aur Two, Human Experience and Absolute Thought: The Central Problem of Hegel’s Philosophy ‘A nly ght cher ‘Oak one Slot hae dad verti bu, where one wl ed ‘Awan the tg Sans ae many Wich one woud nt sree at sy pce. Bat hs ste tey ave ‘nt yet been retin ol needa whee they wl be fd gu ad gen ck Bn Sehr pp 9-a0* 1, Comprehensive System and Radical Openness “The philosophy of GF. W. Hegel claims to comprehend ll phi losopiy. One of his earliest published witings seeks to unite the thought of his immediate predecesors—Fichte and Schelling larger whe In the mature Hegelian writings, the tendency to philosophic comprchensiveness has self become comprehensive ‘Thus whereas Fichtean idealism i opposed, and opposes itself, to dogmatic realism, Hegelian idealism may be regarded asa syn- thesis of the idealism of Kant and Fichte with the realism of * Abbreviations ave Ite ox pp 245 56 The Religious Dimension in Hegel» Thought Spinosa-according to Fichte, the archdogmatist of them all, Again, Hegel may understand his thought as the completion of ‘moder philosophy. He by no means simply rejects the thought of the ancients. His only complete account of his entire system ends with @ quotation from Aristotle's Metaphaysies* But one does not hegin to grasp the Hegelian claim hensiveness if ome sees it as extending t0 other philosophies only Such indeed isthe limit of pre-Kantian metaphysics. That met physics socks to grasp either a highest realty or else a universal structure ofall reality, thus leaving for lesser type of knowledge, respectively, lower realities and contingent particulars; more over, being theoretical knowledge only, it remains simply distinct from what is not knowledge, e.g.. practical life with its varied ‘concerns. The Hegelian philosophy, in contrast, seeks to grasp a Reality which lies in the particulars, by means of a thought which ‘passes through and encompasses them, Moreover, itis not a theory beside practical life but rather an activity which moves through both theory and practice, be both. All this és because the Hegelian philosophy has carried 0 a ‘radical and unsurpassable conclusion the Kantian revotation in phic Josophy. For Kant, all thegretical knowledge has become phenom ‘ena, and philosophy has become the discipline which recognizes this phenomenal character. In Hegefs view, Kant’ philosophy {s a half-way house. Fist, phenomenal knowledge és not divorced from Reality but rather a partial grasp of i. Secondly, such partial grasps ate obtained, not in the detached theoretical observation i rather throughout the length and breadth of © and experience. Thirdly, radically to recognize partiality—ie., to philosophiz—is to transcend i. ‘There is, then, a sharp contrast between pre-Kanta post-Kantian metaphysics. For the pec fers from other forms of knowledge by virtue of its object, and from all practical forms of human life by virtue ofits theoretical relation to its object. For Hegel, the dilflerence between phil a sense neither and in a sense ee untians, metaphysics dif Human Experience and Abvolute Thought ” ‘ophy (itis doubtful whether the tern “metaphysics” should stil bbe sed!) and the whole remainder of human life (Both theoretical and practical) is one of standpoint. All other human activities are truly in contact with Reality, but reach partial traths only because they are limited to finite standpoints. Philosophy—or at any rate the true or final philosophy—rises to an infinite or abwolute standpoint, ‘and to encompass and transigure the partial truths of the finite standpoints into a Truth no longer partial i its sole im, Hegel's philosophy is thus a system whose claims exceed all previous philosophical systems not only in degree but also in pin ciple. But the word “system” is wholly misunderstood unless the ‘usual connotation of closedness is brought into immediate clash ‘ith a notion of total openness.* Hegel's system f by its owen adh ‘mission and insistence a closed circle, but i is also totally open by virtue of a claim to compechensiveness which makes it the radical foe of every form of one-sidediness Its fashionable among contemporary empiticists to describe closed systems as attitudes ‘toward reality, unverifiable and ierefutable because they are atte tudes, and in confit with other attitudes because they are one- sided, and yet naively to imagine that such attitudes can survive the exposure of thei one-sidedness. Hegel encountered this kind of doctrine (and in a much more profound form) in contemporary romanticism, which glried in the plurality and indeed confit of Wellanschauungen. But though buetly wvolved with romanticism he quickly emancipated himself from it His mature system, far {om being a Weltanschauung, onthe contrary spells the death of all mere Weltanschawungen-precisely by exposing their ane sided ness. Nor docs it cure their law merely by uniting them snto one Wellanschauung, all-compechensive because it somehow demon strates its comprehensiveness. The demonstrated unity and meces- sity of such a system would stil be confronted with a work! which {snot united and necessary but on the contrary shot through with union and brute chance, ‘When thus confronted, to be sure, some Hegeians—F Bradley comes to mind=dissipate coniiet and chance into mere18 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought ‘unealty, onthe authority of «system anda Reason which, pre- supposed from the start, do not expose themselves to the world ‘6 not among these Hegelian. His system, to be sure, will seek to demonstrate its as being comprehensive ofthe ‘world. But, in his view, if the system, hagying itself, denied the world in order to save itself, t would not comprehend the world Iba eather bein ight fom s.