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Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco

Scale efficiency for multi-output cost minimizing producers: The case of


the US electricity plants夽 ,夽夽
Barnabé Walheer
International Business School Suzhou, Xi’An Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: To know whether the optimal scale of production has been reached is valuable information for producers.
Received 20 July 2017 To date, scale efficiency measurements have only been suggested for the entire production process. For
Received in revised form 6 December 2017 multi-output producers, more detailed results are required. Hence, in this paper, we show how to pro-
Accepted 12 December 2017 vide such information at the output level. Attractively, our output-specific scale efficiency measurements
Available online 21 December 2017
are nonparametric in nature, they take the economic objective of the producers into account, they can be
defined without observing the input prices, and they are easy to interpret and to use in practice. We apply
JEL classification:
our methodology to a sample of more than 3300 US electricity plants from 1998 to 2012, producing up to
C61
10 types of electricity. We show that, while there is a scale improvement at the total electricity genera-
D24
L94 tion level, this is not the case for each of the 10 types of electricity. Also, we demonstrate that, in general,
Q29 renewable electricity presents better scale of production than non-renewable electricity. Finally, we high-
Q39 light the importance of multi-output plants in the US electricity sector, and show that this type of plant
is preferable for the production of non-renewable electricity, while single-output plants are preferable for
Keywords: renewable electricity.
Scale efficiency © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Cost minimizing
Multi-output producers
Electricity generation

1. Introduction a technique that also provides scale efficiency results for individual
output.
Assessing the optimal scale of a production process is not a Our motivation to provide output-specific scale efficiency results
new topic in both the economic literature and the production is two-fold. On the one hand, by considering output-specific
theory. Indeed, the concept of scale efficiency could already be indicators, the realism and the discriminatory power of the model
found in the works of Hanoch (1975), Panzar and Willig (1977), are naturally increased. The realism is increased since the links
Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1979), Banker (1984), Banker et al. (1984), between the inputs and the outputs can be modelled by allocating
Färe and Grosskopf (1985), Banker and Thrall (1992), Forsund the inputs to the output-specific production processes.1 The dis-
(1996), and Golany and Yu (1997). More recent works include criminatory power is increased since output-specific optimization
those of Simar and Wilson (2002), Forsund and Hjalmarsson (2004), behaviours could be assumed. On the other hand, for multi-output
Krivonozhko et al. (2004), Zelenyuk (2006, 2016), Podinovski et al. producers, knowing whether the optimal scale is reached for each
(2009), and Peyrache (2013). These works have the investigating output separately is clearly additional relevant information; useful
of scale efficiency of the entire production process in common. Or when choosing their strategy or when deciding how to allocate the
in other words, their methods indicate whether optimal scale is inputs.
reached for the aggregate production level. In this paper, we suggest Our scale efficiency measurements are specially designed to take
the economic objective of the producers into account. In particular,

夽 I thank the Editor-in-Chief Richard S.J. Tol, the Editor Perry Sadorsky, and the
1
anonymous referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved the For example, employees allocated to specific output production, machines used
paper. only to produce certain outputs. For more discussion on the allocation of inputs to
夽夽 This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China outputs, refer, for example, to Färe and Grosskopf (2000), Salerian and Chan (2005),
under Grant No. 71750110539. Despic et al. (2007), Färe et al. (2007), Tone and Tsutsui (2009), and Cherchye et al.
E-mail address: Barnabe.Walheer@xjtlu.edu.cn. (2015).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2017.12.017
0140-9883/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36 27

we assume that they are cost minimizers (the following is easily production process, captured by input requirement set defined as
extended to profit or revenue maximizations). Cost minimization follows for output q:
fits with many settings and applications, and is, by definition, a
necessary condition for profit maximization. Our model is rooted   
in the nonparametric cost evaluation models initiated by Afriat Iq (yq ) = xq ∈ RP+  xq can produce yq . (1)
(1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983)
and Varian (1984). That is, we impose very few structures on the pro- Cost evaluation does not require us to make strong assumptions
duction process and, therefore, only the following data are required:
about those sets. In fact, we follow Varian (1984) and only assume
outputs, inputs, and input prices. The distinguishing feature of our
that those sets are nested: producing less outputs cannot lead to
methodology is that by modelling each output separately, we nat- using more inputs.3 In this context, xq ∈ RP+ denote the inputs
urally give the option to assess scale efficiency at the output level.
used to produce the output q. In fact, those inputs are connected to
Finally, as the observation of the input prices is rather restrictive
the aggregate inputs (in x). Some inputs could be used to produce
for some applications, we also provide alternative definitions of our
certain outputs (for example, employees, machines). That is, these
scale efficiency concepts without this assumption.
inputs are allocated to specific output production processes. Next,
We apply our methodology to the case of US electricity plants. The
some inputs could be used to produce all the outputs (for example,
Environmental Protection Agency of the US developed a plant-level
infrastructure, capital), i.e. these inputs are not allocated to specific
database for 1998 to 2012. For each plant, the coal, oil, gas, nuclear,
output production processes. Formally, we have
other fossil, wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and biomass electric-
ity generations are specified. As such, by distinguishing between
10 different types of electricity generation, this database offers a (x)p = (x1 )p + . . . , (xQ )p , if input p is allocated, (2)
unique opportunity to apply our methodology. In particular, the very
detailed data allow us to evaluate scale efficiency of both the indi-
vidual and aggregate electricity generation levels, and to make a
(x)p = (xq )p , if input p is not allocated. (3)
distinction between multi- and single-output producers. Therefore,
we can investigate whether multi- or single-output producers are
preferable for each of the 10 types of electricity generation. This is Attractively, the distinction between allocated and non-allocated
valuable information for managers, regulators, and policy makers inputs provides a unifying framework that is consistent not only
when deciding how to allocate the production of electricity and how with production models integrating information on the internal pro-
to design the plants. duction structure, but also with more standard production models
Moreover, our methodology offers two extra advantages in this (i.e. models that do not consider allocated inputs). As a final remark,
context. On the one hand, it gives the option to allocate the inputs to note that the non-allocated inputs could also be interpreted as public
each electricity generation type. In particular, renewable electricity is good (they are non-rival and non-exclusive to the output production
not produced by the use of fuel, while non-renewable electricity gen- processes), and, therefore, they give rise to economies of scope in the
eration requires this production factor. As such, our methodology, production process (see Panzar and Willig, 1981;Nehring and Puppe,
which recognizes the links between production factors and electric- 2004).
ity generation, is particularly useful as it increases the realism of the As the output-specific inputs xq could be different from the inputs
modelling of the plant production process. On the other hand, while x, nothing guarantees that their price should be the same. As such,
the data for the production factors and electricity generation are let us denote the prices of the output-specific inputs by wq ∈ RP+ .
available for the plant level, the input prices are only available at the Note that, in general, while the input prices could be observed, the
state level. Thus, our methodology that works with partial/without output-specific input prices are not. The relationships between the
input price data is also very attractive for that reason. inputs and the output-specific inputs also imply specific relation-
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the ships between their prices. These prices coincide with the aggregate
methodology. In Section 3, we apply the methodology to the case prices for allocated inputs. Next, for non-allocated inputs these prices
of the US electricity plants from 1998 to 2012. Section 4 provides must add up to the aggregate prices. As explained previously non-
conclusions. allocated inputs could be interpreted as public good. As such, the
output-specific prices have a similar interpretation as Lindahl prices
2. Methodology that, by definition, sum up to the aggregate prices. In that case, the
output-specific input prices capture the economies of scope of the
We consider that we observe producers that are cost minimizers. production processes. Taking together, we obtain
In particular, we assume that they use P inputs, x ∈ RP+ , to produce Q
outputs, y ∈ RQ+ . We denote the input price vector by w ∈ RP+ . Firstly,
we assume that we observe these input prices. This will be relaxed
(wq )p = (w)p , if input p is allocated, (4)
afterwards.

