Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214

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Energy Research & Social Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Original research article

Investigating decentralized renewable energy systems under different

governance approaches in Nepal and Indonesia: How does governance fail?
Yoon-Hee Ha a, *, Surya Sapkota Kumar b
a
Graduate School of Energy and Environment, Korea University (Green School) #520, R&D Center Bldg., 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul 02841, South Korea
b
GETPPP (Global Energy Technology Policy Expert Program), Korea University #515, R&D Center Bldg., 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul 02841, South Korea

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Decentralized energy systems have numerous advantages over mega energy projects, including environmental
Equitable energy access friendliness, lower upfront costs, greater affordability and reliability, lower risks, an easier ability to cope with
Polycentric governance system failures, and community empowerment. Despite these advantages, the type of governance used when
Decentralized renewable energy
constructing these systems can play an important role in yielding these positive impacts to local communities.
Rural electrification
This study investigates how renewable energy projects can fail under certain types of governance. We use case
Climate response
Energy democracy studies in Indonesia and Nepal to demonstrate the problems and factors in terms of the governance structures
that have diminished the performance of decentralized small-scale renewable energy projects. The Indonesian
case study focuses on the top-down governance of a renewable energy project. The project’s promotion under a
conventional central government-led framework resulted in a process of granting renewable energy plants to
local governments without considering stakeholders. In the Nepalese case, a renewable energy project was
designed using a polycentric approach to governance. However, the donor (the European Commission) remotely
controlled the project process, thereby hampering the intended polycentric governance strategy, which was
originally conceived to include multi-level stakeholders. By focusing on real cases throughout a project’s
progress, this study illustrates how monopolized power excludes the interests and commitments of multi-
stakeholder interests and commitments to a project, which impinges on the final result.

1. Introduction causing environmental degradation [1,2,3]. In contrast, decentralized

Growth in energy consumption is linked to an increase in the ma­
terial prosperity of human society. However, the world is facing enor­
mous challenges due to an abundant use of energy, which is
unsustainable and heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Furthermore, mega-
scale electricity generation projects, which are used to satisfy global
energy needs often yield inequality and environmental degradation,
especially in developing countries. This forces the poor urban and large
rural populations to depend on inefficient and low-quality energy
sources.
These inequalities are mainly attributed to centralized energy plan­
ning, which prioritizes the mass supply of energy often at the expense of
the needs of rural populations, excluding them from development and
renewable energy (RE) systems are compatible with sustainable energy
planning. They exhibit several advantages over centralized systems,
including more environmentally friendliness, lower upfront costs, more
affordability and reliability, shorter deployment time, lower risks,
reduced distribution losses, an improved ability to cope with system
failures, and community empowerment [1,4,5,6]. Owing to these
strengths, decentralized energy systems have gained popularity as
promising alternatives to on-grid mega energy systems for rural elec­
trification in developing countries [7,8].
The aims of rural electrification and the nature of the technologies
used for it contrast with conventional mega-energy projects and demand
new approaches in terms of governance. The efficacy of governance has
a decisive impact on the effectiveness of the project. For instance, in