* The system can be comprehensive ‘of the world only by means of total self-exposure to it In his in ‘augural lecture atthe University of Beelin Hegel said: “The dec- sion o pilosophize casts itself purely ito thinking... as ‘ocean without beaches; all bright color, all mainstays have van- fshed, al friendly lights otherwise present are extinct. Only one star sil shines, dhe inner star of Spit... [es natural that, eas lone, Spirit i assailed . by dread it as yet unknown where everything lead, where one will end Among the things vanished are many Which one would not surrender at any’ pice, But i this solitude they have not yet been reconstituted. And itis uncertain whether they will be found again and given back"* 2 Spirit ‘The characteristic of the Hegelian system just deseribed has al- ‘ways been recognized. with varying degrees of elarty, as being. at the core of all that is baffling about the Hegelian philosophy tially the student, fastening on the incredibly high claims made wets view Wt the dechive advantage of his own completion of uslem (Christian) pulenophy over tho Neoplstonie completion tf ncn {pn pn athe any with the war (Soe sh 6, mcs 9-8) 30 shoul rveticess be forced nt ight tan the men wor u'r fect, 3) tht accurtnce wou, therefore, have tobe viewed 8 Sees ‘Human Experience and Absolute Thought 19 bby Hegel in behalf of Reason, will assume that he already knows the meaning ofthis word, and Hegel wll then appar to him as the arch-rationalist of alltime. His work will seem am attempt, mde inthe teeth ofall facts, to deduce reality from a priori principles and, indeed, asthe final reduetio ad absurd ofall such attempts ever made, but the serious student cannot long remain with this caricature. For he soon finds that Hegel asserts an Understanding, which confronts, analyzes, and keeps separate facts, not merely hese a Reason which speculatively unites them but rather-of incomparably greater consequence—within a Reason empty with- ‘out t:And he discovers that Hegel not only admits contingency in addition toa necessity fee of it ut rather—again of incomparably _reater consequence insists tha contingency enters into the neces- sity which in turn comsists of nothing but its conquest Hegel is 30 far from denying the realty of contingency as setually to be the ‘only speculative philosopher in history to attempt a demonstration ofits inevitability" Other specs the Divine free from chance. But it was Hege who first asserted that God is dead." ‘Taking our ewe from the passage cited atthe end ofthe previous section, we may seek to cope with the enigma of the Hegelian system by turning to its fundamental affirmation. Reality i Spr ‘This, however, merely seems to shift the enigma, For Hegelian Spirit, though opposed to Matter, eannot be simply apposed 10 : 8 spiritualism which denied Matter would be, in Hegel's view, as false and one-sided as a materialism which asserted the opposite Hogels Spirit-which is free internal selfdevelopment—includes Matter, which is unfree externality, brute givermess, and chance. But how can Matter be included in Spiit and yet, real in its own. right, be and remain opposed to Spirit? It may well soem that Hgets philosophy must either, as Marx believed, afterall be a ove-sided spiritualism oF ele dissolve itself into x0 radical an ‘openness tothe world as to cease to be a philosophical system of any kind2 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought ‘The tur to Spirit nevertheless takes usa few decisive steps fur ther, i that it gives us an inkling ofthe realities behind the Hegel fan enigma, as well as of the central problems these raise for Hegelian thought. ‘The enigma concerning Spirit appears because Hegel asserts forthe present this isa bare assertion~that Spirit has the power of ‘what he calls overreaching* Sprit, fst, tolerates the other-than- Spirit bevide itself, Secondly, it can and does overcome this side- Dysideness, by absorbing the other-than-Spirit. Thirdly—this must ‘not be overlooked =it eeonsttutes the other i its otherness even ‘while absorbing it I in absorbing the other Spirit simply de- stroyed is otherness—if the “union” which isthe “result” did not preserve the “process” throughout which there is “nonunion’”—the Philosophy affirming this result would be a one-sided monism op- posed