World Development 149 (2022) 105710

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World Development
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and transnational hybrid

governance in Ecuador’s palm oil industry
Adrienne Johnson
University of San Francisco, Environmental Studies Program, 2130 Fulton Street, KA 113, San Francisco, CA 94117 United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The expansion of Latin America’s palm oil frontier has spurred an explosion of interest in the social and
Accepted 27 September 2021 environmental impacts of palm oil production. Researchers have been particularly focused on the effec-
Available online 7 October 2021 tiveness of global sustainability certification standards in addressing induced vulnerabilities. Only a small
fraction of this research, however, analyzes how the local institutionalization of global standards has
Keywords: shaped national and sub-national structures of environmental governance, or regional conceptualizations
Palm oil of authority. It also fails to examine how the entrenchment of global standards has reworked local social
RSPO
relations inhering within formal and informal palm oil governing arrangements. To address these gaps,
Latin America
Ecuador
this paper draws on the case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in Ecuador to answer
Environmental governance the following research questions: 1) How does the local introduction and institutionalization of RSPO
Transnational hybrid governance standards (re)shape national and sub-national environmental governance structures and relations? 2)
How do RSPO standards reconfigure long-standing notions of power and authority? Drawing on extended
fieldwork, the paper finds that the introduction of RSPO standards has prompted three major shifts in
domestic palm oil governance. These shifts are: 1) technicalization of community-company relations,
2) hybridization of governance coalitions 3) regionalization of governance efforts. Taken together, these
transformations point to an emerging transnational hybrid governance regime that blends public laws
with private guidelines to reach national and international sustainability objectives. The regime has
enabled the emergence of new palm governance authorities in the sector yet at the same time, it has rein-
scribed the uneven power relations of palm oil governance. The study concludes that future research and
policy efforts must go beyond simply evaluating RSPO standards in local spaces, and instead aim to
improve the social relations that exist within agro-commodity chains in order to make the governance
of sustainable palm oil more socially-inclusive and just.
Ó 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Nesadurai, 2018; Pramudya, Hospes, & Termeer, 2018), concentrat-

Recent years have witnessed the dramatic growth in the practice
of palm oil certification. In both the global north and south, enthusi-
asm for palm oil certification centers upon its utility in transforming
production practices in producing countries and its promise of rais-
ing social and ecological awareness in consuming countries. Certifi-
cation standards, such as those associated with the Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), have become key tools in governing
the socio-environmental conditions under which palm oil is pro-
duced. Growing literature in human geography and development
studies reflects mounting interest on this topic. This literature has
focused upon standards-creating processes (Cheyns, 2014) and the
effects of standards on state-based resource governance frame-
works (Brandi, 2020; Dermawan & Hospes, 2018; Hospes, 2014;
E-mail address: ajohnson21@usfca.edu
ing mainly in Southeast Asian contexts (e.g. Brandi et al., 2015;
Hidayat, Offermans, & Glasbergen, 2018; Moreno-Peñaranda et al.,
2015; Pye, 2019; Schouten & Bitzer, 2015). It is curious, however,
that Latin America––the region that is now second to Asia in terms
of global palm oil production (Castellanos-Navarrete, de Castro, &
Pacheco, 2021) and RSPO-certified areas (RSPO.org, 2021a)––has
not figured prominently in scholarly work on certification in the
palm oil sector.
As a result, little is known about the relationship between RSPO
standards and local contexts in Latin America. Existing work has
looked at the ‘effectiveness’ of private governance and the extent
to which the introduction of certification standards protects local
actors and ecosystems from negative company actions (Johnson,
2014; Schilling-Vacaflor, Lenschow, Challies, Cotta, & Newig,
2021). Although informative, this research has generally failed to
analyze how the introduction and entrenchment of global

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105710
0305-750X/Ó 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A. Johnson
standards impacts local institutions, and more specifically, how
national and sub-national structures of environmental governance
and authority shift and reconfigure in response to such standards
(for an exception, see Brandão et al., 2021). Further, it says very lit-
tle about the ways in which the institutionalization of global stan-
dards reworks local social relations that inhere within formal and
informal palm oil governing arrangements. Indeed, this informa-
tion is of increasing importance to policy discussions in the region
as several Latin American countries work to integrate RSPO stan-
dards into national development frameworks as a way to boost
agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty. In an effort to
address these research gaps, this paper answers the following
research questions: 1) How does the local introduction and institu-
tionalization of RSPO standards (re)shape national and sub-
national environmental governance structures and relations? 2)
How are notions of power and authority thereby reconfigured?
This paper examines the case of the RSPO in Ecuador and how
the introduction of global RSPO standards has prompted shifts in
domestic palm oil governance at multiple scales. Drawing from
empirical evidence, it argues that the uptake of RSPO standards
by various Ecuadorian actors has reconfigured the ways in which
private and public entities interact, while at the same time estab-
lishing new transnational hybrid institutions and coalitions to sup-
port emerging palm oil sustainability objectives within the
country. These moves are evidence of an emerging palm oil gover-
nance regime: a regime that is increasingly driven by rules, mech-
anisms, and arrangements embedded in both private and public
institutions. The study of domestic micro and macro shifts that
are spurred by RSPO standards, particularly in southern contexts,
reveals the salience of the various local ‘fitting’ processes that must
take place for successful local entrenchment of global standards to
occur (Johnson, 2019). Furthermore, it underscores how the arrival
and institutionalization of global private standards can fundamen-
tally alter national regimes of resource governance, reconstituting
or reconfiguring relations between and among communities, com-
panies, governments and others in recognition of, or resistance to,
the legitimacy of private governance (Falkner, 2003).
This paper examines three shifts in national and sub-national
environmental governance as prompted by the introduction of
RSPO standards in Ecuador, and their implications. They are: 1)
the technicalization of community-company relations, 2) the
hybridization of governance coalitions 3) and the regionalization
of governance efforts. By investigating these transformations, the
paper adds to emerging literature on the local impacts of global
agro-commodity standards in Latin America. It concludes that
the implementation of RSPO standards has restructured and is con-
tinuing to restructure Ecuador’s approach to palm oil governance,
giving rise to a new transnational governance regime.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the section that follows, a
review of relevant literature is provided that brings attention to
the effects of the implementation of private standards on palm
oil production, with a focus on state-based resource frameworks.
The notion of transnational hybrid governance is then introduced
in addition to a relational concept of power. Section 3 provides
necessary background on Ecuador’s palm oil industry. Section 4
describes the methods and methodologies used to collect data
for this paper. Section 5 traces three major governance shifts
that are taking place across local and national levels of palm
oil authority and governance, as triggered by the domestic insti-
tutionalization of RSPO standards. Section 6 analyzes these shifts
and elaborates on how they are ushering in a new transnational
hybrid form of palm oil governance. Final reflections are then
provided in relation to what these transformations mean for
palm oil development and governance in Latin American and
beyond.
2
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
2. Global agro-commodity certification schemes and impacts on
national and sub-national governing regimes
2.1. Private standards and state shifts in environmental governance
Private certification has gained support as a legitimate form of
authority in the governance of environmental commodities. Gover-
nance is defined by the processes of power which are exercised in
society (Tallontire, 2007). Stewardship councils and sustainability
roundtables, led by a combination of industry and civil society
actors, have become key tools in governing the global production
of resources such as seafood, biofuels, timber, meat, and palm oil.
