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    13 views28 pages

    Transfiguration of Faith Into Philosophy

    Uploaded by

    S Robinson
    Emil Fackenheim - Hegel

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    The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy ho wbate world slexst oust we tect 237 Zs, (Wethe, VI, p49) * Thoms Nor xe tey scat pee neracec oe acne Wire wey ongoing Nani acc eases cee tee err limactic tasks to understand! why “philosophy cannot exist with: cut religion, .. fand how it comes to] encompass religion in its ‘own being.” More specifically, the task is to understand Hegots ‘oft-repeated formula that the true content, already existing in the = AUbevations te sted on 245 The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 161 Christian religion in the form of representation, fs given i is ‘oven philophy’the true form of speculative thought? ‘This formula fs more easily cited than understood. How can philosophical thought emancipate itself from the religious form and yet recognize, preserve, and indeed itself presuppose the truth of tie religious content? Not, fist i it reduces what religious representation takes for an actual divin-human relationship to the solitary dsport of the soul with its own unrecognized product. In that cas, religion would be a fale in content as it infor, ‘and philosophy would then destroy its own hopes to grasp the true content even as it exposes the religious failure to grasp it ‘The divine worship which s philosophy’ collapses with the divine ‘worship which i religion * Philosophy cannot, next, accept divine presence in the religious relation and yet simply reject religious representation The rei ious content, while true, would then reduce itself to the emptiet of trata sheer empty Presence manifest in orto a shee feeling esqually empty. In Heges tine as in ours, demythologizing phi Josophies sought simply to destroy myth and syinbol. Hees own philosophy i not among these. tn his view, myth and symbol do ‘ot cover but rather uncover religious Truth? They express con: tent, and the cootent is fseparable frm the form of expression. Philosophie thought, to be sure, aims to rise abuve religion repre= sentation. But ifn so dotng tt stmpy destroyed ths later it would reduce iself to emptiness. Hegelian philosophy of ecligio i not demythologizng or antisymbolic. 1s transmythologica and trans “It cannot, thirdly, possess this last-named character unless it *Phophy til i worhip.” (Werke, Xk, pas (PM. Rel 1 ash sho Fld teh, Phi pi.) Fer Cath, Cod nts were abe ft inte, "Cal and fo aH has fro ss los a 1 iy th it he ‘of Gola wel (Werke, Ail, ppogbt. (Phi. Ret. fl, ppigsif{) This & brome tn steerage “hot {i waches God! bt ater ‘how God reaches man”'(Bl Schr pte) a62 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought ‘can rise to infinity, A thought confined to fnitude might reflect on religious representation and recognize myth and symbol for what they ae, But if while doing so t acupted a divine Presence in religious representation, it could not rise above representation toa higher form of truth. Demnythologizing would lec! back to re- mythologizing, reflection upon religious life, into immediate re- Higious life itself* Hegelian thought, then, can achieve its transrepresentational goals only if itis not finite and hurnan but rather infinite and divine. But how can it achieve its goals even then? The dilemmas just re- jected are not Hegel's. The dilemma now to be considered is at the heart of his own philosophy, and it sno very great exaggeration to say that his whole Philosophy of Religion-—and, indirectly, bis whole philosophy—is haunted by it. Either the representetional Jorm of religion is essential tots content, and this is why philos- cophy requires religion (and the absolute philosophy the Christian religion) as necessary presupposition. Bul then how can philosophy transcend or transfigure the representational form without loss of the religious content? Or else philosophy docs indeed achieve its unprecedented feat: but then teas not the representational form all ‘long unessential to the religious content? And does not then phe losophy presuppose religion, if atoll, only per aecidens? What is here at stake becomes fully clear through the decisive criterion which distinguishes religious representation from specu lative thought. The religiously represented remains other than the representing activity; speculative thought, in contrast, & a sheer, infinite sel productivity which has surpassed and vanquished all otherness: “the represented ceases to be such, and ceases to be alien to the knowledge of it, only because the Self has produced it"* * S00 Werke, Xi tay (Phd. Ra, pay HL): “The experience. that 1 canst hep met by means of relltton ha ve stad upon myc alan coms ‘The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 263, Religion, then, remains a relation between the human and the Divine, but speculative thought is « human activity at one with the Divine ‘The Hegelian dilemma may therefore be restated as follows Either God is ultimately other than mau, as isthe religious testi ‘mony of the believer who stands in relation with Him. But then religion is true in form as well as in content, and philosophic ‘thought must recognize both as well as itself remain frite reflec tion. Or philosophic thought can become an absolute, ellencom= passing selfactictty. But then