Abbreviations: RE, renewable energy; EC, European Commission; PV, Photo Voltaic; BPK, Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia; MoEMR, Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources; MoF, Ministry of Finance; REP, Renewable Energy Project; CBO, community-based organization; GoN, Government of Nepal; AEPC, alter­
native energy promotion center; CESP, community energy service provider; PSC, project steering committee; PTF, project task force; TAC, technical advisory
committee; RPO, regional project office; TA, technical advisory; CO, community organization; REDP, Rural Energy Development Program.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: helloyunie@korea.ac.kr (Y.-H. Ha), suryakumar_sapkota@yahoo.com (S.S. Kumar).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102214
Received 14 November 2020; Received in revised form 18 May 2021; Accepted 25 July 2021
Available online 9 August 2021
2214-6296/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
home solar projects in rural areas, a top-down governance approach may
not effectively respond to the needs and circumstances of households,
such that this ineffective governance often leads to project breakdown.
Diverse forms of governance have been applied to rural RE projects
[8,9,10] using off-grid RE technologies to pursue rural development and
improve the quality of life for rural people in developing countries.
Some projects have achieved to their intended outcomes, but others
ultimately failed; even projects promoted under the same form of
governance often produce different results. This study investigates how
RE projects were ultimately led to failure under a certain type of
governance.
Using case studies from Nepal and Indonesia, this study illustrates
how small rural electrification projects using renewable technologies
failed. The Nepalese case was funded by the EC (European Commission),
which significantly focused on ensuring the active engagement of multi-
level actors and stakeholders. The Indonesian case used a top-down
approach led by the central government, which is identical to that
used in conventional large-scale energy projects. Although these two
cases differ significantly in terms of their forms of governance, both
ultimately failed. Therefore, this study investigates the implementation
process of these projects focusing on the aspects of governance. We
attempt to demonstrate the reasons behind a planned project’s failure
under the type of governance recommended by academic studies did not
have a successful outcome and how a conventional top-down approach
is incompatible with small decentralized RE projects pursuing an equi­
table aim.
2. From centralized Top-Down to polycentric governance
2.1. Crises that the conventional energy system governance engenders
Modern energy has been developed for mass exploitation at large
scales. These attributes require substantial amounts of capital; therefore,
only large corporations and governments can control the energy in­
dustry. The energy industry has maximized its profit by expanding
production, where centralized mega energy facilities have underpinned
the perpetual increase in energy demand. Due to the economy of scale,
conventional energy systems are cheap and abundant. Governments
have supported these cheap and abundant energy systems to secure
economic growth [11,12,13]. These have contributed to the develop­
ment of a large middle class and yielded universal modern energy ser­
vices, at least in the global north [14,15]. Cheap and abundant energy
has transformed societal values, governance, and economic and social
organizations [14,16].
An energy system in which ownership and governance are controlled
by large corporations and governments is intrinsically hierarchical
[9,17]. Governance is the process of governing over a social system in
which interaction and decision-making among stakeholders involved in
a collective problem that leads to the creation, reinforcement, or
reproduction of social norms and institutions [5,7,8,18,19]. Governance
is also the manner in which power is exercised in managing an organi­
zation’s economic and social resources [20,21]. In conventional energy
systems, stakeholders who engage in governing the system are a small
group of elite technicians and government officials, such that there is a
pervading perception that energy systems are separated from people’s
lives and consist of complex technologies beyond their comprehension
[9,11,12]. This type of elite governance, which was established for the
purpose of increasing efficiency, has phenomenally improved produc­
tivity; however, by excluding most people from the decision-making
process, this has also yielded a crisis in democracy. The use of cost-
benefit analysis as a criterion in policymaking is an example of a tech­
nical approach, thus retaining its dominant status. As a result, the
implementation of projects to transform society and people’s lives is
reduced to a cost-benefit ratio. Critical decisions are determined by the
size of inputs and outputs because specialists who adhere to procedure
and economic analysis place more emphasis on measurable and
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Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214
manageable returns in the outputs. Ultimately, energy systems have
become unresponsive to social needs and are indifferent to environ­
mental impacts.
2.2. Divergence of energy system governance
Renewables offer the potential to lead to significant social change
because their use may imply a major decentralization of the energy
system and, importantly, its governance [17,18,22,23,24,25]. Glover
[17] observed that the social goal of RE development lies in establishing
autonomy for users and communities, such that they can tailor policies
to local needs. RE has the potential to be “off grid,” detached from
pipelines and big oil. Therefore, its users can understand and control
their own systems, fix and maintain them with basic skills, do not cause
pollution or impingement, are excluded from monthly utility bills and
high energy costs, and erode support for state- and corporate-managed
energy systems [17] (p. 251).
The attributes of renewables allow the active involvement of diverse
stakeholders, resulting in diverse governance. Thus, renewable projects
pursue divergent goals based on their scale, technology, and location. As
some technologies achieve grid parity, mega scale renewable projects
are promoted in the same way as conventional energy projects. In other
areas, renewable technologies contribute to social development, tar­
geting equity and democracy.
Projects in pursuit of social values require a holistic paradigm change
throughout all elements that encompass a target, including policy
setting, regulatory framework, financial support, implementing a
group’s organization, participants, the distribution of authority and re­
sponsibility among stakeholders, and the tariff system [26,27,28]. A
governing system creates the features of each project by influencing
each element.
Renewable projects for social change have been promoted under
different governance approaches. Local-level energy transition projects
have developed new types of governance [29,30,31,32]. The initiators
of these projects have varied, e.g., multi-level stakeholders, including
central-state-level governments, international organizations, local
businesses, and grassroots organizations, which have been engaged in
the governing processes. These projects basically adopt decentralized
forms of governance, but, due to a mix of leading entities, scales,
covering areas, and local energy contexts, the exact characteristics of
governance are unique to each project. Polycentric governance is a more
contemporary mode of governance used for social energy projects and
has multiple decision-making centers, each of which operates with some
degree of autonomy [18,33,34]. Polycentric energy governance involves
multiple scales (local, regional, national, and global), mechanisms
(centralized command and control regulations, decentralized and local
policies, and the free market), and stakeholders (government in­
stitutions, corporate and business firms, civil society, individuals, and
households) [7,35].
Small-scale RE projects, especially in the developing world, are often
planned in order to secure minimum energy access in regions without
grid service. Modern energy services through these projects are expected
to provide excluded populations opportunities with decent living and
increases in income [36,37]. In energy projects aimed at social values,
the conventional principles of energy systems, such as economic effi­
ciency, represented by the cost-benefit ratio and top-down governance
for functional efficiency, cannot operate effectively. The success of these
projects, which do not pursue and have difficulties in producing eco­