by an equally one-sided pluralism. If it failed to absorb the ‘other-than-Spirt there would be no Spirit but at best only spits, side-by-side, and immersed in, what isnot Spirit. The upsbot is that only if Spit has overreaching power can there be an all comprehensive, yet radically open system, rather than either & one-sided system opposed by other one-sided systems. oF els 80 radical an openness to the world as to dissipate all philosophy into it. But bow docs one know that Reality é overreaching Spirit? Spirit can hardly be a category of thought only, brought to life {nvan attempt to interpret it. Life would testify too loudly against such an interpretation—against a Spirit inclusive of Matter in be- ball of spirits remaining immersed tn, limited by, and opposed to it, Thought itself would thus become a merely one-sided enter- Drie, its one-sidedness exposed by human existence as a whole. ‘Thus the Hegelian philosophic strictares against one-sidedness ‘would turn against his own philosophy, and indeed, against all philosophy. For philosophy, having failed to comprehend hfe, ‘would be disclosed inthis fashie as being comprehended by life It is no accident that post-Hegelian philosophers such as Marx ‘Human Experionce and Absolute Thought a and Nietzsche who considered the Hegelian system a failure should have proclaimed the end of speculative philosophy.” ‘This destructive consequence can be avoided only if Spirit not a category brought to life by thought only, i its overreaching power i already manifest in Iie, for man, prior to and epart from all philosophizing. But the problem will not settle ise easly even then. Ifthe absence of a manifestation of Spirit én life will ‘make philosophy impossible will not its presence in life make philosophy unnecessary? Hegel defines what philosophical thought és in terms of what it docs. But if the Truth of Spirit i already manifest in life what remains to be dove for philosophical thought? ‘This question may seem susceptible of «ready answer. Even i 4 Spirit inclusive of Matter isin fact manifest somewhere in life, spirits immersed in and limited by Matte indisputably exist in life as well. May not to philosophy fall the tak of demonstrating the inclusiveness of Spirit, over against the spirits whose very finitude is a testimony against it? But the problem does not dis pate itself so readily No simple escape iin sight from the derma that if in fe finite spirit testes successfully ugainst a Spirit man festing its alhinclusiveness, a philosophic demonstration to the contrary remains a one-sided assertion of thought over against life; whereas, if Spirit in life already demonstrates is alhinclusive- ness over the protests of nite spirits philosophy is, once again, left without function. As might have been suspected-and as Hegel himself certainly warns often enough=no solution, or even adequate comprehension, of the central isues of the Hegelian ry can be achieved by a thought which, rather than im smersing itself in that philosophy, tries to spare its sch Isbor by means of some abstract a prior argument. ‘Our tum from Hegel's concept of philosophy to its central assertion has nevertheless served to make two disclosures. Firs, the togetherness of comprehensive system with radical openness depends on a Reality which is itself one and yet radically open,a ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought {ce s0 hospitable to plurality of every kind as to eject nothing— no discord, evil, chance, brute faet—into the limbo of unreality, Secondly, Hegelian philosophy cannot be a mere theory of lif which is merely aver against life. Its truth of thought must be also-and already truth manifest a life Ln companion volume to the present work, we intend to exhibit, inthe thought of Hege's {dealstic predecessors from Kant on, an intimate, intricate, and indispensable interconnection between human lie and philasoph- ical thought. We shall ty to show that a truth of life—such as ‘moral duty, religious feeling or aesthetic creation supports a truth of philosophical thought, even as i turn it receives support from philosophy. In the present volume, our task is to show that, here as elsewhere, Hegel radicalizes tendencies manifest in his prede- ‘cessors. These exalt ove standpoint of life at the expense of others, and the philosophy bound up with the exalted standpoint isin simple opposition to all other philosophies. Inthe case of Hegel, the “hfe” in question i af of life, not one ofits standpoints one= sidedly exalted: and the philosophy be puts forward does not so much oppose other philosophies but encompass and transigure them.