it discloses the ilusoriness of the {ap between the Divine and the human, end hence thet—in the decisive respect—religion is false in content no less than in form. Christian tf, in tha case, dissipates itself into mere appearance the sin of man and the death of God are both, afterall, not serious realities but mere aspects of a divine play. As for philosophic thought, it is the enjoyment of the play. ‘This dilemma haunts Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. But it is present, as well, in his philosophy as a whole which (as Hegel himself insists) both presupposes and transfigures Christianity. It {sno accident that our preceding account of the Hegelian phi- Josophy has wrestled with, but not yet answered, these wo ques tions: how can philosophic thought cliim absohuteness over against standpoints of life which themselves claim to fall outside it) and how, having made this claim, ean it both encompass the actual ‘world and yet not, as such, destroy it It has previously emerged that Hegel's philosophy requires an infinite divine human Life to mediate between finite life and infinite Thought, and that this, for Hegel, is Chistian life.’ What emerges now is that Christianity cannot fulfil this mediating function if a final conflict erupts which fs itvelf incapable of mediation—between it and philosophic thought. It is Heget's goal to bring about a final “peace” between the final religion and the final philosophy: It would appear that ‘unless he can achieve this peace, his whole philosophy falls into fragments. ‘This peace isthe subject of the present chapter. The manner in 164 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought which it will be concluded may preliminarily be summed up as follows. The final philosophy presupposes the final religion: unless the absolute content were present in Christian life, philosophic ‘haaght could not, nits oe right, hope to attain it: But in attain- ‘ng that content i tansfigurs its form: for whereas the Christian (and indeed every) religion is @ divine-human relation the final (and indeed every) philosophy is a oneness of thought with Divinity. The final philosophy produces peace with the final re- ligion, in that i rises in thought to the divine side of that divine- human relation at whose human side the final religion remains, and having so risen, by reenacting that relation im thought. ‘Such a philosophic enterprise will produce peace with Chris- tianity ooky if it can satisfy two crucial conditions. It must be able to rise t the divine side of the Christian divine-human relation, ‘even though Christian faith itself remains atthe human, and, hay ing so risen it must be able to reenact the Christian divine-huran ‘elation in thought and yet not destroy or dissipate its representa- tional existence in human Ife. Whether Hegel's thought ean or does supply ether of these conditions is, to be sure, questionable. ‘That he seeks to supply thern i not. This must be stressed in par- ticular concerning the second condition on which in the Philosophy of Religion the main weight rests. The critics have always noted. that the Hegelian philosopher "walls om his head,” but oly rarely that be does s0 “for a change oaly"™—because he is a man as well, They have seen that is philosophy isa speculative “Sunday [dur- {ing which man], uniting himself with the Divine, makes his ind viduality and activity vanish in the Divine" but not that this Sunday is connected with the workaday week “during which man stands on his own feet, is master in his own house, and pursties his ‘own interests But phiknophry, in fact, 4 that connection, The ‘rts in short, have paid insufficient heed tothe fact that nothing fs further from Hegel intentions than the disipation of burman elle in general and religious life i particular~into philé- sophical thought. The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 165, ‘The general exceution of Hegel's intentions in his philosophy as a whole has been discussed in a previous chapter. We then watched the extreme care with which is thought sceks « middle between right-and left-wing extremes, of which one would destroy the actual world and the other. philosophical thought. In the pres: cent chapter, we shall have oceasion to watch Hegel’ speculative transiguration of Christianity give equal care to seeking a middle which would preserve Christianity agninst two extremes equally destructive of it: One of these i a speculative pantheissm which ‘would dissipate the human into the Divine. The other i am athe- {ste humanisen which would reduce the Divine to the human? 2. Christianity and the History of Philosophy ‘Can Hegel’ thought rise from the human to the divine side of the Christian divine-human relation? This question obliges us to introduce (possibly very belatedly) crucial Hegelian doctrine. The rive of thought to Infinity or Divinity is by no means an achievement confined to Hegelian philosophy: itis, whether or not it is recognized as such, actual in all philosoplny worthy of the ‘name. Since Parmenides philosophie thought has been “elevated to the realm of the ideal, as Aristotle ist consciously recognized, {thas been a “thought thinking itself” which isnot finite or human but infinite 0 divine.