nomic returns, depend on a surrounding favorable environment. As
stated by Sovacool [7], the environment is multi-scale, and the mecha­
nisms and stakeholders do not soley seek economic and functional ef­
ficiency. Financial resources can be derived from international, national,
and local levels, as well as from those sharing the values of the projects.
At every step of the process, stakeholders can voice their own thoughts
on the ways in which the regulations, policies, and implementations
should respond to local needs. Command and control mechanisms,
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
decentralized and local policies, or the free market policies can be
implemented if they can meets local needs and contexts. Polycentric
governance has been proposed as a new form of governance for energy
projects focused on social goals [7,18]. An ideal operation of polycentric
governance can be a decisive condition that leads these projects to
achieve successful results.
2.3. Governance as a crucial factor leading RE Projects’ results
Many studies have focused on identifying the factors that have led
policy programs and RE projects to succeed or fail
[38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50]. This approach investigates
multiple aspects influencing the outcomes of projects encompassing
technical design, policy and regulatory framework, government support,
effective planning, managerial sustainability, credit and funding avail­
ability, related infrastructure, local involvement, and capacity building.
Some studies have considered financial mechanisms as an important
impetus for rural RE projects. These studies found that subsidies for
producers and microfinance for consumers promoted the deployment of
RE technologies [51] while regulatory, legislative, and policy support
for financing accelerated the development of rural RE [52]. Bhatta­
charyya [53] pointed out that weak governance, limited organizational
capacity, and unfavorable policy environment are the main barriers to
mobilizing financial resources for energy access and off-grid electrifi­
cation in poor countries.
Only a few studies have solely focused on the aspect of governance.
Atteridge and Weitz [54] reviewed a cook stove project in Kenya,
identifying a lack of legitimacy attributed to the absence of meaningful
governmental engagement. Eitan et al. [55] examined community-
private partnerships in RE projects and suggested that governments
play a central role in successfully facilitating partnerships work well.
Gui, Diesendorf, & MacGill [56] emphasized ownership and governance
as mechanisms that efficiently manage ex-ante investment uncertainty
and ex-post appropriation risks associated with community micro-grids.
Sovacool and Drupady [8] investigated ten small RE projects from ten
countries. Their study primarily focused mainly on governance aspects,
finding that the major factors that led to successful implementation were
community participation, stakeholder consultations, readiness for
transitions, awareness of the needs of the energy service, political sup­
port, flexibility, and participatory processes. Dulal et al. [50] suggest
that governments should make an effort to reduce the policy, institu­
tional, and governance risk and promote transparency for the wide­
spread diffusion of RE.
Melo et al. [57] obtained lessons from the governance of German RE
development that can be applicable to nonconventional development in
Brazil. Feron [58] indicated that incomplete decentralization/partici­
pation is a critical factor that hampers the sustainability of rural off-grid
renewable projects in developing countries. Marquardt [59] identified
missing links between the different levels of decision-making as a barrier
to RE support in the Indonesian case. Sovacool [7] discussed poly­
centricism to offer an equitable, inclusive, informative, accountable,
protective, and adaptable governance framework for promoting RE.
Thus, previous studies commonly recommend that the governance
structure of RE projects must incorporate diverse stakeholders with
different backgrounds and coordinated links between stakeholders. In
this aspect, RE projects differ from conventional energy systems, which
pursue efficiency through hierarchically structured governance
controlled by government bureaucrats and experts [3,11]. The demo­
cratic and multilevel attributes of RE systems are ascribed to the varied
nature of the system compared to conventional systems. In particular,
decentralized small-scale RE projects for rural electrification prioritize
ethical goals rather than just economic efficiency. Accordingly, partic­
ipatory governance is often considered a necessary condition for the
success of rural electrification projects. A large body of projects funded
by international organizations, as well as national/subnational govern­
ments, use participatory governance to pursue civil engagement.
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Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214
However, reality does not always meet this expectation and failed pro­
jects are abundant even though they were subject to participatory and
polycentric governance.
Existing studies seek to establish a general model of governance that
can produce successful decentralized RE projects. This study, however,
is unique in that it concentrates on actual processes that prevent planned
governance from working as expected under certain circumstances
rather than presenting a generalization of ideal governance. The actual
processes reveal the politics between stakeholders with different powers
and contexts surrounding projects. The interactions, power relations,
and contexts present the peculiar shape of a certain project. The analysis
of the imbalanced power among multi-level actors and contexts will
yield meaningful implications for the distribution of power among
different actors in the decision-making and implementation stages. The
difference in power allocation among stakeholders will address why
projects promoted under two different governances both failed.
3. Method and data
This study uses case studies and extensive document reviews. The
case study method involves conducting an intensive, holistic, and sys­
tematic investigation of particular events or activities [60,61]. It com­
prises a detailed examination of a single example [62,63]. Social science
has largely failed to produce general and context-independent theories
[64] due to the nature of social science topics that often reflect human
behaviors and encompass social circumstances. Social events have
thousands of different features, such that they cannot be molded and
understood in one frame, such as through generalization or theory. For
example, the theory “all swans are white [65]” can be easily falsified by
just one case of a black swan. In this example, research on social science
would attempt to detect the true nature of white swans and look closer at
them to unveil their black attributes. Social science research targets
learning rather than definitively proving something. Learning can be
obtained only by intense observations of the details of actual
happenings.
Case studies are a useful social science research type focusing on
contexts, stakeholders, and interactions, which can cover many areas
and disciplines, including government programs, to ascertain their
effectiveness, know whether goals of the programs and initiatives have
been achieved, and to establish factors that have impacted the outcomes
[60,62,66].
The question posed in this study of why the academic recommen­
dation of polycentric governance and conventional governance in en­
ergy development both failed at developing decentralized rural
electrification projects can be answered by investigating the particular
circumstances surrounding those projects [67]. In addition, this study
pursues lessons to ensure that these failures are not repeated in future
projects.
In order to verify the hypothesis, the study requires in-depth exam­
ination of one or more cases while associating with real happenings
under specific contextual conditions. The case study is a most applicable
methodology to this kind of study according to Sovacool et al. [61]. A
cross-case comparison conducted in this study will reveal that poly­
centric governance of RE projects under same power relation as con­
ventional centralized top-down governance generates same outcome.
Also, findings from detailed examination about real happenings of cases
will contribute to drawing out lessons for the governance design of
decentralized community renewable energy projects. Case studies can
provide deeper insights into how and why decentralized energy projects
have failed, even though there were no technology issues in both the
Nepalese and Indonesia projects. Both these projects were selected
among 24 cases presented by 12 developing countries’ energy experts;
