The “Ladder” to the Standpoint of Absolute Knowledge: On the Phenomenology of Spirit posture sad to move in so expect td sel 1 olence mbich tat prepared ws ‘rant em want Phan, pg (Phen, p.98)* Mar i what e oes ns, sect 40 1 raue met in thought wo the Absalte ths ‘hie conncnmnean eta he sore tine Ita ate consis Both aspects ‘eekech ther ade each thet Tamm the struggle hetcen thea Werke, XI, py (Ph Rel, 1, p65) 1 Introduction "The times, togelaserts in the preface tothe Phenomenclogy of Spirit, are ripe for the “elevation of philosophy to the level of science."! Six years eater Fichte had used the Klentical expres: sion; more importantly, Schelling had in that year actually tried to produce “science.”? But in Hegel's view Schelling had merely stated, and stated inadequately, the “sctetific” program. In order 1 be science, philosophy must be the systematic grasp of absolute 4 Abbresiation re sted on p24 ”» ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought Reality someliow inchusive-not exclusive or destructive—of all finite realities. And in order to achieve such a grasp, it must have risen to a standpoint of absolute knowledge somehow inclusive— ot exclusive or destructiveof all standpoints falling short of absoluteness, Schelling’s programmatic fragments had failed on both scores. As for his first failure, this is to be remedied in the Hegelian system, of which the Encyclopedia of Philosophic Sclences isthe sole complete statement.? As for the second, this is remedied in the Phenomenclogy-an introduction to “seience” be- the couse shoe ol Cae sccpons os bo eaconpamed absolute standpoint. Hegel's work bands “the individual” —and pot yet leat but dos ot yt mater who thi tdvida tthe “lar” to tho sant of “ceoea” by “newing Min that ttadpolt a sa hin Scalings ly Sytem of 180, ome ty bad psy aerial cao ata oc cao potas, che coming, sa were “ot fea the plat” But sch Lbs pan as ina beadlege natin ey ar with it, would suffice to invalidate its claim to absoluteness, and Fated ary al hp fr Bs sortion ts ha lal olin eds gp yp sil pce foment Ea deaae Vs an eel le ‘yao tases of vr crept pomphical gees aad teat to Realty ats external object: Reality self inched repre priifonsipor uremia. deer Cte Tes meal perenne ASG Tu Ga tology aa fodons Gee cabelas ores bara mek Carole of des, uate race th ke fn page of ee ate pcre eco tos poeta aie frovtations of the Hegelian with alternative philosophies.* The Pfr pleat ley olny Snpendl grin ys Sou pencinteaeter cones te Seon yi hee Sete ects eae cure eee ae i Chipman with apn akon te ne ot gh ‘ont the Phenomencgy — The “Ladder” to the Absolute Stondpoint 3 {individuals who are handed the ladkler to the Hegelian philosophic standpoint include the percipient of sensuous objects, the slave in fear of his master, the scientist engaged in the rational conguest of nature the French revolutionary an religious believers of various kinds, They do not include But where ese could one Beee gers encompass and supersede, not merely alternative types of phil sophic thought but also nonphilosophic human life? For that ge! ts serious in this labo is beyond all doube. Marx's attempt to tam the Hegelian philosophy from its head to its feet may’ or may not be a val piece of philosophic eritcism. Buti is Hegel-not Marx-who fist recognizes the prima facie absurdity of his ow demand that “natural consciousness... walk for a change on its head” ‘But if Hegelian “science” fs marked by an unprecedented philo- sophical presumptuousness itis also marked by an equally an- precedented philosophical humility. and only if both are seen together is there any hope of doing justice to either. Philosophical science is posible only when the tines are ripe for The events ‘which have made them ripe ince not only events in the history of philosophy, such as Kant Critique of Pure Reason, Fichte's Science of Knowledge of 1794, and Schelling’s My System of 1801. They also inclade—and for our purpose this is Far more im- Portant-such evens in the history of nonphilesophic Me as the ‘Age of Enlightenment, the French revolution and, perhaps above all, the Protestant Reformation.’ Hegel climbs to the pinmacle of philosophic pride with his claim that the complete phibsophic thought does not leave behind but somehow includes apd absorbs the onphilosophic thought and Ile above which it rises; he plumbs the depths of philosophic huriity wit his admission, bute into every aspect of his thought, that philosophic thought could not reach its climactic gos!—indeed, it will turnout, any goal-were {tnot for indispensable aid furnished by nonphilosophic it. What speculative philosopher before Hegel considered it “absurd to fancy that « philosophy can transcend its contemporary workl?™u ‘The Religions Dimension in Hegel's Thought ‘And yet as one absorbs oneself in the Phenomenology (to which the remainder ofthis chapters exclusively devoted) the Hegelian humility may well seer to show itself a mere mock humility, with alltraes of genuineness devoured by the Hegelian presumptuos- ness. Indeed, such may scem tobe the ease necessarily, ifthe work {s to reach its gous. But is not then Hegelian “science” as nakedly self-assertive over against standpoints of nonphilosophic ie as its Schellingian counterpart, and the phenomenological introduction to “slence,” in the end 30 much wasted labor? ‘es tru that the Phenomenology will not judge consciousness in the light of presupposed standards, a procedure which would ‘be based on the dogmatic assertion that it “science” when in Fact itis merely the roed to it. Instead, it will watch “consciousness ‘examine itself” a process in which cach finite standpoint, which is Fragentary because it is finite, will pint to one higher because itis less fragmentary, until Bnally, at the standpoint of absolute fraguentariess is transcended. At the same tine, rate the fll meaning, of this self-earination is own ony tothe watching philosopher. “The Absolute... even, if) present with us fr the start” (ie. with the most primitive hhuman consciousness) is known as Absolute and present oaly to the true philosophy. As for al other forms of human conscious, the self-examination in which they are engaged “goes on, as it were, behind their backs But what is a philosophic humility before nonphilesophic human life which claims so vast a superior ity over ‘The Phenomenology would cease to be a road to “science” if it ‘id not insist on this vast superiority. To do otherwise would be to ‘confess that nonphilosophie life, rather than making the times ripe for goals yet to be reached by sciener, has already reached such goals as are humanly attainable, and that science, left without Function, vanishes into nothingness. The phenomenological oad to science can be a road only if it is abeady scientific. Phenom. ‘coological thought must already be atthe absolute standpoint if it The “Ladder” tothe Absolute Standpoint 35 4s to “hand the individual the Inder” to it. And while this in- dividual has “the right to demand” this ladder, any suggestion that “unscientific consciousness be instructed in science” must be rejected.” ‘And yet Hoget’s phenomenological humility ean be no mere smock hurality, There can be mo total and unbridgeable dualism between a self-examination occurring in nonphilosophic life, and «philosophic thought in exclusive possession of all eriteria for rec= ‘ognition of both the fact and the meaning ofthis self-xamination. there were such a dualisen, how could any individual—in Hegel's ‘own time any more than in any other~ascend the ladder to the absolute standpoint, handed him by a philosopher who himself is already=quite inexplicably~at that standpoint? He would have no choice but to assert his wn standpoint agains that of «thought making a pretense to absoluteness, and this would be enough to shatter the pretense. The entire phenomenological introduction to “scence.” then, must be a mere elaborate failure unless the dualism beteeen the solute thought which does the observing and the nonphilasophic Iie whose self-examination is observed is somehow and some- where bridges! even while it is preserved Human life eanmot have done the work yet to be dane by philosophic thought. Yet what Ife ean do and has dane is indispensable for what i et tobe done, ‘not by life but by philosophic thought, and the philosopher who thas risen to the absolute standpoint from the start must come to recognize at the end that, had it not been for what life has done, the could not himself have risen to that standpoint. Only thus ‘can one period in nonphilowophic history be ripet for seence than any other. Hened everything inthe end depends on this question: Can there be @ jorm of nonphilosophic human life which makes the rise to the scientific standpoint on the one hand possible and om the other still necessary, and ifs, what justifies Hegets claim that inthe nintoenth century that form of Iie has hecome actual? “To cope with this question is our sole purpose with the Phenom6 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought ‘enology, We could not in any ease hope here to do justice to its Incredibly rich, complex, und dificult content. (While firmly on the road to science, Hegel cannot resist the temptation to dwell at length on standpoints which are stations on the road, and it has plausibly been argued that the work, though purportedly a nnere introduction to seience, already contains in one of several possible forms virtually the whole content of science.) Further, our special puarpose would not be srved if, rather than ask the stated question of the Phenomenology, we sarimarized its content with no spectal ‘question in mind" * Our overall objective is to understand the ‘relation between religion and philosophy in HegeTs thought, But it will be seen that in that relation the question we presently ask of ‘the Phenomenology comes toa head. To make progress with our question we must depart from the Phenomenology/s own progression. Hegel on his phenomenological road to science views all standpoints as necessarily pointing be: ‘youd themselves to absolute knowledge, and only as he reaches ‘absolute knowledge does he justly the standpoint from which he hhas done his viewing, The confrontation which occurs in the Phe- nnomenology only at the end must be enacted by us at every tum, This enactment, however, poses a methodological dificulty. To, ‘adopt Hegel's viewing standpoint would be, not to lead up to the absolute standpoint but rather to be at it from the start. To remain with any of Hegel’ viewed standpoints would be to take them as final, Le., to take them as they take themsclves. We must, as it ‘were, hover between the viewing and the viewed standpoints, and swe can do so only by borrowingat least for a while—one Hegelian doctrine: “The self is what it dovs,""-a self-eonstituting process. “The viewed standpoints do net know this trth, not at any’ rate in ‘ts full Hegelian significance, for if they did they woukl not take thennvelves as final and unalterable, The viewing standpoint, in contrast, knows this truth in ts final form and, indeed, produces * See th pens to his cape, p73 The "Laider” to the Absolute Standpolnt y ‘We on our part must tentatively axsunne it and grope from ism ‘mal toward its maximal signiicanee.