™ Such expressly finite forum of thought as tmpircisn are one-sided protests against infinite forms of Thought Which later, beeause abstractly infinite, are themselves one-sided: tnd both the protest and its object are part of a larger, concrete infinity. According to our exposition thus far it may have scemed that the Hegelian project of rising to infinite Thoughts in its selfunderstanding without precedent, and that it presupposes (Christianity. Now it seems that itis as ancient as philosophy itself and (since ancient philosophy is pagan) in no need of Christianity at all, {tis one of the chief objectives of Hegel's History of Pht 166 The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought losophy to define the exact relation of Hegelian philosophy both toall prior philosophy and to Christianity.* The definition emerges from the periods into which the history of philosophy is divided Greek thought, though a “free” se to Divinity is ia principle lim ft by the fact that it ks pre-Christian. ‘This limitation is trans cended by medieval philosophy, which is roted inthe Christian faith. Thi rootedness, however, robs it ofthe freedom essential 19 philosophy, which is why medieval philosophy is not a genuine pilosophic period én sts own right but rather a time of “ferment tion and preparation” ofthe moder period. Filly, modern phi Josophy reconguets the ancient freedom, and indeed expands it to fnfity. But precisely fr this reason i iin its preHegelan forms hostile to the very Christian background to which it owes its power of seltxpansion Only the final modem philosophy. gels owncan recognize that modern speculative thought pre- supposes the Christian faith which t was previously bound to op- pore, and that the opposition between the two i relative rather than absolute: and this recognition trasmates total warfare sto total peace. We see that thought moves, to bein with i, inthe Mile Ages) within Chistian, accepting as abwclte preuppenition. Late, wa the wings of thought have grown stong (ke, inthe modern worl uloscply rss tothe sn ke a young eas. a bird of prey which Seis religion down. Hut Ki the hat developement of speculative ‘hough to do fstice to Faith and make peace with veligion (a) Ancient Philosophy ‘This interpretation of the history of philosophy must now be sketched in some detail And we must begin with Hegel's ex: traordinary esteem for ancient Greece and all its works which, romantically excessive in his youth, still survives in his mature thought. Thus the History of Philosophy devotes more space to 41. nec hry be al that the following acount tras the Hn o py sy rom Win poo, sa fone to av oe rh ‘The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 167 Greek thought than to all the remainder, and the Encyclopedia, albeit a work said to be possible only in the modern Christian ‘work!, nevertheless closes with a famous passage from Aristotle's Metaphysicn* However, mature Hegelian thought keeps esteem for Greece within clear and reasonably wellliseiplined limits. Modern man may feel at home in Greece: yet he eanmot return to itor wish to ‘do 0, for his world is Christian. Modem philosophy may “recog- nize ... [the ancient as] satisfying at its stage of development” ‘but it satisfies at its stage only, which modem philosophy has sur- ‘passed. Greek philosophy isan indispensable aspect of the com lete philosophy, but itis no more.* From its beginnings in Thales to its end in Neoplatonism, Greek thought is never without the freedom which is of the philosophic ‘essence. For it is at one with a Divinity which is no alien Beyond but rather an immanent Presence. Moreover, as ancient thought develops it grows in richness and content. The abstract Being of Parmenides quickly yields to the dialectical Becoming of Heracli- tus which in turn soon emerges—in the Nout of Anaxagoras—as a free, selfdetermining universality. Against the objective univer- sality in which hitherto thought as lst ise subjective reflection then makes its claims, of. in the sophists und Socrates. Tis, to be sure, is immediately « mere human~Fiite—subjectivity, asserted ‘against the objective universality. But Plato and Aristotle raise gee oral ehings Grek can eve be teste only ate mies Berens cer oe enon paveaesecae amd on rach oft pars he bse of ie ‘a Te Gator rpomed bt vote) tod Me pele nea bt hoor oar nfl mae tyrant "er Simca lege comer fhe revaied Cretan gow mk 168, ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought this, tell, to universality, thus reaching an ideal world alive at ‘once as divine Thought and in human thought. Mankind did not have to wait for Christianity in order to learn that God is not ‘envious. For this was known, already, to theso two greatest of all agin philosophers. Indeed, “there is no higher idealism” than that of Aristotle, even in the modern world. ‘And yet, this is neither the highest nor the last stage even of cient philosophy, The Platonic Idea qua pure thought may “con- tain everything.” It, however, “abstract”: internally complete, it {alls to encompass what is not ideal, as well as the subject qua not ‘thinking and this failure is reflected in the failures of the Platonic state. Nor does Aristotle succeed where Plato fails. He docs, in: decd, recognize the particular and seeks to unite it with the universal, But he does not find the unity he seeks. Universal and sense particulars remain beside each other, and the subject qua thinker an! qus human ineliidual fall apart. The comprehensive: ‘ess sought remains an unfullled need Hence classical gives way to postclassical Greek thought, even though this latter cannot either