these are government officials from their country’s energy ministry or
energy corporate’s staff at the sustainable energy policy seminar class at
the Green School Korea University. At the seminar, energy projects with
varying energy resources, sizes, goals, and governance were discussed.
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
Two projects conducted in Nepal and Indonesia showed similarity and
contrast simultaneously. They shared the same goal of using decen­
tralized RE sources but were implemented with different governance
structures. Both failed to achieve their intended results. These case
studies were considered suitable to uncover how the operation of
governance shapes each step of project implementation and to identify
the appropriate governance given the project characteristics.
The case studies included an extensive review of reports on the
evaluation and assessment of related projects. These were obtained by
independent consultants and project implementing agencies, audit re­
ports, discussion with the concerned key officials from the respective
governments, interviews with related stakeholders, such as local gov­
ernment officials, businessmen, expected beneficiaries, authors’ own
experiences with direct or indirect involvement in the case study pro­
jects, and a data analysis to discover the reasons for failure. They also
included an analysis of the RE projects failure in the two countries,
focusing on the design, planning that included the participation of key
stakeholders in the decision-making process, and implementation.
During the study, various literature, such as scientific papers, govern­
ment publications, and international organizations, such as the World
Bank, UNDP, and UNEP, were reviewed.
This study applies the method reported in Flyvbjerg [68] to inves­
tigate the nature of governance of the two projects. In this study,
Flyvbjerg considered the Aalborg Project in Denmark by contrasting the
formal rules and implicit principles of democracy in the city government
with how the government actually functioned in terms of its politics,
administration, and planning. Flyvbjerg investigated the decision-
making of the government and interest groups, observing the in­
teractions and political compromises that occurred between them.
Through Flyvbjerg’s narrative of actual events, the reader is provided
with a factual account rather than summaries, concepts, or general
norms. In this way, Flyvbjerg vividly demonstrated how modern gov­
ernments can impinge upon democracy, despite the presence of strong
democratic ideals, as well as how some modern processes of resolving
power conflicts can diminish democratic principles. Like Flyvbjerg, this
study intends to provide an accurate analysis of the two decentralized
RE projects in Indonesia and Nepal from a governance perspective. This
study considers happenings in real places with specific contexts. The
ideals and reality of governance are at the center of this analysis. The
goal is to uncover power relations that led the two projects with different
governance to the same result.
4. Case studies
4.1. Nepal: Polycentric governance of rural solar energy projects
4.1.1. The Nepal REP
Nepal has considerable RE potential, including an estimated 83,000
MW in hydropower potential, solar with an insolation of 4.98 kWh/m2/
day, and at least 3,000 MW of wind energy potential [69,70]. However,
the use of these resources is limited, such that the country is heavily
dependent on traditional biomass and imported fossil fuels. In rural
areas, energy consumption is dominated by traditional biomass. Limited
access to energy has become the main root of impoverishment in the
rural population and the supply of affordable, efficient, and modern
energy to rural populations is crucial for eradicating poverty in Nepal
[71]. Modern energy supplies directly contribute to social and economic
development with clear links to human health, education, livelihood,
and gender equality [72]. To improve the quality of living for the rural
population, the EC implemented the 5-year Renewable Energy Project
(REP) using solar technologies in Nepal. In April 2003, the Nepalese
government and EC signed a financial agreement for the implementation
of the REP. The project began in August 2004 and was scheduled to be
completed before December 31, 2008. Field-level project activities
began in July 2006; however, due to multiple factors, including political
turmoil and security issues in rural areas, the execution of project
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Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214
activities was continually delayed. Subsequently, the project period was
extended three times, up to September 2012.
The selection of project sites was based on several criteria: low
electrification, large number of rural communities with the lowest
possibility of electric-grid extension in the next five years, a large
number of rural communities living in areas with no potential sites for
mini/micro-hydro power generation, low human development index,
higher solar radiation, and the existence of mature community-based
organizations (CBOs). The project claims to have supported approxi­
mately one million rural residents from approximately 300 villages in 21
remote and very remote districts of Nepal. The project was estimated to
cost € 15.675 million, of which the EC and Government of Nepal (GoN)
would fund € 15 million and € 0.675 million, respectively [73]. The final
amount invested in the project was €10.94 million, which was only 70%
of the initial investment plan. The EC contribution was €10.25 million,
which was 68% of the original EC commitment [73].
4.1.2. Broken energy facilities
Two years after the project completion, the alternative energy pro­
motion center (AEPC) conducted on-site monitoring of parts of the
installed systems. Table 1 presents a summary of this monitoring.
Monitoring was only conducted for parts of the installed systems due to
the high cost, remoteness of system sites, and time constraints. As listed
in Table 1, 157 (14.6%) facilities were monitored from the 1,078 facil­
ities containing REP installed energy system. Among monitored facil­
ities, 87 (56%) systems were not working, 55 (35%) were partially
operating with problems, and only 15 facilities (9.6%) were operating
normally. There were serious problems in the systems installed for
grinding mills and schools. In the case of grinding mills, almost all
systems had problems, where 76% of the monitored systems were not in
operation. In the case of schools, 89 of the monitored school energy
systems were facing problems and 60% did not work (Table 1). The
problems were mainly related to the lack of after-sales-services; with
installer companies not fixing technical issues within the warranty/
guarantee period; the community energy service providers (CESPs)
being in efficient in conducting timely repair and maintenance; the users
were less concerned about the proper operation of the installed systems.
4.1.3. Delays happened at every step of the project
An evaluation of the REP conducted by the EC identified delays that
occurred throughout the entire process of the project as the main reason
for problems because “delays in implementation and design flaws affect
the sustainability of the support provided” [75] (p. 35). Delays in major
elements led to some projects ending prematurely. Delays occurred in
building the governance structure of the project, and at every stage of
implementation.
The REP illustrates a typical form of polycentric governance in which
multiple levels (local, region, national, and global) and stakeholders
involve in decision-making and execution at multiple centers (see
Fig. 1). The project steering committee (PSC) is the highest-level deci­
sion-making body and is composed of representatives from the EC and
GoN. The PSC accepted responsibility for providing guidance on policies
and strategies, including reviewing, recommending and endorsing work
plans and budgets, and progress reports. The project task force (PTF)
consisted of EC experts, Nepalese government staff, and local technical
project staff, and was responsible for all administrative and management
tasks, such as scheduling, networking, contracting, and strengthening
public relations. The technical advisory committee (TAC) was the
technical wing of the project, which provided technical support to co­
ordinate and harmonize policies. Five regional project offices (RPOs)
oversaw the implementation of project activities in their own
jurisdiction.
Every step of forming the decision-making and implementation
bodies in the REP faced delays. Administrative and management duties
were key for the timely implementation of project activities. According
to an AEPC official overseeing this project and our assessment of the
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214