* Buut we may borrow this assumption as assumption only for a while. For as we ask our question of the Phenomenology the gap, ‘between viewing and viewed standpoints must gradually narrow, 4s its closed, our assumption must cease to he an assumption, the question we ask of the Phenomenology must find its 2. Of Individual Selfhood and Its Dialectic (‘The modern world, Hegel thinks, is free in idea i not (or not ‘yet) in actual faet.!* Modem science has freed itself from medieval fetters, Modern Christian faith has moved from external, Catholic authorities into an inward Protestant heart. Modern states have smashed slavery and feudalism and recognized the rights ane duties of men as men, be. belonging to them simply because they Are human. To the modem consciousness, therefore, a true state is «free state, which recognizes the hniman rights of all its citizens, ‘and is in turn recognized by them as their state, to which they owe tis of citizenship. And a true religion is a free religion—one ‘whose God recognizes the humanity of his human worshipers, and is worshiped by them as recognizing tt. No true state and no true religion are ever simply externally Amposed. ‘Thus in ancient China, only one was free. The Kmperor hhad all the rights and no duties, and his subjects, all duties and no rights. Yet these subjects recognized the rights of the Emperor pion (1) became makes posible countess able sorts (i) cae te wih aay ena ah Reed rather than phisphicaly grasplnot there sat (al) aove a ect wed mt dey ou ead ‘hee: the reitan Derwent select and vlgins recep to the vlc, andthe felon of pineical select te beth 2 redone sme ofr tern me nana emerge ony tthe Tat eedore ve ent weird eeepc dh, ect. ate)ss The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought and their own duties toward him, and their humanity was this recognising, The Emperor, on his part, eas his being-recognized, tnd this was his freeiom. Even the most primitive but gemaine ‘human society in history difers in principle from a heap of ants in ‘ature, Still, mach has had to happen between the beginnings of history which recognized the mete arbitrary freedom of ome ran, and the modern age, which recognizes-to repeat, in idea, how ever inadequately and fragmentaily in external fact—that men ate free simply because they are human What is this modem freedom and how has i arisen? What i modern, one may reply, merely a state of consctousness which at length recognizes what exists whether of not recognized: that ‘man is bom free, having satura rights and duties as part of a tiven substance. The true natural sence, religion, and political Constitution, it may bo hel are tineesly true, merely dropping from heaven, as it were, when their respective truths are recog nized. All this not only may be said, but from some Linsted per. speetives—philbsophical or woopilasophical~it must be said. Fot ‘whereas the self makes and has made self “Yorgets” that i has done so, mistaking is selfhood for a substance, ready snade by some force other than iself—and therefore fixed and unaeruble ‘A true philosophic inquiry into the nature of modern freedom, however, is inseparable from ai iniry into is genesis, and itis not thorough wales it inuines into the Being of the modern self even as i inguites into is self-knowledge. Since—for the present x hypothesithe self is x self-coostituting process the self’ recog: nition ofits frcedorn and its production of tht freedom ate tually inseparable.® Tilpare roe Gs ome l poems elie aoe the Pazomensloy bt he bs Sos onyeling the mi Setemees cabo Ge orien es aga ae eet ote ay ob os ade panacea Sree ee Papen cc tanicetnnton er eS ania of sieoolag ‘The Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint x» ‘Such an inquiry mast remain incomplete unless it pursues the ‘double process of self-making and sel-knowing buck to its pris: tine origins. Were it to stop with a self already made st could not ‘but take this self for « ready-made substance, thus showing the ‘inadequacy of the perspective from which it has done sts taking ‘The inquiry must go hack toa point at which thete i a yet 90 ‘made self but only a pure power of self-making It cannot, however, go beyond this point, to a real lacking this power, Le, tothe realm of nonhistorial, natural if. Animals ‘are parts of a larger natural whole in their activities of feeding, reproducing, and protecting their young. They may seem to achieve a higher whole when they live, as do bees and ants, in or ‘tanized “societies” These later, however, ate quast-socitics only [because animal in principle lack the power of scf-making, This at most foreshadowed in animal desire—an urge to appropriate the desired which, when acted out, becomes a self-assertng agains i ‘Animal desire, however, is merely for this or that part of nature, ‘and the acting out of it, mere expression of nature. Thus the an: ‘mal is part of the natural whole but never comes to know itself fs such a part, nor to transcend being a mere part which such Jnowtedige would ental ‘To be a germine power of self-asertng, human desire must be ot for this that part of nature but rather for nature av @ whole a desire which, when acted out, does not express the natural whole but rather tears itself loove from it. The hnman power of self making can be no less if an actual self is ever to have made its Appearance, Also it can be no more. A self already actualy inde pendent from nature would be a self already seltmade.* ‘The desire now wncovered* must have the possibility of satis- ny ph ag in ely tr) tb hv ie diate tent a lad feetece re ee a aaa arco eto st limtaton which the sell comer clove to anced only whe Tas become “Spt cetto-f-tel ae acto th chapter” ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought faction, Without this possibility, the desiring human, though po- tentilly a self, would even now be at actual anima, led with the ace of an wisaistable yearning. and Ayject. (For to know this latter as sehood. he would veto possess selfhood.) Yet the uncovered dest find no direct satisfaction. Asef already made might negate nature fo the reakn of thought, putting up with its physical need of nature and yet asserting its independence as self from this need. But & self yot ma elt and has desires; i is desire and as yet nothing ese, To satisfy this desire diretly would vie the physical negation of nature ax a sehole, and of this nan is no more capable than the animal ("The human power of selfsmaking would he faredoumed to eter al frustration were not forthe pes indirect satisfaction ‘The desire ean be satisfied, not by the negation of nature as a whole, but by the negation of another deste to negate nature as a whole, Le, another man. Thus even in its pristine origins the hu rman self is dependent for selthood on other selves. [tis one dependence which it will never transcend.*) Directly, then, this nconscious, moreover, {8 not one which tng is of another desire to negate mi ture. Indirectly, ft i of nature duel, for exch seeks to take the life of the other while risking his own. Moreover, the negating of nature is not itself an expression af mature, which it ‘would be if it were for purposes of life such as food and sex. This tking and risking of life isa killing for the sake of killing, risk for risks sake, hence a negating—ulbeit indireety-of nature as a whole. Taken in bath ts direet and its inditect aspects, its « pres tige battle, fought by two selves whose selthood is ia the battle and its prestige and as yet nowhere ele, The two selves are selves-ton loose from natute—only if each actually risks his life forthe sake of prestige. They know thenwelves as selves and have the prestige, only f each is recognzed by the other as in fact isk 1 cannes to be mere dependence, hater, by vite of the malty of csp ts} mal $f Uy cha pe *: ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint ” lng his ie forthe sake of prestige, So savay ae the primitive origins of human seo." But the moments of this sels selfhood are shorted Inthe tetual combat there is routual recognition and through it self recognition. Both vanish when the combat is ended. The sai ea neither recognize nor be recognized. And the surviving vitor is @ ‘mere survivor nce the Bush of the moment of vietory has passed. incapable of rising above so primitive a selfhood, the self woukl forever alternate, lke some barbaric prehistoric Faust, between ‘etual battles in which selthood is achieved and times between battles in which selfhood, having been lost without rest, wouk! bo disolved into a dark longing for renewed batle.** ‘e-can pass beyond this condition because ot all those desiring to megate nature vsk life to satisfy their desires. The killer of the foe gives way tothe master of a slave; the self which is risking of ie ot surviving the act of rik, to self which has risked Ife anc 4s this having-risked. For the “result” of the “process” survives in the recognition received from the save. ‘The masters selfhood isthe setual proces of being recognize {As such st eatenls aver the shiv, whose being is his activity of recognizing of the master. I extends, as well, over nature, for, sph ae sr ep cE rete the sy baie homing Hegel in pee bieceriert srtaeraa ct meas peak eren ie pvceme coe Seecioget errata sated spe iar gaan Soaetvarge entrees cece pure Rebel With gone wih whe verti ors withthe bat, om aig wd 1 ms satiation ae hat th Fat iar 8 cnt tiaras Been nai by nome Cathe Hie* ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought bbelaboredl by the slave at the master's bebest, nature is reduced to aan object of his enjoyment. Yet the sve, not the master, fst attains free selfhood The ‘masters self is his dominating of the slave and his enjoyment of nature. He needs a slave to dominate and a nature to enjoy. This double dependence—on the human other and on nature—is in the ‘end dependence on nature, For this human other is the master’s slave only so long as he is nature's slave—so long. as he lives in fear of losing his life It is dependence on mature which is the selfs unfreedom, ‘The process of slavery results in emancipation from this de- pendence. The master does a double chaining—of the laboring ‘lave to nature and of the nature belabored to the slave. The slave is doubly chained-=by the master to the belaboring of nature and to the master by nature, ie. by his own fear of death. This latter 4s the ultimate chain, and he is bound by it because he has shrunk from the risks of selfhood into mete riskles life. Yet a human de- sie which has shrunk from selfhood into life is not an animal desire confined to life; « human slave is nota domesticated animal. ‘Anal the selfhood from which the slave has shrunk in one form is {in another form forced upon him. As the condition of slavery és pushed to extremity the animal fear, which has made the slave a slave, extends its range, deepens in agony, and thus changes in ‘quality. The fear ofthis and that which the animal has turns into 4 fear which the human shave is, and it is a fear, no longer of this and that, but for is very being. Thus the being in which the slave has sought refuge from the risk of selfhood dissipates itself into nothingness, Le, into the total and perpetual fear of death. He has “nothing to lose but his chaine.