2.1. Output-specific framework 


Q
(wq )p = (w)p , if input p is not allocated. (5)
q=1
The distinguishing feature of our scale efficiency measurements
is that we make a clear distinction between aggregate and individ-
ual outputs.2 In particular, let us denote the q-th entry of y by yq . As a final remark, note that the actual cost of the producers could
As such, we will define scale efficiency measurements for both y and be rewritten exclusively by output-specific counterparts: w x =
Q q q q q
yq . To achieve this goal, we model each output separately by its own q=1 w x , where w x represents the cost of output q.

2
For more discussion about efficiency analysis in output-specific frameworks, refer
to Cherchye et al. (2013) for the cost setting, and Cherchye et al. (2016) for the profit  
 
setting. 3
Iq (yq ) is nested if yq ≥ yq ⟹ Iq (yq ) ⊆ Iq yq .
28 B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36

2.2. Cost evaluation of shadow prices). See also our discussion below when input prices
are assumed unobserved.
The starting point of the scale efficiency evaluation is the minimal
cost for each output q:
2.3. Scale efficiency
q q q q q
C (y , w, w ) = min w x . (6) Our previous definition of the technology, captured by the input
q q q x ∈I (y )
requirement sets Iq (yq ), does not assume any particular structure
Cq (yq , w, wq ) selects the minimal input vector, in the input in terms of returns-to-scale. As such, variable returns-to-scale was
requirement set Iq (yq ), to produce the output quantity yq given the implicitly assumed. To test formally for scale efficiency, we first have
 
input prices wq . C q (yq , w, wq ) ≤ wq xq , and C q (yq , w, wq ) = wq xq to define minimal costs for both the aggregate and output-specific
means that output q is produced with minimal cost, revealing cost levels under the hypothetical assumption of constant returns-to-

efficiency, while C q (yq , w, wq ) < wq xq reflects potential cost savings. scale.4 Let us denote the input requirement set satisfying the hypo-
q q
Note that, the minimal costs C (y , w, wq ) depend on the input price thetical assumption of constant returns-to-scale as Iq (yq ). It is
w, making them interdependent. This is rather intuitive, since the straightforward to define the minimal costs with respect to those
unobserved output-specific input prices depend on the input prices sets. In fact, it suffices to use Iq (yq ) instead of Iq (yq ) in Eq.(6):
(see Eqs.(4) and (5)).
Attractively, as explained before, by summing the output-specific 
C q (yq , w, wq ) = min wq xq . (8)
costs, we obtain the cost for the aggregate production level. This also xq ∈Iq (yq )
holds for the minimal costs

  The interpretation of C q (yq , w, wq ) is analogous to the interpreta-



Q
C y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ = C q (yq , w, wq ) . (7) tion of Cq (yq , w, wq ), the only difference is that the cost (in)efficient
q=1 behaviour is evaluated when assuming constant returns-to-scale.
Note also, that by definition C q (yq , w, wq ) ≤ C q (yq , w, wq ). It reflects
Clearly, the property of the costs at the aggregate output level that the input requirement set under constant returns-to-scale is,
are the same as their respective output-specific counterparts. Firstly, in general, greater than the input requirement set under variable

C q (yq , w, wq ) ≤ wq xq , implies that C(y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ ) ≤ w x, i.e. returns-to-scale, or in other words, that Iq (yq ) is included in Iq (yq ).5
at the aggregate output level, the minimal cost is bounded by the We obtain our scale efficiency index for output q and for the
actual cost. Next, if each output is produced with minimal costs, i.e. aggregate production level as follows:

C q (yq , w, wq ) = wq xq for all q, then C(y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ ) = w x, i.e.
the actual cost coincides with the minimal cost. Finally, if at least one C q (yq , w, wq )

output is produced inefficiently, i.e. C q (yq , w, wq ) < wq xq for at least SEq (yq , w, wq ) = . (9)
1 Q 
C q (yq , w, wq )
one q, we have C(y, w, w , . . . , w ) < w x.
In practice, minimal costs can be computed using linear programs.
This is particularly attractive since linear programs are easily solved. Q
  q q q
As noticed previously, the output-specific minimal costs are, by C y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ q=1 C (y , w, w )
SE y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ = 1 Q
= Q .
definition, interdependent as the unobserved output-specific input C y, w, w , . . . , w C q (yq , w, wq )
q=1
prices depend on the input prices. Attractively, we could compute (10)
all the output-specific minimal costs by solving only one program. In
fact, it suffices to evaluate the minimal costs for the aggregate out-
put level. In particular, for every producer t operating at (yt , xt ) with As C q (yq , w, wq ) ≤ C q (yq , w, wq ), SEq (yq , w, wq ) is, in general,
input price wt , the minimal cost Ct is obtained as follows (LP-1): smaller than 1. A value of one indicates scale efficiency behaviour.
When SEq (yq , w, wq ) < 1, it reveals scale inefficiency, which could be
due to decreasing or increasing returns-to-scale.6 As for the output-