Initiatives such as the Marine Stewardship Council (Ponte, 2012),
Forest Stewardship Council (Auld & Cashore, 2013), and Roundta-
bles on Sustainable Soy (Elgert, 2012), Beef (Buckley, Newton,
Gibbs, McConnel, & Ehrmann, 2019; Johnson, 2015), and Palm Oil
(Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011) shape sustainable supply chains
by ensuring that all members (producers and suppliers) voluntarily
abide by established principles and criteria (Oya, Schaefer, &
Skalidou, 2018). These standards, established with input by a com-
munity of global stakeholders such as smallholders, companies,
buyers, and traders, govern the global production of environmental
resources and communicate to consumers that the product has
been created under conditions that promote social and environ-
mental values (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005). The RSPO, which originated
in 2004, is an industry-led global multi-stakeholder institution that
has governed the palm oil industry according to a set of global
standards established through the collection of input from various
actors at international ‘roundtable’ meetings (Schouten, Leroy, &
Glasbergen, 2012). The RSPO’s 7 ‘Principles and Criteria’ promote
values of transparency, respect for local laws and human rights,
smallholder livelihood improvements, good working conditions,
and protection of the environment in the production of palm oil
(RSPO, 2018)
The entrenchment of global private standards in local contexts
involves the reconfiguration of environmental governance struc-
tures and relations between various actors at multiple scales. How-
ever, existing research on the local institutionalization of global
standards has mainly centered on state transformations and
responses (e.g. Bartley, 2014; Foley, 2013; Gulbrandsen, 2014),
focusing upon the role that (mainly northern) states play in the
anchoring, development, and expansion of private governance
mechanisms within national borders. This thread of research
emerged in response to early private governance work that
espoused the belief that private standards contribute to the ‘hol-
lowing out’ of state functions thereby ceding environmental con-
trol to private mechanisms (Astari & Lovett, 2019). Previously,
there was wide agreement that private governance mechanisms
emerged when states appeared to exhibit limits in their capacity
to enforce their own rules and regulations, particularly in southern
countries.
Over time, however, scholarly opinions have shifted to
acknowledge how states recalibrate their functions to fulfill the
roles of regulation, technical assistance, and conflict mediation
while leaving other roles such as ownership, conservation, and
commercialization to other actors such as community stakeholders
and civil society (Segura, 2004). Newer work acknowledges the
overt or subtle ways in which private certification has benefitted
from state involvement (Foley, 2013; Keskitalo, Sandstrom,
Tysiachniouk, & Johansson, 2009; Lister, 2011) via a legitimating,
facilitating, and even enforcing role. Many scholars now assert that
states do not ‘disappear’ in the face of growing market pressures,
but rather reconfigure themselves to fulfill new responsibilities
(McCarthy & Prudham, 2004). This information helps to foreground
the adaptability of states. It often reflects, however, a northern bias
A. Johnson
and obscures from scholarly view the responses of southern (state
and non-state) actors to the introduction of global agro-commodity
standards.
Global standards literature often positions northern and south-
ern actors at opposite poles of a dichotomy. On the one hand,
northern governments are characterized as supportive of private
standards (e.g. Gale & Haward, 2011; Lister, 2011). On the other
hand, southern governments are depicted as ambivalent (e.g.
Brandão et al., 2021) or reactive (e.g. Dermawan & Hospes, 2018;
Hospes, 2014) to them. Southern countries are infrequently charac-
terized as actively welcoming global standards and engaging with
them in synergetic and strategic ways. This is because they are
often understood as either a) having high interest in private gover-
nance but low capacity to facilitate its development within the
country (Segura, 2004), or b) maintaining an antagonistic position
towards private mechanisms for fear of encroachments upon
national sovereignty and the unwanted imposition of northern ide-
als (Bitzer & Marazzi, 2021; Foley & Havice, 2016; Hospes, 2014;
Ponte, 2012; Schouten & Bitzer, 2015; Vandergeest & Unno, 2012).
These simplistic depictions are increasingly being challenged,
however, as scholars move away from static understandings of
southern states and pay closer attention to the dynamic and
nuanced nature of their local responses to global standards. Flexi-
ble, experimentalist approaches have shown a dramatic variety of
state reactions, ranging from competition to cooperation (Brandi,
2020; Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger, & Wood, 2014; Marques
& Eberlein, 2020; Pramudya et al., 2018; Wijaya & Glasbergen,
2016). Public-private cooperative interplay can evolve over time,
yielding mutually-beneficial outcomes (Brandi, 2020; Lambin &
Thorlakson, 2018; Schouten & Hospes, 2018). The widely cited
example of the Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) illustrates
these points. Although the ISPO was initially established by the
Indonesian government to ‘rival’ the RSPO and reassert state
autonomy in the palm oil sector (Hospes, 2014; Pramudya et al.,
2018), new research indicates that more cooperative relations have
emerged with ISPO-RSPO interactions becoming increasingly coor-
dinated. For example, attempts to align both standards have
resulted in the ISPO gaining more traction and recognition in inter-
national markets (Brandi, 2020). This work illustrates the multi-
faceted ways a southern government can respond to global
private standards. However, two major research limitations
remain. First, this research focuses almost exclusively on Southeast
Asian contexts and leaves other emerging palm-producing regions
such as Latin America unexamined. Second, its focus upon state
responses discounts how functions of, and relations among, sub-
national actors such as communities, companies, along with inter-
national authorities may be reconstituted as a result of global stan-
dards uptake (for an exception, see Nesadurai, 2018). Examining
the integration of global standards and the effects this has on
national contexts underscores the interconnected, multi-scalar
dynamics and complexity of palm oil regulation in local contexts.
It also brings attention to how other actors, in addition to the state,
are impacted by private standards institutionalization, in Ecuador
and beyond.
2.2. Transnational hybrid governance (THG), power, and the
reconfiguration of domestic environmental governance relations
Palm oil is governed by a complex multi-scalar regime com-
prised of actors, initiatives, rules, and laws (Brandão et al., 2021;
Pacheco, Schoneveld, Dermawan, Komarudin, & Djama, 2020). This
regime requires the intermingling, systemization, and integration
of various public and private actors within and across international
borders to govern extraction, production, and distribution pro-
cesses. This regime––and its constituent social relations––con
stantly evolves as new institutions and mechanisms enter the
3
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
scene. In Ecuador, state and non-state responses to RSPO standards
(and their various entanglements) increasingly converge in a
regime characterized by ‘transnational hybrid governance’ (THG)
(Ponte & Daugbjerg, 2015). THG refers to the ways in which social,
environmental, and economic regulation take place outside of for-
mal international agreements. Regulation takes place instead
within and between national contexts with various actors and
institutions interacting at different levels. Resource governance
often involves a combination of both public and private actors such
as businesses, community members, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and national and local government representatives. Such
multi-level governance demonstrates ‘‘how rules and institutions
originate at multiple levels and are shaped by complex interactions
between state, private, and civil society actors” (Pacheco et al.,
2020, p. 570). It also demonstrates how, in addition to national-
level actors, local-level actors are embedded in, and impacted by,
global governing networks and processes.
THG regimes consist of various evolving regulatory instruments
that intermingle to create new governing institutions. In some
cases, intermingling resembles the co-mixing of regulatory instru-
ments coming from both private and public authorities where they
overlap and constitute a new system of co-regulation (Lister,
2011). THG refers not only to the overlap of public and private gov-
ernance areas and mechanisms, but also to the mutual dependence
of both forms of governance. This mutual dependence emerges as
private mechanisms come increasingly to rely upon the enforce-
ment and legitimating capacities of public institutions to achieve
sustainability objectives, and public mechanisms craft national
governance models according to the values embedded in standards
of private certification.
