PREFACE

International Relations is that subject in which we discuss and describe the relations
between various states. This is fought as a compulsory subject all over the universities in
Pakistan in political science departments. But, unfortunately, there is absence of a book
which covers the course according to the specific outline of international relations.
Students feel difficulty to read and study this subject,. because they can not approach to
the material easily. It is very hard to seek and find the particular readings in just single
edition.
In this book, I have tried to collect all the matter in one place, which is taught in M.A.
Political Science. I can say with full confidence that difficulties of students which they
face during study, will be released at mass level, when they will find all the subscribed
course in one book.
Tuts book also contains the course of U.S. and P.C.S. Lost ten chapters are especially for
those students and candidates who are interested in US. and P.f.S. and are preparing the
exam. All the relevant material can be traced easily.
During the preparation of this book, my biggest dilemma was, what to cover and what to
on*. But my uffaie effort was to include the relevant course and exclude irrelevant one.
My this effort con be,observed well than me by the readers of this book.
This enormous task of writing a book of this scope is possible only with the help of many
colleagues. For this Hasson Akhtar, Screed Khan Wazir, Abdul-Wahid, Screed Kassuri,
Maqbool Anwar, Abid Ali, Imad Khan, Amjad All, Qasim, Naveed4111611-, Tokeer,
Shafiq, Babar, Ijaz, AL Mazari, Qaisar Abbas Gujar, Miss Amin Akhta~, Miss Saiqa,
Miss Sordid Butt, Miss Asma Sherazi, Miss Saima, Miss Robina and Miss~uratul-Ain
and other fellows.
I am thankful to them all collectively and individually.
For any !’iortcornings and imperfections which may have survived this outpouring of
assistaree, the editor bear full responsibility.
NAWAZIsH Au LAHORE
CONTENTS
Chapter I
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. b.
Introduction To International Relations Meaning of International Relat’ons Significance
of the study of Intzrnationai Relations. International Relations as a separate disciH’ine.
The scope oi International Relations. Problems of the study of International f<olations.
Purpose of the study of International Relations.
Chapter 2
Approaches To International
Relations

1. Meaning of the term approach.

2. Realist approach.
3. Idealist approach.
4. Criticism of the realist approach.
5. Six principles of Realistic approach.

Chapter
Nation - State
The meanings of state, nation and Nation-state. The evolution of the Nation-state to 1870.
The evolution of the Nation-state
1870 to today. challenges to the Nation-state.
20
40

Chapter 4
introduction To The Contemporary
Global Sy9tem
The Global System.
The Nature of Units.
Nations and States
The collapse of states.
Non state Acton
1. St . 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
9. 10
The structure of the system. The Forms of Interaction. The Major Rules of the System.
The sources of stability in the system. The sources of change in the system.
Chapter 5

System Theory
1. The system or General System Theory.
Morton Chaplain, system Theory.
Chapter 6

Decision Makii~g
1. Introduction to decision making.
2.. Decision making models.
3. Factors of decision making.
Chapter 7
Communication Theory

1. Introduction to communication Theory.

2. The control ideas of communication.
3. Communication and control.
4.Transactions, communications, and International Relations.
93
W WWI
Chapter 8
Integration Theory
1, Introduction to Integration Theory. q, Federalism. 3. Functionalism.
4.
Communication Theory and Integration Theory.
5. Sectors of Integration.
6, Goals of Integration.
Soviet Perception of Integration.
g_ American perception of Integration. g, The Chinese perception of Integration. 10. The
Third World Perception of Integration Chapter 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8.
BO
Conflict and Conflict Resolution
Definition of the conflict. ’ Characteristics of conflict, crises and competition. Incidence
of international conflict. Issue fields in international conflict. Possible outcomes of
international conflict. The categories of conflicts and conflict Resolution. Procedure for
resolving International conflicts.
United Nations, Regional organizations, and conflict Resolution: Failure and Tasks.
9. The International court of justice and conflict Resolution.
10. Making peace.
Chapter 10
Power and its Eleri’-’nts
1. Introduction.
2. Domestic and International power.
3. Meshing.
197

4. Domain of power.
5. Range of power. 13. Non-Alignment and new international economic
order.
b. Scope of power. Chapter 13 269
7. Tangible elements of power.
Nationalism
8. Intangible elements of power.
Chapter 11 1. Definition of Nationalism.
2!i 2, Nationalism, past, present, future.
Balance of Power 3. Rise of Nationalism -- 1945.
1. Introduction. 4. Nationalism after world war II.
2. Meaning. 5. The Beneficent face of Nationalism.
3. Haas’s definition of Balance of power.
-
4. Characteristics of Balance of power.
Tomorrow.
5. Historical evolution of the concept.
b. Techniques of Balance of power.
7. Utility of Balance of power.
b. The troubled Face of Nationalism.
7~. Nationalism Tomorrow and
8. Roots of Nationalism.
9. The Rise of modern form of Nationalism.
10. National
Sovereignty.
8. Relevance of Balance of power. 11. Challenges to Nationalism.
9. The Balance of power in modern history. 12. Prospects for Nationalism. -
10. Balance of Terror. Chapter 14 294
Chapter 12 243 Collective Security
Non-AliVment

1. Meaning of Non-Alignment.
2. Non-Alignment as anti-thesis of Alignment.
Factors responsible for adoption of Non-Alignment.
Motives of non-Alignment. Evolution of the concept. Merits of Non-Alignment. Non-
Alignment movement and its role. Relevance and Role of Non-Aligned in international
Relations. Non-Aligned movement at present.
4. 5. b. 7. 8. 9.
10. Threats to non-alignment.
How to strength Non-Aligned Movements.
Non-Alignment in the wake of End of Cold War.
4.
1. Definition of Coliectivi” security.
2. Nature of Collective security.
3. Collective security and Regional Arrangements.
Collective Security and Disarmament.
5. Collective Security and the League System.
b. Collective Security and the United Nations.
Chapter 15
Disarmament
1. Introduction.
2. Disarmament.
3. Disarmament after World War II.
4. Soviet Prospects regarding prohibition of stationing of weapons
309
in outer space.

5. Arms limits.

6. 06stacles to Arms control.

7. Arms control and the future.
Chapter 16

Diplomacy
1. The nature of the diplomacy.
2. Definition of Diplomacy.
3. Foreign policy and Diplomacy.
4. Functions of Diplomats.
5. Diplomacy as communication.

6. The Evolution of Diplomacy.

7. Europe in the 19th Century.
8. Modern Diplomacy (kinds).
Chapter 1?
1. Introduction.
2. Meanings of foreign Policy.
3. 06ject’rves of foreign policy.
4. Detern6rrants of foreign policy.
Chapter 18
foreign Policy
National Interest
1. Definition of National Interest.

2. Issues and problems.

3. National Interest American Style.
4. National Interest Soviet Style.
5. Dimensions of National Interest.
6. Global Interests and objectives.
Chapter 19
352
363
372
384
Intern~’itionay Law
Meanings of International law.

The nature of law.

3. The Dynamics of law.
4. Sources of International law.
ole of international law in IR,
5. R
Chapter 20
International Or~anlZation
1, Definition.
2, Purpose of international organization.
3, International organization structure acrd issues.
4. International organization (Role).
Chapter 21
First World War
1. Causes of First World War. 2, Diplomatic Moves and Alliances.
3. Backdrop to World War 1.
4. Central Powers and the Allies.
5, Treaty of Versailles.
6. Formulation of the treaty.
7. Evaluation of the treaty.
Chapter 22
League of Nations

1. Conception and the establishment of the League.

2. Impact of the War.
3. Blueprint for the League.
4. Structure and function of the league.
5. Political history of the league.
b. Cause
for the failure of the League of Nations.
394
’ 407
420

10, Factors Contributing to cold War.

Chapter 23 438 11.
Forma! Enci of Cold War.
World War II 12. impact on Future course of International Relations.
1. Causes of the Second World War (1939 - 1945). 13. The Causes of Cold War.
2. The Course of the War. 14. The characteristics of Cold War.
3. The End of the War and the Yalta Conference. 15. Confrontation, 1945 -
1962.
4. Consequences of War. 16. From Coexistence to Detente, 1963 - 1978.
5. Trouble in Korea. 17. From Renewed confrontation to Rapprochement, 1979 -
1991.
Chapter 24 456
1$, Consequences of Celd War.
19. Post-Cold War Scenarios.
Decolonization and Expansion of 20. A twenty-First Century Multipolar
Wurld. 507
International Community Chapter 26
1 . Meaning of Colonialism. Fascism and Nazism
2. Varying colonial Policies. 1 3. U.N. Charter and Colonial people. . Political Condition
in Italy.
2. territorial Expansion.
4. Bandung Conference.
3. Italy and Spanish Civil War, 1936.
5. Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries -
4.Fascism Doctrine and its Impact.
an people.
5. Political Conditions in Germany.
6. Special committee on Decolonization.
6. Hitler’s Rise to Prominence.
7. Expansion of International community.
7. Nazi conquest of Europe
Chapter 25 472 8. Impact of Nazism.
Cold War Chapter 27
1. Origin.
Nuclear Test Ban
2. Evolution of cold War.
3. Basis \1. Introduction. b August 1963. ”~of Cold
War.

2,. Estimated Number of nuclear expansions 4. Phases of Cold War.

5. Implication of Cold War. 3’r Nuclear Proliferation.
537
6. Difference between old and New Cold War. Foreign Policy of U.S.A.
Chapter 2

7. Impact of New Cold War on World Politics.

8. Cooling of Second Cold War. 1. Policy after World War II.
9. End of Cold War. 2 Development of U.S. Foreign Policy.

3. Policy toward- Far Cast.

4. Policy towards South-East Asia.
5. Policy towards South Asia.
6. Policy toward Middle Ec-st.
7. Policy towards Europe.
8. Policy cowards Latin America.
9. United States and U.N.U.
10. United States and Disarmament.
Chapter 29
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
1. Development of Soviet Union Foreign Policy.
2. Policy after Kosygin and Brezhner.
3. Policy towards U.S.A.
4. Soviet Policy towards West Europe.
5. Relations with Communist Countries.
6. Soviet Polity in Middle East.
7. Soviet Policy in South Asia.
8. Soviet Policy in South-East Asia.
9. Soviet Polity and the Third World..
10. Soviet Policy and U.N.O.
11. Soviet Union and Disarmament.
12. Soviet Diplomacy, 1945 - 1953.
13. Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe.
14. The coordination of Policies.
Chapter 30

Foreign Policy of China

1. Relations with Soviet Union.

2. Relations with U.S.A.
3. Relations with Non-aligned countries.
4. Relations with Japan.
5. Relations with neighbouring countries.
6, Relations with West-European countries.
7, Relations with India.
g. . Relation with Pakistan.
g, Policy towards Nuclear weapons.
10. Policy towards Third World.
558
594

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
In modern times the world has greatly shrunk as a result of scientific and technological
development. As a consequence events in one part of the world have an immediate
impact on the rest off the world. Therefore the states maintain regular relations with other
states and the study of international relations has assumed great importance. -Though
some sort of international relations have been in vogue since earliest times and some of
the states like Egypt, China, Greece and India had evolved code of the conduct of these
relations, these roles were essentially based en morality and were not scrupulously
observed by the states. Further these relations generally covered states of the same reg-
.on and therefore can more appropriately be described as ’regional relations’. It was only
’n the seventeenth century that the states established relations with other states beyond
the region. This in a wa_>> marked the heg’_nning of the international relations. The
improvements in means of transport and communication and the industrial revolution
further brought th: states closer and greatly contributed to the development of
intcrna:ioval relational were concerned oil]\ with the study of diplomatic histow. law and
philosophy. The study was mainly based on facts finding and no deductions of any
universal principles were made which could be ’ielpfu’. in understanding of the pre~ent
or future relations among sta,_cs. As a result, no well conceived
lntrocluctiorr to International Relations _:
theory could be evolved,which could help in understanding the significan .
the current events.
Meaning of International Relations
The term ’International’ was used for the first time by Jerei -
Bentham in the later part of the eighteenth century with regard to the lw
.
of nations. Consequently, the term international relations was used ~. define the official
relations between the sovereign states. However soy . scholars even included the
economic, social and cultural relations among
the states also ’within the purview of the subject. Thus there are broadly tv: -views
regarding the meaning of international relations. Those who ta~
Marrow view assert that international relations include only ”the
offic; :: relations conducted by the authorised leaders of the state”. To them I
:::
relations between nations. other than the official relations, such as trac., financial
intercourse, missionary activities. travel of students, culku3, relations etc. do not fall in
the domain of international relations. Pr.. Dunn takes a narrow view of international
relations and defines it as ’t’ . actual relations that lake place across national boundaries
or as the body
knowledge which we have of those relations at any given time.
On the other hand some scholars have taken a broad view . international relations and
included apart from the official relatio:. between states, all intercourse among states and
all movements of peop’ . good and ideas across the national frontiers. Within its purview.
The lv,:: view has found wider favour with various authorities en the subject a _ they
have accordingly offered definitions of interriational relatiol:w According to Ouincy
wright” It is not only the nation which internatiol., relations seek to regulate. Varied types
of groups-nations, start governments, people. regions. alliances., confederations,
internation:Il organisations. even industrial organisations. cultural organisations W th : o
the study of internatinoal relations if the treatment is to be made realisti;
Similarly Hoffmann also says” International relations is concerned with t f ; factors and
the activities which affect the extern al policies and the pow’ r . of the basic units- into
which the world is divided’. He asserts that V~outstanding feature of international
relations is the decentralised nature
Qutstanding feature of international relations is the decentralised nature .,; the milieu in
which they take place. James Rosenau goes even further a ~ i argues that as the events in
the arena of world politics are linked wie:; internal national events and vice versa. and
these relations even overl.;~-each other at points, it is difficult to draw a boundary line
betwe. ~e international and national relations. `for example the decision of a coun1
~.
to devalue its currency may be purely a national action, but it has f;,: reaclaug
international implications. Therefore Trygave Mathicsen says tl::’° e~’~ mterual affairs
of the state fall within the jurisdiction of internatio;: v r`~fv~en~. In short. it can be said
that international relations of not coy -

Intematfonal Relations 3
only the official relations conducted by the leaders of representatives of a state, they also
cover the relations conducted by other states. In other AN ords the relations conducted by
the sovereign states may be the most important subject-matter of international, elections
but other important groups also
exercise influence on the actions of the sovereign states.

Significance of Study
In the present day inter-dependent world the study of international relations has great
significance. It enables us to understand the basic motives underlying the policies of
various countries in the international sphere and the reasons which contribute to their
ultimate successor failure. The study also enables us to have an insight in to the problems
facing the world and to face them boldly and confidently.
The study of international relations is also helpful in bringing home the point that narrow
nationalism is the bane of humanity, and poses a serious threat to world reach. It teaches
us that so long the various nations try to view the problems subjectively and give
precedence to national interest over ail other considerations. conflicts are bound to arose.
If world peace is genuinely desired an objective outlook is highly necessary.
Thirdly, the study of international relations demonstrates that traditional concept of
national sovereignty has become outmoded in modern times and needs modifications. No
state in modern times can claim full authority to act as it likes and has to operate within
several constraints inherent in the present international order. The acceptance of the
principles of collective security- and disarmament is a-clear indication of this change.
Finally, the study of international relations has greatly contributed to the strengthening of
feeling among the member states that they must to to conduct their relations along
peaceful lines and avoid military pacts and alliances. In other words they have come to
relaisethat they must avoid policy change in attitude is likely to go a long way in
promoting feeling of universal brotherhood and elimination of wars.

International Relations as a separate Discipline.

Arguments about the degree of autonomy of international relations, both as an area of
human activity and as an intellectual discipline., can go on for-ever. No one will argue
that the field can be isolated, or that the problems asked by political science and political
philosophy in general are not relevant here too. However. for those who are interested in
trying to develop the discipline in the same wax in which
/ntroduction to International Relations 4
political science has been growing for two thousand years. and sociology during the last
century. the two following points should be decisive.

First, the field can be sufficiently distinguished for analytical purposes. international
relations owe their character to the fact that the

milieu in which they take place is a decentralized one. It may be easy to exaggerate the
degree
t0 Whleh, within a nation. the supreme political
authority effectively controls the lesser centers of power: nevertheless such an authority
exists. This is not the case in the international sphere: illaernational relations owe their
distinctive character to the fact that power has been fragmented into competing or
independent groups throughout the worlds history. The nature of the basic units has
changed: what has not disappeared is the coexistence of multiple twits: no empire has
ever stretched across the whole world. Also. past and present empires. which do
indeed possess at their center a supreme authority. are nevertheless no exception to the
rule, since their establishment normally proceeds from one
conununitv’s drive to subjugate others. and their structure generally reflects this origin.
An empire is ”a creation of force artificially superim-posed upon a multiplicity of
umvilling nationtll societies.” not the realization of a eommunit<- which transcends such
societies.
It is the yew lack of a supreme and generally accepted authority
which explains why the nines of the game in world politics differ so sharply from the
rules of domestic politics: the overriding loyalty of each of the
groups into which the world has been divided. belongs to the group rather than to the
world as a whole. Even in the period when those groups had a
common ideal transcending their boundaries. Such as ”the majestic conception of the
unity of the Christian community.” political authority remained fragmented: the common
ideal. at best. was no more than a restraint on the action of the groups--not the expression
of a supreme temporal power. Hence. in particular. the striking differences between
domestic law and international law. whose elaboration. interpretation and enforcement
continue to depend on the will and consent of its yen subjects. Hence also the difference
in perspective between the disciplines of world Politics aid ”domestic” political science.
As one writer has pun it,
the former begins with the context and is then led to consider the content: its interest is in
the environment and in the interrelatedness of ever,thing within: the latter begins within
the basic unit and is then led to consider the setting: its interest is in the individual
organism and in ins relationships \\it” evenuhing without. Certainly the contrast should
not be exaggerated: there are tw iii ht periods. and even in times of sharply distinguished
multiple sovereignties. there arc twilight zones, such as the’ areas in which a federalizing
process goes on. Nevertheless the basic distinction remains normatively \,did,

international Relations
Second. since the pre-requisite can be met i.e. since
it i, intellectually possible to distinguish the field. 1 would argue that the field should be
treated as an autonomous discipline. This does not mean that it should necessarily be
taught in separate departments .Indeed the fragmentation of the social sciences into
severing units has begun to resemble the present state of world affairs .Paradoxically
enough. this trend, comes at a time when the specialists in each field realize that their
oNvti subjects political science. sociology. or even economics the most autonomous of all
really require both a separate set of theories and techniques and a considerable dose of
interdisciplinary- cooperation. Certainly by autonomy of any field within the social
sciences, in so far as it arbitrarily isolates and elevates one sector of social ,activity _
performs a kind of vivisection.
However. the difference in perspective which I have mentioned justifies a separate
treatment. The great historian Mare Block quoted an economists remarks to the effect that
an epidemic would be interpreted differently by a doctor and by a sociologist: the former
would see the spreading of microbes as the cause. and the country’s poverty as a
condition. the latter would find exactly the reverse. A similar contrast can be obtained
when the same event. for instance a countrv*s decision to attack its neighbor. is studied
both from the viewpoint of domestic affairs and from the perspective of international
politics: internal tensions (such as the pressure of social conflicts and the need to find a
diversion from them) could be seen as the cause and eternal insecurity as the condition in
the first case, and the reverse might be found in the second.
There is a much more important reason for advocating autonomy. No social scientist can
work Nyithout having ill mind at least an implicit model of his field. 1f we look at the
two social sciences whose contributions have been most vital for the development of
international relations political science and sociology we see that these disciplines use as
a model the image of the integrated community. The norm for scientific analysis. and
also. Usually, for implicit or explicit evaluation, is the society \\ inch agrees one a certain
notion (more or less extensive) of the common good. The norm is the society in which
political power is institutionalized and law made for the realization of this common good-
and in which thl: conflicts of ideas and interest are both dampened by the underlvin~.
agreement on fundamentals and ultimately resolved .in a way Nylticl; confirms this
consensus and the equilibrium of the system. In this socict\
social functions are differentiated
and carried out in such a way that tlic
i , h, I achi U
mity armony. or internal consistencN of the socictN is . eved aii
,naintained.. Now. whatever else the nature of international relations may be. it is itot an
integrated system. It Avould be very dangerous in the long
introduction to international Relations
run to continue to work in our field with a model that does not fit. May of
the mistakes of contemporar, theoretical attempts in international relations
and international law come from the systematic misapplication of tlu_
model of the integrated Rechi.v.vtaat the modern state characterized be a
sense of common purpose. a rational organization of power. a bureaucracy
and-the vile of law to the decentralized international milieu. either as a
noun for analysis or as a goal. The most extreme and revealing example is
provided by Hans Kelsen~s theory of international law, which assumes that
the international legal order is already supreme. In order to explain the
obvious differences between such a legal order (which is backed neither b* %
a sense of community nor by ay- central system of power) and domestic
legal orders, he is obliged to resort to an impressive gamut of fictions and
to reason ”as if” there existed a superpovcr over and above the units of tlac
world. The gap between theory and practice becomes so great that the
former ceases to have any value as an interpretation of the latter. For he
did not ask the indispensable previous question. ”whether an international
community- exists capable of supporting a legal order.”
There is a last and, I think, divisive reason for advocating an autonomous treatment of
international relations. Without wanting to sound like an imperialist for a relatively green
science. I would add that the architectonic role Aristotle attributed to the science of the
Polls might vycll belong today to international relations, for these have become in the
twentieth century the very condition of our daily life. To philosophize about the ideal
State in isolation- or to theorize about political systems in the abstract, has become
almost meaningless. If. in the study of politics. we were to put the primary emphasis on
world affairs. and to treat domestic politics in the light of world affairs. we might produce
a Copernican revolution even bigger than the change that transformed economics when
microanalysis replaced microanalysis. This should not be taken as a plea to treat domestic
affairs as a by-product of world politics. for to do so would be just as mistaken as to
study domestic political systems in isolation. Tie relations between internal and world
affairs arc highly complicated.
One of the crucial features and paradoxes of politics today is that whereas internal
politics are conditioned and affected by world problems more than ever before- the
foreign policies of nations remain largely dictated by the domestic experience and by the
nations image of itself. World problems become domestic issues. but the nations reaction
to these issues and the nation’s conduct on the world state can often be explained only by
internal history and by the values developed in those happier days hen the outside world
did’ not press so heavily on each countn.. The impossibility of unscrambling domestic
and world affairs is t ’It I ~l«’ument against an autonomous discipline of international

International Relations
relations; it merely shows that we do indeed need an architccton ~,:
conception of our discipline. 3.
The Scope of International Relations
What I shall do here is merely to state certain propositions
about the nature and scope of IR which seem to represent the present views
of some mature scholars in the field. In setting these forth I do not mean to
imply they incorporate the correct of final form of the subject. In my own
view, the present basic divisions of the field are far from satisfactory from
the standpoint of creative scholarship and the nest few years are apt to
witness the development of more imaginative classifications. But in the
early stages of any subject it is the wisest course to make use of existing
terms and categories. To try to invent a set of new ones at the start usually
results in an inability to communicate with anyone else.
The following statements are dogmatically phrased for the reason that sufficient space is
not available to express 411 the possible qualifications. For the same reason, no attempt
has been made to squeeze out the last drop of ambiguity from them.
1. IR may be looked upon as the actual relations that take place across national
boundaries, or as the bode of knowledge which we have of those relations at any given
time.
The later is always more restricted in extent than the former, and its contents will depend,
among other things, upon the intellectual trends of the times and the point of view and
purpose of the obser<er.
2. As a branch of learning, IR consists of both a subject-matter
and a set of techniques and methods of analysis for dealing
6. with new questions.
The subject-matter consists of whatever knowledge, from am seources, may be of
assistance in meeting new international problems of understanding old ones. It includes
both general knowledge about the behavior of political groups or individuals and
particular information about cN cuts or policy
questions.
In the case of questions of general knowledge, the techniques, and methods of analysis
include the logical devices for arriving at hypotheses and for testing and verifying or
rejecting them. In the case of practical questions they include the devices for revealing
the issues involved. classifying the value objectives. indicating the alternative courses of
action available and their probable c^nscqaenccs. and selecting the one most likely to
lead to the desired encl.
/ntroduction to lnterriatlonal Relations
The distinguishing characteristics of IR as a separate branch of learning is found in the
nature of the question with which it deals.
IR is concerned with the questions that arise in the relations between autonomous
political groups in a world system in which power is not centered at one point.
4. An IR analyst is one who purports to have some skill. in dealing with the
questions that arise out of the relations of nations.
The core of his interest lies in the conflict, adjustment and agreement of national policies.
When he concerns himself with related subjects, such as demography, anthropology and
sociology, it is to the extent that these throw light on international questions. This
distinguishes his interest in t~ese fields from that of the professional demographer,
anthropologist of sociologist.
5. The technical kndwledge of IR is not merely the extension to a wider
geographical scale of knowledge of relations inside the national community, but has
unique elements of its own.
Thus international politics-is concerned with the special kind of power relationships that
exist in a community lacking an overriding authority; international economics deals with
trade relations across national boundaries that are complicated by the uncontrolled
actions of sovereign states; and international law is that is based on voluntary acceptance
by independent nations.
Since the questions with which IR deals arise primarily out of social conflicts and
adjustments, its approach is in large part instnuriental and normative in character.
IR is concerned primarily with knowledge that is relevant to the control and improvement
of a particular set of social conditions. Its goal is not merely knowledge for its own sake
but knowledge for the purpose of molding practical events in desired directions. In this
sense it is a policy science. As such it does not differ from traditional polities, economics,
jurisprudence, and similar social disciplines. all of which had their origin in a desire to
improve a particular segment of soitial relations. .
The normative character of IR referAo the kind of questions dealt with and does not
imply
that the subject-matter is associated with any particular ideal conception of the
international cor~uniiy.
The study of IR has been inspired from the beginning by a deep interest in how wars may
be avoided. The early students of IR tended to

International Relations
conceive of idea social systems in which wars did not exist and then to evaluate existing
practices in the light of these ideal conceptions. The present tendency among scholars is
to gave primary attention to the ascertainable facts of international life and the forces and
conditions .that inflticece behavior among nations, as well as the ways in which these can
be used. for desired ends.
’: 8. Foreign policies can only be understood in the light of
knowledge of internal conditions of the states involved.
For many purposes it is possible to talk about the relations of states as if they were
relations between solid bodies with wills of their own apart from human wills. Thus it is
possible to discuss the operation of the balancing process among sovereign states, the
relative value of different power positions, and, to some extent, the legal rights and duties
of nations, with out looking beneath the surface of the slate.
In general, however, it is not possible to understand the course of international events
without a careful study of the local factors and influences that enter into the formation of
national policies.
9. All international relations can be described in terms of decision-making by
identifiable individuals or groups of individuals.
This reveals the fact that the study of IR is basically the study of human behavior in a
particular social setting.
10. By focusing on decision-making it is possible to devise ways of improving the
chances of getting more intelligent decisions.
The study of decision-making reveals the specific kinds of skills and talents needed in
staffing the government service. It indicates the kinds of training that should be
undertaken by those who intend to follow professional careers in the field. In addition, it
helps us to understand the extent to which the personality and predispositions of the
decision-maker enter into his choices of action
11. It is equally important to study the processes of decision-
making in other countries.
Decision-making in IR generally involves the interaction of the officials of two or more
states. Agreement is facilitated by a knowledge of the factors and considerations that
influence the policy-makers of other countries.
12 The average decision-maker tends to operate on the basis of a speculative model
of the general type of decision-makers from other communities he expects to meet in
international
Introduction to
International Relations
negotiations. The accuracy, of this model deternunc, in is nc
’ degree his success in achieving his objectives.
In the past such models have tended to follosv,tsvo extreme ns-p~-• the ”Machiavellian”
character whose sole aim seas the enhancement of hi: own power or that of his nation and
who used any means. hosves Cr immoral, for these ends: and the ”statesman” who paid
little attention to power considerations but sought the settlement of issues solely on the
basis of lass’ and justice and the good of the greatest number.

Neither of these speculative models has been of much use in calculating action, since
only a few policy-makers met in actual life resemble them to any extent. The study of
decision-making met in actual life resemble them to any extent. The study of decision-
making should greatly improve the mental pictures which negotiators have of those
whom they are likely to encounter in their negotiations.

13. The question ”What is the scope of IR as a body of knowledge?” is different from
the question ”What is the proper scope of an educational program in the subject?”
The kind of a program to be offered by any particular institution should depend primarily
on whether its aim is to offer IR as a cultural subject, or to train professionals, or both.

14. As a cultural subject, the aim should not be to turn out skilled decision-makers but
to introduce the students to the general field and the methods available for analyzing its
problems.

The subject-matter of IR has high cultural value both in teaching the sways of effective
thinking and in enabling the student to come to terms with an important part of his
environment. As a citizen in a democracy he is constantly faced with the necessity of
arriving at sensible opinions on questions of foreign affairs.
As professional training for those who intend to follow careers in the field. IR contains an
essential core of five subjects: international politics, international economics,
international law and organization, diplomatic history, and political geography. In
addition it calls for some knowledge of the socio-psychological subjects--sociology,
anthropology, psychology and social psychology, and ethics.
The IR analyst must acquire enough knowledge of the core subjects to enable him to
move freely across the boundaries that separate them and to be able to think effectively
about the whole questions. In addition, he should have mastered at least one of the
accepted disciplines so that he may become familiar with the basic intellectual virtues.
Only

international Relations
after such training will be become sensitive to the need for maintaining the highest
standards of rigorous scholarship if IR is to earn its place as a useful branch of higher
learning.

The Problems of the Study of IR..

The theoretically oriented student of international relations faces serious problems, some
of which can never be overcome because they -are part of the human condition. Personal
involvement, characteristics of the data, and the very nature of the process of acquiring
knowledge combine to make the formulation of a rigorous, cumulative body of theory a
difficult undertaking.

Personal Involvement
The theorist in international relations and other social sciences does not enjoy an abstract,
impersonal relationship with the object of study, as would, for example a chemist.
\instead the theorist approaches the subject from perspectives provided by culture, citizen
loyalty, political affiliation educational experiences, . family, and friends. All these
perspectives create pressures. some reinforcing and others opposing, and combine to
affect the output of theoretical investigations. The dedicated theorist will, of course make
every effort to transcend conscious: preconceptions-even if his or her high degree of
objectivity may at times’’ result in the forfeiting of friends and social privileges.
A second set of individual limitations that cannot be removed consists of subconscious
predispositions and perceptual distortions that lead to with drawal from certain ideas or
their categorization in such a fashion as to influence the product of one’s research. Such
perceptual mechanisms will vitally affect the manner in which the theorist treats data.
Where others saw only windmills. Don Quixzote recognized giants and rushed to the
attack. On the other hand. the ”giant” of the missile-gap crisis between the Soviet Union
and the United States in 1960 proved to be only a ”windmill” after the Kennedy
administration assumed power Many similar episodes have occurred in other parts of the
world.
Ambition is another aspect of personal involvement that may cloud the judgment of the
theorist. As Plato became the advisor of the king of Syracuse and Aristotle the tutor of
A?wxander, it is natural for the theorist to seek to influence the course of events. Indeed,
the Western tradition of historical empiricism in internationals relations has its roots in
the effort of Niccolo Machiavelli in 1 5 1 3 to formulate a consistent ”theory of
statecraft*’ for this prince. The temptation of the theorist to conform to popular beliefs
and to compromise principles may- be at times too great to
resist.
Introduction to international Relations 12
The problem exists not only for individuals but also for organizations.
Government agencies engaged is a bureaucratic struggle for budgetary support may seek
external assistance in the form of outside advisory opinions that support the work of the
agency. A new agency head for example, may contract the services of a ”think tank” so
that expertise outside the hierarchy of government can be used to subject policies to a
review that would be impossible within a hierarchical framework. But the question
remaining is how free will such experts be in criticizing those who are funding their
efforts. As Machiavelli hoped a wise prince will listen to a detached counselor. But how
many princes are indeed wise, and how many counselors can remain detached.
The scientific school of internationals relations appears to have developed a better
defense than the traditionalists against conscious and subconscious perceptual distortions.
Multiple and independent observations

of the same phenomenon provide a basis for cross-checking these observations and
eliminating some individual misperceptions or biases. Nevertheless, the twin engines of
political socialization and professional peer pressure are often powerful enough to
transform giants into windmills.

Characteristics of Data
An important limitation of international relations theory in this category is the sheer
unavailability of pertinent data. The sensitive questions of war and peace are often
debated behind sealed doors. Of necessity, diplomats and soldiers hold the student of
internationals relations at arm’s length. The major European and North American
governments withhold their diplomatic archives from scholarly irfvestigation for an
average of fifty years. The United States is perhaps the most liberal of the great powers in
releasing documentary sources after a
thirty-year period.
yet exceptions are often made, especially when the
interests of an ally- require that documents not be released.
A related limitation is, paradoxically, the opposite of the first: Researchers are often
inundated by too much information. Newspapers, periodicals, books, films, and other
media are multiplying at such a..rate that even the most conscientious scholar is
over`vhehned with information. The problem of discriminating among various sources of
information is

monumental. and it is in this area that computerized information-retrieval barks are likely
to prove of great value in the years to come.
In the data category. the- major-- limitation- on cumulative theoy bui?ding in
internationals relations is the difficulty with which agreement is reached on units of
analysis and definitions of key terms. Although an
(American chemist and a Chinese chemist may readily agree on the validitl
International Relations 13
Introduction to international Relations
of certain formulas, students of international relations from these diver5c political and
cultural back grounds would find the effort to define such fundamental concepts as
democracy. justice. imperialism, political den etopment, and even poNN cr, a source of
endless frustration.
To cope with this problem, scientifically oriented scholars have endeavored to develop a
value-free vocabulary of terms that will endow the field with a unity- of concepts. But
when one tries to fit this depoliticized vocabulary to reality. the cleavages of culture and
ideology again become apparent. Lithe is gained by referring to democracy and
dictatorship as nondirective and directive political systems respectively, when there is no
international agreement on the characteristics of the two forms of regime. As we
indicated earlier. international relations is a subject of inquiry that has developed most
prominently in an American setting, and consequently. it may be more reflective of the
needs of American society than the needs of an international community of scholars.

The Process of Acquiring Knowledge.

An important limitation in the process of acquiring knowledge concerns the adequacy of
the samples we use to construct hypotheses. Students of the natural sciences usually work
with phenomena that they can duplicate in the laboratory; theorists of international
relations enjoy no such advantage. The leadership elites of opposing powers may or may
not respond in the same fashion to comparable crisis situations over a period of tune. The
Soviet=American engagement in and around Berlin from the blockade of 198-.I9 to the
Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 is a case in point. We cannot predict with certainty
whether a threat such as Chairman Nikita Khrushchev’s 1968 demand that West Berlin
be converted into a ’-free” city- in sin months is credible or not. We can hardly be certain
that the idiosyncratic or personality factor is adequately represented in empirical studies.
Or, to put the matter in the form of a question. Can we assume that ”what is” ”will be” in
the study of international relations.
An example serves to illustrate this problem. Let us suppose that we are studying the
history of interactions between two nation-states. We discover that over a period of time
there is a pattern of increasing communications and trade between the citizens of the
states in question, and that the incidence of conflict beW een the two governments
decreases over the same period. May we then assume that a groWh in international
exchdttges always promotes peace and cooperation’? Not necessarily so. As
Karl Deutsch has pointed out. the correlation between the two trends depends upon the
specific circumstances that obtain at the time and in the two states. It is possible. for
example, that two states arc at peace because they do not relate at all, being separated by
geographic. cultural, and linguistic barriers. Moreover. the rise of extensive contac~,~
h°tN~ enn the two
previously isolated political conununities might result in tensions between them that lead
eventually to war.
A second limitation in the’formulation of theoretical knowledge is the temptation to rely
upon historical analogies as evidence of the presumed reliability of policy guidelines.
Since it was first implied by Thucvdides. in his chronicle of the Peloponnesian War, the
domino theory has been paraded again and again as proof that to concede one point to a
potential aggressor only encourages that aggressor to risk greater provocations and
ultimately war: In retrospect, the fournation Munich agreement of 1938. which provided
for the transfer of a disputed frontier region from the Czechoslovak Republic to
Germany, has been likened to a fallen domino that triggered the fall of other dominoes
and led eventually to World War II. Yet are we justified in assuming that negotiated
settlements in other areas of the world at other times necessarily constitute an invitation
to further aggression?
A third limitation in the acquisition of knowledge is the intrusion of the researcher into
the environment under study. In other words: the presence of the observer tends to alter
the behavior of those being observed. Politicians being inters iemed usually seek to
project an image of rationality and restraint. Such an image may bear little resemblance
to the conduct of the same individuals in an actual political conflict. Social scientists
suggest
that a good wan to bypass this particular limitation is to conduct what is referred to as
”unobtrusive observation” or ”participant observation.” In this situation, the observer
does not inform the subjects that they are being observed so as not to affect their
behavior. But unobtrusive observation in activities that are replete with governmental
security- precautions may prove quite risky for the observer who. among other things,
could be accused of being .a spy.
There is. however. a wider problem with experimentation in the social sciences. No one
denies that experimentation under controlled conditions is possible with human subjects.
But within the fast fifty years, private and governmental authorities in various countries
have, through the use of deception or force. carried out inhuman behavioral experiments.
the scientific
benefits of which are indeed dubious. to these and other criticisms. proponents of theory
building through experimentation reply that the study of decision-making dynamics
tinder laboratory. conditions (using techniques such as simulation and game theory)
offers no threat to tlac physical w ell-being or the personal dignity of the participants.

As learning techniques, gaming and simulation have long been n•ed by service
acadenoies and advanced military schools. in executive
<<”~in;~ programs conducted by commercial firms, and by professors of
~’ -~niation theow. Although the utility of simulated expcrimcnt5 m

International Relations ’ ’
decision making for teaching is generally recognized, using this method to build relevant
international relations theory remains a questionable enterprise. The difficulty with such
experimental situations is that the participants playing out the contrived diplomatic and
military roles are its most instances students or civil servants whose responses to
international crisis may, at best, have only an accidental parallel to the reactions of the
African, Chinese, or Soviet officials whose behavior they are simulating. Moreover, the
gains and losses of a simulated international encounter are paper transactions, and the
participants--even if they are professionals--tend to be either more adventurous or more
inhibited in the compressed time circumstances of a simulated environment than they
would be at the country desk of a foreign offce or defense ministry. Nonetheless, our
feeling is that simulation and gaming conducted within realistic limits may offer the best
chance for the application of experimental techniques to the study of international
relations. We must not forget, however, that our object of study involves human beings
who possess the freedom to refuse to be coded and programmed merely to provide a
satisfying solution to the ”problem.”
It is probably limitations such as those we have enumerated above that led Robert Gilpin,
a prominent student of international relations, to express same frustration. He wrote in
one of his major studies that we ”must inquire whether or riot twentieth-century students
of international relations know anything that thucydides and his fifth-century compatriots
did not know about the behavior of states.” If we were to share this pessimistic and
perhaps realistic point of view, we might well ask: Why continue to study a field so hard
to define. so filled with uncertainty, and so defiant of prediction. The answer is that
international relations can affect the outcome of a vast variety of human endeavors
ranging from the improvement of the quality of
life in a society to the avoidance of a global thermonuclear war. to use Stanley
Hoffmann’s thoughtful analogy. the game of international nuclear-power roulette is
currently played in a dark and fortified cellar. The players crouch around the table and
carefully place their bets, despite the constant jostling of an unruly crowd of spectators
who insist upon giving unwanted advice. In the computation of odds between nuclear war
and peace, the stakes are high and the probabilities of success uncertain. Yet with care
and compassion we inay no only survive, but also achieve a measure of progress in
developing institutions that will reduce the likelihood of global warfare and better the
human condition in a spirit of equity.
Perhaps a ”simple folk story” will serve to illustrate the need for partience and skepticism
in our efforts to master our subject.
Introduction to International Relations
There was once a man named Nasreddin Hodza who live in a sniall, we knigte village
community somewhere in Turkei (one day he woke up at daybreak, went out in the yard
in ,front (if his house, bent down on -his knees, and began a vigorous and meticulous
search-,inch by inch--through his - well-kept garden. Soon his neighbours and other
passers by stopped and watched him. Curious, they asked him what he was doing. He
looked up momentarily and said that he had lost his precious gold coin the night before
and was trying to find it. Now there were not too many such gold coins around the vilage
and the good neighbors sympathizing with Nasreddin, volunteered to search with hint.
”The search continued for hours, with increasing urgency. But the’gold coin was nowhere
to be found. As’ a sundown was approaching one frustrated neighbour asked Nasreddin.
”Now see here! Help its a little! Where approximately do you think you

lost this famous gold coin of yours?” Nasreddin looked him straight in the eye and said,
”I am sane 1 lost it inside the house.”
”Then why in Heaven’s name are we searching for it out here?” snapped the exasperated
neighbor. Nasreddin shook his head knowingly and muttered. ”Because there is snore
light out here! ”.
Students of international relations should remember that they too may be searching for
the elusive concepts and causes of politics in areas where there is more adequate light for
them to conduct the sdarch.

Purpose of the Study

The student of international relations should pursue his, stud” with a sensible appraisal of
its linuiations and possibilities, its goals and
objectives. He cannot have the assurance of an engineer: he is not a scientist working
through the laws of the physical world. Igstead,
he is endlessly concerned with emotions, personalities. traditions, motivations, and a host
of other intangible and changing factors. At the same time he must never regard himself
as a mere observer or onlooker--as one who finds the unfolidng story of politics among
nations ”interesting” but without profit as a means to help men shape their future. He
must not be discouraged by the defeatists, who deprecate the study of international
relations because it has not yet revealed sufficiently effective means to prevent tensions
and conflicts among nations or because it has not made it possible accurately to predict
the course of events.