Q
Ct = max
q
Ct specific value, SE(y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ ) = 1 reflects scale efficiency, while
Q
Ct1 ,...,Ct ∈R+ q=1 a value smaller than one implies more scale inefficiency behaviour.
Q Q
w1t ,...,wt ∈R+ Attractively, in that case, the source(s) of inefficiency could be found
s.t. ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, the following holds: simply by looking at the values of the SEq (yq , w, wq ). As a final remark,
q q q q q note that our definition of scale efficiency at the aggregate produc-
(C − 1) : Ct ≤ wt xs for all s : ys ≥ yt ,
  tion level is coherent with the one of Färe and Grosskopf (1985). The
q
(C − 2) : wt = (wt )p for p an allocated input, only difference is that we base our measurement on output-specific
p
technologies.
Q 
 
q The linear program for the minimal costs under the hypothetical
(C − 3) : wt = (wt )p for p a non-allocated input.
p assumption of constant returns-to-scale has a structure that is for-
q=1
mally analogous to the one of (LP-1). In particular, for every producer
q t operating at (yt , xt ) with input price wt , the minimal cost under the
In words, (C-1) picks, for every output q, the minimal cost Ct
when comparing the evaluated producer t to the dominating pro-
q
ducers (i.e. those that produce more outputs than yt ). Note that
it is why we have to impose that the input requirement sets are
0 : x ∈ I (y ) ⟹ kx ∈
nested, otherwise we can only compare producer t to producers that (y ) satisfies constant returns-to-scale if ∀k ∈ R+
4 Iq q q q q q

produce exactly the same output quantity. (C-2) and (C-3) make Iq (kyq ).
sure that the unknown output-specific input prices are correctly (y ) is directly related to Iq (yq ), since Iq (yq ) = k(xq ) ∈ Iq (kyq ), ∀k > 0 .
5 Iq q
6
In practice, it is enough to evaluate the minimal cost when assuming non-
specified (see Eqs.(4) and (5)). As a final remark, it could seem increasing returns-to-scale and compare to Cq (yq , w, wq ). If they are equal, scale
counter-intuitive to maximize a cost function. In fact, the maximiza- inefficiency is due to decreasing returns-to-scale. Otherwise, scale inefficiency is due
tion selects the most favourable output-specific input prices (notion to increasing returns-to-scale.
B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36 29

hypothetical assumption of constant returns-to-scale is obtained as As the computed input prices are the most favourable, the mini-
follows (LP-2): mal cost C y, w1 , . . . , wQ and C y, w1 , . . . , wQ provide upper bounds
for the minimal costs when the input prices are assumed observed.

Q
Ct = max
q
Ct Importantly, since no input prices are available, the constraints on
Q
Ct1 ,...,Ct ∈R+ q=1 the output-specific input prices in Eqs.(4) and (5) are irrelevant. The
Q Q
w1t ,...,wt ∈R+ alternative definitions of scale efficiency are obtained by plugging-in
s.t. ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, the following holds: the new definitions of the minimal costs (12) and (13) in Eqs.(9) and
    (10). Attractively, we can also evaluate those minimal costs by linear
q q q q q q q
(C − 1) : Ct ≤ wt fs xs for all s : fs ys ≥ yt , programs. For every producer t operating at (yt , xt ), the minimal cost
 
q
(C − 2) : wt = (wt )p for p an allocated input, Ct is obtained by solving (LP-3):
p
Q 
 
q 
Q
q
(C − 3) : wt = (wt )p for p a non-allocated input, Ct = max Ct
p Q
q=1 Ct1 ,...,Ct ∈R+ q=1
  1 Q
wt ,...,wt ∈R+
Q
q q q
(C − 4) : fs = inf f ∈ R+
0 | fys ≥ yt .
s.t. ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q},
the following holds:
   
q q
q q q q q
(LP-2) is very similar to (LP-1) except that the input-output of the (C − 1) : ≤
Ct fs xs for all s : fs ys ≥ yt ,
wt
q
dominating producers are rescaled by the factor fs . In fact, this factor  
q q q
(C − 2) : fs = inf f ∈ R+ 0 | fys ≥ yt .
is present exactly to take the hypothetical assumption of constant
returns-to-scale into account in the linear program. This is captured wt xt = 1.
q
by the restriction on the set of the possible value of fs . Note that,
q
(LP-2) coincides with (LP-1) if fs = 1, ∀q, ∀s, i.e. no rescaling of the As explained previously, when input prices are not observed, no
input-output.7 We end this part by one important remark: there is constraints (except that they have to be non-negative) are put on the
an interesting relationship between scale efficiency at both levels.8 output-specific input prices. A common way to proceed, that dates
In fact, scale efficiency at the aggregate level could be obtained as from the work of Charnes et al. (1978), is to normalize the actual
a weighted sum of the scale efficiencies at the output-specific level cost to unity (i.e. wt xt = 1). The normalization is used to make the
where the weights are the output-specific minimal cost shares: computed minimal costs comparable, i.e. the benchmark value is 1.9
The minimal costs Ct are obtained, for every producer t, by setting
q
fs = 1, ∀q, ∀s in (LP-3). Finally, note that extra constraints on the
  Q computed prices could easily be added in (LP-3). For example, lower
C q (yq , w, wq )
SE y, w, w1 , . . . , wQ = Q SEq (yq , wq , wq ) . and upper bounds could be included, as it is the case in our Applica-
C q (yq , w, wq )
q=1 q=1 tion where we use state-level input prices as lower and upper bounds
(11) for the unknown plant-level input prices (See Section 3 for more
details). Those extra constraints are added to increase the realism of
2.4. Input price availability the computed prices.

As it is defined, our aggregate and output-specific scale efficiency 3. Application


indicators depend on the observation of the input price vectors (w).
In the following we relax this assumption. We believe that it is par- We apply our methodology to the case of the US electric-
ticularly attractive since we can keep the advantage of basing our ity plants. Investigating the scale optimality, building on a cost
indicators on economic objective without facing the disadvantage minimization behaviour, of electricity plants has already been
of observing the input prices. As done before for the output-specific considered by several authors. See, for example, Christensen
input prices, we choose the input prices that maximize the minimal and Greene (1976), Nelson (1985), Nelson and Wohar (1985),
costs (i.e. the shadow prices). As such, we evaluate the producers Krautmann and Solow (1988), Nemoto et al. (1993), Burns
in the best possible way in the absence of true input price infor- and Weyman-Jones (1996), Filippini (1996), Considine (2000),
mation, which gives the benefit of the doubt to the producers. We Filippini and Wild (2001), Kleit and Terrell (2001), Maloney
obtain (2001), Rhine (2001), Hiebert (2002), Fraquelli et al. (2005),
⎧ ⎫ Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2008), Akkemik (2009), Arcos
  
