Asian Affairs

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM

SEEKERS FROM CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT AND
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Elżbieta Proń

To cite this article: Elżbieta Proń (2021) TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM
SEEKERS FROM CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS, Asian
Affairs, 52:4, 872-889, DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2021.1992201

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2021.1992201

Published online: 23 Nov 2021.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 91

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raaf20
 Asian Affairs, 2021
Vol. LII, no. IV, 872–889, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2021.1992201

TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM

SEEKERS FROM CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT AND
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
ELŻ BIETA PROŃ

Dr Elżbieta Proń is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political

Science, University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland). Her research is
funded by the National Science Centre (Poland) grant no. 2018/31/D/
HS5/03371. She can be reached at elzbieta.pron@us.edu.pl.

Introduction
The year 2020 seemed to mark a change in Kazakhstan’s approach to
Kazakh asylum seekers from China. In total, at least six ethnic Kazakh
asylum seekers from China’s Xinjiang were granted a right to temporary
stay in Kazakhstan. They all crossed the border illegally, escaping
China’s security and ethnic policy apparatus in Xinjiang. While the
status was valid for one year only, it was a major improvement as until
2020 similar cases were all lost in Kazakh courts. It seems that three
main considerations influenced the decision of Kazakhstan. Firstly, the
international activity and prominence of local Kazakh human rights acti-
vists who have put pressure on the authorities since early 2017, published
widely (in English) on the issue and regularly staged protests in Kazakhstan
and beyond. Secondly, the international recognition of the Xinjiang issue
as genocide, particularly in the United Nations (UN), European Union
(EU), and the United States (US) forums, followed with economic and
political sanctions on China. The third is the ambitions of Kassym-
Jomart Tokayev, who assumed the presidential office in 2019 and has
been developing his own style of the presidency with social issues as its
centrepiece.1

The main purpose of this article is to explain and assess foreign and dom-
estic policy considerations behind Kazakhstan’s approach to asylum
seekers from China, as well as the implications of this approach. This
article first scrutinizes the change in how Kazakhstan has approached
the problem since Tokayev’s assumption of the presidential office in
2019. Drawing from the former, the second part sets the theoretical
© 2021 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 873

background for the qualitative analysis of the change through the lens of
human rights in Kazakh “multi-vectoral” foreign policy and declared Eur-
asianism. Finally, this article looks at the foreign policy implications of
Tokayev’s approach to Kazakh asylum seekers from China, with particular
emphasis on Sino-Kazakh relations.

This article argues that there is no sign of permanent and thorough reform
regarding human rights in Kazakhstan in general and the issue of Kazakh
detainees in Xinjiang in particular. Instead, the situation of Xinjiang detai-
nees has deteriorated in comparison to Nazarbayev’s era. This paper also
finds that Kazakhstan’s approach to the problem of Xinjiang is increasingly
determined by the state of Sino-Kazakh relations. Despite Kazakhstan’s
declared multi-vectoral foreign policy and multisectoral cooperation
with the EU, Tokayev prioritizes China as the major economic and pol-
itical partner for Kazakhstan.

Methodologically, this article develops its assumptions from analyses of

Kazakhstan’s official policy documents and timeline of events. The
sources used to support the argument are written in Russian, English,
and Chinese languages. The analysis of written sources is supported by
several anonymized semi-structured qualitative interviews with Kazakh
lawyers, activists, and experts on the issue conducted in February 2021.

China’s policies in Xinjiang and Kazakh asylum seekers

The gradual influx of Kazakh asylum seekers from China’s westernmost
region of Xinjiang started around 2017. It resulted from Beijing’s cam-
paign in Xinjiang introduced in 2014, dubbed “Strike Hard Against
Violent Terrorism”. Beijing has long linked Xinjiang’s Uyghurs with ter-
rorism and separatism, but the 2014 campaign has been different from the
previous ones in its total reach, methods used, as well as cultural, political,
and demographic consequences. It is built upon extensive hi-tech surveil-
lance apparatus, including cameras, devices to collect biometric data as
well as video analytical hubs.2 The campaign is also realized through
massive detentions of Muslim minorities in so-called “re-education
camps”. As of 2021, detainees, the number of whom is estimated at 2
million people at least, are subject to various human rights violations,
including torture, forced abortions, ill-treatment.3 In 2020, international
reports further unveiled that Xinjiang detainees are victims of forced
labour, including in factories working for big Western companies.4
According to Western experts, the campaign’s total reach, brutality, and
874 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

long-term consequences make it a “cultural genocide” of Xinjiang

Uyghurs.5

While most of the victims are Xinjiang Uyghurs, the campaign similarly
targets other Xinjiang Muslim minorities. Among them, Kazakhs consti-
tute the second largest group of victims.6 Their estimated number ranges
between 172,0007 to half a million.8 The number of detained Kazakhs is
significantly smaller than that of the Uyghurs, yet it is big enough not to
make their forced detentions and human rights violations coincidental.