™* He loses these chains through his labor. Initially, he does labor, ‘tuned to the nature belabored and the commanding master by: the clinging to life which he i, but as the fear of death dissipates * We refer, of course, 10 the famous phase in Man’s Communit lente. The “Ladder” o the Absolute Stondpoint 4 his clinging to life the commanding master and the belabored ma- ture both sink into inessentiaiy. He comes to be a labor no Jonger bound to another, Le, a pure selfactivity. He is free whether enthroned or enslaved inthe external workd—free because he thinks himself free, and capable of thinking himself free be- ‘cause he has made himself free/'The Stoic, like all men, depends ‘on nature, for he must eat, drink and die But he does not fear death and is indifferent to eating and drinking, His selfhood is ‘emancipated from nature. It is a ereatio out of a nature become nihil. The Stoic isa fre, self-made se. * ‘Have we come close tothe freedom which makes the times ripe for Hegelian “science,” and to the thinking which is “science” i- “In view of the infacice ofthis famous section oo Mars shoot tion be ese that stmt eno wre or eat of coe Hae te es tn devoted to the tog ws viewing the “sel-creation ef tan at proces, suns sm th font of ison abc Early Wg, arm ER Moon, (New Yok Mew 1, pa! ha th ab stale othe fal siguhance ody by mea of sharp eftnig tem, ay Ke Heel hn fee chs mce'9) For Hog hl, hs enn Rhee dite contest w cttw lng tise ear ney ‘by spot sak mocallysilanponel iow, sch ore of ao” sa alma awh "ie wet hat latin BCS te pe gh» ei dpe baling hea cede 1 de ob fee (Es. sect 435), des tM hat ioc tant“ The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought self?* We have come nowhere near either, Not one of the stand- ‘points considered has taken itself asthe slf-making proces, which iti seen to be at the absolute standpoint. And the abyss between these two standpoints fs by n0 means beidged when we come to Stoicfam. The Stoic takes his thinking to be a fixed essence, and his freedom from nature and from the human ather as absolute. The philosopher recognizes both as being the result ofa el-therating, process, and the liberation as one-sided and inadequate. The Stoic’s free thought is achieved, not by cooquest of the natural ‘and human worlds but rather by means of «fight from both. And ithas its nemesis, ist, in a Skeptical thought which negates senst- ‘ous reality and yet cannot but recognize it, and Knlly, in a re ligious life which, while “unhappy” i a self-imposed servitude toa Aistant God, i yet higher than a freedom which, confined to mene thought, & incapable of either happiness oF unhappiness. Tt is higher because itis involved with sensuous reality-nature with- ‘out and passions within. A thought which is mere thought, in contrast, has merely fled from both, 3: In Search of the Category of Spirit ‘The account thus far given, even if vastly expanded either by Hegel or on Heget's behalf, would be in principle inadequate for Hgets phenomenological purposes: its terms are inadequate.** No dialectic of iudvidual self making could begin to touch either ‘the most primitive (but genuine) society or the most primitive (but “mwa of ogo tate ect ee ako en igh iv een's semen Srtopene en fotsen ee tthe Usury Cimcric of idee i py hee ay te tet bee 8 Scenery crckport ick sve oe eupieStety at ese isn Pt. and cay ep) we eed Sletten umn tate pn exton orf apprnco Spee te bah ape dn a ‘t= Phonmenrgy For ot ved apyeach, te sce 8) fog hel Ted more than te dpe: We ou ut ft cen ets Mec cn compere tS on the Ph ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint 5 genuine) history, and, not touching either, it does mot, and is not ‘meant to do, full justce to the indilual either. The category thus far used, were it meant to be final. would Teave soctety indifferent ‘or hostile to human selfhood, and it woukl either destroy all hi tory or=which is the same thing—fragment it into as many his- tories as there are self-making selves. It is no wonder, then, that wwe have come nowhere near those nineteenth-century social and historical realities which, according to Hegel, have made the times ripe for “science.” In no society~primitive but genuine—do individuals achieve selfhood by the solitary risk of life, exercise of lordship, or slavish labor. Even the primitive family extends positive recognition to its members. As for the activities of sel:making deseribed, these ‘occur in socal contests, which furnish standards of recognition. In ‘such a context, the victor ina prestige battle becomes a permanent ‘member of the society whose standards of membership he has satisfied: as for masters and slaves, these belong, respectively, to peer. groups of masters and classes of slaves. To deny the relevance af social standards for the selfs sethood would be to afirm the absurd doctrine that conflict and withdrawal can and do, but love and a sense of common purpose cannot and do not, enter into the selfamaking process, and alo that, as regards the possibilities of Iuman selfhood, history cannot and does not advance, The realities descr! in the peceeding section, then, must be pliced into a richer and truer context, and they can be taken as Being realities {in their own right only in times of social disintegration anal chaos." ‘How mast such a placing be done? Social standards must be viewed as capable of entering into the selfs selfhood, Ke. a8 cap- able of being appropriated by the process of individual self making, If incapable of being so viewed, they would necessarily ‘be external to the self-making process the social whole sustained by them would be indistinguishable from the natural whole; and the self about to achieve or auggnent its selfhood would be forced to tear itself loose from both. But while Hegel admits that there6 The Religious Dimension in Heget's Thowght are “bad” states and external history he insists that there are “trac” states aso, and that history cam and does cary the possibilities of ‘human selfhood beyond those primitive ones which exist images as yet barely historical The terms needed forthe philosophic grasp of the nature and genesis of social standards, then, cannot Ive wholly other than those used in the preceding section, But neither can they be wholly the same. One cannot take social standards and the social wholes sustained by them as the product of mere sums of individual selves, initially owned wholly privat tnd only subsequently shared as if by an agreement or contract. For precisely this sharing must thus remain unintelligible. Social standards cannot function for individual selves unless they ean enter into and be appropriated by them, but they eannot be either social or standards at all unless they have an objective validity beyond and apart from the appropriating process~if any subse {quent sharing is destroyed by the private whian in their origin. In searching for adequate terms, then, we are faced with the problem that genuine social standards cannot be simply external to indi ‘vidual selves, nor be simply thie individual or collective product ‘This search produces the concept of a social whole somehow more than the individual selves which compose it, while yet ac Iknowledging their selfhood, of a “substance™* which, while alive ‘only inthe acts of appropriating selves, yet is a substance because itis somehow already there prior to and apart from the acts of appropriating selves, with a law and structure of its own, ‘The ae apes la riers phate iPehat nb ction mire eine or aa TSS Shad Sos eer asec thc oe done ae sha ‘tm i eh the Tru comprehended end xpremed tt Sule 19 (Phen, p80) See furte the fear of this chapter abd als, eset, ch, 6 et 42), ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Stanelpoint 7 social whole or substance or=as Hegel is not averse to putting it “onganism"* is, however, sharply distinet from the natural whole. ‘This latter is leas-thun self, whole of mere parts which forces the individual self to tear itself loose from it. The former must be more than the individual selfs self-activity and yet can be more only if it allows selfhood full scope, ic, if it includes oF heaves 100m for it** This relation, therefore, eannot be one of whole and mere parts. It is between what “in itself” already i, and acts of ap- ropriating “for self” which come to be and are yet to be, aed ‘whose scope is no less than the whole of what “in itself” already i ‘The concept arrived at takes hold of an inner bond between “sub- stance” and “sel.” n which each points tothe other and both are ‘done justice, This is our fist glimpse of the most decisive of all Hegelian concepts—that of Spirit.” Hegel writes: “Qua Substance, Spirit is unbending righteous self-sameness,sel-identity; but qua for itself, elfoxistent and selfsdetermined, sts continuity 8 re solved into discrete elements, itis the selfsacrificing soul of good. ‘ness, the benevolent essential nature in which each full his own special work, ends the continuum ofthe universal Substance and takes his own share of." But the passage just quoted, obscure in any case, asserts far nore than is warranted by the account thus far given. According to i, Spirit can be and is complete or infinite, and this assertion i thus far snjastied and flees wateligible. For st must thus far (on the contrary sem that Spirit can be a bond between substance ‘nd self, ifat all, only if tis eternally fragmentary, We ty teased he bhi om (a