Q ⎨Q ⎬ and De Toledo (2009), Assaf et al. (2011), Kumbhakar et al. (2015),
1 Q q q q q q q
C y, w , . . . , w = C (y , w ) = max C (y , w, w ) , Ajayi et al. (2017).10 The cost minimizing framework is mostly cho-
Q ⎩ ⎭
q=1 w∈R q=1
+ sen in this context as the output side of the production process is
(12) rather exogenous to the plant (fixed, in a sense, by the demand),
⎧ ⎫ while the plants can still control the input side given the electricity
  
Q ⎨Q ⎬
generation. As such, the input side is rather endogenous to the plants.
C y, w1 , . . . , wQ = C q (yq , wq ) = max C q (yq , w, wq ) .
w∈R+
Q ⎩ ⎭
q=1 q=1
(13)

7
Note that other returns-to-scale assumptions are easily implemented by replac-
ing R+0 by (0, 1], [1, ∞) for the decreasing or increasing returns to scale assumption,
9
Note that any value could, in principle, be used for the normalization, 1 is more
respectively. For more details, see also Petersen (1990) and Bogetoft (1996) in a techni- convenient and commonly used in this case.
10
cal nonparametric setting. Also, note that for (C-4), we assume that, if it is not possible Note that in several works other methods are used to compute the cost functions
q q
to find such a fs (i.e. the solution is the empty set), then fs = +∞, i.e. no constraints (such as a stochastic frontier model). In principle, these alternative methods could be
are put on the minimal costs. extended to include output-specific indicators. The advantages of the nonparamet-
8
Zelenyuk (2016) obtains a similar result in a group aggregation context based on ric model are its easy use and that no strong assumptions are required about the
revenue maximization. production process. See our discussion of Eq. (1).
30 B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36

This implies that cost minimization is preferable to profit or revenue


maximization in this context.
The distinguishing feature of our methodology is to consider each
type of electricity separately, instead of modelling only the aggregate
electricity generation. As such, our analysis, while remaining consis-
tent with the previous works, offers the advantage to provide more
detailed results, without making extra assumptions on any aspect of
the production process. Moreover, our methodology offers two extra
advantages in this context. One, it allows us to allocate the inputs to
each electricity generation type, by explicitly recognizing the links
between production factors and electricity generation. In particular,
it is clear that renewable electricity is not produced by the use of fuel,
while non-renewable electricity generation is. Two, our methodol-
ogy also works with partial input price data. This is very attractive
in this context as, while the data for the production factors and elec-
tricity generation are available for the plant-level, the input prices
are only available at the state-level.
We tackle two important questions in this empirical part. Firstly,
we compute scale efficiency of 10 types of electricity generations:
coal, oil, gas, nuclear, other fossil, wind, solar, geothermal, hydro,
and biomass. This is attractive since it is not obvious that the scale
performances are the same for each type of electricity production.
Moreover, our sample consists of more than 3300 plants over a large
period (1998–2012), meaning that our results are trustworthy. Next,
we investigate whether multi- or single-output producers are prefer-
able for each of the 10 types of electricity generation. We believe
that the answers to these two questions are valuable information
for managers, regulators, and policy makers when deciding how to
allocate the production of electricity and how to design the plants.
To present our empirical application, we first define the produc-
tion process of the plants. Next, we present our data and highlight
the importance of multi-output producers in the US. Afterwards, we
present the scale efficiency results. Finally, we provide the shadow
Fig. 1. Production process of the electricity plants. prices for the inputs.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics (MWh) and percentage of electricity generation per type.

Year Total electricity Non-renewable electricity Renewable electricity

Average Median Max Average Median Max Average Median Max Percentage

2012 932,991 54,907 31,933,916 1,421,533 72,088 31,933,916 201,069 38,620 26,461,174 11.99%
2010 997,874 61,727 31,199,935 1,545,660 82,487 31,199,935 184,443 40,978 18,351,775 10.12%
2009 972,270 56,840 30,661,851 1,494,580 74,293 30,661,851 192,098 40,642 20,987,193 10.91%
2007 1,054,755 58,641 26,782,391 1,648,342 105,251 26,782,391 177,627 36,096 21,632,495 9.12%
2005 1,057,669 66,996 25,807,446 1,643,632 121,436 25,807,446 191,635 41,163 20,474,048 9.84%
2004 1,043,974 62,891 28,112,609 1,625,071 102,214 28,112,609 191,788 37,513 18,917,123 10.01%
2000 1,083,721 77,744 30,380,571 1,646,675 133,821 30,380,571 207,732 44,034 21,765,745 10.35%
1999 1,063,401 81,071 30,415,572 1,590,314 136,600 30,415,572 234,004 46,131 24,967,234 12.04%
1998 1,041,813 81,273 30,301,045 1,574,153 144,480 30,301,045 233,544 47,031 21,038,360 12.27%

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2012 2,697,422 23,062 392,136 11,743,938 221,226 134,013 54,078 41,027 428,174 86,535
48.24% 0.84% 15.06% 24.67% 0.39% 8.71% 1.50% 0.09% 0.02% 0.38%
2010 3,136,804 32,581 327,569 12,174,188 200,186 128,759 54,144 41,391 425,636 79,218
54.14% 1.14% 11.62% 23.47% 0.35% 7.36% 1.36% 0.09% 0.02% 0.35%
2009 2,968,009 33,543 312,489 12,161,972 211,640 124,572 55,482 41,114 424,032 77,486
53.09% 1.23% 11.37% 24.05% 0.35% 8.00% 1.37% 0.09% 0.02% 0.36%
2007 3,394,674 51,684 328,110 12,139,194 188,655 132,720 62,607 46,482 428,685 103,422
56.18% 1.74% 10.99% 22.13% 0.51% 6.59% 1.32% 0.09% 0.02% 0.34%
2005 3,383,420 94,413 303,306 11,761,769 208,463 130,399 52,782 45,437 440,625 119,388
55.79% 3.28% 9.98% 21.37% 0.55% 7.24% 1.28% 0.08% 0.02% 0.34%
2004 3,312,531 92,455 294,057 11,873,207 205,628 140,100 60,177 51,926 444,484 101,018
55.53% 3.22% 9.71% 21.89% 0.47% 7.23% 1.41% 0.09% 0.02% 0.35%
2000 3,233,258 74,824 376,365 11,554,690 215,519 140,456 64,908 57,448 480,860 94,111
53.62% 2.77% 13.07% 20.66% 0.50% 7.37% 1.33% 0.09% 0.02% 0.36%
1999 3,094,710 83,327 361,269 11,203,248 248,562 142,549 58,681 56,591 476,607 94,328
52.45% 3.09% 12.71% 20.44% 0.56% 8.68% 1.37% 0.08% 0.02% 0.39%
1998 3,133,357 92,052 352,481 10,365,985 252,520 134,758 51,457 56,211 487,747 91,118
53.38% 3.41% 12.45% 19.32% 0.50% 8.99% 1.25% 0.08% 0.02% 0.39%
B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36 31

