Norton Introduction To Philosophy 2nd Edition Rosen Test Bank

Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd
Edition Rosen Test Bank

Visit to download the full and correct content document: https://testbankdeal.com/dow
nload/norton-introduction-to-philosophy-2nd-edition-rosen-test-bank/
Chapter 8 What is Consciousness?
TRUE/FALSE
1. Jackson thinks that the mind is a different kind of substance than the body.
a. True
b. False
ANS: F DIF: Difficult REF: p. 371

TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?
MSC: Understanding
2. Chalmers thinks that denying physicalism is unscientific.

a. True
b. False
ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 391

TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?
MSC: Understanding
3. Tye thinks that it is clear that philosophical zombies are possible.

a. True
b. False
ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 400

TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?
MSC: Understanding
MULTIPLE CHOICE
1. According to Nagel, the reductive accounts of physicalism currently proposed

a. all fail to provide a reduction of the mental to the physical.
b. all fail to provide a reduction of the physical to the mental.
c. mostly succeed in providing a reduction of the mental to the physical.
d. mostly succeed in providing a reduction of the physical to the mental.
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: pp. 357-358
TOP: What is it Like to Be a Bat? Nagel | Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?
MSC: Understanding
2. Nagel thinks that a reduction of the mental to the physical can succeed only if
a. mental states do not exist.
b. physical states are immaterial.
c. physical descriptions can adequately capture what it is like to have a mental state.
d. mental descriptions of what it is like can be expressed in human language.
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: pp. 362-363
MSC: Understanding
3. Nagel's argument against reduction hinges on an incommensurability between

a. mental and physical states.
b. the subjective and objective characters of experience.
c. physical laws and psychological laws.
d. physicalism and epiphenomenalism.
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: pp. 361-363
MSC: Analyzing
4. One way to challenge Nagel’s position would be to argue that Nagel claims that when we try to
imagine what it is like to be a bat, it is possible
a. for us to imagine having different experiences.
b. for bats to imagine having different experiences.
c. to imagine what it would be like for us to behave like a bat.
d. to imagine having a bat’s experiences.
ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: p. 359
MSC: Evaluating
5. What would Nagel say about a science fiction example where a human's consciousness was
transferred to a dog's body?
a. This is the only way that a human could learn what it is like to be a dog.
b. This is one way, but not the only way, that a human could learn what it is like to be a
dog.
c. This is only one way for a human to learn how they might behave as a dog.
d. This is one way for a human to have experiences with the same subjective character
as a dog.
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: p. 359
MSC: Applying
6. Why does Mary’s learning something when she leaves the black-and-white room pose a
problem for physicalism?
a. She already knows the physical and mental properties in question.
b. She already knows all of the physical information.
c. She already knows all of the information.
d. She already knows all of the mental information.
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: p. 368
MSC: Understanding
7. One way to challenge Jackson’s Knowledge argument is to argue that

a. Mary does not actually learn anything new when she leaves the room.
b. Mary did not know all of the information when she was in the room.
c. Mary could not learn all of the physical information in the room.
d. Mary could not know what qualia are like in the room.
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: pp. 368-369
MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating
8. Jackson uses an example of a particular sort of phenomenon to rebut the objection that we come
to know about other minds on the basis of people’s behavior. Which of the following is another
example of the sort that Jackson uses?
a. Inferring from the fact that classmate A knows what Jackson said that classmate B
also knows what Jackson said.
b. Inferring that someone feels pain based on the person’s reactions to a hot stove.
c. Inferring that someone can know what pain is by watching someone else exhibit
certain behavior.
d. Inferring from the fact that a classmate says something that what they said is true.
ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: p. 372
MSC: Applying
9. According to Churchland, Nagel’s argument begs the question because