Why study internatiotlal relations? The answer is that in this increasingly intrdependent
world its study is essential for human survival
and human progress. It reveals hove men and nations tend to act in given circumstances
and so tells us what conditions should be encouraged and
16

international Relations
what conditions discouraged if we are to promote international harmony and well-being.
The serious student will see that national interests are interpreted by states alone and not
by the ”organized conscience of mankind,” that propaganda can poison as well as inspire,
and that it can upset all expectations regarding the actions of a nation, that states can
move in countless ways to implement their policies through economic, political, and
cultural pressure. that national power is a .tine quo non of survival but that it is varied and
changeable in its form and measure, that the actions of nature and of foreceful
personalities can Nvreek the most painstaking calculations of wise men, that the road to
world peace may. not lead altogether through the field of politics, that race, history.
language, and culture may devise wholly irrational but supremely, effective ties, that
democracy and dictatorship can be both constructive and destructive, that problems of
poverty and overpopulation are not be solved by generalized prescriptions, and that
technical assistance has its limitations as well as its promise. He will see that full
stomachs will not inaugurate the brotherhood of man or a worldwide rise in physical or
educational standards banish conflict from the earth, but that without a minimum
standard of tolerable existence for the worlds people international cooperation -- perhaps
even human survival -- will be constantly in jeopardy. He will learn that tear deferred is a
kind of peace, perhaps the only peace that nations will ever know. Above all, he should
gain a sense of realism -- a realization that the road to a better order is filled with
*obstacles of infinite complexity,
that it can be traversed only by men who see the horizonahead as well as the soil below.
A _careful and thinking student will come to understand the subjectivity of his own
analyses. He will observe that the diagnosis of the ills of the world is not a particularly
difficult task and that most people can achieve it to their own satisfaction. He will
discover that prescribing the cure is a some-what more difficult task but by no means a
baffling one. He may then be shocked by the resolute unwillingness of the patient to take
the cure. When and if the cure finally comes it will have to be acceptable to a great many
sovereign patients, most of whom have long been convinced that the impairment of their
soverignty is far more likely to be fatal than any of the grave afflictions -to which they
have long been acustomed. The student will learn that acceptability conditions every
proposal for international action, and that it so screens every venture that the only
surviving ones are those possessing the rare quality of mutual self-interest, mutually
perceived.
The study of international relations is not a science with which we aohc the problems of
international life. At its best it is an objective and sN ~tcmatic approach to those
problems. Even man who believes that the
human Introduction to International Relations 18
as been endowed with capabilities above those of the lower animals must concede that we
have an obligation to ourselves and our posterity to use our minds to attempt to escape in
the future the miseries and harassments so frequently experienced in the past, and to
make the necessary adjustments. to changing conditions. One such line of effort pertains
to the conditions of the world society in which we live; we call it the study of
”international relations.”
Students of international relations must always strive for objectivity, balance, and
perspective. They must carry on their work in the face of obstacles of prejudice,
ignorance.. emotionalism, and vested interest -- often including thier own. Since the
world is their laboratory, and since a healthy combination of realism and idealism must
underlie their approach to the subject, they must beware of ”simple” solutions to complex
problems.a nd they must also shun the thesis of the ”inevitability” of war, the ”wave of
the future” approach, and all such encouragements to disaster. They must look with
understanding on the world as.it is, and at the same time keep their eyes on the world as it
should be; but they must never mistake the ideal for the actual, or conclude hat what
”must” be will in fact
occur.
They must reconcile themselves to the
fact that many of the problems of international relations are unsolvable under present
conditions. ”The plain fact is that we are living in a very complicated and dangerous
world. There are few if any easy, just and completely satisfying solutions to the great
problems that face us today.” Not all of these problems. however. constitute major threats
to peae and security, and those which are unsolvable and dangerous may take on a
different complexion and decline in importance with the passage of time, even if they are
never really ”solved.” Basic agreement may never be reached between the Communist
and the non-Communist worlds. but this does not mean that war is therefore inevitable, or
that this particular fissure in the internatinoal comunity must exist indefinitely. The
problem of war may never be solved, but there is hope that it can be kept under control
and that total war in the atomic age, with all of frightful consequences, can be avoided
For many issues it may be impossible to devise a genuine solution. for they may be so
complicated and have so many ramifications that they may baffle the most experienced
and far-sighted statesmen. the only possible course in some instances may be to keep the
problems under control as much as possible, to do everything that can be done within the
range of practicable alternatives to deal with them. and to Nvorry along with them as
circumtances permit. ”The limits of foreign policy,” to use the title of a book by a former
member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. are often narower than most
people realize. Another former high

International Relations
official in the State Department, writing in the early postwar period, explained the limits
in this way:
Justice Homles used to remark that there are some statements to which the only answer
is. ”Well, I’ll be deamnd.” There are also, in this world. some situations posing policy
problems where any answer that can conceivably be advanced cna be conclusively
demonstrated to be wrong. There are occasions when it is quite simple to make out a
strong case against a particular lone of action, and all that can be said in its favor is that
an even stronger case can be made against any other course. That is life in this imperfect
world. It will do no good to be hysterical or morose about it.
This homely philosophy is badly needed as a guide to the study of international relations.
It helps to explain why, to paraphrase the famous statement of Oxenstierna, the world is
governed with so little wisdom. and why the policy-makers and practicing diplomats
often seem so much less brilliant than writers and speechmakers
without responsibility for conducting the world’s affairs.
CHAPTER 2
APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Realist Approach
The realist school of thought -in international politics has been associated with scholars
such as Edward H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and George Kent-tan. The
realists see politics as a ”a struggle for power.” Power is loosely, defined as a
psychological relationship in which one actor is able to control the behaviour of another
actor. A second central concept for the realists is interest. A rational political actor is one
who acts to promote his or her interests. The realists conveniently close the definitional
gap between interest and power by practically- equating these two concepts. Thus, to act
rationally (that, to act i one’s interest) is to seek power (that is, to have the ability and the
willinggness to control others).
For the realists, acting in pursuit of personal, group, and national
interests is being eminently political. It is also obeying forces that are
inherent in human nature. To seek power in order to promote one’s
interests is to follow the basic dictates of the ”laws” of nature.Hence, the
realists are quite impatient with the proponents of the idealist school of
thought, who argue that politics shouls follow the highest moral and legal
prinicples. The relists argue that the adoption of legalistic, moralistic, a:- IId
even ideological behavior in politics tends to run contrary to the forces of

lnten rational Relations

nature and to result either in pacifism and defeatism oil the one hand or fierce, esclusivist,
and crusading spirit in the other.

So, to sum up. for the realist a ”good political person” is

”rational political person”-a person, that is, who understands and seeks power but who
also moderates the quest for power because he or slre realizes that other also understand
and seek power. The rational political person’s most important char-acteristic is
prudence. The realist is concerned for the survival and the gromh of his or her social
collectivitI, But such a person never risks the collectivity’s survival in the pursuit if
limitless growth, or in defense of ideological, moralistic. or legalistic righteousness. The
rational political person is. in the last analysis, a pragmatist: understandings, bargains.
and compromises are more likely to prevail than rules, adjudication, and moral
righteousness. For the political realist, Niccolo Machiavelli remains the source and the
inspiration of survival-oriented behavior. Morality, legalism, ideologies--these are
luxuries that can be purused only if they do not endanger the viability and
the vital interests of the political collectively or the government that speaks for the
collectiviri.

Idealist Approach
To the idealist school of thought, the realist maims appear morbid. reactionary, cynical,
and quite often self-seriving. The great varies, of proponents of the idealist school include
pacifists. world federalists. humanitarians, legalists, and moralists. This school is
identified with great names such as \henri de Saint. Simon, Mahatma Gandhi. Woodron
Wilson, and \bertrand Russell. The reader should note that practicing politicians, unlike
political-science scholars. frequently employ idealist rhetoric. This rhetoric generally
remains, however. outside the gates of practical application.
For the idealist, politics is ”the art of good government” rather than the ”art of the
possible.” A good political leader does not do what is possible: rather, he or she does
what is good. Leadership provides for the good-life--which involves justice, obedience to
legitimate nrles (that is. rules derived from universal moral principles), and respect for
fellow humans. both domestically and internationally. \idealists disagree with the
fatalistic orientation of the realists, who assume that ”power politics’ is
natural phenomenon, indeed an unchanging law, of nature. For the idealists, no pattern of
behavior is unchangeable. Humans have motiN trtcrl behavior reduces a person to the
instincts of the beast. Over time, hunla”s learn. improve.. and grow. Civilization means
learning to coexist i~’ societies. operating under fair laves, and banning the laws of the
jrrrr~l`
21
Approaches to International Relations
rchich permit the survival only the most wily, the most powrful, and tire

most ferocious.
For the idealist the art of possible. as a guideline for political action. becomes a sinfully
permissive type of philosophical justification. It licenses the practitioners of politics to
lie. cheat, burgle, kill and torture. if necessary, in defense of personal. party. or national
interests. Political action is thus reduced to a game of deadly violence rattler than a game
of political wits. In contrast, moral principles--which are universal among all of the
world’s major religions--can serve as tire foundations from which fair and just laws can
be derived. which in turn can be applied effectively (that is, with adequate sanctions)
against those who break them. Thus, for the idealist, politics should involve the
abandonment- of force. the encouragement of learning. and the coesist~nce of societies
under the leadership of adequately enlightened rulers.
The dual problem facing the idealists. as one might suspect. is to be found in the
nature and in the implementation of their ideas. For example, we must ponder whether an
adequate method exists for arriving at the substance of ”universal ideals.’ Will it be
possible in a nnOticulture world occupied by states in drastically different stages of
economic development to agree on what is ”good politics’’’ Further. how does one: bring
about ”enlightened societies’ both at ’the domestic and at the international levels? What
does one do with the lawbreakers, especially if they become more numerous than those
who scnrpulously observe the laws? What happens if violence and oppression arc
employed by ruthless government in the name of law order. and justice?

The virous proponents of the idealist school are divided with respect to how best to meet
internal violence and external aggression by states. The pacifists feel that fighting
violence with violence is nrere.lv falling into a Machiavellian/realist trap. IC one ties-
that is. to have ones way (even if this way defends the principles of justice and peace) by
using force or violence, then one fulfills the major axiom of the realists--drat conflict,
regardless of its purpose, is inherent in collective human affairs. The only viable
alternative, according to the pacifists. is to resist nonviolently and to hope that in the long
run the cultural patterns of good political behavior will displace primitive patterns
characterized by ’power Politics’. In contrast. legalists and world deferalists argue drat
the use of centralized and legitimate force is necessary to deter individual actors in a
31\c1r society from breaking the rules drat guarantee collective coexistence without
s;rcrificing fundamental individual rights. These drinkers often Poll”, , lo \Vestern
democratic-competitive systems as models of societies 111;u operate ill accordance with
idealistic principles. These grin crates 1~tlm respect of rides rather than rulers, peaceful
and ,ii bio,nc!
22

lntemational Relations
grounds:
change. progressive taxation that allows for gradual redistribution of income and property
fragmented and accountable governmental structures, and above all civil rights that
gurantee the freedoms of speech, worship. organization and peaceful petitioning of the
government. So, the legalists u..u world federalists argue, if Western states the United
States primary among them, given its ethinic diversity) can coexist within bounds of
controlled violence, and under enlightened and liberal prinicples of behavior, then a
world federation with central authority that monopolizes but does not abuse force can be
instituted. Thus, the world will be freed from the scourge of international war and many
of its derivative
civil wars.

Criticism of the realist approach

The realist approach has been severely criticised on the following
First, the theory ,suffers from ambiguity and is inconsistent with really. No universally
acceptable definition of powr is offered. For example Morgenthau takes power as a
’psychological realionship among states’, but the psychological relations themselves are
quite vague and it is not possible to measure to study the same. The study of complex
psychological relationship among more than 160 nation states of the modern world
renders them even more complex.

Secondly, the theory wrongly assumes that all men and states seek
their national interests in terms of power. If it were so, there would be
Fi,7nllv, the realist theory, that of Morgenthau, is defective in so
constant struggle going on between various states and there would be no
systematic conduct of international relations. In fact. the element of mutual far as
it regards the political sphere as autonomous as the spheres of
co-operation or layers moralises, but he is not quite clear about the
nature
-operation amo’~ng the members of the international community exercises of
autonomy. Though he maintained that a political realist should only deal
profound influence on the conduct of international relations. Stantely with limited
set of variables, yet in his book Dilemmas of Politics he
Hoffmann has rightly observed: ”1t is particularly uncomfortable when asserts that
politics must play the roles of the common integrating core. In
one’s basic postulate about human nature is such that history’ cannot be other words he
says that politics must be concerned with l die ~ariable-
anything but a tale full of sound and fun, signifying nothing. For it is a with which the
other specialised spheres deal. All this leads to confusion.
postulate which stresses the inevitability and universality of evil and which
assumes reason far from following its own inherent impulses is driven
towards its goal by the irrational forces the end of which it serves. Now,
this view makes it almost impossible to understand how there could be a
rational theory of rational human beheviour.”
,approaches to lntemational Relations 24
Fifthly, Dyke has severely criticised the Realist theory. He says ”If
power were always the end in itself, politics could be likened to a game the
object of which is to select the current. It would presumably be a more
bloody game than is chess or baseball, but still the outcome would be
without moral significance. The victory of one participant in the game
would be followed sooner or later by the victory of another, and life would
be made up of
endless round of meaningless struggle. Each victor would
have demonstrated his power arid that would be that.”
S’ixthlv, the critics point out that Morgenthau’s conception that national interest carries
its own morality’ holds good only during the stable eriods when accommodation of
national objectives is possible. But in the present conditions when different nations are
often ready to elimnate on other nations, it would be wrong to assume that national
interest carries its own morality.
.SeventhJv, the realist theory is defective in so far it assumes that there is hardly any
relationship or activity which does not involve power. Actually there exist a number of
non-political relationships and activities which do not involve power, such as
international sports events, circulation of books and other reading matter, private letters
and telegrams etc. which are not political activities. Morgenthau does not suggest any
criteria for the separation of the political activities from the non-political activities.
7hirdlv, the theory wrongly assumes that power is the most important goal which the
nations pursue. In fact other considerations like wealth, cultural welfare, security,
protection and promotion of ideology also greatly influence the actions of the states.
Forthlv. theory is defective in so far it treats the world as a static unit in which power is a
permanent guiding factor. This is against the well-accepted fact that the nations keep on
changing from time to time.
Despite these shortcomings of the realist approach, it cannot be denied that the approach
has three distinct advantages. First, it is persuasive and is supported by historical
experience. Secondly. the realist approach has given a jolt to scholars and compelled
there to re-evaluate
their own assumptions. Thirdly, even those scholars who challenge the bases of realism
have tended implicitly to rely on realist purspectiv°es. Which is a great compliment to
this approach.

SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM

1. Political realism believes that politics. like society in general. is governed by
objective laws that ham their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first
necessaw to understantd the laws by which society lives. The operation of

International Relations
these laws being impervious to our preferences, men « ill challenge them only at the risk
of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in
the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however, imperfectly and one-
sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in
politics
between truth and opinion--between what is true objectively and rationally. supported by
evidence and illuminated by reason. and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced
from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the
classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws.
Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The
fact that a theory of politics, if there by such a theory, has never been heard of before
tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favor of; its soundness. Conversly,
the fact that a theory of politics vas developed hundreds or even thousands of years ago--
as was the theory of the balance of power--does not create a presumption that it must be
outmoded and obsolete. A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason
and experience. To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is
to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the
superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a
”fashion” or ”fad” is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have
opinions but no truths.
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through
reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through
the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of
these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done. and from the
foreseeable consequnces of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have
been.
Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material
of foreign policy, we must approach political relaih- with a kind of rational outline. a
neap that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put
ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign
policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives
are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these
cinlemstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner). and which of these
rational alternatives this particular stotesnn;m. acting under these circumstances. is likely
to choose. It is the
International Relations
Approaches to __-
,o~,;ng of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts ino t~ e r
sequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of
mUe; n, wows
COIL
politics.
2.
The main signpost that helps political realism to tied its was through the landscape of
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of powers. This concept
provides the link between reason trying to understand internatoinal politics and the facts
to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding
apart from

other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth),

ethics, aesthetics, or religion.

Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be

altogether impossible, for without it we
could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least
a measure of systemic order to the political sphere.
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the
evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and
anticipate, as it were, the steps a
statesman past, present, or future has taken or will take on the political scene. We look
over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with
other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest
defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his
thoughts and
actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the
observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the
theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for
rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which
makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as in intelligible, rational
continuum, by and large consistent within itself,
regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intelectual and moral qualities of
successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics. then, will guard against
two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological
preferences.

To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the llloti~, es of statesmen is both
futile and deceptive. 1t is futile because molly es arc the most illusive of psychological
data. distorted as they are. Frequently beyond recognition. by the interests and emotions
of actor and observer ahkc. Do
International Relations
we really know what our ow motives are’? And what do we know of the motives of
others’?
Yet even if we had access to the real
motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign
policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman’s
motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy
might be. It cannot give us, however. the one clue by which to predict his foreign
policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives
and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will
be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say
that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are moral] wrong, but we can say
nothing abut the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political
qualities of his actions. Ave must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen
been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by- making it worse? And
how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither
expected nor desired?
Neville Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by-
good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than,
were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure
the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War
inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of people. Sir Winston Churchill’s
motives, on the other hand, were much less universal in scope and much more narrowly
directed toward personal and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from
these inferior motives were certainly superior in moral and politcal quaky to those
pursued by his predecessor. Judged by his motives, Robespierre was one of the most
virtuous risen who ever lived. Yet it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that
made him kill those less virtuous than himself, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed
the revolution of which he was a leader.
Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; ____, ..., not guarantee
the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire. What is important to
know, if one wants to understand foreign policy. is not primarily the motives of a
statesman, but his intellectual ability- to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as
well as his political ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful
political action. It follows that while ethics in the abstract judges the moral qualities of
motives, political theory must judge the political qualities of intellect, will. and action.
28
7 Approaches to International Relations
A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other
popular fallacy of equating the forign policies of a stateman with his
philosophic or political sympathies. and of deducing the former from the
latter. Statesmen. especially under contemporary conditions. may well
make a habit of presenting thier foreign policies in terms of thicr
philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for
them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their ”official duty.”
which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their
”personal wish,” which is to see their own moral values and political
principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require,
nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles,
but it requries indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the
possible -- between what is desirable even-where and at all times and what
is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always
followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course, the contingent
elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the
weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect
foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy
is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to
marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy can not fail to
impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy
which aims at rationality- must for the time being, as it were, abstract from
these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which
presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the
contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.
Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the
personal whim or the personal psychopathology of the policy maker may
appear contingent only from the vantage point of trationalin. but may
hemselves be elements in <: choerent system of irratonality. The possibility
of constructing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics is worth
exploring.
When one reflects upon the development of American thinking on
for-eign policy, one is struck by the persistence of mistaken attitudes that
have survived-under whatever gueises-both intellectual argument and
political experience.Once that wonder, in true Aristotelian fashion,
has
been transformed into the quest for rational understanding, the quest yields
a conclusion both comforting and disturbing: We are here in the presence
of intellectual defects shared by all of us in different ways and degrees.
Together they provide the outline of a kind of pathology of international
politics. When the human mind approaches realty with the purpose of
taking action. of which the political encounter is one of the outstanding

international Relations 29
instances. it is often led astray by any of four common mental phenomena, residues of
formerly adequate modes of thought and action now rendered obsolete by a new social
reality: demonological interpretations of reality which substitute a fictitious reality-
peopled by evil person rather than seemingly intractable issues-for the actual one; refusal
to come to terms with a threatening state of affairs by denying it through illusory
verbalizatoin; reliance upon the infinite mane-ability of a seemingly obstreperous reality.
Man responds to social situations with repetitive patterns. The same situation. recognized
in its identity with previous situations. evokes the same response. The mind, as it were.
holds in readiness a number of patterns appropriate for different situations: it then
requires only the identification of a particular case to apply to it the preformed pattern
appropriate to it. Thus the human mind follows the principle of economy of effort,
obviating an examination de novo of each individual situation and the pattern of thought
and action appropriate to it. Yet when matters are subject to dynamic change, traditional
patterns are no longer appropriate: they must be replaced by new ones reflecting sch
change. Otherwise a gap will open between traditional patterns and new realities. and
thought and action will be misguided.
On the international plane it is no exaggeration to say that the very structure of
international relations-as reflected in political institutions, diplomatic procedures, and
legal arrangements-has tended to become at variance with, and in large measure
irrelevant to, the reality of international politics. While the former assumes the ”sovereign
equality” of all nations, the latter is dominated by an extreme inequality of nation . two of
which are called superpow because they hold in thier hands the unprecedented power of
total destruction, and many of which are called ”ministates” because their power is
minuscule even compared with that of the traditional nation states. It is this contrast and
incompatibility betvven the reality of international politics and the concepts, institutions.
and procedures designed to make
intelligible and control the former, which has caused, at least below the great-power
level. the unrnanagebilitv of international relations which borders on anarchy.
International terrorism and the different government reactions to it, the involvetnctlt of
foreign governments in the Lebanese civil war. the military operations of the United
States in Southeast Asia. and the military intervention of the Sovict Union in Eastern
Europe cannot be explained or justified by reference to traditional concepts, institutions.
and procedures.
All these situations have one characteristic in common. The modern fact of
interdependence requires a political order which takes that fact into account. while in
reality the legal rind institutional superstructure.
Approaches to International Relations
harking back to the ninteenth century. assumes the existence of a multiplicity of self-
sufficient, impenetrable. sovereign nation states. These residues of an obsolescent legal
and institutional order not only stand in the ,`,ay of a rational transformation of
intertmational relations in light of the illequality of power and the interdependence of
interests, but they also render precarious, if not impossible, more rational policies within
the defective framework of such a system.
It is a charactristic of primitive thinking to personalize social problems. That tendency is
particularly strong when the problem appears not to be susceptible to rational
understanding and successful
manipulation. When a particular person or group of persons is identified ~yith the
recalcitrant difficulty, that may seem to render the problem both intcllecutally accessible
and susceptible of solution. Thus belief in Satan as
the source of evil makes us ”understand” the nature of evil by focusing the search for its
origin and control upon a particular person whose physical existence we assume. The
complexity of political conflict precludes such simple solutions. Natural catastrophes will
not be prevented by burning witches; the threat of a powerftil Germany to establish
hegemony over Europe will not be averted by getting rid of a succession of German
leaders. But by identifying the issue with certain persons over whom we have--or hope to
have--control we reduce the problem, both intellecutally and pragmatically. to
manageable proportions. Once we have identified certain individuals and groups of
individuals as the source of evil, we appear to have understood the causal nexus that-
leads from the individuals
to the social problem, that apparent understanding suggests the apparent solution:
Eliminate the individuals ”responsbile’ for it, and you have solved the problem. *
Superstition still
holds sway over our relations within society. The demonological pattern of thought and
action has now been transferred to other fields of human action closed to the kind of
rational enquiry and action that have driven superstition from our relations with nature.
As William Graham Sumner put it. ”The amount of superstition is not much changed. but
it now attaches to politics, not to religion.” The numerous failures of the United States to
recognize and respond to the polycentric
nature of Communism is a prime example of this defect. The corollary of this
indiscriminate opposition to Communism is the indiscriminate support of governments
and movements that profess and practice anti-Communism. American policies in Asia
and Latin America have derived from this simplistic position. The Vietnam War and our
inabilit\ to come of terms with mainland China find here their rationale. So do the theory
and practice of counterinsurgency, including large-scale assa~sulattnlls nndcr the
Phoenix program in Vietnam and the actual or aitelnpt,~d
30

International Relations ?I
assassinations of individual statemen. Sings of a similar approach hay been evident more
recently in Central America.
The demonological approach to foreign policy strengthens another pathological tendency.
which is the refusal to acknowledge and cope effectively with a threatening reality. The
demonological approach has shifted our attention and concern towards the adherents of -
onununism--individuals at home and aborad, political movements, foreign ;overnments--
and away from the real threat: the power of states, Communist or not. McCarthyism not
only provided the most pen asive American example of the demonological approach but
was also one of the most extreme examples of this kind of misjudgment: it substituted the
largely illusory threat of domestic subversion for the real threat of Russian power.
Finally. it is part of this approach to politics to believe that no problems--however,
hopeless they may appear--are really insoluble, given well meaning, well-financed, and
competent efforts. I have tried elsewhere to lay bare the intellectual and historical roots of
this belief, here I limit myself to pointing out its persistent strength despite much
experience to the contras, such as the Vietnam War and the general decline of American
power. This preference for economic solutions to political and military problems is
powerfully reinforced by the interests of potential recipients of economic support, who
prefer the obviously profitable transfer of economic advantages to pinaful and risky
diplomatic bargaining.
The difference between international
politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between
a photograph and a painted portriat. The photograph shows everything that can be seen
by the naked eye; the painted portriat does not show everthing that can be seen by the
naked eye, but it shows. or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eve cannot
see: the human essence of the person portrayed.
Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows
that political reality is replete, with contingencies and systemic irrationalities and points
to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social
theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements
of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for
theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of rational, foreign policy
which experience can never completely achieve.
At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign
policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and.
hence, complies both with
APproaches to International Relations
the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of su:;,:ecss. Political realism
wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its
painted portriat. Awar of the men itable gap between good--that is rational--foreign
policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory
must focus upon the rational elements of political reality. but also that foreign policy
ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.
Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that
actual foreign policy does not or carrot live up to it. That argument misunderstands the
intention of this book, whichis to present not an indiscriminate description of political
reality, but a rational theory of international politics. For from being invalidated by the
fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality,
it assumes that reality, being deficient in this respect. must be understood and evaluated
as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of power.
Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category
which is universally valid, but
it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fired once and for all. The idea of
interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the cricumstances of time
and
place. Thucydides
statement, born of the experience of ancient Greece, that -1`identin- of interests is the
surest of
bonds whether betwen states or individuals” was taken up in the nineteenth century by
Lord Salisbury’s remark that ”the only bond of union that endures” among nations is ”the
absence of all clashing interests.” It was erected into a general principle of government
by George Washington:
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with
far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every
man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in
particular instances, actuate men to the obsewance of a conduct, purely disinterested; but
they are not of themseleves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined
dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual
sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the
common good. It is vain to exclaim agaisnt the depravity- of human nature on this
account; the fact is so.the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must
in a great measure. change the constitution of man. before we can make it otherwise. No
institution. , not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.
It was echoed and enlarged upon in our centun by INIa\ Weber’s ;,h. ”r\aUion:

lntematlonal Relations 3~
Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the
”images of the world” created by these ideas have ,ver, often served as switches
determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.
Yet the kind of interest determining political action in particular period of piston depends
upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The
goals that might be pursued b~ nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of
objectives am nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its contelti
and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural
environment. Power may comprise an yrthing that establishes and maintains
the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationship
which sere that end. from physical violence to the most ,subtle
psychological ties by which one mind controls anotehr Power covers the
domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and
controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies. and
when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing
but its owls strength and its sole
justification in its aggralldizelneilt.
Political realism does not assume that the contemporan conditions under which foreign
policy operates. with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale
violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, instance, is indeed a perennial
element of all pluratistic societies, as the authors of The Federalist papers well knee: yet
it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative
stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that lime given rise to these conditions can be
duplicated on the internatinoal scene. similar conditions of stability and peace will then
prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations.
What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation
state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist
indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be
judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation stag is
a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course o! pistol,°. Nothing
in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present divisoin of the
political world 1(1t0 nation states will b,’ replaced by larger units of a quite different
character. more in kecpin- wn the technical potentialities and the mural requirements of
the contcmhjra’ xNorl,l
,approaches to International Relations
34
the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed. The
realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the
workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that leave shaped the past as they will
the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that 1,e can bring about that transformation by
confronting a political realty that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to
take those laws

into account.
.1. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political
action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the
moral command and the requirements of successful political
action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that
tension ’and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political
issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics
were morally more satisfying than they actually arc, and the
moral law less exacting that it actually is.
Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of
states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through
the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: ”Fiat
jlrstitia, peneat »ur»dcrs (Let justice be done, even if the world perish),” but the state has
no right to sae so in the name of those who are in its care: Both individual and state must
judge political action by universal moral principles. such as that of libem~. Yet while the
individual has amoral right to sacrifice himself in defence of such a moral principle. the
state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of IiberO_ get in the
way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national
survival. There can be no political morality without prudence,. that is, without
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then,
considers prudence--the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions--to
be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity
with the moral lmv: political ethics judges action by its political consequences Classical
and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said:
I do the ver.v best I hnoir hou% the vc>rv best I ccty and I » roan to keep doing so until
the end. I/~ the end hrlng.v ire o» t all right, what is said against lite urorn’t a»ro»»t
to~anvthk»,y. if the a»d hr-i»gc lite out IrroJrg, ten a»gle.v .sirear-ing Ljo».s right mould
r»ake »o difference.
e7ce.
Political realism refuses to identify the ulorail’aspiraUOUS of a particular nation with the
moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth aml opimou. so it

35 International Relations
distinguishes between truth and ideolatry. All nations are tempted--and few have been
able to resist the temptation for long--to clothe their own particular aspirations and
actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the
moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in
the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the
belief that all nations stand under the judgement of God. inscrutable to the human mind.
and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one’s side and that what one wills
onesefl cannot fail to be willed by God also.
The lightheared equation betwene a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence
is morally indefensible. for it is that very sinof pride against which the Greek tragedians
and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politicaly
pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which in the blindness of
crusading
frenzy. destroys
nations
ideal. or God himself.
On the other
and civilizations--in the name of moral principle.
hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in
terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if
we look at all nations. our own included. as political entities pursuing their respective
interests defined in terms of power. we are able to do justice to all of them. And we arc
able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other antios as we
judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion. we arc then capable of pursing
policies that respect the interests of other antions. while protecting and promoting those
of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderatio of moral judgment.

6. The differnece. then. between political realism and other

schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However much
of the theory of political realism may have been
misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its
distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the
economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined
as power. as the economist think in terms of interest defined as wealth: the layer. of the
conformity of action with legal rules: the moralist. of the conformiy of action with moral
principles. the economist asks: ”How does this policy affect the wealth of society. or a
segment of it’?” The layer asks: ”is this policy in accord with the niles of law’.’~’-the
moralist asks: ”Is this polio in accord with moral
principles?” And the political realist asks: ”How does this policy affect tfic
Approaches to International Relations
power of the nation’?” (Or of the federal government. of Congress. of the parts, of
agriculture, as the case may be.)
The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought
other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other
standards to those of politics. And he parts company, with other schools when they
impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere. It is
here that political realism takes issue with the ”legalistic-moralistic appraoch” to
international politics. That this issue is not, as has been contended, a mere figment of the
imagination, but goes to the very core of the controversy, can be shown from many
historical examples. Three will suffice to make the point.
In 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. This action confronted
France and Great
Britain with two issues, one legal. the other political. Did that action violate the Covenant
of the League of Nations and, if it did, what countermeasures should France and Great
Britain take? The legal
question could easily be answered in the affirmative. for obviously the Soviet Union had
done what was prohibited by the .Covenant. The answer to the political question depends,
first. upon the momter in which the Russian action affected the interests of France and
Great Britain: second upon the existing distribution of power between France and Great
britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile
nations, especially Germany. on the other: and, third, upon the influence that the
contermeasures were likely to have upon the interests of France and Great Britain and the
future distribution of power. France and Great
Britain. as the leading members of the League of Nations, saw to it that the Soviet Union
was expelled from the League. and they were prevented from joining Finland in the war
against the soviet Union only by Sweden’s refusal to allow their troops to pass through
Swedish territory on their way to Finland. If this refusal by Sweden had not saved them,
France and Great Britain would shortly have found themselves at war with the Soviet
Union and Germany at the same time.

The policy of France and Great britain was a classic example of legalism in that they
allowed the answer to the legal question. legitimate within its sphere, to determine their
political actions. Instead of asking both questions. that of law and that of power, they
asked only the question of law; and the answer they received could have’ no bearing on
the issue that their very existence might have depended upon.

The second example illustrates the ”moralistic approach” to international politics. It

concerns the international status of the Communist kovcrnment of China. The rise of that
government confronted the Western
11orld with two issues. one moral. the other political. Were the nature and
36

international Relations
policies of that government in accord with the moral pinnciples of the Western world?
Should the Western world deal with such a government” The answer to the first question
could not fail to be in the negative. Yet it did not follow with necessity that the answer to
the second question should also be in the negative. The standard of thought applied to the
first--the moral--question was simple to test the nature and the policies of the Communist
government of China by the principles of Western morality. On the other hand. the
second--the political--question had to be subjected
to the complicated test of the interests involved and the power available on either side,
and of the bearing of one or the other course of action upon these interests and power.
The application of this test could well have led to the conclusion that it would be -%viser
not to deal with the Communist government of China. To arrive at this conclusion by
neglecting this test, altogether and answering the political question in terms of the moral
issue was indeed a classic example of the ”moralistic approach” to international politics.
The third case illustrates strikingly the contrast between realism and the legalistic-
moralistic approach to foreign policy. Great Britain. as one of the guarantors of the
neutrality of Belgium. went to war with Germany in August 1914 because German- had
violated the neutrality of Belgium. The British action could be justified either in realistic
or legalistic or legalistic-moralistic terms. That is to say, one could argue realistically that
for centuries it had been axiomatic for British foreign policy to prevent the control ofthe
Low Countries by a hostile power. It was then not so much the violation of Belgium’s
neutrality per se as the hostile intentions of the violator which provided the rationale for
British intervention. If the violator had been another nation but Germany, Great Britain
might well have refrained from interventing. This is the position taken by Sir Edward
Grey. British Foreign Secretary during that period. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Hardinge remarked to him in 1908: ”If France violated Belgian neutraity in a war agaism
Germany. it is doubtful whether England or russia would move a finger to maintain
Belgian neutrality. while if the neutrality of Belgium was violated by Germany, it is
probable that the converse would be the case.” Whereupon Sir edward Gre\ replied: ”This
is to the point.” Yet one could also take the legalistic and moralistic position that the
violation .of Belgium’s neutrality per se. because of its legal and moral defects and
regarldess of the interests at stake and of the identity of the violator. justified British and.
for that matter. American intervention. This was the position which Theodore Roosevelt
took in his letter to Sir Edward Grey of January 22. 191 5:
To ine the crrrr or the silrration has heen Bcl(,,imn. If England o ”
France had acted toward Belgium os C;cr~na77~’ has acted I shotrhl
Approaches to International Relations
l7aye opposed there, exnetlv a.s I now oppose Gernrany. I have ernplraticaJJy approved
your action as a model for what should be clone by those who believe that treaties
sl7otrld be observed in
good faith
and that theca is strcl7 a thing as inter-national r rorality. I tape this position as an
American mho is no more an Englishman than he is a Ger-n;an, wl7o endeavors loyally
to sc>7we the interests of his own country, but uMo also endeavors to do what he
can,for’ justice and decency as regards mankind at large, and who there 1in’e feels
obliged to judge all other nations by their- conduct on any given occasion.
This realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere agaisnt
its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and
importance of these other modes of thought. It rather implies
that each should be assigned its proper sphere and ftmction. Political realism is based
upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of .”economic
man,” ”political man.” ”moral man,” -religious man,” etc. A man who was nothing but
”political man” would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restaints.
A man who was nothign but ”moral man” would be a fool, for the would be a saint, for
he would be completely lacking in worldly desires.
Recognizing that these different facets of human nature exist, political realism also
recognizes that in order to undersand one of them one
has to deal with it on its own terms. That is to say, if I mart to understand ”religious
man.” I must for the time being abstract from the other aspects of human nature and deal
with its religious aspect as if it were the only one. Furthermore, I must apply to the
religious sphere the standards of thought appropriate to it, always remaining aware of the
existence of other
tandards and their actual intleunce upon the religious qualities of man. What is true of
this facet of human natue is true of all the others. No n;odern economist. for instance.
would conceive of his science and its. rclaitons to other sciences of man in any other way.
It is exactly through such a process of emancipation from other standards of thought. and
the development of one appropriate to its subject matter, that economics has developed as
an autonomous theory of the economic activities of man. To
contribute to similar development in the field of politics is indeed the purpose of political
realism.

It is in the nature of things that a theory of politics which is based

upon such principles will not meet with unanimous approval--nor does. for that matter.
such a foreign policy. Far theory and poticv alike run counter to two trends in our culture
whit are not abet to reconcile themselves to the ,ntrends disparages the role of power in
society on grounds that stem from ’I’l~ experience
sand philosophy of the nineteenth century: we shall address

International Relations
ourselves to this tendency later in greater detail. The other trend, opposed to the realist
theory and practice of politics, stems from the very relationship that exists, and must exist
between the human mind and the political sphere. For reasons that we shall discuss later
the human mind in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look the truth of politics
straight in the face. It must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish the truth--the more so,
the more the individual is actively involved inthe .processes of politics, and particularly
in those of international politics. For only by deceiving himself about the nature of
politics and the role he plays on the political scene is man able to lice contentedly as a
political animal with himself and his fellow men.
Thus it is inevitable that a theory which tries to understand international politics as it
actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would
like to see it, must overcome a psychological resistance that most other branches of
learning need not face. A book devoted to the theoretical understanding of international
politics therefore requires a special explanation and justification.
39
CHAPTER 3
MODERN
SOVEREIGN
STATE SYSTEM
TIE MEANING OF STATE, NATION, AND NATION-STATE
The terms state, nation, and nation-state are usually used interchangeably in discussions
of international relations. Technically, however, these terms have different meanings. In
certain contexts the differences in meaning may have great significance, and therefore an
understanding of the more precise definitions is of some importance.
A state is a geographically bounded entity, governed by a central authority that has the
ability to make laws, rules. and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules, and decision
within its boundaries. A state is also a legal entity, recognized under international law as
the fundamental decision-making unit of the international legal system. States determine
their own policies (at lest in theory), and establish their own forms of government, which
may differ significantly from state to state. Those people who inhabit the territory of .a
state may or may not be citizens of that state, depending on the laws passed by the
government of that state. Regardless of their citizenship status, inhabitants of the territory
of a state are subject to the laws of that state.
A nation, by contrast, need not necessarily be either geographically bounded or legally
defined. A nation is a grouping of People who view themselves as being kind to one
another
in some manner. ~ nation is therefore as much a psychological fixation as anything else.

lntemational Relations `
Groupings of people who consider themselves to be ethically, culturally. or linguistically
related may, thus be considered a nation. Nations may exist without territorial control, as
did the Jewish nation before 19-47 (when the state of Israel~zvas founded), Ukrainians in
the Soviet Union today, and various Indian tribes in the United States. Other groups
calling themselves national liberation movements allow exist and seek to establish
territorial control in a certain area, thereby’ becoming a state. The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) in the Middle East and the Frabaduno Martin National Liberation
Prom movements each of which seeks to establish territorial control in land areas that are
currently either part of another state or under the control of a state government that the
national liberation movement believes is oppressing its people.

Alationalism is an immediate derivative of the concept of nation. It refers to the feelings

of attachment to one another that members of a nation have and to the sense of pride that
a nation has in itself. Nationalism may be expressed in a number of ways, including a
desire to obtain high standards of living, to win more gold medals than other nations at an
Olympics, or to conquer adjoining territories. Since the eighteenth century, and at an
accelerating pace during the twentieth century., nationalism has perhaps manifested itself
most often in the desire of the members of a nation to control and govern the territory in
which they live. Thus, only gradually, the concepts of nation and state fused u many
instances to yield a nation-state.

The term nation-state, therefore, means a state whose inhabitants consider themselves to
be a nation. It is a geographically bounded legal entity under a single government the
population of which psychologically considers itself to be in some way, shape, or form
related. The term nation-state is historically more recent than either state or nation and
reflects the growing convergence in recent years between the two older terms Countries
today are conunonlv referred to as nation-states. even though in many instances they are
not. In Africa. for instance, the territory included in the many states .that received their
independence during the 1950s and 1960s was based on what had been the old colonial
boundaries. Similarh. the Soviet Union today consists of many nationality groups. and as
the demands for national <intOllolny unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms have
shown. nationality groups in the U.S.S.R. have not submerged their identity to a Soviet
identity.
Thus. in some instances a state counts mane nations (or tribes) as its inhabitants. and in
other instances a single nation because of the arbitrationess of the old colonial boundaries
finds itself inhabiting several different states. Technically such entities are states. not
nation-states. However. the governments of those entities. because of a desire to transfer
the loyalty of the inhabitants of their state from the old
lation-state
42
groups of identification to the new state, have sought to identify those ties as nation-
states. Because of this and other reasons. the terms state, entities
nation. and nation-state are often used interchangeably. Such practice is so widespread
that in the minds of most casual observers of international affairs, there isz,no difference
among the three terms.
For our purposes, except where strict definitional usages are demanded by context, the
generally accepted practice of using the term nation-state to describe a country that is
more accurately a state will be followed. Throughout, however, the very significant
differences in meaning that are hidden by the modern practice of interchanging terms
should be kept in mind.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATION-STATE TO 1870

The Westphalian system of states was a European system that
eventually expanded to include all corners of the globe. (See Table
2-1) Even before the state system became firmly established in

Europe, however. European powers had begun to expand their

empires outside of Europe. By the beginning of the seventeenth century. Dutch, English.
French. Portuguese, and Spanish adventurers had explored every inhabited continent, and
their parent countries followed their explorations by using military power to create
oversees colonial empires.

The First Found of Empire

Almost without exception European states built their empires

during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries for the express purpose of
increasing their wealth and power. Vast colonial empires were created in North and South
America, and gold, silver, furs, and other forms of wealth flowed from the New World to
the courts of European kings and royalty.
A general pattern of colonization was followed by most European

states. After the adventurers proved the feasibility of a journey or the existence of a new
(for Europeans) land, European merchants examined the possibility of commercial profit.
European governments, aware of the

possibility of increasing their own power and wealth and thereby enhancing their position
in the competition between states sanctioned by the Westphalian treaties, quickly claimed
the new lands as colonies and
chartered and funded commercial
companies to explore and developed further the opportunities for wealth. Inevitably
conflicts between states over colonial holdings broke out. and naval and army forces.
financed and manned by the states. because necessary adjuncts of the drive for empire.