As a result of Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, since 2017, Chinese Kazakhs

started to illegally cross the Sino-Kazakh border and seek political asylum
in their titular state. Their influx was raised at multiple Turkic forums,
including that of the quintennial Council of Kazakhs,9 international
Kazakh associations, such as Free Kazakhs based in the US, and by local
human rights organizations – Atajurt, Qaharman, Demos, and Kazakhstan
International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. The multiple
public appearances and media activeness of these organizations’ charis-
matic leaders and human rights lawyers representing the refugees in
Kazakh courts further publicized the problem.10 A further voice was
that of the testimonies of victims and whistle-blowers. They all called
for action from Kazakh authorities, which have declared governmental
support for Kazakh communities worldwide and promoted the Kazakh
identity- and nation-building agenda since the 1990s.

The official Kazakh response to these multiple voices was very limited
between 2017 and 2019. Nur-Sultan (then Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital)
tried to keep the lowest possible profile of the issue so as not to jeopardize
its political and business ties with China.11 The problem of Xinjiang
Kazakhs was largely passed by in the official agenda, while victims were
neither extradited to China nor granted asylum in Kazakhstan either.
Their court cases were usually held in remote parts of the country and fre-
quently postponed. Although in 2018 Kazakhstan managed to negotiate a
right to leave China for over 2,000 Chinese Kazakhs,12 the negotiations
between Nur-Sultan and Beijing were low-key and probably not
resumed after 2018.

Since late 2019 the situation has changed. In December 2019, a Chinese
Kazakh woman, Kaisha Akhan, who fled China to Kazakhstan a year
earlier, was the first to be granted temporary refugee status. She also unex-
pectedly avoided a prison sentence for crossing the border illegally.13 Her
case set a precedent. Over the whole of 2020, another five individuals
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 875

received the same status. They crossed the border illegally either in remote
parts of eastern Kazakhstan or through Khorgos Free Trade Zone, traf-
ficked by retail vendors. They initially stayed in Kazakhstan illegally,
fearing deportation to China or believing that their stay in the country
did not require further paperwork. Once they reported to the police to
legalize their stay in the country, they were believed by lawyers and
human rights observers to have had “no chances to remain in Kazakh-
stan”.14 Their right to a temporary stay in Kazakhstan was thus widely
welcomed and extensively reported by human rights associations. Even-
tually, they were sentenced to 6–12 months in prison or given probation
for illegally crossing the border, yet were allowed to stay in Kazakhstan.
Among the refugees who received the status was even a repeat criminal,
Kaster Musakhanuly, who was once sentenced in 2006 in Kazakhstan
for a robbery and extradited to China to serve that sentence.15

2020–21 thus seemed to mark a slight yet meaningful change in Kazakh-

stan’s approach to asylum seekers from China. Notably, the asylum-
seeking cases won in 2020 did not differ much from the earlier cases
which had been brought unsucessfully. Refugees have been represented
by the same human rights lawyers – Aiman Umarova, renowned laureate
of the US Women of Courage Award, Lyazatt Akhmatova, and Abdulla
Bakbergenuly. Refugees are charged with the same violations under
article 392 of Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, which is “intentional illegal
crossing of the state border of the Republic of Kazakhstan” with a
penalty of up to 12 months’ imprisonment. They also share similar per-
sonal circumstances, such as Kazakh ethnicity, occasionally Kazakhstan’s
green card, Chinese citizenship, strong family and business links with
both Kazakhstan and China. Finally, their lawsuits are held mainly in a
court in Zharkent, although different judges have overseen their cases.

In addition to the six individuals granted a temporary stay in the country,

others managed to be repatriated and reunited with their families with
Kazakhstan. This included Rakyzhan Zeinolla, who returned to Kazakh-
stan after 17 years in Chinese prisons and under house arrest, accused of
spying.16 While still in China, Rakyzhan’s wife was among regular solo
protesters demanding his return to Kazakhstan in front of Chinese diplo-
matic posts in Kazakhstan. Local media widely reported his return to the
country in April 2021.17

The successful safeguarding of the right to stay in Tokayev’s Kazakhstan

for Chinese Kazakhs seemed to result from two main factors. The first,
876 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

rooted in Nazarbayev’s era, has been the energy of Kazakh human rights
activists and their international publicity on the issue.18

The second, which corresponded in time with Tokayev assuming the pre-
sidency, is the rapidly growing attention of international organizations,
individual Western politicians, big international companies, and
Western governments which explicitly condemn Chinese policies in Xin-
jiang.19 Their response has varied from politically non-binding declara-
tions to imposing economic and other sanctions.20 What they shared
was their description of Chinese policies in Xinjiang as being “human
rights violations”,21 a “genocide”,22 and “crimes against humanity”.
Notably, Western actors have frequently pointed at Kazakhstan as the
country with a particular tangible interest in pressing on China on the
Xinjiang issue. It is also Western democracies, in particular Sweden and
the US, where Kazakh Xinjiang activists and refugees have either received
permanent political asylum or opened offices of their human rights
associations.23

The first factor – the energy of human rights defenders – brought little
success during 2017–2019 in developing a systematic approach of
Kazakh authorities to asylum seekers from China. Thus, it does not
seem decisive in Tokayev’s approach to the issue. It is, therefore, necessary
to look at the second – Kazakhstan’s relations with the West and the role
of the multi-vectoral, Eurasian foreign policy outlook in Tokayev’s
Kazakhstan – as the one that determined the change.

