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CASE: STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS. V. SURJAKUMAR OKRAM & ORS.

, 2022 SUPREME
COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Appellant – The State of Manipur & Ors.
Respondent – Surjakumar Okram & Ors.
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna.

FACTS OF THE CASE-


The Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment, Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 2012 was enacted by the State Government which empowered the Chief Minister to appoint members
of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to the position of Parliamentary Secretary, with the status and rank of
a State Minister. According to the Act, the Parliamentary Secretary’s duties and functions were to be
specified by the Chief Minister in the Official Gazette.
On July 26, 2017, a similar law passed by the Assam Assembly called “The Assam Parliamentary

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Secretaries (Appointment, Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2004 was declared as

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unconstitutional by the Apex Court in the case of Bimolangshu Roy (Dead) through LRs v. State of Assam

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and Anr.1. Post the ruling given in the Assam case, Manipur had passed the Manipur Parliamentary

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Secretary (Appointment, Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Repealing Act, 2018. The
Repealing Act provided for a saving clause under Section 2(2) as per which the nullifying law will not affect
previous operations under legislation including anything done in official discharge of their duties by
Parliamentary Secretaries under the Act.

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Taking the Repealing law into consideration, the Manipur High Court on September 17, 2020 in light of

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ruling in Bimolangshu Roy’s case had declared the impugned legislation and the subsequent repealing law

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as invalid and unconstitutional. The High Court while doing so categorically stated that the legislature

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cannot provide for a saving clause in the Repealing law to justify acts, deeds, privileges which are

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impermissible under the underlying statute which is unconstitutional.
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decision was then preferred before the Supreme Court.

RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The Court held that, the Manipur legislature cannot simply infuse life into legislation, which it itself
recognized as unconstitutional, by enacting a saving clause. The saving clause which legalized the Act done
under the parent statute of 2012 was held unconstitutional by the Court stating that what cannot be done
directly by the legislature cannot be done by it indirectly.
The Court further observed that even though the power of legislature to enact a statute is co-extensive with
the power to repeal it, the power does not allow the legislature to save past transactions under the repealing
act. Such saving can only be done when Court is declaring a law as unconstitutional then Court may apply
the doctrine of prospective overruling and save the acts which were already done under the unconstitutional
legislation. The Court stated “The very declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates
the statute entirely as though it had never been passed. The consequences of declaration of
unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.”
While holding the above, the Court laid down the following principles with regard to declaration of statute
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i. A statute which is enacted tr- by a competent legislature is valid till it is declared unconstitutional by a
court.
ii. After declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a court of law, it is non est for all purposes.
iii. In making such declaration the court may apply the doctrine of prospective overruling to save past
transactions under the unconstitutional legislation.
iv. Relief can be moulded by the Court in exercise of its power under Article notwithstanding such
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declaration.

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(2018) 14 SCC 408.
Therefore, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court saved only those
acts and decisions of the Parliamentary Secretaries which were duly undertaken by them under the repealing
statute. The Court further held, the Manipur Legislature was competent to enact the 2018 Repealing Act,
however, saving clause such Act was struck down as unconstitutional.

CASES/ COMMENTARIES’ RELIED ON-


I. State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hirendra Pal Singh & Ors.2- In this case the Supreme Court held that, “It is a
settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never
existed. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier
provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly.”
II. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations3- In this Commentary it was stated that, “where a statute is
adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it and it
constitutes a protection to anyone who has acted under it and no one can be punished for having
refused obedience to it before the decision was made.”
III. Norton v. Shelby County4- In this case Justice Field observed, "an unconstitutional act is not law, it

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contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

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confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office; it is, in legal

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Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay5- it was held by a constitution bench of Supreme

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Court that the law-making power of the State is restricted by a written fundamental law and any law
enacted and opposed to the fundamental law is in excess of the legislative authority and is thus, a
nullity.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS-

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Article 164(1) of the Constitution which provides- the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor

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and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and that the

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Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.

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Article 164(1-A) of the Constitution- it limits the number oftr-Ministers, 9O4O
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Council of Ministers in a State to 15 percent of the total members in the Legislative Assembly of the State.