International Relations
The economic philosophy that led to this first round of empire. huilding was
mercantilism. First espoused by Jean Baptist Colbert, who vas Minister of Finance to
Louis XIV of France, mercantilism taught that state power was derived from wealth. To
maximize power, wealth had to be maximized in
Table 2-1 The Evolution of the Mo t rn Nation 4ZtgP
1648 Treaty of Wesphalia establishers modern states system.
16th, 17th. European states establish colonial empires, especially in 18th centuries North
and South America, this is the first round of empire
American and French revolutions challenge the rule of kings.
1775-1780
1804-1815
181>-I870
1870-1914
1914-1918 1870-1930
1918-1939
1939-1945
1945-today
Napoleon’s French empire threatens to overturn European state system.
The Concert of Europe protects the legitimacy of the state and royal rule.
European states divide Africa and much of the Middle East and Asia in the second round
of empire; the United States and Japan also acquire overseas colonial holdings.
World War I shakes the world system of states.
The number of nation-state in Europe expands from about 15 to over 35; this is the first
proliferation of states.
The coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Nazis in Germany challenges
the legitimacy of the state system.
World War II.
The second proliferation of states takes place as old colonial empires fall; the number of
states increases from about 54 in 1945 to about 170 in 1990; this period also marks the
longest uninterrupted time of peace among major powers since the inception of the state
system.
any way possible. Gold, silver, and first were, of course, important, but rulers of the day
considered it equally necessary to maintain a positive balance of trade, that is to say, to
export more than they imported. Colonies became doubly important, not only as sources
of valuable resources, but also as captive markets.
If mercantilism provided the economic rationale for the first round of empire-building,
they scientific-technical innovations in navigation and
-14
43 Natio,l-State
’r1nspy, as well as in the military. provided the capabilities. In
naN.igation widespread use of the sextant permitted seafarers to accurately
chart their courses. and the European, development of the square-rigger
allowed ships to point closer into the wind and increased their cargo space.

The marriage of gunpowder

and heavy carrion with the square-rigged
ceiling vessel permitted European powers, Great Britain in particular. to
bring heavy firepower to bear on enemy ships and enemy shores. Although

often overlooked, these and other scientific-technical innovations allowed Europeans to

travel beyond the confines of their home continent and carry their living requirements
and military capabilities with them.

Attacks on Re at Leg-itimac
By the end of the eighteenth century, the mercantilist philosophy
was decreasing in popularity and persuasiveness and was gradually being
replaced by an international trading system which stressed free trade, that

is, trade with little or no government intervention. This logic was

persuasively argued by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations. Bullion was

not the determinant of national power and prestige. Smith maintained, but capital and
goods were. Thus, free trade became a logical adjunct to Smith’s laissez-fair economic
philosophy.
With the supporting logic of mercantilism removed, colonies became less important.
European states continued to maintain their

overseas empires, but they became increasingly distracted from non-European affairs by
events closer to home. The existence of the European system of states itself was being
questioned, first by the French Revolution and then by the revolution’s offspring.
Napoleon.
Following the Peace of Westphalia. the answer to the question of who was to rule the
state was considered a given the king. Within any state the king’s word was law. The
regal mantle would be passed from father to son, and the state’s fortunes would follow
the skills and fortunes of the king.

”Letnt c’est rnoi,” declared Louis XIV, and he was right. If a king proved unable or
unvvillings to exercise his authority within his state and was forced to share it, as had
occurred to an extent in Great Britain. that was acceptable to the royal families of Europe
as long as neither the legitimacy of the king nor of hip state was challenged, and as long
as his realm did not challenge the legitimacy of other kings and their states.
To some extent the revolt of Great Britain’s 13 North American colonies and their
Declaration of Independence in 1776 challenged the self-perpetuating continuity of the
Westphalian system. By declaring their independence the North American colonies
rejected King George’s right to

International Relatio,”s
rule them. Some Europeans recognized this challenge, whereas others d,, not: in either
case. North America was an ocean away, and the actions c the North Americans did not
threaten the fundamental stability of q~, European states system and its rulers. By the
early nineteenth century men Spanish possessions in South America followed the North
American lei,, and declared their independence as well. Regal legitimacy had bee,
rejected in the New World, but the legitimacy of the state had not beer The European
state system ryas not in the Americas.

The French Revolution ;vas another matter. France was in tL; heart of Europe, and at the
core of the state system. Louis XVI was th, rightful and legitimate heir to the throne and
exercised his regal rights as kings had don;, within their respective states for nearly a
century and ~ half. The French Revolution of 1789 rejected the legitimacy of rep’
authority, and it was not on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

France was thus a real and immediate problem to other European states. Louis XVI was
beheaded, and a reign of terror swept France. 11
180=4, after- a series of dazzling military victories throughout Europe Napoleon
Bonaparte emerged as Emperor of France.
Napoleon’s dream was to create another Roman Empire iii Europe. If the French
Revolution challenged the legitimacy of kings to govern. Napoleon threatened the verb
existence of the concept of the state After establishing his empire throughout most of
western Europe. Napoleon overextended his reach and attacked Russia in 1812. Defeated
by the Russian winter, Napoleon’s empire declined, and within three years a coalition of
states destroyed it. Napoleon’s last defeat came at Waterloo in 181>.

In Europe, regal legitimacy was again restored, and the state system had been preserved.
The Second Round of Empire
After the defeat of Napoleon. European states. with the exception of Great Britain. joined
together in the so-called Concert of Europe, which eonseisouly sought to preserve and
protect the state and regal legitimacy To a great extent the concert succeeded for a half
century. Great Britain. meanwhile, acted as an independent entity that sought to preserve
balance of power among the states of Europe.

Beginning in about 1870, a second wave of empire-building swept Europe and eventually
the United States and Japan. Explanations for the new wave of imperial conquest varied.
Diplomatic historians, and later political realists, declared that traditional politics was at
work. with states either seeking to improve their status in the international ranking of
states
Nation
attempting to maintain
-4G
the European balance of power. Lenin, as we
or
h~ a seen, believed that imperialism was simply the highest stage of
italisnl, brought about by capitalism’s need for more markets. less cap
expensive resources,- and cheaper labor. Whatever the causes, by the early
l.entieth century European states again
had built colonial empires. The
u
empires were created primarily by superior European military power: by

lyp(), nearly all Africa with the exceptions of Libera and Ethiopia had been divided by
seven European states. and Asia. including the ”Inner Kingdom” of China, had been
similarly dismembered. The British Empire ,,.,as immense; by 19011. Great Britain
governed one fifth of the world’s land mass and one-fourth of its population.

Non-European states also joined the rush to empire. The United States annexed Hawaii,
leased the Panama Canal Zone ”in perpetuin° from the American-created state of
Panama, acquired the Philippines from Spain, and granted Cuba its independence only .
after having an amendment (the Platt Amendment) added to the Cuban constitution that
permitted American armed intervention in Cuban affairs when the United States

deemed it necessary. Meanwhile. Japan acquired Korea and Formosa. Imperialism had
become the order of the day. and the European-style nation-state ruled the world.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATION-STATE: 1870 TO TODAY

At the beglnnulg
of the twentieth century, the nation-state’s
position as supreme arbiter of international affairs seemed secure. and the international
state system appeared stable. As so often is the case. however. appearances were
deceiving. Lurking just below the calm surface of the European state system were forces
which :yon unleashed the cataclysm of World War I.

The First Proliferation of Nation-States

The second wave of imperial expansion inevitably led to economic exploitation of

colonial holdings and increased rivalry among the European states themselves. One
manifestation of this rivalry was a major arms race among the European powers. For the
mot part the straggle for prestige and territory was confined to Asia and Africa. In some
instances, however, territorial struggles occurred in Europe as well. Following France’s
defeat by Prussia in the 187() Franco-Prussian War. Prussia annexed the French province
of Alsac-Lorraine. This annexation, as well the Military defeat itself, was a humiliating
blow to French national pride, and reyanchist sentiment swelled within the French nation.
Additionally. particularly in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. but to a lesser
tt,2grce in Czarist Russia as well. national groups accelerated their struggles

International Relations .1~

for national independence from the remaining old and cnrmblip9 multinational dynastic
empires.
In Europe a subtle change was taking place in the state systenj. 11 was acquiring new
members. During the half century before the beginning of World War 1. the number of
nation-states in Europe grew from
about 1S to over 25. This prolification occurred in two ways. In some cases. as in Albania
and Serbia, new states were born as national groupings brok, away from traditional
empires. In other cases, as in Germane and Itch smaller territorial units formed modern
nation-states. Concurrently «ith
this proliferation of nation-states. the countries of Europe led by the militarily more
powverful among them sought to protect themselves and their possessions, and to either
maintain the existing distribution of po«er in Europe or change it by establishing a rather
rigid network of alliances that stretched throughout the continent. and as a result of their
colonial holdings. beyond.

As we have already seen, alliances had long been a part of the European state system. In
the past, however, alliances had been relatiNch flexible. For example, Great Britain
regularly aligned itself xvith different countries throughout the nineteenth century in an
effort to maintain the existing distribution of power in Europe (which. not
coincidentall*N. significantly favored Britain).The two major alliances of the earl
twentieth century, the Triple Entente including Great Britain. France. and Russia, and the
Triple Alliance including Germany, Austria-Hungary. Iii Italy, were much more rigid in
character, Additionally; several of the state, in the two major alliances were tied by secret
treaties to other states 1101
~:.
the Entente or Alliance.
The side toward World War I might be considered comic il
results were not so tragic. Following the assassination of Archduke Fer6 and of Austria-l-
oangar< at Sarajevo, Austria-Hungary demanded do’’ Serbia permit it to enter Serbia to
search for the assassins. Serbia refiuse~i Austria-Hungary treaty to Serbia’s defense,
began to mobilize. Gr,’ Ncholas at first ordered a partial mobilization of Russian forces.
intendi» only to shoe the Austro-Hungarians that Russia would in fact defer-: Serbia.
However, the Russian military leadership informed him that part:.! mobilization would
hopelessly complicate full mobilization and urged hi! to proclaim full mobilization
because the Russian mobilization rate 10’ slower than that of any other European power.
The Czar complied with 11’’ generals urgings. Germany, viewing the Russian action with
alarm, beg~

its mobilization. Meanwhile. Austria-Hungary, fearing that Germaj~’would renege on its

”blank check” promise of support for Austria-Hungaf` in the event of an Austro-
Htmgariari conflict with Russia. refiised <<’
Nat-;on-State respond to a series of urgent diplomatic communication from Berlin and
marched into Serbia. World War I had begun.
The savagery of World War I appalled rational men and Nvomen eN.cn Nv Here. but the
destruction
went on for four bloody years. Blame for the war was variously attributed depending on
which model of international relations was used. Following the war. collective security.
international law, and arms control were all proposed as remedies for the scourge of
modern war. But by far the most powerful single concept emerging from the war was the
principle of national self-determination, espoused most forcefully by the American
President Woodrow Wilson. Henceforth, under this principle nationalities themselves
would determine %fio Nvould rule them. Theoretically. self-rule would minimize the
thrust for territorial expansion and make war less likely. Actually, self-determination
further accelerated the growth in numbers of new nation-states.
As a result of the acceptance of self-determination, the number of nation-states in Europe
leaped to over 3 > by the early 1930s. Six new states. Austria. Czechoslovakia. Hungary.
Poland. Romania. and Yugoslavia, were formed from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire
alone. Other states were carved from the Russian Empire. which had evolved into the
Bolshevik-ruled Soviet Union. Under the Leaguer of Nations’ mandate system. land
informer German-held colonial territories and in the former Ottoman Empire was
transferred to other nation-states with the specific intent of eventual self-rule and creation
of still additional new states. Thus, in Africa, Great Britain received most of Tanganyika.
and shared i imcroons and Togoland with France, whereas the Union of South Africa N\
as mandated Southwest Africa. In the Middle East. France received Syria, whereas Iraq,
Transjordan. and Palestine all became subject to the British crown. In the Pacific,
Australia. Ne\N Zealand, and Japan were all beneficiaries of the leagues mandate system.
World War I had shaken the state system, but it had also spread the seeds for its further
proliferation.

Attacks on Bourgeois Legitimacy

Whereas the collapse of dynastic rule in Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire paved
the «vay for the creation of additional traditional nation-states. the collapse of Czarist
Russia led to the formation of a state that proclaimed itself to be of a fundamentally new
type. Czar Nicholas 11 abdicated in February 1917: his rule « as replaced by a
provisional government that intended to keep Russia in the war and planned to hold
Western-style free elections to form a new government. In November 1917. 11ONVcver.
the Bolshevik party under V. 1. Lenin seized power proclaimed
4h

International Relations
the creation of a Soviet state under the control of the Russian working class.
Bolshevism was only one variant of Russian Marxism. To Marxists,
all history was the record of struggle between classes. and the state was simply the tool
that the strongest class used to assure its position and to exploit weaker classes. Under the
capitalist economic system of private ownership of the means of production. the strongest
class consisted of those who owned the means of production, or the bourgeoisie. The
bourgeoisie therefore used the state of maintain its position of power and exploit the
working class, or proletariat. Lenin. as we have already seen, further argued that
capitalism led directly to imperialism and war. With the overthrow of capitalism. Lenin
concluded, exploitation. imperialism, and war would disappear as yell.
The Bolshevik party, which eventually became the Communist Party of Soviet Union,
declared itself to be the spokesman for the proletariat of Russia. Lenin and his party
therefore maintained that their seizure of power marked the fast instance that the
proletariat class controlled as state. In Russia, Bolsheviks believed, the illegitimate rule
of the bourgeois class had been terminated. and the exploitation of man by man would
cease. The Bolshevik party would use state power to guarantee it. The dictatorship of the
proletariat was proclaimed.
Some Bolsheviks expected proletariat revolutions to break out across Europe. Indeed, in
Germane and Hungary Marxist government did seize power briefly, but were soon
overthrown. Thus the Soviet Union remained in the post-World War 1 world the only
socialist state. or as Lenin said, ”the only state of a new type.” Joseph Stalin, Lenin’s
successor. reinterpreted this as ”capitalist encirclement” ,
Nevertheless. leaders of other states viewed this ”state of a new type as a new and
vinllent threat to the international community and acted to suppress it. They- extended
limited support to Russian groins that opposed the Bolsheviks. and small contingents of
Western European. American. and Japanese canlbat forces landed in the czar’s old
empire. After the four bloody years of World War I, however. none of the interventionist
states. were committed seriously to the conflict. All eventually withdrew.
Soviet rhetoric and actions gaves other states cause for concern. Asserting clear and
active hostility to the ”expletive” governments of other states. Soviet propaganda called
for the proletariat of other nations to rise tip against their oppressors. In 1920. Bolshevik
forces invaded Poland and attempted to establish a ”proletariat dictatorship” there but
failed. Although Soviet rhetoric and actions became less overtly revolutionan
Ayation-State
’I9 during the 1920s. a fundamental hostility remained between the Soviet
Union and
most other states throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Bourgeois
legitimacy had been challenged, and an allegedly new type of state had
come into existence, at least in the Soviet Union. This fact would have
tremendous significance for the future of the international system of states.
Similarly, in Germany mother allegedly new type of state came into existence. Based on
theories of racial superiority and the subservience of non-Germanic people, national
socialism, or Nazism, preached a philosophy of expansion. It was an assault both on all
non-Germans and on the system of nation-states. for it sought to reduce Europe and
beyond to vassals of Hitler and his minions. From this perspective World War II in
Europe was fought as a result of Nazism’s offensive against the state system in Europe.

The Second Proliferation of States

As we have seen. World War I shattered the old European empires of Austria-Hungary.
Czarist Russia. and the Ottoman Empire and led to the creation of a number of new
states. Following World War II, a similar phenomenon occurred as the states of Europe
gradually granted or were forced to grant independence to their r former colonial
territories. Within 35 years after the end of World War II, with the exception of some 40
dependencies. most of which wire inhabited by fewer than 100.000 people. European
empires were a thing of the past. .
With the end of the Belgian. British. French. Portuguese, and Spanish empires. the
European-style state had conquered the world. As Table 2-2 shows, the number of states
increased drastically in tile post-World War II era. Over 50 states are in Africa alone.
Some of the nev states remain closely tied to their old colonial masters, sometimes for
economic reasons and other times for psychological or cultural reasons. In other cases.
however, the governments of newly independent territories reject am- ties with the
former colonial ruling power.
Colonialism. then. was the vehicle that led to the second proliferation of states.
Colonialism also left its mark in other ways. Almost invariably. former colonial
territories, that is. those states that reircived their independence following World War II.
are the so=called Iess-developed countries, the poor nations of the earth. Although
perceptions differ as to the causes of that poverty. few analysts anywhere rejected !hc
assertion that the disparity in wealth that exists between the rich ”Northern” states (the
established industrial states, primarily located in the northern hemisphere) and the poor
’*Southern” states (4he so-called Third World primarily located in the southern
hemisphere) is a cause both for concern and for potential
International Relations
Table 2-2 Independent States,
1945-1990
Year
No. of Independent
States
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
6-t
75
84
107
125
135
155-
165
170
170
conflict. Similarly, in many newly independent states, old colonial boundaries were
followed as new states received their independence. In some instances, because of this
practice, one nation or tribe sometimes found itself divided among several states, whereas
in other instances, one nation or tribe found itself in a multinational state, in the
miniority, and thus powerless to influence governmental policy decisions. Thus
colonialism not only led to the second proliferation of states, but also carried with it the
seeds of instability and uncertainty, that plague so much of the world today.

The spread of the state system throughout the world also led to another problem, namely,
the multiplication of the number of decision -Making units in the world. This in turn
complicated the conduct of foreign policy by states. For example, during the height of
European colonial power each ~European government had to take into account the
reaction of only 20 to 30 states to a particular policy. In the 1990s, however governments
need to take into account the reaction of as many as T7U to a policy.
Obviously. some states are more important than others to ~~ particular government. and
many states may even be ignored. Nevertheless. the point to be made is simple; The
proliferation of states has tremendously complicated the conduct of foreign policy. In
1918 perlur 50 states existed throughout the world. and perhaps 1.225 sets of bilat. o
Nation State
political relations existed between and among them. Today. if only 150 states existed,
11,171 sets of bilateral political relations would be possible. Indeed the world has
become more complex, if only because so many states now exist.

CHALLENGES TO THE NATION-STATES

The nation-state has dominated international political affairs for over 300 years. In recent
years, however, the utility of the nation-state as we currently know it has been
increasingly questioned. As we have already seen, some groups identify the nation-state
as the cause of war, whereas others maintain that increased global economic
interdependence has rendered the nation-state an obsoic-beCiy :. nod obsolete
organizational concept. In other cases transactional ideological or religious movements
assert that their preachments and outlooks supercede tha -parochial interests of mere
nation-states. Other groups. attack the nation-state from within. maintaining that
contemporary nation-states are in fact multinational states; these groups argue for further
fragmentation
of the international system. On many occasions, these organizations, companies
movements, and groups have themselves became significant international actors. and in
the following three chapters we will examine them in depth.
The point to be made here, however. is that the dominance of the nation-state is being
challenged. The most significant challenges may be grouped into five broad categories:
(1) economic interdependence: (2) military technologies; (3) international governmental
organizations; (-4) transnational movements and thought systems: and (5) internal
fragmentation. ’
The Challenge of Economic Interdependence
In the not-too-distant, one of the primary objectives of nation-states was to attain as great
a degree of economic self sufficiency as was feasible. Within the past 30 years. however,
fewer and fewer states have pursued economic self-sufficiency as a primary objective of
national policy. The reason for this policy reversal has in many instances been one of
simple economic self-interest; goods and services may be obtained more cheaply
elsewhere than they can be obtained domestically.
International trade multiplied roughly 32 times between 1950 and 1988, from a total of
about $ 123 billion in 1950 to $-4.000 billion in 1988. Some countries depend heavily on
foreign trade. whereas others do not. Great Britain, for example, derives about 38 percent
of its national income from foreign trade. The Netherlands is an even more startling case.
derivi,Ig almost 82 percent of its income from foreign trade. By contrast. °’~s about 16
percent of the United States’ gross national product (GNP)

lntemationai Relations 53
cones from foreign trade, and approximately 8 percent of the U.S.SR’s
GNP is derived from foreign trade.
These statistics do both tell the full story, however. The United States is perhaps the best
example to use. Despite the fact that the U.S economy is only- 16 percent trade
dependent, the United States imports large shares of vital raw materials and fuels,
including about 23 percent of the oil that it uses, over 90 percent of the bauxite and
manganese that it consumes, and much of its chromate, cobalt, nickel. platinum, tin, and
potassium. Without these imports the American GNP would decline precipitously. On the
export side U.S. agriculture, the aircraft industry. and other manufacturing ventures are
heavily export dependent. Japan’s economy is even more reliant on external trade
relations than is the economy of the United States, both on the import sides.
Additionally. feNy finished products in today’s world are made entirely in one country.
Whether it be automobiles.
computers, aircraft, or almost any other manufactured product. raNN materials,
component parts. and even final assembly often come from and take place in many
countries. Economic interdependence has become a present-day reality. Indeed, given the
increased volume of world trade. the vital nature of much of that trade, and the
international linkages that have developed in manufacturing processes, the challenge of
economic interdependence is a serious one for the contemporary nation-state. Why,
critics of the nation-state ask, need the state continue to exist if trade is so vital, if
economic self-sufficiency is a thing of the past, and if economic and manufacturing
efficiency can be improved by an international division of labor?
In Western Europe and Eastern Europe, in Latin America, and in South-east Asia, to
name just a few regions, some trade barriers created bN states to assure national
economic autonomy have already been removed. and more may follow. Even the Soviet
Union is beginning to be integrated into the world marketplace. In an economic sense,
then, a strong argument exists that the world may be beginning to enter a poststate era.

There is another side to the coin. The leaders and citizens of nation-states are in many
instances unwilling to become even more dependent on external sources for critical
economic needs. Economic arid political considerations both play a role here. as was
driven home to mach of the industrialized world in 1990 when Iraq conquered Kuwait.
The lrAl action placed that Middle Eastern countn in the position where it could direct if
not determine oil prices for OPEC states. thereby in effect givitrg Iraq the ability to play-
a ma jor role in the economies of industriali;cd states. Not surprisingly. industrialized
states. led by the United States. were not pleased by this situation, and they sent military
forces to the Middle
-I
/1/01102- State
East to further Ira,%yi expansion. (Economics was not the only
reason the l’ S. ,rnd other countries deployed military forces to the Middle
East, htan~ ii ere also incensed and concerned by Iraq’s blatant disregard
for KUXN Flits so\ ercignty.)

Equally- forbiddingly, the periodic recessions of tile 1980s led many states to favor
import restrictions to protect their own economies. Japan never reduced trade barriers as
fully as other industrialized nations. and throughout the 1980s, domestic content
legislation and other forms of barriers to free trade Mere introduced to both hous,~-s of
congress in the United states in an effort to protect American workers and industn’ from
inexpensive foreign competition.
Nor should it
be overlooked that some states are ”more interdependent” than others. For example.
Japan must import almost all its raw materials, and in turn must export finished products
to pa\ for these imports. In comparison, the Soviet Uhion is self-sufficient in most
resources, and there fore is less reliant on foreign raw materials. Degree of
interdependence is thus an important factor in conditioning the international behavior of a
state.

Thus. although the world may be moving toward a post state era in economic relations.
the nation-state can marshal persuasive arguments of its own that economic
interdependence to the nation-state is a real challenge. however, arid xyill not easily be
overcome.

The Challenge of Military Technologies

There is no doubt that the nation-state is militarily vulnerable as never before: Barring the
perfection of a new ”exotic” technology defensive system that would render nuclear
veapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ineffective.~the advent of nuclear
weapons and ICBM delivery systems removed forever the nation-state’s rational that it
could proved effective security for its citizens. Even at the corwentional level modern
\yeapons are appallinglN effective and have a long reach; it is doubtful drat even the
victorious side in a large-scale war could assure its ctyilian populations security.

The nation-state’s response to the challenge of trrllrtar\ technologies has been uncertain.
Weapons continue to be pmcttred. ;ind alliances continue to be formed. but the keN fact
remains that states call no longer guarantee their citizens security. Indeed- +-++despite
tire U S. Strategic Defence Initiative . tire central tenet of American defcrrse planning
remains Minna] assured destruction; that is. if the So\ i-° ’ -nion !;rt,:-;,hes :I nuclear
11”1`e 191111sl the United States. the united states Nril1 be unable to defend

Intemational Relations _
its cities and population, but the Soviet union will be similarly vulnerable to attack.
Therefore, the logic continues, neither side will attack the other

The Challenge of International Governmental Organization

Although international governmental organizations (IGOs) are not new, the challenge
they present to established nation-states is. Many of the political, economic, social, and
military problems that confront contemporary nation-states cut across national
boundaries, and in response to this reality, governments of nation-states created IGOs to
enable them better to meet their problems. In some cases, primarily in Western Europe,
states have surrendered effective decision-making and policy-implementing powers to
IGOs. Both the European
council and the Nordec council, for example, can determine export and import prices for
selected products. With the European community’s single European Act, the EC itself
will
also oversee European technical standards, value added and excise taxes, and other
regulations. Demonstrably, then, there already are instances where in a legal sense
governments of nation-states .have delegated authority to international governmental
organizations. thereby in a functional sense compromising national sovereignty.
SS
The Challenge of Transnational
Movements and Thought Systems
The state system that currently dominates international affairs arose front the ruins of a
European-wide religious empire that pledged its allegiance to the pope. It is somewhat
ironic. therefore, that one of the most serious challenges confronting the current state
system is the existence of a variety of transnational movements and thought systems that
claim the allegiance of individuals and groups. Some of these movements are specifically
religious, as is fundamentalist Shiite Islam. whereas others are specifically antireligious,
as is Marxism.
The resurgence of fundamentalist Islam may be traced to the fall of the shah of Iran and
the coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After a series of fits and starts,
Khomeini proclaimed Iran an Islamic republic, and announced that he and his followers
would seek to convert other states to Islamic republics. Although territorial designs on
neighboring states were officially denied. other Arab states interpreted Khomeini’s
message as a direct assault on their legitimacy ana
sovereignri- To them
khomeini’s Iran represented a direct and immediate
threat. Khomeini’s continuing calls for a return to fundamentalist Islamic teachings only
solidified their perception that he sought to establish transnatioNal political-religious
entrt; following the tellers of his version of the Shiite Islamic faith.
fiyation-State
in ~r theoretical sense Marxism also rejects the; legitimacy of the state. In the communist
Manifesto Karl Marx and Frederick Angels argued that the nation-states and nationalism
were simply tools of the ruling bourgeois class to- divide and weaken the proletariat.
Eventually, Marx believed, the proletariat would develop a sense of international class
consciousness and see through the sham so nationalism perpetuated by the bourgeoisie.
Following the proletariat revolution. Mars concluded, the state would eventually ”wither
away.” Even today. orthodox Marxists maintain that the nation-state disappear once
proletariat revolutions occur even~It’here.

In a practical scene, proponents of both fundamentalist Islam and revolutionary

Marxism have found it necessay to create their own bases of power in states. Both,
however, deny that their states are traditional. To khomeini. Iran was subservient to Allah
and the Koran; to the Soviet leadership, the U.S.S.R. was subservient to its working class.
Even more strikingly, Soviet ideologues saw fit to declare that communism could
develop differently in different countries, taking into account local history. culture, levels
of economic development, and other factors. This has in fact occurred throughout the
communist world, as events in Eastern Europe throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s
dramatically underlined. as several states abandoned communism itself.

Indeed, the combination of events in Eastern Europe and the movement toward
moderation in Iran following the 1989 death of khomeni led some observers to conclude
that both Marxism-Leninism and Islamic fundament talism were ideas whose tittle had
come and gone. But even if that judgment is accurate in regard to these two transnational
thought system, the general point remains valid: religion and ideology continue to have
appeal across national boundaries, and their challenge to the Nation-state continues.

The Challenge of Internal Fragmentation

Nation-state is a geographically bounded legal entiy under a single government, the
population of which psychologically considers itself to be in some way, shape, or from
related. In the contemporary era there are many indications that nationalism. the verv
force that led to the existence of nation-states, remains strong and is growing. It is again
ironic that N-ey nationalism may- lead to further fragmentation of states. and the creation
of new ”ministates.” which by themselves may not be viable political-economic unit. In a
certain sence. then. nationalism itself presents challenge to the nation-state because of its
potential to fragment existing ’t~’tes and create nonviable new miNistates.
5G

International Relations
No continent is so wracked by separatist pressures as Africa. In Nigeria, the Ibo tribe
attempted to secede and establish the state of Biafra, A bloody civil war ended the Ibos’
effort. The Angolan civil war was as much the product of tribal conflict as ideological
antipathy: the conflict continues. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe’s vile was challenged by
Josh ia Nkomo-, both men based their prestige and influence on their own ethnic groups
within Zimbabwe. In Ethiopia the Eritrean secessionist movement fights on. now in its
third decade of warfare against at least two different governments in Addis Ababa. In the
Western Sahara the polisario guerrillas fight to break free from Moroccan
rule. The list could continue.
Europe is also beset by separatist nationalism. Scotland and Wales now have local self-
government in Great Britain, and Italy established and autonomous provincial
government in South Tyrolea. The Basques seek independence from Spain, and a
Norman independence movement seeks independence from France. Belgium has changed
its consa.ution so that the Fiemings and the Walloons now enjoy cultural autonomy. And
in tile Soviet Union, the domestic political, economic, and social reforms put into place in
the late 1980s unleashed waves of separatist nationalism in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Georgia. Azerbaijan. and elsewhere. Indeed, by 1990. the Baltic states wanted to secede
from the U.S.S.R.. and Azerbaijan and Armenia exploded into ethnic civil war.
Strikingly, by 1990 even the Russian Republic in the U.S.S.R. declared that its laws took
precedence over the U.S.S.R.’s laws.

In Asia, Bangladesh received its independence from Pakistan after India defeated
Pakistan in full-scale warfare. Meanwhile. in Australia the sporaden westralia movement
again flickered to life during the 1970s. .
Even North America is not immune to this challenge of fragmentation. Quebec. during
the 1970s, 1980s, flirted with secession from Canada, and still has consuls in a number of
European and American cities. Puerto Rican nationalists periodically demand
independence from the United states. and perhaps most interestingly and subtly, by 1990
individual American states had established at least 73 trade office overseas to actively
seek external foreign investment. Although this last example presents no threat of
secession. it does indicate that even within the united states concern for state identity and
wealth is influencing changes in policy.
Internal fragmentation then is a genuine challenge to many
nation states In some states,
the challenge is a crisis; in others;, it is little
more than a come, the point again, hoevevcr. is that the nation-state must face another
challenge to its three centuries of international domination.
Natior_r-State
58

0.apite these challenges to the dominance of the nation-state in

the ;„tmatioual arena, nothing indicates that the nation-state is in
1 ,nLci of demise. Questions are being raised. hoeeever. about the
re,j,o”s for its existence: if it can no longer offer economic independence,
pro~cd -OW’«uh. w exist? One answer to that qucstion t, that the nation-
state may provide i sense of identity to its inlt.ibrtanm but eecu that is not
a satisfactory response b.\ itself. Ayatntl,ilr khon~,:mi was not alone in ginning his
allegiance to a movement, thought pst~m or organization that transcends the state. and
the Ibos. Basque, and Quebecois are not alone in their resentment of and oppocitioo w the
coy crnments of the nation-states in evhich they currently reside
Perhaps Hart-, Morgcuthan had the best and simplest answer to the question of why the
state continues to wist despite its obvious shortcoming Power. defined in its broadest
terms. Evcri person on the earth lives on land that is controlled or claimed by the state,
and all the land on the face of the earth has been divided by states. International lacy arid
common practice recognize the right of states to use force both internationally and
domestically. to control their own citizens and citizens of other states living within their
territorial confines (except diplomats), and to make laws that determine how and whether
other actors will operate on their territory. The sovereign y of nation-states yay be less
absolute than it once was. but nation states still dominate the international system.

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SYSTEM
This chapter will be long for two reasons: (1) The contemporar, global system is
complex, and (2) it is necessary to spell out in some detail those characteristics of the
system that bring stability (continuity of the system’s main features) and those that are
changing it. We begin by examine the five criteria for comparing systems, boundaries,
the nature of the units, the structure, major forms of interaction, and the rules that guide
or govern those interactions.

The Global System

We say that today we have a global system because all political and social units of the
world are interconnected. There is no longer any region that is thoroughly isolated from
the rest, and with only some very minor exceptions, all societies in the world have been
organized politically into states of one kind or another. And those states and societies all
mutually interact, though certainly not in a symmetrical manner. Decisions made in
Moscov~, Tokyo, and Paris, for example, may have numerous intended and unintended
consequences in Addis Ababa. Bangkok. Santiago, and Libreville. Because of the
asymmetries in tire vorid. howe\°r eNents -ind trends in the latter places. while perhaps
ner~rortli~, ar. ’1lMh less likely to lur~c a direct impact oil a Russi;in. i pap,c. or French
citizen
GO
117trodvction to the Contemporary

All 184 members of the United Nations maintain contacts with one another at times only
sporadic and insignificant, as let us say, are the bilateral relations between Paraguay and
Bhuttan, and at others,-very deep,

persistent. and significant. as they are between Washington and London. All states are
members of the society of states (as indicated by United Nations membership) and they
commonly accept the elementary norms and rules of membership, as we will described
them below-. There are, then, no more boundaries between systems. in the world. All
states and their societies belong to a single entity. -,Ahat Nee call the global system.
This system did
not emerge spontaneously. Europe was the core
throughout the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries. Through various of
the most recent occurrtnb
co in the last thirty years of the
c
nineteenth century. almost all of Africa and the South Pacific were colonized, and China
was thoroughly penetrated by Western economic. military and diplomatic agents. Only a
few societies Ethiopia and Siam, for example were left out of the formal political.
economic, and militaw expansion of European society. The remainder either became
settler colonies, like the United States. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, or arenas for
Western economic and commercial expansion and exploitation.
The ”Westernization” of the world did not involve only the

expansion of military power and commercial activity. Ideas and ideologies were also
exported. These included Christianity, science and technology. Western concepts of
bureaucratic government. and secular ideologies

surrounding the production and consumption of wealth. Indigenous traditional social

forms and ideas did not die out, but they faced, powerful competition. Many of them
ultimately succumbed to Western forms.
Among those Western ideas were variants of Marxism.

democratic theory and, in particular, the doctrine of national self-determination. Starting

in early nineteenth-century Europe, and expanding
slowly, around the world through the end of World War I, the idea of self-determination
served as the source of nationalist uprisings against multi-ethnic empires, such as
Austria-Hungary. and against colonialism. In the latter case. the colonial authorities
sowed the seeds of their own
destruction. We will return in a few moments to the ideological underpinnings of modern
states; here it is sufficient to point out that there has been a tremendous explosion of
state-making during the past centun .
On the eve of World War I, there were sixteen states in Europe, and a few entities like
Japan and China had become at least provisional members of the states system. World
War I and the collapse of the Austrian, Russian. and Ottoman empires created in a
historical instant the following new

states: Finland, Estonia. Latvia, Lithuania. Poland. Czechoslovakia. Hrr1rgar,. arid

Yugoslavia (made up of pre-existing states) A number of
i ., ,. .
., _,- r MOM
International Relations
states or quasis-states on the peripheries of Europe gained membership to the League of
Nations. thus implying-their entry into the society of states, among them were Turkey.
Persia (Iran). and Abyssinia (Ethiopia).
The process of state-creation gained new vigor as the result of World War 11. Whatever
their long range intentions, the colonial poxyers had neither the will nor the power to
maintain control over huge tracts of land and millions of people who had all come to
believe in the doctrine of self-determination. The United Nations vas created in 19=45 by
5] members, mostly from Europe and Latin American. Today, in only a half century. the
membership has increased to 18-1. Put another way. 72 per cent of the conterhporary
states of the world have been born in the last ~U years. Only about a dozen suites (e.g.,
France, Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Sweden. and the like) can claim to have pedigrees
that go back more than 200 years.
Our global system is thus a ”young” system. Most of its members have not been around
for very long. and even a majority have no history_ as a sovereign state that goes back
further than one generation. The ideas and institutions of diplomacy are old, as they were
developed in Europe starting in the fourteenth century, but the players of contemporary
diplomatic games are for the most part novices.
The Nature of the Units
There are some important differences between the ways states were created in nineteenth-
and early l entieth-centur, Europe. and how they evolved in the colonial world following
World War II. It is importam to keep these differences in mind, because they have
significant consequences on how states conduct their foreign policies, and what kinds of
international problems they face.
Throughout the nineteenth century. the sentiments and ideologies of nationalism
generally preceded the creation of states. Minoriu nationalities in multinational empires
such as czarist Russia, Austrial-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire developed feelings of
national solidarity and group identity, and ultimately began demanding political
independence on the theory that each ”nation” (ethnicfLangug1ge/religiotis group)
should form the basis of separate states. The process started with Greek agitation for
independence from the Ottoman Empire. Greed independence was achieved, with the
help of the European powers. in 1832. Subsequently. Romanians. Bulgarians. and other
Balkan peoples. most of whom were Christian rather than Muslim. fought and gained
mdepmdence. By the early twentieth century, the multinational enlprles were doomed.
and during World War I they collapsed. The successor
st:Uc’ here founded upon the principle of nationality. validated usually
eh.won• or plebiscites. The old idea that a state could be made tip of fln
01
~~troduction to the Contemporary ay 1~,„„ hereditary or realms and been replaced with
the notion of popular

so`ereigly and the idea that a political order is legitimate to the extent that it gives
expression to distinct ethnic., language and religious groups.