rater heey) bane fe danger te eae pn The pamhaphs edit fllewing xan hs cation frat InGhapeda nt eal oe tat Hegeban ee ogre eotngrcy een steps Kl my ee be mv or, ip of ghee w rapt seo « ‘bck ehh ae testes “ora ich Say int dapat the nigh ofthe ane aces nh av hr meme Soe father ch open8 The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought Tr the faring aco aers f of li wih sanahyapgropet hao “soca Snel Ln, ial helt wrhich are “ethical work" because Ghey contain “echics! Ie Tey Kool «whch yu ot ts asthe to dd al pop ogee er nero see as Soodeng th a we appraising of te Sony foe Ths would Coen te ral feeeeenes what we hae every vee © tbe fra Bots col elton, end fo tube fs tomate 8 faving droped stray foun beeven. Onompondiagy, teal bs so oto oolong emda “tie ready leet ah wae te ere pas ol oa i cotiag pes hn Se oleaung ett de prirapips fneyrepints pr aytarnepn hewn) wo a de onl ch farhor Sunes angle ngsaaet ‘Aecionoer alsa oth ses Sophos os tales ole ty dearest of to pchely of ats The peal bond Fesocm them nest bes tion ol namie Teo aac substance contains the ethical life which the self can and does omnia tal reas oe es ee ae a ih ed bow ng ed Ba ae sael hes Rey one sans eee Sas alien wee Gus = ieee ows ny scaly slates poten, hia bss ec wocen be cite te aster of to prea mae splat vids ig we seroed ia gia be esos oe nes an ot hea, finn emi, Ati wh in stb Engng satay Kars as ak ft dow os a ts wii tn Soteen’ paolo a sigh coceatey trast poole Wy ome el ion 4 Tat th certs made spre ely pny ath ‘ath preserved in the higher Tr wil be seen im ch. and, the mont ‘pec Dom, os sect and ch ya 4-8 The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint ° But we cannot yet consider this posibility seriously. A history as thus far understood might produce nineteenth-century Euro- pean spirit. It could not produce a sprit making the time ripe for “science.” Itself finite, it coukl only produce in times of harmony’ between substance and self as well as in times of discordspiitual standpoints themselves confined to fnitude, and philosophy. if possible at all, would share this finitude. Thus the reflective grasp ‘of the nature and genesis of nineteenth-century European spit ‘would itself share the standpoint of that spirit; and the one as ‘much as the other would be doomed to be superseded by subse- quent spiritual developments. If spirit in life is confined to Bni- tude, then no period in history és any riper than any other for the absolute standpoint of Hegelian thought, and whenever this latter comes on the scene, i comes shot from the pistol ‘But the definition of Spirit quoted earlier in tis section already shows that the Phenomenology claims to grasp an infinite or com- plete Spirit manifest in historical hfe. Indeed—concerned as itt ‘not to give science but rather what may be described asthe short: cst road to the standpoint of science®*—it deals with infinite or ‘complete Spirit only, The presence of such Spirit might have been, slimpsed even in isolated selthood—when it is driven beyond ab- stract but sel-sulficient Stoic thought to the unhappy insufficiency ‘of «search for God, And it becomes unmistakable in the section of Heyes work explicitly devoted to Spitt, Thus the ethical workd ‘which precedes the confit betwen substance and selfs not seen 4 a simply-fnite, purely-human realty but rather as one whase ‘visible worldly actuality hasan invisible trans-workdly counterpart and nemesis, The “belief in the fearful and unknown darkness” of ‘Fate and the Eumenides of the spirit of the dead disclose the finitude, respectively, of the ancient Greek social whole and the {individual self Kiving in it. An infinite, transcendent dimension re- ‘mains as Roman and medieval “cultural” self-acttvity destroys the ‘dyllic harmony of the Greek ethical work it remains eventhough ‘here society undertakes the task of subduing “harsh actuality” by itse EO PONE Lene a ee | ‘own labors. Fo the counterpart of this worldly “realm of eultare™ here created remains a “work! of faith,” a divine “Essence” which transcends, and is woaifected by, all cultura labor. And while this ichotomy ends when the medieval heaven desevnds to a modem carth this descent is by no means tantamount toa reduction offi nite Spit to finitude.* Bat even if the spiritual realities described by Hegel-and we have thus far barely listed some of them, and done nothing to show how Hegel arrives at them=are rightly deseribed, a hurdle appears which at this point eanmot be passed. The Phenomenology claims to sce one Spirit whose “ethically” experienced or “eultur ally” produced worldly presence is complemented by a feared, oF trusted, transworkly Divinity, For the standpoints seen, however, thore are fico realities, of which one is presently experienced oF produced by finite spirit and the other, the transcendent divine obs ject of finite spet, Hegel himself insists that the Divine is here frasped as “absolute Essence” from the “standpoint of conscious: ness," Le, the standpoint of a spirit which, limited by its object. remains finite Must the Phenomenology, then bring the cate: {gory of complete or infinite Spirit tothe spiritual realities it sees? Iso, how can those realities make the tine ripe for sckence—er science fail to come shot from the pistol? No way is yet visible by ‘which the gap between the standpoints of life phenomenological cbscrved and the standpoint of thought, which does the observing. 3 possibly be bridged. ‘the mon! cunory compton between He il he tino th Paemenly rsa er dc han by Hegel's ram sara, te oveonnt the Phenomenology of the ‘reba etoyal, a sem, wks wou! dee Be west aratary were (Cte! to be an acto of he sell movement of Spit fa history. tk fowever, in acount of the Sell unerent of hewoent logical thought asi so arden stays wil be en Un ce 0 ad vhs wh pases Fm the dlet of Teas, otto Tie tat ne fool Greece 1 Pilosphy of Me ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint st 4 OF Religion, oF “Absolute Spirit Manifest” ‘We might hope that the bridge between these standpoints is found as philosophical thought turns to a complete or absohite Spirit manifest év human life and for humans conscious of the fact.* Such a manifestation, according to Hegel, occurs in the ie of religious faith, and iis complete in the Ie of the Christian faith. As has just been noted, the Divine may be w mere distant object, for human subjects whose present individual and social ‘world exists beside it, and as such i is merely for “the stancpoint of consciousness.” We now confront a divine prevence, in and for human subjects, and hence permeating their individual and social ‘worlds. Here we find, Hegel states, the “self-comsciousnens of Spirit” ‘But it must at fit sight se that what is hopefully approached as the needed bridge on the contrary challenges most radically the entire phenomenological enterprise. Thus far we could hope that the gap between standpoints of life and the standpoint of absolut ‘thought might sorachow be bridged. Now that we have abruptly* ‘come upon the bridge~or, at any rate, upon the realty without which, it will tum out, there can be no bridging-this seems to protest absolutely against being a mete bridge. The standpoint of Teligious faith bears witness 0 a furan relation ty mthing, less than the Divine: surely itasserts that This tion i devoted to gon Bh a i he SPS ee SEH eed eh ligt esl bere be a rad Staal the Phew encom nd we mm he Mela aden oad Teety” Sons 5.8 pec.) Im ed sets we cumotorat Vet wot et rm Furdhernvre we oat snare relipiows ath “ho mr evty if oa porpe ls lead pt the "ecordng to Tegeh, hve wade i iw pe for “sees el bsne char tat, where we hve tome wp Yoon abr, this tsna two the Phenomenologyse ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought to rule out any higher standpoint from which it cam be viewed. ‘That different religions must make presumably irreconcilable claims is a grave encugh challenge fora thought which mast reconcile all ireconcilables. The challenge is total when they all unite in opposing a “science” which would grasp them in terms more ultimate than those in which they understand them- selves We here come forthe frst time upon the issues which will be the central concern of our entire investigation>* They must for tho present be dealt with briefly, and only in terms of the basic problem of the Phenomenology. In the preceding sections, we have followed Hegel's attempt to understand human selfhood— individual and social-as a se-constituting process, The religious faith or faiths now encountered may well sem flatly to assert that finite humanity is not such a process, at least not viseivis the Divine; for the finite human i reeepticely related to the Divine, its infinite Other: indeed this receptivity can be s0 total as to ‘encompass the human selfs very being, In a previous section. the Stoic “free” self was philosophically understood as a selfamade ‘reat ex nihilo. 1s such philosophical understanding Hot in the most radical confit with the Christian testimony to a God who is Creator ex nihilo=s testimony given by a self which acknowledges its own creatureliness? And does this not point to a total clash between religious (or Christan) faith and what since Fichte has Iicen the basic doctrine of idealistic philosophy—that the human self is self-active insofar as it is trl human? Not accidentally Fichte had denied the Creator-God in the name of free selfhood ancl in turn was charged with atheism? But much has happened since the Atheismusstreit, Two interre- Inted developments, im principle complete in the Phenomenology, have atleast mitigated the stark conflict between religious recep: tivity and idealistic selfsativity, First, Hegel has long ago assimilated the protests, made by ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint ss Schlciermacher and Schelling, against Fichte’s one-sided exalts tion of moral self-atiity, in behalf of spheres of le in which the human self, being finite, is eceptive as wel as sel-active.