Insights from global network theory assist in developing a con-
cept of power appropriate to the study of THG. Global network the-
ory helps us conceptualize a relational understanding of power:
one that sees power mapped across levels and actors
(Oosterveer, 2015). A global network interpretation of power rein-
forces the relational, mutually-dependent nature of actors in
resource-oriented THG regimes. Further, it underscores the
dynamic and non-static nature of power embedded in governing
arrangements and accounts for the emergence of new transforma-
tional multi-scalar configurations between actors in resource
development sectors. A network-oriented perspective expands
beyond simply focusing on vertical relations between dominant
economic actors (a common feature in global value chain analyses)
and instead highlights the multi-directional influences of social,
ecological, and political interactions between various actors at
local, regional, and global levels. Understood in this way, actors
are able to exert power in different ways, including horizontally,
and are therefore able to form strong and generative connections
with a multitude of other actors. This perspective offers research-
ers of palm oil production in the global south vital tools for under-
standing new hybrid institutional arrangements surrounding the
introduction and implementation of RSPO standards.
THG arrangements facilitate global sustainability across policy
sectors and industries and mediate domestic circumstances. As
global standards are introduced in local contexts, social dynamics
and power relations between actors likely change where new
national or sub-national coalitions, alliances, or partnerships are
created to facilitate standards institutionalization. For example,
in an effort to ‘ready’ local conditions, new local management
teams consisting of company representatives and smallholders
often emerge to ensure adherence to the technical requirements
of global standards. On a national level, it is not uncommon to
see the formation of new governance committees involving com-
panies, farmer associations, NGOs, and government representa-
tives seeking to ensure that national agriculture and conservation
goals connect to and align with, global standards frameworks. As
A. Johnson
THG regimes develop, new authorities emerge as social relations
are reworked and actors gain more power in palm oil decision-
making. At the same time, a reconfiguration of governing relations
has sometimes led to a further reduction of power for those actors
already marginalized in palm oil governance processes.
Looking specifically at the emerging THG regime in Ecuador, a
convergence of global private standards and national public laws
mediated by domestic development priorities and international
resource goals is observed (see Fig. 1). These processes are punctu-
ated by the social dynamics and power relations between commu-
nities, companies, smallholders, and governments. The THG
framework, with a global network understanding of power, high-
lights the complex nature of palm oil governance and the intercon-
nections between public and private modes of governance at
various scales. It also shows how ‘private governance’ is heavily
reliant on the promotion and maintenance offered by state actors.
Finally, it provides conceptual understanding regarding the new
hybrid institutional arrangements that are emerging in response
to, and to accommodate, RSPO standards, and sheds light on what
these new approaches to environmental governance mean for gov-
erning palm oil production in the global south.
3. Palm oil governance in Ecuador
3.1. Background and governing structures
Palm, or Elaeis guineensis is considered an equatorial plant and
is primarily grown in Esmeraldas (northwestern coast), La Concor-
dia, and Sucumbíos and Orellana (Amazon) (see Map 1)
(Producción.gob.ec, 2017). The first palm seeds were brought to
Latin America by enslaved peoples from West Africa in the 17th
century (Watkins, 2021) and later planted and cultivated in Hon-
duras by the United Company (Carrión & Cuvi, 1985). In 1952, palm
seeds were exported to Ecuador from the United Company’s palm
operations in Central America and the country’s first plantation
was established in La Concordia near Esmeraldas. By the 1970s,
new palm companies had been formed on old banana haciendas
in the area. Although the cultivation of bananas was dominant
(Larrea & North, 1997), palm was primarily grown for small scale
purposes by individual companies. It was not until the late 1970s
and 1980s that palm was picked up by small scale farmers as a
potentially lucrative crop. This was mainly an outcome of efforts
by the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento),
Andean Development Corporation (La Corporación Andina de
Fomento), and the World Bank who promoted a line of credit for
farmers to cultivate palm (Carrión & Cuvi, 1985), bolstering palm
as an alternative crop to bananas.
Varying physical growing conditions and social relations sur-
rounding the crop have induced different spatial patterns of palm
cultivation across Ecuador. For instance, Esmeraldas became a
major center of palm oil cultivation particularly among small cul-
tivators and palm oil companies after 2002 when former President
Gustavo Noboa passed Executive Decree 2691, which changed the
status of forest zones from ‘protected’ to ‘open’ for agricultural
development (Hazlewood, 2012). In other regions, the cultivation
of palm oil took on a different geography as the crop competed
with other resource sectors––such as oil and timber––while bene-
fiting from the infrastructure that had grown around those sectors.
For example, in the Amazon region, the development of the palm
industry was facilitated by the existence of roadways from oil com-
panies in addition to governmental policies that favored large-
scale land monopolization of resource companies (Barragán,
2020; Carrión & Cuvi, 1985). Both regions experienced intensified
colonization through the establishment of palm plantations on
land that was classified as ‘empty’ and ceded to farmer (campesino)
4
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
populations and private companies between 1970 and the mid-
2000s (Hazlewood, 2012; SIPAE, 2012). Today, there are between
267,000 and 280,000 ha of planted palm in Ecuador (INEC, 2019;
Producción.gob.ec, 2017), making the country a Latin American
leader in the global export of palm oil. In 2017, Ecuador exported
over US$196 million worth of palm oil to global destinations such
as Colombia, Venezuela, United States, including almost US$40
million worth to the European Union (EU) (OEC, 2018).
Ecuador’s palm oil industry is dominated by 4 major dynamics
(see Fig. 1) which illuminate the sector’s social, environmental, and
governance problems. First, the majority of palm in Ecuador is
grown by smallholders who make up 87% of the country’s total
producers (Producción.gob.ec, 2017). Smallholders typically own
less than 50 ha of land and usually employ family members to ful-
fill labor positions. Smallholder livelihoods are constantly being
jeopardized by plant disease, climate change, volatile fruit prices,
and fluctuating market demand (Johnson, 2021). Second, larger
Ecuadoran companies, who also have their own industrial planta-
tions, are the primary buyers of the palm fruit from independent
smallholders. These companies own mills where the fruit is pro-
cessed and refined before it is shipped to domestic or global mar-
kets to be used in processed foods, cleaning materials, and bath
products. Firms wield much power in establishing fruit prices, dis-
persing equipment through loans, and controlling the supply chain.
Overall, relations between smallholders and firms are tense yet
mutually dependent (Johnson, 2020, 2021). Third, intensified com-
mercial growing practices (often sanctioned by local and national
governments) have led to widespread social and environmental
vulnerabilities for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities
living around plantation environments (ElUniverso.com, 2011;
Johnson, 2014; MAGAP, 2011; Pérez, 2019; Ponce, 2018;
RapoportCenter, 2009). In these contexts, companies frequently
disregard local and national laws protecting communities and
engage in questionable land deals, environmental destruction,
and human rights abuses. Fourth, the government of Ecuador has
prioritized the production of palm oil as a ‘green’ alternative to pet-
roleum, and has made it a guiding piece of national development
and poverty alleviation strategies (Johnson, 2017; PMC, 2014).
There is much doubt, however, that Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadorian communities will be able to benefit from such pro-
grams due to the social, political, and environmental institutional
exclusions they face, which are compounded by their diminishing
livelihoods opportunities as linked to the expanding palm oil fron-
tier. The aforementioned social and ecological vulnerabilities due
to palm oil expansion highlight the need for sustainably-oriented
extraction and governance processes.
