HAZOP
procedure wil be skipped, and
some process hazards may not be
odentdied. This violates the HAZOP
methoclology and 0\/eral pupose
of cond.Jcli'lg the HAZOP in the
first place. Although on many OC·
casions. stnct appication of the
methodology wil not identify any
hazardous scenarios other than the
obvious ones, which have already
been Isled � front and used as
an agurnent for omitting 8"f fur­
ther analysis. Nevertheless, some­
bmes a non-obvious soenario will
�
be identified that constitutes the
purpose of the HAZOP, and this is
where it demonstrates its power
• Cmying out a superficial rfM&N of
the combinations of key words and
parameters. lsli'lg the most obvi­
ous. :and often repetitw, causes of
deviation without going into detail.
In other words, repeamg
the same
causes, p.r.,meter after p.r.,meter
and node after node. instead of
conducing a more in-depth anal'f ­
sis and ciscussion
• Carrying out HAZOPs using some
form °' pnor nlormation - pre­
built templates or the HAZOP
from a srnilar project. for example.
Again. what the HAZOP is meant
to do is analyze the possible spe­
cific risk scenarios (espedat; the
non-obvious ones) of the process
or project bei�udied at the time
of the HAZOP (Hglre 3). 'M'lie one
can refe< to, ()( reference previous
material, the HAZOP is to be con­
ducted based upon the a.orrent
facility or process, and the equip­
ment. process()( controls may have
changed since the last HAZOP
In practice, the qualrty of a HAZOP
is nftuenced by the ability of the
HAZOP leader to ask the appro­
priate questions to ensure that the
team identlfies al the hazards of the
process bei1g studied, not °""f the
most 00\10\JS hazards. This ability
is based on the leader's expenence
with the HAZOP technique and his or
her technical skils i, process-hazard
identification, as wel as human error
and eq�t failose potential. It is
the responsi)ility of the HAZOP fa­
ciitator to mooage the team and
the HAZOP study process to ensure
that the team stays focused and that
no nodes ()( hazards are missed by
the team.
Mistake 6: Mistaking the tools for
the process. The HAZOP spread­
sheet shoud not be viewed as a
questionnaire whose boxes all have
to be fiQed in, even with numemus
repetitions of scenarios. The combi­
na ticon of pairs of key w()(ds and pa­
rameters is not intended to be an end
i, itself, but to encou-age discussion
and identify deviations from the de­
s,red state. As would be expected,
the same deviation genErally causes
the alteration of more than one pro­
cess parameter, and the<ef()(e could
n
be entered more than one place in
the spreadsheet. An obvious exam­
ple is a distilation column. in which
pressure. temperal\¥8. composition
and flowrate (of reflux, for example)
are clearly nterrelated. Hence, any
change in one of the parameters
automatically causes responses and
changes in the others.
It is not as important for al the
spreadsheet "boxes· to be filled in
as � IS for the HAZOP group to work
effectively n identifying al the pos ­
sible deviations. A HAZOP table is
not and should not be a form -fiting
exerase. Rather, rt should guide and
structure strategic brainstomiing dis­
cussion with the intent of identifying
al hazards and operability problems
tha t may injure employees (Figure 4),
cause damage to property and as­
sets , impact the commuroty or cause
environmental damage.
Mistake 7: Misrepresenting or
misunderstanding safeguards.
Documentation of effective and ap­
propnate safeguards is a key step
i1 the PHA team's decision whether
additional process-risk reduction
is required for a specific scenario.
� of safeguards that are
neither effective nor appropriate are
given below:
• Local instruments that are never
checked by field operat()(S
• Alarms that fail to ,;j,,e the operator
s�nt time to effectively halt the
�uences of the deviation.
ExampieS onclude the following:
0 Alarms that fai
o Very generic alarms that are
activated in runerous differ-
ent situations. In this case,
the operator has to diagnose
which of the mu� op­
tions he or she is faced with,
thereby losing valuable time
for action
o Alam\S that are activated fre­
quently, often for trivial reasons,
and that therefore tend to be
ig',orecl by the opeml()(S
o Alarms where no specific
operator response has
been given on procedures
and traning
o Cascades of alarms, where
'first-n· is not obvious
()(Oncficated
• Presstl'e-relief systems (such as
safety valves and 1\4'.)ture discs) that
were not designed f()( the case and
process conditions bei1g stucied.
Obviously, the pupose of a HAZOP
is not to verify the correct desig1 of
pressur&-<elief systems. Neverthe­
less, i there is reasonable cb.bt,
a reoommendation should be is­
sued to check that the scenario for
which ii was losted as a safeg.Jard
was one of the cases of design for
the reief device ()( system
Operating procedures camot be
considered safeguards when the
cause giving rise to the scenario is
