Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313

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Ocean and Coastal Management

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman

Stakeholder diversity correlates with governance network performance in

two artisanal fisheries in Northwest Mexico
Manuel J. Zetina-Rejón a, *, José Alberto Zepeda-Domínguez b, Marian Rodríguez-Fuentes a,
Claudia María Fumero-Andreu a
a
Instituto Politécnico Nacional – Centro Interdisciplinario de Ciencias Marinas, Av. IPN S/N Col. Playa Palo Santa Rita, 23096, La Paz, Baja California Sur, Mexico
b
Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, Facultad de Ciencias Marinas, Carretera Transpeninsular Ensenada, Tijuana No. 3917, Colonia Playitas, C.P. 22860,
Ensenada, Baja California, México

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The sustainability of fisheries depends not only on the condition of the fish stock but also on the complex in­
Fisheries governance terrelationships of stakeholders. In this study, we employed network analysis to study the social structure of
Stakeholder diversity governance in two fisheries in Northwest Mexico. We selected two artisanal fisheries that are well-known to serve
Centrality indexes
as examples of successful and less effective governance: the red spiny lobster fishery (RLF) and the swimming
Network subgroups
crab fishery (SCF), respectively. We built two networks that represent the relationships between stakeholders in
Red lobster
Swimming crab each fishery. We found that stakeholders with higher levels of centrality are more diverse in the RLF compared
with the SCF. We also found that the RLF has characteristics of a more collaborative network with subgroups
with a high diversity of stakeholders, which is in contrast with the SCF. Additionally, given the similarity of
stakeholders’ roles in the RLF, more stakeholders are able to play roles currently played by other stakeholders,
which is in contrast to the SCF, where the roles are more divided. These results helped to elucidate the structure
of governance networks and the stakeholder’s roles, highlighting that the different levels of governance effi­
ciency are related to stakeholder diversity.

1. Introduction
The United Nations 2030 Agenda recognizes that a key element to
achieving sustainable development is good governance. Particularly, it
is well recognized that fisheries’ sustainability depends both on the
health of fish stocks and complex interactions between the stakeholders
and governance systems. In this sense, it is necessary to acknowledge the
complexity of the processes of governance (Adams et al., 2003) and the
social factors that enable adaptive co-management of natural resources
(Folke et al., 2005; Jentoft, 2005). Adaptive co-management of fisheries
promotes participation of direct users, governments and other stake­
holders in decision-making processes (d’Armengol et al., 2018), which
can contribute to a better governance system (Ostrom, 2009). In the last
two decades, the discussion of principles for efficient governance has
been continuing (Grafton et al., 2007; Henry and Dietz, 2011; Bodin,
2017). Even today, an understanding of fisheries governance structures
remains important because it can help to overcome the underlying
causes of unsustainability in fisheries (Grafton et al., 2007; Hilborn
et al., 2020). However, there is a risk that fisheries governance princi­
ples can easily be oversimplified, causing failures in resource manage­
ment due to the lack of empirical analysis (Young et al., 2018).
Therefore, there is a need to analyze case studies to understand which
properties of stakeholder networks foster good governance.
Stakeholders’ relationships shape the structure of social networks,
which can impact governance dynamics. The relationship between
specific attributes of network structure and governance performance
remains has not been elucidated. Nevertheless, the use of empirical data
can uncover crucial network characteristics that benefit governance
processes. For this reason, it is necessary to perform research to under­
stand when and how governance networks can be most effective (Bodin,
2017). Differences in structural network properties, such as number of
social ties, position of actors, presence of cohesive subgroups, and in­
teractions between those subgroups, could lead to different governance
processes and outcomes (Bodin and Crona, 2009). For example, the
presence of subgroups in governance networks can reduce effective
communication between actors (Barnes et al., 2016) or the inclusion of