Table 2 the Environmental Protection Agency provides price data for the
Production factors. states. As such, we use those prices to increase the realism of the
Year Boilers Generators Nameplate capacity Fuel computed prices. In particular, we use the plant-level prices as lower
(number) (number) (MW) (MMBtu) and upper bounds for the unknown plant-level prices. The goal of
2012 1.15 3.68 247 10,488,370 these bounds is to avoid trivial and/or unrealistic prices (as too close
2010 1.17 3.40 246 11,607,583 to zero or too large). See our discussion at the end of Section 2 for
2009 1.16 3.38 245 11,103,202 more details. Next, as the data for the number of boilers and gener-
2007 0.65 3.38 241 12,593,262
ators are also provided by the eGRID system, we could incorporate
2005 1.00 3.38 241 12,795,503
2004 0.99 3.42 241 12,894,084 them as extra inputs. This is done in, for example, Sarkis and Cordeiro
2000 0.61 2.75 230 13,474,571 (2012). In that case, P = 4. As the results are very similar and for the
1999 0.59 2.73 230 13,237,346 sake of simplicity, we present the case with two inputs, i.e. P = 2.
1998 0.58 2.06 229 13,249,417

3.1. Data and plant production process 3.2. Descriptive statistics and importance of the multi-output plants

We use data of the eGRID system developed by the Environmental We present the descriptive statistics in Table 1. The first part
Protection Agency in the US. In particular, we use all the databases of Table 1 (top) gives the averages, medians, and maxima for the
available between 1998 and 2012 (there are no databases available total, non-renewable, and renewable electricity generation for the
after 2012). Unfortunately, the databases are not provided for each period. Clearly, plants produce more non-renewable than renewable
year but for nine years: 2012, 2010, 2009, 2007, 2005, 2004, 2000, electricity for the period. This is confirmed by both the averages
1999, and 1998. There are also two more databases in 1996 and 1997, and the medians. Moreover, as highlighted by the maxima, the
but the input labels are different; thus, we do not take those two largest plants are those producing non-renewable electricity. Next,
extra databases into account. This results in a sample of 3389 plants. renewable electricity generation represents around 10% of the total
As explained in the Introduction, the first distinguishing feature electricity production, and this percentage is more or less constant
of our empirical analysis is that we model each type of electricity for the period. The second part of Table 1 (bottom) presents the
separately. Each plant can produce up to 10 types of electricity: coal, relative importance of each type of electricity. It reveals that coal
oil, gas, nuclear, other fossil, wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and electricity generation represents around 50% of the total electricity
biomass (in fact, the maximum is 10 and the average is 1.40 on the generation for the period, while nuclear electricity generation repre-
period). We have Q = 10. As done by the eGRID system, we regroup sents around 25%, gas electricity generation represents around 10%,
the ten types of electricity into two categories: renewable (wind, and hydro electricity generation representsslightly less than 10%. For
solar, geothermal, hydro, and biomass) and non-renewable (coal, non-renewable electricity, the coal and oil electricity generation are
oil, gas, nuclear, other fossil). By summing the ten types of electric- decreasing, while the gas and nuclear are increasing. For renewable
ity generation, we obtain the total electricity generation. Therefore, electricity, they are all more or less stable for the period.
we obtain three levels of comparison: ten types of electricity gen- Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the input side of the
eration (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, other fossil, wind, solar, geothermal, production process. While the fuel consumption slowly decreases for
hydro, and biomass), two aggregate categories (renewable and non- the period, the nameplate capacity increases. It means that plants are
renewable), and the total generation. becoming bigger. This is also confirmed by the rise of the number of
While the output side of the production process is described in generators and boilers.
much detail by the eGRID system, the input side is not so detailed. As explained in the Introduction, the second distinguishing fea-
Indeed, only the fuel consumption is provided by eGRID system. For- ture of our empirical analysis is that we differentiate between multi-
tunately, we could proxy the missing inputs (such as infrastructure, and single-output plants. To justify the importance of this distinction
labour) by the nameplate capacity, provided by the eGRID system. in this context, we present in Table 3, the proportion of multi-output
This strategy has already been used, for example, by Tone and Tsut- producers for the total, non-renewable, and renewable electricity
sui (2011), Sarkis and Cordeiro (2012), Cherchye et al. (2015), and generation, and the percentage of electricity produced and produc-
Walheer (2017, 2018) in a similar context. We have two inputs, i.e. tion factors used by the multi-output plants.
P = 2. An attractive feature of our technique, as discussed previ- While the percentage of multi-output producers decreases from
ously, is that it gives the option to allocate the inputs to the outputs. almost 40% to 30% over the period, they are important as they pro-
In this context, this is particularly relevant as the fuel input is clearly duce around 60% of the total electricity, and represent 60% of the
not used to produce the renewable electricity. We summarize the nameplate capacity and 90% of the fuel consumption. This impor-
production process of a typical plant in Fig 1. tance is higher for non-renewable electricity generation as more than
We end this part by two remarks. Firstly, no data for the input 50% of the producers are multi-output producers, and they repre-
prices are reported for the plants by the eGRID system. Nevertheless, sent around 70% of the production of this type of electricity. Both

Table 3
Importance of the multi-output producers.

Year Total Non-renewable Renewable Production factors

Multi Prod Multi Prod Multi Prod Namplate capacity Fuel

2012 31% 60% 54% 66% 16% 12% 59% 90%


2010 33% 64% 56% 70% 17% 13% 61% 92%
2009 32% 63% 55% 68% 17% 12% 60% 92%
2007 34% 67% 57% 72% 16% 14% 64% 93%
2005 35% 68% 60% 73% 16% 12% 65% 94%
2004 34% 67% 59% 72% 16% 12% 63% 92%
2000 39% 68% 66% 73% 18% 13% 67% 92%
1999 38% 67% 65% 73% 18% 12% 65% 92%
1998 37% 67% 64% 74% 16% 11% 65% 92%
32 B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36

Table 4
Averages, medians, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values.