hi.man err()(, which presupposes
that the procedure has not been fol­
lowed properly
Mistake 8: ExcessNe recommen­
dations. Some HAZOP groups be­
lieve that they should issue a recom­
menda!Jon for any scenario that has
negative consequences, whether a
hazard scenario. equipment failure or
operabity problem. This is not on the
sp,rit of the HAZOP method. 'Mlat a
HAZOP aims to do is identify al of
the hazardous scenarios, deterrnne
the associated risk for each particu­
lar scenario and check whether the
process has been <My protected by
the safeguards. and only if there is
not adequate protection. propose
recommendations for doing so.
Mistake 9: Irrelevant recommen·
dations. Sometimes, people wil
suggest and utilize HAZOP recom­
mendations as a way to obtain ap­
proval for an operational or plant
design improvement that IS not nec­
essanly directly related to the safety
of personnel or the release of a haz­
ardous chemical. In many cases,
these changes have already been
evaluated and ruled out for various
reasons. While a HAZOP can and
should inckide reconvnendations re­
lated to operational and maintenarice
issues. the HAZOP's sole intent is f()(
the identification of issues, not to find
a solution to the problems ()( rede­
sign the faciity. All recommendations
are made for further onvestigatoon and
design considerations. There/()(8, the
actual HAZOP is not the best time
()( place to deal with these types ol
ISSll8S. They should be further inves­
tigated offine i, the correct setting.
and should include the appropriate
personnel in the discussions.
Mistake 10: Excessively lax rec­
ommendations. When making rec­
anmendations in a HAZOP, it is very
important to Ullllze the proper word­
ong. Since the HAZOP team is com­
posed of knowledgeable people,
recommendations should be made
that involve action. Two words that
are highly over-utilized are •recom­
mend" and 'consider." 'Recom­
mend" is already used in the title for
the column :and moSI of the trne. the
team's bra,nstorming makes up the
'consideration" aspect of the recom­
mendation t,e,ng proposed. If addi­
bonal nsk analysis is required. •con­
sider" is an appropriate phrase.
There are often mutiple ways to re­
duce risk and the team's time should
not be spent analyzing alternatives.
Another convnon phrase seen i,
many HAZOP recommendations is
'Further study on what needs to be
n
done in ()(de( to .. : - which reality
is not specific and can be left open
for interpretation. Most of the time,
recommendations that involve an
acticon and have a specific pll'pose
should be made. Start recommen­
dations with strong action words.
such as 'onstall." 'onvestJgate,"
'graph,"()( "add." Additionaly, when
wording recommendations, if a rec­
ommenda.ticon is bei1g made for a
specific reason. include that reason
in the recommendation so it is not
forgotten when the HAZOP report
os written or IS being reviewed. The
following are good examples of welt­
worded recommendations:
• lnstal a pressure gage and trans­
mitter on the overhead lone 'L12" of
th e distilla!Jon colt.nm to ll'ICrease
the SIL level from 1 to 2
• Graph the PIT curve for the reac­
tion process and add the accept•
....."-
AGUIIE4.H.1ZOP..-intend1Dp<0wdeacoa­
haz_llld_-,
llfdlonsivoinclexol ...
�·-may-damageo,put.......,.
able operali'lg range. Utiize this
chart to set appropnate process
alarm and shutdown points
It should be noted how these two
recommendations are very specific
action items and also include the
reason for the action.
On some oocasions, there may
be two or m()(8 divergent opnoos,
and a consensus camot be reached
di.Wing the HAZOP itself. In this case,
both recommendations shotAd be
included in the HAZOP and left f()(
further invest,gabon or evaluation
by the company, based upon the
inf()(mation from the HAZOP. For
scenarios such as these, the bes t
solution - after further investigation
and research is completed - ma y
be sometlwlg not even mentioned or
thought about i1 the HAZOP itself.
Again, ,t should be reiterated that
except for a few unq.,e situations.
such as the divergent opinion case,
r80()(nmendabons should be clear.
specific, not open to nterpretations
and indude the reasoning at the time
that the HAZOP was corrllcted.
Mistake 11: Trying to solve the rec­
ommendation or design the solu­
tion during the HAZOP. Another
common mistake that can delay t he
HAZOP and cause the group to lose
its focus is trying to solve the prob­
lem or redeslgl the process listed
in the recorrmendation during the
HAZOP study itself. This is most
common when process-design en­
gineers are team members and they
desire to make the process perfect.
Unless rt is a dear and easy solutlon,
many recommendations require ft.r­
ther investigation or other actions to
complete the task. alleviate or moni­
m,ze the hazard, and dose out t he
action rtem based upon the recom­
mendation. It must be remembe.-ed
that a HAZOP IS a brainst()(mng
......
�

