Language in Society 22, 235-255.

Printed in the United States of America

The semantics of certainty in Quechua and its

implications for a cultural epistemology
JANIS B. NUCKOLLS
Department of Anthropology, Indiana University,
Bloom ing ton, IN 47405

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to attempts on the part of Quechua scholars to

understand the evidential system of this language family, and thereby
paves the way for a more complex understanding of Quechua speakers'
language and culture. The author opposes the position that the most
general meaning of the -mi suffix is to indicate a direct or first-hand
experience; and she holds that specific claims about Quechua speakers'
epistemological orientations, based on such an analysis, cannot be sup-
ported. Evidence from speakers' use of -mi indicates that it encodes two
paradigmatic contrasts: one is status-like or modal, the other evidential.
The patterning of -mi, including its use and nonuse in a variety of speech
types, suggests that Quechua speakers from the Pastaza region of Ecuador
do not share Euro-American concern for facts that transcend aesthetic
and emotive significance. (Quechua language and culture, evidentiality,
language in context, grammatical categories)*

"He could never become a war photographer or a photographer of acci-

dents in the street," Susan Sontag has written. "What he looks for . . . is
the quiddity or "isness" of something. Not the truth about something, but
the strongest version of it."
About the late Robert Mapplethorpe
(Newsweek July 25, 1988, pp. 56-57)
The ways in which speakers of different languages make clear their basis for
asserting something is referred to by the general term evidentiality (Chafe &
Nichols 1986). Broadly conceived, linguistic evidentiality is considered from
two very general perspectives. On the one hand, evidential markers may indi-
cate a speaker's attitude regarding the validity of certain information, e.g.,
whether it is certain, probable, or untrustworthy. On the other hand, eviden-
tially marked utterances may indicate how knowledge or information was
acquired, e.g., through personal experience, inference, or report. If through
experience, then a speaker may additionally specify a dominant sensory
modality, such as visual or auditory, or a particular state of consciousness,

© 1993 Cambridge University Press 0047-4045/93 $5.00 + .00

235
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

such as a dream or revelation. Given the epistemological character of linguis-

tic evidentiality, it is not surprising that some linguists have attempted to infer
culturally specific values for knowledge and truth on the basis of evidential
usage.
This article contributes to attempts by Quechua scholars to understand
the evidential system of this language family. It also addresses one attempt
to characterize a cultural epistemology from linguistic evidence. I examine
evidentiality in the Pastaza dialect of Ecuadorean Quechua, giving particular
attention to the paradigmatic contrasts defined by one suffix. I argue, with
data from a number of discursive contexts, that the most general function
of the suffix -mi is to mark what is asserted by the speaker of an utterance,
and that a variety of particular meanings follow from this one. Moreover,
the distributional and semantic regularities exhibited by -mi across all Quechua
dialects support this analysis, and cast suspicion on that offered by Weber
1986 for the Quechua languages of Central Peru. Weber's claim for a Quechua
axiom of direct experience underlying the use of -mi can thus not be sup-
ported. I conclude by suggesting that an adequate understanding of the epis-
temological orientations of Pastaza Quechua speakers can only be approached
through an initial negation of certain aspects of our own scientific stance.
Specifically, the objectivist separation of facts from values is fundamentally
inappropriate for understanding the Pastaza Quechua. Evidence from their
evidential usage and their performative speech acts suggests that they are
extremely preoccupied with the aesthetic and emotional significance of their
experience, rather than with the merely verifiable "facts" of experience.
The Pastaza Quechua are a sizable and growing population, inhabiting that
part of Ecuador that begins at the eastern foothills of the Andes, stretches
out across the lowland rain forest, and ends at the Peruvian border. This
region encompasses the Napo and Pastaza provinces, which demarcate rel-
atively distinctive dialects. All the data in this article are taken from tape-
recorded conversations between myself and Quechua speakers from the
village of Puka yaku, situated along the Bobonaza river in the province of
Pastaza. This dialect belongs to a larger division of the Quechua language
family that is descended from the Inca lingua franca, and is referred to var-
iously as Quechua II (Torero 1964, Adelaar 1992), Quechua A (Parker 1963),
or Peripheral Quechua (Mannheim 1991). Among grammarians of all dia-
lects, there is a general consensus about the existence of evidentiality. How-
ever, there is disagreement about the ways that evidentiality is expressed
across dialects. Without wishing to undermine the very real differences that
define these dialects, I suggest that some of these alleged differences should
be reconsidered.
It has been claimed that the suffix -mi marks an assertion based on first-
hand information (Cole 1982:164, Cerron-Palomino 1987:288) or on direct
experience (Weber 1986:138-9). Alternatively, it has been claimed that -mi
236
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

marks an assertion that is believed true, regardless of a speaker's informa-

tional source (Le6n 1950:13, Orr & Wrisley 1965:162, Bills et al. 1969:261-2,
Adelaar 1977:79, Ross 1979:4). What is significant about these alternative
analyses is that one position does not necessarily exclude the other; thus
Parker (1969:94) has stated that -mi indicates both a personal conviction and
a first-hand experience. The importance of these alternative analyses, then,
lies in how (if at all) they are to be analytically related. Weber (1986:140),
who adopts the position that -mi means 'learned by direct experience', also
admits that -mi can indicate personal conviction, "but only because of the
axiom that direct experience is reliable (and thus one is convinced about
it)."' The consequences of adopting his analysis are potentially quite signif-
icant. If Weber's interpretation of -mi is accepted, then we are forced to con-
clude that Quechua speakers are limited, in their making of assertions, to
"first-hand information" or "direct experience." This is a very strong empir-
icist claim, with consequences that need to be critically examined. Weber has
addressed the implications of his analysis by attributing a utilitarian view
of the world to Quechua speakers. From his claim that the -mi suffix means
'learned by direct experience', he moves to a set of assumptions about Quechua
culture: the Quechua speaker is described as a pragmatic, maximizing indi-
vidual, who believes that "only one's own experience is reliable," who "avoids
unnecessary risk," and assumes responsibility "only if it is safe to do so"
(1986:138).
Putting aside the very real difficulties in distinguishing "direct" from "indi-
rect" experiences, how are culturally constituted beliefs to be asserted by
Quechua speakers? The epistemological pitfalls of Weber's analysis can be
avoided, I suggest, if the variations in the meaning of -mi are properly
related. To understand the variations in the meaning of case forms, Jakob-
son ([1936] 1984:62) noted the important distinction between a general mean-
ing or Gesamtbedeutung, described as "a single abstract concept," and
particular meanings or Sonderbedeutungen, which are the "concrete appli-
cations" derived from it. Using these concepts, I argue that, for all dialects
of Quechua, the Gesamtbedeutung of -mi is modally assertive. In all dialects,
-mi participates in a paradigmatic contrast with the negative suffix -chu, and
functions to make an assertion on whatever basis. Second, I argue that one
of the Sonderbedeutungen of -mi in many dialects is to distinguish a speaker's
own assertion from someone else's. When it is so used, -mi can and often
does imply first-hand or direct experience, but it need not. The advantage
of this analysis is that it identifies a pan-dialectal regularity that has long been
unrecognized; at the same time, it accounts for the multiple semantic nuances
of -mi used by Quechua speakers. Furthermore, by expanding the consider-
ation of data beyond referential statements, and by considering performa-
tive speech acts as well, this analysis approaches a more defensible appraisal
of an indigenous Quechua epistemology.
237
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