™* To. 04 giant step further, he has reached the view that this receptiv: ity has ultimate reality, even when viewed from the abvohite standpoint to which (following the Sehelling of 1801) he bas risen. By failing to do justice to this requirement Schelling had lssipated all finite reality into a “hight in which all cows are black” But, as will gradually emerge, the entire philosophy of Hegel's maturity may be viewed as one vast attempt to escape this Sehellingian fate ‘The other development is no less significant. Under Kantian Influence Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling and indeed, the Hegel of the Early Theological Writings acl all been inlined to contrast Positive religions, taken as resting on litte more than arbitrary ‘external authority, with an ideal religion of pute inwards, Thus they bad very nearly ignored historical religious realities in Favor of a true religion consisting respectively of rational hope, joyous ‘moral activity. pious religious passivity and the “revelation” of fart For the mature Hegel. a vital distinction stil exists between ‘genuine religion and one of merely external belief or observance ‘But i no longer coincides with the distinction between a merely {deal religion and historical religious realities. This is due t a doc: eine of the utmost consequence. In every genuine religion, the human i both inwardly related to the Divine and remains other than the Divine; ust 2s without the fst a religion is not genuine 40 without the second i lacking in serious realty, Hegel terms the togetherness of, and strain between, these two aspeets “re- ligious representation.” and hokds that this has itself no sorious reality until itis acted out. But this acting out occurs, and has ‘occurred, in actual history. "This isthe reason why Hegel immerses himself ever more deeply in the historical realities of religious life and whyas will be seenhe alone ofall German idealistico The Religious Dimension in Hegel’ Thowght philosopher, achieve gle philonopbilconfrnttion wth the historia! Christan uth? ‘Can 77 clin thus tncertoed-lacudg the Cheitin-— sulle to mabe the Une rips fr Hegelian “cen?” Our Present tmeelypeclimoay, acouet of Hoge encounter with Crt (ijn vote holy uaa ein Pe ral rague wl let poet ey than the umpanboth dda sel an octal whole whlch TW pote Alaa 5 bao olan anol taal terial! lee fom i. Above a Diviy oherhan sell ie re hgh ese a ET ap esata yap seool, This bowever, no gemsice velo ort Tr dock Docent cocarceves fe ak seer cle ve A tall, kaha Divialiy, eomsmomauat eo ‘hig Ro holly dsl the ta el lle at being adel fe, Forth lev vogines what crus te witoot voc og nin there would be no religous reltonip at all The sl fecoplzes elas ining i the very tmormet of belog Fabry rmegal tr avian ky wh don felog The weld ea lh Bie weeks dapat os dea the tH el fr which ey diotegmte, But the sll acknowledges the truth of tis daintpating, ts fv ct of el serendr Ie ths diloegatiog end sitaurendeing nd bonus to et pian specter cya erse eget entiation of ts reigns posty as an Mato Lie ied elcid Page f reams ag rng gen. Pr te tt tay getine wl buna eligi exstrnce repnecratinal-even Chala for this pre serves Coed Fi ‘hough Easter overeacies (Par Fall dco Sf ropreertatia existence ch, soca snd appends 4) ch sets) ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint 5s actuality is vague-deliberately so, it would appear? 1 sa “re ligion of light” in which all iit realities disappear in an infinite but “empty depth.” This could hardly be an historical actuality, however, the finite walities simply disappeared. These latter, after all, do assert their historical existence, and they do so even {nthe moment of divine presence, The divine depth, then, is pres- ent in and for an “actual nation” acknowledging it, and this takes ‘tse for, and is, the “nation of God.” But here a radical strain manifests its presence. The infinite divine depth is “empty”; “the actual self” of the nation does not disolve into emptiness but rather remains not empty-and finite. Hence the “nation of God” finds itself “rected.” Thus the divine-human incommensurability remains even as finite self and finite mation turn thelr bei ‘dissolved into an act of surrender. The surrender cannot be rade ‘wholly eal. On the contrary, the jay ofthe rnoment of union on accentuates the pain of actual separation which persists i real Ife, ivine-human inyardness already exists in the religion of ight. Divine-human otherness stil exists in ts extreme opposite, histori cally actual in the Greck “religion of art” At frst sight this may seem to be religion of pare inwardness. For the self and the ma tion here worship wotks af theie own ereating, which yet ean be ‘worshiped only because they ae, and are known to be, not works ‘of meee humanity but rather of « Divinity at work within it, such worship, the self alfians ise even as it worships the Divine, ‘and the gods, “friendly” to the worshiping nation and “recogni ing its selfhorx,” recognize the actuil historical life ofthe nation. ‘And yet this recognition of the human by the Divine can only seem absolute and destined to last forever. A Divinity immanent {in finite human acting and creating has lost its emptiness, It has done sa, however, atthe price of depth. And for all the commen: surateness to the human acquired in its aesthetic immanenee, the Divine retains transcendence, infinity, and incommensurabiity with all things human, and the religion of art, oblivious to trams6 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought cendence, is confined to idolatous worship of finite gods, But as the ignored or abandoned trath at Ingth enters ito consciousness these gods, their worship, and the worshiping nation are all de- styoyed © ‘The Christian religion i the absolute religion because it con tains, preserves and reconciles the depth of the “religion of light” ‘with the self or spit of the religion of art. Here the Divine isthe depth of an Infinity incommensurable with all things nite and human, and it has yet become absolutely commensurate with hu- 1man selfhood, s0 radically as to enter into actual human finitude and to suffer actual human death, As for the human worshiper, he recognizes the divine depth, and in so doing dies the death of his sinfulness, and he recognizes as well both the divine death which has occurred on his behalf and the divine “death of death’— the divine resurrection—which conquers all death. This recogniz~ ing, moreover is, and is own to be, nota recognizing of the Di- vine by the human only but also the work of « Divinity other- than human i the human—the holy Spirit. Thus, Hegel asserts, the divine human relation which is actual iy all genmine religion finds its total consummation in a divine sel-recognition in the hhuman—the “slf-consciousness” of “absohite Spirit" ‘So much, forthe present, for the religious realities encountered by phikesophical thought, although even our brief account has doubtless already moved beyond sheer encounter toward compre Ihension. Can Heges phenomenological thought move toward a ‘comprehension which will remove the religious protest against the standpoint of absolute thought an, indecd, see religion as a bridge to it? It cam do so only if it can grasp the coniet between hee sie aes wth be ete ete he igen et a i gan oa occ ate th it sche wee sane Go meee deeaken by Topol plnwomenatgialthmght (See p69 20 move: ST yer cas eee ha er rh Gr it ak i Ca rel we Jovsh, Grek and Chestan Sores ry became the oe deat with at ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint a” the baa se acvy abn compere al the ana re ceptivity to the Divine which is yet to be comprehended as ala cece -oee oud yesaonion nara aicoee prehended as aspects of « single whole. Once again, them, a re- structuring of previously comprehended reakities is called for, in terms of a category neither wholly other than the foregoing nor wholly the same. Finite spirt—individuol and social—is seen as om ‘aspect of infinite oF absolute Spirit; without suffering a los ofits real finitud, it iv phase in the self-realiztion of divine Spirit. ‘One must grasp fully the enormity of the step here tobe taken. In the preceding sections we have deliberately departed from Hogets own progression, and this in part precisely in order to bring to light the enormity of the present step, and considered ‘only human—ie, fnite—realities, and the borrowed philosophical ‘category of self-activity was itself only finite. Within these limits it remained wholly mysterious how any ave time in human history ‘could ever become ripe for Hegelian “science,” much more how ‘numan history could move necessarily in that direction; the rise to the standpoint of “science,” if it was ever coming at all, was bound to.come “shot from the pistol” What has now emerged is that only if history is mot human but rather, as faith takes to be, human divine can Hegelian “science” ever have an historically justified beginning: Hegelian thought presupposes the prior existence of religious (amore precisely, Chistian) life, ad when it comes on the scene it accepts, gn must accept, the faith of that life as— in some senso—true**) ‘This acceptance, however, does not exhaust the enormity of the Hegelian step. It is more comect to say that i is omly the nec cssary preliminary to that step. On Hegel's own admission and insistence, religious faith does not grasp itself asthe Phenomenol. ‘ogy does and must grasp it. In its own self-understanding, is humanly receptive of a Divinity otherthan-human, and remains 10 even when what it receives isthe Christian Grace which recon- ‘ils the burn with the Divine; the self self-actvity—individual ‘or social-exists either beside or in the context ofthis receptivity,s ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought tan it remains finite anc human. Understood in the light of the new philosophical category of infinite Spirit, however, religion becomes a divine selfactivity in finite humanity; and in order so tograsp it Hegelian thought must have done nothing less than rise shove a selfeactice thought confined to human ftude in order to become a sef-actice thought which is infinite and divine ® But our question i, as it has been all along, how Hegelian thought can have reached this “scientific” standpoint. Does the presence of the Christian truth by itself sulfice to make the time ripe forthe rise to scientific thought? The answer isclealy i the negative. Indeed, a veritable gulf exists between the religious self ‘which in its own seltunderstanding remains humanly receptive of the Divine, even when in possession of Christian Grace, and the philosophical self which, as has now emerged. must have become infinite and divine But this negative answer might, after all have been expected According to Hegel, the time has become ripe for science, not since Jesus of Nazareth inthe rst century, nor even since Luther in the sixteenth. It has become ripe for science only in his own time. 5 Of “Spirit Certin-of-Lself According to Hegel, this ripeness has been brought about by a post-Enlighteament, post-eevolutionary “morality” which has come imto existence in his own time." Here Spirt—individual or social isnot merely selfactve tis, and knows self to be, infinitely self active. This i no longer the sel-activity of a medieval culture, finite