Kazakhstan’s approach to human rights through an IR

approach
The issue of China’s Xinjiang policies and its Muslim victims has been
assessed as a part of the human rights agenda. Human rights as an interna-
tionally-recognized norm and institution are an inherent element of clas-
sical Western IR theories of constructivism and liberalism. Constructivists
build their argument on the assumption that the international order is not
ordained by its strongest players, but constantly shaped by interactions
between its actors and norms. They see relations between state institutions
and actors as reciprocal and cross-border in character. This leads to the
development of international cooperation which further influences
national identities and interests24 leading to a “socialisation” with the
new roles.25
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 877

Human rights as a norm recognized and adhered to internationally can

thus be seen as the prime example of a constructivist policy outlook.
These rights have been institutionalized in several legal acts and through
the practice of cooperation. Recognition for human rights has also
spread worldwide as a part of modern international relations making
human rights “integral to the moral purpose of modern state” and a pre-
requisite of legitimate statehood.26

In Tokayev’s Kazakhstan, social issues and human rights have received

much attention, also as a part of the president’s regular State of the
Nation Addresses.27 The words were translated into deeds, as in Septem-
ber 2020, Tokayev established the Supreme Council for Reforms, a new
government agency to implement reforms in three core areas, including
that related to the welfare of citizens. Tokayev also set up the National
Council of Public Confidence, a 44-member advisory body composed
of activists, human rights lawyers, and representatives of different social
groups. The main task of the Council that meets every six months is to
provide expertise on the most pressing social issues. Aiman Umarova, a
lawyer famous for representing Kazakhs human rights activists and refu-
gees from China, has also been appointed a member of the Council.

These steps may suggest that Tokayev’s Kazakhstan seeks a closer norma-
tive cooperation with the West on Xinjiang, and durable solutions for
many domestic social issues. However, two main factors undermine the
constructivist interpretation of this change. The first is the time span –
about two years – between recognition of the Xinjiang issue by Nazar-
bayev in 2017 and his protégé Tokayev assuming office in 2019. This
time span might be long enough to conduct some reforms of state insti-
tutions yet does not seem sufficient for the process of thorough socializa-
tion of norms and values. The second problem is the very relationship
between Nazarbayev and Tokayev, who prior to his presidency was a
skilled diplomat and a top-level politician for many years. International
experts assess Tokayev as a continuator of Nazarbayev policies, a
“puppet apparatchik figure”.28 Indeed, after the change in the presidency,
Nazarbayev has retained full control over the state security apparatus,
establishing himself as an influential backstage figure.29 Therefore, a quali-
tative change in the socialization of the human rights regime, including the
thorough protection of ethnic Kazakh from Xinjiang, does not seem
justified.

This change in Kazakhstan’s approach to human rights and social issues

may thus suggest a more liberal policy outlook, not based on socialization,
878 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

but on the notion that all individuals have a right to enjoy fair civil liberties
and equality. The protection of various human rights lies at the center of
this approach. In order to achieve this goal, strong state institutions are
vital for monitoring compliance with the law. Such institutional design
of a state also corresponds with the premise of liberal democracy, which
would mean a departure from the earlier authoritarian policy in Kazakh-
stan.30 Such an approach is costly in terms of domestic policy reform, yet it
pays off in terms of international relations: a better record of how states
treat citizens and protect their rights leads to a better score in inter-state
cooperation, particularly with Western liberal democracies. Economic
cooperation is the area where this peaceful coexistence of democracies
is the most developed.

The promise of growing political and economic cooperation with

Western democracies may justify Kazakhstan’s turn to social issues and
human rights. Kazakhstan has been the primary beneficiary in Central
Asia of all the EU’s initiatives in the region, leaving other regional states
far behind. Kazakhstan is the first country in Central Asia to sign the
Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in
2016 detailing economic cooperation. Kazakhstan is the EU’s leading
trading partner in the region, and the EU is by far Kazakhstan’s first
trading partner overall representing 40 percent of the total Kazakh external
trade including uranium supplies, which satisfy a fifth of the EU uranium
demand.31 At the same time, the EU is also the leading foreign investor in
the country, accounting for 48 percent of total foreign direct invest-
ment.32 Besides these direct trade relations, Kazakhstan is the beneficiary
of 60 percent of the EU Erasmus+ academic exchange programme in
Central Asia and the main beneficiary of the €115 million fund earmarked
for higher education cooperation with Central Asia in 2014–2020.33 The
EU has also been involved in the post-COVID-19 economic recovery in
Kazakhstan, allocating in July 2020, the €3 million Central Asia COVID-
19 Crisis Response Solidarity Programme, with a primary focus on
Kazakhstan.34

This growing EU-Kazakhstan cooperation is welcomed by Nur-Sultan,

which has always followed the idea of multi-vectoral and Eurasian policies
centred on the concurrent development of ties with Russia, China and the
West. Immediate, economic benefits of the Kazakhstan-EU ties may also
explain Nur-Sultan’s turn to a social and human rights agenda, strongly
backed by the EU. However, as for Europe, economic cooperation is
closely tied with social, judicial and political reforms.35 While the EU is
not strict on the conditionality of its support in exchange for democratic
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 879

change, there is a growing pressure within the EU to demand concrete

reforms from Kazakhstan and review their effects.36 Since 2010, the EU
has organized annual Justice and Home affairs Subcommittee meetings
and Human Rights Dialogues with Kazakhstan evaluating how the
country handles human rights norms. The EU has also supported and
monitored Kazakhstan’s judicial system reforms and adoptions of several
international legal acts, such as ratification of Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enforcing abolition
of the death penalty.