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mzetina@ipn.mx (M.J. Zetina-Rejón).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105313
Received 23 March 2020; Received in revised form 18 July 2020; Accepted 23 July 2020
Available online 12 August 2020
0964-5691/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al.
diverse stakeholders can cause more positive outcomes (d’Armengol
et al., 2018). Thus, the study of governance of fisheries can be addressed
through a network approach that allows an understanding of different
unknowns that are otherwise not easily addressed, contrasting cases
with efficient or challenging governance. In this way, the evidence
arising from these studies can complete the social-ecological perspective
to reach sustainability (Hilborn et al., 2020). Hence, it is necessary to
identify vulnerabilities or sources of adaptive capacity and resilience in
social-ecological systems that can sustain ecosystem services and human
well-being (Chapin et al., 2010). Consequently, analysis of governance
networks is crucial, given that these networks are a key element of
social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2009).
In Mexico, the formal inclusion of governance aspects in the study of
fisheries is incipient. Although the topic has been addressed more
frequently in the last decade, it has not been fully integrated into
Mexican fisheries policy to date. Most of these studies have been per­
formed in the northwestern region of Mexico (Peña-Puch et al., 2020)
because it is the most important region for fisheries, supporting 60% of
national landings on average. In this area, there are well-managed
fisheries with an effective governance system that follows accepted
sustainability standards, such as the red lobster fishery (RLF), from the
peninsula of Baja California (Bourillon, 2009; Pérez-Ramírez et al.,
2012; McCay et al., 2014). However, there are other fisheries of com­
munity impact at a regional level for which management faces complex
challenges due to environmental and governance conditions. One
example is the swimming crab fishery (SCF) of the Sonora coasts in the
Gulf of California (DOF, 2014; Zepeda et al., 2015).
In the last decades, progress has been made in the management of
Mexican fisheries. Some have achieved international sustainability
standards (e.g., fishery certification) or implemented co-management
through participatory processes, particularly in northwestern region of
Fig. 1. Location of case studies fisheries. The brown swimming crab fishery is located in the state of Sonora, and the red spiny lobster is located in the peninsula of
Baja California. The fishing concession area is shown in the dashed box (see text). After Basurto et al. (2000) and Pérez-Ramírez et al. (2012).
2
Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313
the country. However, although studies using a social-ecological
perspective (transdisciplinary approach) of Mexican fisheries have
been increasing, very few management plans have integrated their re­
sults into strategic goals or target objectives (Peña-Puch et al., 2020). In
particular, there is a lack of fisheries governance assessments in
small-scale fisheries; therefore, further efforts are needed to formally
incorporate them into management plans (Espinosa-Romero et al., 2014;
Peña-Puch et al., 2020). In this context, while fisheries in Mexico are
subject to the same administration policies under the same legal
framework, there is a lack in the understanding of the properties of
stakeholders’ networks interactions that create differences between an
efficient and a complicated fishery governance system. Hence, the main
aim of this study was to analyze the social structure of the stakeholders
in fisheries governance networks in two case studies: 1) the red lobster
fishery from the peninsula of Baja California and 2) the swimming crab
fishery in the Gulf of California. We focus on comparing the structure of
the governance networks to highlight differences between effective and
less successful governance systems.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Case studies
We selected two fisheries to compare stakeholders’ roles and
network structure in their governance systems. We chose the brown
swimming crab in the state of Sonora as an example of a fishery with
complicated governance and the red spiny lobster from the peninsula of
Baja California as an example of a fishery with successful governance
(Fig. 1).
The artisanal fishery of the brown swimming crab (Callinectes belli­
cosus) in the state of Sonora is located on the northern coasts of the Gulf
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al.
of California. The rights of use are assigned mainly through permits to
the fishermen’s cooperative societies or to independent fishers (permit
holders). There are at least three ethnic groups involved in the exploi­
tation of this fishery: the Seris in the central region, the Yaquis in the
south and the mixed-race communities present along the entire coastline
where this fishery is located. Insufficient access to education, healthcare,
employment sources, housing, and drinking water services are in­
dicators of the social lag of this region (Zárate-Valdez, 2016). The
original territories of the Seris have been reduced since the Spanish
colonization. To ensure the survival of the Seris culture and reduce
conflicts with other communities, the Mexican government granted
them their own territory, including a portion of coastal land and Tiburon
Island and its marine surrounding waters (Fig. 1) (Basurto et al., 2000).
The agreement includes a fishing concession that states that only the Seri
fishing cooperatives may extract marine resources from these areas,
which generates conflicts with other fishers in the region mainly because
marine boundaries are not clearly defined by the law. However, in 2011,
an NGO (COBI) and fishing authorities started a participatory process to
develop a management plan for the fishery that included stakeholders
from different communities, including people from indigenous groups.
The management plan was finally published in 2014 and stated that the
stock is harvested to the maximum sustainable yield with the recom­
mendation not to increase fishing efforts beyond this limit. The rules for
management of the resource also contemplate a seasonal closure and
regulate the fishing methods allowed (DOF, 2014). Government au­
thorities have promoted the integration of permit holders and co­
operatives in the fisheries management committee to strengthen the
value chain. However, this integration has not been achieved because
commercialization of the product is informal and mostly based on per­
sonal relationships. In addition, the committee does not have a technical
advisory committee or a community co-management body.
The red lobster fishery (Panulirus interruptus) is distributed along the
Pacific coast of the central region of the Baja California Peninsula. This
fishery is considered to be exploited to the maximum sustainable yield.
During 2012, approximately 2000 tons (70% of the national production)
were captured with a value close to $23 million USD. This fishery is
organized in cooperatives and federations of cooperatives. The assign­
ment of rights occurs through permissions and concessions with space
rights for the fishery’s users. The fishery is co-managed by the National
Commission of Aquaculture and Fisheries (CONAPESCA), the National
Fisheries Institute (INAPESCA) and fishermen (Pérez-Ramírez et al.,
2012). Mexican law provides guidelines, which specifies gears, mini­
mum sizes, restrictions on the capture of ovigerous females and tem­
porary closures (DOF, 2016). Strong collaboration occurs among all
types of stakeholders, including academia, NGOs, federal regulation
agencies and producers (Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012). Cooperatives are
vertically integrated, and fishing communities have a considerable sense
of identity and belonging. The development of the fishery and the region
itself has been supported by the generation of interdisciplinary scientific
information (Consejo Nacional de Langosta del Pácifico, 2019). This
information allowed the fishery to meet high qualification standards in
relation to the three fundamental principles of the Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC): 1) sustainable populations, 2) minimal environmental
impacts and 3) effective management of the resource. The red rock
lobster case study fishery became one of the first fisheries in the
developing world to achieve MSC certification (Pérez-Ramírez et al.,
2012).
2.2. Data collection
To map the stakeholders of the fisheries and their relationships, we
conducted a two-phase data collection from July 2013 to July 2014. For
each case study, the first phase involved interviews with two key in­
formants who are well familiarized with the respective local fishery. The
result of this first phase was a preliminary list of actors named by the two
key informants. Then, for the second phase, the snowball sampling
3
Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313
method (Goodman, 1961) was applied, in which subsequent interviews
are conducted by asking each actor from the preliminary list to name
other important actors. Then, the same is done with the new actors
named in this round and so on until fewer and fewer new actors appear.
We conducted a total of 10 interviews in each case study. Using an actor
accumulation curve, Zepeda et al. (2017) showed that with this number
of interviews, it is possible to represent 97% and 99% of the total of
actors from the red lobster and swimming crab fisheries, respectively.
The ethical and technical details described by Fontana and Frey (2005)
and Prell (2012) were followed for the design, calibration and applica­
tion of the interviews. All interviews were semi-structured, face-to-face,
and no longer than 45 min. The interviews were used to identify re­
lationships between actors which can include all interactions between
them within the fishery (e.g. planning, extraction, product distribution,
commercialization, etc.). For interpretation purposes, we classified ac­
tors into different stakeholders categories defined on their types and the
main activities in the fishery (Table 1).
2.3. Data analysis
The list of all identified stakeholders included in the analysis is
provided in Annex 1. We built two empirical networks from the infor­
mation obtained from the interviews, one for each case study. The net­
works nodes represent the stakeholders, and relationships between them
were defined as undirected weighted links. The weight of the links was
based on the number of times the relationship was identified in the in­
terviews. To analyze the role of stakeholders and the governance
structure of our case study fisheries, we used centrality indexes to
measure the positional relevance of each actor (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). The first index we calculated was the weighted degree index (Di),
which is the sum of the weights of links between an actor and all others
in the network. This index measures the level of connectivity of each
actor to other actors. The second index calculated was the closeness
centrality index (CCi), which quantifies the inverse of the distance of a
given actor to all others (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The index was
estimated as follows:
1
CCi = ∑
n
dij
j=1
where i ∕
= j, and dij is the length of the geodesic distances between actors
i and j in the network. This index measures how close an actor is to
Table 1
Stakeholder categories used in the analysis of governance network.
Category Description
1 Academia University and research organizations.
2 Conservation Federal agencies in charge of conservation and protection
of the environment.
3 Enforcement Federal agencies responsible for observance and
enforcement of laws.
4 Federal Federal agencies in charge of administration, regulation,
Regulation and enforcement of fisheries.
5 Financial Government agencies providing financial support
(subsidies and incentives) for the fishery.
6 Local Regulation State agencies working in coordination with federal
regulation agencies to assist their activities.
7 NGO Nongovernmental organizations promoting sustainable
fishing practices.
8 Producers Fishing cooperatives or permit holders with fishing rights.
9 Quality Agencies involved in technical support for achieving
quality, traceability and sustainability international
standards.
10 Social Federal agencies supporting social development
Development promoting employment rights and obligations and actions
related to decent work.
11 Wholesaler Middlemen buying fisheries products from fishers or
fishing cooperatives to sell to larger markets.
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313

