Arturo M. De Castro vc. JBC and Pres.

GMA
GR. NO. 191002 | March 17, 2010 (Decision); April 17, 2010(Resolution)

FACTS
The position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was to be vacated on May 17, 2010
for the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated
on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S.
Puno. The JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing
authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy
in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2)
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and
Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. Meanwhile,
strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose. Petitioners Arturo M.
De Castro as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be
compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position
of the next Chief Justice, because of the midnight appointments ban in Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President's power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from "political vicissitudes" and its
"insulation from political pressures," such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice. The JBC also argued that the ban on midnight appointments did not
apply to the appointments to the Judiciary.

ISSUE
Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint Chief Justice during the election ban
period?
RULING
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the Prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among
others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at
least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.