3.2. The emergence of the RSPO
In 2012, Ecuador’s National Association of Palm Oil Cultivators
(ANCUPA), with several domestic companies and minor govern-
ment involvement, began to organize working groups, committees,
and public events to promote the adoption of RSPO standards
within the country. At this time, domestic producers (companies
and smallholders) and buyers were encouraged to become RSPO
members and institutionalize standards at an individual level. In
the last eight years, the RSPO mechanism has garnered even more
support from Ecuadorian companies, smallholders, buyers, in
coalition with environmental NGOs and government ministries.
As a culmination of these efforts, a National Interpretation of the
RSPO standards was recently launched (Johnson, 2019).1 In part,
1
As of 2021, there are 3 approaches to RSPO certification: individual (at the
producer level), national (where a country approves its own version of RSPO
standards), and jurisdictional (where a certain district works to certify all producers
in that region).
A. Johnson World Development 149 (2022) 105710

Fig. 1. THG and the local institutionalization of RSPO standards in Ecuador.

Map 1. Major palm-producing regions of Ecuador (by author and William Strum).

enthusiasm for the RSPO among domestic commercial actors reflects
the inclusion of RSPO-certified palm oil as a sustainable biofuel by
the European Union. In 2009, the EU established the transnational
biofuel procurement policy known as the Renewable Energy Direc-
tive (RED). The RED dictated that by 2020, 10% of energy in the trans-
port sector must come from renewable sources that have been
produced according to sustainability criteria. In order for an input
to count towards the 10%, the EU considers the production criteria
under which it was cultivated. The EU accepts renewable sources
produced according to sector-specific qualifying sustainability
5
criteria such as the RSPO, the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy, Bon-
sucro (sugarcane), and the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials.
Responding to the RED, many Ecuadorian companies and smallhold-
ers began to look at harmonization of local practices with RSPO stan-
dards as a key to accessing EU markets. On a national scale, the
government of Ecuador has moved to institutionalize RSPO stan-
dards in both national economic plans and regional environmental
policies to bolster and guide sustainability objectives in those areas
(see Fig. 1).
A. Johnson
While corporate uptake of RSPO standards in Ecuador is
increasing, certification among smallholders continues to lag. This
is largely due to: 1) financial barriers associated with compliance
(for example, in regard to obtaining land titles), transitioning
growing practices to more sustainable methods, and paying for
third-party audits, and 2) knowledge gaps related to familiarity
with the standards and problems interpreting and implementing
them (Furumo, Rueda, Rodríguez, & Parés Ramos, 2020). ANCUPA
has partially sought to address these problems by leading effective
RSPO educational workshops directed at smallholders. These
efforts have, however, been inconsistent, and have tended to leave
the serious issue of financial constraints still intact. Only recently
have innovative and cost-reductive solutions such as group certifi-
cation (Brandi et al., 2015; Furumo et al., 2020) and landscape cer-
tification (discussed in section 5) been introduced. These
pathways, which were established by the global RSPO body to
address smallholder certification obstacles, have proven to ease
smallholder certification challenges in other countries to some
degree (Brandi et al., 2015; Seymour, Aurora, & Arif, 2020). They
hold much promise in terms of improving the economic livelihoods
of smallholders while strengthening their bargaining power vis-à-
vis companies and facilitating their involvement in RSPO certifica-
tion. Nevertheless, these initiatives are still nascent, and their
effects on smallholders have yet to be fully realized. Despite these
uptake challenges, many Ecuadorian smallholders are optimistic
about RSPO standards and the economic opportunities and inter-
national credibility that can result from their integration.
Overall, RSPO standards appeal to companies, smallholders,
governments, and civil society actors for 5 reasons. First, they sup-
port and reinforce local laws and, when institutionalized, encour-
age compliance with governmental institutions and policies.
Second, when integrated into company operations, agro-
commodity standards indicate a public commitment to sustain-
ability and ecologically-sensitive business which can work to
improve a firm’s reputation and also open new market opportuni-
ties. Third, in contexts where standards are lacking, their absence
shines a light on the social and environmental injustices experi-
enced by communities marginalized by corporate negligence.
Fourth, RSPO systems prioritize smallholder livelihoods and aim
to make certification easier for them to achieve. Fifth, when stan-
dards are developed and promoted on a country-wide scale, they
indicate a national commitment to sustainable production,
acknowledgement of the social and environmental destruction
linked to palm oil production, and support for producers (both
companies and smallholders) to obtain certification.
4. Research design and methods
The analysis presented in this paper is based on ethnographic
research conducted in Ecuador between 2011 and 2014, with
follow-up field visits carried out in 2017. The primary focus of
the project was to study the emergence of the RSPO mechanism
in Latin America, and investigate how local palm oil actors in Ecua-
dor were making sense of the new RSPO standards. Ethnography
largely rests on long-term participant observation and produces
‘‘insight[s] into the processes and meanings that sustain and moti-
vate social groups” (Herbert, 2000, p. 550). It is particularly useful
when studying natural resource industries because it illuminates
the complexities of entangled power relations embedded in con-
tentious sites of extraction (Johnson et al., 2020). Extended periods
of time were spent alongside both palm oil companies and com-
munities surrounding their operations in order to understand the
social effects of RSPO certification uptake and the relations of
power undergirding them. Employing an ethnographic approach
is essential to gaining first-hand insights into how national and
6
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
sub-national governance configurations shift as a result of RSPO
standards implementation over time. It also provided important
insights into how local social actors (such as Indigenous peoples)
have responded to RSPO standards integration and why and how
new coalitions have emerged to facilitate the uptake and imple-
mentation of these standards on the ground.
Other qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews
and discourse analysis were employed. Using a purposive sampling
method to identify research participants, more than 80 interviews
were carried out with the following actors: palm oil companies
(10), smallholders (24), RSPO representatives (2), environmental
NGOs (11), government officials and policymakers (10), Afro-
Ecuadorian and Indigenous community members (19), local aca-
demics and an environmental lawyer (5). Data referenced in this
paper is derived from employee interviews representing 6 major
palm oil companies (5 large and 1 medium) who are RSPO mem-
bers and have active palm operations in the Amazon region. There
are approximately 15 corporate RSPO members in Ecuador (RSPO.
org, 2021b). The ones included in this study are significant because
in addition to being RSPO-certified, they rank in the country’s ‘top
ten’ in terms of palm oil coverage and influential role in the
national palm oil supply chain (NationalPalmCensus, 2017). Given
this information, the findings of this study represent important
shifts in palm oil governance involving 40% of Ecuador’s RSPO-
certified companies.
Fieldwork locations included the capital of Quito and the major
palm-producing provinces of Esmeraldas, Sucumbíos and Orellana,
with visits lasting between 1 and 10 months. These locations were
selected due to their economic, social, and ecological significance
to the geographies of the palm oil sector. In between and after field-
work periods, time was spent performing systematic analyses on
secondary literature related to RSPO standards in Ecuador with a
critical eye on how national and sub-national environmental gover-
nance institutions were responding to RSPO standards entrench-
ment. Surveyed literature included national development plans,
policy briefs, and technical reports. Analysis of this information
focused on the convergence or overlap of public/private and
national/global governance frameworks. Lastly, the author attended
local, national, and global RSPO meetings. These included various
regional workshops and seminars in Ecuador, the 2012 and 2013
Latin American RSPO meetings (in Ecuador and Honduras, respec-
tively), and the 2017 RSPO meeting in Indonesia. The next section
explains how the arrival and institutionalization of RSPO standards
in Ecuador has fundamentally transformed the environmental
structures and relations linking various actors in Ecuador’s palm
oil sector. It identifies shifting social dynamics and new emerging
authorities in the governance of palm oil and elaborates on what
these changes could mean for various actors linked to the industry.