Table 1
Status of monitored solar energy systems in Nepal.
Facilities No. of Installed No. of Monitored Status of Monitored Solar Systems
Systems Systems (%)
Working Working Partially but with Problems Not Working

Grinding Mills 107 38 (36%) 1 9 (MCB not functioning, Backup and 28 (Problems in charge controller, grinder,
switching problems) MCB-Miniature Circuit Breaker switch)
Health Posts 206 22 (11%) 7 13 (Solar panel damage, No inverter, 2 (Battery damaged)
Battery damaged)
Schools 378 47 (12%) 5 14 (Control box problems, Back up 28 (Battery and wire problems)
problems, Power shortage, Panel stolen)
Computer Literacy 29 7 (24%) 1 5 (Inverter not working) 1
Community 124 16 (13%) 1 10 (MCB not working, Battery damaged) 5 (Inverter not working)
Communication Centre
Community 59 15 (25%) 4 (Slow; not enough backup, Power 11 (Battery problems)
Entertainment Centre shortage)
Water Pumping 30 12 (40%) 12 (Motor not working, System not working)
Solar Hot Waters 14
Solar Dryers 24
Total 1,078 157 (14.6%) 15 55 (35%) 87 (56%)
(9.6%)

Source: AEPC, Nepal [74].

Fig. 1. Structure of the REP implementation.
project work plan and progress, the delays in setting up the aforemen­
tioned bodies were due to the long process of EC approval.
Another cause of delays was the long and cumbersome procurement
process necessitated by the EC [75]. According to the financing agree­
ment between the EC and GoN, the REP had to follow procurement
regulations set out by the EC [76]. Transparency, equal treatment, open
competition, and sound procedural management are principles of EC
procurement. However, it required an extended period to pass all the
steps to complete procurement, such as preparing tender documents,
shortlisting companies, calling for technical and financial proposals
from pre-listed companies, evaluation of technical and financial pro­
posals, negotiation with contractors, receiving deposits for performance
security, and signing contract agreements with the selected company to
supply and install energy systems [73]. According to the responsible
AEPC official, as per the EC’s procurement guidelines, contractors
should only be from European countries, i.e., Nepalese contractors were
unable to participate. The GoN had its own financial support policies for
the installation of RE systems, but the EC did not agree to use these for
the REP. The GoN also had its own public procurement act and regu­
lations in line with international standards, but, in the case of the REP, it
had to go through the EC’s procurement procedure, which did not fit the
local context.
The establishment of the international technical advisory (TA) and
PTF was mentioned in the agreement between the EC and GoN as vital
for the smooth implementation of project activities and the sustain­
ability of the project without external support after phasing out. How­
ever, the international TA and PTF did not have the capacity to address
certain issues, including the mobilization of human resources, admin­
istrative and management timing arrangements, procurement related
issues, and field level activities. These factors indicate that the TA and
PTF were not experienced with projects under similar circumstances and
that they did not have the capacity to coordinate with EC and GoN
agencies to address the diverse issues that emerged during the imple­
mentation process.
The extended period required to commence project activities directly
affected the selection and support given to community organizations
(COs), which were designed to take responsibility for the O&M of the
installed systems. Due to the prolonged project period, the EC intended
to complete the project activities as soon as possible. Therefore, the
field-level installation and delivery were completed without capacity
building and institutionalization of the COs for sustainable operation
and adequate maintenance.
As listed in Table 1, most systems installed by the REP were found to
not work properly [73]. This is mainly attributed to improper O&M. The
problems in O&M stem from three primary sources, which are the lack of
capacity building of the COs and users; the lack of a sustainable
financing systems for O&M due to extremely low tariffs or communities’
unwillingness to pay tariffs and a lack of means to secure the funds for
replacing major parts and appliances; and the lack of community ca­
pacity for the operation of the installed system.
The REP was the first large scale RE project in Nepal financed
through the EC. Compared to similar projects financed by European
countries, the REP was different in terms of the overall decision-making
process, implementation methods, and compliance policy. Similar pro­
jects financed by European countries had more flexible implementation
modalities, where project activities were implemented by a Nepalese
government agency, such as the AEPC. Donor countries provided
funding and technical support for specific activities that were incorpo­
rated into Nepalese national plans. Procurement and implementation
were completed as per GoN policy while donors, who formed part of a
project steering committee, only required audit and progress reports.
There were no implementation issues with the REP, and project activ­
ities were completed within the timeframe. Furthermore, project
ownership belonged to the GoN to secure the continuity of the project
even after the donors’ support was unavailable.
The procurement procedures implemented by the EC even made
purchasing office supplies difficult. As an example of this cumbersome
process, the REP had to rent office computers, printers, and photocopiers
for three years (out of five years of the project period). According to the
Nepalese procurement regulations, contractors were obliged to provide
users with simple O&M training, after-sale service during the warranty
period, and to fix systems with service fees in the case of requests from
users even after the expiration of the warranty period. However, the REP
contractors, who had to be from European countries, were not bound to