* The problem of the relation between comprehensive sys tem and radical openness thus transforms itself into the problem ofthe relation between all of human life and an allcomprehensive philosophical thought. This ithe central probleen of the whole Hegelian philosophy 1 Religious Life and Philosophie Thought sibly the last statement in the preceding paragraph is an ex eration. The exaggeration i justified, however, in the context ‘of this exposition, the central theme of which is the relation be- ‘tween religion and philosophy in Hegel's thought. For if for Hegel the truth of Spirit is already disclosed in life the disclosure s found or found deeisively-in religious Mfe, reaching its fullness én modern Protestant Christianity, In the Hegelian system, religion Human Experience and Absolute Thought +3 appears as one among, other forms of spiritual life. ‘This must under no circumstances abscure the fact that it és also the basis, ‘and the condition of the possibility, of the system in its entirety. ‘The Hegelian problem concerning the relation between life and philosophical thought therefore specifies itself into a problem con ceming the relation between religious life and philosophic thought. It is a central Hegelian doctrine that the true religion aleady is the true “content,” lacking merely the true “form” of speculative thought; that philosophy could wot rach truth unless its true content preexisted in religion; that philosophic thought therefore requires religion as its basis in life, and that the true in giving the true religious content its true form of thought, both transfigures religion and produces ise. The pur pose of our entie concern with Hegel is, in the end, but to ex pound that doctrine.) ‘Toward this purpose, itis essential to face up from the start to the fact that, whereas Hegel's mature thought is: unwaveringly ‘committed to the doctrine just stated he nowhere systematica ‘expounds it. More precisely, while the doctrine eals Foran exposi- tion composed of two stages Hegel himself gives only the second. “The frst stage would be to deseribe how Truth is present in a religious life philosophically uncomprohended, ie, for religious selfunderstanding, thus bringing to light the basis, in Wie, of the true philosophy, The second stage would be to produce the philo- sophical comprehension, ie., a thought which absorbs and trans- figures its religious basis and rises above it, OF these two tasks, Hogel explicitly accomplishes only the second in all the three major works in which religion has a central roe. His Phenome- ‘nology of Spirit (1807) “hands the ladder” to all~including re= ligious~standpotnts, tothe standpoint of absolute knowledge but inso doing it has itself already assumed the standpoint of absolute knowledge." The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (fest ‘ed, 1817, second ed, 1828; third ed, 1830) reenacts fn thought all natural and spetual-tnchiding religious-reality; but the thought4 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought reematiog i slready philosophical ® The Lectures onthe Pow ophy of Religion (delivered in 182: pobbsbed periemouly) ere al Sete Talo align, Bee ar wok tw does acta dato Tigre if luncettinding, tender then to show the pouty we llc of is trnsigurtion Int specu the thong, Kn th werk scious Mel lady apecustively trang No doubt thle Hegelan practice has done smech te fer the Selecad ew ft lp We tect of ioe thought external and altar lapoed om fe wen in fot es fort tls ler oy es acess lboee ‘dite, Hegets gigantic tempt may fll His thought may, stir al romala bowel tn li seve wh seks to hes ceartage eopslpape re aplication ag i after al ie ony ot the costo lo of fot Me thes becrm the dogmatic rational it 9 widely thought to be mien Thought lls infact eter (are tcl tained copechly the lta aula he lnc Eeasias Wh psoas lass egueael Cea” aly cexusl ts eon Genk copes pearing Pe Cord, ceoplo biter roupghes spurt ie And whether dove a fot ergy tw forge acini. To ak uae oe ined ol ernte In order to carry out this examination we have no choice but to ‘per olay tn Soka repay Bus ae ae epaod In handing « llr to the tapott of checkin thought, the Phenemewelogy skew slope Gat saudpsks ww mist ib ‘whut ood lf show, tle por sdopion can bs Jailod The Encyclopedia renacs the actual week abolate thought, clo ng that vo ous has occured in the eenactrcnt. We mest four ll attention on this last-named claim, bearing in mind that reality re= owas pen! avec ly tober ent gs Human Experience and Absolute Thought a5 mains shot through with contingency even while absolute thought rises above it. The Philosophy of Religion grasps, frst, a specula- tive Notion of religion and then, existing religions asthe necessary process ofits actualization, a process completed fn Cheistianity Here we mast proceed in two stages. The fst Is a descriptive Account of the philosophically unrcenacted religion which i the alleged basis of both the Hegelian philosophy of religion and the Hegelian philosophy asa whole, Le, Christianity. The second is an account of Hegel's speculative comprehension ofthat religion, Le ‘of how in “encompassing” that religion “in its own being” Hegelian thought can hope to produce itself as the allcomprehensive philosophy. 