EVIDENTIALITY IN QUECHUA
Quechua's evidential system is built around a concern for making an asser-
tion, or distinguishing a speaker's point of view from someone else's, or
expressing doubt.2 However, there are variations in the form and expression
of these concepts across dialects, and some disagreement about their nature.
The specific task of this article is to clarify the most general semantic func-
tions of one suffix, and by doing so to pave the way for a more complex
understanding of Pastaza Quechua speakers' linguistic culture.
The morphological shape of evidential -mi varies somewhat with respect
to dialect. Both Ayacucho and Tarma have allomorphs -mi and -m (Parker
1969:83, Adelaar 1977:79, Cerron-Palomino 1987:288). Bolivian Quechua
has -min (Bills et al. 1969:261). The Imbabura, Napo, and Pastaza dialects
of Ecuadorean Quechua, as well as the Huanuco dialect of Peruvian Quechua,
have only one form, -mi (Leon 1950:13, Orr & Wrisley 1965:162, Mugica
1967:8, Ross 1979:4, Cole 1982:164, Weber 1989:419). For convenience, I
represent this suffix as -mi throughout the text. These variations in the for-
mal shape of -mi are united by formal distributional and semantic regulari-
ties. In every dialect, -mi is an independent suffix; i.e., it occurs with any
lexical class, and it is always the last suffix of a bound form. Furthermore,
in every Quechua dialect, -mi participates in a paradigmatic contrast with the
negative suffix -chu. This contrast with -chu is what defines the assertive
function of -mi across dialects. In all dialects, -mi is used to make a declar-
ative statement in the indicative mood, often in response to yes/no questions.
The contrast between -mi and -chu is fundamental, and is one of the earliest
lessons learned by students of Quechua, in part because it illustrates an almost
perfect symmetry. A question is asked by suffixing the morpheme -chu onto
that portion of the utterance which is the focus of the question. (In all the
examples below, the constituent to which the suffixes are added will be
underlined in both Quechua and English.) For example, the following ques-
tion was once addressed to me by a friend the first time she visited my tem-
porary residence:
(1) Kay-chu punug angi? (I)
'Is it here that you sleep?'
If the reply is positive, as was mine in reply to this question, then the utter-
ance is repeated with -mi replacing -chu as the focus of the new, modally
assertive, utterance:
(2) Nda. Kay-mi punug ani. (N)
'Yes. It's here that I sleep.'
In this way, yes/no questions can be asked and answered about any specific
semantic structure within a sentence. When it is used to assert what has been
questioned, -mi contrasts with the suffix -chu, because it is used to affirm
what -chu has called into question.
238
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

Past assessments of the -mi suffix have not properly articulated the inter-
relations between Gesamtbedeutung and Sonderbedeutungen. The assertive
function of -mi, which is its Gesamtbedeutung, contrasts with negative -chu.
We can adopt Jakobson's terminology and consider the assertive -mi a sta-
tus category, because it defines the "logical quality of an event" (Jakobson
[1957] 1984:46). Alternatively, assertive -mi could be described as a modal
category - again adopting Jakobson's definition - because it "reflects the
speaker's view of the character of the connection between the action and
the actor or the goal" (ibid., 46). Data from Pastaza Quechua will reveal that
assertive -mi combines status-like with modal functions. However, -mi
encodes yet another categorial distinction which includes its Sonderbedeu-
tungen. Among its particular meanings, -mi distinguishes a speaker's own
assertion from someone else's, and also a speaker's direct versus indirect
experience. These meanings are properly evidential because they concern the
"source of information about the narrated event" (Jakobson [1957] 1984:46).
The claim that -mi encodes grammatical concepts that are analytically dis-
tinct, but semantically related, is consistent with the typological fact that evi-
dential categories are known to participate in other grammatical subsystems
such as tense, aspect, and mood (Slobin & Aksu 1982, Anderson 1986). The
following data from Pastaza reveal the multiple functions of -mi within two
analytically distinct, but semantically related categories. The first subsection
below illustrates the modal and status-like functions of -mi, which are assert-
ive. The second describes the evidential functions of -mi, which mark a
speaker's point of view. The last main section of the article discusses perfor-
mative speech acts, and their relevance for a theory of Pastaza Quechua
epistemology.

-Mi used to assert

The suffix -mi is at the core of Quechua speakers' assertions: it is used to
make a declarative statement in the indicative mood. Such declarative state-
ments can be used for various rhetorical effects. These are discussed in each
of the following subsections, with examples from conversations, interviews,
myths, legends, and narrative accounts. The examples demonstrate that
personal conviction or belief rather than direct experience is the Gesamt-
bedeutung of -mi.

To judge or evaluate. The assertive -mi is not restricted to affirmations

of yes/no questions about matters of fact. Speakers also use it to assert their
aesthetic preferences and negative evaluations. This is evident in ex. 3, taken
from a discussion of pottery glazing and finishing. Speaker E is telling me
that, after a pot is painted with slip, it has to be dried to a certain point of
dampness only. If the slip dries up completely, the pot is no longer burnish-
able, which means that it will never be shiny. The speaker uses -mi on the
239
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

word iridza 'ugly' to evaluate the resulting appearance of a pot that has been
left too long to dry.
(3) Na mana valinga, na ima shinata chyulya rikuringa? iridza-mi sakirin, iridza. (E)
'Then it will be worthless; how will it be able to shine? Ugly it remains, ugly.'
All of the assertive functions of -mi to be discussed in the next several sec-
tions have in common their concern for events, actions, or processes which
have not yet taken place. These examples provide strong logical evidence that
the use of -mi does not have to be based on what is directly experienced. One
cannot, after all, directly experience what has not yet happened.

To announce. -Mi is often used by speakers to announce their intention

to do something. Ex. 4 is taken from a myth about a star woman who comes
down to earth to take a human husband, but then abandons him and returns
to the sky. The following sentence constitutes her announcement that she is
leaving.
(4) Mana kanwan tiyasha, ichusha-mi ringa rawni nishka. (A)
'"I won't stay with you; abandoning you I'm going to go," she said.'

To threaten. The assertiveness of -mi can also be used to add a threat-

ening tone to an announcement which the speaker may not intend to carry
out. I heard a mother say the following to her children when they suddenly
began crying and fighting in another portion of a house she was visiting.
Although she stated that she was coming to discipline them, she never did.
However, the desired effect, to make them quiet down, was achieved. Her
use of -mi, therefore, added a threatening force to her assertion.
(5) Imatara? imatara? na shamuni-mi! (C)
'What happened? what happened? I'm coming now!'