Year Total Non-renewable Renewable

All Multi Single All Multi Single All Multi Single

2012 0.58 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.67 0.57 0.69
2010 0.61 0.57 0.64 0.51 0.54 0.48 0.72 0.69 0.72
2009 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.41 0.61 0.68 0.59
2007 0.46 0.56 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.37 0.62 0.32
2005 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.70 0.61
2004 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.58 0.70 0.56
2000 0.58 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.71 0.55
1999 0.51 0.58 0.47 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.45 0.58 0.42
1998 0.52 0.58 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.66 0.46
2012 0.62 0.53 0.69 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.71 0.60 0.73
2010 0.70 0.64 0.72 0.53 0.58 0.46 0.76 0.76 0.76
2009 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.49 0.55 0.37 0.62 0.76 0.60
2007 0.46 0.60 0.36 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.28 0.71 0.22
2005 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.78 0.62
2004 0.57 0.64 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.48 0.57 0.77 0.55
2000 0.58 0.70 0.52 0.64 0.66 0.56 0.54 0.77 0.51
1999 0.51 0.65 0.41 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.40 0.64 0.35
1998 0.51 0.66 0.39 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.39 0.73 0.38
2012 > 1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00
2012 > 2010 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.97 1.00
2010 > 2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00
2009 > 2007 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.34 0.17 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
2007 > 2005 0.94 0.03 0.84 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.82 0.99 0.83
2005 > 2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00
2004 > 2000 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.96 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.00
2000 > 1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
1999 > 1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.89 0.21

these numbers decrease over the period. For the renewable electric- for every plant. We also add extra constraints on the prices as dis-
ity production, the multi-output producers represent around 16% of cussed before. We use three tools to present our results without losing
the number of producers, and generate around 12% of the electricity. too much information. Indeed, we have the scale efficiency scores for
Both these numbers are stable over the period. the 3389 plants for the 10 outputs and the nine years. In particular,
In Table 6 in the Appendix, we give the number of producers for an obvious choice is to give the averages and the medians for each
each of the 10 types of electricity generation, and the proportion of year. While these two statistics give a good first approximation of
multi-output producers. A first observation is that the proportion of the change of scale efficiency, relying only on the averages and medi-
multi-output producers is very high for the coal and solar electric- ans to conclude if the scale efficiency has improved or not could be
ity generation, as they represent more than 90% of the producers. restrictive in this context. Namely, because of the size of our sample.
Next, they represent around 70% of the producers for the oil, gas, and As such, a more formal way to check the existence of an improve-
biomass electricity generation. The majority of producers of nuclear, ment is to make use of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS
hydro, and wind electricity generation are single-output produc- test). This is a nonparametric test that checks whether the distribu-
ers, while there are no multi-output producers for the geothermal tions of two samples are equal or not. In our context, we calibrate the
electricity generation. Finally, note that the proportion of multi- test to check whether an improvement exists, i.e. if the distribution
output producers is slowly decreasing for every type of electricity has moved to the right. As such, we also provide the p-values of the
generation, except for solar electricity generation. two-sample KS test. If the p-value is smaller than 5%, we can reject

3.3. Scale efficiency results Table 6


Shadow prices for nameplate capacity and fuel.

The previous descriptive analysis has set the stage by revealing Year All Non-renewable Renewable
the main characteristics of the US production plants, and the impor- Multi Single Multi Single
tance of the multi-output plants. In this part, we present the results
2012 6.51 5.52 5.8 6.81 6.83
of the scale efficiency scores. Those scores are computed using (LP-3)
2010 7.73 6.65 6.81 8.01 7.86
2009 8.08 7.52 7.65 8.56 8.45
Table 5 2007 8.09 7.52 7.64 8.56 8.45
Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values. 2005 6.41 6.35 6.21 6.99 6.84
2004 5.42 5.31 5.22 5.68 5.76
Year Renewable > Non-renewable Multi > single
2001 5.51 5.45 5.62 5.62 5.71
1999 5.5 5.31 5.54 5.63 5.64
All Multi Single Total Non-renewable Renewable
1998 5.81 5.22 5.32 6.01 5.98
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2012 3.09 3.01 3.12 – –
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.07 2010 3.85 3.84 3.86 – –
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.36 0.20 2009 3.86 3.7 4.01 – –
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.74 2007 4.63 4.4 4.71 – –
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 2005 5.63 5.56 5.65 – –
2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 2004 4.45 4.4 4.48 – –
2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 2004 5.45 5.32 4.98 – –
1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.26 1999 5.64 5.61 5.67 – –
1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.24 1998 5.21 5.19 5.23 – –
B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36 33