maintain or recapture the classical speculative power. In Stoicism and Epicurcanismn isolated sub- jectivity, hitherto left outside and uncomprehended, asserts itself, ‘and in making itself the eriterion ofall truth this self-assertion is bsolute, By itself, to be sure, this i an arid individualistic, sub fectivist, dogmatism. But it shows its aridity by a display of its internal emptiness, and as this emptiness assumes—in Skepticism — conscious recognition, it annihilates all dogmatic claims of every {solated subjectivity, those of Skepticism itself included, And this ‘selfannihilation has a positive power, Ancient Skepticism points ‘beyond a self-enclosed subjectivity cut off from objective reality, and to a renewal, within the sphere of inwarduess, of an objective world, This rencwal-the climactic achievement of ancient thought is accomplished in Alexandrinian Neoplatonism. Unlike original Platonism, because it has passed through the destructive subjec- The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 169 tivism ofthe Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptical phases, Neoplatonismn {s “left with no other Essence than its own sef-consclousness,” and ‘this és why it can rebuild the ideal world within this sphere only. As so rebuilt, however, this world is by no means the mere inte product of a merely finite subjectivity. It is an infinite world produced by a subjectivity which, dialetically ruined by Skepti- ‘ism in its finite claims, has raised itself to infinity on these very ruins. This total “internalization of infinite subjectivity . . Lin which] sef-consciousness knows itself to be, in its thinking, the Absolute” isthe final standpoint achieved in the ancient world ‘And of this Hegel asserts that itis “closely connected with the revolution brought about by Christianity in the world.">* Nevertheless, the Christian revolution will mark the end of ancient pagan thought, the Neoplatonic included. True, that most decisive “jolt” in all of history which is Christianity is not ‘wholly confined to Christianity. For Ncoplatonie thought shares with Christian faith the “revelation” of a God at once living trinitarian and “not alien”—in and for subjectivity rather than ‘external to it, In the ease of Neoplatonism, however, there is a hhigh price to he paid for this revelation, one too high for survival. ‘The Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptical assertion of finite subjective thought ‘aas been accompanied by a progressive alienation from the externa, objective world. This breach is by no means healed by the Neoplatoni rise to infinity. The inward work! of thought attained, to be sue, isa complete world, in which Spirit ean dwell, in self-sufficiency, and while Stoies, Epicurean, and even Skeptics must seek compensation for their empty inward freedom in an ‘external world which, however unfree, is not at any rate empty, Neoplatonic mystics do not need such compensation: for their inward life is rich and internally complete. But this very richness, far from healing the breach between the inward and outward ‘worlds, makes it complete" ‘The origins of this alienation hark back virtually to the begin tings of Greek philosophy. As early as in Anaxagoras philosophy 170 The Religious Dimension in Hegels Thought demythologizes (enfgocttlicht) nature, thereby threatening that unity with nature, that beautiful faith, that innocent spirit and childlike purity” which are characteristic of early Greek life. As for the Socratic “freedom of se-consciousness.” it may initiate 1 reversal of the whole “Sprit ofthe world” At the same time, the caitical morality which it produces is alo at odds with uncritical Greek custom, externally sanctioned by the gods: thus it poses, atthe very time ofthe “greatest fowering of Greek life” the “threat of disaster." The confiet between Socrates and his Athenian judges fs not one between good and evil. Iisa tragic collision ** This split the Platone state cannot heal but only disclose, and it progressively widens asthe pagan world moves toward its internal ‘isintegration, Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptical free thought be- ‘comes progressively divorced from an external world which, under Rome, becomes increasingly oppressive, and the nemesis of this flight from the world is an increasing inward emptiness. Neopl tonic thought does create « whole inward world on this empty ‘and barren soil, but because it remains in fight from the external ‘world, its inward creation reflects this ight. Neoplatonism does not tackle the “absolute breach” of an “infinite subjectivity" which permeates both the external and the intemal, t secks escape from that breach. Hence the “totality” in which it comes to dwell, how ‘ever “concrete,” isnot a final consurmmation of the ok! work but rather a longing for anew. ‘This result of ancient thought corresponds to a result in the ancient world; for this too ends in longing. There i, however, « significant difference between the two. The Roman world may end ‘with state of unhappy longing, but it docs not transcend this con- dition, and salvation, when it comes, comes simply from without. Neoplatonic philosophy, in contrast, transcends is pagan limita tons sulciently to recognize them as limitations, which i why ‘thas some readiness of thought for aTruth which cannot and will ot come from mere thought. As St. Augustine was to pati the [Neoplatonists may not know the road tothe country in which man The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy wm Ihenceforth is to dwell But they at least perceive it, albeit dimly and as if through a veik* (b) Mediceal Philosophy Medieval thought exposes itself to Christian faith, and in so doing suffers loss of that freedom which is of the philosophic es- sence, but justin this lies its greatness and woek-historical signi ‘canee.