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Article 194(3) of the Constitution- it empowers the State Legislature to make laws in respect of the powers,

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privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature and of the members and the committees of a House
of such Legislature.
Article 246 of the Constitution- it confers the Legislature of a State with exclusive powers to make laws for
such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh
Schedule.
Article 142 of the Constitution of India- it enables the Supreme Court to pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. According to
Article 142, “The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order
as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed
order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by
or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the
President may by order prescribe.”

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(2011) 5 SCC 305.
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Volume I, page 382.
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118 US 425 (1886).
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(1955) 1 SCR 613.
CASE: THE CHIEF PERSONNEL OFFICER & ORS. v. A NISHANTH GEORGE, 2022 SUPREME
COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Petitioner- The Chief Personnel Officer & Ors.
Respondent- A Nishanth George
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and A.S. Bopanna.

FACTS OF THE CASE-


Respondent's father who was working in Southern Railways opted for voluntary retirement under
LARSGESS (Liberalized Active Retirement Scheme for Guaranteed Employment for Safety Staff) scheme
and also applied for appointment of respondent who though qualified written exam for appointment but
failed to pass the medical test. The respondent moved before the Madras Central Administrative Tribunal
praying for its appointment under the scheme.

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The tribunal directed for his appointment but his claim was rejected and he again filed original application

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before the Tribunal and it again ordered to consider the respondent in a post according to his medical fitness.

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The respondent then moved to High Court for issuance of directions for complying with the Tribunal's order

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in reply of which the petitioner stated that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had held that the
LARSGESS Scheme was contrary to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. High Court
rejected the plea of petitioner and directed it to make appointment of respondent under the scheme. The

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order of High Court was then challenged by the petitioner in this case before Supreme Court.

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RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The Court held that the Liberalized Active Retirement Scheme for Guaranteed Employment for Safety Staff

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notified by the Railways i.e., LARSGESS Scheme provides an avenue for backdoor entry into service and

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thus it is contrary to the mandate of Article 16 which guarantees 8M9O4Oopportunity in matters of public
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employment.

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Thus, the Court held that in this backdrop, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madras issuing a

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writ of mandamus for the appointment of the respondent cannot be sustained.

CASES RELIED ON-


I. Manjit v. Union of India6- wherein the Court with respect to LARSGESS Scheme observed that,
(i) “the grant of reliefs to the petitioners would only enable them to seek back door entry;
(ii) the Union of India had correctly terminated the scheme; and
(iii) no person can claim a vested right or legitimate expectation under the scheme."
II. Kala Singh v. Union of India7 – in this case the High Court while dismissing the writ petition,
directed the railway authorities to- “revisit its validity and sustainability keeping in view the
principles of equal opportunity and elimination of monopoly in holding public employment before
making any appointment under the "offending policy".”
RELEVANT PROVISION-

The LARSGESS scheme has been held in this 9O


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Constitution.
Article 14 guarantees right to equality and states- “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.
Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and states that-
“There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to
any office under the State.”
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LL 2021 SC 57.
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2016, P&H HC.
CASE: KANTHA VIBHAG YUVA KOLI SAMAJ PARIVARTAN TRUST AND OTHERS v. STATE
OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS, 2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Appellant- Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust and Others
Respondent- State of Gujarat and Others
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Bela M. Trivedi.

FACTS OF THE CASE-


The case relates to an appeal filed before Supreme Court under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal
Act 2010 challenging the decision of Principal Bench of NGT. In the case, an original application was filed
before NGT in 2014 relating to the issue of dumping of untreated Municipal Solid Waste at an open landfill
site in Surat. When the application was brought on hearing, it was dismissed by NGT on the ground that in
another similar application it has formed Apex, Regional and State Level Committees to monitor the

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implementation of the Solid Waste Management Rules. Such dismissal was then challenged before Supreme

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Court via appeal on the ground that whether NGT was correct in dismissing the application and ordering the

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parties to approach one of the Committees set up by it, rather than continue with the proceedings.

RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The two judge bench of the Supreme Court held that NGT cannot delegate its adjudicatory functions to

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administrative expert committees. Such committees may provide assistance to NGT in coming to a
particular decision by conducting fact finding exercises or surveys but adjudication in particular case has to

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be done by the Tribunal itself and is not delegable.