4 Schellingion ond Hegelian Absolute Idealism future work already repeatedly referred to, we intend to ‘consider the religious thought of Hegel's idealistic predecessors— Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher and Schelling, Here we mast pause for 4 brief comparison of Hegel's absolute idealism with that of F.W. J. Schelling, his immediate predecessor, erstwhile close friend and subsequent rival. This comparison wil serve three sy tematic purposes in the present context. It will identify the stage tm the development of German idealism at which Hegel's philos cophy comes on the scene. It will corroborate, in terms of tha stage of development, the major points already made in the preceding ‘ages. And it wall show that Hegelian thought calls for a tematic comprehension which concentrates on his mature works. ‘The last-named point has already been made. A comparison of Hegel and Schelling will confirm it. Schelling’ philosophy, which shifts from standpoint to standpoint ells fora genetic exposition. Hegel's dissent from Schelling’s various positions, his absolute Idealism included, concerns precisely those aspects which make restless shifts on Schelling’s part a seemingly endless necessity. ‘And it i against Schelling, mote than against any other phils:6 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hoget« Thought copher, that Hegel asserts that philosophy must assume system ‘and finality, The interpreter may not ignore or minimize this Commentators often belittle Hegel's debt to Schelling, One ean- not belittle it, It was Schelling who'in 1801 frst reached the stand point of absolute idealisin. It may briefly be described as the standpoint of aa infinite or divine ‘Thought which has relativized, nd thereby exposed as morely phenomenal, all those hard-and- fast distinctions which remain thard-and-fast for a merely finite ‘or human thought. Hegel comes to share the standpoint reached by Schelling in 1801. Indeed, whereas Schelling quickly abandons absolute idealism Hegel remains with it to the end.* He is able to do s0, however, only because he is critical of Schelling’: kind of absolute idealism from the start. Indeed, “while his criticism deepens as his thought develops his basie ob- jection to Schelling’ position actually antedates Schelling’s state iment of it. As eat as in 1800 Hegel writes; “Life is the union of ‘union and! nonunion." For the Schelling of 801, nonunion is mete appearance, taken for real by Bnite standpoints but not by 4 thought risen to the absolute standpoint, It is Hegel’ lifelong lawwledgable a tet aC. Miller refer to Sceling ae cans {Hlpel Denkguchte emus Lebenigen (Ber aid Mild Fouts sol ite Sethe Cac tras one of inate posal Tis tenative ears} came eaten ier ‘ane preface cata an atk on Schehig lloers ad ‘thie frends wo fave Seethng war evn then sell be ea wth Vinge comesponien sage [New York Doubly, gs, pao.) But Ie teworhy that tn Heat ae Lecter ow the Hr of Phowphy cba ae alm ul pas depron Crh hy pa sp Fee ca OF the alienation betwoen Schelling td Hop, whic eccarvedgually rather than abruptly se F- WS, efe tnd Dokwmewes te I. Fuk (Bota Bower, wha), pase ‘Human Experience and Absolute Thought 27 ‘objection that reality itself includes nonunion and that, unless a thought aspiring to absoluteness can recognize and preserve it as ‘sch i dissipates both reality and itself into mere shadows. ‘A negative outcome of just this kind was to lead Schelling in his overall endeavors no less concerned to preserve the realities of lie from dissipation into abstract thought=to abardon absolute idealism for what finaly turned out to be an existentialist position, If Heget’s absolute idealism is sometimes seriously strained but in the end never threatened, it is because of two intervelated—but tot ielentical~convictions, arrived at by the time of philosophical maturity and never subsequently abandoned. One is that Reality is dialectical. The other is that the true philosophical thought i dialectal. ‘One must hesitate to make general pronouncements of any sort about Hegelian dialectic. There has been and can be no greater misunderstanding of Heget's thought than the ascription to it of a dialectical method separable from all content, deriving its validity one knows not whence, and indiscriminately applied ‘one cannat say by what justifeation. The error owes mach of ts inspiration to the same kind of positivstic thinking which con- ‘lads that, inasmuch as Hegefs thought is obviously not inductive it must somehow be deduetive; and it acquires a touch of comedy whenever the triumphant discovery is made that the dialectical method has broken down because general characteristics, mis- takenly ascribed to st to begin with, do not ft a particular apple cation, The truth fs that Hegelian dlalectic—the dialectic of both Reality and philosophical thought—is inseparable from content, and that only a thought which actually labors with realty ean ‘ome upon either, Fo this reason our present merely introductory observations cannot go far beyond cortoborating what has already Deen said Fist, Reality i dialectical in that the fnite at once points to ‘an Infinity which contains it while yet retaining is own reality, For Hegel, a forthe Schelling of 1801, “the ideality of the finite8 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hoger's Thought {s the main principle of philosophy."