The past decade showed that EU-Kazakhstan cooperation in economic,

education, judicial and political matters is deepening. Yet, it seems to have
little impact on the country’s democracy score, which undermines the
liberal assessment of Kazakh foreign policy. The country has not improved
in democracy indexes since around 2015 and is still tagged “non-free” by
Freedom House.37 Despite many institutions introduced by Tokayev, the
country has violated several guaranteed freedoms of its citizens, widely
used so-called preventive arrests, and exercised violence and detentions
against protesters on many occasions. Several previously “illegal” human
rights organizations in the country have finally been registered since
around 2018, but only to receive fines for allegedly unlawful actions.38
Some human rights activists in late-2020 left the country arguing that they
were unable to continue their work39 or, conversely, have remained
outside of Kazakhstan to avoid detentions and continue their activities.

The government has also made an effort to end the inflow of ethnic Kazakhs
from China seeking a legal stay in Kazakhstan. The government has tigh-
tened the porous sections of the border, preventing further escapes from
China.40 Concurrently, the six Kazakhs who received a right to stay in
Kazakhstan in 2020 have constantly been discouraged from public appear-
ances and publicity on their cases. In January 2021, both Kaisha Akhsan and
Muraker Alimuly were violently attacked in two separate incidents. These
incidents are believed to be an attempt to silence the two and discourage
other refugees from speaking up about their situation.

These developments mark a deterioration of the situation in terms of

human rights protection compared to the Nazarbayev era. They also
suggest that Kazakhstan has turned from ignoring human rights issues
to a strategy of cooptation of human rights defenders and organizations.
By doing so, the authorities have better control over their activities and
“may accomplish the goals of the elites without significant political or
financial cost”.41 A part of this cooptation strategy is also the granting
880 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

of temporary asylum status to the refugees who have illegally crossed the
border. By doing so, Kazakhstan’s authorities respond to public pressures
regarding the refugees and act according to Western expectations, while
concurrently neglecting the real motives behind the escapes from China.

This also leads to the contention that Kazakhstan under Tokayev con-
tinues to be primarily driven by a realist foreign policy despite reforms
and new institutions. Kazakhstan aims at maximizing the country’s gains
from international cooperation with multiple actors yet refrains from
any profound transformation of its political system. By officially turning
to social issues and public demands, Kazakhstan secures benefits from its
cooperation with the EU. There is no evidence that the country has socia-
lized itself into human rights norms or embarked on a more democratic
policy course. What is more, by coopting popular dissent and addressing
it in a way convenient to the authorities, Tokayev has maintained a
stable relationship with its main partners abroad and provided an official
response to the domestic audience.

This very realist, pragmatic and opportunistic approach to human rights

and social issues corresponds well with a concept of a multi-vectoral
foreign policy, widely followed in Central Asia. It also fulfils the main
goals of the Eurasianism, coined by Nazarbayev in the early 1990s.
According to both concepts, Kazakhstan sees its foreign policy interests
as determined by the country’s political, economic and material interests,
which “span from Lisbon to Vladivostok”.42 It also sees three main
pivots that must be looked at while developing foreign policy –
Russia, China, and the US/EU. To achieve a durable integration of
Kazakhstan in Eurasia and maximize its gains, Kazakhstan sees its
primary priorities as the stability of domestic regime, a thorough active
presence in Eurasian politics, and sovereignty in international relations.
Tokayev’s recent approach to human rights, particularly regarding the
Xinjiang issue, seems to respond the first two of them, at least in the
short term. The following section looks at the long term, that are the
foreign policy implications of this approach, in particular in terms of
Sino-Kazakh relations.

Tokayev’s policy towards Xinjiang Kazakhs – foreign policy

implications
The Tokayev’s realist strategy towards human rights in general and Xin-
jiang Kazakhs has two main foreign policy implications.
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 881

The first is directly related to the European pivot in Kazakhstan’s foreign

policy. Tokayev’s realist tilt towards cooptation of social discontent
doubled with opportunistic Eurasianism strengthens authoritarianism in
the country. This, in consequence, starts to undermine Kazakhstan’s
relations with the EU at the declarative level and through the practice of
cooperation. These concerns have already been expressed in a fifth Joint
Motion for Resolution issued on February 10, 2021, which specifically
addressed Kazakhstan’s human rights record. In the Joint Motion, the EU
Parliament criticized Kazakhstan’s government for “harassing and even
criminally prosecuting human rights defenders”, “abusing vague and
overly broad extremism laws to persecute the opposition and human
rights defenders” and “misusing (…) pandemic restrictions as a pretext for
intensifying the political repression of civil society”. In the address, the
EU has called for concrete steps regarding situation of political opposition,
minority groups, political prisoners, and urged “the Government of
Kazakhstan to ensure the safety of ethnic Kazakhs and other minority
groups who have fled China’s concentration camps, including by granting
permanent refugee status to Murager Alimuly and Kaisha Akankyzy”.43

In the Joint Motion for Resolution, the EU Parliament demanded that

Kazakhstan take action over the situation of particular organizations and
other problems. Failure to do so might eventually result in the EU
ceasing support for the country. For Nur-Sultan, the main problem
with the Joint Motion is the inclusion of serious reservations about the
quality of human rights in the country in connection with the issue of
Xinjiang. The Joint Motion is one of the very few documents issued by
a Western institution that links domestic Kazakh politics, human rights
protection in Kazakhstan, and Xinjiang refugees.

Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State in the Trump administration, regu-

larly made similar calls giving Xinjiang Kazakh detainees much publicity in
2020. During his official visit to Kazakhstan in February 2020, Pompeo
stood along with the family members of Xinjiang Kazakh detainees
demanding that the country “provide safe refuge and asylum to those
seeking to flee China (and) protect human dignity.”44 He regularly
repeated these calls in his tweets on “People’s Republic of China (…)
committing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, China,
targeting Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups.”45 These concerns were also reiterated by the US
Department of State 2020 Countries Report on Human Rights Practices,
which devoted several passages to Kazakh asylum seekers from China.46
While recognizing the right to a legal temporary stay of the refugees
882 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

who were granted it in 2020, the Department noted there was almost no
institutional aid to facilitate their stay in Kazakhstan. The report also
enumerated problems with authorities faced by several human rights
associations, particularly Atajurt and its former leader Serikzhan Bilash,
and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule
of Law. Remarkably, in late 2020 Bilash left Kazakhstan for Turkey and
eventually the US to continue his work.47

Potential diplomatic and financial losses as a result of failing to address

these problems are unwelcome to Nur-Sultan. They would challenge a
delicate balance between Russia, China, the US and the EU within the
multi-vectoral foreign policy. Nevertheless, the more significant challenge
is the potential of antagonizing the relationship with Beijing, Kazakhstan’s
primary economic partner and an important investor.

By 2019, Beijing had invested around USD 20 billion in Kazakhstan,

ranking fourth in FDI inflow in Kazakhstan.48 Kazakhstan’s trade turnover
with China reached 18.1%, nearly a fifth of Kazakhstan’s total trade.49
However, what matters most for Nur-Sultan is not the rank in the econ-
omic data but the sectors in which China invests in the country. These
sectors include those traditionally perceived as beneficial for the country,
such as infrastructure and the energy industry, as well as modern sectors
of the economy – renewable energy sources, and production of local
high-tech (including the automotive industry). China has also initiated
new economic partnerships between local Chinese and Kazakh companies.

Despite the logistical and epidemiological restrictions due to COVID-

2019 pandemics, which hit both countries severely, in September 2020
Beijing started to install five 50-megawatt turbines at the wind farm in
Kostanay, Northwestern Kazakhstan.50 In July 2021, China also com-
pleted the construction of Turgusun hydropower station in Eastern
Kazakhstan, a part of Industrial and Innovative Development of Kazakh-
stan for 2015–2019 Programme.51 The same year, China participated in
over 150 online meetings held between Kazakh exporters and Chinese
companies through the QazTrade Accelerator programme.52 A few
months later, in April 2021, a Chinese automotive company, Great
Wall Motors in partnership with Kazakh Astana Motors, also entered
the Kazakh automotive market opening its first store in Almaty and plan-
ning to establish dealer stores in another 15 cities.

Even in the more traditional field of railway infrastructure China’s invest-

ments continued over this period. Khorgos dry port, opened in 2015 in
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 883

“the middle of nowhere”53 whose role as a hub of the Belt and Road
(BRI) was initially viewed with scepticism,54 proved to be of particular
importance with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pan-
demic demonstrated that railway transport can be much more effective
than maritime transport, which may be prone to restrictions, delays, and
quarantine rules. The March 2021 weeks-long blockage of the Suez
Canal further exposed the growing role of alternative, railway transport
giving yet another rationale for developing railways across Eurasia.55
Unsurprisingly, China followed this momentum launching a new connec-
tion between Xi’an and Nur-Sultan, and further expanding the existing
network.56

Two arguments may be made from recent Chinese activities in Kazakh-

stan. First, that China seems to be a step ahead in relation to Kazakhstan’s
economic development strategy. China’s growing presence in various
sectors of the modern economy corresponds perfectly with Kazakhstan’s
National Strategy 2050 that aims to place the country among the 30 top
global economies and to support innovation and entrepreneurship.57
The second argument is that China seems to be two steps ahead of
other external actors in the country, which remain focused on more tra-
ditional branches of the Kazakh economy.

China’s engagement in many sectors of the country’s economy has already

paid off in political terms. Not only are China and its BRI seen as crucial to
post-pandemic economic recovery,58 but also “ties with China are becom-
ing an increasingly important means of self-enrichment for many of the
region’s ruling families and groups, and Beijing has fostered this reliance
on China to bolster its regional influence”.59 As a result, Kazakh politicians
claim to “have no knowledge” about the issue of Kazakh detainees in Xin-
jiang camps60 despite mounting evidence of the atrocities against Kazakhs in
Xinjiang. What is more, the Kazakh administration is increasingly reluctant
to help Chinese Kazakhs both in China and in Kazakhstan. As of July 2021,
out of the six who secured their legal temporary stay in 2019-2020, three
were seeking an opportunity to mirgrate to a third country, seeing no possi-
bility of legalizing their permanent stay in Kazakhstan.61 The status of the
other three has not been reported.