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The Court, further, explained the difference between the expert committees which are set by the courts or

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tribunals and those set up by the Government in exercise of executive powers or under a particular statute

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and stated that, “the latter are set up due to their technical tr-
expertise in9Oa4Ogiven area, and their reports are
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open to judicial review. On the other hand, expert committees set up by courts/tribunals for conducting fact-

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finding exercise which may often require the committees to conduct field visits. Their role does not substitute

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the adjudicatory role of the court or tribunal. They are appointed by an adjudicatory forum is only to assist
it in the exercise of adjudicatory functions.”

OBITER DICTA-
The Court observed that NGT is a specialized body constituted under National Green Tribunal Act, 2010
which consists of judicial and expert members. While former performs adjudicatory functions under the
parent statute, the latter are appointed for the purpose of decision making on various scientific matters
concerning environment.

CASES RELIED ON-


Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India8 in which it was held by the Court that protecting health of
environment is a key to protect the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court also held that, “Section 15 empowers the NGT to award compensation to the victims of pollution
and for environmental damage, to provide for9Orestitution
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restitution of the environment. The NGT cannot abdicate its jurisdiction by entrusting these core
adjudicatory functions to administrative expert committees. Expert committees may be appointed to assist
the NGT in the performance of its task but adjudication under the statute is entrusted to the NGT and cannot
be delegated to administrative authorities.”

RELEVANT PROVISIONS-9B4I
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Section 14 and 15 of the NGT Act entrust adjudicatory functions in NGT.

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2019 Supreme Court.
Section 14(1) states-“The Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial
question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is
involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I.”
Section 15 of the Act provides power to grant relief, compensation and restitution while adjudicating its
decisions in different cases.

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CASE: PAPPU TIWARY v. STATE OF JHARKHAND (2022) SC &
LAW TIWARI @ UPENDRA KUMAR TIWARI V. STATE OF JHARKHAND (2022) SC
PARTIES’ NAME-
Appellants- Pappu Tiwary & Law Tiwari @ Upendra Kumar Tiwari
Respondent- State of Jharkhand
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh.

FACTS OF THE CASE-


Pappu Tiwari and Law Tiwari along with four others were convicted and sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment by Session Court for murder of Vikas Singh under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code. The conviction was upheld by Jharkhand High Court jointly delivering judgment on two
separate appeals against which Pappu Tiwari filed SLP before Supreme Court which was dismissed and he
was ordered to surrender. He failed to do so and was the apprehended. Then he filed application for

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restoration of his SLP but it was again dismissed. Then he filed review petition which was allowed by the

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Court. Law Tiwari also filed SLP which was also dismissed. Later he file petition challenging his conviction
on ground of plea of alibi which was admitted by Court.

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RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The Court held that, the burden to establish plea of alibi under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act is on

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the accused person and is heavy. Such burden be discharged with accuracy and it must be proved with
certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of accused at the place of the occurrence
of the crime.

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The court while making this observation examined the evidence of Law Tiwari and held such degree of

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burden has not been discharged by the accused so as to make his plea admissible allow the accused to

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become entitle to the benefit of such doubt. 9O4O
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OBITER DICTA-

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The Court observed that, “the test which is applied of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean that the endeavour should be to nick pick and somehow find some excuse to obtain acquittal.”
In other words, the accused is not entitled to nick pick circumstances claiming that the prosecution has failed
to discharge its burden and obtaining benefit of doubt when there is no discrepancy between medical and
ocular evidence of the prosecution.

CASES RELIED ON-


i. Vijay Pal v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)9- in this case evidence adduced by the accused to
prove his plea of alibi were considered sketchy and without any reason. The Court held that, “The
evidence adduced by the accused is not of such quality that the Court would entertain a reasonable
doubt. The burden on the accused is rather heavy and he is required to establish the plea of alibi
with certitude.”
ii. Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana10- in this case it was stated that, “accused have failed to bring on
record any such evidence which 4N would,9Oeven
4O by reasonable probability, establish their plea of alibi.
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The plea of alibi in fact is required to be proved with certainty so as to completely exclude the
possibility of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence”.

RELEVANT PROVISION-
Plea of alibi which is sought to be proved in this case by the accused becomes relevant under Section 11 of
the Indian Evidence 9B4I
Act-
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Section 11- Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant-
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(2015) 4 SCC 749.
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(2012) 6 SCC 204.
1. If they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact;
2. If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any
fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.