To predict. Frequently, speakers use -mi to predict that something will

happen; ex. 6 illustrates this use. It also raises serious questions about what
might be said to count as a direct experience. Speaker E was telling me a very
long story about her husband's narrow escape from an attack by Peruvian
soldiers, and his subsequent attempts to find his way back home through
unfamiliar forests. He was lost for a period of about three to four months,
and was presumed dead by most of his relatives. However, his wife had
sought the advice of a shaman, who gave her a psychotropic substance to
help her learn what happened. Lowland Quechua often resort to this form
of divination when a particularly important matter troubles them (cf. Har-
rison 1989). After drinking this substance, she told me, her husband appeared
to her; he told her where he was, and that he would return. Elated by this
experience, she went to tell her in-laws what she'd seen. What follows is what
she told me she said to her in-laws.

240
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

(6) Shamunga-mi. Mana wanushka chan. Shamunga-mi, uyangichi! Paktamunga-mi nirani. (E)
'He will come. He's not dead. He will come, listen, all of you! He will arrive, I said.'

To hope for. The foregoing example illustrates a prediction that was

based on a feeling of certainty. However, I have also observed people mak-
ing predictions with -mi when they couldn't possibly have been sure. In such
cases, the assertive character of -mi expresses a speaker's desire or hope,
rather than a feeling of certainty, that something will indeed come to pass.
Ex. 7 illustrates such a speaker's use of -mi. One afternoon, several of us
were clustered around a baby which had just been given to my comadre to
raise. (It occasionally happened that a woman who had just given birth would
immediately hand the baby over to someone else, usually a close relative.)
What I alone didn't realize, at that time, was that this baby was the seventh
child born to a woman who had already given most of her children away.
After her first couple of infants died, the mother suspected that her own milk
had been poisoned by a malevolent shaman. She was convinced, therefore,
that giving her children to other women might enable them to live. Unfor-
tunately, at the time this particular child was born, there was only one
remaining sibling, a two-year-old brother (who did later die also, shortly
before I left the field). There is no question in my mind that everyone present
that afternoon knew all of this, although no one spoke of it. Nevertheless,
as we clustered around the baby, one woman made the following statement,
which I later realized was hopeful rather than certain.
(7) Winanga-mi wawa; wirayawn-mi, kunan riki maki ruku. (C)
'The baby will grow up; she's becoming fat, now look at her big hands.'
It is particularly ironic that this woman observed the baby to be getting fat.
In fact, the baby never did nurse well, and once became so severely under-
nourished that we had to fly her out of the village for hospitalization. In any
case, there was every reason, from speaker C's own direct experience, i.e.,
her knowledge of the baby's family history, to doubt that this baby would
live long enough to grow up. Yet she used -mi both on the verbs for 'grow
up' and 'become fat'. This can only make sense if we assume that the most
general meaning of -mi is to assert what is believed - and by extension, hoped
for, irrespective of one's direct experience.
The remaining functions of assertive -mi have in common their concern
for establishing various kinds of focus within an utterance. The notion of
focus is very often involved in asserting because it is frequently necessary to
specify that a particular aspect of something is being asserted, i.e., "It was
X (and not Y) who stole the money." In fact, as is shown below, it is some-
times difficult to separate the focusing function of -mi from its assertive func-
tion. This is congenial with the findings of Wolck (1969:3-4), who describes
-mi as a suffix conveying both definiteness and focus. The focusing functions

241
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

of -mi makes sense if one considers its Gesamtbedeutung to be assertion

rather than direct experience. If the more general meaning of -mi were, after
all, to mark what is directly experienced, then one would expect its fo-
cusing function somehow to reflect that. In other words, one would expect
that -mi would be used to focus on a semantic element, the referent of
which was directly experienced by a speaker; but this is not the case. In none
of the example sentences below does the use of -mi correlate in any ob-
vious way with what is directly experienced, rather than with what is not
directly experienced. These examples, therefore, support assertiveness as -mi's
Gesamtbedeutung.
To distinguish new from already known information. The focusing func-
tion of -mi is often realized in discourse by contrast with the topicalizing suf-
fix -ga. The respective functions of -ga and -mi can be understood by
reference to the Prague School conception of a sentence as a structure which
communicates by relating new information to already understood informa-
tion. Within this framework, old information is referred to as "thematic,"
and new information as "rhematic." A speaker's use of -mi to mark what is
rhematically important in a sentence has been reported for many dialects
(Parker 1969, Adelaar 1977, Cole 1982, Weber 1986). In Pastaza Quechua,
topicalizing -ga generally coincides with the thematic material of a sentence,
because it contextualizes what is already understood; but -mi is typically used
with rhematic material, because it highlights new information. Ex. 8, taken
from a description of harvesting manioc, illustrates the theme/rheme con-
trast between -ga and -mi. (In what follows, (braces) are used to set off com-
binations with -ga.)
(8) {AFi aparishkata-ga) alyasha-mi surkunawn; pilanata mana ushana chahun. (E)
'{The good tubers that it has borne}, one removes by digging; they cannot be plucked.'
Speaker E uses thematic -ga on the phrase 'the good tubers that it has borne'
because her immediately preceding sentence had already referred to the fact
that manioc bushes bear tubers. She uses a rhematic -mi on the verb 'to dig'
to state that these tubers have to be dug rather than plucked, because of the
depth at which they grow. It is the information that they must be dug which
is new, and is therefore suffixed with -mi.
Ex. 9 demonstrates that what is marked by -mi as new information need
not follow what is already understood and marked by -ga; -mi may precede,
as it does in the next example. This example, taken from a tale, features the
protagonist's important revelation that he, rather than another, had been
responsible for killing a monster, and was therefore the one who deserved
to marry a king's daughter.
(9) Nuka-mi wanuchirani, kamba ushushita {mikunga rawta-ga); yanga-mi {pay}-ga kazara-
hun nishka. (T)
'I'm the one who killed it, as it was {going to eat} your daughter; undeservedly {he} is
marrying her, he said.'

242
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

This example also illustrates very well the rhematic importance of the suf-
fix -mi, which is used for the two most important informational components.
It occurs first on the pronoun nuka 'I', which has been translated as 'I'm the
one' to reflect its assertive status. It is then used on the adverb yanga
'undeservedly', which is also significantly revelatory. The suffix -ga, by con-
trast, is used on semantic components which are already established: the fact
of a monster's attempt to consume, and the pronominal reference to the man
pretending to have been the hero.

To focus. Often, assertive -mi functions to focus on a semantic element

for some rhetorical purpose. Ex. (10) is taken from an exchange observed
between two women. Speaker F was leaving the house of speaker C; and as
she passed by a heap of trash, she noticed a basket disgarded by her friend.
She then shouted the following question, using -mi on the word for 'basket'.
(10) Ooooooh! Kamba ashangata-mi ningichu Camilla? (F)
'Hey! Do you want your basket, Camilla?'
Speaker C, understanding that this was a request for the basket, answered:
(11) Mana! A pay. (C)
'No! Take it.'