Conclusions
This study of the first two years of Tokayev’s policy towards Kazakh detai-
nees in Xinjiang leads to three main conclusions. First, at the domestic
884 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

policy level, Tokayev does not plan to develop any coherent strategy
towards Kazakh detainees in Xinjiang or the asylum-seekers. Kazakhstan’s
initial steps to grant the refugees a temporary stay were neither extended
nor later offered towards other refugees. On the contrary, since 2020, no
new cases of Kazakhs fleeing China have been made public, while the
2019–2020 asylum seekers try to secure their stay in a third country, as
they are unable to receive Kazakh citizenship. Government officials and
the president also avoid any statement or action regarding Kazakh detai-
nees in Xinjiang. These developments confirm that Tokayev has not
only continued Nazarbayev’s strategy towards the issue of Xinjiang but
even become more hard line. Despite introducing several social pro-
grammes, establishing government institutions devoted to human rights
protection, and allowing popular consultations on the Xinjiang issue,
the authorities learned how to avoid the problem effectively instead of
providing a durable solution to it.

This leads to the second conclusion, that Tokayev has not only maintained
good and cooperative relations with Beijing, but also developed them
further. Such an approach has been seen in the investments and economic
opportunities provided by Beijing, particularly in the post-pandemic econ-
omic recovery in Kazakhstan. Nur-Sultan’s ambition to make the best use of
these opportunities stems from the aim of rebuilding economic growth,
which fell to minus 2.6 percent in 2020.62 It is also shown by Beijing’s
rocky relationship with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, contrary
to which a politically stable, cooperative and economically vibrant Kazakh-
stan can further strengthen its position as a critical player in landline BRI.

This assessment leads to the third conclusion concerning Kazakhstan’s

foreign policy outlook in the coming years. Although devoted in words
– and occasionally in deeds – to building its international image as a Eur-
asian country having good ties with the West and East alike, Kazakhstan is
clearly departing from this path. The EU continues to develop its Central
Asian Strategy providing more concrete aid but making it more con-
ditional than before. Yet, Kazakhstan under Tokayev (and under the
COVID-19 pandemic) focuses on bringing quick and durable solutions
to economic problems in the country. Many of these have already been
put in place owing to China’s engagement in the country. Unsurprisingly,
a consequence is a diminishing interest in following the EU recommen-
dations over Kazakhstan’s politics and policies. Also, many of the EU pro-
grammes, realized through political and educational exchanges have been
suspended because of COVID-19 restrictions, further loosening ties
between Kazakhstan and the EU.
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 885

As the pandemic continues, we may expect a further weakening Kazakh-

EU ties and conversely a strengthening of Kazakh-China relations. The
economic cooperation between the latter two followed by the political
steps will palpably affect Kazakhstan’s foreign policy outlook at the top
of government and the fate of Kazakh asylum seekers from China at the
very bottom of society.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

NOTES

1. Akorda, ‘President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s State of the Nation

Address’, September 2, 2019, https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_
president/president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-state-of-the-nation-
address-september-2-2019 (accessed 27 November 2020).
2. M. Clarke, ‘Urumqi 2009 and the Road to Xinjiang Re-education Centers’. The
Diplomat, July 11, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/urumqi-2009-and-
the-road-to-xinjiang-re-education-centers/ (accessed 7 August 2020).
3. HRW, ‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots: China’s crimes against humanity tar-
geting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims’. Human Rights Watch, April 19, 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/
chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting (accessed 29 June 2021).
4. H. Maass, ‘What the West can do about China’s Uyghur labour camps’. The Spec-
tator, January 22, 2021, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/what-the-west-can-
do-about-chinas-uyghur-labour-camps (accessed 12 February 2021).
5. J. Leibold, ’Despite China’s Denials, its Treatment of the Uyghurs Should Be Called
What It Is: Cultural Genocide’. The Conversation, July 24, 2019, https://
theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-
be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654 (accessed 10 January 2021).
6. The third-largest group of detainees are Han Chinese. See: Xinjiang Victim Database
at https://shahit.biz/eng/ (accessed 16 September 2021).
7. A. Zenz, ‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude: China’s
Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang’. Central Asian Survey Vol. 38. Issue 1
(2019): 122.
8. As estimated by Free Kazakhs Association (see: Gani Stambek at @GaniStambekov
via twitter September 19, 2020 and December 1, 2020).
9. N. Lahanuly, ‘Pochemu Vsemirnaia Associaciia Kazahov ne zashchitila kazahov v
Sinʹcziane?’ [Why didn’t the World Association of Kazakhs protect Kazakhs in Xin-
jiang?]. Azattyq, November 30, 2020, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/why-didn-t-the-
world-association-of-kazakhs-protect-kazakhs-in-xinjiang-/30974796.html
(accessed 10 January 2021).
886 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