exercise with knowledgeable p r o ­ Mistake 13: Failure to update sents an extremely powerful tool for
c ess persomel from different areas HAZOPs when process knowledge the identification, semi-quantification
of the plant, whose task is to identify changes. A HAZOP wcrlsheet is a liv­ and mtigation of risks in CPI proo.,c­
hazards or hazardous scenarios and ng document. Ideally, it reflects man­ tion ifaciities with conmuous, batch
make pracbCal recommendations agEl'l'l8M's CUTl!nt knowledge of the or sem-batch processes.
to alleviate or minimize the hazard­ prooess hazards, the consequences The biggest inconvenience of this
ous scenarios or consequeoces. of those hazards and the controls technque is its relatively high cost, in
As prelliousJy stated, not al recom­ necessary to reduce the process risk terms of time and people who need
mendations have clear-cut solutions, to a tolerable level. HAZOPs lose their to be i1volved and participate i1 the
and the HAZOP time should not be effeel-.ess <:Net time when they are brainstorming sessions. This high
wasted with actions that may require not t.pdated promptly. cost means that the HAZOP needs
research and further investigation Changes in process safety nfor­ to be carried out to optimum effect,
that only one of the participants, or mation should result in a PHA re,i-ew avoiding the sorts of mistakes that
a qualified expert, can resolve in the through the site MOC prooedln,. The have been discussed in this article. It
quet of his or her own offioe. Even review wil identify any OOH causes of is the responslliity of the HAZOP fa­
HAZOP-recommended changes to a a process deviation or OpE(lDi\y is­ citator to make SU'e the group stays
process should be subjected to the sues, changes i1 safeguards for previ­ focused and does not commit any
site's management-of-change(MOC) oosly documented haz.ard scenarios, of these mistakes. Finally, the selec­
process to prewnt the introducllon and posslbly new or reYised recom­ tion of a knowledgeable and experi­ Featured Produd
of OOH hazards. It ,snot t.ne0mmon menclabons to address the hazatds. enced PHA faciitator IS a crucial ele­
for an incident to be triggered by a Recent accidents or near misses ment for asslfing the success of the a Service Providers