a. it is not certain what a bat’s experience would be like.
b. it relies on the assumption that bats have subjective experience.
c. it relies on the assumption that brain states are not mental states.
d. it relies on the assumption that intentional properties are genuine properties of
objects.
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: p. 378
TOP: Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States, Churchland | Chapter 8: What is
Consciousness? MSC: Understanding
10. One might challenge Churchland’s response to Jackson’s Knowledge argument by arguing that
a. we have empirical reasons for thinking that color vision creates qualia.
b. we have a priori reasons for thinking that Mary knows all of neuroscience.
c. we have a priori reasons for thinking that qualia exist.
d. we have empirical reasons for thinking that one must have an experience in order to
know what it is like.
ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 381-382
Consciousness? MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating
11. Why does Churchland think A and B can be identical even if no one knows this?
a. She is using the term “identical” in the weak,non-philosophical sense (i.e., two
distinct things that look like each other).
b. It may be that no one knows what properties A or B have.
c. We may describe A differently than B and therefore not know that they are one and
the same thing.
d. We may believe they are identical, but not know it.
Consciousness? MSC: Analyzing
12. Churchland’s claim about different ways of knowing would explain which of the following
phenomena?
a. Knowing that the person you see in the mirror has a red shirt on without knowing
that you have a red shirt on
b. Knowing how to ride a bike without being able to drive a car
c. Knowing the answers to some questions on an exam without knowing the answers to
others
d. Knowing by way of reasoning alone without having experiences
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: pp. 379-381
Consciousness? MSC: Applying
13. How might one object to Chalmers's argument concerning philosophical zombies?
a. By arguing that philosophical zombies are conscious
b. By arguing that philosophical zombies are unconscious
c. By arguing that philosophical zombies are impossible
d. By arguing that philosophical zombies do not exist
ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 388-389
MSC: Evaluating
14. Chalmers's argument concerning philosophical zombies is a version of

a. the Knowledge argument.
b. the Modal argument.
c. the “What it is like” argument.
d. the Epiphenomenal argument.
ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 388-389
MSC: Applying
15. Having representational content requires having

a. conditions that can be correct about the world.
b. conditions that cannot be correct about the world.
c. conditions that are unstable.
d. conditions that are stable.
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: p. 396
MSC: Understanding
16. According to Chalmers, we can explain functions by specifying

a. a particular mechanism.
b. a particular causal law.
c. a particular function.
d. a particular evolutionary trait.
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: pp. 387
MSC: Understanding
17. According to Tye, if you attempt to focus on your experience of reading this page, you will
a. end up confused about what you are reading.
b. end up noticing a variety of sensations that are part of your experience.
c. end up noticing features of the page that you are looking at.
d. end up noticing other experiences that you were previously unaware of.
ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 395-396
MSC: Applying
18. According to Tye, one problem for strong representationalism is that

a. it implies that qualia are immaterial.
b. it implies that the phenomenal character of your experience is hidden from you.
c. it implies that your experiences lack phenomenal character.
d. it implies that in order to have any experience at all there must be representational
content.
MSC: Evaluating
19. Tye thinks that it is possible to attend to a collection of objects

a. without being conscious.
b. without experiencing any qualia.
c. without attending to individuals in the collection.
d. without attending to the features of the collection.
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: pp. 398-399
MSC: Analyzing
COMPLETION
1. Jackson thinks that in order to be true, _____ requires a too optimistic picture of our powers to
understand the world.
ANS: physicalism
DIF: Medium REF: p. 373

MSC: Remembering
2. According to Churchland, Nagel commits the _____ fallacy in his argument that we cannot
know what it is like to be a bat.
ANS: intentional

Consciousness? MSC: Remembering
3. Chalmers thinks that the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of ____ .
ANS: experience
MSC: Remembering
ESSAY
1. How is Jackson’s “Knowledge argument” different from what he calls the “Modal argument”?
Why might one think that the Knowledge argument is stronger?
ANS:
Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Jackson’s Knowledge
argument as well as the Modal argument. Additionally, a valid response should/might include
discussion of one of Jackson’s examples used to motivate the Knowledge argument. Finally, a
valid respond should/might include discussion of the fact that the Modal argument depends on
an intuition about how things would be in another world where presumably the laws of nature
are different than our own, as well as how this seems to be more susceptible to attack than his
claims concerning the Knowledge argument.
DIF: Medium REF: pp. 366-374 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson

MSC: Evaluating
2. How does Churchland object to Nagel’s argument? How might Nagel respond?
ANS:
Answers will vary. A valid response should/might include discussion of Churchland’s attack on
Nagel’s argument (i.e., her claim that his argument fails because it commits the intentional
fallacy). A valid response should/might include discussion of how Nagel might try to defend the
claim that he does not commit the fallacy that Churchland charges him with. For instance, a
valid response should/might include that Nagel could argue that his argument does not depend
on properties that we take mental states to have, but instead depends upon objective properties
of those experiences (e.g., the subjective experiences of a bat simply cannot be had by humans).
DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 356-365; 377-382

TOP: Chapter 8: What is Consciousness? MSC: Analyzing/Evaluating
3. What are philosophical zombies? How does Chalmers think that philosophical zombies can be
used to argue against materialism/physicalism?
ANS:
Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of what philosophical zombies
are (i.e., physically just like us but without conscious experience). Additionally, a valid
response should include discussion of why Chalmers thinks that the possibility of philosophical
zombies poses a problem for materialism (i.e., their possibility seems to show that
material/physical facts do not exhaust all the facts there are).
DIF: Medium REF: pp. 384-391 TOP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers
MSC: Understanding
4. Chalmers argues that philosophical zombies provide the grounds for an argument against
materialism/physicalism.How might Churchland respond to this argument?
ANS:
Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Chalmers's description of
philosophical zombies. Additionally, a valid response should include discussion of Chalmers's
claims about how philosophical zombies can be used to argue against materialism/physicalism.
Finally, a valid response should/might include discussion of how Churchland could object to
this in a similar way to her objection to the Knowledge argument. That is, she could object that
we do not know enough about all of the physical laws to determine whether it is really possible
that there could be philosophical zombies at all.
DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 377-391 TOP: Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

MSC: Applying/Evaluating
5. Why does Tye think that the standard assumption is incorrect that there are three components to
visual experience?
ANS:
Answers will vary. A valid response should include discussion of Tye's description of the
standard assumption. In particular, a valid response should include discussion of Tye's claim
that it is standardly assumed that in visual experience there is (1) the external object, (2) the
experience, and (3) a causal relationship between the object and the experience. A valid
response should/might also include discussion of Tye's claims that this picture seems incorrect,
because no matter how hard we try we cannot become aware of the experience. Instead, we are
only aware of features of the object.
DIF: Easy REF: pp. 392-400 TOP: The Puzzle of Transparency, Tye
MSC: Analyzing

Norton Introduction To Philosophy 2nd Edition Rosen Test Bank

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Norton Introduction To Philosophy 2nd Edition Rosen Test Bank

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd

Edition Rosen Test Bank

ANS: F DIF: Difficult REF: p. 371

2. Chalmers thinks that denying physicalism is unscientific.

ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 391

3. Tye thinks that it is clear that philosophical zombies are possible.

ANS: F DIF: Medium REF: p. 400

1. According to Nagel, the reductive accounts of physicalism currently proposed

3. Nagel's argument against reduction hinges on an incommensurability between

7. One way to challenge Jackson’s Knowledge argument is to argue that

9. According to Churchland, Nagel’s argument begs the question because

14. Chalmers's argument concerning philosophical zombies is a version of

15. Having representational content requires having

16. According to Chalmers, we can explain functions by specifying

18. According to Tye, one problem for strong representationalism is that

19. Tye thinks that it is possible to attend to a collection of objects

DIF: Medium REF: p. 373

DIF: Medium REF: p. 379

DIF: Medium REF: pp. 366-374 TOP: Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson

DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 356-365; 377-382

DIF: Difficult REF: pp. 377-391 TOP: Chapter 8: What is Consciousness?

You might also like