5. Results
5.1. Technicalization of company-community relations
The swift local institutionalization of RSPO standards in com-
pany operations is reconfiguring company-community relations
in ways that, on the one hand, satisfy technical sustainability
requirements but on the other, eliminate livelihood-enabling
arrangements. After becoming an official member of the RSPO,
Ecuadorian palm oil companies usually begin to institutionalize
RSPO standards and policies into their individual operations by
augmenting day-to-day operations so they align with RSPO stan-
dards. This is done in order to obtain RSPO certification so as to
access international markets and satisfy buyer demands. One com-
pany’s environmental director explained the importance of obtain-
ing company-wide certification:
A. Johnson
. . .we need the RSPO certification because most of our produc-
tion that goes from [our company] we send to Europe. And,
you know that Europe is very much linked to RSPO certification.
So we need to do this. . .we need to [have the certification] in
order to say that we are an ecological company, we are
green. . .[we‘ve had] a lot of pressure from our buyers in order
to achieve [RSPO] certification (interview 2014).
For many companies, the entrenchment of RSPO standards
means formalizing their day-to-day activities by following techni-
cal and legal requirements. For example, in fieldwork interviews,
palm oil company representatives shared how they were starting
to align their operations with RSPO Principles. Several respondents
mentioned they were prioritizing Principle #2 (which promotes
local legal compliance) and applying for environmental licenses
for their plantations. The principle requires that certified producers
comply with all legal requirements of the local jurisdiction where
they operate (RSPO, 2013).2 Relevant legislation includes regula-
tions governing land tenure and land-use rights, growing practices,
and environmental management, and compliance is considered a
baseline requirement for certification of palm growers of all sizes.
In Ecuador, environmental regulations state that all palm producers
(e.g. smallholders and companies) must obtain an environmental
license for their plantations to ensure measures are followed to min-
imize social and environmental harm to surrounding areas. Mea-
sures include proper ecological monitoring, impact assessments,
and community consultations. Although licenses have been a
requirement for all palm plantations for several years, many compa-
nies and smallholders historically operated without them because
governments rarely verified compliance (interview 2014). Although
lack of government oversight remains an issue, major palm oil com-
panies are now highly motivated to apply for environmental licenses
because international buyers seeking RSPO-certified palm oil are
asking for proof that local regulations have been followed (interview
2014).
The prioritization of local technical environmental regulation
compliance and the formalization of production practices accord-
ing to RSPO standards represents a reconfiguration of corporate
practices according to neoliberal environmental governance and
corporate responsibility logics. As various scholars have noted,
the emergence of neoliberal mechanisms such as voluntary guide-
lines in corporate spaces signals a shift in sustainability manage-
ment where companies move away from antagonistic
interactions with affected communities and instead rely on codes
of conduct to govern social and environmental relations
(Laplante & Spears, 2008). In doing so, company objectives are
reframed around notions of corporate ‘cooperation’ and ‘compli-
ance’ while interventions focus on fostering individual and com-
munity capacities to care for human health and welfare (Billo,
2015; Shever, 2010). These more ‘responsible’ approaches contrast
highly with historical paternalistic arrangements of philanthropy
where communities were recipients of company-initiated gifts,
services, and development projects. Patronage and paternalism
were common features of extraction industries in Ecuador in the
1980s and 1990s (Billo, 2015). During this time, palm oil compa-
nies advanced social and environmental objectives by providing
communities with material goods, credit programs, literacy initia-
tives, and health services (interview 2014).
The provisioning of livelihood infrastructure and services to
communities by resource extraction firms has long been key to
perpetuating ideas about the perceived absence of the state in rural
areas and securing conditions that ensure the continued operations
2
Although the global RSPO standards were updated in 2018, the 2013 version of
the standards is referenced since these guided the company’s certification efforts at
the time of field visits.
7
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
of extraction companies (Billo, 2015). One company’s environmen-
tal director stated that philanthropic interventions were histori-
cally offered to communities because, ‘‘they don’t have anything
to eat, they live in poverty, so they need a lot of opportunities that
the government doesn’t give to them. And we give them these
opportunities” (interview 2014). He further explained that gifts
and social initiatives were typically offered to curry favor with sur-
rounding communities in exchange for a social license to operate.
Over time, these offerings of material goods and services trans-
formed into strategic levers used by communities to negotiate
with, and obtain valuable resources from, the company. The envi-
ronmental director provided an example illustrating this dynamic:
. . .[a local Indigenous] community. . . sent us a letter for exam-
ple, [requesting] $1,000 [USD] in order to buy sport t-shirts and
we said, ’ok!’. But we want to change that. The problem is that
we [have been] working in Ecuador since the 1970s and in the
past, the politics were, ’don’t have problems with the communi-
ties!’ – [If] they ask, you give! But this is not correct. . .(inter-
view 2014).
With the recent introduction of RSPO standards in Ecuador
however, things are changing. The director observed that a general
shift was taking place in the overall thinking and conduct of com-
panies, away from development projects and services, towards
more technical practices. His company’s new approach to social
and environmental sustainability is to internalize the demands of
communities by changing production practices so they align and
comply with RSPO Principles and Criteria, making this the default
mode of operation. For example, the company has revised their
pesticide management practices according to RSPO requirements
by creating and implementing a plan that ensures responsible
application of chemicals in plantation areas (in line with RSPO
Principle #4). Additionally, the company reformed their operations
by devising plans that assess the economic, social, and environ-
mental performance of the company so that areas for improvement
can be identified (in line with RSPO Principle #8) (interview 2014).
These changes are amounting to an overall strengthening of tech-
nical operations and an institutionalization of sustainability poli-
cies guided by RSPO standards within the company. The director
explained,
. . .in some [areas], we are trying to [make] these programs more
technical, more strong; we need to create, like, policies, not only
like a ‘program’. We need to create policies where we are work-
ing to create these projects, in order to improve our communi-
ties in education, health, [and] in their economic opportunities.
So this is the line that we are pursuing in order to follow better
practices. (interview 2014).
Although the ‘rendering technical’ (see Li, 2007) of environmen-
tal and social governing relations is a goal of the RSPO mechanism,
the entrenchment of RSPO standards has begun to impact the ways
companies and communities socially interact in two major ways.
First, social and environmental grievances are reduced to technical
problems that can be ‘solved’ by companies simply complying with
rules and codes of conduct. This shift allows companies to maintain
their operations at particular sites of extraction by reframing them
in apolitical terms. Second, communities are now being read as
needing to be ‘self-sufficient’ and are no longer able to negotiate
with palm oil companies in order to obtain material resources cru-
cial to their livelihoods. This was confirmed during follow-up field-
work in 2017. Interviews with Indigenous peoples living in a
community close to one of the palm oil companies indicated that
their requests for materials such as petroleum and health supplies
were increasingly being denied and that they were now left to their
own devices (interview 2017).
A. Johnson
The technicalization of company-community relations signals a
consolidation of power within palm oil companies. The institution-
alization of RSPO standards offers companies the opportunity to
powerfully reconfigure harmful production practices around stan-
dardized sustainability criteria while simultaneously relieving
themselves of patronage responsibilities historically sedimented
through years of socio-environmental injustices. In response, some
community members have expressed frustration and non-
acceptance of these shifts as they are seen as evidence of growing
company control rather than a forging of community-oriented,
sustainable practices (interview 2017). Given negative community
responses, the extrication of companies from the provision of ser-
vices and infrastructure may pose challenges for companies in
obtaining future community approval for their operations however
this has yet to be seen. Overall, the institutionalization of RSPO
standards at the company-level is reconfiguring governing rela-
tions between communities and companies which ultimately
diminishes the power that communities wield in such contexts.
