8 The Historical Construction of Christianity The real sciences can be distinguished from the absolute or ideal science only because they contain a historical element. Theology, however, apart from this element, stands in a special relation to history. It is primarily in theology, which deals with specu- lative Ideas, that philosophy becomes objective. For this reason, theology is the highest synthesis of philosophical and historical knowledge. To demonstrate this is the chief purpose of the following remarks, My assertion that theology stands in a special relation to history is not based solely on the fact that religion, like every other type of knowledge, like civilization itself, could only have originated in the teachings of su- perior beings—in other words, that from the very outset religion was tradition. The current explanations—ac- cording to which the idea of God or gods was produced by fear, gratitude, or some other feeling or was a crafty invention on the part of early lawgivers—are unsatisfac- tory; in the former hypothesis the idea of God is reduced to a purely psychological phenomenon, while the latter fails to explain how it ever occurred to anyone to makeThe Historical Construction of Christianity 83 himself a lawgiver in the first place, or how anyone could have used religion as a threat to enforce obedience unless religion had already existed. Among the falsest and shallowest writings in recent times are the so-called histories of mankind, Their views of the primitive con- ditions of our species are inspired by travelers’ accounts stressing the rudeness of savage peoples. Actually there is no condition of barbarism that is not a degenerated form of vanished civilization, The history of the earth will eventually prove that the savage tribes of today are the remnants of nations which were separated from the rest of the world as a result of revolutions. Unable to communicate with each other, robbed of their earlier cultural possessions, they have regressed to their present state. I firmly believe that the earliest condition of the human race was a civilized one and that the first states, sciences, arts, and religions were founded simultaneously - or, more accurately, that they were not separated but were perfectly fused, as they will again be one day in their final form. Nor does my assertion that theology has a special rela- tion to history refer merely to the fact that the particular forms of Christianity in which religion exists among us can be known only historically. What makes this rela- tion special is that in Christianity the universe is viewed as history, as a moral kingdom, and that this view con- stitut>s its fundamental character. We can fully under- stand this only by comparing Christianity with the religica of ancient Greece. If I do not mention still older religions, notably that of India, it is because in this respect they provide no contrast (this is not to imply, however, that they are closer to Christianity). The limits of the present lecture do not permit a com- plete exposition of this view; hence, I shall only outline84 On Unrversiry STupizs it briefly. The mythology of the Greeks was a self-con- tained world of symbols for the Ideas, which could be visualized as real only in the form of gods. Each par- ticular divinity and the world of the gods as a whole were conceived of as clearly delimited on the one hand and as absolute on the other. The infinite was perceived only in the finite and, in this way, even subordinated to the finite. The gods were beings of a higher nature, abiding, immutable figures. Very different is a religion which is concerned directly with the infinite, in which the finite is not conceived of as a symbol of the infinite —nor as existing at the same time for its own sake—but only as an allegory of the infinite, wholly subordinated to it. The system in which the ideas of such a religion become objective is necessarily infinite itself, not a world completed and bounded on all sides; the figures which represent the godhead are not abiding but transitory— not eternal beings of nature but historical figures in which the divine is revealed transitorily, its fleeting ap- pearance held fast by faith, yet never transformed into an absolute presence. Where the infinite itself can become one finite thing, there it can also become many, there polytheism is pos- sible. Where the infinite is only represented by the finite, it remains necessarily one, and no polytheism is possible except as a coexistence of divine figures. Poly- theism arises from a synthesis between absoluteness and limitation, a synthesis in which neither formal absolute- ness nor limitation is abolished. In this respect, a reli- gion like Christianity cannot be rooted in nature, for it does not conceive the finite as symbol of the infinite, nor as existing for its own sake. Consequently, Christianity can be rooted only in what falls within time—that is, in history; and hence Christianity is, in the highest senseThe Historical Construction of Christianity 85 and in its innermost spirit, historical. Every moment of time is a revelation of a particular aspect of God, in each of which He is absolute. That which the Greek religion had as simultaneity, Christianity has as succession in time, although it has not yet achieved its definitive form. It has already been pointed out that nature is to his- tory what the real is to the ideal; the same is true of the relation between the Greek religion and the Christian religion. In Christianity the divine principle no longer reveals itself in nature and is recognizable only in his- tory. Nature as such is the sphere in which things are in themselves, i.e., in which things have a life independent of the Ideas (though they symbolize the Ideas in virtue of the fact that their finitude embodies the infinite). This is why God becomes, so to speak, exoteric in na- ture; the ideal manifests itself in something different from the ideal—in an existent. Yet the divine is truly