another actor, and those with high closeness can quickly influence other performed with blockmodeling package version 0.3.4 (Žiberna, 2007).
actors given their short communication paths to the others. Finally, we
calculated the betweenness centrality index (BCi) that measures how 3. Results
frequently actor i is noted on the paths between every pair of actors j and
k (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This index was calculated as follows: We identified 30 and 35 key stakeholders belonging to 6 and 11
∑gjki different stakeholder categories in the swimming crab (SCF) and red
BCi =
g spiny lobster (RLF) fisheries governance network, respectively (Fig. 2a
j<k jk
and b, Table A1 and Table A2). In the SCF, we identified stakeholders
from six categories: academia, enforcement, federal regulation, NGOs,
where i ∕ = j and k, gjk is the number of paths between actors j and k, and
producers, and wholesalers. In addition, for the RLF, we found stake­
gjki is the number of these paths where actor i is present. This index thus
holders from conservation, financial, social development, local regula­
measures how often an actor falls along the paths between other nodes,
tion, and quality categories. In Fig. 3, we present the rank of
thus modulating interaction between actors. All indexes values were
stakeholders according to centrality indexes for the SCF and RLF,
normalized (0–1) for comparison purposes. We analyzed the correlation
respectively. In general, for both fisheries, stakeholders with higher
between the actor’s degree, closeness, and betweenness indexes using a
values of degree index were different from those with higher values of
Spearman’s rank test.
closeness and betweenness. A Spearman’s rank correlation test revealed
Additionally, we used the community finding algorithm (Newman
that the connectivity of individual stakeholders measured by the degree
and Girvan, 2004) to detect cohesive subgroups, which are subsets of
index was not correlated with their closeness or betweenness in both
nodes that are well connected among themselves, but are only sparsely
fisheries (Table 2). In contrast, in both fisheries, actor closeness and
connected to other nodes from others subgroups. This algorithm is based
betweenness were positively correlated. In the RLF, all federal regula­
on a network modularity index (MW) that measures how modular a
tion agencies were well connected, showing high values of degree index.
network is based on difference between the proportion of links within
However, some local regulation agencies, producers (fishing co­
and between subgroups (Guimerà et al., 2007; Newman and Girvan,
operatives), and conservation and academia stakeholders also exhibited
2004). For weighted networks, the network modularity (MW) is calcu­
high values of this index. For the SCF, the most connected actors were
lated according to (Guimerà et al., 2007) as follows:
two federal regulation agencies, an NGO, a producer and an academia
[ ( all )2 ]
NM ( in )
∑ stakeholder. In the SCF, few stakeholders have higher values of
ws ws
MW =
W
−
2W betweenness, and they also have higher values of closeness. In contrast,
for the RLF, stakeholders with higher values for closeness and
s=1