5
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
these regulations as only EC procurement rules were effective.
The EC’s involvement in procurement was time consuming and
conflicted with the GoN’s own procurement procedure. In addition, such
an activity cannot be conducted by international contractors who have
little motivation to provide after-sale services due to high cost. The
energy system products supplied by international contractors were not
tested at the authorized RE test station in Nepal. Therefore, there were
doubts about the quality of the supplied products.
4.1.4. Excluded local stakeholders in polycentric governance
In summary, the delays identified as the major source of problems
occurred because the project was completely led by EC fund donors. The
REP was implemented in accordance with EC regulations and proced­
ures, which were made according to EC member countries’ technical
level, social context, and interest, while excluding local experiences,
knowledge, and people. The REP neither assessed the needs of the target
populations nor allowed communities to engage in the initial design and
planning phase. Local companies were not involved with the interna­
tional companies that supplied the equipment and products. As a result,
international tendering was done without ensuring repair, maintenance,
and after-sale services. The project documents were prepared without
consulting key stakeholders, including the agencies that would be
responsible for implementation. The projects did not follow Nepal’s
domestic policy and procedure for subsidy, testing of equipment,
installation, monitoring, or penalty. The projects did not prioritize
strengthening the capacity building of local companies and communities
and enhancing the capacity of human resources for the O&M of installed
systems. Financial sustainability was not considered even though the
projects supported the establishment of community energy service
providers (CESPs) as business entities to collect tariffs from users, such
as schools, health posts, entertainment centers, communication centers,
and water users. CESPs were not interested in collecting tariffs to ensure
the installed systems were in continuous operation and well maintained.
During discussions with some of the beneficiaries in remote areas,
they expressed concerns regarding the unavailability of spare parts,
particularly solar PV water pumps and grinding mills, which are
expensive and not readily available locally. Beneficiaries also com­
plained that the installer company was not responsible for the replace­
ment or fixing of damaged components. In addition, local governments
complained about their roles not being clearly defined in the imple­
mentation or post-completion of the project. As discussed with some
local government officials, as there was no financial contribution from
the local government for the installation of the systems, they were not
consulted or involved in the decision-making process, even regarding
the selection of potential beneficiaries, delivery of the installed systems,
or monitoring of the systems.
Local companies working in the Nepal solar energy sector com­
plained that their companies were excluded from participating due to
the EC procurement regulations, despite their extensive experience in
manufacturing, supplying, and installing solar energy systems in Nepal,
which would allow them to supply and install the systems at a lower
cost, provide after-sales services, and repair and maintain damaged
systems.
The final result from this project was “many systems not working and
in worst cases, they were not found installed” as stated in an official
letter from the AEPC to the delegate of EC to Kathmandu, Nepal. In
addition, unsatisfied voices of the local stakeholders were further evi­
dence of the failure of the REP.
6
Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214
4.2. Indonesia: Centralized top-down governance of rural RE projects
4.2.1. Indonesia’s RE and energy conservation program
RE development in Indonesia occurs in several ways, such as through
private sector investment, central government programs, and household
rooftop solar PV installation1. RE development by the central govern­
ment originates from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
(MoEMR)2 regulation called “Physical Activities for the Utilization of RE
and Energy Conservation Program” (hereinafter “RE and Energy Con­
servation Program”)3. This program implements projects related to
electricity supply from RE sources, fuel supply installation (non-bio­
energy electric power plant), efficient energy equipment, rehabilitation
of RE facilities, and other RE utilization. Government bodies, including
regional governments (provinces and regencies/cities), national pro­
grams, ministry programs, or alliances among ministries and public
entities, can propose their projects to this program, followed by selective
implementation by the central government of the proposed projects. RE
facilities developed by this program are generally small scale with
kilowatt-level capacity. Since 2012, more than 2,800 RE projects have
been proposed across Indonesia4, mainly by regional governments.
4.2.2. Unachieved objective
There are disputes over whether the Indonesian government’s RE
development has been effective. A disagreement between the Audit
Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK)5 and the MoEMR over the
effectiveness of the country’s RE deployment policy is an example of
such dispute. The BPK released a report6 evaluating the performance of
RE development progress and MoEMR policy at its December 2017
seminar. Among the noted problems, the BPK highlighted the dysfunc­
tion of 708 RE projects, with approximately USD 224 million7 spent
through the RE and Energy Conservation Program. Among these, 142
projects with a 27.9 MW capacity have faced difficulties with respect to
their completion with a delayed delivery from the central to regional
government. A total of 112 projects with a capacity of 7.25 MW was in
diverse defective states (Table 2). Following the report from the BPK, the
MoEMR released a statement refuting these claims8. According to the
MoEMR, 686 RE projects with a value of approximately USD 213.7
million were implemented by the MoEMR from 2011 to 2017. RE
Table 2
Progress of RE projects through RE and Energy Conservation Programs esti­
mated by the BPK and MoEMR.
BPK MoEMR
Estimation Estimation
Total RE projects implemented by the central 708 686
government
Projects with delayed delivery of facilities from 142 126
central to local governments
Number of projects in defective conditions 112 68
1
MoEMR Regulation No 49 of 2018: Installation of rooftop solar PV by PLN
consumer.
2
Revoked with MoEMR regulation No 39 of 2017 [12].
3
MoEMR Regulation No. 39 of 2017: Implementation of physical activities
for the utilization of new and renewable energy and energy conservation.
4
RE Proposed Program Matrix (Internal data from MoEMR).
5
BPK is the abbreviation for Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan.
6
Press Release Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, Jakarta, Tuesday, December 12,
2017, on “BPK lakukan pemeriksaan pengembangan energi baru terbarukan di
Indonesia.”
7
1 US dollar is equivalent to 14.083 Indonesian Rupiah.
8
Press Release Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, No 00161.Pers/
04/SJI/2017 December 18, 2017, on “Penjelasan Dirjen EBTKE Mengenai Isu
Pembangunan Pembangkit Energi Terbarukan.”
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
facilities built by these projects were mainly installed in isolated areas of
Indonesia. Among them, 126 projects were not delivered to regional
governments, 55 projects were in minor defective conditions, and 13
were heavily damaged and unable to operate. The MoEMR argued that
some of the heavy defects originated from natural disasters rather than