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change made for safety reasons. on a site process, or a similar process HAZOP process. a
The HAZOP can and should result in elseNhere, should trigger a HAZOP Edited by Maty Page Bailey
a list of actions or recommendations. review to ensure that the same or AMERICAN
with the designation of someone re­ simlar scenano has already been Authors

--�­
sponsible for carrying them out, but consideced and docunented dur­ � tAnlaolrujllos�lln!c-
stim:lfy".., -
not necessarily the mal solution or ng the most recent HAZOP and that llldChiworl>Amollr.a.lhe
re-oogineenng of the plant. effectilie controls are i1 place to pre­ S!>lrisll
...., - " Oll(llA (JqxJb
wnt a samw incident from ocx:umng 249 4' ptr,g ®13 -

._ 21",�-".t i.'.(:R:��#W : Q
lil>an; 1>11a•o: ,:M--031-426 020;
Followup stage n the future.
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The output of the HAZOP study is

...'""""an!-
-""". ·-illg-·-
Helm-noellul200
the set of recommendations 1hat are Additional applications
ustaly presented to management in For the sake of simplici1y, this article
a standardized report lormat_ At this has foe.used on common mistakes ,ngolOw,rlh, "'- .. ·--"'
stage, srte rnanagem«1t is respon­ observeddurngtheuseoftheHAZOP EftonJ!*:a.He ___cleCl.1blu-

�-('i=
sible for responding to each recom­ methodology. The discussion i1 this PhD. llom Jeng lt4*i'lS l.liieloily.
mendation according to local or site artide can be equally applied to other -S.K.essler�a-po­

---
reqla'ements and the reqlarements scenaricrbased methodologies, such °"'s:Klyc:orisoll:n,IQllworth
of applicable standards, such as the as 'what-if' analyses, which can be
U.S. Occupational Safety !lld Health carried out at V8fY earty stages of the Pim,: 832-492-43511: Emol:
Aannstra'lion (OSHAj Process Safety prooess 6fecyde - HAZOP is typi­ waiter.kessler@dekr-a.com).
Management (PSM) standa!d Trtle cat, reserved for late-design stage -.11as20iearsd"1Jl'ri­
em, ii the petrdeum reirey.
29, CFR Part 1910.119. Site proce­ or later-lijecyde stages when more
du:es should include regular f-olowup detailed PSI is available. The specific
reports to track recommendallons PSI that IS avaiable and the expertise
al.,,,,,.,__ -
gos•pocessing. �
"111 ad INACR t,e:ilrg. "'1ting. :ir ct,-*1g 3lld
to their resokJtion. needed for other hazard 81/akJation �irmlries.iddngfileie,n�
��ftmillSHe-ilslru­
Mistake 12: Failure of manage­ melhodologies may be different, but
mer,t to act promptly on each rec­ the types of mistakes ciscussed here,
-illhedesiiJ>llll"""1nlcliooof-relil­
er,,gosllll-iro=;inglac:ililies.�•
�
ommendation. Site management and their prevention. IW"9 V8fY similar. ph,r"'""'*'1fillirqprocesoanclalsola$e,pcrion,e
IDS. s.i,,o m 1eonawuacu1ng

'SANDVIK�
must evaluate each recommendation
accorcing to its technical feasilility, Closing thoughts -.,LGailllerisa-po­
asssmy�alQllworth
the risk-reduction beoefit versus total OSHA recogjzes the HAZOP tech­ llldnlilgy n:. "13 CVll)US

-----.. -­
cost of impkment ation, avaiability of rique as an acceptable methodology loo. Prinoetln. Ml �;
liternative SC*ltions and other fac­ tor oondJcting PHAs of processes - 7J2 .58ij-6EMQ: Emal:
rober1.g:aitl'le10dek11.com).
tors. The PSM standard allows reiec­ covered l:>'f the PSM standard. Other

TLV
Goilh!r 1"' mon,lh3n 28Jl!Ol'd
tion of a PHA recommendation only reguators ar<>t.nd the world also ac­ e,pcrion,eina,mpony�
for specific causes. Good industry cept the HAZOP methodology as regofallly�.-
pracbces dictate that mar,a,gernent appropriate for analyzng the exist­ 1111C�31ld­
"*1r:nnol<...._-.tte1m"'1�•t
takes prompt action on each recom­ ng and potenbal hazards of a com­
mendation and ensures that all rec­ plex process that invowes a highly ... p,rtamonce and,villclri "°"
s3lt,gs. &>lher
isnn:idi1HAZOP31ldSIA0PA-.iion.Helolsa
ommeodations are tracked to final hazardous substance. PllD :nisac:e<tiied'*'!professiorol�
reSC*ltion and closure. The HAZOP methodology repre-