To distinguish primary from secondary focus. Another type of contrast

results from the co-occurrence of -mi and -ga in the same sentence. However,
this particular contrast cannot strictly be the Praguean theme/rheme distinc-
tion, discussed earlier, although it is comparable in a very general way.
Quechua speakers often use -mi for primary focus, and -ga for secondary
focus. This contrast is distinct from the previous one insofar as no new infor-
mation is introduced by -mi; rather, -mi is used to highlight the primary focus
on something already mentioned. Consider ex. (12), taken from an account
of a nonordinary experience. Speaker R is telling me that a noise she heard
one night was created by a brujo or shaman who had meant to harm her
household. The sentence below summarizes her conclusion about what had
caused the noise.
(12) Buruhuguna chasna rakpi-mi shina shamushkara, mana {yanga-ga}. (R)
'As if shamans made it happen like that, it had come; not {without reason}.'
It is clear that the information marked by -mi is not new, but already known.
This is evident by the indexical adverb chasna 'like that', which refers to the
sequence of events just related. In this example, -mi functions to mark the
utterance's primary focus, and -ga functions to mark its secondary focus.
Ex. 13 also demonstrates the use of -mi and -ga for primary and second-
ary focus. Moreover, it includes two secondary foci, both suffixed with -ga.
Speaker E was telling me how her father used to gather and process latex
while traveling through the forest. She had also mentioned that the product
243
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

of this processing could be ignited and used for illumination while walking
at night. In this particular sentence, she uses -mi to establish a primary focus
on the pronominal reference to the form of latex resulting from the set of
procedures she has just enumerated.
(13) Chi kawchuta shina {rasha-ga} pangawan {pilyusha-ga) waskan watasha chilyata-mi
beta, nukanchi raygu. (E)
'Processing this latex {in that way}, with a leaf {wrapping it}, with a rope tying it,
this very thing is also a candle for us.'
Again, the -mi suffix does not mark new information: it refers to informa-
tion already presented. My claim that the element to which -mi is suffixed
is the primary focus is supported by its use along with emphatic -Fata,
which compounds the primary focus.
The foregoing examples of -mi usage were presented as primarily assert-
ive or focusing in their function. However, it is not difficult to understand
how these two functions might be combined. What is asserted with -mi is
thereby singled out and focused on for its semantic significance. Similarly,
what is focused on in an utterance lends itself to assertion. In the next two
examples, the assertive and focusing functions are combined.

To state "But X". The suffix -mi can indicate that an assertion either runs
contrary to someone else's understanding, or else comes as a surprise to
someone. When -mi is used in this way, it is suffixed onto that part of an
assertion which is the focus of a contrary understanding or surprise. Con-
sider the following situation. Approximately nine people, including myself,
were floating downriver in a balsa raft. Suddenly speaker C noticed a tree
filled with ripe fruit and told her sister, speaker T, to look at it. At that
moment her sister, who was doubled over coughing, did not look up. How-
ever, she told her sister that she had already seen the tree by suffixing -mi
onto the verb rikuna 'to see'.
(14) C: Kayma riki, asta riki!
'Look here! Just look!'
T: (coughing) Rikurani-mi!
'But I saw (it)!'

Another example of -mi used in a "But X" construction is the following.

Speaker C noticed that I was smoking a cigarette, and asked me where I got
it. I told her that her mother had sold me the pack. She in turn replied, tell-
ing me that the cigarettes were stale, by suffixing -mi onto the participial
form of the verb waglina 'be spoiled'.
(15) C: Mayta aparangi?
'Where did you get (those)?'
N: Kamba mama rartdichiwara.
'Your mother sold (them) to me.'
C: Na wagliushka-mi.
"But (they've) already spoiled!'

244
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

To state "Therefore X". In this function, -mi is used to mark the focus
of an assertive inference which has been made - often from visual, auditory,
or other kinds of evidence. Once I had left the household in which I was stay-
ing, to visit another. When it became dark, speaker F and her daughter,
whose guest I was, began to wonder if I would return, or spend the night
where I'd been visiting. They inferred correctly that I was in fact returning
when they heard the sound of barking dogs coming from a household located
midway between their own house and the house I was visiting. In ex. 16, F
explains how she came to this realization.
(16) Chiga how how how how; Chay! Shamun-mi nini! (F)
'So then, (the dogs bark) how how how how; "There! She's come," I say.'
Although F's inference was correct that time, it might have been wrong. Any
number of people could have walked down that path, past the dogs, thereby
setting off their barking. If the most general meaning of -mi were to indi-
cate a speaker's direct experience, then F should have suffixed it onto the
barking sound, which she did actually hear. Yet she suffixed -mi onto 'come',
even though, at that point, she had not yet seen me coming. She does this
to indicate the focus of her assertive inference.

-Mi used to report speaker's point of view

All of the functions of -mi that have been discussed so far have been assert-
ive, definable most generally in terms of paradigmatic contrast with the neg-
ative suffix -chu. The suffix -mi can be replaced by the negative suffix -chu,
thereby transforming an assertion into a yes/no question. However, in many
dialects of Quechua, including Ayacucho (Parker 1969, Cerr6n-Palomino
1987), Tarma (Adelaar 1977), and Huanuco (Weber 1986), -mi participates
in another paradigmatic contrast with the "reportative" suffix -shi, which is
commonly labeled a "hearsay" suffix. To avoid the implication of disbelief
that can be connoted by the term hearsay, I use the term reportative. In
contrast with reportative -shi, the suffix -mi specifies that the very speaker
of an utterance is doing the asserting, rather than someone else. It is this con-
trast which is properly evidential, since it specifies the source of information
about the narrated event.
The contrast between a speaker's own assertion and someone else's is
important in the evidential systems of many languages. Whorf noted it in
Hopi ([1941] 1956:144). Jakobson ([1957] 1984:41) mentioned it for Bulgar-
ian, and used various terms in his discussion of reportative evidentiality,
including "reported speech," "relayed speech," "displaced speech," and "rep-
resented discourse" ([1957] 1984:41). A number of scholars have used the
term quotative to refer to this type of evidentiality (Oswalt 1986:30, Whistler
1986:64). However, the term quotative does not refer literally to quoted
speech; it means, rather, that what is being asserted is done so by someone