!* But to Schelling this means that the finite merely appears real at Snite standpoints and i seen as absorbed in infinity at the absolute standpoint, ‘To Hegel it rears that the fte 8 overreached by the Infinite, and that it aust be real as well us “merely idea," ifthe overreaching Inf nite i not itself to suffer los of all reatity. It this conviction ‘which forces Hegel to recognize the partial truth of finite thought— ‘eg natural seience—when Schelling can merely oppose or ignore {Tes this conviction, too, which produces his charge that Schel- lngian thought reduces the Absolute toa “night in which all cows are black""*—a charge made in behalf of a “labor of thought”™— ‘which must take place, soto speak, i the daylight of multicolored It. I's this, inally~and for our purpose most inportantly—which makes the mature Hegel confront seriously the actual Christianity ‘of historical tradition, Fora brief period early in his carer—anore precisely, before his career had begun in earoest—he had em- raced religious romanticism which exalts ecstatic moments in ‘which the finite human spirit seems simply to becorne ene with the Divine The mature Hegel is forced to take seriously the Chri tian claim that the Easter which reconciles the human with the Divine can occur only after a Good Friday which exhausts the whole agony of their discord, Hegel's mature confrontation of orthodox Christianity has often been viewed as a lapse into reac: tion, and this view hus received renewed impetus by the absurd recent fashion to exalt the Early Theological Writings-never in tended by Hegel for publicationat the expense ofthe published ‘works of his maturity.* The truth is that the confrontation with, corthoxox Christianity is but part af Hegel's mature thought as a whole, as this exposition will seek to show, a integral and indeed indispensable part So much, for the present, for the dlaletic of Reality. What of the dialectic of philosophic thought? Only a finite thought remains * Nathing is wren Wotan a pase ef couse, ith swith et Bary Theol (poco Hgts onl od ey ee Human Experience and Abyolute Thought 1 ‘confronted by Reality, as its Mniting oer, and Hegel's absohte {dealistic thought aspires us much to infinity as that of Schelling Philosophical thought clams to be safnte Spit in its ftinate form, adit does not confront Reality but rather is ane with it.The Schelling of s801, however, merely ascets this identity in the teeth of al forms of fite existence and thought which deny i, an assertion which, as Hegel pats it, comes “shot from the pistol™ eget’ own thought, in vast contrast, cm absorb and transigure Realty ony after fst ofall confronting it in its otherness. Rather than assert its claim over against finite experience an thought tnd indeed over agunst conflicting phibsophic thought-t aries from all these ot, more precisely, has so arisen, anit must pro> serve the “proces” of rising in the “resue” of having risen. In ‘other words, just as iafinite Spirit in Me overreaches the fnite— finite sprit and all of Matter=so the infinite Spirit which is the true philosophic thought appears on the scene by manifesting over- reachitng power. But what makes i the true philosophic thought i that it overreaches all ese “Ten years after Hegets death Schelling reemerged from phi sophical obscurity to proclaim that philosophic thonght cannot Afterall, each the titanic goals to which absolute dealin had fapired; that his own carir absolute idealism, while grasping ex sence, had all along been eluded by enistenen, ani he called for ‘What in effect was am existential philosophy. For the twentit ‘entry student it al foo easy to side with Selling’ existential fm and dispose, without real examination, of Hegel» philsophy fsa mere essentially" But thas already been stated that Schel Ting and Hegel sbare an overall determination to guard against isipating finite reaites into an absolute thought reduced to mere shadows. In Schelling’ case, this termination ism in the restlessness with which he moves from poston to position fad in his final arrival at “positive” philosophy which has reduced 1s earlier abwolute ideal to a necessary but merely “negative preliminary, But Hegels absolute idealism is not Schelling’,»” ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought in his case the loyalty to finite realities manifests itself in the steadfast persistence in a position believed capable of doing them justice. Whether or not Hegel is right in this belief eannot be decided by Schelling’s strictures on his earlier absohite idealism Dut only by the study of Hegel's ov. And such a study must take seriously his steadfast persistence in his positon. It must compre Ihend and appraise his philosophy as it was intended to be eom- prehended—as a systematic, allcomprehensive whole.