* As has just been noted, philosophic thought is not wholly ‘unprepared for the Christian reality, which is why it ean survive and in some respects even grow under is impact. At the samme time, {tis not and cannot be wholly prepared for it, and this is why it loses its freedom beyond recovery. Or rather, if and when thought reconquers freedom the medieval world will hive ended, and the modern work! will have arrived. ‘To achieve its unique greatness medieval thought was bound, to begin with, to resist certain Christian heresies, ‘The Pelagian denial of original sin, the Avian rejection of God incarnate in (Christ, Manichean allegorizing concerning the crucfiion, Gnostic dissipation ofthe historical element in Christianity: these doctrines, had they been accepted by medieval thought, would have lft it in its pagan coodition~an anachronism in the new, Christian ‘world, For this new world is not made new by the rise of thought * 1 wrth ing that mdr! Mi a owt pie bee Fee ‘he He an acheme and ate dis arate of 1) For spre pees ail el fi bi af tF i int i | ki i i I 1 ‘The Religious Dimension in eget» Thought from « pagan counterpart such as Socrates, if at all, only in de= agree); nor again by dhe mete belief in that “tremendous eomposi- tion of opposites”—the incursion by the Divine in the extreme of sts infinite power into the bumman in the extreme of its human im- potence, i, death. Free philosophic thought would dispose of such a mere human belief as a mere myth. The new world is made new by nothing les than the actual event of divine ineursion Jnto human flesh, Nothing les could have cured the contradictions ‘of the ancient world, manifest in both their Roman and Jewish forms: And in faet the eu ripe for nt 4t had come, philosophic thought was bound to re- verse the fight from the external world toward which Greek thought had been driven, and to become reconciled with the ‘event which had reconciled the external world. It is no wonder that, in its selfexposine to such an event, philosophic thought should have lost its freedom, and have remained bound through: ‘ut the entire medieval period to an “absolute presupposition of faith” The wonder is Medieval th ed at once two temptations. On (as already stated), they opposed heretical dissipations of the historical into a speculative dimension, forthrightly paying the price of philosophic tunfreedom. On the other hand, they opposed the reduetion of the speculative and eternal to pure histary devoid of eternity, thereby saving, philosophic thought from destruction, For to their workl- historical eredit they recognized ~as many 1 ‘ologians lo not-that the sensuously present, historical remain present for faith only if, having disappeared as sensuous ancl historical, he is “received into the realm of representation? ‘that an inward spiritual relation~as distinct from a more external ‘historical one~can exist omly with a Christ who “sts at the right and of God,” onie timeless Trinity, then, at once re ‘mains timeless anel yot actually enters into history, And Patristic ih rather that it survived at all?" nt was & Tho Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy ay thought sat once speculative in content snd subservient to Church authority. * Medieval thought cannot repain the fredom here surrendered ‘even im its highest achievements, brought about by the labor of scholastic thought. While this later contains the “deepest specu: Intions of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists... {often in} shmpler tnd purer form” these speculations have now a Christian, no Jongera pagan bass, And whereas for pagan Greece, nature and self were a slid foundation fo arse of fee thought to Divinity, they have now lost thee sesufickent reality. Nature and human self have now reality only through a divine Self which, beyond both, is secessible only through revelation: but revelation itself must be passively received. “This tobe sure, reqs the testimony of Spin ny tos sll eprsent. The testimony, however, Ie doesnot develop so ato produce Hs own content receptive, Moreover the Spink which trtifies remains distinct from me fs individal, and thee remains for re enly the empty shell of Dsity, Its within this ftractabe tandpoirt that pheophy must feemerge “The standpoint is intractable indeed: for philosophy i activity, bout the medieval access to the revealed Christian Godt remains receptive. Thus God has became remote for philosophic thought Nor ean scholastic thought for all ts bor suecoed in making the {intractable tractable. Pagan Greck thought had achieved « living ‘unity with Divinity. Christan scholastic thought merely points to God and is itself finite. Hence this thought (for which God is remote) remains subservient to faith; fr this later possesses the divine presence. “Scholastic philosophy has the same want of inde- pendence as thought among the Church Fathors.