betweenness were more diverse. Of note, in SCF, there are some

where W is the sum of the weighted interactions of all actors, win s is the
wholesalers with high values of closeness and betweenness in the SCF in
sum of the weights of actor interactions within the subgroup s, and walls is contrast with the RLF where the only one wholesaler had low values of
the sum of the weights of actor interactions involving actor i within
these indexes. Additionally, the values of closeness and betweenness of
subgroup s and all other actors. The goal of the community finding al­
enforcement agency were high in the RLF and low in the SCF.
gorithm is to identify the network partitioning into subgroups that
The analysis of cohesive subgroups also shows differences between
maximize MW. Based on a simplified view, the algorithm works as fol­
the two fisheries, even though the number of subgroups and mixture of
lows. In the first step, the network is partitioned such that each actor is
stakeholders in the subgroups are similar (Table 3, Fig. 2c and d). The
considered as a subgroup, and MW is calculated. In subsequent steps,
distribution of the number of stakeholders in subgroups in the RLF was
actors are joined in new subgroups, and, MW is calculated again in each
more homogeneous compared with the SCF, where a subgroup aggre­
step. Due to the large number of possible partitions of a network, the
gates up to 44% of the total number of stakeholders. Additionally, the
process is repeated using heuristic algorithms to identify the partitioning
subgroups in the RLF were more diverse with actors from different
that maximizes the MW value. By maximizing the value of MW, the
categories compared with the SCF where most subgroups included three
resulting network partition includes subgroups of nodes with dense
or less stakeholder categories. Additionally, the number of links and
connections between them but sparse connections between nodes in
their weights within subgroups are higher in the SCF compared with the
different subgroups. After this step, we identified the size and compared
RLF. Thus, most interactions occur within members of the same sub­
the diversity of actors in the subgroups detected in our two fisheries
groups in the SCF in contrast with the RLF, where subgroups exhibit
using Shannon’s diversity index, and differences were further examined
more interactions between them (Fig. 2c and d). We also observed dif­
using a paired Student’s t-test.
ferences in the diversity of stakeholders in subgroups for the two fish­
Finally, the similarities in actor roles were analyzed using the regular
eries, and diversity was relatively increased in the red lobster fishery
equivalence (REGE) algorithm (White and Reitz, 1983). This approach
(Fig. 4). The t-test diversity confirmed significant differences (p < 0.05).
assumes that equivalent actors occupy similar positions and are related
These results imply more interactions occur between more diverse
in the same way to others who have also the same or similar roles
stakeholders within subgroups in the red spiny lobster fishery.
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This algorithm classifies actors based on
The analysis of similarities of actor roles shows that clusters included
the similarity of their relationships in the network. For example, if two
stakeholders from different categories for both fisheries (Fig. 5). How­
actors are equivalent, then if one is connected to a third party, then the
ever, the dendrogram showed that we identified two clusters for the RLF
other one has a corresponding connection to an equivalent third party
and three for the SCF at a level of 80% of equivalence (0.2 distance
but not necessarily to the same actor. This approach is based on a
coefficient). The smaller number of clusters with higher equivalence
comparison of all links in the network for all pairs of actors. The output
indicates that more stakeholders tend to play similar roles.
is a square distance matrix that records regular equivalence coefficients
between each pair of actors. In this instance, we estimated those co­
4. Discussion
efficients as distance measures ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates
perfectly equivalent roles and 1 completely different roles. This matrix
In this study, using quantitative network analysis tools, we show that
was submitted to cluster analysis to group actors with similarities in
stakeholder networks differ between a fishery with effective governance
their roles.
and one with less successful governance. This finding implies that not
All network analyses were performed using the igraph package
only stakeholder interactions but also stakeholder diversity can help to
version 0.7.0 for the R-programming language (Csárdi and Nepusz,
understand the governance network performance of fisheries resources.
2006) with the exception of the regular equivalence analysis, which was
Even when management plans take into account the natural variability