5.2. Emerging public–private governance coalitions
The introduction of RSPO standards has shifted national palm
oil governance in Ecuador towards an approach mediated by new
public–private coalitions. In 2014, the Ministry of Agriculture, Live-
stock, Aquaculture, and Fish (MAGAP) established the Competitive
Plan for the Improvement of the Palm Oil Chain (PMC) which lays
out economic strategies and actions necessary to transform Ecua-
dor’s palm oil sector into an efficient, sustainable, and socially
inclusive one while bolstering its production by 2025 (PMC,
2014). RSPO standards anchor the sustainability goals of the plan.
Policy-makers designed the PMC with an eye to shaping the sec-
tor’s sustainability targets around RSPO tools and standards. Pro-
ducer adherence to RSPO standards is foundational to the
building of a domestic palm oil market and product that is destined
for international export (PMC, 2014). Objective 5 of the PMC, for
example, states that RSPO standards are key to establishing diverse
international partnerships and gaining EU market access (PMC,
2014). Support for the PMC and its unique integration of RSPO
standards has grown over time among government ministries as
well as private actors, each seeing RSPO standards as effective tools
in achieving mutual economic and sustainability objectives. This
has led to calls for more coordination between public and private
actors.
In 2016, the Public-Private Agreement Plan of the PMC was
launched, which marked the emergence of a coalition of public
and private bodies to assist in the execution of the PMC and pro-
motion of RSPO standards. The coalition was made up of represen-
tatives from some of the country’s largest palm oil companies (e.g.
AEXPALMA, La Fabril, DANEC, ALES), the national association repre-
senting smallholder interests (ANCUPA), and members of the Min-
istry of External Commerce, Ministry of Environment (MAE), and
MAGAP. Such an alliance was unprecedented in Ecuador’s palm
oil governance history as it marked the first time such varied actors
worked in conjunction with one another to execute palm oil indus-
try economic and sustainability objectives. The coalition was effec-
tive in creating a space where palm oil governance challenges
could be contemplated and economic solutions devised. The coali-
tion continued to gain steam as new members joined and in 2018,
the group was launched as a formal organization through the issu-
ance of Inter-ministerial Agreement No. 030 and officially given
the name, Inter-Institutional Committee for the Monitoring of Sus-
tainable Palm (CISPS). The committee, which is a public and private
entity, is in charge of leading and promoting sustainable palm
production with Ecuador so the country can compete in the inter-
national market. It also aims to uphold high social and environ-
mental standards that ensure economic, social and
8
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
environmental well-being while promoting RSPO certification as
a pathway to new world markets (agricultura.gob.ec, 2018). The
formalization of this coalition signals the emergence of a new
hybrid authority in palm oil governance as state and non-state
actors work together to oversee economic targets while prioritiz-
ing sustainability standards.
The CISPS coalition is a crucial force in facilitating the institu-
tionalization of RSPO standards and ultimately building a THG
regime. The coalition seeks to help the country reshape its agricul-
tural development objectives so they align with EU biofuel input
policies. RSPO standards facilitate the connection between the pro-
duction context of Ecuador and international procurement policies.
In March 2018, the national government brought together the
CISPS and other palm oil supply chain actors to develop and
approve a 5-year plan that would inject $1.2 billion (from
300,000 private sector investors) into the palm oil sector to make
it more sustainable (Michail, 2019). According to the Minister of
MAGAP, such a large sum of investment is needed in order boost
production in order to take advantage of international demand:
‘‘There is an important growing market in demand for organic
and sustainable products in . . . Europe of around 20–23% annually,
so there is a tremendous opportunity to be grabbed there”
(Michail, 2019).
The CISPS continues to be an authority driving sustainable palm
oil production. The coalition, in concert with the government, is
devising many plans to incentivize producers to develop the sector
according to RSPO standards and expand sustainability certifica-
tion to smallholders. For example, the government is providing
tax breaks for palm oil exporters on the condition that the money
raised through tax returns will be put in a fund that is managed by
private and public actors, and will be used to support smallholders
switch to more sustainable practices and obtain RSPO certification
(Michail, 2019). Other funds will be distributed to the country’s
palm oil growers’ smallholder association, ANCUPA, which is a
member of the RSPO. The funds will be used to strengthen the ser-
vices this organization provides farmers such as transferring tech-
nology and technical assistance, so they are on track to getting
RSPO certified. These moves are largely being carried out to expand
access to sustainable production practices and therefore expand
RSPO certification more broadly.
5.3. Rescaling of governance jurisdictions
The integration of RSPO standards into national environmental
and economic policies has elicited a rescaling of palm oil gover-
nance and land-use planning with a focus on the regional scale,
changing the dynamics of authority and power at sub-national
levels. As a new authority driving palm oil governance decisions,
the CISPS is pursuing an RSPO landscape governance method called
a Jurisdictional Approach (JA) in the Amazon region.3 Launched in
2019, the JA in Ecuador is a pilot program funded by a larger conser-
vation initiative financed by the Green Climate Fund and the Global
Environmental Facility with a budget of US$53 million (Barragán,
2020). Such an approach ‘down scales’ certification efforts from
the national to the regional level and uses RSPO standards to reach
PMC objectives in the region.
The purpose behind a JA is to certify whole regions (instead of
individual company or smallholder plantations) according to RSPO
Principles and Criteria. This is done through a regional ecological
analysis of a defined landscape, which is led by a group of local
governments and companies working together. With information
gleaned from the analysis, government officials and producers
3
Other JAs are being piloted in Malaysia (Sabah) and Indonesia (Seruyan and
Kapuas Hulu).
A. Johnson
are able to learn about site-specific environmental characteristics
such as endangered species, important water systems, and
degraded areas (interview 2017). This information is also key in
determining areas with high conservation value and others better
suited for future palm oil plantations. A JA differs from traditional
certification approaches where companies or smallholders are
responsible, on an individual basis, for investing in and meeting
certification targets (MacIssac, 2017). For smallholders, individual
RSPO certification can be extremely difficult to obtain. Require-
ments such as environmental impact assessments and mapping
exercises are prohibitively expensive and environmental permit-
ting processes are bureaucratic and confusing (interview 2017).
Instead, local governments and companies working in the region
take care of mapping and monitoring of drivers of deforestation
and areas of high ecological value. Further, land-titling and permit-
ting processes are simplified. Once mapping of the region is carried
out, efforts are made to certify all smallholders in the area.
The regional JA supersedes prior approaches to sustainable
palm oil governance in Ecuador which were previously advanced
as part of the PMC at a national level. In 2015, a country-wide map-
ping exercise and study was carried out by various government
bodies and ANCUPA with the objective of identifying ‘optimal
areas’–areas containing suitable soil quality and climatic condi-
tions–for palm plantation expansion (Barragán, 2020; Johnson,
2017). Over time, support for the national approach diminished
as government ministries and ANCUPA shifted their sustainability
priorities away from simply identifying areas for increased palm oil
expansion to devising plans that encourage the active investment
in, and uptake of, RSPO certification among all producers in a cer-
tain region.