245
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

other than the speaker. In fact, at least for Pastaza Quechua, a more accu-
rate term than quotative for the -sfti suffix would be indirectly quotative,
because a speaker's use of -shi signals that what is being related is the gist
of a report, rather than a word-for-word rendition. Since one's own asser-
tions are often based on one's own experience, a contrast between direct and
indirect experience can be implied by the -mi/-shi contrast, although it need
not be. However, a speaker's use of reportative -shi rather than -mi does not
render a communicative message suspect. It only indicates that the author-
ity for saying something resides with someone else.3
Consider ex. 17. Speaker E was telling me about a type of tree bark, the
resin of which can be used to relieve toothaches. In explaining how it works,
she reports someone else's assertion that the foam from this resin kills worms
that live inside the teeth. Her use of -mi on the word pusku 'foam' indicates
that she herself is making this assertion. However, since someone else has
told her about the worms, she uses the reportative -shi on the verb wanuchin
'it kills'; this indicates that she is basing this statement on someone else's
authority. (The translation of what is modified by -shi is [bracketed] in all
of the following examples.)
(17) Intachi pusku shinki pusku-mi lyukshin. Chita churarikpi, mana mas nanangachu;
[wanuchin-shi] kiru kuruta. (E)
'The intachi foam, it's a shiny black foam that emerges. Having applied that foam, one's
teeth will no longer hurt; [it kills] the worms in the teeth.'
A speaker of English, wanting to distinguish here between what is asserted
and what is reportatively stated, might say, "Apparently it kills the worms
in the teeth."
Mythic narrative is another context requiring speakers to defer the author-
ity for their statements. Consider the first line of a myth told by speaker T:
she suffixes -shi on the word warmi 'woman', to indicate that she is not fram-
ing this assertion with her own voice.
(18) Shuk [warmi-shi] tiyag ara, ishkay ushushiwan. (T)
'There was a [woman] with two daughters.'
The suffix -shi is used prodigiously in mythic and legendary narratives. In
conjunction with the narrative past tense form of -shka, which is also used
in mythic accounts to refer to unattested events (cf. Mannheim 1987:146),
the suffix -shi focuses on what a speaker asserts by someone else's authority.
Space is lacking here to present a detailed analysis of -shi. However,
the following excerpt from a narrative demonstrates that, in general, -shi
has an assertive and focusing function similar to -mi. Just as -mi indicates
a speaker's primary focus on a portion of an utterance, so too does -shi. The
important difference is that, while -mi indicates the speaker's own focus,
-shi indicates the focus of someone else's assertion. The following excerpt
also shows that the distinction between one's own assertion and someone
else's is sometimes indistinguishable from that between direct and indirect
246
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

experience. What is asserted with -mi is often based on a speaker's direct, per-
sonal experience; what is reported with -shi is often based on someone else's
direct, personal experience. Exx. (19-32) were catalyzed by a discussion
between myself and speaker E about the sounds made by splashing water
while bathing in a river. This discussion reminded E of an incident in which
she was not a major participant, although she was within earshot. For
speaker E, this incident served to highlight the dangers of bathing oneself in
unfamiliar rivers. It concerns an attempt by an anaconda to submerge a
canoe that was parked near the shoreline, with its prow tied to a tree.
In general, the first half of the narrative relates the events through one of
the main participants, while the last half shifts to E's own perspective. This
bifurcation of perspectives is evident in the patterning of -shi and -mi. In
19-26, she uses -shi to focus on various constituent structures of an utter-
ance through someone else's voice. She then shifts to -mi, as she describes
the event from her own perspective.
(19) Payna armangawa rig, [imanasha-shi] Those guys, having gone to bathe,
wondered [what] just pulled, pulled,
yanga chuta chuta chuta! pulled,
making the yutsu tree quake, quake,
(20) Yutsuga san san san san san! quake, quake, quake?
Tying the canoe to the yutsu tree they'd
(21) Yutsuy watasha sakishkaga; na left it; now, [from behind]
[washama-shi] it was being pulled, they said.
(22) aysariushka ninawra; If it hadn't been tied with ilu latex, it
(23) Mana ilu kawchu ashka ashaga might have cut loose.
pitirinma mara; This Rodolfo, thinking "What [is] it?"
(24) Ima [shan-shi] nisha chi Rodolfo,
[na-shi] said "[Just then] 1 was going to go in the
(25) yaikunga rawrani nira Edwardowan; water with Eduardo."
(26) Rikukpi, [rikuglyayta-shi] kanoa sikitaga He looked and [while he stood there]
na
(27) [yaykuchiuura-shi] nira-mi; and watched], "[it was submerging] the
rear of the canoe," he said.
(28) [Amarun-shi] aysawshka; An [anaconda] was pulling it;
(29) Chiga ayyyy! Kanoata-mi amarun So then, "Ayyyy! An anaconda's taking
apawn! the canoe!
(30) Ayyyyyy! Kanoata amarun apawn-mi "Ayyyyyy! An anaconda's taking the
kaparinawn; canoe!" they shout.
(31) Nuka yanga-mi niunguna kay 1 thought, "joking they are saying this,
nusparishka
(32) lokogunaga nisha-mi nini nuka mikyata. these crazed lunatics"; thinking this, I
said as much to my aunt.

It is essential to realize that E is not calling into question the first half of
the narrative by her use of -shi. Rather, she is attempting to represent the
events of this first part by relating them from someone else's perspective. In
19, she uses -shi to focus on the word imanasha 'what, why', which voices
one of the witness's musings about the source of the pulling of the rope and
the quaking of the tree. Similarly, in 24, -shi is used with the verb shan 'is',
247
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

and the word na 'just then' to indicate that E is focusing on these words
through another person. Lines 26-27 mark the transition between predom-
inant points of view. In 26, she has not yet assumed her own point of view,
as is evident by her use of -shi on rikuglyayta 'while he stood there and
watched'. But 27 contains the first instance of her own assertion, used to
frame someone else's assertion. E uses -mi on the verb nira 'he said', which
indicates that she herself is asserting the report of his words. But she uses
-shi on the verb yaykuchiuura 'was submerging' because she is focusing this
part of the assertion through one of the witnesses. In 28, she uses one more
-shi suffix on the word amarun 'anaconda' to indicate the participant's point
of view. In 29-30, she directly quotes what the witnesses shouted, using -mi
with kanoata 'canoe' and apawn 'is taking', as they themselves must have,
since they were asserting from their own perspective. Moreover, her use of
-mi in 29-30 also brings the listener fully into E's own point of view. Until
this point, she has only reconstructed the events as they were related to her
by the witnesses; but the witnesses' shouts, which are directly quoted, rep-
resent E's own first awareness of what was going on. Finally, in 31-32, she
asserts her initial disbelief upon hearing their shouts, which she expresses by
suffixing -mi on yanga 'joking' and nisha 'thinking'.
E's alternation between -mi and -shi coincides in a general way with the
distinction between her own direct and indirect experience. In the first half
of the narrative, she is mostly reconstructing the gist of what took place,
based on what was reported by the men Rodolfo and Eduardo. In the sec-
ond half, she relates her own awareness and experience of the events, and
her feelings about its authenticity. Yet the distinction between E's own di-
rect and indirect experiences cannot account for every instance of the alterna-
tion between -mi and -shi. In 27, e.g., she states: yaykuchiuura-shi nira-mi
'"[it was submerging,]" he said.' If the -mi/-shi contrast's most general
meaning were direct vs. indirect experience, then E's use of -mi on nira 'he
said' would have to represent a direct quote of something which was actu-
ally said to her later on, when the event was being related by the witnesses.
She was not, after all, present when the anaconda did this. However, on
closer analysis, what is quoted by E could not have been a direct quote; it
does not, in fact, represent her own direct experience of this statement, since
it uses -shi on yaykuchiuura 'was submerging" instead of -mi. If E had been
relating her own direct experience of this statement, as heard from the men
who witnessed the events, then she would have used -mi on yaykuchiuura as
they themselves would have, because they were stating what they had directly
witnessed. In this context, her use of -shi and -mi can only be explained as
a shifting of the voices which are doing the asserting. E uses -shi on the verb
yaykuchiuura 'was submerging' in order to distinguish it from her own asser-
tion nirami 'he said'.