The concept of nationally previously referring just to a geographic location where distinct
groups lived. now became wedded to the concept of the state.
Of courses this idea could not be implement without difficulties because population
distributions do not follow neat territorial frontiers. All of the new successor states
contained significant minorities-the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians in
Romania, the Germans in Poland, and the like. Should they also not have their own
states’ Here the question became practical and political. The principle of self-
determination can be taken only so far. The intermixture of populations, economic
practicalities.

and strategic considerations preclude complete adherence to the principle. Some states, it
was commonly acknowledged in post-World War I Europe, could not survive except in
the mutli-ethnic and mufti-language format,
The point then. is that nationalism and the sense of nation hood existed prior to the
creation of these new states. The states existed in sentiment, loyaly, identification. and
solidarity before they earned or gained formal sovereignty
The process of state-formation 1n man), of the colonial areas was quite different. In the
nineteenth -century. the colonial powers drew boundaries, particularly across Africa.
language, and religious population distributions. Frequently. boundaries were `nothing
but straight lines fashioned in a foreign ministry as part of a deal to cave up a region of
Africa or Asia among competing powers. Many of these states were-created by the
colonial powers, and their existence as independent states was validated bv_ the United
Nations before a strong sense of nationalism had developed. There is, for example. no
single people that corresponds to the territorial boundaries of the Central African
Republic. Cameroon. Nigeria. Kenya. and mane other new states. These states are made
up of Multiplicities of ethnic. language. and religious groups. Individuals’ loyalties
extend primarily to the tribe. clan. region, or other significant reference group, and often
only secondarily if at all to the state that has been created in their names.
Most of these states, to be sure, had ”national liberation movements.” Their leaders spoke
in the name of the ”people.” but
their
political referent was the geographic
and often artificial colonial creation.
not a distinct and unified societh. Their right to rule in the post-independence period was
seldom validated by elections or plebiscites. Thv result has been that mom- of the new
states are ”weak’ not weak militarily . but in the sense that significant sectors of the
populations do not identity

international Relations
.,trongly with the ruling groups or the post-colonial state and its symbols
Soitiments of nationalism are not deeply rooted. if they exist at all. and the
social fabric of the country is weakened by frequent or incessant communal
conflicts between the various groups that make up the population
Secessionist movements abound among minorities seeking to create their
own states. The Palestine Liberation Organization is one of the best-knot1,t
groups attempting to create its own state; but three are dozens of others
spread throughout Africa. Asia. and Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, there is
even a secessionist movement on the island of Bougainvillea that wants
independence from Papua-New Guinea. In the next chapter we will o1rtline
some of the foreign policy consequences of the fact ”weak” states.
Ethnic heterogeneity is not, of course, the only sources of state weakness. In Europe,
countries such as Switzerland and Finland are multi. ethnic, but they are ”strong” states in
the sense of commanding loyalties from all segments of the population and maintaining
extensive and effective government services throughout the society. How many weak
states are there? A 1981 study underlined the extent to which most states at that time, 12
percent has at least three large ethnic groups that made up between 34 and 97 percent of
the total; the remainder were distributed between 5 and 19 different minority groups.
Thirteen percent .of the countries had two major nationalities that comprised between 65
and 9i percent of the population. Ten percent had one group that constituted between :40
and 60 percent of the total, with the remainder distributed between 7 and 25 different
groups. Thirty eight percent of the states had one group that constituted between 60 and
95 percent of the population And 27 percent of the countries could be considered
reasonably homogenous, where just one national group accounted for more than 95
percent of the population. The point is clear: A majority of states ha\c populations
divided among two or more-and often many more-distuict ethnic, language, and religious
groups. India is a marvel of survival. NO], 36 major languages, groups professing all of
the world’s major religions. and literally hundreds of ethnic. communal,
and caste groups. It has surri,ived in part because the Indian constitution guarantees equal
rights for all and bases citizenship’s on membership in the community. Many other
countries base citizenship on ethnicity. which renders all others automatically into
minorities. In country after country. these minprities are victimized, excluded from
political influence and officer. and sore times threatened with genocide or expulsion.
Rule based on ethnicity rather”41:nn citizenship is one of the chief characteristics of
weak states.
The second major point about the units of the :oDi,:mpor31` international system is that
is the disparities among their auribiae,~ arc today more pronounced than ever before. In
eighteenth ccntur, Furopc-
_iptroduct’On to the Contemporary
differ etween Denmark and France or Saxony and Hesse were ,harked. but ’.hey were a
matter of brodations. Today. the differences are so great as to soggeFt significant
qua’.itative distinctions. The largest country-China-has a population of about 1 billion. In
contrast. Nauru’s population ,1irnnbers abut 6.000. It would take millions of Singapore’s
to equal the ,and mass cf Russia. The government of Nor\,, y rules through democratic
consent. .11,1 its leaders gain litt.c through holding office except prestige
and pop-’13~ity. In contrast, the governments of Haiti under the Duvalies, or Nicaragua a
tder the Sr mozas, were nin as personal fiefdoms, without am basis of popular legitimacy.
Rule was maintained by coercion, fear, graft, arid ^,orr:option. The rulers enriched
themselves personally, using tax revenue -nd foreign aid to amass fortunes. the niters and
their friends lived op.rlr ntly among popular squalor. There are still a few regimes of this
type. but their numbers are quite small and probably dwindling. There are also. however,
numerous praetorian mililay regimes that perpetuate themselves through coercion and
terror. The major difference from the previous category is that their leaders do a better
job of hiding their privileges, and they- go to some lengths to manufacture manifestations
of popularity. Romania under Nicolae Ceaucescu and North Korea under the venerable
Kim II-Sung are examples.
Finally, the level of technological development, public education,
and general well-being among populations varies extensively. In the eighteenth century, a
French visitor to newly ”discovered” Thailand could report that Thai society was not
entirely different from that of his home
country. The majorit<- of the population was made up of the peasantry-. there was a
small commercial class, an aristocracy. and other groups of privilege. The similarities
were perhaps as pronounced as were the social differences
between the two countries.
Today. there are much greater disparities between societies. Populations in countries sych
as Japan have annual per capita incomes of X20.000 or more; there is a high degree of
income equality where typically
the top 10 percent of income earners do not own more than 25 percent of the national
wealth. Literacy rates are over 99 percent. Life expectancy approaches eight’ years. Daily
calorie and protein consumption are well above minimum requirements. Citizens have
full and often free access to medical and dential care. Seconday school participation rates
(the proportion of the relevant age group: twelve to seventeen, actually attending school)
are usually over 80 percent. These are just some of the indications of well-being and
equality of opportunity.
In contrast, n:anv populations in Africa, South Asia. Central America. and a few other
regions demonstrate all the characteristics of widespread poverty. dccpite some great
strides forward compared to several
o4

International Relations
decades earlier Lifc expectancies are about thirty years less than those found in the
vkeahh.N countries. Literacy rates. although growing rapidh arc \\cll under 51j percent of
the population. Calorie and protein intake are insufficient to maintain health and normal
gro«ih. Access to medical services is often difficult and services are of generally log
quality Secondary school participation rates are often as low as 20 percent of the relevant
age group. while less than 1 percent attend any sort of post. secondary education.
Population gro«-th rates remain high. while tlje amount of land available for cultivation
holds steady or shrinks due to desertification, soil erosion, deforestation. and pollution.
Mass migrations to the cities create immense housing problems. slums. and
unemployment The processes of development have in man cases worsened many of these
problems. Finally, wealth distribution is highly uneven. Typically, the richest 10 percent
of the population owns more than -40 percent of the country’s wealth, while the poorest
20 percent owns less than 5 percent.
Despite these disparities between the wealthy industrial countries and the poorest
developing countries. it is important to acknowledge great strides made by many
developing nations over what is historically a ver) short time. Table 3-1 list the growth
rates and percentage increases of several ”quality of life” indicators among industrial and
developing societies. While significant gaps remain in some cases, the ”catching up” of
some countries is remarkable.
The important point about the great disparities of attributes is that they help create
international dependencies. The lack
of resources makes many developing states weak in all dimensions. To suit ive. they nccd
outside sources of economic aid. frequent doses of humanitarian assistance to help cope
with natural disasters such as droughts and floods. nulitarv aid to build and maintain even
rudimentary armed forces (which :,re often used more for maintaing the regime against
its internal critics and secessionki movements than against external attack). and markets
for their fcN\ exports. We will look in more detail later at. the problems of dependenc\
Here it is adequate to underline that about i0 percent of the stags of 1110 contemporary
world are weak and yet confront immense problems associated with development.

Nations and States

Common error in analyses of international politics is to co»tisc the terms state and nation.
Technically. international relations is
misnomer. It really should be something like interstate relations. The concept of a nation
refers to a community whose members see thcmsclccs as distinct from other
communities. usually different in terms of histon culture, language. ethnicity, religion. or
some combination of tlieni
idea of nationhood is a variable. not a constant. In nlld-nlncteenth c-11!W\
N/A- Data not available. *= Change is negli.

Source: data are from World Bank,

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International Relations 61
Italy, far example, only about 3 percent of Italians could speak the common language;
most spoke highly distinct regional dialects, and most identified themselves as Sicilians,
Romans, and the like. By the end of World War I however, most Italian immigrants to
North America identified themseh-e, as Italians. The Italian nation had grown or
developed within identities, o, the overcoming of one identity with another. Many of the
elites of Yugoslavia after World .War II identified themselves primarily
Yugoslavs. By the 1990s, they had shed themselves of this identity a,1d adopted the
narrower identities
of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and the like. Seventy years of Yugoslav
statehood and forty-five years of Communist rule failed to eradicate these mare
primordial identities.
One of the great sources of international conflict in the twentieth century-a point re-
emphasized has been the lack of ”fit” between the demographic distributions of
nationalities and the boundaries of states. .As suggested, there are very few states based
on a single ethnic cornmunin (Japan, Iceland, Denmark are among them). The mufti-
ethnic character of mast states has led to countless conflicts and wars. Usually, this is
v%-lrere the population of one community seeks to extend protection or aid to its kin in a
neighboring state. Or, even more likely a minority within one state seeks secession in
order to unite with its ethnic kin in a neighboring state. This is the phenomenon of
irredentism, and it is a common source of conflict. Consider, for example, the case of the
Albanians. Over 50 percem of the Albanians live outside Albania; most are in the Kosovo
region of Serbia and in neighboring Macedonian. Predictably, there is a movement
among Kosovo’s Albanians to unite with their brethren in Albania proper. rather than to
remain, as they consider it, second-class citizens deprived of many rights in the Serbian
region called Kosovo. This leads to tension between Albania and Serbia (Yugoslavia):
some observers fear ultimate armed conflict between Serbia and Albania, triggered by the
Kosovo Albanian’s search to ”liberate” themselves from Serbia and to unite with
Albania. This scenaio is repeated in many areas of Africa,.South Asia, the Balkans, and
in regions of the former Soviet Union. Wherever one finds a national community
distributed between two or more states, irredentism is likely to lead to international
conflict.
y In addition to having more than one nation within a state, there is also the problem of
stateless nations. The Palestinians are a prime example, as are the Kurds, whose
population concentrations straddle foot different countries Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.
As could be expected, many Kurds wish to create their own state. As a minority,
particularly ”» Turkey and Iraq, they are oppressed in many ways and believe that they
cannot sustain their unique identity- and culture unless they have the protection that can
be afforded by their own state. The Kurdish problem
fifroduction to the Contemporary
has been a constant source of tension between the countries where they are
located.
We thus have nation states, where the national community and the state largely coincide,
nations without states, and multinational states.
There are, finally a few states without nations The Vatican has many of the attributes of a
state (a territorial base, a bureaucracy, a diplomatic corps, and the like), but it has no
underlying community based on ethnicity or language. Its relevant community- is spread
throughout the world as. namely. the community of believers. But tliis is not a nation.
Nationalism is not necessarily a force leading to international conflict (it should not be
confused with patriotism, which is a sense of pride in a nation’s or state’s it is also a form
of ideology that can be used to mobilize communities to seek statehood. This search has
historically led to war. Most states, including the United States, have been born through
wars, both civil and international. Since 1945, many engaged in wars of ’national (sic]
liberation,” not unlike the American war of independence. The goal is statehood. It was
true for American colonials in the 1770s; for the Greeks. Bulgars, Romanians. Serbs, and
other Balkan peoples in the nineteenth century; and since 1945, for the numerous colonial
peoples of the Southern Hemisphere. In some. cases, nations coexist reasonably well
within a single state (Switzerland and India, for example), but where some communities
face oppression, exclusion from political power, or persecution ranging from genocide to
disenfranchisement, they, are likely to take up arms to gain independence, that is,
sovereign statehood. This search for statehood is one of the predominant historical trends
of the last two hundred years, and it continues unabated.
The Collapse of States
If the flowering of statehood has been one of the hallmarks of the modern international
system. it does not mean that all states endure. Many, as suggested, suffer from
debilitating weaknesses. Some continue to exist Primarily through the support of external
friends who provide critical financial, material and personnel assistance. It is unlikely, for
example, that Jordan could have survived as a state without critical assistance from Great
Britain from the 1920s until the 1970s. Some states fail; they collapse. They remain
sovereign entities in name only but otherwise have felv of the hallmarks so sovereignty,
in particular, a monopoly over the legitimate instruments of order and coercion. They
cannot provide minimal purity-, law and order, nor functioning economic and
communications infrastructures. Contemporary Lebanon is run less by the official
g°werument than by local militias, warlords, Palestinian refugees, the Israeli military (in
the extreme south), the Syrian military (in the Bekaa val’e> >. and diverse religious
movements. There is an official
68

Interrratlona! R:latlons tgovernments, but it does not rule.

Popular loyalties are split among ti
diverse groups, and as most are heavily armed, the central government ha.
no way to make its authority effective. In 1990 to 1991, the government ~.
Somalia fled into exile, and diverse warlords filled the vacuum. None coup
provide the essential services of a state, and when mass starvatic:.
developed, largely as a result of the multi-faced civil war, no author;,.
could provide necessary assistance. The United Nations eventual,
intervened to provide minimum food but soon became involved in the loci
warlord’s feuds.
The Somali case is not just a civil war between two faction, attempting to gain control of
the state. It is a case of the absolute coilapa. .of statehood, leading to social catastrophe.
Even in the. bitter war ; Bosnia, governments began or continued to function behind the
lines. ;: Somalia and Lebanon, governance gives way to large-scale chaos.
Nonstate Actors
Compared to the dozens of micro-states and weak states, there a; a number of non-state
actors that have a great deal more influent; developing and promoting issues on the
international agenda. Althoug there are great varieties of nonstate actors functioning
today, we vii consider only those that have the most important impact on internationa
politics. These would include (1) territorial nonstate actors, such a: national liberation
movements; (2) nonterritorial transitions organizations, such as multinational
corporations; and (~ intergovernmental organizations, such as NATO or the Organization
fn. Economic Cooperation and Development (DECD).
The politically most important territorial nonstate actors are th, various national liberation
movements and secessionist groups. Them activities may be conducted throughout the
world; but they are territorial because the purpose of their actions is to create states. The
most famous o-these organizations is the Palestine Liberation Organization. Its activitic=
are conducted throughout the world. Even though it is not a state. n maintains
”diplomatic’ relations with a number of governments and les= formal contacts with
militant groups in many countries. It has obsenc status at the United Nations, it
commands military strength, and it 111’ determined what sort of peace arrangements are
being made in the Niidd~ East. Through its propaganda and in the past, terrorist
activities. underlined the plight of the Palestinian population to the point where became
one of the most significant and enduring problems on th~ international agenda.
Compared with many weak states, the decisions a~’L activities of the PLO have had
greater impact on world issues and on tl” foreign policy attention of the
major powers.
,,,tpduction to the Conter»porary
Nonterritorial transitional organizations are characterized~by (1) organized activities
occurring simultaneously in a number of countries; (2) objectives that do not relate to
interests within any given territory; and (3) component parts that are essentially
nonpolitical. The Catholic Church is perhaps the oldest organization with these
characteristics. Although it has an administrative center in Rome, its activities occur in
virtually every country in the world. Like all nonterritorial transitional organizations, its
livehood depends upon unfettered access to people living in ail countries. Its activities are
also transitional in the sense that if one component unit gets into difficulties, it can draw
upon the financial, administrative, personal, and spiritual capabilities of other units or of
the entire organization. The Church, of course, has only a very indirect and intermittent
impact on international politics, but occasionally its involverdent becomes more apparent.
The Pope has made pronouncements on a variety of international issues, including
economic development, arms control, and the nature of political regimes. To the extent
that these pronouncement influence public attitudes or the views of foreign policy
makers, the impact may be direct.
Most authorities on the multinational firm distinguish between nationally based firms that
conduct some operations abroad and true multinationals. To be classified in the latter
groups, a firm must have some minimum number of foreign subsidiaries operating in
various countries. A minimum of six countries is often used as the cut off point. Others
have listed as MNC only those corporations whose asses, sales, earnings, production, and
employment come significantly (perhaps 25 percent) from abroad.
Multinational corporations reflect the increasing globalization of the world economy. Just
as in Europe and America, where most firms began with local markets and ultimately
spread their activities to regions and then the entire nations, since World War II many
industrial giants have continued expanding their productive and marketing activities to
other regions of the world. Until the late 160s, most MNCs were American-or European-
based, but over the last two decades, Japanese firms have become prominent as economic
actors in many regions of the world. Most recently; we have witnessed the appearance of
MNCs whose home is a developing country (LDC). Korean-based Hyundai operates a
variety of enterprises throughout the world; Indian companies have projects in African
countries such as Zambia, Somalia, and Tanzania; a number of Brazilian- based
companies have built
plants throughout Latin America and in several African countries. Many of these LDC-
based MNCs specialize in technologies and products particularly appropriate for
de`~elopmg nations. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of MNCs.

International Relations 71
they are becoming an increasingly visible form of economic organization one which is no
longer confined to the major industrial nations of the West.
~~ctlon to the Contemporary
came of the matter, as U.S. government officials had already undertaken their own
program to oust Alleged.
By their size in physical and financial assets, we would assumt Despite such
examples of direct involvement in host-country
that multinational corporations have a great impact on the contemporan Politics,
studies show that such episodes are exceptional. William
global system. The assets of some of the largest MNCs, such as Unilever.
Thompson studied 274 successful and unsuccessful military coups in the
IBM, General Motors, British Petroleum, and Mitsubishi, far outstrip the nod from 1946
to 1969 and found very little evidence of direct
economic capabilities of small states. How can we measure the politiq
involvement by MNCs. Likewise, there is little evidence that MNCs. have
impact of such immense concentrations of wealth and centers of contra been a
significant factor either as causes of, or participants in, international
over economic resources? By allocating factors of production and ears. There are,
however a number of cases where the interest of an MNTC
controlling investment flows, no doubt the activities of MNCs seriously and a
home government coincided, so that the intervention of the home
influence the character of economic development. Payment of royalties and government
against the host country served the interests of the MNC. Such taxes, establishment of
new plants or closing down of old ones, decisions was the case of the American
government’s involvement in the overthrow on where to locate plants, and advertising-
these and many other decisions of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953. after which
American oil can crucially affect a developing country’s economic structure, tax
companies obtained new operating privileges in that country; the European revenues,
level of employment, and consumption patterns. It can be argued oil companies strong
support of the French-British Israeli invasion of the for example, that by fostering
consumerism through advertising MNCs Suez Canal in 1956, the direct role of the Union
Miniere Company in the seriously distort development patterns in poor countries. Rather
than Belgian government’s support of the Katanga
secession from the Congo in promoting rural development, public transportation, or
communal the early 1960s; and the pressure that American oil companies put on
enterprise, MNCs try to create markets for middle-class needs anc Washington to ”do
something” about Fidel Castor’s nationalization of their aspirations. By helping to
destroy or alter indigenous cultural anc assets in Cuba, so that the interests of the oil
companies were probably on economic patterns, moreover, the MNC may, at least
indirectly, foster factor, among many, taken into consideration in planning the abortive
Bay social strains and ultimately radical political movements. Several of Pigs invasion of
1961. Again, however, the evidence indicates that these important guerrilla groups in
Latin America, for example, claim that are exceptional cases; although MNCs constantly
seek, through persuasion MNCs lead not only to direct political imperialism but also to a
more of various sorts, to have the host governments treat their operations with a subtle
form of cultural pollution. Whatever the indirect impact, it is hard to minimum of
interference, or without high taxation, the occasions where identifv~ and measure. No
doubt it is greater among small, weak countrio such activity has included subversion are
few. When a company prevails than in the industrial countries, where a majority of the
activities of MNCs upon the home government to take up its case, if it feels it is being
deal
with unfairly by the host government, there are regular and legitimate procedures
provided under international law. It should be acknowledged,
too, that often host governments have nationalized the assets of MNCs or instituted
extremely high taxation rates, and that these steps were taken without the threat or
commission of retaliation either by the MNCs or the home government. An increasing
trend for hosts to expropriate MNC assets suggests that impact does not flow in only one
direction.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are also nonstate actors that often have important
influences on international politics and the domestic orders of states. Most 1GOs reflect
the interests of their members, but occasionally, it makes sense to talk of the European
Community’s ”polio” the ”action” of the United Nations, or the ”reaction” of NATO.
These organizations often develop a common ”external” policy that has
behind it all the forces of persuasion the organization can muster. And
72
are already located.
The direct political impact of the MNC is perhaps easier to deal with. While it is more
intermittent, it is also more obvious. For example MNCs have occasionally played an
important role.
in the domestic policiO of host states. The United Fruit Company’s record of activities in
th~ ”banana republics” of Central America is well known: It primarily involved attempts
to keep governments in power that would allow th; company to operate unfettered by
regulations and excessive taxes. When government hostile to its interests came to power
in Guatemala in 195= the company apparently assisted in helping the American
government through exiles in Honduras and Nicaragua to overthrow the Arben’ regime.
In 1970. the International Telephone and Telegraph Compan’ promoted a scheme for
toppling the Alleged government in Chile. Nothin

haternational Relations _
sometimes the policy may contravene the interests of any single member’s
state.
Thus, the United Nations was instrumental in creating the Congo
Republic and in reducing the possibilities of intervention into the Congo
crisis by the United States and the Soviet Union. The European
Community has a single external tariff and, on many occasions, bargain;
as a single political actor in its relations with nonmembers. The Food and
Agriculture Organization can be expected in the coming decades to plan an
important role in helping to set up food reserves; in same cases, its
activities could spell the difference between mass starvation and life in
some of the LDCs.
As the web of international relationships has become more dense
because of growing commercial, social and communications transactions,
the need for collaboration and coordination between governments has
grown as well. Today there are more than 344 formal intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). And if the offshoots of these groupings, as well as
some organizations blending intergovernmental and transitior~a,
characteristics, are included, the number is more than 1,100. Their growth
in recent years has been prodigious. More than 94 percent of them have
appeared since 1940, meaning that in a typical postwar year, more
intergovernmental organizations were created than in the entire nineteenth
century. The pace of growth, moreover, seems to be accelerating, as falls
70 percent of the IGOs have been established since 1960s. A large
proportion of the IGOs deal with economic issues, and the densest web of
memberships is in Western Europe where, for example, many countries
belong simultaneously to such important organizations as NATO, the
European Community-, the Nordic Council, Euratom, and hundreds of
more specialized intergovernmental agencies. Denmark, with 10
memberships in IGGs, leads the world. The United States in the carp
1980s belonged to 122, while Canada had 110 memberships. While th:
industrial states
of the West tend to have the most membershipsr, joininc
IGOs is among the first actions taken by states that have just achieve
independence. The motivations for all states are essentially the same: the
expectation of economic benefits and efficiencies, and, in other cases. actors exist
and operate only with the consent of governments. The
increments of security and protection. it is not possible to measure tb”’ example of
the PLO supports the generalization: It has many of the
impact of such a great variety of organizations, but the dynamic growth ”’ characteristics
of a government and on several occasions has been a major
their numbers suggests that many of them provide substantial benefits t~’ determinant
of crisis and war. Fiat it has these characteristics precisely
because its objective is to create a Palestinian state; that is, to join the international
society of states as a sovereign, legally equal, and territcwially
based political order. Amnesty International, multinational corporations, the International
Red Cross, and the International Ice Hockey Federation
#,troductlon to the Contemporary
without translating their concerns into major diplomatic issues. In general, nonstate actors
can play several roles in international politics: (1) introduced an issue onto the
international diplomatic agenda; (2) publicize and raise citizen consciousness regarding
certain global or regional problems; (3) lobby national governments and international
organizations to make decisions favorable to their cause; and (4) seek an outcome
through direct action, sometimes (though relatively rarely) involving the
threat or use of force.
A good illustration of these four types of activities is provided by the Green-peace
movement, a transitional organization with headquarters in London, but with national and
regional organizations located throughout world. In areas such as depletion of whale
populations by the major whaling nations, French testing of nuclear weapons in the South
Pacific, and the culling of seal pups on the ice floes off of Atlantic Canada,
Green peace has been instrumental in bringing to an end certain activities (with the
exception of the French nuclear tests). This has been done by a combination of publicity,
carefully staged encounters with those whose activities they challenge-usually dramatic
David versus-Goliath
confrontations- dissemination of scientific research results to international organizations
and citizens’ groups, lobbying national governments and organizations such as the
International Whaling Commission, and mounting protects. Overall, Green peace has
been highly successful in all of its roles and has used its transitional contacts
to challenge governments and industries with resources far more extensive than its own.
Most nonstate actors, however, seek to achieve or defend very specific interests, few of
which have a direct relationship to critical issues
leading to war and peace. Governments are the arbiters of these ultimate questions. The
state remains the critical actor of international politics, because (1) only it commands the
allegiance of people occupying a defined territory; (2) only it possesses the capabilities to
employ the ultinwte threat
(war); (3) governments, unlike most transitional organizations, are concerned with the
full range of welfare and security issues of a population; and (4) only governments enjoy
sovereignty. All other types of
their members.
The global political system is thus inhabited by. a variety of actor u i agents, in addition
to modern states, developing countries. and maI” wo-ro-states. Some have considerable
impact on selected global issues others operate across national boundaries to achicvc
specific objectives. b”

mom
75
Intematlonal Relations
seek none of these goals and are not, therefore, the critical actors of international politics.
While the state thus remains the most important actor in world politics, the arguments has
been made that its importance is declining and the political significance of nonstate actors
has increased. States are no longer able to control transitional movements and influences
from abroad. Populations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and competent, and
their loyalties to the state, even when surrounded and transportation, can no longer be
assumed. Armed with modern communications and transportation, regional or worldwide
contacts, and the ability to learn what is going on outside their country, they can fatefully
support, oppose, or even topple their governments. We have had many illustrations of the
seeming decline of government control in the face of grass-roots transitional movements
and the growing competence of publics. Several come to mind.
In 1987, the Russian nuclear reactor in Chernobyl brick down and caused a major teak of
radioactive material. In the past, it had been the practice of the Soviet government not to
publicize disasters within the USSR. But in this case, after several days of silence the
authorities had to concede that a major catastrophe had occurred.
Radiation levels throughout Scandinavia and other parts of Europe dangerously.
American spy satellites took photographs of the flaming reactor and Russian officials
attempts to evacuate the immediate area. The event could not be kept from international
examination. Through
various forms of international communication, Soviet citizens soon learned of the disaster
long before Soviet authorities and national media acknowledge that it had taken place.
The wave of revolutions in the world throughout the latter part of the 1980s had great
demonstration effects. Corazon Aquino’s ”yellow power” revolution in the Philippines
toppled the Macros regime in 1986 and set the example for South Koreans. whose
massive demonstrations (and riots) ultimately forced the government to promise fair
elections and to end military rule. The Korean democrats’ success was conveyed through
the media to the Burmese, who organized protects demanding the democratization of the
country and the end of military rule.
The demonstration effect of democratic opposition to Communist rule in Eastern Europe
was perhaps even more dramatic. It took the Solidarity movement almost ten years to
achieve the capitulation of Communist rule and the creation of genuine pluralist political
institutions in Poland. Taking heart from the Poles, the Hungarians achieved roughly the
same results in about ten months. Thousands of East Germans then used Hungary as the
escape route to West Germany, causing a massive
Introduction to the Contemporary I

population hemorrhage, vast demonstration in East German cities, and the ultimate
collapse of the Communist regime. The entire process took about one month. Shortly
after, the demonstrations began in Prague, and in ten days the Communist authorities
capitulated. It took only a few days of demonstrations, riots, and finally the execution of
Nicoiae Ceaucescu, to bring down the Communist government in Romania in December.
1989. The press passed on to Bulgaria. What had begun as a meeting of shipyard workers
in Gdansk, Poland, in 1979 ended ten years later with the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe. Despite the Communist regimes’ monopoly of power, and their
command of the media, the courts, the secret police, and the military, they stood
defenseless against the spontaneous forces of opposition. Success in one country
immediately brought emulation in another.
International demonstration effects and toss of government control are not confined to
political developments. Private investors and speculators can shift billions of dollars or
other currencies within a matter of moments. As the world economy becomes
increasingly integrated, major events of October 1987 occurred almost simultaneously in
Auckland, Tokyo, Toronto, Hong Kong. Amsterdam, New York and elsewhere. Interest
rates in one country can have impacts on unemployment levels, tax policies, and interests
rates in many
others. Fads, fashions, and drug trade cannot be confined to single corOrtries. In short,
states have become increasingly porous to outside influences and transactions.
In the face of these integrating forces, is the state declining? One of the paradoxes of the
contemporary global system is that despite all the technologies that shrink distances and
help .crate millions of contacts between individuals of different societies. the forces of
political fragmentation, separateness, and local loyalties are also strong and even
increasing. Dozens of movements in both industrial and developing countries seek not
integration but separation. The ultimate goal of much political activity in the
contemporary world is the creation of more states. Autonomy and independence remain
potent values, and they are buttressed by the nineteenth-century doctrine of self-
determination, which is invoked by countless think, language, and religious groups to
justifi- their search for a separate state. The list of secessionist or independence
movements is lengthy and continues to grow: the Tibetans in China, the Sikhs in the
Punjab; the Kashmiries, the Tamils in Sri Lanka; the Shans> among others, in Myanmar
(Burma); the Palestinians; the southern Sudanese; the Muslims in .the Philippines; and
the Kanakas in New Caledonia, just to mention a few. The phenomenon is not confined
to the weak states of the developing world. There have been separatist movements in
Spain (the

Intaffsetiorfal Relations
Bxsqucs), France (the Corsicans), Italy (the Tyroleans), and Canada (the
Quebecois). -
To argue, then, that the state as the premier unit in international relations is fading away
ignores a great deal of evidence to the contrary. That the state can no longer control all
the activities of its citizens, or keep r out all unwanted external influences, is correct, but
this does not mean that the state as the premier from of political organization-a unit that
provides a full range of services for its citizens-is becoming obsolete. Tthec state remains
the only organization that fan provide the two essential services that allow a society to
survive an& grow: security and welfare, broadly conceived. No other organization can
provide these simultaneously. This is not to argue that all states provide them well,
efficiently, justly, or fairly. But then most other kinds of organizations cannot provide
them at all.
Political fragmentation is also sustained by the sentiment of nationalism, a crucial
ingredient in personal identity. Individuals, according to William Bloom, seek to identify
”in order to achieve psychological security.” Such security in necessary for personality
stability and emotional well-being.
National identity, he suggests, ”describes that condition in which a mass of people have
made the same identification with national symbols so that they may act as one
psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of these
symbols of national identity.” It is precisely because many of the new states are artificial
constructs that nationalism in them is so weak. In the new states, the symbols and
affinities remain directed toward the ethnic groups, tribe, region, or some other social
subunit of the state. But elsewhere identifications are strongly established with the
adulation accorded to one’s athletes in international sports contests to see evidence of the
continuing significance of nationalism. American television during the Olympic Games
focuses almost solely on the performance of American athletes, and generally ignores
that of others. Fans attending World Cup soccer matches every four years emblazon
themselves with national symbols: flags, the national colors painted on their faces and
worn on their clothes. An unhappy outcome to a match has on occasion caused riots and
deaths. Travelers abroad often seek out the company of their fellow nationals rather than
that of the locals. The examples could be multiplied easily. They all constitute evidence
of the continuing force of nationalism in a world that is in many ways shrinking. One can
be a good European, or even ”world citizen,” but one remains foremost a Scot, a Swiss,
an Austrian, or a Pole. A Latin American shares a language, religion, and history with
many others on the continent. But he or she will still identity the self primarily as a
Peruvian, a Colombian, or an Argentinean. In many cases, the profusion of the means of
communication helps to sustain, and
introduction to the Contenrporaiy
even create, national identities more than a sense of international or global solidarity. ,
Thus, while it is important to identify who, how, and under what circumstances nonstate
actors have an impact on the international agenda, the proliferation of such actors and the
greater ease of communication between societies has not appreciably diminished the
activities of states. The decisions and actions of their governments and their interrelations
remain the focus of inquiry.

The Structure of the System

Most analysts that the structure of power and influence in the world between the onset of
the Cold War and some point in the 1970s was polar. Only the United States and the
Soviet Union had the capacity to destroy each other. To fashion a solution on any number
of conflicts in the world required the tacit or formal approval of one or (often) both.
As the greatest donors of foreign aid and the most significant sources of modern
weaponry, they could greatly influence, and in some cases command, lesser states’
foreign policies. The combined Israeli-French-British invasion of
the Suez Canal region in 1956 had to be terminated because of Soviet protests and lack of
American support. Wars in Afghanistan, Angola, the Ogaden, and between Iraq and Iran
came to an end when the Soviets decided to stop supplying their clients.

The two superpowers were not, of course, omnipotent. But they

were the only countries that defined their interests in global terms and that had the
military capabilities (in the case of the Soviet Union, only by the late 1970s) to defend or
expand those interests. By contrast, even the second tier of states, including reat Britain,
France, and China, had mostly regional interests and did not have the capacity to extend
military power beyond those regions.
The world was polarized, if we measure polarity using military indicators. On questions
of peace and war, the fate of many nations lay in decisions made in Moscow and
Washington. But in other issue areas, the
structure of power and influence looked significantly different. On matters of
international trade and finance, for example, the Soviet Union and China were not even in
the game. Japan, military weak, was and remains a major actor. Decisions made in
Tokyo, not Moscow or Beijing. have the greatest impact on world financial institutions
and trade practices. When we talk about a world power structure, then, we may have to
specify- what kinds of issues are in contention.
If there was a consensus about polarity during the height of the Cold War, there is little
agreement about trends since the 1970s. Has there been a vast decline in American
power? Are we entering a new structure of
78

International Relations ~` introduction to the Contemporary 80

multipolarity. perhaps a configuration something akin to that of the mid nineteenth
century in Europe? Here the problem is that one can make
pretty convincing case in support of different positions. it all depends upol the evidence
that -one uses to measure power. The reader may have his o her own favorite evidence,
but even if we agree on the figures, we may no agree on the inferences to be made from
them.
Consider economics. All the figures point to a relative decline c. the United States during
the past two decades. American gross natiow1 product used to make up about 35 percent
of the world total in the 1950-Today it constitutes about 20 percent. At the height of the
Cold Va., Americans were indisputably better off than
the citizens of any othc, country. Today, compared with Americans, the citizens of
several countric: including Switzerland and Japan, on average are, wealthier, live longc:,
have easier and cheaper access to health care, and are less frequent],. victims of violent
crime, alcoholism, road accidents, and the like. In th. 1950s, the United States was the
most important trading nation in th world, and Americans had more money invested
abroad than any other nationality. Today, the Japanese have either surpassed or are close
tc-approximating American economic activities abroad. In 1989, for examplc Japan
became the world’s largest overseas investor on an annual basis. h the first two decades
after World War 11, American scientists won almos, all the Nobel prizes. They still
maintain a commanding position, bw increasingly non-Americans are earning those
laurels. One also read, almost daily about the leading position of Japan in certain high-
teci industries, about the threat to American industrial predominance by Japa: or by the
integrating European economy. There is, in brief, no lack of dal, to substantiate the case
of America’s relative decline in the world.
But here we need to introduce more content to the notion o’ structure. The question about
dominance is not which country possesses th” most guns, or which has the largest foreign
currency holdings, or whose athletes win the most medals, in international competitions.
By structure: power, we mean the authority. and capacity to set the rules of the game and
to determine how the others will play the game (further discussion is iii Chapter 5). Those
who attempt to play other games can be persuaded of coerced to conform only by those
with superior structural power.
Looked at this way, the argument about he decline of the Unitcc’ States is less
compelling. On most security and commercial issues, th, United States has the capacity to
lead, coerce, and persuade. An arms-control agreement without American participation
would mean little. Th”, United States has over the years coerced and cajoled the Japanese
to opc` up markets to American goods. It is unlikely that the Japanese coulu Marshall
similar coercive ability against the United States.
But there is more than coercive capacity involved. Structural power includes unseated
assumptions about standards and rules: who should conform to i% hat and how. One
illustration will make the point.
In the 1980s the American trade authorities, at the prompting of the lumber industry.
charged that Canadian provinces were subsidizing their own wood industries by charging
unreasonably low rents for cutting rights. In the
United States, lumber companies bid competitively for cutting rights in federal forests;
many others themselves own forests. In Canada, in contrast, the provinces ”own” almost
all the forest resources and charge a fee (stumpage rate) for cutting rights. There is no
competitive bidding for stands to timber, as there is in the United States. In other words,
the ways that the American and Canadian wood companies gain access to the resource
differ significantly. American trade authorities threatened that if the Canadian provinces
did not begin charging higher stumpage fees, the United States would impose punitive
tariffs on all Canadian lumber entering America. The assumption underlying the
negotiation of a final solution to the problem was that the American method of providing
access to wood resources was the ”normal” way of doing things, and that Canadian
methods had to be adjusted. No one imagined, or proposed, that perhaps the Americans
should reorganize their lumber industry to conform to the Canadian model.
In many of the debates about world trade, there has been an assumption that the
American definition of a ”level playing field” is the only definition; all other countries
must play according to that definition or face economic retaliation. It seldom occurs to
Americans that the way they do business, as, for example in maintaining the archaic
British system of weights and measures, constitutes a barrier to trade, and that it is the
United States that is out of tune with the rest of the world. No other economy has the
capacity, single handily. to coerce the United States to change.
There is much evidence, then, that in terms of structural power, the United States
maintains a position of global predominance and has the capacity to maintain it in the
foreseeable future. The supports of the position remain basically intact: The United States
maintains a leading position in world manufacturing; in high-tech production; in
ownership and control of world communications facilities; in data banks; in the
production of computers; and in the fast-growing new technologies of article intelligence,
space exploration, microelectronics, biotechnology, and the like. The position is likely to
endure for some time because the United States has by far the largest number of research
oriented universities, and because spending on national defense research-a vast system of
state-suosidized research with huge commercial benefits remains the highest in

lnten>:ational Relations
the world by far. The dollar remains the world’s most important currency, and the United
States provides the world’s most extensive credit facilities. Combined, the
predominance of military power, along with significantly leading positions knowledge
finance, and production, guarantee America’s leading position.
Others, like Japan and a uniting Europe, will gain increasing leverage in some issue
sectors. The reforming and restructuring of Eastern Europe will be undertaken primarily
under the auspices of Western European leadership. The United States appears to play
only a secondan role there. On the critical questions of peace and war, the shape of the
global economy, and the fashioning of settlements to prolonged conflicts such as.the
Middle East situation, the United States will remain the critical actor. In the newer issue
areas of global pollution and atmospheric degradation, American leadership is essential
because the United States contributes approximately 25 percent of the total atmospheric
polluting agents. This is not to say that the United States, has. or will, provide that
leadership.
The structure of the international system in some sense looks more multiplier. Certainly
with the collapse oT the Communist systems i» Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
and the daily revelations of Russian economic weakness, it is hard to consider Russia as
approximate to the United States. Russia retains the second most powerful military
arsenal, but intercontinental missiles and tanks will not buy diplomatic influence on
abroad range of contemporary issues. The general conclusion is that in terms of structural
power, the United States remains predominant, but increasingly it is having to coordinate
its policies with other important industrial countries. We may be entering an era of less
polarity and more collective hegemony represented by the great coalition of industrial
societies centered in Europe, North America. and Japan.
81
The Forms of Interaction
interactions between societies have grown at an unprecedented pace. Whether measured
in terms of the total volume of world trade, mail flows, tourism and travel, telephone
calls, foreign investment, international conference of scientists and other academics, or
international sports competitions, the figures all show precipitous increases. They are
matched by contacts between governments More governments have more embassies and
consulates abroad now than at any previous time. There has been ~1 vast growth in the
numbers of intergovernmental organizations, ad hoc conferences. and summit meetings.
We need not spell out then developments in statistics. The trends are clear and well-
known; what thci~ consequences are remains more problematic.
introduction to the Contemporary 82
What may be more significant than the aggregate gro«-th
rates of transactions between individuals, societies, and governments is their patterns.
Recall the dependency model of international relations outlined in Chapter 1. That
”image” of the world is based in part on the highly skewed patterns of global transaction.
Most trade is between industrial countries. as are tourism, mail flows and other forms of
communication, foreign investment, interactions between transitional organizations.
sports contacts. and formal diplomatic communications. There is a significant north south
trade pattern, but it is skewed in its make up: The north exports high technology and
manufactured goods, while the south continues-though less so than previously to export
primay products and manufactured goods of a lower technological grade. South trade.
investment. tourism, and other forms of communication, are only in an infant stage. You
will see evidence of this on your own campus: There are significant numbers of students
from Third World countries in most major Western universities. But you will find almost
no Westerners enrolled in the Universiy, of Lusaka, University Sains Malaysia, or the
University of Calcutta and their many counterparts in other Third World countries. The
Western tutelary position in formal scientific knowledge is reproduced in the, world’s
media patterns: Because information and new tend to flow from north to south. people in
the industrial countries would know little about other regions of the world, while literate
populations in the Third World and the former Soviet Union know considerably more
about the West. The concentration of global-reaching media resources in a few
conglomerates like CNN ensures that the manufacturing of news will continue to have
strongly Western bias.
One trend that is not so obvious is war. Because we have so many forms of warfare
today. ranging from various forms of terrorism and ”low intensity conflict” to more
conventional operations, it is difficult to identify all wars. or to determine when they
began and ended. Nevertheless, victims of war have numbered well over 20 million since
1945. and tpe number of wars has not declined from previous eras despite -numerous
international organizations whose major task is to prevent them. ’
Of course, war has not occurred randomly among the states in the s)rtem. The great
powers traditionally have employed force more frequently than have lesser states. What
is striking about the post 19-1> figures is that all the wars and armed intewentions with
the exception of the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 196 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
Bosnian war of the 1990s, and local wars in some former Soviet republics
ha~e occurred in the Third World. One reason is that many of the straggles f°R
independence or national unity were waged through armed combat. In fvc” most post-
194s wars have had to do with the creation and unili_:;tion

International Relations
of states. There have been relatively few classic state-versus-state wars except in the
Middle East. Else where, most wars have been of tly ”national liberation” or national
unification type.
War, then, remains an important form of interaction between states and would be states.
Many wars began as domestic rebellions anc; ultimately became internationalized. While
the number of wars adjusted for the number of states of states has decreased, all the
forces that help bring the world together have not significantly altered the securiy 1,1c1
insecurity problems of many state. Increased communications have not necessarily
increased understanding, and certainly not mutual sympathies Frequent recourse to arms
indicates that many changes and adjustments arc not being achieved through peaceful
means of interaction, ’such as trade and diplomacy.

The Major Rules of the System

The rules and principles articulated in the Westphalia treaties and developed through the
eighteenth century continue to sewe as th; foundation of contemporary international
relationships. States formally remain sovereign, they are legally equal regardless of the
differences in their attributes, and they are enjoined not to interfere in each other’s
internal affairs. These rules are sustained by ideologies of self-determination, by
nationalism. and by the international legitimacy accorded to the state. It is still only states
that can join international organizations like the United Nations; only states can enter into
treaU relations: states cannot legislate for. or administer their own rules on, other states:
territories; and blatant interference in the domestic political processes of foreign countries
usually brings strong protests. Rules still protect the immunity of diplomats, and most
states remain legally equal in the sense that they commonly share rights and
responsibilities.
There have been significant changes in interpretation regarding these fundamentals of the
states system. While the rule of noninterference persists, it is broken with such regularly
that it may not survive as n fundamental norm. In Washington. D.C.. there are thousands
of lobbyists in the pay of foreign governments. Some make contributions to the political
campaign fiends of congressional and presidential candidates Others offer access to
decision making centers. Similar forms of persuasioll take place in many other national
capitals. But because local rules alloy these activities, they are considered
illegitimate even if technically they obviously influence domestic politics.
In the area of human rights. an even more significant revoluti~l~ has taken place. For
years a variet3 of governments claimed that then internal governing arrangements could
not become a matter of negotiation with foreigners. The South African regime protested
for decades that o’.fc
introduction to the Contemporary 84
conutucs involvement in -the matter of race relations constituted gross interference in
South Africa’s internal affairs. Similarly, even after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 had
spelled out a number of norms relating t:. human rights (the freedoms of speech. religion,
and assembly, for ewmple). the Communist signatories claimed repeatedly that no
foreign country had the right to discuss or criticize how they dealt with their owe F
citizens. But this was to no avail. Over the years, a consensus seems to bu emerging
among many governments that gross violations of human right, are everybody’s business,
and that foreign governments have the right and even a duty to do something about
injustices. There are now enough precedents to suggest that this may become a norm of
the system, although many states continue to teject its application. In the field of human
rights. the principle of noninterference has become contested.
Norms relating to the use of force in foreign policy have also changed. The Westphalian
rules assumed that a sovereign had the right to formulate his or her realm’s foreign
policies free of restraints fron; supranational authorities such as the Pope or the Holy
Roman Emperor Among those prerogatives was the use of armed force. There was a
tradition associated with doctrine of just war, but most of these had gom into abeyance
during the eighteenth eentuw. In general, until the lat;: nineteenth century armed force
was considered to be one of several instruments of stagecraft, and an essential attribute or
corollary of sovereignty.
The two great world wars of the twentieth century and th; development of weapons of
mass destruction have changed attitudes toward the use of force. First in the League of
Nations Covenant, and later in the charter of the United Nations, norms regulating the use
of force were spelled out in detail, At present force can be used in .only two,
circumstances: (1) in self-defense, individually or collectively: and (2) as coercive
sanctions approved by the Security Council of the United Nations. or some other
international organizations. 1n the latter case, a state can use military means on behalf of
community objectives. While these rules might seem to rule out Hitler-style aggressions,
they are by no means without
controversy. In almost any circumstance, a government can say that it employed force for
defense purposes.
Whatever the loopholes, the important point. in contrast to practices in earlier centuries,
is that today there is a last resort and only in
cases of extreme provocation or danger.’ But an additional problem has vPPeared in post-
19-15 uses of force. As we have seen, most involved the ””led struggles of national
liberation movements to end colonialism fherc,s no norm that rules out force when it is
used against colonialism; .. I”st this is the position taken by the governments of many
new countries

International Relations
The whole issue of the use of force, including various forms low- in tens conflict, by no
state actors-primarily secessionist groups--has becol. , murky.