4
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al.
of fish resources and the environmental impact of fisheries, adequate
governance is one of the essential requisites to achieve successful
management of natural resources (Ostrom, 2009). This notion is
attributed to the fact that governance is the system that shapes the
performance of natural resource users, and governance is responsible for
how the environment is exploited and to what extent. For example,
adaptive management strategies often considered in effective gover­
nance are useful for addressing fluctuations of exploited resources as
suggested by Fuller et al. (2017).
Collaborative governance is one of the preferred means to address
environmental problems and achieve local solutions (Bodin, 2017). In
this context, the understanding of stakeholders interactions is needed to
identify the strengths and weaknesses in governance networks. Effective
collaboration among actors is needed because people and institutions
can be adapted to environmental variation but not vice versa. Thus, the
understanding of ecological system is a prerequisite for the sustain­
ability of a fishery, but it is not sufficient. Additionally, it is necessary to
integrate this knowledge into informed decision-making processes that
promotes sustainable practices within an effective governance system.
Effective governance can contribute to sustainability through collabo­
ration and achievement of consensual agreements among stakeholders
that diminish potential environmental conflicts.
One of the most useful approaches to characterizing how stake­
holders interact is network analysis methods. These methods are helpful
in identifying the position of stakeholders in the complex system and
enable the recognition of roles and groups of stakeholders interacting
more closely. This knowledge is a basic step towards proposing man­
agement actions or adapting strategies for the use of natural resources.
The engagement, collaboration and diversity of stakeholders are critical
for successful management (d’Armengol et al., 2018). In this paper, we
evaluate stakeholder interactions with contrasting evidence from two
5
Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313
Fig. 2. Fisheries governance networks for the swim­
ming crab (2a) and red spiny lobster (2b) in North­
west Mexico. Each node represents a stakeholder with
color and shapes indicating its category. The node
size is relative to the stakeholders’ degree index and
numbers are the stakeholder’s IDs according to Annex
1. The right graphs are the aggregated networks for
the swimming crab (2c) and red spiny lobster (2d).
Here each pie represents a cohesive subgroup
showing in colors the proportion of stakeholder cat­
egories in each subgroup. The pie size is relative to
the number of stakeholders and line thickness is
proportional to the number of interactions between
subgroups. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
fisheries with different levels of governance effectiveness. The fisheries
selected for this study are well-recognized examples of successful
governance (red spiny lobster, RLF) and complex governance (swim­
ming crab, SCF). The differences in the diversity of stakeholders noted
between the two fisheries suggest that the involvement of more different
types of stakeholders can contribute to better governance and manage­
ment (Chapin et al., 2010). Particularly, the RLF includes stakeholder
types engaged in conservation, financial support, social development,
quality and local regulation activities that were absent in the SCF. These
extra stakeholders contribute to the development of the fishery in areas
beyond resource extraction. For example, in the RLF, financial and
quality agencies support transformation and service processes, adding
value to the product (e.g., canning, processing, packing, distribution,
retailing, and eco-labeling). On the other hand, a low variety or diversity
of stakeholders, such as that noted in the SCF, is related to power in and
influence on decision-making processes being concentrated with few
stakeholders (Spitzeck and Hansen, 2010), which can lead to difficult
and conflict management and governance.
The degree, betweenness and closeness of stakeholders are related to
key processes in social networks (Glaser et al., 2012), and sustainability
goals require that decision-making processes include the full range of
stakeholders or at least as large a range as logistic constraints allow
(Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). For example, regime shifts observed in
marine ecosystems and ecosystem-based management can be better
faced when multiple stakeholders work together (deReynier et al., 2010;
Levin and Möllmann, 2015). Additionally, differences in structure of the
governance networks reveal that vulnerabilities to perturbation can be
highly distinctive for the two fisheries because the inclusion of more
stakeholders enhances cooperation (Fletcher et al., 2014).
Although high stakeholder connectivity is usually pursued in
collaborative networks, we found that a high level of connectivity
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313