Three differences characterize the previous approach to sus-
tainable palm oil governance and the current jurisdictional
approach. First, a scale difference exists: previous efforts were
nationally focused while the new JA targets a particular political
geographical region (the Amazon). Second, the current JA is driven
by a hybrid governing body consisting of palm oil companies, gov-
ernment personnel, and smallholder organizations. Previously, it
was mainly national government ministries, with the help of
ANCUPA, which led mapping and monitoring exercises. Third, the
main objective of the previous approach was to increase national
agricultural revenues via the expansion and intensification of palm
cultivation. With the JA, increasing national revenue is still a goal
however the means through which to achieve this rests on wide-
spread regional RSPO certification of all producers and linking
them to EU markets.
Ecuador has over 12 million hectares of natural forest, 74% of
which are located in the Amazon region. The provinces of Orellana
and Sucumbíos are home to 26% of the country’s forest reserves
(Barragán, 2020). The area is known for a growing number of palm
oil plantations owned by smallholders and large companies.
Because of the high concentration of biodiversity in these pro-
vinces and growing threats posed by expanding plantations, the
Amazon region was selected as an ideal site for the JA pilot. It is
believed that increasing smallholder certification in the region will
contribute to broad conservation efforts as well as the achievement
of economic goals associated with the PMC. ‘Regionalizing’ palm oil
governance has the positive potential to 1) encourage greater com-
pliance with environmental laws and regulations, for example,
obtaining mandatory environmental licenses 2) reduce financial
and institutional certification barriers for smallholders since local
companies and governments are covering costs and leading the
way. Ultimately, a JA carries benefits for governments (who want
producers to comply with local environmental regulations), small-
holders (who encounter various barriers to legal compliance and
certification), and companies (who are increasingly looking to
buy certified palm fruit in order to satisfy international demands).
9
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
A corporate CISPS member explained a common problem faced by
both the government and smallholders, and how a JA can remedy
it,
Getting all these [smallholders] licensed is a problem for [the
Ministry of Environment], but licenses are mandatory. The Min-
istry of Environment can write letters and everything they want
telling [smallholders], ‘you know, you have to get your govern-
mental license’. And these farmers go like, ‘you know, we don’t
have the money to do it, forget about it, we’re not doing this. . .
[A jurisdictional approach] is a win–win situation’ (interview
2017).
In the process of rescaling palm oil governance in accordance
with JA and RSPO requirements, environmental authority in the
Amazon region is being reconfigured as greater oversight responsi-
bility is shifted onto local bodies. An effective JA relies heavily on
local institutions to actively ensure that RSPO certification pro-
cesses are carried out. Locally, the Amazon municipalities of Sacha
and Lago are beginning to work together with local palm oil com-
panies and regional governments to provide education to small-
holders about better agro-management practices. Further, these
bodies are overseeing smallholder RSPO certification by verifying
local law compliance such as obtaining land titles and environ-
mental licenses for plantation operations (interview 2017). Impor-
tantly, local governments and palm oil companies have begun to
use spatial technologies to map the entire Amazon region in order
to locate ecologically valuable landscape characteristics such as
high conservation areas and areas with high carbon stock. Findings
will be shared with smallholders to be integrated into their envi-
ronmental monitoring plans (which are necessary components of
environmental license applications). A JA rescales palm oil gover-
nance to improve the welfare of regional smallholders, lessen or
eradicate environmental destructive practices that are specific to
the area, and increase the efficiency of the palm oil production sup-
ply chain as rooted in the Amazon. It also provides new opportuni-
ties for local actors such as governments to make their mark on
sustainability frameworks and extends the role of government in
a ‘wall-to-wall’ fashion (see Boyd et al., 2018) thereby enhancing
RSPO standards uptake in local spaces. At the same time, a JA
places more responsibility onto the shoulders of local institutions
to oversee certification processes which could ultimately lead to
less compliance and more ecological devastation if these institu-
tions, and their capacities, are not strengthened.
6. Discussion and conclusion
The institutionalization of global standards in Latin America
and their effects on local governing systems remains a particularly
understudied area of private certification studies. The ways in
which local institutions and social relations shift and reconfigure
in response to standards have only minimally been the focus of
scholars’ work. The entrenchment of RSPO standards in Ecuador
has several implications for community-company dynamics, pub-
lic–private governing coalitions, and scalar approaches to land-
scape governance.
6.1. An emerging THG regime
Evidence presented in this paper points to the emergence of a
THG palm oil regime in Ecuador. This means that national policy-
creation and decision-making are increasingly guided by a blend
of public domestic institutions and private global mechanisms, in
concert with informal social arrangements. A combination of insti-
tutional overlap and mutual dependence defines Ecuador’s
transnational hybrid arrangements (see Pacheco et al., 2020;
A. Johnson
Ponte & Daugbjerg, 2015). For example, EU biofuel sourcing
policies have become entangled with both RSPO standards and
Ecuadorian economic policies that incentivize adherence to local
laws and sustainable practices. Because the EU’s procurement pol-
icy (RED) requires biofuel inputs to be certified at the site of extrac-
tion, the EU leans on RSPO standards to ensure that palm oil is
produced in a sustainable way. Similarly, The Ecuadorian govern-
ment has leveraged EU biofuel input policies in addition to RSPO
standards in strategic ways to guide national economic and agri-
cultural development plans. The government relies upon the insti-
tutionalization of global RSPO standards to guide sustainability
practices while using adherence to EU policies as a way to access
bigger market shares for companies and smallholders. What
remains to be seen is how long EU procurement policies will
anchor and drive Ecuadorian agriculture and commerce develop-
ment plans. In 2018, the EU revised its biofuel input policies in
response to growing greenhouse gas and deforestation concerns
linked to palm oil production. A new ruling holds that while the
EU will continue to import palm oil from countries like Ecuador,
this input will no longer ‘count’ towards RED sustainability targets
from 2030 onward (EU, 2019). Although it is not entirely clear
what this will mean for palm-producing countries going forward,
what is clear is that the gradual transnational hybridization of gov-
ernance, comprised of private and public elements at multiple
scales, has become a defining feature of palm oil governance in
the global south.
6.2. New public–private coalitions
The Ecuador case study reveals an alternative sectoral response
to the institutionalization of RSPO standards where the state is har-
monizing private regulatory instruments with national economic
plans via the country’s PMC (see Brandi, 2020; Lambin &
Thorlakson, 2018; Pramudya et al., 2018 for comparable cases).
Following a THG approach, Ecuador has strategically used RSPO
standards to meet national goals, and these efforts have forged
synergic relations between unlikely actors. The institutionalization
of RSPO standards at the national level has spurred innovative
coalition-building among government bodies, palm oil companies,
and smallholder organizations as coalitions such as the CISPS are
needed to monitor, oversee, and support widespread RSPO certifi-
cation uptake that will lead the country closer to reaching its
development goals. The CISPS is a unique organization in that it
is tasked with tracking changes in international regulations and
standards and finding ways to incorporate them into Ecuador’s
governance plans so as to expand market competitiveness. The alli-
ances forged between private and public actors, as facilitated by
RSPO standards and public policy, point to new emerging authori-
ties in palm oil decision-making. Rather than impinging upon the
sovereignty of actors involved in national resource governance,
RSPO standards can, in fact, enhance sovereignty as they are used
by governments and companies to reach mutually-dependent sus-
tainability and economic goals (Brandi, 2020). In this case, private
standards have the effect of increasing the power of governments
and companies, not diminishing it.