The Sources of Stability in the System

Recall that by the word stability we do not necessarily mean pe„~ and harmony. Stability
refers to the persistence of the main characterist,y:. of the international system, as defined
by its geographic scope, the natun; of the units (actors), system structure, major forms of
interaction, and t’ rules and norms that underlie it.

The geographic scope of the system cannot change. It is alreri

;. global and virtually all peoples are organized into the predominant fore: political
organization, the state. There are, of course, no other syste~ barring the discovery of
extracter-restrial life. .
The prevalence of nationalism has consequences for both stabil and change. As suggest
the days of the state do not seem to be numbcrc,; even though the ability of states to
control transitional interactions i,: declined substantially in recent years. The aspiration
for statehood remn:r, the primary goal of many communities. With the collapse of the
So,,;. Union and Yugoslavia, we have witnessed the birth of at least ninet,:~
new states since 1989, and the process of fragmentation in that area I;,.~ not yet run its
course. If the dozens of ’national liberation’ movemc;,t• active in the Third World today
achieve their goals. we can except anotl,„: dozen or so new members of the United
Nations by the end of ;:. yitiitlennium. The days of the multinational empire have now
passed. ,i
.’
we are perhaps seeing only the beginning of an era when m communities will be
organized on the basis of the state principle.
Westphalian principles of sovereignty, legal equality. noninterference also help sustain
the states system. While math deer, -’costs’ of sovereignty-in particular the difficulties of
getting internatio:~ agreement on regulating many of the destructive consequences of
mod.: industrial life the sovereignty,
principle provides important forms protection. particularly for weak states. Iraq’s
conquest and annexation

Kuwait in the summer of 1990. followed by the United Nations coalitiomilitary reversal
of that conquest, demonstrates the continued vibrancy
the sovereignty concept. The forcible annexation of another state is v, the United Nations
was designed to prevent. In that sense. the Ui11 Nations is a conservative organization.
Like the balance of power in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. it «-as designed to
protect independence of its members.
The collapse of communism as an ideology also helps ~,ustaiII system. The original
Leninist and Maoist purpose of communism wl,
1ntpductfon to the Contemporary
promote world revolution and to organize the world on the basis of class ,ntcrest, rather
than states. This dream of a world transcending states ultimately developed into a
Russian-dominated regional empire clothed under Leninist heroic. Since the death of
Mao Tse-tung in 1976 and the ideological innovations of Mikhail Gorbachev in the late
1980s. the idea of organizing the world on a basis other than statehood remains alive only
among some Muslim fundamentalists. They define the world in terms of spiritual
communities and regard states as Western inventions that do not accord with God’s plan
of human organization. State boundaries, in this view, are artificial and are used by
Western orientated leaders to perpetuate their rule. Ethnicity and/or language are no basis
for political organization. Religious belief is the critical criterion of comnnmitv.
While this world view appeals to some. the attraction of nationalism which sustains the
states system appears today much stronger than religious belief. Many argue that the
triumph of liberalism also helps to sustain the system. Unlike the clash of ideologies that
produced World War I and the Cold War, the growing world consensus around liberalism
is destined to make the world as safer place. Wars between the states of Western Europe
are hard imagine, and the hope is that ultimately there will be a great ”zone of peace”
stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Whether this is wishful thinking remains to be
seen, but all the post-Cold War leaders of the West have expressed the hope that the
elements of the former Soviet Union, and ultimately China, will become carbon copies of
Western liberal democracies. The expectation is that the more political communities
came to resemble each other, the less likely there will be drive for hegemony, conquest,
ideological warfare. and ultimately world war. The ”Vancouver to Vladivostok- scheme
is clearly based. on the principles of economic liberation
(free markets) and political democracy.
The reader may wish to speculate on other sources of stability. Are there otter items in
the realm of ideas, actions. and technology that help perpetuate the states system?

The Sources of Change in the System

Nationalism has many consequences. It helps sustain the idea of statehood as the primary
form of political organization for communities. But the drive for statehood may also have
de-stabilising consequences for the system. The pressures of political fragmentation arc
acute in many areas of the world. and they are helping to bring about the birth of new
states. But many of the new states (and some older ones as well) will be barely (or not
all) viable if the hope is to make them ethnically ”pure ” Can til>> (in terms of
population, not necessarily territon) siates..each with its °ANn minorities. survive as
economic ctifltics? What will be the fete of B°”nia I ’ ethnically pure’ mini-states (or
Bantustans. if yon prefer)? If
86

lnterrnatfonal Relations r’

such creations are fundamentally weak. will they tempt otitsidcrs’. If lh~ goal of all
communities is to havAheir own state, can this be done NN 1! holit war and bloodshed?
What about the remaining minorities’ If tlle~ Ire
’it i be done NN 1! holit
d done ’NN
I
f
h
t
minorities’ If tlle~ Ire
persecuted or oppressed, they will turn to armed struggle. The idc.t tU.it every state must
be founded on a single ethnic group can lead only to alt infinite regress of ”wars of
national liberation.” To take the most extreme example, Africa is populated by more than
3,000 distinct ethnic/language/tribal groups. What is the consequence of a vision which
argues that every group must have its own state’?

The only antidote to the explosion-mostly be violence-of statehood, is the alternative

concept of the citizen. The political communil is composed of citizens, regardless of their
ethnic origins, preferred religion or other attributes. Most Western states are based on the
concept of citizenship, not enthicity. The result is that, because they enjoy equal rights,
most ”minorities” (a minority is an invented concept, not a fact of life) do not seek
separate statehood.

The ideology of nationalism, when ”nation” is defined lax ethnicity, thus may have some
long run consequences for the character of the international system. It might help
contribute to more war: it might increase the numbers of state in international
organizations to the point where those organizations find it difficult to operate effectively
(n majority of states today do not pay their dues to the United Nations); and it might help
increase the growing gap between the rich and poor of the world There
is plenty of room for speculation about the long range consequences of nationalism..

Technology may significantly alter the main characteristics of international systems. We

have already noted how improvements in military technology helped to end the reign of
Greek city-states in the three centuries before Christ. The application of Chinese chemists
to cannons through the medium of gunpowder similarly rendered the European medieval
walled city obsolete, and thus proved an important factor in helping monarchs centralize
power and develop the modern state. E

In our era, the development of weapons of mass destmction has fundamentally altered
calculations about the costs and advantages of war Throughout modern European history,
and indeed in most historic civilizations, war was commonly regarded as just one of
many means of defending and achieving the objectives of political communities. in an era
when war can lead. to mutual suicide. as was the came of Cold War relations, the
rationality of armed combat begins to erode. Even the use of limited force over a
marginal issue runs the risk of escalation and nuclear exchanges. Nuclear weapons have
been, then. instruments not only of deterrence against an adversary but also of self
deterrence. Unfortunatch

rtroduction to the Contempora~

88

the greater costs and risks of war do not render it obsolete, but it is ienifiUut that since
1946 there has not been a major power war (Korea as a marginal exception). whereas
prior to World War II, such wars were regular feature of the European landscape.

Technology may have a more subtle affect on war as a major yccurrence between states.
Throughout history, political units, whether empires, city-states, or nomadic tribes. have
expanded territorially. They have done so for a varies of reasons, but paramount among
these was the search for an increased tax base. A larger population and resources base can
be exploited for revenues to pay administrative and military costs and often the opulence
of central governments. Some territonv also held important strategic value: mountain
passes. naval straits, river valleys, and the like.

Today the bases of national strength. wealth, and prestige reside

less in territory than in science and technology. Wealth comes more from brain power
than from land. Territon- I itself means little, except where it continues to maintain
strategic significance. We see many states that are richly endowed with territory (Central
African Republic. Chad, Sudan) but are in no sense wealthy; strong, or prestigious. I
contrast, Japan with only the territorial dimensions of California, has the world’s highest
living

standards. These
were achieved through education, science, technology and trade. and not through
territorial expansion. Thus. one of the oldest causes of war the control over territory has
altered significantly during the past century or so. One of the classical features of the
European based

international system dating from the mid-seventeenth century, namely war between its
members, has drastically changed. Among the industrial states. we can no longer argue
that war is one of its characteristic forms of interaction. Rousseau’s security dilemma is
rarely to be seen in Western Europe. North America and Southeast Asia.

Technology- has also aided in the growth and proliferation of nonstate actors and their
capabilities. This may be an important sources of change for states and their interactions
and weapons technology, thus providing them with considerable political leverage. Drug
cartels. transitional ”liberation” movements. and crime organizations can effectively
challenge governments and ether nonstate actors. The drug

cartels in Colombia. for example, have seriously corroded that countr<-’s government’s
abiliy to maintain organizations run massive transitional economic enterprises. launder
the profits of criminal activities. and move their operations from county to Collntll as
constraints and opportunities arise. Their ability to protect and expand turf is intimately
linked to access 1° ’liqdcrn weapons and communications facilities. Some organizations
’°’~S’~nn~ essentially a ”state within a state.’ and it is not inconceivable

11w, IF ’’ I

International Relations

that eventually some formal sovereign states will be little more than ”front” for highly
organized criminal groups.

The globalization of the worlds economy is another developmc ,,

.that is likely to have significant changes in the structure and processes :”; . the
international system over coming years. We have already noted hov., transitional
processes weaken or reduce the authority . of modern governments. Because capital,
talent, and resources can move aloaosl instantaneously to wherever there are
opportunities, state decision makers are less able to control their own economies. How
does this afI’cct international relationships? For one thing. it forces governments to
collaborate whereas they might prefer to ”go it alone”. The Ameri~,a 1, government
cannot reduce interest rates as a means of stinnilatfirg
domestic investment if other important industrial countries maintaur ~ higher rates. Think
of yourself as an investor. If you own $10.000 worth of
American government bonds paying annual interest of 5 percent, while f similar bonds in
Germane are paying 8 percent, you would cash in your ~
American bonds and purchase their counterparts in Germany. Now if several million
people did that simultaneously. it would create problems in the United States in the form
of lowering the value of the currency aa~ increasing the U.S national debt, among other
things. So these nnriualiv dependent governments are forced to cajole. compromise,
bargain, amc coerce until their main domestic economic policies are more or less
synchronized.

What the effects of economic globalization are on international politics remains a matter
of some debate, however. Some argue that tire interconnectedness of economies mutes
conflict, and certainly diminishes the risk of war. One reason that the United States, for
example, has riot exercised more coercion against Japan is the fear that if diplomatic
tensions increase too notch, thousands of Japanese investors in the United States would
pull to, thus causing serious economic dislocation. including unemployment, in America.
Following the thought of nineteenth centres liberals, ntanv obsewers today are convinced
that increased trade and 611-globalization ) of the economy are ”mighty engines of
peace.” to quote British Prime Ministgr John Major. Others argue with equal conviction
that economic interconnectedness increases conflicts between governments and societies,
particularly during eras of economic downturn or stagnation. They quarrel over trade,
they resort to overt or hidden protectionism, and occasionally they adopt competitive
practices that verge on trade ears.

James N. Roseau has argued that mass education has also had profound effects on the
nature; of international politics. Citi~ensytround the world ore becoming increasingly
competent as litcracv rates riser and as ,~annntmicalions facilities reach to tire world’s
b.rckwa&si Informed

Introduction to the Contemporary 90

citizens cannot be fooled by self-serving elites and despots. Societies can tto longer be
sealed off by walls, barbed-wire fences, or radio jamming. Ntore people today know
more about the outside world than ever before. And as they increase their knowledge.
they also increase their political skills. These can be used to constrain governments from
totalitarian practices, from undertaking foreign adventures (or at least from sustaining
them over long periods), and from systematicaly distorting the troth. Liberal theory has
long held that the ordinary people of the world generally

want peace; it is governments that lead nations to war. In an age of universal literacy-
another fifty years should achieve that goal-and increased popular activism, dictators,
despots, and international predators will pay a high price for unpopular policies.

Whether or not one

agrees with this analysis depends on one’s view of human nature. Perverted forms of
nationalism are not held only be governments. The practices of ”ethnic cleansing” remind
us that under certain circumstances people are quite happy to kill their neighbors. Wars
are not just launched by top officials. There are, for better or worse, plenty of ”popular”
wars remaining with us. and roam’ of them arc organized. aided, led. and forgot by
ordinary people.

Although we could expand the list of factors that are changing some of the main
characteristics of the contemporary international system, it is better for the reader to
propose his or her own candidates. There is, however, one final candidate. It is the
change in our conceptions of sovereignty.

In discussing national is, we suggested that the drive for statehood among diverse
communities (mostly ethnic) was helping to proliferate the

number of state and nonstate actors in the international system. The forces of political
fragmentation are powerful. Yet, once statehood has been achieved, it is becoming
increasingly permeable. Once a society could hide behind the legal shield of sovereignty
and the physical seals of frontiers ` and iron curtains. How, a government dealt with ’its
population was not
matter that could be easily monitored or changed by other governments. To insist
otherevise was to bring forth the charge of interference in the internal affairs of the state,
another important Westphalian concept.

But as norms governing human rights become internationalized, there is the slowly
evolving view that the internal affairs of a state, if the
abuses are too systematic and widespread, may become the legitimate concern of other
sates. Sovereignty, in other words. is conditional upon meeting minimal standards of
human rights observations. Hence. few-denounced the United Nations-United States
efforts to protect Kurds and Shiites against Saddam Hussein’s army by imposing ”no-fly”
zones ’in the 110 the and south of Iraq. Iraqis claimed this was a major violation of the

International Relations 91

principle of sovereignty. and indeed it was. Similarly, many countries imposed economic
sanctions against South Africa on the grounds that apartheid constituted a fundamental
denial of human rights. South. Africa protested. using the noninterference rule (which is
also enshrined in the United Nations charter), yet to no avail.

But a few instances of international action to protect populations at risk (usually,

minorities) in violation of the sovereignty doctrine do not yet add up to common practice.
In many instances of systematic abuse of citizens
by governments (Idi Amin’s Uganda in the 1970s, Pol Pot’s massacres in Kampuchea in
the late 1970s, and the like) the world community, did almost nothing. Individual
governments did take some actions, but there was no general consensus among them to
take effective measures on the behalf of victims. It is too early, to say. them. that a
definite trend in the erosion of the sovereignty concept has developed yet. The direction
is there, but not always the political consensus or will to act.

Readers will note throughout the discussion oblique references to the five models of
international politics introduced in the first chapter. Our contemporary international
system contains many, of the elements of the realist vision (formal anarchy among
sovereign states, the persistence of war and security dilemmas in some areas of the world;
the society of states view (many, ”rules of the game.” the club-like features, including
mechanisms for ostracizing those who do not follow the rules, and the many, bonds that
tie societies together); pluralist-interdependence models (the significance of nonstate
actors, economic mutual dependence); dependency models (the growing gap between
living conditions in the north and south, the persistence of asymmetrical economic ties)”
and world society models (increasing similarities of lifestyles thanks to global
communications, the erosion of the sovereignty principle). Our world is made up of
many,complepatterns of interaction, and trends with contradictory or mixed
consequences. Communications for example ma’ enhance mutual understanding, but they
can also whip up frenzies of nationalist fears or hatreds for. ”others”. National, in so far
as it helps communities seek statehood, perpetuates the Westphanliam system but when it
takes the form of secession or persecution. of minorities. it invites ~nreign intervention
and thus erodes the principle of sovereignty. one of the . ornerstones of that system.

This chapter has sought to be suggestive. not definitive. Readers

;ould try their hand at adding other factors of stability and change. or tsing out some of
the further implications of the trends discussed above.

By now it should be clear that the international system. which is

:imagined concept (you cannot see it or touch it), does have an impact on
”,:IN states behave toward each other. The concept of sovereignty. for

pntduction to the Contemporary 92

example, presupposes that most countries most of the time will tolerate the c~istcnce of
their neighbors and others. If countries wish to trade, allow their citizens to travel,
exchange diplomats, and join international organizations. they have to accept many rules
of the game and
custom established over past centuries. In a system dominated by two contending
Military alliances, smaller states enjoy little latitude of choice; if they challenge the
hegemonies, as did the Hungarians in 1956 or the Nicaraguans in the 1980s. they will pay
a high price. Globalizcd economic activity has a deep impact on all countries.

CHAPTER 5

THE SYSTEM THEORY

The systems theory is the result of the behavioural revolution u social sciences. it
developed out of the anxiety of the new social scienusn to evolve a general body of
knowledge be integrating the various disciplines of social sciences. There has been no
unanimity among scholar regarding the meaning of a system. Hall and Fagen defined the
system as ”a set of objects together with relationship between the objects and between the
attributes.” Colin Cherry defined it as a whole which is compounded of many parts in an
ensemble of attributes. The systems theon- has beer applied in various disciplines and
assigned a variety of meanings and definitions. ,

The Systems or General Systems Theory

The general system theory is based on the assumption that ther.° are certain features of
relationship that are common to systems of all kinds In other words a system connotes
relationships between units or its various components.

In the recent years efforts have been made to study international relations in the contest
of systems analysis. Those who believe in this approach are of the view that a scientific
study of international relation can be made only if the relevant material is treated in terms
of system action. The study of the actions of the parts of a political system can be made
in terms of an analysis of the actions of participating units. Their assumption is that there
is a system in international relations. The nation` (states) being its parts involved in the
process of interaction as each nation (a unit) is in constant contact with the whole or the
internationn’ environment. It shows therefore, that each system besides being a svsten

~y~tem THeory
9-1

can be a sub-system in relation to a larger system. A nation’s behavior is ”a t`s.o way

activity of taking from and giving to the international environment.”
It may be noted that international system came into existence with the emergence of the
modern European State systems. In the earlier period no doubt, state system existed but
these systems were limited to certain yell defined areas like Greece, Italy, China and
India and a universal scstem was absent.

The scholars have assigned different meanings to the concept of systems and used it in
different senses. Firstly. the system is described as an arrangement
of international actors in which interactions could be identified. Secondly as explanation
it is referred to as particular arrangement in which the nature of the arrangement itself is
considered the most important variable in explaining the behaviour of states. Thirdly,
system is used in the sense of application of special.ypes of approaches (methods) to the
study of international politics.

James N.Rosenau represents the first usage. According to him ”a system is considered to
exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which through interaction are in
relation to each other.” The use of the term in this sense is made to describe the pattern of
action among international actors. It does not posses much of theoretical value.
In the second sense the term is used to convey that the world is divided into a number of
national entities possessed of sovereignty which affects the nature of international
relations. With no system of law enforceable among these sovereign states. conflicts
leading to war are bound to occur. Kenneth Waltz. Kenneth Bounding and Charles
McClelland have used the concept in this sense.

In the third sense. system is the application of special types of approaches to the study of
international relations. The system as method refers to particular approach adopted for
bringing about a theoretical order in the vast data of international politics or relations.
The system is `used as a tool of analysis and focus is upon arrangement of actors,
interaction of actors or recurring pattern of individual behaviour. Thus system analysis in
terms of method makes international politics to be viewed as a system in the meaning of
system as explanation. In other words it means that there can be no use of system as
method without prior commitment to certain assumptions. Therefore. it is necessary that
there should be complete a~lareness of all the premises, e.g. ideological preferences
which involve assumptions about the influence of values on human behaviour.

The system thebr< or general systems theory was first expounded b! McClelland in 19».
Later it was developed by many other scholars but

International Relations y;

the theory was presented in a most systematic manner by Morton Kaph, who declared
that systems approach provides the only possible meth, which can ensure the
development of scientific politics. Therefore, it shat be appropriate to discuss Morton
Kaplan’s theon_- in detail.

Morton Kaplan’s Theory System

Morton A. Kaplan, in an influential book reflecting the scientif, orientation, presented a

very useful array of real and hypothetical models, global political organization. The
discussion that follows is indebted q’
Kaplan’s work. In it, we refer to some of Kaplan’s models, leave other out, and include
some models not discussed in his book. Kaplan’s work ha, been criticized for presenting
a series of rigid and imaginary mternatioN systems that he claims have existed in the past
or may be encouraged llltlt~ future. Real life probably cannot be classified according to
compact lnodeli that consistently obey different rules and that posses fixed and
identifiabl;l attributes. However. we have found it quite useful to employ these model

in the classroom, because they help the student recognize that the presc!
structure of the international system is not timeless, that it has chang;,
over time, and that it will more than likely experience a number of chajhe
in the future. `

1. The Oligopolar (or Classical Balance-of-Power) Model

The period from 1815 to 191:1, according to Kaplan, is th,

historical counterpart of this model. The classical balance of power ntod: operates best
when the international system includes at least five 1nnJc powers and no regional or
universal international organizations (such; the European Colnrrlunitv and the United
Nations).” Alliances in Ili system tend to be specific and short in duration and they tend
to shill c the basis of pragmatic rather than ideological advantage. Wars bwke~ major
powers tend to be limited. Wars involving minor powers are r.: allowed to escalate and
are settled in a fashion that is compatible with i interests of the major powers.
International law is quite opcrrit” (primarily in the area of law of war) because its rules,
which arc accepU1l’ to the heads of the major powers, are habitually practiced. Kaplan
feels th. the classical balance of power was exemplified by nineteenth celllu’ European
international political behavior. By his own definition, lie do~ not expect it to occur again
as long as nuclear weapons continue to N the possession of major powers and as long as
world organizations sli~ll

tile United Nations continue.

We disagree with Kaplan on two counts: First. it is possible fe’ balance of power style of
behavior to exist in all international envirowl~ where a limited number of great powers
possess nuclear weapons :slid, not rise them except as deterrents to total nuclear war.
Great pc objectives call remain cautious and marginal under a mutually ncutrall

system Theory

9C

;h as the „.._.__ ______.., _... specialized agencies, anti regional groupings such as the
East European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the European Community and
the Organization of American States does not prevent the basic and informal rules of the
balance of power system f
2. The Loose
Bipolar Model

This model. also called the cold war model, characterizes the history of our globe from
approximately 1947 to 1971. The loose bipolar model operates when the international
system has two superpowers. Each of these superpowers acts as all ally, protector, and
even controller of a number of weaker nation states that belong to its bloc. There are also
some peripheral nation states that are not aligned with either bloc. The major blocs tend
to abide by and to transmit uncompromising and mutually exclusive ideologies and to
function with drastically different magnitude that the adoption by one bloc of the political
system of the other Would call for the replacement of the ruling elite’s and alter the
existing distribution states in contrast; are characterized by a variety of ideologies and
governmental systems.

rom operating.

Kaplan emphasizes the importance of nuclear weapons in this type of system. He

suggests that bipolariy is a function of the possession of credible nuclear arsenals by the
two bloc leaders, the United States and the Soviet Union. We less rigid than Kaplay argue
that bipolarity after World War II would have developed regardless of nuclear weapons
and that it ”War have been a fimetion of the overwhelming economic, industrial and
conventional militay capabilities of the two superpowers.

Unlike the classical balance of power model, there loose bipolar model calls for long time
highly formal and institutionalized alliances based on interests that arc perceived as
permanent and that are couched in ideological terms. Given the high level of
govenimentallv encouraged psychological hostility, wars in this system would tend to. be
total and nlleomprOllIlSlllg one political economic systems would be destroyed by the

other. The mutual destructiveness of the nuclear weapons available to-both

blocs has however, kept hostilities below the level of total nlilitan-
confrontation. -

The Tight Bipolar Model

There is no historical counterpart to -this model. according to Kaplan. and we shall not
elaborate mulch in it. Its major assumption is that all Nonaligned nation states are
absorbed into one bloc or the other. The

nNCOnlpronlising hostility in regard to ideology and security is much the s`” lie as in
loose bipolar model, except that it is now extended throughout ~I’c World. The tight
bipolar model can best be envisioned as a world

lnterrfational Relations 9
cleanly divided into two major empires, one headed by Washington and the other by
Moscow. Each metropolis seeks to maintain tight control over its allies and to sustain
high level hostility- toward the other empire. This
model could also develop into a less conflictive variant described Is ”doubly.” In this
system the two superpowers would formally agree to play respective spheres and in the
maintenance of the international system so as to serge their respective interests.

4. The Unit-Veto (or Nuclear Proliferation) Model

This model fortunately up to this point has no historical counterpart. It depicts a highly
unstable and potentially deadly style of international intercourse. It envisages an
international system in which most states possess relatively credible nuclear weapon
capabilities which they can use to discourage other states from pursuing unfriendly
policies toward them. Thus any one of over a hundred separate political entities could
trigger nuclear warfare and cause global catastrophe. This model if it came to pass would
create the kind of climate that would exist among a number of unfriendly and mutually
suspicious people finding themselves on a large vacant each wanting to take the vessel to
different parts of the ;world and use it for different purposes. These people cannot ever
resolve their disagreements because each of them has immediate access to a buttoi; that if
pushed will blow the boat and all its passengers to pieces. Each can therefore threaten all
the others with collective suicide unless his or her will is respected. The chances of
destruction through miscalculation. irrationality, obstinacy-, or accident are extremely
high in such a system.

Fearing an accidental unclear confrontation resulting from a misunderstanding states

would tend to limit their contacts in a unit veto system thus minimizing the exchange of
goods, people and services across national boundaries. There could be conventional wars.
because any war. once erupted, would most probably escalate to the nuclear level. The
unit veto system could assume even more dreaded proportions if substantial actors were
to possess nuclear weapons and crude but effective means of delivering them. Such actors
could be terrorist liberation groups. criminal organizations (such as the Mafia),
multinational corporations- ethnic or racial minorities. or demented individuals wishing
to cause large scale harm to their fellow human beings.

It should be clear by now that a unit veto system would seriously press the leaders of
nation-states to accept some form of centralized global onthoritv an authority with the
power to appropriate all nuclear weapons or destroy totally nuclear stockpiles. The
question is whether a nuclear dcaclent will occur before national leaders become pressed
enough to re,i1W tli;a the risk of general nuclear war has become a tomll1 wmcCchtable
option.
System Theory
5. The Collective Security Model

This is an ideal model (with no historical counterpart). The best Way to visualize it is to
think in terms of the United Nations working according to the lofty, ideals of its founders.
The collective securiri- model calls for a voluntary system to regulation. In this system,
military force as an instrument of policy is forbidden; there are no alliances, either short
term or long term; and aggression by one state against any other is punished by economic
and military sanctions imposed collectively by all other states. Over time, therefore, this
system could be a relatively peaceful one. 1n an environment of collective in settling
international disputes peacefully.

The collective security system has been criticized as being too idealistic and impractical.
it is based on a primitive structure similar to that of the balance of power system. Yet it
expects nation states and their governments to abide by moral and legal restrictions -
voluntarily. rather than out of respect or fear of centralized world authorities. It also
assumes that states will agree consistently on the definition and the interpretation of

aggression and that they will be willing to defend any other state being aggressed against
regardless of their own national interests. The collective security- system, further, expects
the United Nations to function effectively

security system is unrealistic because its implementation would require nation states,
which exist now in what is fundamentally a decentralized, balance of power system, to
refrain from entering into alliances or other, less formal political arrangements.

b. The Multibloc (or Interregional) Model

This model, which would also fit in the Oligopolar category. mes in two varieties. The
first. portrays a world divided into five to seven utually exclusive sphere of influence.
Each of these spheres would consist
hierarchy of countries controlled by one of the world’s major powers. ajors powers would
institutionalize their respective spheres of influence means of security-political
organizations of the NATO and Warsaw Pact riey. Each of the major powers would
refrain from interfering in the ternal affairs” of any of the other spheres of influence.

The second variant of the Multibloc model would result from

ccessful economic and political integration efforts within the inhabited ntinents of our
earth. This variant envisions a world organized into large
d autonomous integrated regions, such as North America. South erica. Western Europe,
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Africa, e Middle East, and various difficult. to
forecast regional arrangements Involving South and Southeast
Asia, East Asia, and Oceanic. Following gradual economic and political integration
within these regions. the

98

. 99

Intemational Relations

distribution of global power will be radically affected. Mobile and transcontinental

national powers will no longer exist.

7. The National-Fragmentation (or Multipolar) Modd

system Theory
9. The Hierarchical (or Monopolar) Model
This model clearly falls outside the family of decentralized
Here we mast imagine processes of political and territorial political
systems that is. systems relying on a balance of over for
disintegration at work in states multiplying geometrically the units of
p
political action. Ethnic, tribal racial, and economic separatist movements
could challenge seriously the political cohesiveness of polytechnic,
multilingual, multireligious, multiracial, or unevenly developed states.
Contemporary separatist movements in Canada. Yugoslavia. Ulster,
Cyprus, Belgium, Spain, Nigeria, and Turkey could be emulated b~
separatists elements in many other countries such as the United States the
USSR, China, Brazil, India. Indonesia. Sudan, and Australia. It would be
plausible, then that a process of global political and economic integration
would fast undergo a phase of fragmentation of the existing national
states, especially those with a disproportionately large amount of power
and wealth. The fragmentation of nation states presumably would
eliminate the resistance to a transformation of the existing international
system into a system of world government. On the other hand, it would
entail imponderable in level and intensity civil and inter national conflicts.
8. The Post-Nuclear War Model
Here we must visualize our earth after a catastrophic nuclear war
As many as half a billion people could perish as a result of the explosions.
heat, and radiation. But that would not be all. Transportation.
communications, and industrial production would grind to a halt. Entire
regions of the earth would be contaminated with nuclear fallout. Diseased
and mained people would be scrambling frantically for shelter, food, and
medication. The fear of contamination would drive healthy citizens to tree
potentially diseased ones as vermin to be quarantined or exterminated. Tli.
sight of heaps of mangled and scalded human bodies, the debris of fallen
buildings, the scorched earth, the stench of death, and the howling of th~
dying could all have totally unpredictable psychological consequences upon
the survivors. Following the immediate effects, the deathly coldness o
”nuclear winter” will set in. In such a nightmarish situation only the mop
tyrannical regimes would be able
to maintain enough order for III-
distribution not wish upon our medical treatment. This is a system that v
certainly do not wish upon our children and grandchildren. But beyon~
wishes,.it is important that we quickly develop effective safeguards again`
the madness of a total nuclear war and a world in which the living v’
envy the dead.

10()

regr1lition) that we have been discussing so far in this section. As its name „plies. this
model describes a pyramidal system of international regulation that could best be
achieved through world government. Such a eocernment could be based on federal and
democratic principles and could e,olve from the rudimentary institutions of the United
Nations. It could on the other hand. result from conquest and control of the globe by a
single power. The Roman Empire, which resulted from the military conquests of

the Romans is a rough example of this type of system. Had Napoleon succeeded in his
expansionist objectives. or had Adolph Hitler won World War II. the outcome might have
been a worldwide version of authoritarian government. A hierarchical system could
develop in the future if the United States. the Soviet Union, or a third power were to
prevail upon the remaining superpowers. The hierarchical system. whether democratic or
authoritarian’. would not necessarily be vew stable in the long run. It would undoubtedly
suffer from separatist tendencies, which could degenerate into i dead( global ”civil war,”.

CHAPTER 6

DECISION-MAKING

The decision making approach to the study of internatiol: relation broadens the scope of
foreign policy analysis. It places indiNidu~; « ithin different social contests. and it views
their decisions or outcomes a function of those contexts. As James Robinson and Richard
Snyder put ”the main purpose of inquiries about decision making processes is determine
whether and how decision process affects the content of dccisr outcome.” To put it
another way. the decision making approach concerned with different external stimuk that
influence the deCISIC

making process and the decision itself. It seeks to determine whether <~esto quote
Robinson and Snyder, ”different combinations of situliic’

individuals, and organizations produce different policies.”

There are numerous decision-making approaches. One. should be familiar because it

contains the same basic parameters ~~’ assumptions that are the central theme of this
book. tries to build th0r’-concerning the interaction of variables in a decision situation. 1-
I’` decision theories attempt to define the variables -not only carefull” ” operationally. It
is an approach that collects information on indepe»` variables thought to affect
the final decision or the decision process trend.

In recent years. however. increasing interest has futures analysis of decision-making

models, which. although often related theories, are for the most part much ”looser” and
less rigorous. In sl’ this drawback, they help to establish the parameters of decision-W
and bring into the open contrasting assumptions about how deoisio made. Consequently.
they present different broad-scale explanatil decision.

Decision Malting
102

For our purposes a model will be a yen general picture of how decisions are made; it will
be concerned with overall processes of decision-making. Each model possesses quite
different assumptions about those processes, and therefore each paints a different picture
of hoc individuals nr,ke decisions resulting in foreign policy. Decision-making theory.
ho„ ,ever, is more concerned with specific hypotheses predicting the outcome of decision
processes. The distinction is not a perfect one. for hypotheses are involved in decision-
making models. and decision-making theories rely on different models. Nonetheless, it
will the important to understand the diligence between theories arid models in terms of
have and that they explain.

Before turning to the decision-making models. a word is necessary oil the ”rationality” of
decisions. Whenever .Nc attempt to analyze decisions made by national leaders, this
question arises: it decisions are in part irrational, how can anyone hope to analyze them
systematically as if they were rational? Sidney Verbal has dealt with the question and
convincingly suggests that the ”nonlogical” model-that decision are a function of
nonlogical as opposed to logical reasons-probably does not suffice as the model of
foreign policy decision-making. and that, therefore, it most likely does not account for a
large number of decisions in international politics. Because of that he suggests the use of
what he terms the ”logical” model, ii,hich ir, turn resembles one of the models to be
considered in the next section. They point here is that the time-worn attack on those
trying to analyze foreign policy decision--that Such tasks are impossible because such
decisions are likely a function of irrational decision-makers--does not apply to most
decisions or decision-making.

Decision-making models

Decision-making as a distinct type of analysis came into its own during the 1950s. It is
riot a new form of analysis. -of course. for scholars have always analyzed decisions. They
have always relied on-usually implicit-models, although they may not have graced their
analyzes with that term. Perhaps the oldest type of decision model is the strictly historical
description
of a decision, in which decision-makers are portrayed as acting iVithin loosely defined
environments that impinge on them, forcing them to establish their goals and act on them.
The primary emphasis has been on description. and the explanation seems to flow from
the description itself. As *1 result, multitudes of historical case studies of decision have
been produced. Thus, one type of model consists primarily of a description of ~v’ents. It
often includes hypotheses and linkages, though not necessarily e’plicitlv.

International Relations

SNYDER

In 1954 Snyder and his colleagues proposed what at the time ;, _, viewed by many, as a
revolutionary idea into he study of foreign poll,”’., decisions. They suggested that
political scientists learn from their fell, social scientists in economics and. public
administration and recognize tl;; decisions are a type of behavior or process. that while
decisions do evllib.. some differences, there are substantial, comparable similarities.

Snyder had to make some simplifying assumptions, namely, ti,,,, the de jury decision-
makers were in fact the ones making the decision; and that those decisions were the
important and authoritative ones. If otl;,, individuals were making the decisions, but did
not possess tile authoril t, do so, they were excluded from the analysis. Snyder and his
associate; focused on the decisions as the group members saw it. In short. the wanted to
analyze the decision, not evaluate it.

The Snyder model represented nothing substantively new: ill, difference rested in
viewing it as an approach to compare decisions, and„ establishing quite specifically the
dimensions along which decisions very variable ”clusters” that were considered to be the
determinate of decision. making behavior. The first, called ”spheres of competence,”
constituted the characteristics of a decision-making organization or unit-whether it waa
tight or loose, formal or informal; whether it had the abili,y to change. what its level of
bureaucratization might be. The ”communication and information” cluster pertained to
the communication networks within an organization--who communicates with whom;
how they do it: what blocs exist in communication; how much information comes from
outside the unit; how flexible the unit is in accepting it. Finally, the closer called
”motivation”, which to Snyder was admittedly a ”ball of snakes.” related to the objectives
of the entire decision-making unit, the norms and values of those within the unit, and any
values of the community.

Needless to say, the Snyder scheme was almost all-inclusive. In fact, one of the
continuing criticisms leveled
at the design has been its umvorkability. Rather than providing a useful tool for reducing
the complexly of decision-making processes in order to compare them. the Snyder model
requires the retention of almost all of the original historical data. Only one major study-of
the U.S. decision to respond to due No1dl Korean invasion of South Korea in 1960--has
been carried out using it. and was conducted by Glenn Paige. On analysis. Paige’s study
turns out to be quite revealing for more than 250 pages of the 356 page manuscript are
devoted to recapturing the historical conditions of the era as well as a da”~ by-day
account of the actual decision. Though Snyder considered the three variable clusters as
”factors which determine the choice of.. decision-rrakers.” Page presents a series of five
hypothesis clusters all revolving

WMMW1 WWI

pecision Making 104

around the effect of ”crisis” on the three variables suggested by Snyder.
These clusters, then, become dependent on the level of crisis and are not
thought of as the determinants of decision-making.

In spite of these problems, Snyder’s scheme was a rather sharp break format he then
prevalent historical model because it suggested abstracting the common elements of
decisions. Decision-making studies in foreign policy before that time had never explicitly
done that. The Snyder mod-proposed that decision could be analyzed as a type of
behavior, that similar determinants might be respoiisible for a wide array of decisions,
and that those determinants could be studied in a systematic way. It also focused to some
degree on decisions as the result of a rationalized process.

SIMON AND LINDBLOM ’

Basic to conceiving of decisions as ’a rational process (not, it shoiid be noted, necessarily

producing rational decision, whatever they may be) is the psychological model of
”.rational man,” in which goals are established and then means found to maximize them.
Herbert Simon, however, suggested that men do not go about maximizing their goals.
given the great difficulty of making decisions-merely ”satisfying” them, a term he uses to
describe the process of considering alternatives sequentially, or incrementally, until one
comes along that seems to meet certain requirements. The ideal of rationally processing
alternatives according to some criteria until the best one is found seems to be contradicted
by much of what we see every day, even in our own lives.
Charles Lindblom likewise questioned what he called the ”rational-comprehensive”
model, arguing that not only do individuals not follow that process lists the assumptions
underlying the rationalized process along with the alternative model that
Liridhbloms suggested, called the ”successive limited comparison” model.

A rationalized process implies that decision-makers establish their goals first, and then
consider all the alternative open to them. The ”best Policy or decision, then, emerges
from the many alternatives as the one most ideally suited to reach the desired end. in
other words, the analysis is comprehensive because all factors are taken into account. Just
as image theory was called the ”normal” individual model of international relations. The
rational comprehensive model can be called the ”normal” decision-making model
because most people like to think they make decisions iri just this ”rational” way. But
Lindblom made the rather startling--although In retrospect quite perceptive and probably
accurate-suggestion that we rarely make decisions according to the rational-
comprehensive model. Rather, humans more often rely on a ”successive limited
comparison” model in which means and goals are intertwined, and in which the goals are
often affected by the desirability of specific means. The ”best” policy.

International Relations

------------
moreover, is now not necessarily the one most able to realize the goal, ~~;t rather the one
the decision-makers feel they can finally agree on. Most importantly, of course, is the
assertion, following Simon, that hum<<rv beings are not capable of analyzing vast
amounts of information ark therefore many possible outcomes as well possible
alternatives are ofte; simply not considered.

The successive limited comparison model suggests that makin„ decisions is often a very
costly-process, one, therefore, that may be put off even if information is high and many
alternatives are possible. Indeed, it is dust when information is extremely high and
alternatives are numero,j; that the human decision-making system begins to break down
frons woverload.” Humans tend to eliminate alternatives, not because some are bad but
because they simply cannot handle more than a small number of them at once. They deal
with decisions, that is, one at a time incrementally, successively. They often cannot see
the long-range implications of making the small, incremental decisions they face even
day. This way of going about making a decision may not appear to be the most
”rational”; nonetheless, most people will recognize here their own behaviour pattern.
Moreover, one scholar has even advocated that complex decisions should be broken up
and make incrementally.

ALLISON

More recently Graham Allison has suggested that the foreign policy literature, on
decision-making actually constrains three quite distinct models. In most instances,
however, he points out that
they are not recognized as distinct nor are their parameters and assumptions made it.

Allison’s First Model

Allison’s first model, the ”rational policy” model, resembles and blom’s rational-
comprehensive model. and is the ”normal” model of fc:reign policy decisions. It asserts
drat important events have important causes; that monolithic units perform large actions
for big, important reasons; and that in any loreign policy decision situation a purpose or
intention exists that must be explained, that is, actions that a state chooses ’ire calculated
ones directly responsive that is, actions that a state chooses are calculated ones directly,
’responsive to the large strategic problem the state faces. Ultimately, the model asserts
that a sufficient explanation of the state’s decision consists in showing whit goal the state
was pursuing through its action. Thus state action is understood in terms of decision
makers’ rationally planning and executing a policy for large-scale reasons. -i hese
important actions do not merely ”happen.” Decision-making must h,me had
overwhelming reasons for executing them.

pecision Matting

106

Allison’s second model

Is the ”organizational process” model, and it bears some resemblance to Lindblom’s

limited successive comparison model. Government are large organization, with fixed sets
of procedures, and their behavior is dependent on these procedures. Organizations do
change, but their greater propensity is to retain certain tendencies and routines, which
permit them to reduce the uncertainty in their environment. All large org,mizations must
have rules so they are not caught off-guard. Anyone who has dealt with these
organizations--the army, General, Motors. universities, passport offices, the telephone
company, Internal Revenue Service-has stories to tell of their intransigence, the very
characteristic that forces an organization to act today as much as possible like the way in
which it was acting yesterday. The significance of the organizational model is that even
in the area of foreign affairs, where we often assume presidents and prime ministers have
complete control, the organizations narrow their alternatives for them.