the null hypothesis, and conclude that the distribution has moved to 3.4. Shadow prices
the right implying an improvement of scale efficiency. The results for
the total, non-renewable, and renewable electricity generations are We end our application by providing the shadow prices. As
shown in Table 4. For each type of electricity generation, we consider explained previously, one of the advantages of the suggested
three cases: all the producers, the multi-output producers, and the methodology for scale efficiency is that it works when prices are not
single-output producers. or partially available. For our US plant context, this is attractive as
Firstly, we can conclude that there is an improvement of scale only the state-level input prices are provided by the Environmen-
efficiency over the period for the total electricity generation. Except tal Protection Agency of the US. We provide in Table 6 the average
for 2007, the averages and medians have increased, and the p-values shadow prices when assuming variable returns-to-scale. Note that
of the KS test are close to zero. The same conclusion holds if we take similar results could be obtained when assuming constant returns-
only the multi- or the single-output producers into account. Note to-scale, but since the latter assumption is more restrictive, we rely
that the averages have decreased for the multi-output producers, but on the former. This also reveals that assumptions about the technol-
the p-values of the KS test are close to zero. This reveals the use- ogy should be well motivated as they have an impact on the results.
fulness of this test in our context. Next, non-renewable electricity As done previously for the scale efficiency results, we make a distinc-
generation shows a slight improvement, while the improvement on tion between renewable and non-renewable electricity generation,
renewable electricity generation is rather high. This is confirmed by and between single- and multi-output producers. The shadow prices
the p-values of the KS test. Again, similar results hold when looking for nameplate capacity are given in dollar per MW, and for fuel in
only at the multi- and single-output producers. Next, two important dollar per MMBtu.
rankings seem present in Table 4. One, renewable electricity gener- As explained in detail in Section 2, the shadow prices represent
ation seems to present higher scale efficiency than non-renewable the most favourable prices in the absence of price information. As
electricity. Two, single-output producers seem less efficient on non- such, they are not the estimators of the true unknown prices, and
renewable electricity, but more efficient on renewable than multi- have thus to be interpreted carefully. Nevertheless, they not only
output producers. The differences are more pronounced for renew- provide interesting useful information for the managers of the plants,
able electricity generation. To formally check those two observations, but also for policy-makers and regulators. At this juncture, we point
we again make use of the KS test. The results are available in Table 5. out that, in general, estimating the production cost of the plants is
Our first observation about the relationship between renewable not an easy task. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency
and non-renewable electricity generation is clearly confirmed, as the is putting much effort into estimating these costs.12 The provided
KS test p-values are all close to zero, implying that the distribution shadow prices could help in that task.
of renewable electricity is always larger than that for non-renewable An initial observation is that the price of nameplate capacity for
electricity. Our second observation is also confirmed. Indeed, the the producers of renewable electricity is, on average, higher than the
majority of the KS test p-values are close to zero for the total and non- price for the producers of non-renewable electricity. This could be
renewable electricity, but not for the renewable electricity. As such, explained as it is the only input used by the producers of renewable
multi-output producers are justified for non-renewable electricity, electricity. Next, on average, the prices of the single-output producers
while single-output producers are preferred for renewable electricity. are higher for both inputs than those of the multi-output produc-
Finally, we present in Tables 7–9 (available in the Appendix), ers. This might be explained by the presence of economies of scope.
the averages, medians, and KS test p-values of the scale efficiency Indeed, a reason for producing more than one type of electricity is to
scores for each type of electricity generation. We give below the obtain a decrease of the average total cost (see also our discussion of
main findings. Firstly, the averages and medians for the nuclear Eq.(3)). The smaller input prices might be interpreted in that sense.
generation are the highest, and, as shown by the KS test p-values,
they are increasing. The performance of the three other types of
4. Conclusion
non-renewable electricity generation (i.e. coal, oil, and gas) are
decreasing; this explains the relative worse performances for non-
In this paper, we have shown how to provide scale efficiency
renewable electricity generation discussed previously. Then, there
indicators at the output-level. This is particularly attractive for multi-
are high scores in hydro electricity generation (and increasing),
output producers since it represents valuable information. Moreover,
biomass electricity generation (and decreasing), and wind electricity
our output-specific scale efficiency measurements are nonparamet-
generation (and increasing), which explains the better performances
ric in nature, they take the economic objective of the producers into
for renewable electricity generation highlighted before.
account, they can be defined without observing the input prices, and
When comparing single- and multi-output producers, it is clear
they are easy to interpret and to use in practice.
that single-output producers perform better for hydro, biomass, and
We have applied our methodology to the case of the US electricity
wind electricity generation, which explains the better performances
plants. Using the plant-level database developed by the Environmen-
of this type of producer for renewable electricity. The performances
tal Protection Agency of the US, we evaluated the scale efficiency
of the single-output plant for geothermal electricity generation are
of more than 3300 US electricity plants from 1998 to 2012 for 10
also high, but slowly decreasing. Note that no results are presented
different types of electricity generation (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, other
for geothermal electricity generation for the multi-output plants as
fossil, wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and biomass). We show that,
only single-output plants produce that type of electricity. Interest-
while there is a scale improvement at the total electricity generation
ingly, the performances of the multi-output producers are higher
level, this is not the case for each of the 10 types of electricity. Also,
for solar electricity generation. For non-renewable electricity, the
we demonstrated that, in general, renewable electricity presents
multi-output producers perform better for nuclear, coal, gas, and oil
better scale of production than non-renewable electricity. Next, we
electricity generation; but as discussed previously, the differences
highlighted the importance of the multi-output plants in the US
are more pronounced for renewable generation.11
electricity sector, and show that those plants are preferable for the
production of non-renewable electricity, while single-output plants
are preferable for renewable electricity.

11
Those results are also confirmed by KS tests. For the sake of compactness (i.e. 10
types of electricity for nine years), we do not present those results in the paper, but
12
they are available by request from the author. See the following website for more detail: www.eia.gov/outlooks/capitalcost.
34 B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36

Appendix A

Table 7
Number of producers and percentage of multi-output producers.

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2012 538 1032 1144 63 136 1178 339 53 18 27


92% 73% 63% 8% 99% 2% 69% 9% 94% 0%
2010 581 1095 1167 65 151 1213 357 57 16 28
93% 75% 65% 9% 99% 2% 69% 11% 94% 0%
2009 586 1075 1149 65 148 1219 358 55 15 28
92% 74% 64% 6% 97% 3% 69% 7% 88% 0%
2007 588 1133 1171 65 177 1223 354 53 12 28
91% 75% 67% 11% 98% 3% 69% 2% 92% 0%
2005 589 1196 1160 65 166 1219 351 54 12 28
92% 76% 70% 11% 98% 3% 68% 4% 92% 0%
2004 591 1174 1142 65 165 1214 355 52 11 28
92% 76% 69% 11% 97% 3% 66% 2% 91% 0%
2000 602 1330 1258 65 192 1225 345 51 11 27
95% 79% 76% 14% 94% 3% 74% 0% 91% 0%
1999 602 1299 1252 65 213 1221 342 51 11 29
95% 78% 74% 14% 94% 3% 74% 0% 91% 0%
1998 593 1264 1228 64 191 1219 323 51 11 28
95% 78% 73% 14% 94% 1% 72% 0% 91% 0%

Table 8
Averages, medians, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values: all producers.