because Divinity emains a believed in, transcendent abject Divinity is, and is known to be, snmanent in this selfactiity, This Imorahty is “Splat certaiwot-isell” We have observed Hegel ac- opt the testimony of Christin faith We shall now find him accept 1 contemporary moral testimony which has found philosophical articulation, fragmentarily in Kant, and more adequately in his contemporaries. It will emerge that for Hegel's ‘Tho “Lauder” to the Absolute Stand point 59 phenomenological enterprise the one acceptance is as essential as the other, ‘This double acceptance raises three fundamental questions Every standpoint ths far encountered by philosophic thought has been finite in its own self-understanding. This, obviously true of isolated individual selfhood and social realities as we have treated them, is equally true of religious faith even asi isin a divine pres- ‘ence; for the religious self takes itself to be receptively related to the present divine Infinity, and hence finite and human. But what is now to be encountered is a moral self-consciousness which laims infinity to be immanent in its own knowing and neting This tives rise to three crucial questions. Cana philosopher in principle Accept the claim which now makes its sudden appearance, or must he rather reject it as amounting to a claim to divinity made by finite humans, and hence to madness? Secondly, ifthe claim can and must be accepted, is it not in radical collet with the religious claim already accepted? Can there be a greater con fic than between a religious faith which takes the human to be receptively related to a Divinity other-than-human (and hence it- self finite) an a moral consciousness which asserts divinity as lmmanent in man’s moral knowing and acting? The third question, raised at every stage in ou inquiry, has now reached is final and ‘imactic stage. Must the standpoint of « moral ife in which Spirit is certain-oftself” not already be the absolute standpoint, thas rendering the standpoint of a still more ultimate “science” both supertiuous and impossible? “To begin with, while our account has come suddenly upom a human claim to infinite self-consciousness, this is not true of the Phenomenology itself We have thus far been compelled to depart from the internal progression of Hegel's work, It is now necessary 1 give some idea of what that progression i. “The very frst soction of the work?”—thus far wholly ignored-~ watches the self-examination of consciousness, te, of a subject ‘which takes itself to be wholly passively related toan object, taken 1s wholly independent; successively, the sense-certainy of a sheer60 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought ‘here and now, the perception of sensuows things, and the scientific nderstanding of forces and laws by which they are governed, What is seen by the watching philosopher is the breakdown of any such subjectobject relationship. Thus already the fist of the ‘six major sections of Hogers work concdes that the truth of a consciousness externally imited by objects és an infinite se f-com- sciousvess not so imiteda conclusion which leaves ane wonder- ing why the vast and “complicated” remainder of the work is still needed. It stil & needed, Hegel tells us, because a truth “already in prineiple tached by the observing philosopher is as yet from reached by the subject observed by hie. And unless this subject somehow does reach this truth, and indeed has dane so, how can the philosopher have reached it? In any case having reached this truth, the philosopher makes ‘use of it as he turns from consciousness to self-cousciousness. The self here observed assets itself against its external other—natute and other selves=as objects of consciousness to be subdued by selfhood, The oberving philosopher already knows that this com- fict with the external other isan internal confit as well, and that therefore what seems sheer hostility is also mutual need.* Hence hie will view the selfs victaris in a perspective diferent from that bby which the observed self lives. What tothe self sits final victory =a Stoic af Skeptical freedom of thought, hought at the price af “withdrawal from or denial of nature and the human other=will be viewed as «one-sided victory, and the internally divided un- happy religious consciousness, as its nemesis, But the truth of self-consciousess pointed to by this nemesis is selfhood which has at once internalized the other—natural and human—and itself Jost individualistic isolation in the process. This truth is Reason Selfhood becomes “rational” when, rather than assert its indie Viluality against the other, it asserts itself as a universality ideally * he pare “sy he min ele ts ge (Pd, sag tile past nto te wh he sdk ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint o Inco of oberon, and sin fac shming at an stat inchs tia inn indie procs of coq. Remsen Unde neta presen ine netural scence whch whe Wt “obervieg” bs vss tet atu at A wore given ober, jot “reset Deets orevar ch ot th cooqiet of the mire pve Aad Sets poten! cpresion fa mal ls obich whe wag Doak ctl coon whe tuples pci ot rel and what qua universal and ideal it ought to be, forever aims at the realization of the ideal. This Reason is a modem phenomenon, ‘and Kant and Fichte are among its spokesmen. It is the “conscious tevaity of blag all realty>= Tt weit be noted hat af ths polt the Phenomanclogy has al aig lang belagieey in arcmin Alencar ad that this cam docs ota lest neta this point dissipate its finite humanity. The conquest of the real by the ideal Jake merely del, free sven or but never wally atnned The “cera” of seeing does aot Income the “rath ope fesse Indeed, the sl the srving-a Bit-inie, rea eal terion wwe glorious ud stern destiny is tobe denied the pce cd baton acs sal, sod tatnd fo be stitch (oh bapoeo ha cou aoa ele fs bow es nd ths ongek wis bien cue ech Tf foe Say ca shes dace sep ba the ect The omenclogy—one whore elects reverberate thoughout the whole ‘work-it is the affirmation that Reason is not the final form of self- Teo in feta ut x Reason the “Tra of. comcoumess ‘50 the Truth of Reason is Spirit." We have already grasped Hegel's sali pc al ib re ahh tees as Baracoa ee a he pti Ch Lael cal eta teak flees fo 5 ot at Sane Per Suter te core ere Sie Spare wee So ope Sirsa.6 ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought Splat a tne lf which Jr come ob by ts oom el actvy. What te the far cul nly sate tt ot rep that the Spi singed tut inthe Phenomenology compte or nue Spe, Lo, the ier bond betwee a subnce which sme hao mee be tons wile acs whch oxncoch tnn ide, The Phe tomenology gles out sch Spt became wba tee and fs the Trath of Reason The tonal dot been the ply alte rela the merely Moline sa ebrton thon Hoan a Aly, an ha fat nt ln Ge stl iplrulfe fom which es abstected. in ch «Me, he ub ftnce which aed i is cl sot though with Welly and Inflety athe wl whic et to allen Halt and ity, is ermente hilton th realty eel ald, What for Sitact Danson oa btu oppeion Wk contre spinal dined nag fae pr wy eke rs teeta wibrocrmtcton But when at lng te sl omc ‘propre this otal of petal let tanscede the stage corals os sy leet ots be gan Tlf inal cali, tbs become “pe ceri ‘ate the cruetal import do well to pase for an historical the companion volume to the present work already repeatedly re- ferred to, in 81 Schelling had transcended the Fichtean “idealism of the finite self The Fichtean self had remained finite, for ithad to take reached. And, be transcend the limits of yelfhood in tandpoint of Fiehtean idealism had itself remained finite, ‘To be sure, the Schelling * See Phan, p.a28 (Phen par) as nr econ Sa corm ts temethig br w ch the st ha nett which at the sun Xe of the step here taken we As will b shown in The “Ladder” to the Absolute Stendpoint % thought of 1801 had risen to a standpoint of abvolute selfhood; but in so doing it had produces! vast gulf between a thinking self riven to infinity and a living self remainingeven in att, ac ‘cording to Schelling its highest achievementconfined to fintude, tis just this gulf which Hlegets phenomenological introduction to “sctence” seeks to bridge, and the step presently under considera tion is crucial for his entire enterprise. For if-as Fichte main- tained "Reason isthe highest stage of selfhood in life then philo- sophical thought too must remain confined fo the standpoint of finite selfhood. It ean rise to the Schellingian absolute selfhood ‘only if selthood in life can become, and has infact become, "Spirit certain-of tell.” How can the self in life find this certainty? It eannot so long, 4s the selfs oneness with complete or infinite Spirit is observed ‘uly by the philosopher, and isnot grasped by the self observed. ‘We have already noted that whereas the Phenomenology sees one Infinite Spirit binding the harmonious Greek ethical world to the dark Fate which is its nemesis, those who live in that world ex perience tteo separate realities, of which one is immanent but finite, and the other, infinite but transcendent, and also that ‘whereas the Phenomenology sees Roman and medieval ealtural sell-uctivity asthe self-alienation of one infinite Spirit those en spiged in that selfcactiity are left with fro worlds of which ane és 4 present, lived in, earthly, human “cultural” product whereas the other isa divine world, believed in, eternally unproduced and in heaven. It remains here to be added! that cultural slf-activity remains alicnated-te, falls short of being Spirit certain-o-tell— ‘even as it seeks to appropriate Substance ths bringing down the ‘medieval heaven toa modern earth. [tis true that the Age of lightenment “turns against faith” and “transforms all being itself (Ansichsein) into being-foritsell (Firséchsein),"* and that the French revolution which acts out this transformation rakes “absolute freedom” an earthly reality. But because here “objec- tivity is destroyed... substantiality [is]. «last! rather than ape6 ‘The Religions Dimension in Megets Thowght propriate; the absolute sel-certainty in question isa merely finite and human sell-activty, idolatrowsly absolutived. This is evident ‘even in the merely halfhearted and merely theoretical Sprit ofthe Enlightenment, which reduces all things to objects of a merely Junin use The evidence is overwhelming in French revolutionary rnicalism; having absolstized a merely human freedom, it be ‘comes a “self-destructive actuality," which ends up in terror? The ‘certainty which Hegel seeks and nceds, then, can be found only if Spirit has overcome this slf-alienation, so as to appropriate ay self for itself a Substance which remains Substance i itself, And