from managerial problems. The MoEMR also emphasized that USD 1.25
million was allocated for the repair of damaged RE plants in 2018.
Table 2 summarizes the two reports. There are significant variations
in the estimations of the programs from each agency. The BPK reviewed
the MoEMR’s policy implementation from a critical perspective as the
national audit authority. However, regardless of the estimation used, it
is clear that the intended outcomes of the MoEMR were not achieved.
According to Table 2, failures occurred due to delayed delivery and
damage to RE facilities. The RE and Energy Conservation Program’s
project process begins with requests for proposals; the proposals are then
evaluated and projects selected; materials are then procured and facil­
ities are constructed; and once the project is complete, the facilities are
delivered to the project initiators, mainly regional governments, for
operation and management (Fig. 2). The uniqueness of this program is
derived from the delivery process, which follows MoEMR regulation 30/
20159. To conform to this regulation, the delivery of RE facilities re­
quires approval from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). This two-step
process creates bottlenecks in many projects. As presented in reports
from the BPK and MoEMR, this handover process is a major obstacle to
the country’s small-scale RE plant deployment.
5. Central government detached from community level energy
facilities
Bureaucracy is a common constraint in the Indonesian government’s
work [77], and the delivery process of RE facilities has encountered the
same problem. This bureaucracy has proven to be a protracted and time-
consuming process to assess the readiness of local governments to accept
and operate RE technology, local government conditions, and the
location of RE projects in terms of RE facility dispersion in the region
[78]. The length of the process becomes problematic when the time
taken for an approval procedure exceeds the plants’ warranty period.
Projects in a state of delayed delivery cannot contribute to the policy’s
purpose. In addition, delays cause damage to facilities owing to the
absence of proper management.
The unique way in which Indonesia’s central government directly
implements community-level small-scale RE projects can be attributed
to the hierarchical relationships among different levels of governments
and a tendency toward strong top-down administration. This has been
deeply rooted in the Indonesian administration since colonial times;
however, Indonesia’s centralism peaked under President Suharto’s10
New Order11. The centralized administration allowed the authoritarian
government to bind an ethnically heterogeneous population [79]. The
government enforced policies down to the village level and controlled
all channels of dissent through the centralized structure [79]. After the
resignation of Suharto in 1998, owing to two devolution laws12, political
and fiscal power began transferring to lower levels of government.
Owing to its democratic impacts (e.g., people’s empowerment, partici­
pation, autonomy, diversity, and transparency), decentralization
9
This is titled “the Procedure for Granting State-owned Goods Planned to be
granted from the Beginning of Procurement.” In 2019, MoEMR amended the
MoEMR regulation 30/2015 to 1/2019 [16].
10
Suharto is the second President of Indonesia, who was in office for 31 years
from 1967 to 1998. He took power via a military coup and maintained strong
authoritarian power.
11
Suharto called his regime as New to contrast his rule with that of his pre­
decessor Sukarno.
12
Law 22/1999 and 25/1999 provided the framework for Indonesia’s
decentralization.
7
Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214
became the core agenda of the succeeding regime, and power transfer
was implemented in great haste.
However, devolution has created numerous unintended problems.
Devolved power was often monopolized by predatory political actors,
such as local bureaucrats, soldiers, businessmen, or criminals, instead of
the community and common people [80,81]. The agent of corruption
changed from the central elites to local forces. Many regulations created
by local governments are unfriendly to businesses and the environment
[79]. They are also thought to have led to the disintegration of the
country [81]. These problems reinforced the voices of skeptics, such as
bureaucrats in the central government, who were largely against
decentralization. The Minister of Mines and Energy and Minister of
Forestry released statements stating that regional governments did not
have the capability to be autonomous; thus, decentralization had to be
postponed [79]. Confusion and confrontation delayed Indonesia’s
decentralization, and this had a significant impact on national energy
policy.
The Indonesian government’s RE development is a product of this
lagged decentralization. RE plants developed through the RE and Energy
Conservation Program are installed in isolated rural areas for villages
that are excluded from main electrical grid. Accordingly, these facilities
should be responsive to community needs; their successful use and
operation depend heavily on the engagement of indigenous people.
However, as shown in Fig. 2, Indonesian RE development for isolated
villages is led by the central government, which implements a large
portion of the development process from the appraisal of the plan,
funding, procurement, and building, thus blocking the participation of
the local community. The long process of transferring ownership to the
local government, which can be omitted if a local government, local
coop, or community directly implement projects, is a major obstacle to
achieving the objectives of the programs. The physical and mental dis­
tance from the central government’s control over projects to an under­
standing of people’s needs and overseeing the builder’s transparency is
engendering inefficiency and failures.
6. Discussion
The two projects analyzed in this study concluded with little
contribution towards improving the energy access in remote rural
communities. A significant portion of the installed RE systems were
broken before operation could commence or were left broken due to the
indifference of the expected beneficiaries.
6.1. Imbalanced power: Failing polycentric governance
Polycentrism has been presented and investigated as an alternative
to top-down governance for infrastructure development aimed at social
goals. As stated by Sovacool [7], polycentrism can achieve equity, in­
clusivity, adaptability, and flexibility, which is advantageous for
obtaining information and monitoring the benefits of organizational
multiplicity. Polycentrism is most useful when it is implemented with
principles, such as equitable distribution of power, multiple actor
decision-making, and discretionary implementation. The Nepal REP was
established to apply polycentric governance (Fig. 1); however, it failed
with respect to the theoretical advantages of such process.
The EC, the major funder, dominated the creation of the rules for the
project. Rules that regulated the entire process were imported from the
EC without any adjustments to account for Nepalese circumstances.
Nepalese voices, including governments, businesses, and local people,
had no impact on the project. The uncompromising attitude of the EC,
who demanded unilateral acceptance of their own system, caused con­
flict between the two entities and slowed the progress of the project.
Eventually, the projects were hastily wrapped up without building up
the capacity of community organizations for O&M and without devel­
oping a sense of ownership among the locals. The events of the REP
reveal the politics between stakeholdrs with an imbalanced power
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar Energy Research & Social Science 80 (2021) 102214