Fig. 3. Centrality indexes of different stakeholders involved in the swimming crab fishery (upper panels) and red spiny lobster fishery (lower panels). Index values
are normalized (0–1) for comparison purposes. Colors and shapes indicate stakeholder category. The numbers above the symbol are the stakeholder’s IDs according
to Annex 1. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

Table 2
Correlation matrix of centrality indexes for two fisheries in Northwestern Mexico. SCF = swimming crab fishery; RLF = red spiny lobster fishery. * indicates significant
Spearman’s rank correlations p < 0.05.
SCF RLF

Degree Betweenness Closeness Degree Betweenness Closeness

Degree – –
Betweenness 0.36 – − 0.21 –
Closeness 0.35 0.83* – − 0.13 0.75* –

the distance of each actor to others and betweenness represents the

Table 3 frequency of stakeholders in network paths, these indexes measure to
Analysis of cohesive subgroups for governance network of two fisheries in
some extent the stakeholder’s level of influence and regulation of
Northwestern Mexico.
collaboration paths, respectively. Nevertheless, it seems important that
Swimming crab Red spiny lobster relationships also occur between different stakeholder types to support
Modularity index 0.07 0.06 better governance (Kininmonth et al., 2015; Bodin et al., 2016). The
Number of cohesive subgroups 4 4 interaction between actors of different types and categories leads them
% of stakeholders by subgroup 13, 20, 23, 44 17, 23, 23, 37
to influence each other to improve mutual learning, resource sharing
% of number of links in subgroups 56.8 48.2
% of links’ weights in subgroups 41.8 33.6 and advice (Reed et al., 2009). These factors are critical to efficient
governance and management. Conversely, if interactions occur only
between similar actors, successful resource management becomes
(degree index) does not necessarily mean high influence or regulation of difficult due to the necessity of including different opinions and skills.
the collaboration paths. This finding is attributed to the fact that the We found that for the RLF, stakeholders with high values in all three
degree index for measuring stakeholder connectivity only takes into centrality indexes were more diverse, which could provide strength in
account the number and strength of stakeholder links with immediate the decision-making processes. It has been documented that this fishery
neighbors. In this sense, this index does not consider the impact of allows participative management, which contributes to the identity of
stakeholders in the entire network. In contrast, since closeness measures