248
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

There are many other examples of a speaker's use of -shi to assert or to

project a focus from someone else's perspective onto what the speaker has
directly experienced him- or herself. Ex. 33, also from E, constitutes one such
instance. E and several companions were camping out on a beach beside a
pond, in order to watch for turtles. E, who had seen, directly experienced,
and participated in every aspect of this trip, uttered the following descrip-
tion of her companions' intentions.
(33) Hatun [charapata-shi] hapinala munanawn payna, tula. (E)
'They want to catch a big [turtle] that night.'
E's use of -shi on charapa 'turtle' can only be understood as a way of focus-
ing an assertion from someone else's perspective. It does not indicate any
indirectness in E's experience, or in her knowledge of their desires and inten-
tions. She was well aware of their intention to catch a turtle, because they
had mentioned it to her. It is clear, then, that the distinction between -mi and
-shi can indicate direct vs. indirect experience. However, the most general
meaning of this distinction is one of assertiveness. Alternations between -mi
and -shi shift the voices that do the asserting, and allow a speaker to frame
his or her assertion with another point of view.

THE REPRESENTATION OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

The claim that Quechua speakers make assertions primarily on the basis of
direct or first-hand experience is not supported by the patterning of -mi and
-shi. Moreover, the assumption that Quechua speakers have a primary inter-
est in their perceptions for the verification of safe and risk-free truths is
highly problematic. I now present data which suggest that Quechua speak-
ers have, in common with the late Robert Mapplethorpe,4 a predilection for
considering the strongest, most aesthetically salient version of their percep-
tual experiences, rather than what some would call the "truth" of such expe-
riences. One could substitute the term "vivid" for "aesthetically salient."
These terms should be understood in the context of Whitehead's critique
(1925) of the development of the modern scientific attitude. The essence of
his criticism of modern science is that it is based on errors of Protestantism,
materialism, and the abstractions of political economy (1925:203). The fault
of scientific materialism, he says, was the propagation of an attitude which
regarded matter as objectively bare of value (202), and therefore looked upon
aesthetic and also religious values as irrelevant to "concrete reality" (204).
Whitehead considered the aesthetic attitude to be a necessary foil for the
errors of scientific materialism (200):
Thus "art" in the general sense which I require is any selection by which
the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular val-
ues which are realizable by them. For example, the mere disposing of the

249
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

human body and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a sunset is a sim-
ple form of artistic selection. The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid
values.
That Quechua speakers have a predilection for the aesthetic attitude is evi-
dent by their frequent engagement in a type of speech act termed "perfor-
mance" (Bauman 1977, 1986). A performance is an artful way of speaking
which is "offered for the enhancement of experience, through the present
appreciation of the intrinsic qualities of the act of expression itself" (Bau-
man 1986:3). Typically, the term performance is applied to stretches of dis-
course lasting longer than a sentence. However, I have identified a subtype
that I call "sound symbolic performance" (Nuckolls 1992), which takes place
within a sentence. Sound symbolic performances are predominantly iconic
rather than conventionally symbolic in mode. They are imitative of sounds,
rhythms, visual patterns, and even psychophysical sensations. Sound sym-
bolic performances are highly susceptible to foregrounding by reduplication,
multiple repetition, prosodic elaboration, or syntactic isolation. When they
are so foregrounded, these performances simulate the vivid, aesthetically sali-
ent features of an action's spatio-temporal unfolding. However, sound sym-
bolic performances are not merely expressive. Quechua speakers who use
sound symbolism performatively are communicating a message that is simul-
taneously expressive, explicit, and precise.
The following example, taken from a myth, illustrates a sound symbolic
performance. It also clarifies the difference between referring to an action's
occurrence by means of a verb as opposed to simulating or performing some
essential quality of its occurrence with a sound symbolic adverb. This exam-
ple features both a verbal rendition and a sound symbolic adverbial rendi-
tion of a bird's flying away. The repetitions of the adverb pa simulate the
flapping of the bird's wings as it flies off.
(34) Phaa pa pa pa pa pa pcvpawasha rig, kuti mandzhariracha. (M)
'Flying phaa pa pa pa pa pa * , „ , It went off, well, maybe because it was frightened.'

Speaker M's performative repetitions of pa heighten the temporal and spa-

tial unfolding of the bird's flying away. By diminishing the force of her rep-
etitions, the narrator simulates the experience of watching something appear
to grow smaller as it moves farther away. She is, in effect, creating an audi-
tory analog to the visual illusion of depth perception. It seems at first to be
an overwhelmingly vivid, aesthetic description, but it also communicates pre-
cise and explicit information.
Besides their use in myths and legendary narratives, sound symbolic per-
formances are also an important feature of Quechua speakers' everyday con-
versations. In the following example, speaker J uses the sound symbolic
adverb tupu, which describes the sound of falling into water. She uses tupu
to describe how a kapiwara, a large rodent, quickly dove into the river to
250
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