The third model

Offered by Allison is the ”bureaucratic politics” model, which also resembles a

nonrationalized perspective. Decisions under this model result from bargaining and
compromise with in the decisional unit. Each bureaucratic ”player” has different
perceptions and priorities, and each vies for power, promotion, and retention of his own
position even after the crisis has passed. The policy problems that the historian isolates
with hindsight, then, are different from those facing
the members of the political unit making the decision.

As noted earlier models represent generalized views of how decisions are made: Each
constitutes a different way of explaining decision. The overlap between the different
authors is’ high; Lindblom’s rational-comprehensive model resembles Allison’s rational
process model; his successive limited comparison model more closely fits Allison’s
second and third models: and all three are at least indirect offshoots from Simon’s earlier
work on organizational processes. Before elucidating the models through two case
studies, some mention must be made of the problems of evidence in utilizing
decision~making models.

Measurement

Decision making models do not focus on testing specific hypotheses and the ”variables”
they employ are much looser than we would prefer. The ”measurement” of these models,
therefore, is problematic, and an evaluation of competing models presents severe
problems. .

The greatest drawback in any decision making study is access to

material. The amount of legwork done by Allison in his study of the Cuban

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Missile Crisis, which are turn to in the next section, is an illustration of this handicap.
Because few criteria exist for what is necessary information in these studies, the
sentiency is to gather as much minutia as possible, and string it all together in
chronological sequence with the hope that out of the plethora of data an explanation will
somehow emerge.

The very looseness of the concepts (organizational process. ”bureaucratic polities”)

moreover, creates further problems of dat;i gathering. Generalized concepts abound, but
few specific concepts have been proposed. Consequently, everything plausible is thrown
under a kind of conceptual tent. Needless to say, this creates a certain laxity about what
exactly is being demonstrated with what evidence.

Even so. despite these very real and limiting problems, some attempts must be made to
go beyond the mere presentation of plausible explanations or models. One method, to be
proposed in the concluding section of this chapter, is to think about models in
competitive terms, and to evaluate one against the other. In this connection, three
questions might be kept in mind as we proceed to discuss the case studies that follow.
First. what are the assumptions of each of the models, and how realistic are they? The
more realistic assumptions namely those that are more likely to be true in a given
situation, are preferable. Second, does the evidence that supports one model also tend to
support another? the evidence, as noted, is not always as clearly spelled out as we would
like, and sometimes can be interpreted
to support more than one model. Finally, what types of behavior do the models purport to
explain? We will find, particularly in Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis that the
different models are actually applied to different decisions and therefore are not strictly
competitors.

Variables of Decision Making

James N. Rosenau, a prolific scholar with a scientific orientation, has offered us a handy
guide designed to aid our search for variables that affect the making of foreign policy.
Rosenau has grouped these variables into five major categories: idiosyncratic, role,
bureaucratic, national, and systemic.

Idiosyncratic (Individual) Variables

These variables are concerned with the perceptions images, and personal characteristics
of decision makers: cautiousness versus raxhness. anger versus prudence, pragmatism
versus ideological crusadism, superiority versus inferiority, creativeness versus
destructiveness, paranoia versus overconfidence and so on. Undeniably, the
psychological characteristics and the ideological predilections of leaders and other
makers and implementers of policy have a certain bearing on policy

pecision Walking outcomes. However. the variables that are related to these
characteristics are very difficult to measure. For instance, do variables such as the martial
status type and quality of education, social origin of parents. financial status, and
influential friends affect the decisions that a leader makes?

The psychiatrist Erich From has concluded from a study of selected political leaders that
wartime heads of government, such as Adolf Hitler or to a lesser extent. Winston
Churchill. are often fascinated by destruction. One might ask: What would have been the
impact on German. British relations (and on history in general) had Hitler become a
successful architect and Churchill a fine journalist. novelist or artist? A more direct
version of this question is: What was the impact of each one’s personality upon his or her
countn’s foreign policies Charismatic leaders such as Kemal Ataturk, V.I. Lenin John F.
Kennedy. Marshal Tito, Francisco Franco Constantine Karamanlis. Indira Gandhi.’Anwar
Sadat, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Juan Person, Archbishop Makarios, Jomo
Kenyatta, Gold Meir, Charles de Gaulle, Ronald Reagan, and Mikhail Gorbachev offer us
fascinating opportunities to study the impact of a single personality on domestic politics
and foreign policies.

It would be fair to assume that the impact of idiosyncratic variables is greater in crisis
than in programmatic decisions. During crisis, the time and threat constraints place most
of the burden on the shoulders of a state’s leader
and a few advisors who can be hastily assembled. Similarly one can argue that
idiosyncratic variables help explain decisions more readily in authoritarian and
totalitarian states than in democratic competitive ones. A leader who is also a dictator can
reflect his or her own personal traits far more readily in all categories of decisions than a
democratic leader subject to the scrutiny of governmental checks and balances, as well as
the free press, parliament or congress, public opinion, pressure groups, and so on.

Role Variables

Role variables are somewhat more difficult to pinpoint. They are usually defined as job
descriptions or as expected rules of behavior for officeholders such as presidents, cabinet
officers, high level pureaucrats. congressional representatives and senators, journalists,
educators. laborunion and other pressure group leaders and other elite’s who affect,
formulate. and implement foreign policies.

Regardless of a person’s psychological profile, when lie or she takes on a specific role,
resultant, behavior is modified considerably by the public’s expectations of that role. A
good example of the impact of role upon behavior is the story of Thomas a Becket. As
King Henn, I1’s drinking, hunting, and leathering buddy, Becket was a devil may care
man Whose main concern was to enjoy the ”deep” pleasures of life and to satisfy

108

International Relations

his friend. protector, and sovereign. However, once Becket was persuaded to accept the
position of archbishop by his king, a profound transformation occurred. Becket
internalized the requirements of his new role and decided to actin accordance with the
dictates of his office. He ceased being a yes man and a sidekick of the king and
proceeded to protect the rights and to shoulder the responsibilities of the church. Had
king Henry read and understood role theory, he would not have had to consent to the
murder of his great personal friend, albeit political enemy, Becket. He would simph1
never have offered him the job.

Another good illustration of the impact of role on foreign police attitudes is a comparison
of foreign policy statements made by political leaders when they are in the role of the
opposition NAith their statements following their assumption of governing
responsibilities. As opposition leaders they tend to exaggerate their differences with the
policies employed by those in power. They also tend to make a number of promises
designed to maximize the hopes and expectations (and the votes) of a given constituency.
Once in power, however. they tend to mute their rhetoric somewhat, and they come
closer to assuming a
their predecessors.

The definition of
a role affects larger political and societal variables. to which we shall be turning shortly.
For instance, the definition of the role of the chairperson of the Chinese Communist Part’
is different from that of the British prime Minister. Whereas the chairperson has near
monopoly in the conceptualization, definition, and handling of important foreign policy
issues, the British prime minister is hampered by a great number of obstacles, such as the
views of important members of his or her own cabinet and party, the views of the
opposition parties, the attitudes of the press, public opinion, and the constraints of having
to act in harmom with European. NATO and Common wealth colleagues. It is safe.
therefore. to hypothesize that given the less constrained role of the Chinese chairperson,
personality characteristics are much more likely t0 significantly
awl

role reminiscent of that of

affect his or her country’s policy than are the personality characteristics of the British
prime minister. This difference in definition between the role of the chairperson and the
role of the prime minister allows us to visualize clearly the impact of role. as a variable.

Unlike idiosyncratic variables role variables are probably better suited to explain
programmatic and tactical decisions in democratic competitive societies. A justification
for this assertion would include thc following arguments. Programmatic decisions take
much time and requir` mI.Itiple inputs into the decisions making process. Therefore,
unlike crisp decisions, they permit a large number of individuals occupying ’’
multiplicity of roles to enter into the decisions making process. Rol~

psttstop Making

,,ariables, we could further argue. can be more operative in democratic competitive

systems because the behavior of the decision makers has to be much more visible and
subject to criticism. Thus deviations from traditional expectations of the role in a given
office (e.g.. the Watergate events. 1972-74) play even lead to the removal of a leader
from power.

Bureaucratic Variables

These variables are concerned with the structure processes of a government and their
effects upon foreign policies. Interesting studies by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin
have detailed the complexities and nuances of bureaucratic politics. These authors
suggest that bureaucratic complexity is the normal characteristic in most countries,
including those that are least developed. Allison and Halperin, and other authors as well,
argue with considerable merit that to view foreign policies as rationally derived plans
designed to maximize the best interests of abstract and monolithic units called nation
states is to
simplify if not openly distort reality. Instead. they argue. most policies reflect the
conflicting interests of various government bureaus, military services, and subdivisions
therefore, which constantly compete to maintain their narrow bureaucratic survival and
growth and to maximize their involvement and influence in the policy making process.

For example. the student of bureaucratic politics, rather than studying ”American”
policies toward Europe or the Soviet Union, should think in terms of Army. Nary, Air
Force, CIA, and State Department views competing to influence the decisions of
President London Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford. Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan,
and George Bush on various issues. This picture of decisional nonrationality is further
complicated when one realize that each of the major governmental agencies is subdivided
into administrative, factional and even personal domains. Moreovenbetween decisions at
home and their implementation abroad there is a lot of room for misperception
disagreements calculated distortions of orders from above, and even outright
disobedience to them:
They argue, convincingly, ,that major powers especially industrialized. states) which
possess large and complex bureaucracies are more likely to be subject to the impact of
bureaucratic variables. They suggest. however, that political parties pressure groups,
independent mass media, and public opinion affect foreign policies much more in so-
called democratic competitive systems than they do into totalitarian or authorit-arian
countries.
To sum up. bureaucratic variables include the structure of

governmental organization, the standard operating procedures of major bureaucratic

agencies the decision making processes.at various levels of policy formulation

techniques for implementing policy decisions. and the

international Relatlons III

attitudes of officials regarding the impact of foreign policies on domestic policies and on
the general welfare of their country.

National Variables

’ This category embraces a vast number of national attributes that

influence foreign policy outcomes. We have already covered much of this
category of variables in our discussion of tangible and intangible elements
of power. We shall mention some of these variables here and leave it to
your imagination and ingenuity to fill in the gaps.

Under the heading of national variables we include environmental variables, such as the
size geographic location types of terrain: climate, and resources of nation states. To
illustrate. one would expect a continental nation state with vulnerable boundaries and a
strategic location either to develop an
offensive strategy (such as seeking more secure boundaries or acquiring buffer zones) or
to gain the protection of a more powerful and mobile nation state. On the other hand an
insular nation state or one bounded, by nearly impermeable natural frontiers is more
likely to develop a defensive strategy and avoid entangling alliances. which might limit
its sovereignty.

We can also list under national variables, population attributes, such as the size and
density of population of a country, and the vital statistics of a population, such as age
distribution, literacy. and physical health. We could ask some interesting questions in
regard to these variables: Do populous countries such as China India, the Soviet Union.
and the United States exhibit any similar characteristics in their foreign policies. Are
countries with a high population density such as China. Japan, and Indonesia likely to
follow expansionist policies. Are well nourished and disease free populations more prone
to expansionist and adventurist policies than undernourished and disease ridden ones.
These questions await careful scientific research and analysis. The record of foreign
policy behavior to date is too mixed to allow firm answers to most such questions. We
are likely for example, to encounter as man instances of densely populated nation-states
acting cautiously as instances of such states acting adventurously.

Gross national product, industrial and agricultural outputs. economic gron1h rate,
military strength and other attributes of a nation-state’s capability should also be impact
of an industrial. technological economy upon foreign policy? What would be the impact
of a traditionall*-agrarian economy? One response would be that we can not realistically
predict an expansionist policy for an insular nation state that is technologically backward
and possesses no appreciable naval and air capabilities for overseas operations.

pecision Making 112

The political economic, and social systems of a nation state are still other attributes that
seriously affect foreign policy making. The

theoretical questions in these areas are of central importance to students of political

science. Let us consider political variables first. For example does the types of political
system in a given nation state have an impact on

foreign policy decisions and their implementation? One could argue that dictatorship ate
so concerned with maintaining internal order in the face of a hostile domestic population
that they are more likely to pursue cautions and compromising foreign policies and
thereby avoid adding an eternal

conflict wtheir internal one. This argument, naturally, can be reversed. For example
dictatorships have been accused of seeking foreign adventures in order to endow an
oppressed domestic population with the type of

solidarity that only serious eternal threats can produce. Both arguments sound logical and
convincing, but a lot of empirical research over time ieould be called for before we could
side with one or the other.

In the case of economic variables questions could be asked about

the effects of capitalist, market orientated economics and communist, planned economies
upon foreign polit:_Y. It has been argued, for instance. that communist countries by
virtue of their central control of their economies, are more affective in orchestrating their
foreign economic policies in such a way as to advance their political objectives. The
opposite ii,ould allegedly be true in capitalist countries, where powerful private economic
actors, independent of governmental control, can shape the lines of foreign policy on the
basis of corporate rather than national interests.

In regard ’ to social variables we would be interested in adventifying the effects of class

structure, distribution of income and status. and racial linguistic, cultural, and religious
homogeneity (or heterogeneity) upon different nation-states foreign policies. We can
argue that a nation state with serious racial or ethnic cleavages will have to control these
cleavages before embarking on offensive foreign policies. \Ye can easily be exploited by
nation-state B, which wishing to gain nen advantages. offers certain factions in nation
state A the external support they need in order to survive politically.

The last four categories of national variables we shall consider are national character,
culture, shared images and historical memories of nation states. National character is a
very elusive concept. It can be described by both disparaging and complimentary
generalizations. Both forms of generalization distort a complex reality’ that shifts with
time.

Disparaging stereotypes portray the Vietnames and Germans are warlike and cruel, the
French as arrogant and vacillating, the British as hfpocritical and conniving, the Soviets
as bnrtaland calculating, the Americans as blunt and expletive. and so on. Complimentary
images of

International Relations I1;

national character are reflected in such terms as selfless, magnanimous. industrious.

honest, and cooperative. The choice of words depends on who is doing the perceiving. A
nation state’s self image, as a rule, is more complimentary than images that are held by
others. Despite the inexactness of the concept of national character; one could argue that
national styles (another way of referring to national character)
do indeed affect foreign policies. For example. one can detect a greater degree of caution
in post-World War II Chinese and Soviet foreign policies than in United States foreign
policies of the same period. Would it follow, then, than caution and gradualism are
Russian characteristics, and that rashness and exploisiveness are American
characteristics? Perhaps we should wait one or two centuries before accepting such erode
generalizations as useful propositions and only after submitting them to further testing.

In speaking of culture, shares images and the historical memory of nation states, we are
referring to a collective state of mind-which emerge with the aid of educational
institutions. the media literature. and the fine arts about the identity- of a country. A
nation state’s identity can be traced in its history. its great men and women, popular
memories of crises and threats, historic battles for survival, and vital inventions and
discoveries. Historical memories greatly affect the substance, direction, quality and
intQnsihof foreign policy. For example, traditional conflicts, such as the French-German,
German-Russian, Chinese Russian, Greek Turkish. Chinese Vietnamese, and Iranian
Iraqis have been kept alive in the popular myths and the history- texts of these peoples.
The United States, in contrast. feels secure toward neighbors such as Canada and Mexico,
whereas in periods of cold war tension its standard image of the Soviets is that they are
aggressive subversive. and expansionist.

An extremely- important memory for most politicians and

diplomats, a memory that emerged after World War II, is that of the Munich Agreement
(1938). Munich has been equated with the appeasement of aggressors, an action that
serve- merely to whet the aggressors; appetites for more territorial expansion. ”No more
Munich’s has been a conscious and in some instances subconscious aphorism in the
minds of both Western and Eastern national leaders. Wars such as those in Korea and
Vietnam have been fought allegedly to avoid another Munich. More recently, after the
bloody and bitter Vietnamese experience, a neNs memory has formed. ”No more
Vietnams”. What are the hapless leaders of the future to do -hen they are haunted by
memories of both Munich aid Vietnam? We an only suggest that in the future, both
leaders and followers sho d ponder the dangers of thinking and acting on the basis of
loosc his ical analogy.

pecision Making

Given the comprehensives and inclusiveness of national variables. one can assume that
all these variables acting jointly have a very important impact on decisions of leaders in
most categories of
states. Once again, how’ever, we may assert that national variables are more consciously
and carefully taken into consideration in the making of programmatic and tactical rather
than crisis decisions. In times of crisis, the pressure of the situation does not usually
permit a systematic evaluation of capabilities prior to taking one or another type of
corrective action.

Systemic Variables -
Under this heading we can group the large number of variables that are external to the
country whose foreign policy- decisions we are observing and analyzing. For instance,
we can include in this category the structure and processes of the whole international
system. An international system of balance of power which we discussed is likely- to
have quite a different impact on foreign policies of national states than a cold war bipolar
system. Following the pioneering work of nation states than a cold war bipolar system.
Following the pioneering work of Morton Kaplan. for example we can test the hypothesis
that under the rules of the balance of power system foreign policies of great powers will
be flexible, pragmatic. nonideological. and generally restrained. In contrast. under the
roles of cold war bipolarity. we can test whether nation states are pressured to enter into
large alliances. In a cold war environment. prgamatism allegedly^gives way to
ideological and political orthodox. the suspicions of the global adversaries reach levels of
political convulsion, and mutual urges to behave violently are restrained only by the
knowledge of the mutual destructiveness of a total nuclear war.

Systematic variables also include the policies and actions of other nation-states, which
can stimulate policy responses by- the nation-states selected for study. In fact. the
assumption of most traditionally as well as scientifically orientated theorists of
international relations has been that foreign
Th policy is a set of responses to external challenges and opportunities. These theorists
view foreign polices <,s rationally defined objectives of nation-states acting through their
governments. These objectives are to defend existing possessions or accomplishments
and to maximize Opportunities, within prudent limits. for new possessions and related
accomplishments. For example, the attack on South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese
was viewed by U.S. policy makers as the attempt of a countr` Supported by- the Soviets
and the Chinese to disturb the existing balance of p°wer in Southeast Asia. In a more
narrow setting. the South Vietnamese g°vernment, prior to its collapse in 1975, was
considered ”useful and friendly” by the U.S. government and therefore worthy of
American \`~pu°n
in its straggle with internal (Viet Conga) and external (North

International Relations 113

Vietnamese) opponents. This support lacking these opponents were
expected to overthrow the South Vietnamese government and to adverseh
affect American interests in Southeast Asia. The analysis of this situation
was generally horizontal. That is nation states were viewed as cohesive and
unified actors (in other words, nation states were equated with their
governments), and quarrels among states over territory or resources were
considered to be the result of conflicting national interests in a turbulent
international system.

The careful student might point out that systemic variables (such as structure of the
international system, international law, international organizations, alliances
dependencies and interdependencies, and the actions and internationals of other states)
affect a state’s foreign policy formulation both Objectively and subjectively. The
objective effect is that systemic variables provide constraints and opportunities that
outline the general directions of foreign policies. In other words, there are objective limits
to the actions of a nation state. A country without landing craft, for example. cannot
mount an amphibious invasion. The subjective effect is that systemic variables can be
seen only through the eyes of foreign policy makers. Let us consider just one illustration
here. Soviet foreign policy toward China can be viewed as a reaction to Chinese behavior
in concrete terms, or it can be viewed as a set of policies arising from Soviet leader’s
perceptions of Chinese behavior. Traditionalist scholars usually employ the objective
orientation; scientifically oriented scholars gravitate more often to the subjective
orientation.

Before ending the discussion on international system variables, ne must once more raise
the question regarding the types of decisions and the types of states that these variables
affect the most. This is a very important theoretical question that can hardly be disposed
of in introductory text. For our purposes, we can assume that systemic variables constrain
more directly the decisions made by small and powerless states than they do the decisions
made by leaders of great powers. For if we assume that the maintenance of the structure
and processes of the international system can be affected by decisions made by the
superpowers, then the ”piles of the international game’- will be set by the powerful and
they will constrain the behavior of the powerless. In Thucydidean terms ”the strong do
what the! can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Viewing the whole bewildering array

of variables that help shape foreign policy. we should feel considerably perplexed.
Simplistic explanations of for gn policy will no longer suit us, and we will be 1110r`
likely to reject tl foreign policy analyses of others without procidin satisfacton an ~-ses of
our own. Despite the frustrating aspects of th` enterprise: ~ consistent effort has been
made primarily by America’

pension Making
116 political scientists to focus on the decision making processes and on the decision
makers themselves in order to reduce uncertainties and perhaps to rich some
generalizations that could be subjected to further evaluation. gaving reviewed variables
that influence, the foreign policy making process- we turn now to the study of this very
process.

CHAPTER 7

COMMUNICATIONS THEORY

I. Introduction: Engineering Systems and Human Systems

The application of communications tlleory~ to internatioir, relations has developed

rapidly, over the past decade. A number orientations and bodies of theory exist within the
communications fielc but the most promising work stems from the ideas of cybernetics
and it upon cybernetics that this chapter will focus.

Although it possesses a compelling utility, in the study of politi”; cybernetics, like game
theory, originated in, the work of mathematician And like game theory it is also a partial
theory,- that applies to the politic, behavior of decision makers and nation states,
Cybernetics itself if may 1 defined as the systematic study of communication and control
r organizations of all kinds. Essentially it represents a shift in the center interest from
drives to steering and from instincts to systems of decision’ regulation and control..” The
fast major formulation of its ideas was F forward by Norbert Wiener in the late 1910.
Wiener had noted nsil.
’`

wartime advances in electronic processes such as sonar, radar. rah directed anti aircraft
fire, and transfer of coded messages through adva””’ communication networks. All of
these developments involved so’ measure of informs ion transfer and self-correction
through a feeding f`’ into the decision system of the results of actual systetm
performa~”* Wiener contend that these communication processes in machines b°’’
fundaments imilarit~- to individual human, social, and institl,uc! process’s other words. a
basic identity, existed in the teclsnic^1 plat”’

~pfflnfunication Theory

imunication, whether the system involved was one employing electronic signals, human
nerve cells, or governmental bureaucracy-. In the steps by „hick they operated these
entities had. a great deal in common they could receive and send messages store and
reproduce various kinds of data, and arasv upon a
memory of facts and formulate. Basically they were goal oriented systems that shared the
ability to select certain kinds of information, combine old and new information, and
monitor their own performance. Lest this be regarded as a crude, mechanistic or
dehumanizing identification of men with machines, it is well to draw upon Wiener’s own
carefully stated position.

While human and social communication are extremely complica-ted in comparison to the
existing patterns of machine communic-anon. they are subject to the same grammar and
this grammar has received its highest technical development when applied to the simpler
content of the machine.

As Wiener noted, social science is based on the sbiliy, to treat a social group as an
organization and ”communication is the comment that makes organizations.” Therefore
by concentrating upon the communications process itself we will greatly increase our
comprehension of how all kinds of organizations actually operate. Indeed, since

organizations operate within limits set by their communication. s mean of understanding

a previously intractable subject may suggest itself. For if

something we wish to comprehend is closed to us perhaps the inner workings of the

Soviet Politburo or the mind of a United States president

there may nonetheless be opportunities for gaining greater knowledge of it by regarding

the object as a ”black box,” that is something for the moment sealed off from direct
serenity but the inputs and outputs of which arc

visible. the indirect procedure of focusing on communications and transactions that go

into and come out of the black boa may ultimately reyl significant information about the
contents of the box, for example, the attitudes or procedures of otherwise inaccessible
decision-makers. and may even provide insights about decision making processes
themselves.

The values of the cybernetic approach is that it opens the possibilit<- of bPPlymg
techniques borrowed from engineering and electronics to

o gical and social processes, these human phenomena may then be ”awe wore susceptible
to quantitative treatment and ultimately to umpr°N-ed understanding. ’

Karl Deutsch is responsible for the chief development and

ap~r ate°,a of cybernetic theory, to international politics. In his view. rue

„ - - understood in terms of communication and control, offers s
perspective on all politics. Communications are literally the ~ °f go\ ernment-’. Bv
directing out attention to such matters as how

intemational Relations 11~

decisions are made, message flow between decisions makers, messa,c
storage and tetrieval, and the response of decision makers, cybernetics rnn,,
provide significant insights about
how and why political systems survi\,”
and change.

The cybernetic model also displaced earlier and inadeqnat_ classical theoretical
conceptions that had persisted for over a centur, Among the most prevalent of these were
organic models, based
analogies between the human body and the state. These models left n~ room for the
learning process, did not provide the opportunity for intern;,, rearrangement or accurate
analysis and regarded natural law as providin, suffcient explanation for political
phenomena. There were also historica models, which did devote a certain amount of
attention to growIh anC, innovation but provided no improved understanding of the
operation c these processes themselves, nor any possibility -of quantitativ predictability.
Finally, mechanical and equilibrium models tended t; present entities whose whole
constituted on more than the sum of that parts and whose parts did not modify one
another. They give n; opportunity for insights into processes of growth or change, and
their application favored a static social theory. Thus in contrast to such earhc: models,
Deutsech has argued than even as a mere analogy cybernetic, would be superior to
previous analogies that shaped our theoretica conceptions of politics. Because cybernetics
indicates that it is steering thx, stands as the most fundamental process, the study of it in
institutions societies, and individuals ought to increase our grasp of problems in al! these
fields.

Of equal importance is the possibility that the coulmunication~ model may provide
marked advantages in policy making. John Burton, the leading theorist in this field in
Britain, argues that communications models that focus upon decision making processes
are strongly preferable to static concepts of balance and to the traditional power politics
point of view that they, foster. For Burton, the use of force is a measure of the ability not
tc have to learn or to adjust or accept peaceful change, and power is a conccf; that is used
by those with superior might to maintain the status quo. Tlt° use of the communications
model by policy makers would increase th~ possibility of nations being able to
understand each other’s decision= processes and thereby anticipate mutual responses so
that the developrlle” of certain intolerable options could be prevented. Decision making
model’ are appropriate to international politics in a nuclear age the demar’c’ considerable
ability to c ange goals especially in the shift from the shor, nrn air-; of exclusive notional
security to a longer term preservation 01 civilization itself something not easily managed
in power politics terms.

Communication
Theory 120

From Burton’s viewpoint power models ignore decision processes that stem from
influences other than power. whereas the communications ,model concentrates upon
national decision processes so as to determine ,hat influences shape relations between
states:

11. The Central Ideas of Cybernetics

Cybernetics begins with the ver,- general concept of a self-controllin.; system. That is its
attention is directed to any system that possesses sufficient organization, communication,
and control. This applies ,whether message transmission is by electronic signals in a
computer, human speech or writing in a society, or nerve impulses within a human body.
The basic features that these systems share include their nature as networks of
information flow; their capacity to receive and recombine new Ivith stored information;
their operation as decision-making entities, and their ability to change their performance
by taking into account the results of their previous goal-seeking actions.

The key idea in cybernetics is that of information. for this is the element that circulates in
any, communication network. Indeed. cybernetic theorists claim for this commodity a
status with other major scientific concepts such as matter, energy and the electric charge.
Information can be reproduced, stored or quantified hence its analysis but unlike matter
or energy it can be both created and destroyed. By measuring the amount of information
that is transmitted, lost, or received, we can obtain an index of the efficiency of a
communications channel. The importance of informa-tion to self controlling systems is
that it enables them to adjust to their environment; its presence is thus the sine qua non of
system autonomy.

Information is also the negative of entropy, another critical concept of cybernetics.

Entropy, as a concept comes from thermodynamics, but the process itself is readily
understandable. Basically. entropy is the tendency of a closed system to deteriorate. In
thermodynarroics this applies particularly to loss of heat, but the broader systemic
process involves decay from a more highly organized differentiated. and less probable
’state to a less organized undifferentiated, and more probable or chaotic state. According
to Norbert Wiener, both living things and machines, since they represent greater
orderliness, are instances of decreasing entropy. In a slightly theological vein. Wiener
once observed that science’s attempt to
discover order in the universe was continually undertaken against a ”devil” interpreted as
the absence of order. As a more mundane example of entropy, anyone who has ever
rented a firrnished residence NA ill appreciate the tendency
of things ?o break down. however. diligent tire attentions of the occupant. ’Chus the rate
landlord. obsessed with a broken chair or sr~ddenly defective plumbing, ,might be
consoled by having ]us attention ~lled to tile theoretical insight that thesc arc instances
net of lcident

International Relations

negligence but of an ineluctable and universal entropy. Any owner of an automobile will
also have experienced at first hand the operation of entropy.

The advantage that human and other information systems possess is their ability to adapt
to changes in their surroundings, to continue to learn, and thus to work against the current
of entropy. This learning process is contingent upon feed back, another fundamental
cybernetic concept and certainly the central mechanism in its operation. Feedback itself
involves modifying system behavior on the basis of incorporating ; ”feeding back”
information on the nature of that system’s actual, rail:,. than anticipated, performance.
The quaky of feedback decisively shop, the effectiveness of the system in pursing its
goals. Feedback, which . common to all self controlling systems, can be based on
quantltatn.; indices, the success or failure of some action, or the outcome of an entit_
behavior syndrome. Thus the information contained there in might dc;, with the distance
by which anti aircraft fire has missed its target, I],-relieve success of a certain kind of
technique in selling used cars (or use
tanks), or perhaps tire efficacy of a national policy 1 promoting a county, . security. The
inputs that these results provide are then the basis-togeth~.. with stored data or memory
for the system to modify its future actions
order to have a better chance of attaining its goal (whether downed aircraf; sold cars, or
national survival). Yet another example of other operation Of feedback mechanism is
provided by the management of modern economic where data on employment, inflation,
and industrial production al, continually assessed and are the basis for decisions about
adjustments i! national monetary and fiscal policies.

Feedback may also be of two very different types. On the one hall, there is negatics
feedback, in which system behavior is controlled by th; margin of error in reference to a
specific goal and and signals from tlu goal are used to restrict output. Negative feediback
by reducing a previol!~ action, is thus the essence of goal attainment. On the other hand,
positiv t feedback is a very- different sort of phenomenon. It involves amplificatio, or
reinforcement of existing behavior learning to read and escalation of ~; arms race are two
markedly different examples of positive feedback.

The
efficiency of the feedback process can be measured h` examining four factors. The first
of these is called load, and has to do vcitl the amount of information a system must
process. Typically the concer, here is with pressures pon a state’s machinery for political
decision making. Second, there is lag or the delay between the time informatio! about the
location of t ”target” is received and the point at vshic!’ corrective action is car ed out.
Obviously the mere sizable the system -’ lay. thc less, likely it s to attain any changing
goal. In political terms. 1~=

Co0tntunication Theory 122

measures the delay in respailse of decision makers to a new situation of any

kind. The third factor is gain or the extent of corrective action actually taken. Too great a
corrective action can cause a system to overshoot its goal, just as too limited a gain can
anew it to fall short. This index measures the speed and extent of political and
governmental reaction time, for example, in terms of political or military mobilization in
response to a sudden external challenge. Finally there is lead, or the distance of the
predicted location of a moving target or goal from its previous position. Just as deer
hunters or anti-ballistic missiles may ”lead” their targets, so political system require the
ability to anticipate new problems. Since all governments and communications systems
depend on information processing and hence upon feedback, their efficiency can be
measured in terms of these four factors. If persistent imbalances develop between the
communications loads placed upon political institutions and the capabilities that they
posses for coping with these loads, then systems may fail to attain their goals or else
suffer serious breakdown. For example. analyzed from the perspective of cybernetic.
United States decision ’making during the Vietnam war was characterized by very poor
feedback with regard to such important matters as the impact of bombing upon the will of
North Vietnamese decision makers and the success of the pacification program. In terms
of load, the decision system was inundated with information, some of which was faulty
(e.g. reported number of enemy

casualties, proportion of ”safe” hamlets), information stored in memory was sometimes

not drawn upon (e.g., the strategic bombing survey dealing with American air attacks on
Germany during World War 1I), and more cautious assessments (e.g, by the CIA) were
disregarded in favor of sanguine judgments. Furthermore. the amplification of on going
efforts (a form of positive feedback) brought more bombing, more casualties, more
reftigees, widespread misery and no real success in the
attainment of original goals. Finally, the lag, or delay, of United States decision makers in
responding to the developing Vietnamese situation was also acute, so that it took a long
time for the United States to respond to the fact that booming was having little effect on
the fighting abilities of the Viet Conga and North Vietnamese.

III. Communication and Control

The balance between capabilities and loads assumes considerable importance in the
analysis of international politics from the cybernetic viewpoint. This measurement itself
is dependent upon the notion of transaction floats. Since political systems operate both
internally and externally through communications, these connnunications can be assessed

terms of interchanges of physical things or of information. Such transactions can include

trade. transportation patterns migration. tourism,

lntemational Relations
123 CoMmunlcation Theory
124

student exchanges, first class mail, telephone and telegraph traffic, movies, and the like.
One of the ”lost useful means of measuring these transactions is through construction of
an Index of Relative Acceptance, or RA index. This is a measurement of the percentage
by which the amount of transactions, for example in terms of exports, between two
countries is either greater or less than ”than hypothetical amount that would be
proportional to the overall share of each of these two countries in the total flow of
transactions among ail countries in the world.” The virtue of this. RA index lies in its
ability to indicate mutual preference or avoidance in transactions between two countries
or among groups of countries. Because the figure is a positive or negative proportion, it is
far more stable and less subject to sharp year to year fluctuation titan any kind of
calculation based on absolute figures would be. The value of such broad gauged indices
and several of them are used together is to provide an indication of major trends in
transactions and mutual responsiveness. But beyond this, international politics is
characterized fundamentally by relations across national boundaries. These relations
largely take of the form of transactions, and the significance point is that such
transactions can be analyzed, measured and mapped. We are thus not concerned with
trade ratios and mail flows as factors in themselves indeed alone their value is trivial but
only as they provide evidence of international relations in their most fundamental sense.

The application of certain of these concepts’ and analytic techniques to contemporary

Western Europe may provide further clarification of the cybernetic logic. Thus an
examination of the record of political and economic integration between France and West
Germany during the 1950s and 1960s reveals relationships that are predictable through
the cybernetic approach. Integration between two or more countries creates a diplomatic
decision system. When the capabilities of this system are greater than its loads the system
functions effectively in the direction of its goal of further integration. in this case the
establishment of European unity. When the decision systern becomes overloaded, system
performance falters. In the Franco-German case, diplomatic decision: making functioned
effectively in the early 1950s, was then interrupted during 1954-56 (the period of the
French rejection of the Europcan Defense Community), resumed its progress during
195?-62, ryas disrupted once again during 1963-65 (the period of the de Caulle veto of
Britain’s Common. Market application, controversy over participation in the United
States proposal for a European multilateral mealier force, and r1isputcs about decision
making in the EEC), and then appeared to revive in the late 1960s. The overall pattern is
one in which there is a direct relationships beween low points in progress toward the
institutionalization of integration and a high degree of diplomatic stress. Diplomatic
decision

making functioned effectively toward the goal of European unity and relatively lower
loads upon decision making systems. Interruptions in the construction of regional
integration, occurred in the face of overloads upon the European diplomatic decision
system. Since system over load in cybernetic terms is measured by the ratio of
capabilities to loads, rather than by absolute amounts of either, it is capabilities to loads,
rather than by absolute amounts of either, it is instructive that the regional and
international strains that caused the breakdown of 195:1-56 period. Because of the solid
advancement in European system capabilities, as measured by transaction ratios and the
growth of governmental and non-governmental institutions along regional lines, in the
early sixties it took a demonstrably greater load to bring the movemept toward European
integration to a halt than it had a decade previously.

More broadly, the Western European lesson appears to indicate the importance of high
and positive transaction flows as a necessary precondition for political and economic
integration. While a ”common sense” observation may lead to the conclusion that France
and Germany have always had, as European neighbors, a great deal to do with each other,
the accidence of transaction flows indicates otherwise. The data instead reveal that during
the 1920s and 1930s France
and Germany actually had significantly less to do with each other on a proportionate
basis than with other countries of the world. In cybernetic terms, the RA indices of
international transaction flows between these two countries, as measured for trade, mail,
travel and student exchanges. Nvere almost consistently negative. It was only after World
War II that the gross transaction flows began to shift in a positive direction.

Another study utilizing the cybernetic approach also provides evidence that contradicts a
widely held impressionistic viewpoint about international politics. In this case a study by
Bruce Russett dealing with the relationships between Britain and the United States has
shown that contrary to the idea that the experience of mutual support and alliance in two
world wars has brought closer ties between the two countries, the reverse actually
occurred. That is based on indices provided by trade figures, student exchanges, mail
flows. and telephone and telegraph traffic, Russett has established that Britain and the
United States are actually less responsive to one another than they once were.

The application of the communications approach to integration

has already been treated, but some additional points are here in order.
Specifically because transactions are the basis for mutual responsiveness
among states, and because cybernetics assumes that a high mutual
relevance encourages cooperation, the analysis of transaction makes
G 15ssible a very useful measure of integration. Correspondingly. attention to

International Reiatlons 125

the balance between loads and capabilities provides further anahrtie benefits. These
techniques also provide the basis for assessing how well integrated a courltr, may be
internally. Deutsch in particular has placed great stress on the research question of
whether communications boundaries coincide with or cut across political boundaries, for
when these boundaries are not coincident it is predictable that the political ones will be
resisted, with disruptive implications. What is more, the transactions data also reveal,
contrary to common-sense notions. that (in an age of modern air travel and new means of
international communication) countries arc becoming not more interdependent but less
so. As measured by foreign; trade as a percentage of national income and by the
proportion of GNP going through the governmental sector, the cybernetic approach finds
than countries are actually more self preoccupied than ever, and this closure tends to
increase with size.

IV. Transactions, Communications, and International

Relations

What impact has the communications approach had upon international relations theory in
general’? Sharply differing assessments have been made. On the one hand a critic finds
cybernetic unhelpful and ”inherently inappropriate.’ This criticism stems from the
judgment that a theory of international relations based on c5-bernetic and feedback is
only a metaphor. The difficulty- is said to be that while in the engineering field
cybernetics has produced important and formalized propositions for predicting the quality
of system adaptation the application of cybernetics to international relations fails to
produce similar advantages. This. is the case because not alt international relations fits
within the cybernetic framework. Instead it only does so under a special set of
circumstances by which, first. the behavior of any actor is repetitive and variable; second
the distance of a system front its goal is affected by the system’s own behavior, and third.
the goal itself relates to some environmental trait. More fundamentally; the same
argument rests on the contention that it is unhelpful to treat international relations in
cybernetic terms because international relations itself is not a system.

These criticisms are profound and yet they rest on definitional criteria, which may be of
limited relevance. The question of whether international relations itself does not
constitute a ”system” is treated in chapter six (Systems Theory), but it is appropriate to
note here that a negative answer to this question would not necessarily compromise the
validity of the communications approach. Thus to dwelt upon the point as a test of the
utility of cybernetics is unrewarding. This is so because cybernetic itself stands or falls
less as a general theory of internatioiial relations, i.e., a set of interrelated propositions
that cover the field is ,:

CoIninunication Theory

limi-ted portions of the field. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it resembles
gargle theory in this respect. If we treat cybernetics not as a full theory. but as a means of
viewing complex systems, it may still possess considerable utility. And even when the
criticism of the cybernetic approach rests on the assumption that not all international
relations fits within its bounds, but only that portion to which the above three criteria,
apply. the applicabiliy of cybernetics remains...For there is little in the descriptions of
system and human behavior in terms of the cybernetic model to imply that those kinds of
international relations phenomena falling outside it need to be farted into a framework
they do not fit.

Apart from this set of criticism however. other important criteria do exist for assessing
the virtues and limits of the communications
approach. First, there is tire question of whether indices based on transaction flows do or
do not provide a valid too. Some objections here can be more readily dismissed than
others, as, for example, is the case with those that focus upon a particular index (e.g. mail
flow) and belabor it as crude or simplistic. It has already been observed that such
arguments lose force because they misunderstand the application of transaction flow data.
The indices. when properly utilized, constitute no more than part of a broader whole.
Several sets of measurements must be taken together, and the ensemble is an aid or
supplements not a substitute for analysis and judgment. While the criticism has also been
made that such gross quantitative indices seem. for example, to treat every letier as equal
whether a communication between two heads of government or two taxi drivers it must
be kept in mind - that communication patterns among political elite’s are treated
separately, for example by content analysis of the elite press or by elite opinion- surveys.
A more apt criticism of transactions indices concerns how they are to be weighted. That
is, are trade ratios, mail flows, student exchanges, survey data, and amount of attention in
the elite press all of equal importance or are some (e.g., trade) for more important than
others (e.g., mail)? The problem becomes evident on the occasions when various indices
exhibit conflicting positive and negative values. One can acknowledge the major
contribution of the transactions data as objective evidence in the study of otherwise
emotional and highly subject topics such as nationalism and sovereignty and yet be
aware of this limitation. In the absence of a more precise weighting only broad gauged
judgments can be made.