6
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al.
Fig. 4. Boxplot of Shannon’s diversity of stakeholders measured in subgroups
for two fisheries in Northwestern Mexico. SCF = Swimming crab fishery, RLF =
Red lobster fishery.
the community empowering local people as they expand their autonomy
in decision-making (Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012). In contrast, in condi­
tions of low social welfare, low levels of education and a lack of
Fig. 5. Hierarchical cluster of the analysis of regular equivalence of stakeholders for two fisheries in Northwestern Mexico. Colors and shapes indicate stakeholder
category. The numbers below the shapes are the stakeholder’s IDs according to Annex 1. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader
is referred to the Web version of this article.)
7
Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313
knowledge of management regulations in the region of the SCF
(Meza-Monge et al., 2015; Zárate-Valdez, 2016), stakeholder collabo­
rations in the decision-making process could be much more difficult. In
this sense, empowerment increases with stakeholder involvement and is
a key factor for co-management (Jentoft, 2005).
Another aspect to consider in reaching sustainability is how gover­
nance networks are structured. Homophily is common in the structure of
social networks, implying that people have a tendency to construct links
to actors that are similar to themselves (Henry and Dietz, 2011). This
tendency can lead to clustered networks reducing collaboration among
stakeholders of different types (Henry, 2011). Occasionally, clusters or
subgroups can inhibit the diffusion of sustainable behaviors due to no or
low sharing of information across subgroups (Barnes et al., 2016).
However, subgroups can enhance network efficiency because new in­
formation spreads faster when a network is clustered due to social
reinforcement from neighbors of same subgroups (Centola, 2010).
Although no strong differences were identified in the number or size of
subgroups for the two fisheries examined in this study, we propose that
diversity of stakeholders within subgroups can be a key factor in how
these stakeholders interact within their subgroups promoting mutual
and diverse learning, as in the two fisheries studied here. In addition,
when analyzing the role of stakeholders, we found that roles are divided
in more groups in the SCF than in the RLF. This division likely affects the
adaptive capacity of each fishery due that if roles are more divided, role
redundancy, information exchange and mutual learning can be limited
among stakeholders. Hence, more role redundancy is noted in the RLF
due to the lower number of clusters, so the clusters included more
stakeholders able to play roles that are currently played by other
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al.
stakeholders. This notion potentially allows the RLF to be more resilient
than the SCF because the former has increased capacity to lose stake­
holders without losing the functions they perform. Although two case
studies do not present reliable evidence on this notion at present, we
hypothesize that for an effective governance system as in the RLF,
subgroups composed of stakeholders from diverse categories may act
supportively, while more homogenous subgroups may act as a hindrance
as in the SCF. This is because when a governance system has diverse
stakeholders grouped in multiple centers of decision-making, it is
polycentric, and this form of governance enhances adaptive capacity
and social strategies are aligned with ecological processes for risk
mitigation (Carlisle and Gruby, 2017). However, future research should
include consideration of which factors in governance networks structure
promotes resilience and effective governance.
In the case of the RLF, it is well known that fishermen have a high
level of organization in fishing cooperatives with a democratic decision-
making system. The fishing cooperatives possess a professional structure
in areas, such as production, processing, commercialization, stock
assessment, and administration (Bourillon, 2009). This notion is
consistent with the finding of stakeholders from social development and
financial categories in the fishery governance network. The organization
of fishing cooperatives contributes to the empowerment of fishermen
because they interact with different types of stakeholders, which con­
tributes to mutual learning. Empowerment was demonstrated in the role
analysis results. These results demonstrated that different types of
stakeholders contribute different skills, creating constructive roles.
These constructive roles create a strong sense of community among
fishermen, which, with the support of NGOs and government author­
ities, resulted in co-management for addressing environmental and po­
litical crises, i.e., when the high value abalone resource (also exploited
by the same fishers) was threatened due to 1982–1983 El Niño events
(McCay et al., 2014). Actually, co-management that involves fishermen
and federal and local authorities is key to the success of the regulatory
measures implemented in the RLF. In fact, the lobster management plan
and Mexican legislation established that fishing cooperatives must
cooperate with government and academia to conduct stock assessments
to maintain their exclusive access rights (Phillips, 2008; Ponce-Díaz
et al., 2009; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012).
There have been efforts to improve governance of the SCF, particu­
larly by NGOs through the development of a management plan with a
participatory process, but achieving this objective has not been easy. In
this context, the main goals of the management plans are to promote
adaptive co-management and best fishing practices, improve the stock
condition, develop innovative fishing methods, and strengthen the value
chain among others. To reach those goals, the management plan
considered new management organizational structures, such as a fishing
regional management committee and local subcommittees, to be
imperative with the aim to support the participation of all actors at
different scales (DOF, 2014). However, not all local subcommittees have
been operating (Espinosa-Romero et al., 2014), thereby causing difficult
interactions among different stakeholders. Additionally, evidence sug­
gests that the swimming crab is not a single homogeneous population
along the coast of Sonora but a metapopulation composed of dependent
local populations connected through larval dispersion during the
spawning period (Cisneros-Mata et al., 2019). This notion implies that
management decisions should be set at local scales but also take
neighboring areas into account. In this regard, the interaction of local
subcommittees is key for matching governance with ecological scales of
the fish resource (Espinosa-Romero et al., 2014). The incipient func­
tioning of the organizational structures considered in the management
plan could explain the presence of subgroups with low diversity of
stakeholders where mutual learning and information flow are limited.
It is important to recognize some elements that can contribute to
governance performance and create differences between two case
studies. For example, the red lobster fishery has obtained support from
the Mexican authorities to continue scientific research, communication
8
Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313
between stakeholders is efficient, and negotiation and agreements be­
tween managers and users are also productive. In addition, fishing
communities had received governmental support for social programs,
electrical services, road access, fish equipment and processing plants
(Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012). Most of these supports arose after the
fishery was certified. Also, there is a strong attachment and belonging
among the lobster fishery workers and their community and fish sus­
tainability issues are addressed through effective co-management and
active community involvement (Ponce-Díaz et al., 2009). This has led to
increase participation and empowerment of diverse users. On the other
hand, in the swimming crab fishery, the involvement of governmental
and nongovernmental groups has been challenging. Particularly, when
highly political and economic interests are at stake among participating
actors, effective cooperation is difficult to reach (Basurto et al., 2000).
However, when relationships based on trust and reciprocity between
local people and NGOs are developed, good working schemes can arise,
like in the case of COBI that promoted the development of the man­
agement plan (Espinosa-Romero et al., 2014). For this reason, major
efforts may be needed in the swimming crab fisheries to involve and
empower fishing users and local communities. This implies to invest in
social capital to promote social development, improve trust and
collaborative networks. In this way, local people could cooperate in the
efforts made by government and NGOs to improve management stra­
tegies and governance performance. Also, it is necessary to increase
transparent management institutions, involvement and empowerment
of diverse actors in fisheries councils to promote devolution of different
fishing duties, decentralize decision-making processes and implement
adaptive co-management.
5. Conclusions
Differences were noted in the governance network properties of the
two case studies. The evidence suggests that a high diversity of stake­
holders involved in governance networks positively affect governance
performance. For example, more stakeholders with higher centrality
indexes were classified as different types in the red lobster fishery
compared with the swimming crab fishery. Additionally, high diversity
of stakeholders in cohesive subgroups represents a factor promoting
better governance. However, if the similarity of stakeholders’ roles is
reduced, there is reduced redundancy of stakeholders in the governance
networks, which can reduce resilience to the governance system. The
network approach introduced in this paper indicated to be a useful tool
to understand the governance systems of distinct types of fisheries.
Through quantitative network analysis, the findings allow us to under­
stand the different complexities of both fisheries governance networks.
However, the approach used in this study has some limitations. For
example, the reduced number of case studies is a limitation. These
fisheries are located in same regional area and both are artisanal fish­
eries. Additionally, the data used here only identified relationships
among stakeholders without further analyzing the type and nature of
these relationships. We suggest further research on other case studies
and analyzing different interactions among stakeholders to investigate
whether some of these interactions are critical in successful governance
schemes.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for financial support received from Project
SIP-IPN 20200819. MJZR thanks EDI and COFAA from Instituto
Politécnico Nacional. JAZD thanks PRODEP UABC-PTC-802 for
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313