avoid being detected by J, who was washing clothes nearby. Her first pro-
nunciation of tupu is performatively foregrounded with strong aspiration
over the second syllable, imitating the force of the animal's contact with the
water.
(35) Kasna taksarikbi chay lyukakbi, nukanchi tiyashka punguy, tuphuuu! tupu saltaga,
yakuy chingarin. (J)
'(And so 1 was) washing clothes like that, and there it was crawling near the clearing
where we live; tuphuuu (it went); leaping tupu into the water, it was gone!'
The absence of evidential -mi in 34-35 - as well as in 16, which featured a
sound symbolic performance of barking dogs - is consistent with my own
observation that the overwhelming majority of sound symbolic utterances
lack assertive or evidential specification. This is decisive evidence against the
claim that Quechua speakers use evidential -mi to assert only what they
directly experience: the sound symbolic portion of an utterance is concerned
with a perceptual experience, which is as "direct" an experience as one could
possibly have.
However, if my own analysis of the multiple functions of -mi is adopted,
then the absence of -mi on sound symbolic performances makes sense. -Mi
functions to assert what is believed, to focus on what is most relevant to an
assertion, and to indicate what is asserted by an utterance's own speaker. But
a performative statement is a different kind of expression than an assertive
statement. A prototypical assertion states something about an event, process,
or action (Lyons 1977:726); it is therefore grounded in the distinction made
by Jakobson between a speech event (Es) and a narrated event (En). How-
ever, sound symbolic performative utterances are iconic. They communicate
not by referring, but by simulating the most salient features of an action,
event, or process. The distinction between a speech event and a narrated
event is therefore collapsed in sound symbolic performance, which uses the
speech event to re-create the vivid features of the narrated event, rather than
to report it or refer to it. I suggest, therefore, that sound symbolic perfor-
mances are typically exempt from the usual requirements of assertion mark-
ing, including distinguishing a speaker's own assertion from someone else's.
Such performances are also, by their nature, already highly foregrounded or
focused. To add an additional focusing morpheme such as -mi is unnecessary.
Nevertheless, I have observed Quechua speakers' occasional use of -mi and
-shi on sound symbolic utterances. Ex. 36 illustrates the use of dzyu, a sound
symbolic adverb that describes a quick sliding movement. It used below by
speaker C to describe a type of deformity whereby the iris of a man's eye
seemed to slide slightly out of place with a rhythmic intermittence. She
describes this intermittent sliding with performative repetitions of dzyu. In
her initial performative description, she does not use -mi; however, when I
asked her to clarify what she was saying, she suffixed -mi onto her last
repetition of dzyu.
251
 JANIS B. NUCKOLLS

(36) C: Na amsa wawa na purig man; na dzyu dzyu dzyu dz"u dzyu purig mai.
'Now just a little bit it (iris) moves; now dzyu dzyu dzyu dzyu dzyu it moves.'
N: Ima shinata purin?
'How does it move?'
C: Na dzyu dzyu dzyu-mi purin, likcharik.
'Now dzyu dzyu dzyu it moves, when he wakes up.'
C's use of -mi makes sense here as a technique for focusing attention on
the part of her utterance which asserts the answer to my question. How-
ever, it only became necessary to indicate this focus when I asked her for
clarification.
Occasionally, Quechua speakers mark the assertive or evidential status of
a performative utterance even without a request for clarification. Ex. 37
features a sound symbolic performative description which was part of an
explanation of the technique for fortifying clay. Speaker E has just finished
explaining how the bark from a tree must be roasted, ground up, and
blended with raw clay. Having done this, one has to test its consistency by
biting down into it. The sound produced by this biting is described as indic-
ative of the clay's appropriate consistency. This sound, described with the
sound symbolic adverb khyu, is performatively repeated and also suffixed
with assertive -mi.
(37) Kiruwan kasna kamakpiga, khyu khyu khyu khyu khyu khyu-mi uyarin, tiyu shina. (E)
'Testing it like this with the teeth, it sounds khyu khyu khyu khyu khyu khyu like bit-
ing into sand.'
Exx. 36-37 demonstrate that performative utterances can be specified
for assertiveness. This strengthens the claim that sound symbolic perfor-
mances are simultaneously expressive, explicit, and precise, because it pro-
vides evidence that Pastaza speakers themselves consider their expressivity
to be communicative also of precise and explicit information. This in turn
implies that they do not share the assumptions mentioned in Sontag's
appraisal of Mapplethorpe: they are not preoccupied with the distinction
between an objective truth and an aesthetically apperceived truth. This
doesn't mean, of course, that there are no "facts" for the Pastaza Quechua.
I suggest, rather, that they do not share our assumptions about what a fact
means. They do not consider facts within the same system of values as we
do. Within the Euro-American scientific tradition, a fact is the antithesis of
a value; it is part of a formalized system of knowledge which is believed to
transcend aesthetic, religious, and emotive significance.5

CONCLUSION
In all dialects of Quechua, the suffix -mi contrasts with the suffix -chu to
specify the assertive status of an utterance, or to express a speaker's partic-
ular point of view regarding his or her assertion. The Gesamtbedeutung of

252
 THE SEMANTICS OF CERTAINTY IN QUECHUA

the suffix -mi is therefore assertive. In many dialects of Quechua, the suf-
fix -mi also contrasts with the suffix -shi, or a cognate thereof, to distinguish
from a speaker's own assertion from a report of someone else's assertion.
The contrast between -mi and -shi can, and often does, imply direct vs. indi-
rect experience. However, direct and indirect experiences are not the most
general meaning of the -mi/shi contrast. Therefore, the claim advanced by
Weber 1986, that Quechua speakers give epistemic priority to their own direct
experience because it is safe to do so, cannot be supported. The foregoing
data have demonstrated that Pastaza Quechua speakers use the -mi suffix to
assert not only what they have experienced directly, but also what they
expect, hope for, or predict will happen. It is clear that they often take risks
in their assertion-making. The example of the woman who asserted, based
on a psychotropically induced vision, that her husband was alive, is one
example of such a risk.6 The woman who asserted that a baby would live
long enough to grow up, against extraordinarily bad odds, is an example of
a very risky assertion. The example of my comadre, speaker F, who asserted
that I had returned - based on the sound of barking dogs - is a relatively
inconsequential risk, but a risk all the same, since she had not actually seen
me coming.
Aside from the issue of Quechua speakers' willingness to ignore their expe-
rience and make risky assertions, there are problems with the very idea of
direct experience as the basis for a grammatical category. One problem is that
it suggests a scenario whereby an independently existing factual reality awaits
verification from a Quechua speaker. This is a form of objectivism. Another
problem, which directly contradicts the first, is the claim that each Quechua
speaker must verify the facts of such a reality for him- or herself. This is an
extreme form of subjectivism. Both objectivism and subjectivism are based
on the fact/value dichotomy which is basic to scientific thought. Moreover,
this dichotomy has become part of the way members of a Euro-American
culture construct the world. That is why there is a division of labor between
news photographers, who report the truth, and artist photographers, who
express strong versions of truth. I have made an essentially negative claim
in stating that this dichotomy is not relevant to the Pastaza Quechua speak-
ers in the lowlands of Eastern Ecuador. Evidence from their abundant use
of sound symbolic, performative speech acts suggests that they do not share
Euro-Americans' concern for distinguishing between "truths" and "vivid
truths." Whether or not this negative claim can be applied to other Quechua
speakers, as well, will depend on comparative evidence from language use
in these other dialects. What is particularly needed are data which go beyond
mythic and legendary genres, and include a variety of speech types from
everyday contexts. Only then will we be equipped to formulate a Quechua
epistemology.