10. For a detailed analysis of Kazakh human rights movements related to China’s Xin-
jiang policy and the government response to the problem in 2017-2019, see:
E. Proń and E. Szwajnoch, ‘Kyrgyz and Kazakh responses to China’s Xinjiang
policy under Xi Jinping’. Asian Affairs Vol. 51. Issue: 4 (2020): 761–778.
11. Proń and Szwajnoch, op. cit., p. 773.
12. D. Kang, ‘China allowing 2,000 ethnic Kazakhs to leave Xinjiang region’. AP News,
January 9, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/kazakhstan-ap-top-news-international-
news-asia-china-6c0a9dcdd7bd4a0b85a0bc96ef3dd6f2 (accessed 29 November
2019).
13. N. Lahanuly, ‘Mne grozilo zatochenie v ’lagerʹ. Prigovor kazashke iz Sinʹczjana’ ["I was
threatened with imprisonment in a ’camp’." Sentence for a Kazakh woman from
Xinjiang]. Azzatyq, December 23, 2019, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-
china-kazakh-court/30340732.html (accessed 12 December 2020).
14. C. Rickleton, ‘Kazakhstan: Asylum seeker trial begins, testing hawkish talk on Xin-
jiang’. Eurasianet, January 7, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-asylum-
seeker-trial-begins-testing-hawkish-talk-on-xinjiang (accessed 12 December 2020).
15. Nastoyashcheye Vremya, ‘ Kak kazakhi bezhali iz Kitaya’ [How Kazakhs escaped
from China], October 16, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HAAy8vg2PSQ (accessed 10 April 2021).
16. M. Kaiyrtaiuly, ‘Posle 17 let razluki. Vosssoyedineniye kazakha iz Sinʹczjana s
semyey’ [After 17 years of separation. The reunion of a Kazakh man from Xinjiang
with family]. Azattyq, April 9, 2021, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-rakyzhan-
zeinolla-returned/31194788.html (accessed 2 May 2021).
17. M. Kaiyrtaiuly and A. Zhankatov, ‘Uznik Sin’tszyana Rakhyzhan Zeynolla: Schastliv,
chto vernulsya domoy’ [Xinjiang’s prisoner Rakhyzhan Zeynolla: I am happy that I came
back home]. Azattyq, April 9, 2021, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-almaty-
rakhyzhan-zeynolla-returned-from-china/31195427.html (accessed 2 May 2021).
18. See footnote 10.
19. For instance, in July 2021, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
issues a 37-page long report on Xinjiang situation calling for a numer of measures by
the UK govenrment, including ban on the import of all cotton products from Xinjiang,
boycotting to a certain extent the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, and forbidding
Chinese surveillance companies from operating in the UK. See: House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atroci-
ties in Xinjiang and Beyond’, July 8, 2021, https://committees.parliament.uk/
publications/6624/documents/71430/default/ (accessed 8 September 2021).
20. BBC, ‘Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights abuses’. The BBC,
March 22, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162 (accessed
5 September 2021)
21. France24, ‘Grave concerns raised about China at UN rights council’, June 22, 2021,
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210622-grave-concerns-raised-about-
china-at-un-rights-council (accessed 7 September 2021).
22. On the United States of America: E. Wong and C. Buckley, ‘U.S. says China repres-
sion of Uighurs is genocide’. New York Times, January 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html (accessed 2 May 2021);
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 887

On the United Kingdom: R. Ingram, ‘The Ayes have it, the Ayes have it! UK Par-
liament says it’s genocide’. Bitter Winter, April 23, 2021, https://bitterwinter.org/
the-ayes-have-it-the-ayes-have-it-uk-parliament-says-its-genocide/ (accessed 2
May 2021); On Canada: BBC, ‘Canada’s parliament declares China’s treatment of
Uighurs genocide’. The BBC, February 23, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-us-canada-56163220 (accessed 10 September 2021).
23. C. Rickleton, ‘After tentative start, Kazakhstan is obliterating Xinjiang activism’.
Eurasianet, February 22, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/after-tentative-start-
kazakhstan-is-obliterating-xinjiang-activism (accessed 6 May 2021).
24. A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power poli-
tics’. International Organization Vol. 46. Issue 2 (1992): 395.
25. J. Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution’. International Organization
Vol. 46. Issue 3 (1992): 567.
26. C. Reus-Smit, ‘Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty’. Review of
International Studies Vol. 27. Issue 4 (2001): 520.
27. Akorda, ‘President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s State of the Nation
Address’. September 1, 2020, https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_
president/president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-state-of-the-nation-
address-september-1-2020 (accessed 7 May 2021).
28. N. Astrasheuskaya, ‘Voters sense hand of Nazarbayev in Kazakh presidential poll’.
Financial Times, June 6, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9324b22e-883a-
11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (accessed 10 May 2021). Also a view expressed by
L. Anceschi during MECACS Seminar at St. Andrews University, October 27,
2020.
29. S. Ibbotson, ‘Covid-19: approaches, outlooks, and power dynamics in Central Asia’.
Asian Affairs Vol. 51. Issue 3 (2020): 537–538.
30. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.
31. European Commission, ‘Kazakhstan’, undated, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/kazakhstan/ (accessed 11 September 2021);
A. Nurjanov, ‘EU, Kazakhstan Intend to Deepen Energy Ties’. Caspian News,
March 30, 2021, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/eu-kazakhstan-intend-to-
deepen-energy-ties-2021-3-30-0/ (accessed 15 September 2021).
32. EEAS (European Union External Action Service), ‘Kazakhstan and the EU’.
October 26, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan_es/1367/
Kazakhstan%20and%20the%20EU (accessed 13 May 2021).
33. EEAS, ‘EU – Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee’. September 25, 2020, https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/85817/EU- Kazakhstan
%20Cooperation%20Committee (accessed 13 May 2021).
34. Ibid.
35. A. Aubakir, ‘New EU Strategy for Central Asia: history, vision, prospects’. Central
Asia and the Caucasus Vol. 21. Issue 4 (2020): 10.
36. T. Tsertsvadze and V. Axonova, ‘Trading values with Kazakhstan’. EUCAM Policy
Brief no. 32, September 2013, p.3.
37. View expressed by N. Niyazbekov at the IPSA RC34 International Workshop,
March 6, 2021.
888 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS

38. Freedom House, ‘Kazakhstan: Government Suspends Key Human Rights Organiz-
ations’. January 27, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/article/kazakhstan-government-
suspends-key-human-rights-organizations (accessed 15 May 2021).
39. B. Pannier, ‘Activist defending ethnic Kazakhs In China explains why he had to flee
Kazakhstan’. Radio Free Europe, January 18, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/
31051495.html (accessed 15 May 2021).
40. Interview with a human rights activist.
41. M. Holdo, ‘Cooptation and non-cooptation: elite strategies in response to social
protest’. Social Movement Studies Vol. 18. Issue 4 (2019): 444–462.
42. L. Anceshi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy. London and New York: Routle-
dge, 2020, p. 165.
43. EP Joint Motion for Resolution, February 10, 2021 https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0144_EN.pdf (accessed 20 May 2021).
44. VOA News, ‘Pompeo urges Kazakhstan to press China over Xinjiang crackdown’. VOA
News, February 2, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pompeo-
urges-kazakhstan-press-china-over-xinjiang-crackdown (accessed 2 April 2020).
45. @mikepompeo via twitter, January 19, 2021.
46. U.S. Department of State, ‘2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Kazakhstan’, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-
practices/kazakhstan/ (accessed 20 May 2021).
47. Rickleton, op.cit.
48. E. Altynsarina, ‘Kazakhstan and China strengthening friendship and partnership in a
new era’. Astana Times, September 15, 2019, https://astanatimes.com/2019/09/
kazakhstan-and-china-strengthening-friendship-and-partnership-in-a-new-era/
(accessed 23 May 2021).
49. Z. Shayakhmetova, ‘Positive dynamics observed in trade between Kazakhstan and
China’. Astana Times, April 29, 2021, https://astanatimes.com/2021/04/positive-
dynamics-observed-in-trade-between-kazakhstan-and-china/ (accessed 10 June 2021).
50. Xinhuanet, ‘First wind turbine on NW Kazakhstan Chinese-built wind farm
installed’. Xinhua, September 18, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
2020-09/18/c_139379325.htm (accessed 12 June 2021).
51. Xinhuanet, ‘Zai Hasakesitan Tuergusun He pan ganshou Yidai Yilu luse mai’ [Feel
the green veins of the "Belt and Road" on the Turgusun River in Kazakhstan]. Xin-
huanet, August 10, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-08/10/c_1127748995.
htm (accessed 13 September 2021).
52. Qaztrade, ‘QazTrade Accelerator awaits $ 117 million contracts’. December 11, 2020,
http://qaztrade.org.kz/eng/qaztrade-accelerator-awaits-117-million-contracts/
(accessed 12 June 2021).
53. B. Mauk, ‘Can China turn the middle on nowhere into the center of the World
economy?’. New York Times, January 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/01/29/magazine/china-globalization-kazakhstan.html (accessed
13 June 2021).
54. Bloomberg Quicktake, ‘If China builds it, will they come?’. Bloomberg, January 7,
2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpqtHvPS8OQ (accessed 17 June
2021).
 TOKAYEV’S APPROACH TO KAZAKH ASYLUM SEEKERS 889

55. Xinhuanet, ‘China-Europe freight trains support economic lifeline amid pandemic’.
Xinhua, June 24, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-06/24/c_
1310026070.htm (accessed 20 June 2021).
56. Xinhuanet, ‘New freight train route linking China’s Guangxi, Kazakhstan opens’.
March 13, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/13/c_139808157.
htm (accessed 20 June 2021).
57. N.A. Nazarbayev, ‘Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. A new course for the republic’.
December 14, 2012, https://kazakhstan2050.com/ (accessed 20 June 2021).
58. B. Nurgaliyev, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Kazakhstan and Geopolitics’,
June 3, 2020, https://astanatimes.com/2020/06/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-
kazakhstan-and-geopolitics/ (accessed 27 June 2021).
59. T. Umarov, ‘Dangerous liasons: how China is taming Central Asia’s elites?’. Carne-
gie, January 29, 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83756 (accessed 27 June
2021).
60. Radio Azatlyk, ‘Ponyatiya ne imeyu. Senatory — o probleme etnicheskikh kazakhov v
Kitaye’ [I have no idea. Senators – about the problem of ethnic Kazakhs in China].
March 4, 2021, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/kazakhstan-nur-sultan-vox-pop-
senators-about-china-kazakhs-03042021/31133689.html (accessed 28 June 2021).
61. L. Adilzhan, ‘Refugees from Xinjiang, protesters harassed and arrested in Kazakh-
stan’. Bitter Winter, December, May 12, 2021, https://bitterwinter.org/refugees-
from-xinjiang-protesters-harassed-and-arrested-in-kazakhstan/ (accessed 30 June
2021).
62. Asia Development Bank, ‘Promote innovation to improve post-pandemic recovery
in Kazakhstan’, April 29, 2021, https://www.adb.org/news/promote-innovation-
improve-post-pandemic-recovery-kazakhstan-adb (accessed 12 July 2021).

ORCID
Elżbieta Proń http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0513-3879