For example, if between France and Germany all indices move

together in a positive direction, there is clear evidence of increasing

mutual responsiveness conducive to integration. Yet what conclusions are
to be drawn when the indices move in different directions? Thus Karl
Deutchs, focusing on certain kinds of transaction flows, has identified a

126

International Relations 127

halting iii the process of Western European integration since the mid-1950 Deutsch and
his coworkers relied on five different strains of evidence: elite interviews, mass opinion
polls, a survey of arms control proposals, content

analysis of newspapers and periodicals, and a large body of aggregate data about actual
behavior (trade, student exchanges, travel migration, mail). However another researcher,
Ronald Inglehart, dealing with the sane problem, has reached a virtually opposite
conclusion: that European integration may
have begun to make real progress only since the late 1950s. The reason for this difference
is that Inglehart’s conclusions rest on data concerning attitudes among the younger
generation in Western Europe. He also challenges Deutsch’s use of transaction flows on
the basis that absolute increases in intra-European trade tourism, and student exchanges
are more important than a stagnation in their ratios. Such different conclusions are
inevitable as long as the matter of the weighting and usage of indices remains unresolved
or imprecise.

Another unresolved problem concerns the significance of transaction flows as cause of

effect of integration. Specifically, does a high and positive pattern of transaction flows
between two countries in some way facilitate integration, or does it merely provide
evidence confirming that integration has taken or is taking place? If the former holds,
then transaction flows are critical as a cause or precondition of integration; if the later
relationship applies, then transactions are a useful noncausative measurement (just as a
high reading on a thermometer provides information on but does not cause the hot
weather it measures).

Donald Puchala’s cautious treatment of transaction leans toward the causative side. While
he finds that they are neither necessary nor suffcient preconditions for integration, and
that the most one can conclude from the Western European case is the changes in
international communication preceded movement to regional political merger. he does
assert that the shift in transaction flows to mutual relevance, attentiveness and
responsiveness was a necessary part of the European integration process, and the
sequence of integration in the region can be summarized as ”transactions, institutions,
polity formation and then legitimacy or support.” Deutsch and Russett deal with this
fundamental questionably finding that both cause and effect may be involved. Thus one
formulation attributed to Deutsch and Russett deal with this fundamental question by
finding that both cause and effect may be involved. Thus one formulation attributed to
Deutsch is that ”cohesiveness among individuals and among, communities of individuals
can be measured by--and is probablypromoted by--the extent of mutual relationship or
interaction among them.” Similarly Russett asserts that transactions contribute to the
development of community and are also promoted by the existence of community. While

Cominunication Theory’

this formulation remains somewhat vague, it is true that a process of mutual

reinforcement is not illogical. After all the concept of positive feedback does in fact
depict a reinforcing of cyclical
process. Understood in these terms there is some logic in the description of transactions
as both cause and effect of integration. In sum, the relationship of transaction floe’s to
integration is almost certainly a highly complex one of both cause and effect and is not
entirely resolved. The implication is that while these indices are highly useful they must
be employed with considerable care and sophistication and with awareness of their
limitations.

What then of the virtues of the communications model? John Burton has suggested that
its widespread adoption as a means of looking at the world by analysis and policy-marks
can have significantly beneficial results. Whereas the various models or approaches that
concentrate on some aspect of power suggest no outcome to international conflict short of
recurrent warfare or disaster, the communications model makes more conspicuous the
existence of goal-changing options for decisions-makers. The relevance of Burton’s
argument rests on his contention that the political scientist, in revealing the behavior
forced .upon decision-makers, can make them more aware of alternatives apart from the
obvious fatalistic ones inherent in the power politics approaches. It may be that Burton o\
erstates the virtuous consequences of any shift to the communications approach from a
more traditional international relations framework. And his perspective has been
challenged on the grounds that it is by no means self-evident that international affairs will
suddenly be conducted on the basis of peace and mutual respect once statesmen
accept°this changed perspective. Thus, for example, there is nothing in cybernetic theory
to dictate whether international behavior will be either violent or peaceful « lien the
feedback process itself is either good or bad. . Yet the real contribution of cybernetics,
with its shift in emphasis from power or drives to steering in judgment to require that in
order to be justified any proposed
1»novation must be capable of bringing about a Manichean reversal of practice. Rather,
the adoption of this different framework may be regarded ;Is beneficial because it is in
some way conducive to improved international o<<tcomes. By providing for increased
scrutiny of the adversary’s decision

process and perception of alternatives, the communications approach

displaces existing emphases on ideas of power, prestige, and commitment
t!,at have a propensity to present others as inferior and irresolute or a
~’11.1niscient and insatiable. For the power perspective can lead to such
”’judicious prescriptions as that outlined by the then Secretary of State.
Dean Rusk in a July 1963 memorandum:
The central objective of
the United States in South Vietnam must
be to insure that North Vietnam not succeed in taking over or
determining the future of South Vietnam by force.

128

International Relations

129 We must accomplish this objective without a genera possible .... The integrity of the
U.S. commitment is the principle pitta or peace throughout the world. IJ’that corrnridnent
tiecorrr~,, unreliable, the Communist world would certainlv <G-„,. conclusions that
would lead to our ruin and almost certainh

catastrophic mar-.

Conceivably, adoption of the communication approach would bring with it more careful
consideration of ”Communist world” (Russian-) Chinese? North Vietnamese’..’ Cuban’?)
calculations and in all likelihood would produce judgments no less informed that those of
the forearm Secretary of State. The value of this approach is that at a
possibilities that traditional

this enterprise.
Indeed, it may even be that the theoretical study of international relations will come into
shaper conflict with prevailing political and foreign policy orthodoxies. As Burton has
put it, though with a certain degree of overstatement, the challenge to existing ideas and
practices into he foreign policy realm is as drastic as that of Keynesianism to the
economic orthodoxies of the 1930s. At that time reversal of accepted economic policy
was a prerequisite for economic stability; now, an analogous reversal is required if we are
to hope to attain the goals of peace and security.

minimum it opens or power approaches may rule out and thus creates not a certainty but
at least a propensity toward more judicious judgments and the consideration of otherwise
neglected alternatives.
While Deutsch’s application of a steering perspective based on cybernetic concepts may
not develop all the power of the original engineering theory, it does proved a coherent
conceptual scheme, and not a mere analogy, for building theories and models for
communication and control in international relations. In its difference of orientation from
more traditional framework it is likely to affect our own perspectives; the questions we
ask, the data we seek, and ultimately the conclusions we draw about the nature of
international politics.
From a distinctly normative standpoint the cybernetic approach also possesses some
valued characteristics. Its emphasis is on openness rather than closure, the preser,-ation of
communication possibilities with a ”potentially inexhaustible environment and a
potentially infinite future and the rejection as pathological of frameworks that make
survival and self-respect difficult.
serves:
And cybernetics derives its likely utility from its capacity to
aid in

CHAPTER

INTEGRATION THEORY
”The development of integration theory has been heralded as one of the most significant
advances in contemporary political science.” It is said to provide great insights and to be
truly comparative in its analyses. This chapter will introduce some of the key ideas and
applications of integration theory. After very briefly treating the federalist approach, it
will turn to the two most important theories of integration: functionalism and the
communications approach. The chapter will then consider the opportunities for
measurement that these theories provide, and will conclude with an assessment of their
possibilities and limitations as partial theories of international relations.

At its most basic, the concept of integration can be defined as forming parts into a whole
or creating interdependence. Although several complex and somewhat divergent
definitions of political integration exist, the concept basically denotes a relationship of,
community or strong cohesiveness among peoples in a political entity. It involves mutual
ties and a sense of group identity and self-awareness, there are two different levels at
which integration can be considered. One is national and concerns the condition or
process of integration within a single country. The other. with which we are mainly
concerned here, is regional and applies to the development of integration between two or
more separate countries. National integration can concern the success or failure of
creating a sense of nationhood within a recently independent entity such as Indonesia or
Nigeria, or it can deal with more established states, such as Belgium or Canada, that have
internal divisions involving language, religion, or

Intersiatdortal RelatAarns

ethnicity. Regional integration typically involves grouping such as European Economic

Community or the East African Community.

I. Federalism

Federalism as a theory of regional integration has been rough;., handled by most

contemporary theorists. It combines description rt,t4 prescription in asserting that the
surest pathway to political communit, i~ by means of formal institutional measures.
Federalism regards the creation of federal institutions including military and police forces
and a comrnor, legal system as the best method for uniting people who already share
so,nc common features such as language or culture or merely geographi; proximity, but
who live in separate states. (A federal arrangement is said o exist when a set of political
communities are united in a common order. but retain their autonomy.) Proponents of
federalism expect that tla establishment of common
institutions will promote the growth of conunon attitudes and a sense of community.
Hence they are preoccupied with written constitutions, different forms of representative
institutions. and th; division of powers between federal, national, and local levels. h9os,
commonly, federalism is advocated as a means of bringing togeth,r prey ioasly separate
entities to form a more effective or desirable common government, By implication,
federalism seeks to adapt institutions tL;;[ operate successfully at a national level for use
on a regional bas,
Typically, the successful federation of the original thirteen colonies into tip; United
States .of America, is depicted as the literal model--albeit
preindustrial one--upon which a United States of Europe can and should is based. But
attention is also devoted to other successful federal systems sucL as Australia, Canada,
West Germany, and Switzerland.

Although the federalist notion does have the virtue of heedin~ political and value
orientations, which other theories tend to slight. n leaves something to be desired in its
lack of attention to social aNl economic factors and in its assumption of inherent unities
based e historical experience. In terms of practical application, recent experimem, in
federalism have not been notably successful, as in the case of th; abortive federations of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the British West Indic’ Malaysia, Mali, and the United Arab
Republic (of Egypt and Syria). AI~c, contrary to some basic assumptions of federalism,
studies of successfil~

federations reveal that strong centralized institutions of law enforcemer’. and coercion
were of only minor importance in their early stages. Thus r the case of Switzerland, the
participating cantons retained all militar` power from the thirteenth to the early nineteenth
centuw. The iJnitc~ States affords another example; ithad no War Department until 1798.
~~r’° even then it possessed a federal army of only 700 men, which was ”`’ greatly
enlarged for a number of years.

p1tegratlon Theory

Two different theoretical approac’aes to federalism can be distinguished. One variant,

followed by an ”, ctivisf group, has aimed at the achievement of regional federations in
Western Europe and in Africa. It identifies a popular need that either must necessarly or
else ought to lead to a federal outcome. Proponents of this view reject indirect functional
means; they prefer the conscious creation of cc nstitu, ions and formal institutional
structures. However, Earnest Haas finds that vents in Europe since 1954 and in Africa
since 1960 have contradicted and discredited the descriptions, explanations, and
predictions
of these federalists. An alternative approach to federalism is that of the ”theorist” group,
which is more concerned with observing patterns of federal integration, although its
members have also been active in the writing of constitutions. While they stress the
importance of institutional and constitutional questions more

than the neo-functionalists do, their characterizations of federalism as a process, or an

evolving pattern of relationships of federalism as a process, or an evolving pattern of
relationships, bears resemblance to the ensemble of demands, expectations, bargaining,
and growth of institutions on an ad hoc basis with which the one functionalists are
concerned.

II. Functionalism

As opposed to the federalist conception, it is functional integration that has received the
greatest theoretical attention in recent years. The basic statement of functionalism comes
from David Mitrany’s 1943’ work entitled A Gi orking Peace System. Mitrany began by
assuming t ie need for some new kind of international system of replace.the one whose
oreakdown had led to two world wars. He argued that federalism would not )e the best
framework for such a new international order because it :ould not overcome the forces of
nationalism and ideology. Even if a t umber of

federal units could be constructed, this would leave the world St ll divided on a
competitive basis. In seeking a pragmatic and global solution. Mitrany put the case for
the ”Functional Alternative.” Peaceful change would come not through a shift of national
boundaries but by means of acti ms taken across them. States would not surrender formal
sovereignty--wilich they

certainly remained reluctant to do in any case--but would transfer o,xecutive authority for
specific ends. World peace could best be promoted if international activities, trade, and
even production. There would be as many international organizations as needs and they
would be organized. on

a universal rather than a regional basis, with countries being under no compulsion to join.
Although the immediate outlook was not propitious for
political union, functional union would allow all states to work together Hithout such a
general political authority. The successful performance of functional activities by bodies
that had taken over specific asks and authorities from governments would bring nations
closer togaher and

iJSternational Relations

139

common government whether unitary (e.g., the United Kingdom) or federal each
government remains legally separate and independent. For example, the United States
and Canada have. since the middle of the ’nineteenth century, been ”integrated” (in the
sense
of no longer considering the possibility of warfare against each other), and are therefore
categorized as a pluralistic security community.

The communications approach applies principles from cybernetics to the relations

between nations or population groups. It focuses on the volume of transactions among
these entities as the most appropriate indicator, and it operates on the assumption that
”cohesiveness among individuals can be measured, and is probably promoted, by the
extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them.” By focusing on the flow of
social transaction among different units; it obtains measurements that are regarded as
objective and that facilitate the making of judgments about the condition of integration.

Several indicators are commonly used; they involve such things as mail flows, telephone
traffic, trade figures, and student exchanges. Thus, for example, based on reports of the
Universal Postal Union, it is possible to compute for a given country the ratio of domestic
to foreign mail (The D/F ratio). This can provide a useful indicator of trends in national
versus international preoccupation, and of the ties among two or more countries. Another
basic measurement can -be constructed from figures for long distance telephone calls. A
formula exists for roughly predicting the 41tquency of calls between two points in a
country, say New York and Cleveland, if the figures are .known fox the number of calls
between New York and Chicago. What is interesting here is that the formula will not
operate successfully if applied between New York and Montreal. The geo-political fact of
the United States--Canadian border is reflected in social Lansactions as well, so that
proportionately fewer phone calls take place between the two countries than within them.
By inference, the use of figures such as these, especially if attention were paid to yearly
trends, would provide useful data on the extent to which separate countries such as
France and Germany were becoming more integrated over time, as well as on how this
compared with other groups of integrated countries and with domestic patterns. Still
another indicator exists in the form of a trade matrix. This treats the relative acceptance
by countries of each others exhorts. Here too, discernible patterns arise that supplement
our information and impressions about links between countries and trends over decades
or even centuries.

It may seem overly mechanical, or perhaps crude, to focus upon Vch phenomena as mail
flow, telephone calls and trade fieures in order to
it conclusions about internationa lit:cs Hov%evel. the approach

lRNoatlon Theory

~u5tif~able provided certain assumptions

are kept in mind. Deutsch takes pains to caution that no one index is adequate by itself.
Instead, an ensemble of indices is required, so that if a number of these point in the same
direction, for example by signaling an increasing propensity toward mutual attention
between France and England, we may then say with some assuredness that underlying
social factors are shifting in such a way as to create favorable opportunities for
integration. Nor are we concerned exclusively with the raw volume of transaction since
we pay attention to ratios and proportions of total volume. Finally, we are directed to
examine the nature of joint rewards and penalties in these transaction, In other words, is a
high level of exchange between two peoples accompanied by mutual benefits? If what is
good for one side is good for the other--which is often the case in high levels of mutual
trade--then we speak of a high convariance of rewards. The existence of this pattern of
objective interests, in the presence of high level of transactions, leads groups to identify
with each other; this in turn is expected to bring about greater cohesion between them. On
the other hand, if there is a low covariance of rewards, so that what is good for one side is
bad for the other, then a high level of contact is not only unlikely to bring about mutual
responsiveness, but may even cause conflict.

With these understandings (that several indices must be examined, that trends and ratios
rather than the raw volume of transactions are important, and that the mutual covariance
of rewards must’ be scrutinized;, we have a highly useful tool at our disposal. The
measurement of transaction flows allows us to acquire impersonal evidence in order to
test general beliefs, statements, or conclusions about nationalism and political integration.
Such a tool surely provides advantages over impressionistic approaches that simply
assert: ”There is something of interest, I think it means this,” versus ”No, I look at ii a
different way and I think it means that.” Used along with more general understanding
historical information, and personal insights, rather than as a substitute for them, the
measurement that the communications approach permits facilitates description,
explanation and even prediction about political integration.

A good example of what applied systematic thinking about integration can achieve is the
historical analysis of the integration experience of nearly a dozen countries. Karl
Deutsch, Sidney Bureli, et al., in their work, Political Corrrruunitv and the North Atlantic
Area, drew from several centuries of Western experience in order to abstract those
conditions
most necessary for the creation and maintenance of political integration. The study
examined the experience of English-Scottish Union, the collapse of union between
Ireland and the United Kingdom, the growth

140

lnt•Inatlonal Relations

of German unity from the Middle Ages to 1571. Italian unity in 141 the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, preservation and dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, the union and
separation of Norway and Sweden, the gradual integration of Switzerland prior to 1848,
English-Welsh union after 1455, the formation of England itself, and finally the union of
the American Colonies into the United States in 1789 followed by breakup in the Civil
War and the subsequent reunion. A total of sixteen shorter-n,n situations were derived
from the above cases.

This study questioned a, number integration. One such belief was that modern

of popular beliefs about

life is somehow more
international., Based on figures for trade ratios, immigration patterns and
mail flow, the authors found evidence that this was not the case. They also
found that no modern industrial state had ever amalgamated with another.
A second common belief that the findings contradicted was the idea that
there exists a kind of snowball process so that the size of national units is
ever increasing. Thus the authors point to such contrary cases as the
inability of the United Kingdom to maintain its grip on the American
colonies or even on Ireland, the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, and the
dissolution of union between Norway and Sweden. Next, their analysis
permits them to challenges the belief that force has operated as an
important factor in stimulating integration. Historically, problems of
policing and coercion rarely played a large role, and military conquest
proved to be one of the lest effective methods of integration. Finally, and in
contrast to still another widely held notion, they determined that even such
a feature as ethnic or linguistic assimilation did not constitute an essential
background condition for political integration.

Nine essential conditions for establishment of an amalgamated security community were

found to exist. The separate entities had to have mutual compatibility of values, a
distinctive way of life, the expectation f stronger economic ties or gains, a marked
increase in political and administrative capabilities, superior economic growth, unbroken
links of social communication broadening of political elites, mobility of persons, and a
multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. Additional conditions were
found to. be of possible importance; perhaps the most significant one of these
was mutual predictability of behavior. Among the more interesting conclusions, the
authors found that while both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities
constituted practictil means to integration, and both exhibited many successful cases,
pluralisl!l had particular advantages. Most notably, there was only on case of failure
involving a pluralistic security community (that of Austria and Prussia
’~

the German Confederationr whereas there were numerous examples failure involving
amalgamated security communities (e.g. the United St,&

integration 77reory in 1861. Norway-Sweden in 1905, Austria-Hungary in 1917,

England-

Ireland in 1918, and Metropolitan France with a number of wars and revolutions from
1789 to 1871). Although there are limits to the application of the pluralistic model, its
relevance seems to be that in seeking to bring about lasting peaceful relationship among
countries, there may be a greater payoff in concentrating efforts upon the less ambitious
pluralistic pathway, rather than gambling upon the more elaborate istic security
communities remain preferable to amalgamated security communities because they are
easier to form and less likely to lead to internal conflict.

By dealing with the situations in which political integration actually failed, the study
managed to identify a set of background

conditions necessary (though perhaps not sufficient in themselves) for disintegration.

Examining the failures of England-Ireland, Norway-Sweden, and three separate situations
involving Austria, the authors found that these conditions could be divided into two
categories: those that increased the .burdens on amalgamated governments, and those that
reduced the capabilities of governments or political elites for timely response. Under the
first category, the authors identified excessive military commitments, a substantial
increase in political participation by groups or regions once passive, and an increase in
ethnic or linguistic differentiation. Within the second category they placed the conditions
of economic decline or stagnation, closure of the political elite (thus promoting the rise of
a frustrated counter elite), excessive delay in expected reforms and major failure of a
strong group or region to adjust.

Once again, a systematic effort to deal with the subject matter of international relations
suggests a means for improving our grasp of politics. In this case, the indicators of
disintegration provide a pd%sible way of organizing our knowledge and even of
predicting possible future events of real consequence. For although the authors do not
attempt to do so, their

criteria can, for example, be employed in examining the

contemporary situation of the United States. For nearly a decade, America has lived with
a sense of national crisis. Political dialogue the media, and private conversation have
become saturated with statements of the national predicament. But. how much does this
theme owe to ascertain fashionableness of expression, and how are we to judge just how
substantial a problem there may be? Will the United States muddle through .as in the case
of past national difficulties, or is the present situation so different as to be uniquely
ominous. Impressionistic statements abound as to problems of race, poverty, violence,
drugs, the cities. the Universities and the environment. But can the actual degree of
difficult-,, disintegrate, i.e., that there might be a breakdown of peaceful political

142

International Relations 1 41

of German unity from the Middle Ages to 1571. Italian unity in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, preservation and dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, the union and
separation of Norway and Sweden, the gradual integration of Switzerland prior to 1848,
English-Welsh union after 1455, the formation of England itself, and finally the union of
the American Colonies into -the United States in 1789 followed by breakup in the Civil
War and the subsequent reunion. A total of sixteen shorter-run situations were derived
from the above cases.

This study questioned a, number of popular beliefs about integration. One such belief was
that modern life is somehow more international.. Based on figures for trade ratios,
immigration patterns and mail flow, the authors found evidence that this was not the case.
They also found that no modern industrial state had ever amalg«mated with another. A
second common belief that the findings contradicted was the idea that there exists a kind
of snowball process so that the size of national units is ever increasing. Thus the authors
point to such contrary cases as the inability of the United Kingdom to maintain its grip on
the American colonies or even on Ireland, the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, and the
dissolution of union between Norway and Sweden. Next, their analysis permits them to
challenges the belief that force has operated as an important factor in stimulating
integration. Historically, problems of policing and coercion rarely played a large role, and
military conquest proved to be one of the lest effective methods of integration. Finally,
and in contrast to still another widely held notion, they determined that even such a
feature as ethnic or linguistic assimilation did not constitute an essential background
condition for political integration.

Nine essential
conditions for establishment of an amalgamated security community were found to exist.
The separate entities had to have mutual compatibility of values, a distinctive way of life,
the expectation f stronger economic ties or gains, a marked increase in political and
administrative capabilities, superior economic growth, unbroken links of social
communication broadening of political elites, mobility of persons. and a multiplicity of
ranges of communication and transaction. Addition
conditions were found to. be of possible importance; perhaps the m -significant one of
these was mutual predictability of behavior. Among t more interesting conclusions, the
authors found that while bo’ amalgamated and pluralistic security communities
constituted practic means to integration, and both exhibited many, successful ses,
pluralis! had particular advantages. Most notably, there was only one case of failu
involving a pluralistic security community (that of Austria and Prussia . the German
Confederation); whereas there were numerous examples
failure involving amalgamated security communities (e.g. the United Stag

lnregratlon Theory

142

1861. Norway-Sweden in 1905, Austria-Hungary in 1917 England-Ireland in 1918, and

Metropolitan France with a number of wars and revolutions from 1789 to 1871. Although
there are limits to the application of the pluralistic model its relevance seems to be that in
seeking to bring about lasting peaceful relationship among countries, there may be a
greater payoff in concentrating efforts upon the less ambitious pluralistic pathway, rather
than gambling upon the more elaborate istic security communities remain preferable to
amalgamated security communities because they are easier to form and less likely to lead
to internal conflict.
By dealing with the situations in which political integration actually failed, the study
managed to identify a set of background conditions necessary (though perhaps not
sufficient in themselves) for disintegration. Examining the failures of England-Ireland,
Norway-Sweden, and three separate situations involving Austria, the authors found that
these conditions could be divided into two categories: those that increased the .burdens
on amalgamated governments, and those that reduced the capabilities of governments or
political elites for timely response. Under the first category, the authors identified
excessive military commitments, a substantial increase in political participation by
groups or

regions once passive, and an increase in ethnic or linguistic differentiation. Within the
second category they placed the conditions of economic decline or stagnation, closure of
the political elite (thus promoting
the rise of a frustrated counter elite), excessive delay in expected reforms and major
failure of a strong group or region to adjust..

Once again, a systematic effort to deal with the subject matter of international relations
suggests a means for improving our grasp of politics. In this case, the indicators of
disintegration provide a possible way of organizing our knowledge and even of predicting
possible future events of real consequence. For although the authors do not attempt to do
so, their

criteria can, for example, be employed in examining the contemporarisituation of the

United States. For nearly a decade, America has lived with

a sense of national crisis. Political dialogue the media, and private conversation have
become saturated with statements of the national predicament. But. how much does this
theme owe to ascertain

fashionableness of expression, and how are ,N,c to judge just how substantial a problem
there may be? Will the United States muddle through .as in the case of past national
difficulties, or is the present

situation so different as to be uniquely ominous. Impressionistic statements abound as to

problems of race, poverty, violence, drugs, the cities, the universities, . and the
environment. But can the actual degree of diflicultN-disintegrate, i.e., that there might be
a breakdown of peaceful political

awl

Intemational Relations

eot’nmunity? There are historical precedents for raising the question :~ the above criteria
provide a method for answering it systematicalh.-testing the situation of the United States
against each of several indicatc,. it is possible to gauge the nature of the contemporary
predicanlc compare it with past experience, and make predictions about the future.

In carrying out this analysis, it is clear that al three conditie reflecting burdens or loads
upon the government show serious increas throughout the decade of the 1960s. First,
military commitrne,,i, particularly in the form of the Vietnam War, have been substantial.
Wl1i the economic costs or (more importantly) the loss of human lives have ,1 been
nearly so severe as in World War II, their duration and politic impact do impose an
obvious burden. Second, there has been a substant: increase in political participation by
formerly passive groups. Most notab: by the blacks and other racial minorities, but also
on the part of studen t. anti-war activists, women and Wallace voters. A demonstration, or
ever; riot, is, after all, a form of political participation, but prior to the 196f participation
by these strata was far less evident. This brings us to the thir; conditions, that of ethnic or
linguistic differentiation.
Here the nasce;l black or Mexican-American movements for increased self-awareness an-
even separatism are obvious examples. Less obvious, but no less valid it this category,-
are other groups whose differentiation is such that a sense of community may no longer
exist between them and the broader political entity. Here again, portions of the youth,
advocates of the counter-culture and various political extremists of left ad right, are
clearly differentiated The extent of these differences is important because Deutsch et al.
has identified the ability to communicate, or a sense of ”we feeling,” as a definite
requirement for successful integration.

If the above conditions reflect sharply increased burdens, what then do the capabilities for
meeting these appear to be? Here, the picture is less obvious. To begin with, the
economic situation was one or rapid and sustained growth throughout most of the 1960s.
For all the inequities. environmental consequences, and later _diffrculties stemming from
budgetary consequences of the Vietnam War, the real standard of living of

most Americans rose during this period, and only reached stagnation during the recession
of 1970-71 (at a time of slightly reduced political turmoil). Next there is the question of
elite closure. Here the picture may be slightly less satisfactory, as the various political,
administrative, and business elites perhaps have offered only a limited accessibility to nc
’’’ mobilized strata. Related to this, there does appear to be excess deh< expected
reforms. To a certain extent, the. problem may be one C re% olution of rising
expectations, but the fact is that the response of political system has not been perceived as
effective when contrasted 1~

integration Theory
144

the magnitude of the problems facing it. (Here, the burden of military commitments may
have had its most serious effect.) Finally, has there been a major failure of a strong group
to adjust. In this case, we must include those groups whose political mobilization and
differentiation made up the burdens upon the political system. In addition, there may be
further difficulties of adjustment as a consequence of both technological innovation and
the changes wrought by those efforts that are made to deal with the above problems. Thus
elements of the celebrated ”silent majority,” « bite ethnic groups, blue collar workers,
businessmen, teachers, a military leaders, as well as some students blacks, and the poor
may resist adjustment to either the status quo or to innovations in it.

From this over<~iew, one conclusion may be that the strongest element in favor of
persistent national integration is the economy; indeed, prosperity
may operate as a kind of social cement. The prediction could

follow that the overall situation will remain manageable so long as the economy stays
healthy. The United States would thereby be able to maintain a balance of capabilities
over burdens. However, were the United States to falter into uneconomic predicament as
serious as the depression of

the 1930s, on top of the present social problems, burdens might then outdistance
capabilities and the picture would become truly ominous. The use of the disintegration
indicators has thus permitted us to gain a measure of perspective on a complex and
sprawling situation; it also suggests the importance of economic prosperity, which might
not otherwise have been so obvious. Indeed, not only has this exercise enabled us to
analyze and make tentative predictions, but it also produces criteria for significant policy
recommendations. In this case, the importance placed on sustaining the health of the
economy could be translated into recommendations that such needs take precedence over
military or space commitments, and perhaps that the government ought to pay careful
attention to maintaining employment at a level as high as possible, even at a cost of some
inflation, budget deficit, or international financial difficulty.

There is of course room for criticism here, both of the North

Atlantic study and of the above application of the disintegration criteria. one thing. the
North Atlantic study treated societies that were mostly p”:industnial, for another, the
United States would
fagment along state or geographic lines as it.

The Sectors of Integration ’

What functions have been given over to the integrative process? ~fl~at purposes,
normally seined by national governments, have been ”misted to higher political levels?
The answers to these questions lie in 1hc different sectors of integration.

hardly be likely to

lnternatlonal Relations

Economics

Historically, the sector most frequently integrated has been the economic sector. The
most familiar integrative organizations are ”common markets,” in which the member
states consolidate all or part of their economic activities. The European Economics
Community (EEC), the Central American Common Market (CACIvI), the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) are among the most familiar.
The function of a common markets is to raise economic potential through policy
consolidation. Two particular instruments are used. First, the members eliminate barriers
to trade among themselves, so that goods flow freely in trades. Second, they agree to treat
outside
states with a single economic policy; their economic policies concerning nonmembers are
not only coordinated but are also identical and mutually enforced.

Because economic interaction is highly complex, it is instructive to consider economic

subsectors. In the European experience, for example, progress toward a full free trade
area has developed at different rates and with vastly different amounts of enthusiasm in
the industrial and agricultural subsectors. Although it has not been easy, principles for
industrial free trade areas were more readily achieved than were those for agriculture. In
addition, Britain’s entry into the Common Market was delayed not only by French
politics (on Britain’s first serious attempt to gain entry in 1963, President Charles de
Gaulle vetoed its membership) but also by British fears of the impact on its agricultural
subsector. Upon entry in 1973, Britain suffered inflation in food prices but anticipated
that gains in industrial trade would favorably affect its balance of payments (increase
exports over imports) and would stabilize the British economy.

Another distinction involves production and producer. Though an economy consists of

production of goods and services. goods and services are produced by people. Therefore
there are important labor aspects to a free trade area--standardization of wages in
industries, conununity, agreement on fair labor practices, free flow of labor across
national boundaries, and agreement on pension and unemployment benefits.

In addition to labor and produce, another aspect of economic integration is the

availability of capital, without which efficient. coordinated growth cannot occur. If this
means borrowing from abroad. then one state (even perhaps an outside state) may
dominate growth by controlling both capital and decisions about capital utilization.
Creation of a common medium of exchange among participating central banks facilitates
payments. Western European integration achieved this milestone in 1971 with the
establishment of the E-note (E), which is exchangcablc only among the nrcmber
treasrNes.

,hregration Theory

Social Considerations
The second major sector is the social sector. Although it may be technically feasible to
integratic economics, ultimate integration requires mutual toleration and common social
and political values. Social integration means transforming national preferences into
loyalty to the larger political community. Supranational attitudes must evolve.
There is considerable evidence that such a process is now occurring in Europe. Studies
reveal that the degree of ”Europeaness” among nationals of various European states--the
degree to which people sense themselves part of a larger political community--is growing
steadily. Then also demonstrate variations among age groups, with younger people
generally more favorably disposed toward supranational attitudes. Furthermore, available
data suggest that the growth of supranational consciousness is accompanied by outward-
looking attitudes: A united Europe is seen not only as a political community-for self-
service but also as a stabilizing force in the international system.

146

Politics

A third sector of concern to integration theory is, the political sector. though it is not
nearly distinguished from other sectors. Societies are replete with bonds of patriotism,
loyalty, historical mythology, and a sense of national difference. Political integration
refers, therefore, to the relatively narrow concept of integration of basin political
institutions--with transfer of sovereignty over external policy to common international
institution. It aims not to eliminate national governments but to alter their control over
specific functions. These changes may affect internal matters of the state, such as fiscal
policy or production policy. In integration short of full federation, there is no pretense to
transfer of full sovereignty over internal matters.

Despite this limited expectation. political integration is more diffrcults ac?sieve than is
economic integration, chiefly because the latter is expected to strengthen the national
economy, thus encouraging dual loyalty to nation and larger community. Political
integration, in contrast. directly affect the state’s sovereignty over decision making with
respect to its nationals its institutional effects are more visible, and the assault on
nationalism is more nearly frontal. The state is reduced in stature. Only where this is
regarded as a desirable objective has the concept of political integration caught on.

A variety of interpretations exists about the relationships among Political integration.

social integration. and general governmental cooperation. Some hold that social
predisposition is the critical measure of .ntegration potential. Others insist that the
creation of institutions among

international Relations 147

generally sympathetic states will create the social conditions necessary for political
integration. Empirical studies indicate, however. that improvement in intergovernmental
relations must precede both institution building and changes in societal attitudes. Western
Europe integration illustrates this point.

It was apparent by the mid-1960s that political unification of Europe required a revival of
internationalism in France. Always conscious of French historical and
cultural uniqueness, President de Gaulle’s view of European organization was pragmatic:
How much can France profit from integration without sacrificing national identity?
Toward the end of his long public career, de Gaulle confided to Christopher Somas,
British ambassador to France, that he anticipated as an ideal ”a looser form of free trade
area with arrangements by each country to exchange agricultural produce, and s small
inner council of a European political integration vas not part of Gaullist politics, and both
the entry of Britain into the EC and French governmental receptivity to political unity
awaited the. passing of the Gaullist era.

The forthcoming entry of Britain along with Denmark and Ireland in 1973 set the stage
for a forward-looking summit conference in October 1972, at which ministers from the
three incoming states participated. There a general agreement was signed calling for a
phased schedule of political unity by 1980. Details of the unity were to be culminated in
the first phase, scheduled to end in 1975. The departure of de Gaulle, the enlightened
attitude of his successor. the willingness of the British Conservative government to with
stand the attacks of the Labour opposition in entering the EEC--these and other events
converged to give new life to the spirit of political supernationalism among the Nine. Bv
January 1976, major achievements had been scored: the Tindemans Report on
progressive integration was published; a formal agreement had been made for direct
election of the European Parliament in 1978 (as contrasted with assignment of members
from the respective national parliaments): and the members had intentionally presented a
common front at the United Nations on the economic matters considered at the special
session on the new international economic order. In addition. within the communltv need
political alliances had formed. and on matters of deliberation there had developed a
tendency for cross-national parties and interest groups to discuss policy on the basis of
shared interests rather than to resort to the more primitive device of national caucuses.

As is not uncommon, howes-er, progress toward political integration has failed to keep
up with the plan. The direct election of tile European Parliament was postponed to 1979,
but even in advance of the event some observers expr~ssed the view that the very
preparation for such

integration Theory

elections had a profound effect on the national politics of the member states. One such
observer noted that in the preparations, European subjects had become more important in
public debate, that European voters were aware that Europe
itself would soon become a fourth level of politics for their consideration--local, state,
national, and now continental. In addition, it nvas apparent that the forthcoming elections
were promoting latent transational links among European political parties. All of these
trends seemed to revive earlier attitudes toward the probable political spillovers of
economic integration and seemed to give new life to the notion of at least a partial
transfer of loyalty from the nation as the source of services and economic vitality to the
union of nations.

Another little-noticed trend gave added evidence of progress toNvard political union. By
the end of 1978, based on a nine-year old agreement on European political cooperation, a
substantial EC diplomatic presence was discernible around the world, which might in
time result in the development of a structure for a common foreign policy. Working
principally through a presidential commission, the directors-general responsible for
various aspects of the community’s affairs (such as external relations, agricultural trade,
international development, and the like) had begun consulting regularly on behalf of the
community in several capitals, including Washington, Tokyo, Peking, and Ottawa. They
had placed fifty representatives in the developing world and elsewhere and had stationed
conferences with several international organizations. In the words of two commentators
on the subject, ”Without any clear or agreed plan for developing the Commission’s role
in bilateral diplomacy, incremental gromh has nevertheless produced an extensive pattern
of Community missions in (nonmember) countries. In 1981, the EC’s diplomatic activity
resulted in an elaborate proposal, presented to the Kremlin, for the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan.

Even though the direct election of the European Parliament in 198-1 had la disappointing
voter turnout as contrasted with the election of 1979, the 1983--1985 period showed
substantial declaratory progress toward political integration. During that time, the EC
produced a draft treaty on a European Union and a Solemn Declaration on European
Union, each in one way or another calling for improvement in the EC’s institutions and
policies concerning economic activity, social policy, international relations outside the
community. and the union’s finances. In a climactic event, the European Council of
Ministers met at Luxembourg at the close of 1985 to review reports and strategies, most
particularly the report of the ad hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs (the Dodge
Committee), and from their deliberations produced the Single European

148

International
Relations 149

Act and called for its ratification by member governments by the end of 1987.

These events demonstrate the occasional interdependence of integrating sectors. In the

judgment of at least one recognized expert ol, EC affairs, this progress resulted from a
recognition that without another leap forward in integration, Europe would continue to
suffer the effects of the absence of common planning during recession and to lag behind
the United States and Japan in such vitally- competitive fields as information technology.

Once critic of the pace of Western European integration argues that without a renewed
political impulse. the region will be unable tc complete in the technological revolution
with the United States and Japan While great progress has been made in the area of trade,
integration in the economic sector has not made sufficient progress to permit the EC to
compete effectively. Only with new awareness of the need for political integration can
the EC achieve the kind of comprehensive economic polic., and investment program to
promote production and financial integration so that it will no longer be limited by the
forces of the market and American financial agents.

Security

The fourth major area in integrations is the security sector Integration may follow
existing alliances, but it implies considerably morc than more alliance. Generally, an
alliance is a political instrument througli which the dominant member gains political
access to the decision-making processes of the lesser members, in return for which the
weaker states arc guaranteed strategic assistance. Integration calls upon all members.
whatever their relative power potentials, to contribute to decision making at all levels of
planning, deployment, and command.

Integrated alliances are rare. Despite the frequency of alliance since the Concert of
Europe (181 >). governments have generally resistcU giving total strategic control to
common institutions. The Warsaw Pact--the military alliance of the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European allies-is about as integrated as an alliance can be. The Soviet Union,
through it-, political control and economic supremacy. regulates the power and tll~
respective roles of the other allies, thus virtually dictating policy. Th~ North Atlantic
Treaty Organization has consistently clung to unilateral control. Much of the recent
history of NATO diplomacy has revoh’c, around attempts by the Western European
members to break down th” American position. While troops and conventional war
materials have bee” integrated to a conside?;able extent, fully integrated decision making
doe’ not yet
exist.

,ptegration Theory

1 sc>

These observations lead to preliminary conclusions. First, considering the importance of

strategic policy to national survival and to po«,erful national elites, security integration
must follow political integration. The creation of alliances does not ensure integrated
policy making. integrated commands, or integrated allocation of resources. Second, given
the same political realities, moves toward security integration occur mainly in times of
crisis. They are the result not of political and social preferences but to immediate vital
need.

3, Goals of Integration

The following are the major goals of integration.

Economic Potential

Historically. the largest single motive has been the desire to maximise economic
potential. In the presence of a few giant economics. smaller states have been unable to
keep pace with competition. Whether they are less developed states or old industrial
states, the hope of fully competing may be a call to integration.

After the Second World War the Western European states rebuilt their industries only to
discover that once-great national economics were lost in the American shadow. The
economy of the Western world had become asymmetrical, with the United States
commanding the greatest produce for export, the largest and most technically developed
labor force, and the most innovative entrepreneurial skill. For reconstructed Western
Europe to compete it was necessary to merge national economics. Though this meant
hardship for agriculture, six governments agreed in 1957 to establish the European
Economic Community (the Common Market). with an elaborate plan for integrating trade
among themselves and for a common trade policy with respect to nonmembers.-In the
first sixteen years of their integrating experience, during which the Economic Community
consisted only of the potential second only to that of the United States.

Political Potential

A second major motive for integration is the desire to maximize political potential. With
rare exception, small and politically powerless states have had little impact on the
international system. especially during the bipolar era that followed the Second World
War. Small states have felt either left out of or victimized by, a world of two massive
poN\cr centers
Some view integration as the route to reestablishing a multipolar world in ”loch their
diplomacy may achieve more favorable results.
Conflict Resolution

A third impetus to integration is the desire to resolve potential conflict among territorial
neighbuors. If there is nascent conflict among

Intematlonal Relations lsl

states forced by geography to be interdependent, integration of vital

sectors of their interaction may outweigh the existing sources of strife.

The most notable instance of such motivation was the founding in 1951 of the European
Coal and Steel Community by the same six states which founded the EEC a few years
later. Though the ECSC was the r,.,. implementation of long-range plan for European
economic integration, . was addressed more immediately to a specific problem: the age-
old Franc . German rivalry over coal and steel resources. At a prerss conference
1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman declared that:

That gathering of the nations of .Europe requires the eliminatic, of the age-old opposition
of France and Germany. The first concern in ar., action undertaken must be these
two.countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes to tal,, action immediately on
one ’limited but decisive point. The Fren,! Government proposes to place Franco-German
production of cc,:, and steel under a common ”high authority,” within the frame«or. of an
organization open to-the participation of the other couiitri; of Europe.

The Schuman Declaration, previously approved by the Frew. Council of Ministers;

resulted in the ECSC. Most important, however,
the specific intent which Schuman emphasized--the interdependence C European
economic integration with elimination of this historic cause c war.