253
 JANIS B . NUCKOLLS

NOTES

*This article is based on research conducted in Ecuador from January 1987 through June
1988. 1 gratefully acknowledge support received from the Committee on Latin America and the
Caribbean of the Social Science Research Council; the National Science Foundation; the Wenner-
Gren Foundation; and, during the writing-up stage, from the American Association of Univer-
sity Women. Special thanks go to Dell Hymes, William Bright, and Nancy Hornberger for helpful
editorial advice. I also owe a great debt to the following people, whose names are indicated by
capital letters in the text, for putting up with many kinds of interferences, impositions, and nui-
sances which were caused by my presence among them in Puka Yaku: Antonia, Camilla, Eloise,
Faviola, Irma, Jacinta, Malako, Rosa Elena, and Theresa. The initial N stands for myself.
' The problem of what counts as "direct experience" is never addressed by Weber. At times,
he seems to mean physical and temporal co-presence; e.g., according to his source, one could
not report the name of one's mother's grandfather with the suffix -mi unless one had actually
met the man (1986:40). However, he also states that -mi can be used with future tensed state-
ments (41).
2
In many dialects of Quechua, evidential concepts are formally marked by a three-way con-
trast among suffixal morphemes. For example, the Pastaza dialect shares with the Ayacucho
dialect of Peru a three-way contrast among the suffixes -mi, -shi, and -cha. The -shi suffix, which
is reportative in Pastaza, is discussed briefly in the second section of the article. I should add
that the functions of -shi vary, and a full account of its meanings in a variety of discourse con-
texts has not yet been undertaken for the Pastaza dialect: thus Cole (1982:164) states that, in
the Imbabura dialect of highland Ecuador, -shi indicates a conjecture rather than a report. The
-cha suffix, which indicates doubt, is not discussed because this article is concerned with what
Quechua speakers are sure of, and why. However, the Huanuco and Tarma dialects also fea-
ture a three-way contrast, with -chi rather than -cha. Other dialects have only a two-way con-
trast between -mi and -shi, but have dubitative adverbs as well as special narrative past tense
forms.
3
Weber does admit that disbelief is not necessarily implied by -shi (1986:140): "A speaker
may use -shi when he wishes to escape the implication of direct experience . . . This -shi has
nothing to do with whether the speaker really believes the information." However, this is not
consistent with his stronger claim that Quechua speakers assume responsibility for information
"only if it is safe to do so" (1986:138). His stronger claim implies that there is some suspension
of trust in a message communicated with -shi.
" I've chosen Mapplethorpe to exemplify this aesthetic stance because his work has provoked
such controversy. Critics have used words like "harrowing," "gritty," "heart-quickening," and
"disturbing" to describe his photographic images. I would use the same words to describe some
of the sound symbolic descriptions I've heard from Quechua speakers, although not for the same
reasons. For example, I've heard sound symbolic descriptions of the rhythm of blood spurting
out of a man dying from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, the sound of a bone as it is cracked,
and the appearance of flesh charred in a fire. My point, then, is that the Quechua-speaking peo-
ple with whom I worked would also not make very good war photographers, by Susan Sontag's
criterion. They are only too willing to focus on the most vivid aspects of their experiences, no
matter how harrowing, shocking, or disturbing.
5
But this view of facts is itself based in a set of values, with very definite aesthetic, religious,
and emotional consequences.
6
Perhaps this only seems risky to us. It would be interesting to know what this woman's rel-
atives thought about her assertion that her husband would return. In any case, this particular
example raises the important issue of what counts as a perception across different cultures.

REFERENCES

Adelaar, Willem F. H. (1977). Tarma Quechua grammar, texts, dictionary. Lisse: Peter de
Ridder.
(1992). Quechuan languages. In William Bright (ed.), International encyclopedia of lin-
guistics. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. 3:303-8.

254
 THE SEMANTICS OF C E R T A I N T Y IN Q U E C H U A

Anderson, Lloyd B. (1986). Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: Typologically reg-
ular asymmetries. In Chafe & Nichols (eds.), 273-312.
Bauman, Richard (1977). Verbal art as performance. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
(1986). Story, performance, and event. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Bills, Garland; Vallejo, C , Bernardo; & Troike, Rudolph (1969). An introduction to spoken
Bolivian Quechua. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Cerr6n-Palomino, Rodolfo M. (1987). Linguistica quechua. Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Rurales
Andinos "Bartolome de las Casas."
Chafe, Wallace, & Nichols, Johanna, eds. (1986). Evidentiality: The linguistic coding ofepis-
temology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Cole, Peter (1982). Imbabura Quechua. The Hague: Mouton.
Harrison, Regina (1989). Signs, songs, and memory in the Andes. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
Jakobson, Roman (1936). Contributions to the general theory of case: General meanings of the
Russian cases. Reprinted in his Russian and Slavic grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1984.
59-103.
(1957). Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb. Reprinted in his Russian and
Slavic grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1984. 41-58.
Le6n, Agustin M. (1950). Gramdtica de Quichua. MS. Puyo, Ecuador: Dominican Mission.
Lyons, John (1977). Semantics, volume 2. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mannheim, Bruce (1987). A semiotic of Andean dreams. In Barbara Tedlock (ed.), Dreaming:
Anthropological and psychological approaches. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 132-53.
(1991). The language of the Inca since the European invasion. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
Mugica, P. Camilio (1967). Aprenda el quichua: Gramdtica y vocabularios. Aguarico, Ecua-
dor: Prefectura Apost61ica.
Nuckolls, Janis (1992). Sound symbolic involvement. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology
2:51-80.
Orr, Carolyn, & Wrisley, Betsy. (1965). Vocabulario Quichua del Oriente. Quito: Instituto Lin-
giiistico de Verano.
Oswalt, Robert L. (1986). The evidential system of Kashaya. In Chafe & Nichols (eds.), 29-45.
Parker, Gary J. (1963). La clasificaci6n genitica de los dialectos quechuas. Revista del Museo
Nacional (Lima) 32:241-52.
(1969). Ayacucho Quechua grammar and dictionary. The Hague: Mouton.
Ross, Ellen (1979). Introduction to Ecuador Highland Quechua. Madison, WI: Foundation for
Inter-Andean Development.
Slobin, Dan, & Aksu, Ayhan A. (1982). Tense, aspect, and modality in the use of the Turkish
evidential. In Paul Hopper (ed.), Tense-aspect: Between semantics and pragmatics. Amster-
dam: Benjamins. 185-200.
Torero, Alfredo (1964). Los dialectos quechuas. Anales Cientificos de la Universidad Agraria
(Lima) 2:446-8.
Weber, David (1986). Information perspective, profile, and patterns in Quechua. In Chafe &
Nichols (eds.), 137-55.
(1989). A grammar of Huallaga (Huanuco) Quechua. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Whistler, Kenneth W. (1986). Evidentials in Patwin. In Chafe & Nichols (eds.), 60-74.
Whitehead, Alfred N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Free Press.
Whorf, Benjamin L. (1941). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language.
Reprinted in John Carroll (ed.), Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings, ed. by John
Carroll. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956. 134-59.
Wolck, Wolfgang (1969). Especificacidn y foco en quechua. Bloomington: Indiana University
Linguistics Club.

255