this, the asserts, has at least in prineiple occurred in a post-Enlighten- rent, post revolutionary “morality” existing in his own time, What {is that morality? ted but now considered, not as an imperative abstractly op- powd by a legislating rational self to the workd, but ruther as & ‘concrete spiritual life lived by the self with the world, and here 8 4 “moral view of the world” acted out in the world, In order for there to be such a view and such an acting-out there must be, in addition to the opposition between the ideal and the netwal 4 postulated harmony between them, ‘The fst postulate... [i] the harmony’ of morality and objective ma ture, the eter s+» the Ia cd wil bn Me form of sensuous inclination, the final purpose of sel-consekousess as suc, The former harewny ithe for of beings the second, in the form of being forttsef or veliconsciousness. Hut what connects these two final purposes and mediates betwern thom isthe movement of overt acting af Dut this overt acting discloses & “whole nest of contradiction First, legislating Reason must be both purely sand within | ‘me; yet the duties it legislates must he countless contingent duties which is why, to retain its purity, the Reason which is within me rust also be represented as a "holy Legislator” apart from me, Secondly, the postulated harmony of morality ancl nature must Tho “Lauder” tothe Absolute Standpoint 65 bbe my task, and this latter must be absolute, 4c. incapable of completion. Yet the harmony must also “he, not remain a meee task’; hence what is my task must also be hoped for as a divine {ft These and other contradictions arise because in the “move: iment of overt acting” infinite ideahity ad finite actuality are both at war and united" What matters, however, isnot that « philosopher can detect these contradictions. It is that the “movement of overt acting” ‘being one movement, can itself rise above ther, and has in fact, done s0 ina post-Kantian moral Ife, The self of the mora view of ‘the world remains internally divided into an abstractly univers anda contingently particular aspect. post-Kantian conscience of ‘conscientiousness® has boldly accepted itself as a unity, in which {deal universality and contingent particularity are inextricably ine tertwined. Moreover, it has accepted conscience oF conscientious ‘ess in others, and what forthe moral view of the work isan abs stract unity of munkid, constituted by an abstract universal daty, thas given way to « community of conscientious persons, united ‘through mutual recognition. Discord, however, inevitably persists, Hence conscience oF eo scientiousness must seek to purify itself ofthe “blemish of deter- sminacy” and free itself “every content of duty.” thereby becom ing “moral genius ... {to which] its inner yoice & the voice of ‘God.” Having thus ted from determinacy ts acting reduces elt to“the contemplation ofits own divinity”, and this “soit ship of the God within” is communal only in that there arises a ‘community of “beautiful souls, . assuring each other of their cconscientiousness, good intentions and parity of purpose." ‘Conscience oF conscentiousness thus les from discord. It su {ers an interna) and external nemesis of this ight. “Living in dread of contaminating its inward radiance by action and existence” it sulflers internally the loss of action and existence and dissolves into {nsubstantiaity. Its externally challenged by the moral agent who hhas not fled from action and existence but on the contrary con-6 ‘The Religions Dimension in Hegel's Thought sciously accepted its blemish and ditties his hands; indeed, this latter hard-heartedly asserts his “egotistic purposes”. For this, to be sure, he is judged by tho beautiful soul, and rightly so by its pore standards. But this judgment fn turn invites the accusa- tion of hypocrisy. For the beautiful soul has remained beautiful ‘only at the price of not acting at alls* But the final state ofthe final moraityfor in Hegel's view this morality isin idea unsurpassable, however inadecuately realized in facts not this “unforgiving” conflict. The beautiful soul lets go ofits beauty in recognizing its own unreality. The man of action ecognizes an ideality which calls his egotism ato question. A “word of reconciliation” is spoken, and a “mutual recognition” is accomplished. This later, however, could not be accomplished by the unaided moral selt-activity which lives in and between the two ‘extremes. The tension s transcended only becatse what the moral self—in both its poles-produces, and forever is yet to produce, already is as Substance; and because, in recognizing and ace cepting what already is, the moral self tums religious. The “reconciling yea" which i€ recognizes and accepts is “the God who appears.” ‘The questions asked atthe beginning of the present section ean now be answered. More precisely, they have already anvwered themselves. Fist the moxlern moral self contemplates an inward divinity; it doesnot rise above humanity ane become divine. Foe whem it aspites to teal divinity it dissolves into unceaity, and when its action and existence itis tarnished by: their blemish. In modern moral seltactivity, then. Spirit s certain of itself. But it does not transcend human finitade and fragmentariness so as to convert this certainty into druth.* Secomaly. this moral certainty points toa truth which is reigns ‘The certainty is moral because it i a knowing and doing of what This ts why, whereas rion i a form of abla Sprit, morabty even ‘ts highest oly pints to abate Spt Sew fnther ch 8 wre. The “Ladder” tothe Abwolute Sandpoint & forever is yet 10 be accomplished. The truth pointed to is religlous ‘because it iva reality already accomplished. The infinite autonomy ‘of modem moral selfhood far from challenging religions truth, om the contrary refers toi as its truth, and sine it may be described a the highest and. most concrete selfassertion of autonomous ‘Reason in modern lif, the Hegelian philosophy may be described 4 an attempt to reconcile a Reason whieh asserts itself against the reality which is witha religious truth which already i.* ‘Thirdly, Hegel holds this reconciliation to be aleeady in prime ‘ple actual in modern life, It is wot, however, as yet grasped as actual. Moral self-activity points oly either to futher moral set activity, thus remaining eternally fragmented. o ee to an anfrag- mented religious truth which remains beyond is sel-actiity be cause it is received as already being, Religious faith, on its part {simits own self-understanding not a slf-actvity at al: it does not self-actively produce recooeibition but rather reevives it as the sift of divine Grace. The Christian truth, which is the essential content” of “science,” has heen actual in human history for nearly ‘two millennia, And self-activity las reached in modern moral lie 4s ultimate a “form” as it can ever reach in life. But because it ‘remains human in both its religious and its moral aspeets, human life has notin ether aspect risen, and could not have risen, to an infinite and self-complete self-activity. The time has become as ripe for “science” as life can ever make it. Only philesophical thought can be the sef.activty which produces seience. 6. The Standpoint of Absolute Knowledge ‘The last-named of these answers requires further explication. AAs viewed by the Phenomenology, the final moral self-activity a the fnal religion “all to begin with apart.” They are, nevertheless, = This rcomeiation sere given only within the lis ofthe phenome sclogeal comp, Fors fait stunts ch. sete 8-8.6s ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought “already implicitly unitedin religion. For religion is the rath, of the roel certainty, What is rligiosly received. as abrdy done woukl not be final if what morally is yet to be done fell simply outside i, The workaday week of “action and existence” points to the Sunday of rest and reconeiliation—a Sunday vorced from the week but rather of the week." What the needed? “The unification which is still missing.” Hogel tells us, “athe simple unity of the Notion." What is this Notion? tis what it does, and it does what remains to be done. What i stil missing sa spiritual acting, which (like moral “Spirit certin- tse”) is, and knows itself to be, an infinite selfacting and ‘which (ike Christian faith) has transeended the fragmmentari- ness of a certainty of what forover is yet to be done, and has come into complete possession of what already is. This s activity isthe explicit Knowledge of the unity which implicitly already is, To a degree, this selfactivity is foreshadowed! in the beautiful soul, for itis @“sel-contemplating of the Divine.”* This ltt however, isa divine selfcontemplating in the human only, and for this reason ean maintain itself in purity oaly at the price of flight from the blemish of finite humanity. Iti, therefore, doubly contradicted by the human realities from which it his fled-~by blemished but real “action and existence,” and by a faith which, while receptive of a God other-than-human, itself remains fully and concretely human. In contrast, the divine self-activity which ‘tion does not flee from these realities but rather unites them, and it can do so only by reenacting them 30 as to trans figure them. ‘This is done by complete or absolute Spirit, already the Binal religion, but reereating itself in that wlkimate form of selfactvity which is already present inthe final form of ‘moral acting. Iti the Self which, at lang lst, i absolutely free, ‘e., no longer either in fight from, or limited by, any external rea ity. The human self which has risen to this selfhood has risen to ‘The “Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint & the absolute standpoint. Andl what itis and does is in the final philosophical thinking Hegelian “science."* ‘With this conclusion, both the nature of Hegel's phenomenologi- cal introduction to science and its relation to the Hegelian system as a whole have at least in principle established themselves, If the phenomenological road to science is “already scientific.” it 4s because if moves from beginning to end in the “circle™ of the {ree self-activity of the Notion. Only thus can it view the vatie- {gated standpoints of life so differently from the way they view themselves, Le, as form of self-activty pointing beyond them- selves, and ultimately to the absolute self-activity of the Notion {itself Only thus, too, ean it move from standpoint to standpoi bby an internal necessity, anc view the self-examination which it sees in every standpoint as leading to the necessary abandonment ofthe examined standpoint ** Because the Phenomenology already ‘moves within the crele of the Notion, it presupposes the ‘sci ence”—Hegelian logic—which explicates that Notion. If never- theless itis an introduction to science itis because, unlike science itsell it dwells on how each standpoint of life views itself before "The final shape of Spe atte bowled. 