exoteric only insofar as this existent is taken for the essence, and the symbol is viewed as independent of the Idea; in terms of the Idea it is esoteric. The divine un- veils itself in the ideal world—above all, in history; here the mystery of the divine kingdom is disclosed. In nature the intelligible world is present only sym- bolically. In Greek poetry it was as though wrapped in a cocoon, still veiled objectively and unexpressed subjec- tively. By contrast, Christianity is the revealed mystery, and whereas paganism is inherently exoteric, Christian- ity is inherently esoteric. With the advent of Christianity the relation between nature and the ideal world was thus inevitably reversed. In paganism nature was made manifest while the ideal world was veiled in mystery. In Christianity the ideal world was progressively revealed while nature inevitably receded into the background as mystery. To the Greeks,86 On University Srupiss nature as such was divine; their gods were not super- natural or extra-natural. To the modern world nature was a closed book, for she was not conceived of in her- self, but only as a metaphor of the invisible spiritual world. The most active phenomena of nature, such as electricity and chemical change, were scarcely known to the ancients—at least they failed to arouse the wide- spread enthusiasm they arouse in the modern world. The highest religious feeling, as expressed in Christian mysticism, holds the mystery of nature and the mystery of the Incarnation to be one and the same. Elsewhere (in the System of Transcendental Idealism) I have shown that we must assume that there have been three periods in history—Nature, Fate, and Providence. All three terms express the same identity, but in differ- ent ways. Fate is Providence, too, as recognized in the world of real things; similarly, Providence is Fate, but viewed in the ideal world. In the period of Nature, eternal necessity was identical with and revealed itself as nature; the opposition between the infinite and the finite still lay hidden in the common seed of the finite. Greek religion and poetry had their finest flowering in this period, Then, seceding from nature, eternal neces- sity revealed itself as Fate and was brought into conflict with freedom. This happened at the close of the ancient world, and, for this reason, its history taken as a whole may be looked upon as the period of tragedy. The mod- ern world began with a universal “Fall of Man,” ie., a breaking away from nature. Surrender to nature had not been sin so long as it was unconscious; this was man- kind’s Golden Age. With consciousness innocence and reconciliation with nature were lost; voluntary sur- render to it became necessary. From the ensuing struggle freedom emerged as both the conquered and the con-The Historical Construction of Christianity 87 queror. Conscious reconciliation with nature, which has supplanted unconscious identity with it and conflict with fate and which restores unity on a higher plane, is expressed in the idea of Providence. It was Christianity that introduced the period of Providence as well as its dominant view of the universe as history and as world ruled by Providence. Christianity represented a great turning point in hu- man history, and this is why the science of religion in the Christian world is inseparable from history—indeed, why it must be identical with it. But the synthesis of religion with history, without which theology would be inconceivable, presupposes in turn the validity of the Christian view of history. History is commonly opposed to philosophy, but this opposition holds good only so long as history is con- ceived of as a sequence of accidental occurrences—the vulgar theory—or as merely empirical necessity—a sup- posedly superior conception, but actually as narrow as the other. History, too, springs from an eternal unity and has roots in the absolute, just like nature or any other object of cognition. To the common understand- ing the contingency of events and actions seems to be founded on the contingent nature of individuals. But I ask: What is this or that individual but the very man who carried out this or that particular action? There can be no other definition of the individual. Consequently, if the action was necessary, so was the individual who performed it. Even from a subordinate point of view, what may appear as a free act and hence objective “by accident” seems so merely by the circumstance that the individual supposes to be of his own choice what is predetermined and necessary. At the same time, how- ever, so far as the consequences are concerned and88 Ow Universiry STuDIEs whether for good or for evil, the act was an instrument of absolute necessity. Empirical necessity is nothing but a device for ex- tending the scope of contingency by making necessity regress indefinitely. If we allow this kind of necessity in nature only on the phenomenal plane, must we not a fortiori do the same where human history is concerned? What intelligent person will persuade himself that events like the development of Christianity, the migra- tions of peoples, the Crusades, and other great events originated in the empirical causes assigned to them? Even were these in fact the controlling causes, still they have to be regarded as instruments of an eternal order of things. What is true of history in general is especially true of the history of religion, namely, it is founded upon an eternal necessity, and consequently it is possible to con- struct it. By means of such a construction history be- comes closely bound up with the science of religion. The historical construction of Christianity can have only one point of departure, namely, the view that the world as a whole, and hence also its history, necessarily shows two different aspects and that the opposition be- tween them, which is that between the modern world and the ancient world, is sufficient to account for Chris- tianity’s nature and special characteristics. The ancient