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CASE: VEENA MITTAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS., 2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Petitioner- Veena Mittal
Respondent- State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
BENCH-
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud & Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

FACTS OF THE CASE-


The case relates to power of High Court under Section 482 of CrPC with respect to quashing of criminal
proceedings. In this case, demands for dowry were made by the mother in law and brother in law of a
woman who induced her to deliver her stridhan and hence FIR was filed under Section 498A, 420 and 406
of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Single Judge of the High Court before
which petition was filed for quashing of proceedings which were initiated on the basis of such FIR under
Section 482 CrPC ordered so while observing that there were no specific allegations made against mother in

order appeal was then filed before the Supreme Court.

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law and brother in law of the victim and hence proceedings against them are quashed. Challenging such

RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The Supreme Court held that High Court can exercise its jurisdiction to quash proceedings initiated on the
basis of FIR under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure only if no offence is made out on reading the
allegations in the FIR as they stand.

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The two judge bench of the Court observed- “It is well-settled that at the stage when the High Court

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considers a petition for quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, the allegations in the

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FIR must be read as they stand and it is only if on the face of the allegations that no offence, as alleged, has

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been made out, that the Court may be justified in exercising its jurisdiction to quash.”

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CASES RELIED ON-

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Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra11- In this case parameters/ guidelines were reiterated by the

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Supreme Court with respect to exercise of jurisdiction by High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure explaining when the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order either staying the
further investigation in the FIR/complaint or interim order in the nature of "no coercive steps" or not to
arrest the accused either pending investigation by the police or during the pendency of the quashing petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C or petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

RELEVANT PROVISION-
The case relates to the scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC which states
that-
“Section 482 – Saving of inherent power of High Court
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
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2021 SCC OnLine SC 315.
CASE: STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL, 2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Appellant- State of Uttar Pradesh
Respondent- Veerpal
BENCH-
M. R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna JJ.
FACTS OF THE CASE-
The case to evidentiary value of dying declaration in which an accused was convicted by the Trial Court on
the sole basis of dying declaration of the victim. Observations made by the Trial Court while rejecting the
evidence of the accused that the victim herself poured acid on her body was that such evidence and
statements are not admissible considering the medical evidence on record and victim’s dying declaration.
The conviction was challenged by the accused before High Court where the Court refused to solely rely on
dying declaration for upholding conviction of accused and thus acquitted him. Appeal against such acquittal
was filed by the State before Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution.

RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The two judge bench of the Supreme Court held that if the Court finds that the dying declaration made by

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victim under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act voluntarily and truly after eliminating scope of
malice or falsification then the Court can base conviction of accused solely on the basis of such declaration
without any corroboration from other evidence.

OBITER DICTA-

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Since in the case two dying declarations were recorded one by a police officer and another by SDM, the

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Court observed that, dying declaration recorded by police is a statement which falls under Section 161 of

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CrPC and is hit by Section 162 of CrPC. Such statement is not substantive evidence but only holds

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CASES RELIED ON-

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While giving its decision the Supreme Court relied on following cases-
a) Paniben (Smt) v. State of Gujarat12- In this case it was held that, “there is neither a rule of law nor of
prudence to the effect that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon without a corroboration. It is
observed and held that if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can
base its conviction on it, without corroboration.”
b) Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay13- in this case following principles were laid down by the Supreme
Court relating to acceptance of dying declaration as sole ground of conviction without any
corroboration-
i. “it is not absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated.
ii. That each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the
dying declaration was made.
iii. That it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of
evidence than other pieces of4N evidence.
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iv. That a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be
judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing
the weighing of evidence.
v. That a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner,
that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the
maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which
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, (1992) 2 SCC 474.
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AIR 1958 SC 22.
depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and
human character.
vi. that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has to keep in view, the
circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation and that the statement had
been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.”

RELEVANT PROVISION-
The case relates to dying declaration which is relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act
which states that-
“Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or
who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount
of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are
themselves relevant facts in the following cases—
(1) When it relates to cause of death: When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or
as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause
of that person’s death comes into question.

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Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they

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were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the
cause of his death comes into question.”