financial support.

Annex 1. List of stakeholders and category classification based on their main activities in the two case studies (see Table 1). All names
were intentionally conserved in Spanish, and personal names (marketers, permit holders, etc.) were anonymized to preserve privacy

Table A1
Swimming crab fishery

ID Name Category

1 Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura Federal Regulation

2 Secretaría de Marina Enforcement
3 Instituto Nacional de la Pesca Federal Regulation
4 Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación Federal Regulation
5 Instituto de Acuacultura del Estado de Sonora Academia
6 Universidad de Sonora Academia
7 Centro de Investigaciones Biológicas del Noroeste Academia
8 Centro de Investigación en Alimentación y Desarrollo Academia
9 Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C. NGO
10 Centro Intercultural de Estudios de Desiertos y Oceanos A.C. NGO
11 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
12 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
13 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
14 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
15 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
16 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
17 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
18 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
19 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
20 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
21 Anonymous marketer Wholesaler
22 Comité Estatal Sistema Producto Jaiba en Sonora A.C. Producers
23 Fishermen’s Cooperative Society 1 Producers
24 Permit holder 1 Producers
25 Fishermen’s Cooperative Society 2 Producers
26 Fishermen’s Cooperative Society 3 Producers
27 Fishermen’s Cooperative Society 4 Producers
28 Permit holder 2 Producers
29 Unión de productores de Puerto Peñasco A.C. Producers
30 Anonymous Independent Consultant Academia

Table A2
Red lobster fishery

ID Name Category

1 Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura Federal Regulation

2 Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura (Delegación del Estado de Baja California) Federal Regulation
3 Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura (Delegación del Estado de Baja California Sur) Federal Regulation
4 Secretaría de Pesca de Baja California Local Regulation
5 Secretaría de Pesca de Baja California Sur Local Regulation
6 Secretaría de Desarrollo Baja California Sur Financial
7 Secretaría de Pesca de Baja California Sur - Fondo para la Protección del los Recursos Marinos Local Regulation
8 Comisión Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas Conservation
9 Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente Conservation
10 Secretaría de Marina Enforcement
11 Secretaría de Economía Financial
12 Comisión Federal para la Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios Quality
13 Servicio Nacional de Sanidad, Inocuidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria Quality
14 Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social Social Development
15 Comité Estatal de Sanidad Acuícola e Inocuidad de Baja California Quality
16 Instituto Nacional de la Pesca - Centro Regional de Investigación Pesquera en Baja California Federal Regulation
17 Instituto Nacional de la Pesca - Centro Regional de Investigación Pesquera en Baja California Sur Federal Regulation
18 Centro de Investigaciones Biológicas del Noroeste Academia
19 Centro Interdisciplinario de Ciencias Marinas Academia
20 Centro de Investigación Científica y Estudios Superiores de Ensenada Academia
21 Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Academia
22 Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Sur Academia
23 Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C. NGO
24 Grupo de Ecología y Conservación de Islas, A. C. NGO
25 Terrapeninsular A.C. NGO
26 Marine Stewardship Council Quality
27 Stanford University Academia
28 Federación de Cooperativas Pesqueras de Baja California Sur Producers
29 Federación de Cooperativas Pesqueras de Baja California Producers
30 Confederación Mexicana de Cooperativas Pesqueras Producers
(continued on next page)

9
M.J. Zetina-Rejón et al. Ocean and Coastal Management 196 (2020) 105313

Table A2 (continued )
ID Name Category

31 Sociedades Cooperativas de Producción Pesquera Producers

32 Comité Sistema Producto langosta Baja California Producers
33 Comité Sistema Producto langosta Baja California Sur Producers
34 Comité Sistema Producto langosta Nacional Producers
35 Ocean Garden Wholesaler

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