Fig. 2. Process of RE project development, MoEMR.

relationship due to one side holding more financial weight. The EC made active support of the resource providers, which includes domestic, as
efforts to build sound governance that would secure sustainable energy well as international, public entities, businesses, and activist groups.
systems for rural development. However, the overwhelming power of Ensuring the involvement of stakeholders during decision-making and
the major fund contributor led to unilateralism, which does not implementation is a crucial condition for successful RE development as a
acknowledge the contextual differences in which the European rules social project.
operate. The Nepal REP that attempted to pursue the advantages of This study concludes that renewable energy projects aimed at social
polycentrism came to a failed end, leaving records of inequitable, goals do not fit the operational principles of conventional energy sys­
exclusive, inflexible, and rigid project implementation. tems and governance structures. To achieve the goals of the respective
social energy project, its governance should be more inclusive and
secure the active engagement of multi-stakeholders, as existing studies
6.2. Incompatibility of community RE projects and centralized top-down
have demonstrated. However, the Nepalese case study showed that
governance
projects under participatory governance could lead to failure, as the true
nature of participatory governance does not differ from that of con­
Indonesian RE projects were completed using a conventional top-
ventional top-down governance. Many practitioners and developers in
down governance approach as is typical for energy infrastructure
the renewable energy sector, whom we met, testify the failures of
development. The central government led the entire process and deliv­
community renewable energy projects implemented in developing
ered the completely built RE plants to the local government as the final
countries. The roots of the failures are diverse, though governance flaws
step in project development. The project aimed to secure equitable en­
often become the major cause of those failures.
ergy access for excluded populations; however, it did not pay attention
The findings of this study is that energy system governance ulti­
to the roles of multi-level stakeholders, such as regional and local gov­
mately fails when it does not achieve power distribution. Especially, in
ernments, civil groups, COs, and civilians. Small distributed RE plants do
developing and less developed countries, a large portion of community
not fit the operational structure of conventional large-scale energy sys­
RE projects for social development depend on international aids or
tems, in which the separation of decision-making, project implementa­
central government subsidies. It indicates that fund donors can easily
tion, and O&M do not impact the sustainability of the infrastructure. As
exert overwhelming power on other stakeholdrs standing at different
the intrinsic value of conventional large-scale energy systems lies in
scales and each step of implementation. If it happens, power is
economic and operational efficiency, their output becomes greater with
concentrated on stakeholders with capital power, and then it facilitates a
the reduction of intervening factors. In contrast, a small distributed RE
unilateral decision making environment. This eventually is attributed to
project pursuing social values can satisfy its aims by acknowledging as
indifference or ignorance of field context and circumstances. Nepalese
many factors as possible. At every step, the support, knowledge, and
and Indonesian cases are vivid exemplars of this process. They illus­
policy measures of diverse stakeholders are demanded. Project design
trated that when polycentrism fails to secure balanced power distribu­
should depend on local context and circumstances. The participation of
tion, both of polycentric and centralized governance come in same
end users in decision-making relating to plant scale, technology, oper­
nature such that is exclusive, inequitable, inflexible, and rigid imple­
ation, tariffs, and funding sources is vital, such that they take care of
mentation. After all, indifferent governance of end users’ needs does not
their plants with a sense of ownership. Thus, the active engagement of
make any difference in people’s lives. It is an inevitable consequence of
end users is requisite as it does not secure profits. Given this under­
decisions being made separate from realities although they perfectly
standing, the failure of the community RE deployment projects led by
operated in different policy settings and environment. Norgaard [82]
the central Indonesian government were inevitable.
poignantly illustrates the unilateral policy system in his field study of
Brazilian Amazon development, noting that field managers were
7. Conclusion
saddled with unrealistic work plans drawn up by bureaucrats or
corporate officials who may never have been in the Amazon and un­
The two cases reviewed in this study were promoted under different
derstand little about its social and ecological systems (p. 120).
types of governance. Nevertheless, the end results were similar. In both
In a governance design, it does not matter whether the governance
projects, power was appointed to the main resource providers who
retains externally distributive or intensive structure in terms of power.
occupied decision-making. By excluding local authorities and benefi­
Theoretical conditions for the ideal polycentric governance are not
ciaries, RE plants were left out of their interest. As an example of a
automatically secured. Reality is always ready to undermine the foun­
successful case, the Rural Energy Development Program (REDP) in
dation of good governance. In this context, project initiators must be
Nepal, supported initially by UNDP and later by the World Bank, con­
more vigilant in maintaining the power balance among multi-
trasts with the two projects in this study in that communities and local
stakeholders in designing the governance of social energy projects so
governments were actively engaged in the planning, implementation,
that reality can be reflected on decisions and implementation.
management of the project, and the establishment of the COs. Conse­
The contribution of this study lies in uncovering the attributes of
quently, the project led to socioeconomic development by facilitating
governance that cause decentralized energy projects to fail. By focusing
the productive use of energy.
on real events throughout a project’s progress, this study illustrated how
Decentralized RE plants aiming at improving society’s equity and
monopolized power can exclude multi-stakeholders’ interest and
humanity’s quality of life operate on different principles from conven­
commitment to a project and how it can impinge on a project’s final
tional energy systems. They pursue equitable access to energy rather
result.
than the largest supply of energy at the cheapest price. Their success
This study found the cause of failure in decentralized renewable
depends on the engagement of beneficiaries and the accountability and

8
Y.-H. Ha and S.S. Kumar
projects in terms of governance; however, extensive research is further
needed to establish governance that can lead a project to success. As
demonstrated in this study, good governance cannot be generalized
using only one specific context. Further research focusing on real hap­
penings under diverse circumstances can yield insights into how project
promoters can establish and operate good governance that fits local
context. We acknowledge that there is high possibility of failure in the
early phase of decentralized RE deployment in developing countries,
especially when the projects are pursued in remote rural settings. But
failures can lead in the next projects to such governance tailored to the
specific context of those countries if projects are implemented without
considering the local context and best possible sustainability approach.
Even the best practices verified in the Global North cannot be easily
translated to successful cases, which needs evaluation and explanation
of the failures such as this study for better performance in the next RE
project. In addition, quantitative studies of varied cases can allow for the
acquisition of statistical results to specifically identify which factors of
governance are more effective in leading to success.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Mr. Adimas Pratiyo for advising the Indo­
nesian case design.
Funding
This work was supported by KU-KIST Graduate School project. The
funding sources had no role in the study design; in the collection,
analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report; or in the
decision to submit the article for publication.
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