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2012 0.57 0.33 0.45 0.89 0.42 0.69 0.60 0.67 0.47 0.70
2010 0.74 0.35 0.37 0.89 0.45 0.72 0.73 0.62 0.54 0.78
2009 0.71 0.24 0.37 0.84 0.50 0.56 0.75 0.67 0.55 0.64
2007 0.67 0.38 0.40 0.87 0.54 0.26 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.66
2005 0.75 0.42 0.41 0.89 0.51 0.58 0.77 0.71 0.59 0.67
2004 0.71 0.35 0.41 0.91 0.48 0.52 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.72
2000 0.77 0.37 0.47 0.84 0.54 0.51 0.77 0.65 0.43 0.62
1999 0.74 0.37 0.45 0.85 0.50 0.37 0.64 0.68 0.48 0.63
1998 0.66 0.26 0.56 0.81 0.53 0.42 0.70 0.65 0.47 0.70
2012 0.59 0.33 0.42 0.90 0.42 0.74 0.61 0.63 0.46 0.74
2010 0.76 0.33 0.32 0.91 0.44 0.76 0.78 0.60 0.43 0.78
2009 0.74 0.19 0.34 0.83 0.48 0.57 0.78 0.68 0.50 0.64
2007 0.72 0.38 0.37 0.87 0.52 0.17 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.64
2005 0.78 0.45 0.42 0.90 0.53 0.60 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.69
2004 0.74 0.33 0.38 0.92 0.48 0.54 0.81 0.70 0.60 0.72
2000 0.80 0.34 0.51 0.90 0.62 0.48 0.82 0.71 0.42 0.66
1999 0.76 0.36 0.45 0.91 0.58 0.33 0.68 0.70 0.46 0.69
1998 0.70 0.20 0.66 0.87 0.57 0.37 0.75 0.70 0.38 0.78
2012 > 1998 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.83 0.71 0.27 0.61
2012 > 2010 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.79 0.44 0.99 0.94 0.13 0.77 0.96
2010 > 2009 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.98 0.91 0.74 0.00
2009 > 2007 0.00 0.97 0.98 0.86 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.54
2007 > 2005 1.00 0.89 0.00 0.94 0.02 0.65 0.99 0.93 0.43 0.86
2005 > 2004 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.98 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.40 0.80 0.86
2004 > 2000 0.88 0.59 0.28 0.11 0.41 0.00 0.16 0.56 0.13 0.32
2000 > 1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.86 0.69
1999 > 1998 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.59 0.23 0.68 0.39 0.51 0.98

Table 9
Averages, medians, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values: multi-output producers.

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2012 0.59 0.41 0.52 0.89 1.00 0.51 0.58 0.40 0.49 –
2010 0.81 0.40 0.43 0.91 0.55 0.57 0.70 0.47 0.54 –
2009 0.77 0.20 0.43 0.84 0.86 0.40 0.72 0.25 0.55 –
2007 0.68 0.52 0.48 0.87 0.77 0.14 0.68 0.14 0.61 –
2005 0.79 0.54 0.51 0.89 0.66 0.47 0.74 0.44 0.59 –
2004 0.75 0.38 0.51 0.91 0.73 0.40 0.73 0.65 0.61 –
2000 0.82 0.39 0.61 0.91 0.79 0.35 0.74 – 0.43 –
1999 0.77 0.49 0.56 0.91 0.56 0.30 0.60 – 0.48 –
1998 0.61 0.23 0.68 0.87 0.76 0.24 0.68 – 0.49 –
2012 0.61 0.37 0.49 0.90 1.00 0.57 0.60 0.42 0.46 –
2010 0.85 0.40 0.43 0.91 0.55 0.70 0.76 0.54 0.42 –
2009 0.80 0.10 0.41 0.83 0.86 0.49 0.77 0.20 0.56 –
2007 0.73 0.51 0.46 0.87 0.75 0.07 0.72 0.14 0.71 –
2005 0.83 0.54 0.61 0.91 0.66 0.55 0.80 0.44 0.72 –
(continued on next page)
B. Walheer / Energy Economics 70 (2018) 26–36 35

Table 9 (continued)

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2004 0.78 0.33 0.55 0.92 0.77 0.50 0.79 0.65 0.67 –
2000 0.83 0.32 0.67 0.92 0.83 0.41 0.78 – 0.43 –
1999 0.80 0.50 0.60 0.92 0.49 0.29 0.65 – 0.47 –
1998 0.63 0.12 0.77 0.88 0.84 0.21 0.73 – 0.54 –
2012 > 1998 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.97 – 0.61 –
2012 > 2010 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.06 0.84 0.93 0.78 0.77 –
2010 > 2009 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.93 0.13 0.72 –
2009 > 2007 0.00 0.67 0.64 0.93 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.59 –
2007 > 2005 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.93 0.07 1.00 0.98 0.14 0.43 –
2005 > 2004 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.98 0.37 0.06 0.40 0.56 0.80 –
2004 > 2000 0.77 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.38 0.31 0.14 – 0.37 –
2000 > 1999 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.00 – 0.93 –
1999 > 1998 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.49 0.96 0.88 – 0.48 –

Table 10
Averages, medians, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values: single-output producers.

Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Other fossil Hydro Biomass Wind Solar Geothermal

2012 0.57 0.31 0.42 0.88 0.41 0.69 0.63 0.69 0.04 0.70
2010 0.73 0.33 0.34 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.78 0.64 0.45 0.78
2009 0.70 0.25 0.33 0.84 0.49 0.57 0.81 0.71 0.50 0.64
2007 0.67 0.33 0.37 0.84 0.54 0.26 0.75 0.66 0.54 0.66
2005 0.75 0.38 0.37 0.87 0.51 0.59 0.84 0.72 0.55 0.67
2004 0.71 0.34 0.36 0.89 0.47 0.52 0.84 0.68 0.43 0.72
2000 0.77 0.36 0.42 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.85 0.71 0.41 0.74
1999 0.74 0.34 0.41 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.74 0.73 0.39 0.72
1998 0.66 0.27 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.42 0.75 0.71 0.28 0.80
2012 0.59 0.30 0.36 0.89 0.42 0.74 0.65 0.64 0.04 0.74
2010 0.76 0.31 0.29 0.83 0.44 0.76 0.82 0.61 0.45 0.78
2009 0.74 0.23 0.31 0.83 0.48 0.57 0.82 0.70 0.50 0.64
2007 0.71 0.32 0.34 0.87 0.52 0.17 0.76 0.65 0.54 0.64
2005 0.78 0.39 0.35 0.89 0.53 0.60 0.84 0.72 0.55 0.69
2004 0.73 0.33 0.31 0.93 0.47 0.54 0.83 0.70 0.43 0.72
2000 0.79 0.35 0.45 0.82 0.62 0.48 0.88 0.72 0.41 0.69
1999 0.76 0.32 0.38 0.86 0.59 0.33 0.75 0.73 0.39 0.70
1998 0.70 0.23 0.62 0.80 0.55 0.37 0.82 0.71 0.28 0.80
2012 > 1998 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.42 0.67 0.23 0.87
2012 > 2010 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.18 0.57 0.99 0.93 0.06 1.00 0.96
2010 > 2009 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.53 0.00 0.55 0.98 1.00 0.00
2009 > 2007 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.05 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.54
2007 > 2005 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.50 0.04 0.64 0.96 0.93 0.56 0.86
2005 > 2004 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.84 0.10 0.00 0.71 0.38 0.14 0.86
2004 > 2000 0.91 0.90 0.63 0.32 0.29 0.00 0.33 0.74 0.08 0.56
2000 > 1999 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.73 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.14 0.64
1999 > 1998 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.39 0.22 0.67 0.36 0.14 0.98

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