1 Sp whic op Mehpengstgecoly eminem to her eng gl ‘Noto fem at i remains within Ghe Notas whe aon We Tth hero tot merely ipl eis wth fol “ie ra that hon pase Teuton TOG De TESE ie a alee i oot cient ehh a neaokgial vont ts “acenee”conkd wt be “scot” (Phin 74 Prien egal) What moves a th aby eter tt rather he plo ting cach sendpent he fever fe tional hn i fo stu ata Doin The oinervedstandints themselves either Jo not rane a ll Ce She gical thought abandons tandpt ecaime i vepreseas fn shtraction torn tof a larger contrat, Le, a the case ef each Wastin trom ame of the maps dvi ofthe Phenomenology to be reat, eer they mare onky coliionallyon condition that fact they reach the ex tos hi peworneokogseal ght phen he reat have reached ‘rer tohave become ripn ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought it criticizes it in the light of the Notion; and because, in doing Doth, it “hands the individual [the] ladder” to science.* Does this answer the question which throughout this Giscourse we have been asking of the Phenomenology? Up to & point. The Phenomenology bas not “instructed unscientific consciousness in science, and this holds true, as much as of any other such con- sciousness, of Christian faith and modern moral self-activity: What ithas shown, however, is that not ll individuals are equally remote from, or near to, “seience.” It is true that in “scientific” thinking “the individual walks on his head.” whereas everywhere in life he walks on his feet. But the expectation that such a strange posture bbe adopted is not equally unprepared at all times. A moral self Which already knows its being and acting to be “Spirit certain-of- ftsel™ need but recognize and accept that the same Spirit which its own acting is forever yet to be already isin the divine-human relation manifest in the Christian faith—and be will have entered {nto the circle of the Notion. As for the Phenomenology ise, it may have moved within that circle from the beginning, It demon- strates atthe cad thatthe time in which this moving has been done has been made as ripe for it by life as life can ever make i. Yet our question has been answered ony up toa point. A radical ap, afterall, remains between the standpoint of absolute thought Satie dee Gorse eres Say pet eens eee Seto mage : footie gestae us array ey toe Pecede mest oa e ead {echelon foes ace ge Ret eer oe eee eee subyrct the Tia snes th wom dl i ey pin STS rae dye si nwt Sorenehrenas an pet Sia etoracned meee peace Soegeecetenra etn Terao oo one ‘The*Ladder” to the Absolute Standpoint n land even those standpoints of life which are closest to it. Why-— this might be asked not only by Fichteans but alo, mutatis ‘mutandis, by Marsists-should the standpoint of moral self-actvity rasp the ladder tothe scientific standpoint when, having done so, {finds is cortainty of what is forever yet to he done point to a ‘Truth which already is done? Why-and this is in fact asked by Kierkegaardians and Barthians~shoukd a faith humanly receptive to the Divine grasp this ladder when this requires no less a pre- ‘sumption than the rise in thought to divine Selthood? Rather than ascend the Hegelian ladder, will not both standpoints protest ‘against the Hegelian expectation, even atthe peice of radical con flict with each other? And will not this protest he enough to call the abvoluteness of the standpoint of Hegelian scence into ques: tion? Moreover, even if they are willing to ascend the Hegelian ladder, is either standpoint able to do x0? As thus far considered, Hegelian philosophic science springs sudklenly from swomphilo- sophic life—and it isa “circle” ‘These questions demand a far closer examination than we have ths far given them, and it will have to concentrate on the rela- tion between Christian Ife and Hegelian philosophic thought ge flatly asserts thatthe Christian religin isthe presupposition in life of his philosophie thought, and that it already contains—in Principlein nonphilasophic form its essential content: yet our ‘account of that religion has hitherto been most cursory® He assets, to, that his, arises from, and consummates, not ‘only history but also the history of philosophy. However, we have thus far not suid a word about the relation between Hees philo- ‘ophy and the history of philosophy; indeed, Hegel himself Fully explicate that relation only many years after writing the Phe- Another | however; calls for more immediate attention: it will be dealt with in the chapter immediately following. The Phenomenology is road to science” It passes fom standpoint to standpoint, and it would be quite jusifed in doing so along thenm ‘The Religious Dimension in Hegets Thought straightest and quickest path, As forthe superseded standpoints, nply Heft behind. Yet these continue to assert their persisting reality, even when higher standpoints have ‘become historical realities. Thus even ifthe Christian faith and the Post-Kantian moral self-activity accepted by Hegel are in fact living realities in Heget's own time—which of course might itself be seriously questioned*—countles other forms of human lie in Uisputably exist beside them. This fact can be ignored by the Phenomenology, concerned as it merely to hand the ladder to the absolute standpoint, to individuals at varying degrees of near- ness to it. It eannot be ignored by Hegelian “science” proper. In producing « simple union, ean the Notion ignore or deny the Contingent realities of human existence which are shot through with Bnitude, confit, and nonunion? But then surely any single protest made anywhere in finite life must suffice to shatter the pretensions of the Notion, Or can the unifying Notion recognize ll nonunion? But then surely this recognition must reduce it to « mere form of finite thought. Unless Hegelian science can cope With this dilemma the introtuetion to “science” furnished by the Phenomenology will tar out to have beea lost labor * ‘This dilemma isnot lost sight of even during the course of the Phenomenology itself. In pursuit of it goal, the work ought to move toward the absolute standpoint as speedily and elogantly ax possible. Yet its actual movement is tortuous, and is arrested time tnd again as if Heigl were haunted by the fear that encountered standpoints of life, disposed of too quickly or glibly by a thought which is Notion, will arise to accuse the Notion of Melessness. ‘When finally the Notion appears om the scene in its own right, i cloes not expand its scope explicitly over the whole vast panorama of life previously viewed. It is merely teruly asserted—as a stage ng demand. Hegel has not forgotten that the time which he sees as ripe for "slence” is also (like all tine )~ane of conflict, chanee, and brute fact, and that he=the self rising to absolute ‘thought-is also a contingent self in the midst of time, Many years The “Ladder” the Absolute Sandpoint 73 after the composition ofthe Phenomenology Hogel wrote: “I mise myself in thought to the Absolute... thus being infinite conscious- ness; yet atthe same time Tam finite consciousness... Both aspects seek cach other and lee each other... Lam the struggle between them: This struggle—and the struggle to resolve the struggle— {sin the end the sole theme of the Phenomenology and, indeed, of the whole Hegelian philosophy.) Appendie ‘The Place of the Phenomenology in the Hegelian System (See p36.) The Phenomenology hat been the subject of schol controversy fr ‘rll overs contury nd ar hs concer tt ony etal bu io towel igicrace and place wan Ow Hegelian sytem Heels ‘rn statements on ths ater question ave wot whey content, a ty rae, er, the mala Incositency-orapparctIncontngy— telng tet wha olered a 87 tx on vodon to (and Bt pert (2) Seknee”appeartcer toma To oppearia the Emptopedis (ht a, 1817) a part ofthe cette oat, Le a asec of vb frive spite sn paragon Uae qustn are Phan ay S018 (Phen, pp, ho.) Log, Lg, 39, 51 Cage Tppasil sof, rofl), ne, sete 410-00) steal de etal qt he retin betwen the Phe somenoogy an the sytem. Por scholars dspaing of 2 sya Sawer, the geetion tas bewn wheter the lr Hel tus be re fade thang abandoned bs whole carer pheverenlola ene. fb, in whlch cae the querion Ie sbether the vriow or signee Tio tthe ahr oh Phoremenclgy or that ft Lge a the Enegelpeia. More recently srs hive quested wether the Phenemenagy iw nly even eral, or siber ptcort com fovea eas ln tong, oer on cv tat prt Tine. (A prominent advocate ef he patchwork they fe Theodor” The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought Hacrig, Hegel: Sein Wollen unt Werk, 2 vol. (Leipeig and Berlin: ‘Teubner, 1920, 1938). For an excellent account ofthe history of Pho- omenooay iterretatins, see Otto Poxgeler, “Zor Deutng der Phinomenologie des Geistes” Hegel.Studien [oom: Bouvier, 1961) I Prass-o4) We vbmtoasly cant here enter dy detail into thse slay cont ‘verses. We confine ourselves to these comments (0) The hypothesis ofan evolution of major significance in Hegel's thought from Phenomenology to system is rendered unlikely, indeed ‘ot ruled out, by the facts (a) that Hegel gave an early version of the Tater system in his Jona ects, poe to cnnponing the Phenomenology (See Jenenser Logik, Metaphyrik und. Naturphlosoplc, ed. Georg Lasso (Leipeig: Meiner, 1g2a], and Jenenser Reolphicsophie, ed. Johannes Hlfocster, 2 vol, [eiprig: Meine, 1951-32)):_(b) that the began preparing a secon edition of the Phenomenology just prior to ‘is death-an unkbely eventually Ie ad considered the work super- sede by his later thought. Kt mnt be aed, however, that to doubt or even reject the genetic hypothesis ix tot to have established that the Problem of the systematic rebtion between the Phenomenology and {he system can find a wholly satisfactory soliton. (For my” om tent tive stand on this sue, se sect. and especially p70 ofthis chapter) {(W) The patchwork hypothe bas external evidence fs supprt, and it could be genainely refute only by a through systematic ster pretation ofthe entire Phenomenology task of such propentions that Stas never been attempted. Even 40, any close pimophicalh-enindd student of the work must be the patchwuth bypothest f cnly because he finds time ani again systematic onder where there iad seem tebe sheer cme This account of the Phenomenclogy | tystematic interpretation of selected aspects relevant tou Ppene ‘nly, considered inthe perspective expounded in sect. 1 of this hupter.