world represents the “nature” side of history in the sense that its dominant idea—what gives it unity—is that the infinite exists only in the finite. The end of the ancient world and the beginning of modern times, whose domi- nant principle is the infinite, could come about only when the true infinite was embodied in the finite—the purpose was not to deify the finite, but to offer it up as a sacrifice to God in His own person and thus to reconcileThe Historical Construction of Christianity 89 the two. Hence Christianity’s leading idea is God be- come incarnate, Christ as culmination, the closing out of the ancient world of gods. In Him, as in the ancient gods, the divine principle becomes finite, but the hu- manity he assumes is not humanity in its highest estate but in its lowest. He stands as the boundary between the two worlds, decreed from all eternity yet a transitory phenomenon in time. He Himself returns to the in- visible realm and promises the coming of the Spirit—not the principle which becomes finite to stay finite but the ideal principle which leads the finite back to the infinite and, as such, is the light of the modern world. All the other leading traits of Christianity are bound up with this basic one. To represent the unity of the infinite and the finite objectively through symbols, as the Greek religion did, is impossible in Christianity be- cause of its ideal orientation. Now symbolism is rele- gated to the subject; resolution of the contradiction is apprehended internally, not externally, and hence re- mains a mystery, something hidden. The all-pervasive antinomy between the divine and the natural is tran- scended within the subject only when both are—in an incomprehensible way—conceived as one. Such a sub- jective unity is expressed in the term “miracle.” In this sense, every idea is a miracle, since it is produced in time without having any relation to time. No idea can come into being in a temporal manner; it is an expression of the absolute—that is, God himself reveals the idea, and this is why the concept of Revelation is absolutely necessary in Christianity. A religion which exists among men as poetry needs no historical foundation—like nature, it is simply there, open for all to see. But a religion in which the divine principle does not take on any enduring form but makes90 On Univensiry Srupies only fleeting appearances needs some way of recording them, of perpetuating them. In addition to its mysteries, religion requires a mythology—in Christianity mythol- ogy is the exoteric aspect, which is founded upon reli- gion; in paganism the opposite is the case: there religion was founded upon mythology. The ideas of a religion in which the infinite is appre- hended in the finite have to be expressed primarily in actually existing things. The ideas of the opposite reli- gion, in which all symbols are subjective, can become objective only in human action. Here the original sym- bol of God is history. History, however, is endless, im- measurable, and, hence, can be represented only by something infinite yet limited, something that is not real as the state is real but ideal, and that embodies, as im- mediate presence, the spiritual union of all men without abolishing their individual distinctions. This symbol of God is the Church as a living work of art. Now, just as the action which expresses the unity of the infinite and the finite may be called symbolic when it is external, the same action, when expressed in- ternally, may be called mystical; more generally, mys- ticism is a subjective symbolism. Mystical writings have always been frowned upon by the Church, and their authors have occasionally been persecuted because they sought to make the esoteric element in Christianity exoteric—not because the innermost spirit of Christian- ity is opposed to the spirit of mysticism. If the actions and customs of the Church are held to be objectively symbolic, on the ground that their sig- nificance can only be mystical, at least the Christian ideas symbolized in the dogmas of the Church have re- tained their full speculative significance, for these sym-The Historical Construction of Christianity 91 bols have not achieved a life of their own, independent of their meanings, as those of Greek mythology. The reconciliation of the finite which had seceded from God, a reconciliation effected by God’s birth in the finite world, is the basic idea of Christianity; the idea of the Trinity, which expresses the whole Christian view of the world and of its history, is a necessary part of it. Lessing, in his Education of Mankind, attempted to de- velop the philosophical implications of this doctrine, and his observations on this subject are perhaps more profoundly speculative than anything else he wrote. But his interpretation fails to connect this idea closely enough with the history of the world. The true relation is as follows: the eternal Son of God, born of the essence of the Father of all things, is the finite itself, as it exists in God's eternal intuition; this finite manifests itself as a suffering God, subject to the vicissitudes of time, who at the culmination of His career, in the person of Christ, closes the world of the finite and opens the world of the infinite, i.e., the reign of the Spirit. If it were possible here to go further into the histori- cal construction of Christianity, we should in the same way recognize the necessity of every one of the opposi- tions between Christianity and paganism, as well as of the dominant Christian ideas and subjective symbols of ideas. It is sufficient for my purpose to have shown the possibility of such a construction. If Christianity as a whole and in its most important forms is historically necessary, and if we recognize that its higher view of history is itself rooted in higher necessity, it becomes possible to understand Christianity historically as a di- vine and absolute phenomenon, and consequently to arrive at a truly historical science of religion and theology.