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CASE: JOGI RAM v. SURESH KUMAR & ORS., 2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Appellant- Jogi Ram
Respondent- Suresh Kumar & Ors.
BENCH-
Sanjay Kishan Kaul & M.M. Sundresh, JJ.
FACTS OF THE CASE-
The case relates to application and interpreatation by Supreme Court of both the clauses of Section 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act. In this case, Tulsi Ram through his will bequeathed certain property to his son Jogi
Ram and his second wife Ram Devi. Ram Devi was given only life interest in the property for her
maintenance from the income derived out of the property without any right to alienate the same. The will
specified that the property will vest on her death in Jogi Ram absolutely. If Ram Devi predeceases Tulsi
Ram then also property will go to Jogi Ram absolutely. Appellant filed case claiming absolute ownership of
property on death of Ram Devi which was in consideration before Supreme Court in light of Section 14 Act.

RATIO DECIDENDI-

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The Supreme Court while interpreting Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act held that the provision

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does not specifically bar bequeathing of limited interest by any person to a female. But, if a limited interest
is given to her by her husband for her maintenance during her life time then such interest will become an
absolute interest of such female in the property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. Such transfer will not

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fall under Section 14(2) because the interest given to her is in lieu of her maintenance during her lifetime to

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It was observed by the Court that Section 14(2) applies only to that will which creates an independent and

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new title of a female in the property and not when there is recognition of a pre-existing right or where

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transfer is for ensuring maintenance of such female.

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The Court observed: "In our view the objective of sub-Section 9O4O
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repeatedly by this Court in various judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a

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property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate

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is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said
Act".

CASES RELIED ON-


V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs14 - in which it was held that where an instrument
transfers property to a female in lieu of her maintenance or a share in partition which is recognition
of her pre-existing right in property then such transfers fall outside the scope of Section 14(2) and
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act thereby creating her right in the estate absolutely whatever
maybe the intention of the transferee.

RELEVANT PROVISION-
Application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession has been interpreted and discussed in this case by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court which states that-
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
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(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this
Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a
female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance,
or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or
exertion, or by 8Apurchase
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held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

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(1977) 3 SCC 99.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will
or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of
the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such
property.”

CASE: ANAMIKA VARUN RATHORE v. VARUN PRATAP SINGH RATHORE, 2022 SUPREME
COURT
PARTIES’ NAME-
Petitioner- Anamikavarun Rathore @ Anamika Singh Bhadouria
Respondent- Varun Pratap Singh Rathore
BENCH-

c o m
Krishna Murari J.
FACTS OF THE CASE-

rs .
The case was filed by the petitioner requesting the court to exercise its power under Article 142 of the

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Constitution and thereby granting decree of divorce by mutual consent between petitioner and respondent on
the basis of settlement agreement entered between them. The case was filed before the single bench of

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Justice Murari who in light of the conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the issue that

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whether a single judge can grant decree of divorce by mutual consent invoking Article 142, has referred the

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case before larger bench of the Supreme Court.

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OBSERVATION MADE WHILE MAKING SUCH REFERENCE-

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"I am of the view that while sitting singly this Court does not have the jurisdiction to take a decision on that

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plea made in the joint application. One of the preconditions for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 in
passing order or decree for doing complete justice is that the cause or the matter in which the Court intends
to invoke the provisions thereof must be pending before it.
Annulment of marriage cannot be linked to any cause or matter pending before this Court in the facts of the
given case. The transfer petition arose out of matrimonial dispute between the parties, but the expression
'cause or matter pending before it' cannot be stretched to cover all disputes originating from such
matrimonial problem that can be resolved by this Court, sitting singly, while hearing a transfer petition.”

CASES REFERRED-
Sabita Shashank Singh v. Shashank Shekhar Singh (2021)- in this case it was observed a single bench of
Supreme Court while hearing a transfer petition cannot invoke power under Article 142 of the Constitution
and pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent under the Hindu Marriage Act.

CONFLICTING JUDGEMENTS OF 4N SUPREME


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I. Avinash Tiwari v. State of UP (2021)- in which decree of divorce by mutual consent was granted by
the single judge bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.K. Maheshwari in exercise of the
power under Article 142 of the Constitution of the India.
II. Pooja Deepak Kumar Pandey v. Rajesh Saligram Bohra- in this case also decree was passed granting
divorce by mutual consent to the parties by a single judge bench of the Supreme Court.
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RELEVANT PROVISION-
The scope of the power of Supreme Court under Article 142 is in question in the present case. Article 142
states-
“The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed
order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by
or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the
President may by order prescribe.”

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To

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