6.3. Community-company dynamics
The further empowerment of governments and companies,
however, does not bode well for local communities who reside
near company palm plantations and experience diminishing liveli-
hood conditions as a result of egregious company palm-related
activities. Companies have historically offered material goods as
a way to placate communities, stave off grievances, and maintain
social licenses to operate (Billo, 2015). In Ecuador, these offerings
provide opportunities for community members to exist with palm
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World Development 149 (2022) 105710
companies and their operations. Although RSPO Principles and Cri-
teria encourage technical company transformations along sustain-
ability lines, their entrenchment reconfigures community-
company social relations in ways that can disempower communi-
ties. The shift from gift-giving to internal technical changes
removes the leverage that communities have over companies to
bargain for livelihood-enabling goods and services such as infras-
tructure and healthcare. Furthermore, it reduces corporate sustain-
ability commitments to neoliberal technical revisions and reframes
them according to an apolitical lens. Although it is hoped that RSPO
standards will lead to widespread sustainable practices that will
reduce instances of company-initiated social and environmental
devastation, the implementation of these standards may have the
paradoxical effect of robbing communities of their abilities to
negotiate with companies on their own terms. Therefore, the
entrenchment of RSPO standards can empower companies while
disempowering communities. Data shows that although standards
entrenchment reconfigures the ‘rules of engagement’ of companies
and communities, the standards do not challenge the social rela-
tions undergirding their relative positions of power. Because of
this, many of the problems associated with the monopolization
of power of corporate palm oil companies will likely remain.
6.4. Governance re-scaling
The trend of downscaling certification efforts from the national
scale to a jurisdictional level represents a major change in how
palm oil governance is implemented in Ecuador. This scalar shift
points to diminishing support for country-wide certification
efforts, and growing momentum for successful sustainability tran-
sitions that are led by local actors and focused on particular juris-
dictional geographies. In practice, more emphasis has been put on
local institutions and governmental bodies in the Amazon pro-
vinces of Orellana and Sucumbíos to carry out certification promo-
tion and oversight in order to achieve widespread RSPO
certification. Previously, these tasks fell under the responsibility
of national-level ministries. While the JA is in its early stages, evi-
dence suggests that sub-national governing structures and power
relations have been altered in several ways. For example, the devo-
lution of power is putting more responsibility onto the shoulders of
local level authorities. In many ways, this move is a good one as it
may empower local districts to devise certification approaches that
are tailored to the needs of the local context. Research shows that
smallholders are benefiting from this shift as local authorities sim-
plify bureaucratic processes required for standards compliance.
Although this ‘downloading’ of responsibility may make certifica-
tion efforts more sensitive to the needs of local smallholders, there
is no evidence to suggest that resources have been allocated to
enhance local governments and their capacities to carry out these
responsibilities effectively for the long-term. In line with other
observations of JA arrangements (e.g. Brandão et al., 2020;
Nepstad, 2017), it is unclear to what extent local authorities like
those in the Amazon region can effectively advance certification
and oversight efforts without stronger capacities. If these capaci-
ties are not strengthened, the implementation of a JA may paradox-
ically lead to greater environmental violations and lower rates of
certification. This points to a lacuna within the JA framework of
the RSPO and prompts calls for capacity-building to accompany
governance devolution in order for JAs to be effective.
Preliminary research in Ecuador further indicates that the JA is
very ‘production-oriented’ and overly focused on overcoming
smallholder obstacles to certification and increased yields with lit-
tle attention paid to the struggles of local communities affected by
industry expansion (Barragán, 2020). Therefore, although a rescal-
ing of palm oil governance has the potential to empower lower-
level actors in sustainability decision-making and agenda-setting,
A. Johnson
it may also reinscribe ongoing marginalization of communities of
Indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian peoples. To remedy these negative
potentials, efforts must be made to ensure adherence not only to
RSPO standards that promote ‘efficiency’ and ‘optimized produc-
tion’ (Principle #3), but also to principles that uphold human rights
through compliance with Free, Prior, and Informed Consent and
International Labour Organization regulations (Principle #4). In
this way, local actors such as social and/or environmental NGOs
have a key role to play because of their long-term involvement
in, and detailed knowledge of, palm oil conflicts in the region
(see Brandão et al., 2020). These non-state actors, along with regio-
nal governments, should be centered as key players in jurisdic-
tional approaches in order to elevate social concerns in
sustainable palm oil governance discussions and actions.
What relevance does a THG analysis on global RSPO standards
in Ecuador have for other nascent palm-producing economies in
Latin America? For one, given the beneficial synergies that can
emerge when national development objectives are aligned with
global governance standards, this study urges southern states to
reconsider the establishment of domestically-oriented palm oil
programs and to direct efforts to linking national initiatives with
international ones. These conclusions are applicable to countries
such as Brazil, who are looking to increase national incomes and
diversify biofuel feedstock sources (Brandão et al., 2021). This
research also highlights the need for more local-level studies that
examine the social effects of RSPO standards in community set-
tings. Such research is particularly urgent in regard to the case of
Colombia, which has integrated 3 other global certification
schemes into its national palm oil sector in addition to RSPO. These
include the Rainforest Alliance, Organic (IFOAM), and International
Sustainability and Carbon Certification (Furumo et al., 2020). This
‘stacking’ of global standards may very well facilitate more inter-
national market access for commercial producers and smallholders
in the country. However, it may also contribute to ongoing pro-
cesses of disempowerment and marginalization for Indigenous
and Afro-descendent peoples (see Genoud, 2021). Finally, this
research applies to countries such as Peru, where RSPO certifica-
tion momentum has slowed in recent years due to corporate and
smallholder certification uptake challenges. The JA approach may
lessen challenges by focusing education efforts and financial
resources to a particular region while generating a smaller, more
tailored roadmap through which RSPO standards can be integrated.
Although countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras, and Gua-
temala successfully formalized RSPO standards on a national scale
early on, this may be not be the most appropriate first-step for all
countries.
In conclusion, the local entrenchment of RSPO standards alters
structures and relations of environmental governance to a large
degree. In Ecuador and other countries, these shifts reveal the
increasing transnational interconnections (along the lines of trade,
demand, and governance) that shape sustainable agro-commodity
chains and the emergence of new authorities (both local and inter-
national) active in managing these interactions. At the same time,
these shifts have rarely indicated a rebalancing of power particu-
larly in favor of local communities. Although innovative public
and private coalitions forging new synergies and governing
approaches have emerged as a result of the introduction of RSPO
standards, these arrangements have continued to uphold struc-
tures that typically exclude communities most impacted by palm
oil expansion. Illuminating these dynamics will hopefully lead to
more environmental research and development policy work that
goes beyond simply evaluating the ‘effectiveness’ of RSPO stan-
dards in meeting sustainability goals and rather, examines and
improves the local social relations that exist within agro-
commodity chains to make sustainable palm oil governance more
socially-inclusive and just.
11
World Development 149 (2022) 105710
Conflict of interest statement
I have no known competing financial interests or personal rela-
tionships that could influence the work reported in this paper.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Adrienne Johnson: Conceptualization, Investigation, Writing –
original draft, Funding acquisition.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks goes to the various individuals and communities
that participated in this research project. Research assistance was
provided by Víctor Arroyo, Susana Anda, and Ashley Jimenez. Much
appreciation goes to Anthony Bebbington who read an earlier draft
of this paper. Also, thank you to editor, Dr. Chuan Liao, and two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback and suggestions.
The research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada (Award 752-2012-0801), the
Conference of Latin American Geographers (CLAG), the Land Deal
Politics Initiative, Clark University, and the University of San Fran-
cisco. Any remaining errors or omissions are my own.
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