* ‘To this limitation of medieval Christian thought cortesponds & limitation of medieval Christian lie, The Divine, while received * Sco appeals wo ths chapter, p36 174 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hogets Thought by the believer's sanctified heart, does not permeate his worldly activities; these romain unsanetibied. A divorce thus erupts be- tween the sacred and the secular. The believer, free in the sight ‘of God, remains free in His sight only, and unfree on earth: salva~ tion becomes a mete other-worldly hope. Moreover, the Church— the repository ofthe sacred—cannot forever maintain itself beside the profane, Existing in the world it becomes in due course in fected by its workdines. Its “world of life" which is beyond earth becomes aflicted by the sickness of the “world of death’ which & ‘arth, And this sickness inthe end provokes a radical revo against the dualison which is its cause: a this-worldly revolt which wants to findand establish—heaven on earth. Inthe mist of this revolt modern thought will discover its own essence. Scholastic thought has degencrated into a “god-forsaken” thought~one which seeks with Bnite means to grasp an Infinity beyond these means. Modern thought will boldly assert self as an infinite power, immanent in the human mind ‘But just as ancient thought at its highest transcends the limits of the ancient world so medicval thought at its highest transcends the limits of medieval Christendom. The proofs for the existence of Goda “wholly new phenomenon” in the Middle Ages—to be sue, are ope and all invalid in form, and this reflects their medieval limitations. (The form is that of «finite thought which deman- strates conchisions from fixed premises, and the conclusions do ‘ot follow from the premises.) However, their content, which con- sists of truths of faith, shatters these Kintations. This content isthe cevation of the finite and human to the Infinite and Divine and— fn the ease of the ontological argument, richest and uniquely Christan in content-of finite spirit to infinite Spirit. And in the arguments (which are inadequate thought but thought noncthe- less) thought has moved toward the appropriation of the religious content, by means of slf-elevation to infinity.” ‘That this isa self-elevation isa truth, to be sure, which thought does not here recognize, and indeed this recognition transcends The Trensfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 175 the limits of medieval power. Thus the ontological argument takes itself as moving from a mete subjective—and hence finite and hoe ‘man—idea of God, left in subjective fixity, to an objective divine ‘Being left equally fined. Stil it requires but one step—albeit one 50 vast as to be a veritable leap-to give the true content of the ‘ontological argument its trae form, that i, for thought to moce $0 as to dissolve its own finiteness, to cancel the mere subjectivity of its God-idea, and thus to elevate itself to Infinity. And this eleva- tion is among the ripest fruits of the final philosophy. It sno acei- dent that inthe very last year of his life Hegel composed leture which transfigured the medieval ontological argument into final ‘modern speculative truth! (e) Modern Philosophy ‘The modem world begins with a renaissance of Greek this- worldly freedom. However, this now expands itself, in various, and at Brst sight unrelated, ways into infinity. Greek man shuns the world of the barbarians; modern man discovers America. Greek states recognize some men as free; truly modern states recognize all men as free simply because they are human. Greek science {grasps order and is stopped short by chaos: modern science secks to penetrate and conquer the infinitude of contingent facts. In short, moder man, like the Greek, has a “joy inthe earth” and is convinced that there is “right and understanding {in his} oceupa- tion with i.” But unlike forthe Greek what now invites and n- deed demands such oceupation is the whole earth’ * ‘Modern philosophy too acquires an infinite dimension. Ancient tand modem philosophic thought are both free. But whereas the cone is “naively” geared to Being, the other i “refleively” turned on the relation between Thought and Being. The one is free ‘because itis simply at one with the divine Being—a union above all *Hgets famous reference to Americas the ld ofthe future (Werke, 1X, pps [PA Mp 801) whey nine th conception hs der meh: Seo c's aed appoin 16 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought nonunion. The other faces up to an “opposition” between Being snd Thought so radical as to fragment both into fnitude; and it achieves its freedom, not by means of escape from this condition, tout rather by means ofits gradual conquest It is in the movement toward this conquest that the infinity of modem philosophic thought consists. “Modern freedom doesnot simply take over whe the Greek left off, with the medieval world as a mere barren interlude between them. If modem seience gives “due honor” to the empirical, modem states recognize the human individual qua individual and human, f modern philosophic thought confronts gulf between Thought and Being so wide as to reduce it to finiteness and yet shows a justified self-confidence in its own infnitude, all these achievements, impossible among the ancients, would have mained equally impossible in the modern work! except for the medieval worl which preceded it. For the antimedieval revolt ‘which produces the moder world has positive as well as negative significance. The moder world negates the medieval divorce be- tvecen the sccular present and the sacred eyond, which had eft empirical facts without “honor,” human individuals worthles ex: ‘cept in the sight of God, and philosophic thought bereft of its native freedom. And in this negating proces it appropriates what had originally cased the medieval divorce—that “unheard of com: position” ofan infinite God with a finite man which has prodhiced the Christian world. But in the modem appropriation, dhat com: position descends frm a medieval heaven to a modern earth * ‘This descent, however, fs by bo means a one-sided secularization ES a open ot ne Rte gh roan Si binrmmevectwsda cueioses eae ier big mnd htbemee eee Paci eed ete gegny Seek cto bring So cores ctay kay Si? (er mas ‘The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 7 of what was formerly sacred. The modern world negates both the sacred and the secular in their medieval divorce and! opposition, tnd it alficms both in their mutually supporting relation. ‘That “workdly judging of worklly things” which is modem science woul be fragmented and without diteetion unless it were the secular aspect of a life whose religious aspect “sanctified” it, The human rights in the modem secular state would remain groundless unless these states in their very seculaity were permeated by «religious Spirit. In short, the Christian religion is not a medieval reality ‘only, which in the modern appropriation is as such destroyed. It becomes a moder reality as well-when heart “appropriating Eternity” does away with monks, priests and an other-worklly hie, ‘nd transforms the medicval hope in a beyond into a present, in- ‘ward experience. The modern world docs not destroy Chirstianity It produces the Protestant Reformation * In the modern world, then, the sacred does not reduce itself to the secular even though their medieval divorce has become an anachronism. Neither does it dissipate itself into modern philos- ‘ophy, and this despite the fact that modem philosophy must (at least to begin with) turn radically agains it Modern philosophie thought cannot be one aspect ofa life of ‘which faith is another: For the very claim to infinity which makes it modem makes it hostile to all claims extemal to it. Greck thought, falling short of the moder infinity, left room for an historcal-relgious Truth external to it, as is illustrated by the medieval use of Greek phi “+ Modern philosophic thought— whose fredom is infinite—can allow no such room; for its ange must include—not remain indifferent tothe nite and historical Doubtless subservience to a free Protestant heart would be less intolerable for modem philosophic thought than subservience to unfree ecclesiastical authoritis.* But they are both impossible. vos Den a aac Th occ slog Cet hgh to savin tera logy aed frees tt become seit to ecckstasval author as The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought It is thus no accident that modern philosophy (unlike philos- ‘ophy in any previous age) achieves radical emancipation from theology, and indeed, that in achicving it it is not neutral but hostile to theology. Yet in the end the very totality ofthis warfare ‘ill bring about total peace; the very radicalism with which phil sophie thought asserts its autonomy—and hence its independence from theology—will nally make it and theology identical. And when this goal i reached the whole history of philosophy has reached its end.* ‘The reflexive tur of modern philosophic thought bens with the Cartesian Cogito, which, recognizing the opposition of ‘Thought and Being, also gives the fist. abstract assertion of their identity, “accepting as true [only] ... what has inner evidence im consciousness.” Spinoza exhausts this fist assertion. For Par- mendes, Thought is naively at one with Being. Spinoza—a Jew who yeti essentially a modera philosopher in a Christian workd— takes “Thinking and Being as opposed as well as identical,” The Parmenidian Being is an abstract unity, and multiplicity falls out- side it. The Spinozistic Substance asserts itself as a unity encom- passing the many as well as the ane—even at the price of an acosmic" denial of the many ax many, and of the finite as finite, ‘This loss of the finite world, tobe sure, ia defeat for autonomous ‘Thought. But in the modern world such defeats are met, not by the surrender of the claim to autonomy made by Thought, but a eee athens wuneereoen ee Soke reent Seow se miioats RockeO he vernenmes Bs eaten neeraane attr ecglap yee eee Syauoen eran aeecies reat aaeaececnta iaeomtice agate mnie The Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy 9 rather by opposite forms of Thought with equal claims to auton- ‘omy. The Spinozistic identity of infinite Thought and infinite Sub- stance is countered by Locke's “metaphysical empiricism” which asserts an absolute opposition of Thought and Being, reducing both to finitude. But just as Spinozs reflexive thought cannot maintain the simple identity of Thought and Being so Locke's ‘equally reflexive thought cannot maintain their simple opposition The “a prior idealism” of the one—which begins with a pure uni versal abstraction—willy.nily points to particularity and concrete- ness. The “a posterior realism” ofthe other moves willy-illy from the empirically given particular to a universal Substance, posited by Thought alone. Both are one-sided phases ofa thinking which, on the one hand, accepts the opposition between Thought and Being and the attendant fragmentation of thought into finteness and yet, on the other, moves toward the ‘of both, That they are one-sided isa truth manifesting ise i the Leibnizian ‘monad, whichis "internally differentiated and yet remains one and simple.” Thus abstract infinity is united with the finite given.™** 180 The Religious Dimension in Hegel Thought “As far as thought reaches, just so far and no further reaches the ‘universe, and where comprehension ceases the universe ceases, ‘and God begins." Thus abstractness has given way to concreteness ‘only at the price of surrender of that chim to infinity which, boldly asserted by Spinoza i the essential beginning of modern philos- ‘ophy; and not until modem thought will have reemerged from self-immersion ia concrete fnitude as a Thought at once infinite and concrete—not until it will have “brought back through “Thought” the God itis about to lose—will its soal be reached.*" ‘The thought of the period just sketched is “metaphysical” be- ‘causc—whether Spinocistic unity with infinite Substance, Lockean ‘oppasition to finite objec, or Leibnizian synthesis of the two-it asserts the reality of an objective Being, It is, however, a “meti- physics of the Understanding” only because this Being is merely ‘aserted; itis not developed by the activity of a self-developing ‘Thought. Hence in the period now following. Thought mast let 20 ‘of all such merely asserted dogmas, even atthe price of lapse into ‘subjectivst rite. However, itcannot remain with sheer fnitude, ‘The perio! now beginning will tum out to be merely transitional. ‘On the British scene, finite subjctivst thought remains theo- retical, and reduced to a “singular consciousness” divorced from both other singular consciousness and the objective word, it issues in Hume's dealstic skepticism. On the French scene, finite sub jectivist thought turns practical, thereby both overcoming isolation and giving skepticism a postive turn. It negates what is, but it does sointhe light of an ideal which ought tobe, and it realizes the ideal by revolutionizing the social consciousness and the world in whieh itexists. Thought in both its British and French forms puts a crea tive product ofits own making into the place left empty by the loss ‘of the metaphysical object. Ths latter object had been by a fted thought, and the subjective mavernent of thinking had been a mere “method external to its object.” This movernent hs now become Thoughts essential object. Hence forall his skepti- ‘ism Hlume holds fast to the idealistic certainty of self-conscious- ‘The Tronsfiguration of Faith into Philosophy as ness, and this latter is activity and movement, Among the French— ‘who can boust ofthe greater achievement=the movement of sub- jective thought becomes overtly active in the practical, external ‘worklso much so as to create a whole workd in its image. This “world of truth,” to be sure, is only finite and “external to God,” for what produces it is a merely human freedom falsely made ‘absolute, But itis a world of truth all the same, And the French revolution, which is initiated by i, is nothing sbort ofthe secular ‘equivalent of the religious revolution initiated by Luther. There remains but the need for one final revolution. This will reconcile the God of Lutheran faith with the activity of finite subjectvist thought, and it will accomplish its goal by raising subjectvist thought to an infinity already implicit in it. This revolution is Drought about by German speculative thought ‘This revolution begins with Kant, who may be viewed as the Socrates of the modern world. Like Socrates, Kant asserts the free thinking subject against the authority of the extemal world, Bot unlke Socrates he has passed through the radical opposition between Thought and Being which fragments both into fiitude. Hence the freedom he assets is infinite, ic, mot simply opposed to the external but inclusive of it: i is am infinitude inclusive of finiteness. This freedom is “absokutely ulimate . . . [because] twithin the finite and in connexion with it an absolute standpoint ‘aries... which unites the finite and Teas on to iit.” What in British thought is an absolute given becomes relatively given only, subject to the dictates of regulative Reason. And what in French life is an absolute human freedom becomes subject to the impera tive of a practical Reason which is more than human” Kantian freedom renews in the modern context the Socratic ‘opposition to external deities. For theoretical consciousness, Godt is found neither in outward nor in inward experience: thus He ‘becomes an empty Beyond. For practical freedom He becomes & ‘mere extrapolated Ideal, In both respects, Kant shrinks from a radicalism which, fully asserting Thoughts appropriating power, 180 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought would destroy both the empty theoretical Beyond and the extra: polation of moral self-activty. But only foolish or faithless Chs- tian theologiaus wil sok refuge inthe Kantian inconsistency. For instead ofthe “knowledge of God [which is] the essence of re vealed religion” they are here lft with mere emptiness which co ceals-as it docs im Kantinism itself—a hidden yearning. ‘This yearning discloses itself in Fichtean thought because Fichte, alike Kant, is « radkal It Fiehte, not Kant, who does away with thinge-inthemsclves and extrapolated deities, and

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