How effectively does progress toward supranationalism actuall, diminish conflict among
the participants? While integration does nc eliminate strife, it does reduce its frequency.
Denying that this proves
causal link, one scholar contends that ”when combined with awareness an, concern on the
part of Central American elites about the relationslu; between economics integration and
violent conflict, it does provide som,
useful evidence for the existence of the probable relationship :”

But not all students of integration are persuaded that organizatio reduce the likelihood of
war among members. Using five measurements 0 integration (common institutional
membership, proximity. econonu interdependence, sociocultural similarity and similarity
of UN votin-behavior), for example, another scholar has reviewed the history of confli~
among forty-one pairs of states. He found that ”All five of these conditiol” may be
necessary to prevent war between states .... but not even all f ” together are sufficient to
do so.” The greater the interdependence arnon nations, the more sensitive their salience
becomes, and the greater the’ prospects of conflict. Unfortunately, the closest neighbor
may have th largest number of chances to fight--and may do so despite tbel:

jMtegration Theory

152

interdependence. Thus the desire to resolve conflict

is not invariably an adequate cause for .integration. Even in such circumstances the loads
(duties, expectations and so on) placed upon integrative processes may exceed the
stabilizing capabilities of organization.

Even though Western Europe now exemplifies a high degree of integration, conflict has
not disappeared. Raymond Aaron, French political scientist,-has warned that Europe is a
place and an idea, but it is not a unity. Still another European has written a Ten
Commandments for ”The Nine,” the first of which is, ”Do not confuse Europe with
Uniformity. Europe. is not uniform and attempts to make it so will be rightly resented and
resisted.”

Scholars have adopted the same tone. Nothing that community is built upon a growing
sense of cooperation, we are reminded that:
’ The members of the Community do not confront each other only or chiefly as
diplomatic gladiators; they encounter each other at almost every level of organized
society through constant interaction in the joint policymaking contexts of officials,,
parliamentarians, interest group leaders, businessmen, farmer, and trade unionists.
Conflicts of interest and purpose are inevitable. There is no paradox between the progress
of economic integration in the Community and sharpening political disagreement, indeed,
the success of economic integration can be a cause of political disagreement. The
member states are engaged in the enterprise for widely different reasons, and their actions
have been supported or instigated by elites seeking their own particular goals. Therefore,
conflicts would seem endemic as the results of joint activity come to be felt and as the
pro-integration consensus shifts.

Progress aside, integration, is a dynamic process. Goals change, roles shift, new leaders
and elites emerge, old influences wane and new ones burst onto the scene. Integration
may thus proceed in a xQgional system of constant conflict. Indeed, since progress
toward supra nationalism creates stresses of its own. the process may have negative
effects upon the overall relations of members. Reason dictates that while the resolution of
regional conflicts may be one of the expectations,of integrating members, the very
process itself may be the cause of strife.

4.

Background Conditions for Integration

Alone common expectations about regional fixture are not sufficient to promote
integration. Certain preconditions mist be satisfied, though sub-consciously for the most
part.

International Relations
Social Assimilation

To some observers, the foremost precondition of regi,,;;.,,

integration is social causation, resulting in a so-called sociocms,,
paradigm of integration. Focusing upon transnational attitudes,
this pos,;,
that social assimilation is a precondition of integration. Critics of t1,;;
concept reject the assumed necessity of social assimilation. Nevertheless
most observers agree that minimal social prerequisites do exist, and than
among them are mutual tolerance of cultures, common identity of foreig,;
policy goals, and generally cordial contacts of governments and respective
nationals.
Value Sharing ,
A second precondition is value sharing, especially among elites
In the economic sector, for example, unless the elites of participating states
share common values, such as capitalism or socialism, or free market as
contrasted with central controls and subsidies, they will expend little
energy toward integration, and little pressure will be. exerted upon
governments. Again, this is a sociopolitical condition.
Mutual Benefit
Expectation of nurtaral benefit is the third precondition. Since
states will enter into a process which fundamentally alters national
prerogatives only with sufficient incentives, states must be able to predict
that benefits will

5. Maintaining the Momentum of Integration

Starting along the integrative path and continued progress toward
the goal of supranationalism are quite separate issues. Hence, in addition to
certain preconditions which permit the process to begin, certain
combination of ”process factors” must be present to govern steady progress.
Bureaucracy
Functional Satisfaction The institutionalization of a political process
involves the

generation of a bureaucracy, specially trained to manage sectoral activities. Since j high

degree of technical competence is needed in addition to
administrative skills, these bureaucracies are customarily referred to as technocracies. But
not only do the technocrats manage the day-to-day affairs; they must also coordinate the
expectations of elites. soothe the sensitivities of governments, and make the unremitting
case for further development. They are not only technical experts and intergovernmental
managers: they are also the guardians of the integrative process.

Community Jurisprudence

Another. though less visible. process condition is the development or, ~•,;,prrrrmrti•
jrrrt.~tv-Iluence, a commonly recognized body of law which governs legal relations of
the respective states. If governlnellts or

First among these is firractiorral .calls faction.- that is, recognition by pertinent elites and
officials of the degree to which integrated policy is serving their interests. This
recognition promotes feedback, thus fueling greater sectoral integration and encouraging
spillover.

Increased Pacific Transactions

A second process factor is an increased •f-equencv of pacific transaction.

The rate and number of transactions are measures of mutual reliance, revealing
governmental willingness to compromise sovereignty W specific sectors. Since
increasing interdependence is indispensable. the rate of transactions is a criticalmcasure
of progress. Yet one recent study has cautioned against oven-aluing transactions as a
causal factor in the grov’th of integration in:reased transaction are more a reflection of
integration

1ntegrati®n Theory

that a cause. Yet it is probable that satisfaction in these contacts, originally an effect of
integration, now encourages additional contacts, and is thus a major determinant of
sectoral feedback.

Regulation

Gradually. the transaction of integrating sectors must become institutionalized. Informal

regulation cannot continuously serve the objective of formal integration. A third major
process condition is flue
proliferation of institutions with sufficient authority to regulate.
Ultimately, these institutions must assume the national governments’ normal legislative
and executive prerogatives. Complete transfer of such authoriy from national
governments to common institutions is the final stage of the integrating process; and with
its completion a supranational community may be said to exist. At present, the maximum
progress toward complete integration of a subsectors is represented in the High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). which has been authorized by its
members to exercise sovereign authority over the allocation of the pertinent resources.

The achievement of full multisectoral supranationalism requires establishment of

sufficient institutional machinery to govern the community. This means development of
legislative. executive. and judicial institutions, each vested with full authority’ in its
realm. At present, one of the most interesting developments in Western Europe is the
drive inspired principally by Great Britain, to wrest legislative control from the Council
of Ministers of the European Communities and to invest full legislative authority in the
European Parliament. Eventually, it is hoped by advocates of ultimate federation of
Europe, this body will be a multinational legislature.

I >-l

Intemational Relations 15
;
corporations of different states become involved in legal problems. it is ,ZO,

productive in an integrating community to rely upon the judicial practice,’ of one state or
another. Furthermore, if a community.institution and a star; have a legal disagreement,
the development of a body of law and o, community courts is eventually necessary in the
development of supranational politics. The Court Of Justice of the European
Communities senes this need,
and has already developed a large body of case la„ governing the relations of the
communities, the member states and individual technocrats.

Increased Decisions

Increased transactions, formation of institutions and technocracies, and the establishment

of a common core of_jurispnidence all point to the next process condition: increased
deasiolral ocjtprrt. It cannot be said that integration is under way merely because of
institutional appearances; rather, measurable and reliable decisions, upon which go`-
ernments and pertinent elites willingly depend and with which then comply consistently
are indispensable. Institutions can have no productive effect upon national elites unless
they are able to command the external transactions of those - elites. Only through actual
decisions does the institution become the authoritative vehicle of an international process.

Mass Attitudes

All of the foregoing process factors imply increased relations and communications
among elites. But in addition, the process of integration requires that mass political and
social attitudes also be nurtured. Thus, a seventh important process factor is the
development of mutual mass attitudes. Though progress toward integration may build
upon elite pressures, governments are not likely to sacrifice national prerogatives or to
respond to narrow demands for supranationality until appropriate attitudes have rooted
among their electorates. This development must take place in most or all of tree
participating nations. In this way, mutual expectations are regularly communicated
nations. In this way, mutual expectations are regularly communicated across national
boundaries, the benefits of continued progress become more familiar to individuals, and
nationalitic attitudes begin to recede. British entry into the Community was paradoxical
membership. It was thus expected that while Britain’s membership might eventually
accelerate integration, there would be a lag time during which British elite and, popular
attitudes would catch up with those on the continent. In fact, it was not until 1975 that a
British referendum derhonspated decisively the public desire for full membership in the
European Community.

156

Integration Theory

External Factors
External factors of either of two types may influence the ittegrative process. First, they
may be external events which absorb the e,Iergies of one of the participants in
community. These events may prevent fill and earnest participation or in some cases
accentuate regional preferences. French foreign policy provides examples of both
phenomena. Before the Gaullist era, French participation in European integration was
impeded by preoccupation
with problems in North Africa and Indochina. But for a decade commencing in the mid-
1950s. President deGaulle turned these problems around and directed energies inward.
Those years ,htnessed the most vigorous steps towards European supranationalism. Thus
integration may depend on external events in which one of the community members is
vitally engaged. These are ”member-centered” eternal events.
Other external events are not member-centered, but may nevertheless have major impacts
upon the integrative process. The foreign policies (potentially even domestic policies) of
other nations may touch upon one or more of the members of a growing community with
either irtegrative effects or disintegrative effects. The unpopularity among Europeans of
American policy in Southeast Asia undoubtedly heightened the sense of Europeanness
and correspondingly diminished the p>ychological bonds with Washington. Except in the
security sector (NATO), then, the Vietnam War (as a nonmember-centered .external
factor) had integrative effects upon Europe. Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, a resort to long invisible Soviet politics, was an event of similar meaning to
Western Europe.

A most instructive nonmember-centered external event occurred it 1962 with telling

effect upon European economic integration. Already concerned about future competition
from Europe. American merchants sought long-term relief from tariff barriers. As a
result, the Kennedy aaminitration sought and secured from Congress discretionary
authority to negotiate substantial reciprocal tariff reductions. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorized executive discretion for a period of five years, during which major
changes in American trade policy might be negotiated.

The EEC members entered into the subsequent negotiations called t)te Kennedy Round
with full awareness of the American intent to safeguard industrial exports against future
competition. This awareness s)arked renewed activity in the EEC toward eliminating
internal restraints to trade, and resulted particularly in resolution of many of the thorny
acriculturai problems which had previously retarded progress toward a full fee trade
arrangement.

International Relations

These negotiations. together with growing America investment in Europe designed to

”get behind” the tariff barrier comprised a clear signal to EEC members that major
industrial competitors feared the successful culmination of the free trade area, and
provided added incentives for conscious development. Resentment over this form of
exploitation also sparked European attacks upon the American balance-of, payments
deficit. accentuated European degaulle’s efforts ”to de, Americanize
Europe.” and generally raised the level of Europe. consciousness. Hence there were
significant social and political spillovers.

Transfer of Loyalty

The final process conditions is really the measure of all of the others: the transfer of
loyalty gradually from national community values, objectives and institutions. It means
the adoption by national majorities of farreaching supranationalist attitudes. As this itself
is a functional requisite, such a development does not occur except through individual
recognization of the profitability of integration. Nor will it occur in several nations unless
there is sufficient communication by which societies can measure attitudinal progress in
neighboring lands. Social communication is thus vital to the transfer of loyalties.

The loyalty transfer process is one of continuing socialization in which positive value
communication substantiates the need for comnnmin--oriented attitudes. Several studies
have concluded that Europeans look less and less to national governments for critical
decisions and increasingly to community institutions. Socialization data point almost
incontrovertible to further integration in economic, social, and political sectors in
Western Europe. Public opinion polls in 1962, for example, showed over,vhelming
preference for unification and widespread expectation that it would occur within ten or
fifteen years. Furthermore, responses to questions pertaining to internal matters of the
European Communities showed huge favorabilitv of integrated policy. More recently,
sur<ei of French attitudes has been conducted (within three weeks of British entry in
1)73). On questions of direct election of the European Parliament, the evolution of a
formal Community government an C0171111u111h- supremacy in such critical areas as
defense. diplomacy economics, and nuclear and space development, the number of
respondents who preferred Community-oriented solutions consistently exceeded those
who favored state-oriented policy, though approximately one-third of respondents gave
no opinions. Repeatedly. therefore, socialization data have underscored public preference
for. Ind acceptance, or regional integration to the extent of spillover from the economic to
the political sector.

~pte9ration Theory

In this examination of integration, we assume that supranationalism is healthy and that it

is to be encouraged and lauded. But if integration occurs, then its impact upon people and
upon international order is worth exploring.

First consider the effects of integration upon the subjects of an integrated community.
Although it is conventionally presumed that these persons will. for the most part profit
from integration,
some observes raise the negative aspects. Integration may very well raise standards of
living. indices of production, and so on, but what will life be like? Does supranationalism
necessarily make the individual’s life more pleasure?

Although this question defies definitives response at the.present time. depend upon
perpetuating the initial causes. In causes. In security communities, the original cause is
threat; and the perpetuation of securitY institutions may thus depend upon successful
threat perception and the ability to convince populations and appropriating agencies of
the continuing character of potential crisis. Should this occur-if persons propagandize and
even roman-ticize crisis-potential for institutional or personal aggrandizement-then
institutions may prolong crises, contributing to the disassociating effects carried by the
original antipathy. Institutionalized alliances always bear this danger. and since integrated
institutions magnify the political potential of elites, supranationalosecurity-conununities
may impede global stability.

There may also be a dangerous aspect to tile connection between supranational

institutions and domestic institutions. Science successful integrative trends require close
cooperation between regional technocrats and services for personal purposes. Thus the
command officers of an integrated military community may gain inordinate access to
legislative politics, to the great detriment df domestic policy. Strong. and sernisecretive
national regional competition among interacting elites may hasten the erosion of the
beneficial aspects of national life.

Despite the dangers implicit in integration from both domestic and international
perspectives at present the prevailing attitude is that regional integrative trends are
healthy, productive, and promising of a brighter future for national propels and for global
stability. Indeed, one French student of community affairs has gone of far as to write that
”Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major centre of
the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonised victim but the
examplar of a new stage in political cwilisation.” But two others have entered an incisive
condition: that ”the connnnniriws capacity to act constructively in the world depends in
the last resort Oil its just society. ”

International Relations

1 iy

It is safe to conclude that the application of integration to a,p, ,region will encounter a
similar variety of predictions.

The American perception of Integration

Having maximized its own political, social, and economic potentialities through
federative
integration and having undergone
bloody Civil War to preserve union, it is natural for the United states to favor integration.

Indeed, at the close of World War I1 the United states not onl% encouraged but also paid
about $ 15 billion to reconstruct Europe through the Marshall Plan (European Recovery
Program). From the start the United states assumed that the Western European
participants would plan to gather a forerunner to the economic integration which the
United states intended to encourage. Taking cues from Winston Churchill, Jean Bonnet
and others, Americans such as Secretary of State George C. Marshall. William L.
Clayton, and Christian Herter joined from this side of the Atlantic in constructing the
foundations for a United States of Europe.

The dramatic recovery of Western Europe depended in large measure on America’s

assistance and willingness to undergo a decade or more of disadvantageous trade
principles of that Europe might speed its reconstruction. Although the principles of the
international monetan system and of free world trade were dectated principally by the
United States, they benefited Western Europe even more. They opened wide American
markets to European produce: and they protected the infant European industries from
American competition. Now that EC has matured, time has come to restructure the
system, for the United States ought no longer be asked to bear the burdens of trade and
monetan disadvantages. For economic purposes, a U.S.E. (United States of Europe) now
exists, and its competitive ability has surpassed the American concessions to its
maturation. That the EC not have disassociating effects in the Western hemisphere, the
rules of the road must be changed. Negotiations for the new codes of economic behavior
between Europe and the Americas commenced at the close of 1971, precipitated largely,
b~ justified American insistence and partly by European responses to Washington’s
unilateral policies in the two preceding years.

Other than in Europe, the United States continues to encourage economic integration,
though successful industrial competition which mighty alter American attitudes has not
arisen from any other integrated region.

On the matter of political integration, the United States takes 3 some-what dm ~er view.
Even in Europe, Washington’s view is ambivalent about political supranationalism,
which would deprive

1hiegiation Theory
i

Washington of the ability to negotiate with European capitals individually on certain

matters, and would remove the traditional rite of playing one power off against another.
Preservation of the American role in the larger traps-Atlanten community thus dictates a
cautious approach
to European political integration

The Perceptions of America’s Major Allies

As the world’s prime promoters of integration, the- attitude of America’s Western
European allies in the record of their, experience., Bit what of Japan and Canada’? ,

The Japanese view is not entirely clear, though logic would seem to construct a negative
attitude. In the first place, just as the United States had retaliated against Japanese
economic success, so too has it against the resurgence of Europe. But since the target of
such actions is rarely specified, am- Western-oriented industrial producer is likely to feel
the burnt of American protection. Secondly. Japan’s exports are industrial and Europe is
a large industrial market. The efficiency of European industry-, together with the
common barriers to trade raised against external competitors: reduces the probable sales
of Japanese goods in Western Europe. And third, because of Japan’s huge balance-of-
payments deficit to the oil-producing states, it desperately needs to compile surpluses by
its industrial trade to places like Europe. Though it cannot be said that Japan is hostile to
European integration, it appears that integrative success is detrimental to the distribution
of Japan’s industrial exports.

In its own region of the world, Japan is actively promoting development both through
public assistance (largely through the Asian Development Bank) and through private
capital flows, but is interest is not now in integration. Instead Japan is attempting to
construct industrial markets, particularly in places rich in natural resources.

Canada’s view of integration is typically restrained. Itself a federal state, integrate

experience is understood by custom. Yet the British entry into the European Community
placed economic strains on Canada which, as a member of the British Commonwealth,
had previously enjoyed a free trade relation with Britain and had particularly profited as
an agricultural supplier. British entry not only removed those advantages, but presented
the added strain of making industrial trade more difficult at precisely the point when
Canada was undergoing a major phase of-, industrial development. Even in 1973,
nevertheless (the year of British entry). Canada’s balance-of-trade surplus with respect to
Britain continued to rise. But it will be a few years before Britain must comply fully with
the common tariff’ policy, of the Community, suggesting that the Canadian payments
respect to the world at large, it is probable that the European

160
ami -Timm

International Relations 161

Community will eventually present costly barriers to Canada’s industrial trade.

The
Soviet Perception of Integration

The forced integration of the Soviet regions in the civil war NN Rich followed the
Bolshevik Revolution, succeeded by years of intense ”Ratification” of the non-Russian
peoples of the Soviet Union, speaks vividly for the Soviet tendency to favor integration,
at least among its friends and allies. Post-World War 11 incorporation of Eastern Europe
in a related economic supranationalism directed from Moscow, as capital of the

Socialist commonwealth, accentuates this view. But as for integration in the West, the
Kremlin’s view is mixed, and has changed with progression from the cold war to the era
of peacefiil coexistence.

Initially, the Soviet Union saw American interest in the integration of Europe not as a
move toward economic stabilization, but as part of the effort to subject the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe to capitalist encirclement. In the wake of World War 11 and the
division of Europe, the United States sought to isolate the East politically and
economically by strengthening Western Europe as a hug economic colon), and political
puppet of American interests. In a view increasingly shared by Western Europeans, the
Soviets see American economic restoration as a way not to creased through the EC, the
Soviets look upon the effects as salutary to American economy overseas. And in a view
increasingly shared by American revisionist historians, the Kremlin sees economic
restoration principally as a step towered preventing the kinds of economic and social
conditions which mighty have made Marxism an attractive doctrine to Western
Europeans. American motives were, therefore. either imperialistic or ideological, or
perhaps both.

The integrative trends in Europe have been both more peacefiil and more successful that
those of Eastern Europe, a contrast which is a source of embarrassment to the Soviet
Union. Yet as economic integration increases through the EC, the Soviets look upon the
effects as salutan- to their objectives. Western European economic strength decreases
dependence upon the United States. This facilitates pan-European trade without
involvement with American capital. It also may diminish the general harmony of
transatlantic relations. giving Europeans more independence in their policies, especially
toward the Communist world.

But to the Soviets, Western European integration has one characteristic that is especially
important. The Kremlin is aware of the partial incompatibility of European integration,
on the one hand. and security dependence upon the United States through NATO, on the
other. Like many- Western observers, they acknowledge that NATO has had
disintegrating-’effects upon the European members.
If integration is to

lateyration Theory

proceed, Washington’s domination of NATO must be minimized. The

spin-off effects of integration upon the American security role in Europe
are thus negative as viewed from Washington, but positive from the
,,antage point of the Kremlin. -

At present, therefore, the Soviet Union favors Western European integration because it
tends to reduce the American role in Europe, principally in the security sector, but in the
economic as well. If the aim of soviet foreign policy is to divide the Western allies, then
European progress that causes any division from the United States--particularly that
reduces American dominance--is to be encouraged. Hence the fundamental paradox of
the Soviet perception: while the Soviets use coerced integration to keep Soviet allies in
line on political, economic, and security matters. they expect voluntary integration in
Western Europe to divide the Western alliance. reducing the United States as a European
actor.

The Chinese Perception of Integration

In Peking, regional integration is seen through the lenses of both an emerging superpower
and a huge underdeveloped country. As a major poiier. China’s principal objective is to
prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from dividing the world into two giant
camps. Thus any reduction of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe is useful; and any
political trends that diminish American dominance in Western Europe are likewise
desirable. Such developments dilute superpower politics, and reduce the gags which
China must fill to reach full to reach full major-power status.

As an underdeveloped country, China strives for multipolarity and encourages

competition among major blues that will further reduce super poIxer control. While
China itself intends to be a power pole in a future multipolar world, it looks to other
centers to achieve the same end. Western Europe, Ah its enormous economic potential
and its ability to generate a nuclear deterrent free of American strategy. is one of the
critical areas in the future global power distribution.
Pragmatic considerations also govern the Chinese perception. Faced with the huge
problem of industrializing rapidly, China’s trading needs are large. And although Japan is
a natural target for trade. a long h’st’on~ of Sino-Japanese antipathy, coupled with the
humiliation of Japan’s close relations with the United States during the years in which the
U.S. isolated China, mitigate against full reliance on Japan. Industrial trade Il~ith,
Western Europe, as productive as Japan and as much in need of Chiina’s raw materials, is
an available alternative. And, paradoxically,
with the vacuum left by American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, China e\Pects to
benefit from any strong Western coalition which will divert the attcmtion of the Soviet
Union from the Asian theater, even if pan-European

162

International Relations 163

stabiliy enables the Soviets to station more divisions along the C
border..
integration Theory 164
As to China’s view of integration elsewhere, its policy is not Ne
clear. While integrated economies in Asia and the pacific would both associate
members and to former colonial possessions of the members.
accelerate development and reduce foreign interference, such trends would ’thus it is
enjoyed only selectively by the Third World.
rely heavily upon Japanese capital, goods, and political superiority. This is On
balance, however, integration is a common goal of the Third
unacceptable to China. Hence while somewhat reticent on the subject. World,
though the necessity for nationalism both impedes progress and
China specific political reasons does not look favorably upon integration in
ensures that, for the foreseeable future, supranationalist progress will be
its own geographic region. i;,uited to the economic sector.
The Third World Perception of Integration
Although there is considerable regional organizational activity ;,~
the Third World, progress toward integration is beset by a peculiar
dilemma. The governments are confronted simultaneously by a need for
rapid development and by the careful nurturing of nationalist spirits
required by modernization.. While integration of the economic sectors
might increase the pace of modernization, the other edge of the sword of
nationalism prevents such progress. In the older regions of Central and
South America the dilemma has been bridged. with the resulting Central
American Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Association.
and the Andean Pact. But in the newly independent areas, only the East
African Common Market (EACM) has achieved much integrative
progress. The merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into Tanzania has had
little external effect, and the Arab states have not successfully integrated
either politically or economically. While the Asian and Pacific Council
(ASPAC) and the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA) may eventualh
embark upon supranational trends, they have made no measurable progr~-
to date.
Yet Western Europe continues to be the focus of forward-look””’
n Third World statesmen, both as a model of economic promise and as ,1 symbol of the
passing of bipolarity and of superpower imperialism. Sons Third World states,
particularly former colonial possessions of Fra,n: enjoy the status of associate
membership in
the EEC. This status
controversial, for awhile the associate member is accorded tariff concessio~w among the
EEC members, it must also award such preferences to otl1= members. This latter
condition in some cases offsets the benefits
associate membership, payments balances. and infant industries.

I There is one aspect of the European Community which is ;

undeniable benefit to the Third World. In recent years the members of ~ w
community, acting in a coordinated but nonintegrated way, have becoll’
major providers of development funds. By 1970. the total foreign assist,”’,
offered by the Six exceeded the annual foreign aid budget of the Unite
States for the first time. Generally, however, such lending is limited

CHAPTER 8

CONFLICT AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

~o„fiict and Conflict Resolution 166

of conflict concrete enough to make them subject only to a narrow range of technical
criticism. An exemption is the substantial and ,wide ranging literature on how to define
revolution

The Characteristics of conflict, Crisis, and competition

Conflict leading to organized violence emerges from a particular combination of parties,

incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and
military actions. The parties to an international conflict are normally, but not necessarily,
the governments of states (obvious exceptions would include the various palestinian
guerrilla bands and the secretary-general of the United Nations). Parties seek to achieve
certain objective, such as additional or more secure territory, security, control of valuable
resources, access to markets, prestige, unification with neighboring ethnic groups, world
resolution. the overthrow of an unfriendly government, and many other things. In efforts
to achieve or defend these objectives, their demands, actions, or both will run counter to
the interests, ideals, and objectives of other parties.

An issue field or stake is the subject of contention between the parties and includes the
positions they are attempting to achieve. Conflict behavior (attitudes and actions) is likely
to result when party A occupies a position that is incompatible with the wishes, ideas, or
interests of party B and perhaps others. The critical condition is thus one of scarcity,
where a move in an issue field by one party is seen to be at the expense of the other
park’s position. This is often called a zero-sum situation: One’s gain is the other’s loss.
The term tensions refers to the set of attitudes and predispositions-such as distrust and
suspicion-that populations and policy makers hold tonard other parties. Tension of not by
themselves cause conflict
but only predispose parties to employ or manifest conflict behavior should they seek to
achieve incompatible objectives. The Israeli and Syrian governments display distrust,
fear, and suspicion to-ward each other, but incompatible positions on an issue, such as
control of Jerusalem and the Golan Height’s, must arise before these predispositions or
attitudes lead to diplomatic or military actions. In o:her words, antagonism, distrust,
suspicion, and the like are not sufficient conditions for the occurrence of conflict or crisis.

Finally, conflict includes the actions-the diplomatic, propagandist. conrntercial, or

military threats and punishments discussed that - the roe tending patties take toward each
other. We thus distinguish the issues ated out of incompatible collective objectives, the
attitudes of polio ”Aers that predispose them to make threats and carry out punishments.

Definition of Conflict:

Conflict phenomena are the overt, coercive interactions contending collectivities. This
working definition is intended to be bra: enough to encompass the full range of
threatening, forceful, and NioL interactions that occur among groups and nations. There
are many ot, definitions of conflict, some broad, some more narrow. Ours dire: attention
to interactions that have these four distinguishing properties. first three of which are
identified by Mack and Snyder:
1. two or more parties are involved
2. they engage in mutually opposing actions

they use coercive behaviors, ”designed to destroy. in’ thwart, or otherwise control” their
opponent
.1. these contentious interactions are overt, hence
occurrence can easily new detected and agreed uPO’’
independent observers.

The essential purpose of this definition is to characterize tlrb

conflict phenomena or behaviors that are juxtaposed in this chapter
not designed to resolve more fundamental (and irreconcilable) dct
about what distinguishes conflict from competition, or whether st”’
minds. intentions, and situations should be included in the ’doll”’.
studies. Our definition also says nothing about hoNI- to distin=’
more homogenous categories of conflict phenomena. For good or bad.
ernpir al research on conflict evades the need for abstract definition’
distincti lrs f ccifc’

by employing precise operational definitions o sh

_ V
and the actions taken. Tensions are only a part of conflict, the u
psychological dimension. What, then, is a crisis?
A crisis is one stage of conflict; its distinguishing fratures include a sudden eruption of
unexpected events caused by previous conflict. q conflict, such as the fate of the
Palestinians or sovereignty, over Taiwan

may container for decades,

but occasicnall~ , sudden and unexpected hostile actions by one party will raise tensions
and perceived threat to such a point that policy makers of the responding state feel.
compelled to chops

between extreme alternatives, including making war or surrendering. proilthe policy

makers’ point of view, the hallmarks crisis are il) unanticipated

(surprise) actions by. the opponent: (2) perception of great threat; (;,, perception of
limited time to make a decision or response and t41 perception of disastrous
consequences from inaction. Name of these eve,tt, or perception is likely to occur unless
there has been a preceding conflict.

If we adhere to these definitions of conflict and crisis, we can eliminate some situations
that are frequently classified as conflict. First, situations in which private citizens become
involved with another grovenment or with citizens of another country over some
contentious issue and subsequently call upon their own government to provide them nitj
t
protection or redress can be called ”disputes.” We will exclude them from most of the
ensuing discussion because, in most cases, they did not invohc the collective objectives
of governments. To cite some examples: the accidental shooting of farm animals near the
frontier by the border police of a neighboring st a the violation of an international frontier
by a group of armed bandits; and frontier guards shooting at each other, where such an
incident was not organized and commanded by a government. Such incidcnis and the
ensuing disputes may- lead to conflict and even war if there are tensions and other
conflicts between the two states. In most cases. however, they are detail with through
legal.or administrative procedures and have little bearing on relations between
governments.

Second, our definition of conflict and crisis excludes what ma), be termed international
competition. Recall that the perception of scarcity is a central ingredient of conflict,
where a move of position by one state in an issue field is considered a loss or threat by
the other party. In a conflict, the issue field, like a pie, is usually of a fixed size. If state A
obtains a larger piece, state b perceives it will necessarily receive a smaller one. h,
competition, however, the size of the pie varies. State A may try to achieve some
objective or increase some value. hut this effort means neither that state 13’s share of the
value will decrease nor that it will be totally exclude

from sharing in that value. In the heyday of European and American imperialism during
the latter part of the nineteenth century. the Western states could compete with each other
for colonies and markets
as long ns

conflict and Conflict Resolution t

the territory available for colonization and commercial exploitation kept
expanding. However, once all the non-Western area of the world had been

caned up between the imperial nations, none could gain more except at the expense of
some other imperial power. Thus, competition changed to conflict.

We can now examine international conflict in the twentieth

century according to the four components: parties, issue fields, attitudes, and actions.
This will provide us with a basis for assessing the relative effectiveness of means of
resolving international conflict.

Incidence of International Conflict

Thanks to major research projects investigating the characteristics and correlates of

international conflicts since 181 >, we are today in a better position to understand not
only the sources of international conflict but also the nature of those that are more or less
likely to end in war. In a major study of ”serious interstate disputes” (what we have
called conflicts). Zeev

Maoz has identified the incidence of such conflicts, all involving the threat, display,
and/or use of military force, their location, participants, and outcomes. In the period from
1815 to 1976, he identified 827 conflicts. 210

of which occurred in the nineteenth century, with the remaining 617 in the twentieth
centuw. For the entire period, there was an annual average of 5.2 oar-threatening or war-
producing conflicts. The most peaceful period followed the Napoleonic wars, while the
period since 1945 has been the

highest pumber of conflicts. In an absolute sense, the world today is significantly more
”war-prone” then it was in previous eras. However. ”’hen we consider that in the 1820s
and 18 30s there were only about 2
states, and that today there are more than 180. the incidence of conflicts.

when divided by the number of actors, has, not actually increased. .Maoz’ figures
indicate, on the contrary. that the most conflict-prone era was

between 1910 and 1920 (an artifact of World War I). while the period since M() has been
comparable there have been about 1.2 conflicts per state in the system betweCn 1950 and
1976, while the figure for the relatively

peaceful 1830s and 18=tOs is about 0.8. Overall, the twentieth century has been
somewhat more conflict-prone than the preceding eras. but not sta>rtli,rgl`. more so.
Maoz’ findings support a conclusion from a number of other

siud,es: The great powers account -for a significant number of conflicts. vlthough their
number leas fluctuated between four and eight in the two centuries studies. they have
participated in about -11 percent
of all
`oudicts
~~cntt’ali, either as initiators of the conflicts. as targets. or as parties
cic,-c~t lc.tding embroiled ranked deco ding to Uerosts ihc
acts ahonal

lntematlonai Relations I 69

These figures underline the predominance of the great powers .,; initiators, targets, and
involved parties in international conflicts. Whil they emphasize the conflict-proneness of
these kinds of states, the bulk ~ conflicts--about 58 percent--are between minor states.
However, since y;` data do no include the number of years a state has been in the system,
the. do not serve as an entirely satisfacton- measure of the propensities Cvarious kinds of
states to become involved in international conflicts. Mao

has thus divided the raw numbers of state participation by the years cstatehood, giving an
annual frequency of conflict involvement (see Tab;, 14-2).

Conflict Participation by Mates, by Rank, 1815-1976

STATE AS INITIATOR AS TARGET TOTAL INVOLVEMENTS

United States
Great Britain
Russia/USSR

France ,

Prussia/Germ
any

Turkey

Italy

China
Japan
Peru
Israel

56 47 26 27

20

25 29
28

28

40

99 76

70

sa

52

so

47

4s

Again, the great powers predominate, although medium or smal: states almost perpetually
involved in conflicts since 1945 head the list Note also that among the major powers,
England and the United States ar. the countries most likely to initiate a warthreatening or
actually violen’ conflict.

The figures establish the predominance of the great powers in the world’s map of
international conflicts for 160 years. Yet, various research projects suggest a possible
reversal of the pattern: The incidence of maY power confrontations has declined slightly
(2.16 annually from 1945
1976 compared with 2.60 pi rw to World War I), while the incidence o’ minor power
conflicts has g:r v• n dramatically--from 2.47 annually from 1900 to 1914; to 10.10
annually in the post-1945 period. Most of the mina’ power conflicts since 1945 have
occurred in the Third World. Ma”’

Conflict and Conflict Resolution

14,3 Annual Frequency of Country Conflict Involvement, 18-5-1976

STATE ANNUAL FREQ.

INTIATE ANNUAL FREQ.
TARGET FREQ. OF
INVOLVEMENT
Israel .s0 .s2 1.61
India .s2 .41 1.10
North Vietnam .s0 .36 86
Liganda .s7 .29 .8>
l’aited States .32 .18 .7s
Great Britain .3s .lI .74
Russia-’USSR .29 .19 .73
1 ranca .16 10 .63
Ynissial/Germany .21 .22 .s9
Yew .17 13 .54
,1;,Y,„l.23 15 46
Clung .18 .16 .4>
Italy .13 .07 .36

involve attempts of the newer states to develop secure borders and to unify
ethnic/language and religious groups divided by colonial frontiers. Secessionist
movements have also generated a number of conflicts between
Third World countries. Mean while, the traditional arena of international conflict-Europe-
has become a zone of peace, where there has been an absence of armed conflict between
states for a half centure.

Table 1.4-3 supports the observation that most wars since 1945 have occurred in what
was known as the Third world. When we investigate the genesis of those wars, moreover,
we find that most began as civil disturbances, rebellions, secessionist movements, and
civil wars. The pattern that emerges indicates that the prime locale for wars has been
”weak states,”. If the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first half of the twentieth century were
the eras of wars between European states. and imperial wars by European states, the last
half of the twentieth century- has been the era of wars within weak states. These have
often escalated to interstate wars when one or more outside powers-usually the traditional
great powers-inten’ened. Typical examples would include the civil wars in Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Sri Lanks (all weak states) which escalated through outside armed
intervention by the United states, Russia. and India, respectively. More recently, the
weakly successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have been the locales
for war, warlordism, and ethnic hatreds. The main problem facing the world at the end of
the millenium is less classical-type wars between states, but wars arising from rebellions,
ethnic secession movements, and the birth of new states and the collapse of old states.
The figures on issues that led to these wars support the generalization.

International Relations

The issue Fields in international conflict

What were the parties quarreling about? Over what kinds of issues were they making
threats and occasionally going to war? If we go back far enough in the history of the
modern states system, we can see dynasts warring over questions that strike us as bezarre
by today’s standards. They fought over claims to thrones, dynastic inheritances, and
religious questions. But they also went to war to expend their domains, to control
strategic waterways and mountain passes (thus giving them increments-of security), over
colonies, and to control fishing resources-things that still give rise to international
conflicts today.

The figures in Table 144 indicate that most armed conflicts have multiple issues
underlying them. This is why the columns add up to more than 100. The Gulf war of
1991, for example, involved the survival Of South Vietnam as an independent state (not
rerecognezed by communist states), government composition, , and ideology, and from
the North Vietnamese perspective, national unification.

Problems
of state creation, ethnicity, secession, and national unification have been the major issues
underlying wars since 1945. All of

Issues Underlying Fifty-Nice Armed Conflicts Since 1945

FREQUENCY APPEARS IN PERCENT

OF CONLICTS
State-eraation/etlutic unifieationlirredenta/
Protect ethnic kin abroad 42 73
Territory or boundary disputes 31 53
Ideology/govenurnnt compositirnt. 16 28
Crate or regime survival 12 21
fend’support ally 9 16
sources/trade/and/or navigation R 13
these are associated with the problems of weak states, government legitimacy. and the
status and rights of minorities. The search for statehood and the struggle of weak states to
survive have spread ,in the 1990s to the former Yugoslavia and to many of the former
Soviet republics. As of the mid-1990s there were major nationalist-inspired armed
conflicts taking place in locations as diverse as Georgia. Bosnia, Croatia, Sri Lanka.
-Myanmar. Sudan, and Rwanda. In each case, there is a minority movement
’ seoing statehood. on one side. and a weak state seeking to survive in its
original format. on the other;

Control over territory constitutes the second most important issue underlying armed
conflicts. This category refers to outright land grabs. as

Cams let and Conflict Resolution

has been seen in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, as well as disputes over the exact
location of boundaries.

Wars have also arisen over the composition of governments. These reflect ideological
issues where, for example, a major power will intervene militarily to prop up a
beleaguered ally or to topple a regime it considers a threat to its own security or to the
security of its allies. The United States has intervened militarily on numerous occasions
as a means of overthrowing regimes it could not, for whatever reason, tolerate, or of
supporting those that requested military assistance. Included in the long list of such
interventions are Lebanon (1958), Vietnam (starting in the late 1950), Grenada (1982),
Nicaragua in the 1980s, and Panama 1989). The Soviet Union intervened militarily in
Hungary (19>6), Czechoslovakia (198), and Afghanistan (1979) to quell reformist or
anti-Soviet revolutionary regimes.

The reader may wish to speculate on the kinds of issues that will generate conflicts in the
future. Now that the Cold War has passed into history,`will ideological divisions continue
to drive wars? If the world’s resources diminish,--while demand continues to increase,
will we see more uses of force to maintain access to or control ever them’? Will
population pressures compel some states to search for more territory? Or, if the value of
territory in general has declined, given that national strength
today in based more on science, technology, and economic performance that on control
of geographical space, will scrambles for territory cease to be a major source of war?
Will the collapse of weak states become more frequent?

Attitudes

We can say little regarding the unique configuration of attitudes that underlay the action
taken in each of these international conflicts. Our comments will refer. there fore,
primarily to the general conclusions that can be drawn from the diplomatic historical
literature on crisis behavior, as yell as the studies of social scientists who have concerned
themselves with foreign policy decision making in conditions of great stress. These
studies show that certain attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround
any serious conflict or crisis. These frames of mind help to eXpvain the propensity to use
violence in attempts to achieve or defend collective objectives. The following are some of
the most typical attitudes: In each case, we can illustrate how the attitude affects the
decisions policy makers ultimately take in a crisis.

Suspicion is directed toward opponents, their intentions. and the motives underlying their
actions. Intentions and actions of friendly states not in conflict are larger- predictable. In
a

lntematlonal Relations 169

These figures underline the predominance of the great powers ,~ initiators targets, and
involved parties in international conflicts. Whil” they emphasize the conflict-proneness
of these kinds of states, the bulk ~,; conflicts--about 58 percent--are between minor
states. However, since th,, data do no include the number of years a state has been in the
system, the,, do not serve as an entirely satisfactory measure of the propensities 0 various
kinds of states to become involved in international conflicts. Mao, has thus divided the
raw numbers of state participation by the years ~~ statehood, giving an annual frequency
of conflict involvement (see Tablc 14-2).

Conflict Participation by States, by Rank, 1815-1976

STATE AS INITIATOR AS TARGET TOTAL INVOLVEMENTS
United States

Great Britain
Russia/USSR

France ,

Prussia/Germ
any

Turkey
Italy

China
Japan
Peru
Israel

56 47 26 27

20

25 29

28

40

99 76

70 58 52

so

47

45

Again, the great powers predominate; although medium or small states almost perpetually
involved in conflicts since 1945 head the list. Note also that among the major powers,
England and the United States are the countries most likely to initiate a warthreatening or
actually violent Conflict.

The figures establish the predominance of the great powers in the world’s map of
international conflicts for 160 years.
Yet, various research projects suggest a possible reversal of the pattern: The incidence of
m?1Ot power confrontations has declined slightly (2.16 annually from 1Wi 1976
compared with 2.60 pi rw to World War I), while the incidenc• minor power conflicts has
g:c.wn dramatically--from 2.47 anriuallv -’~’ 1900 to 191-4; to 10.10 annually in the
post-1945 period. Most of the 11W’’ power conflicts since 1945 have occurred in the
Third World. Nl~

Conflict and Conflict Resolution

1:1.3 Annual Frequency of Country Conflict Involvement, 18-5-1976

STATE ANNUAL FREQ.

INTIATE ANNUAL FREQ.
TARGET FREQ. OF
INVOLVEMENT
Israel .50 .52 1.61
India .5241 .10
Vietnam .50 .36 86
Uganda .57 .29 .85
United States .32 .18 ,7j
Great Britain .35 11 .74
Russia/C1SSR .29 .19 .73
France .16 .10 .63
Pmssial%GennanY .21 .22 s9
Pem .17 .13 .54
Japan .23 .15 .46
(China .18 .16 .4j
Italy .13 .07 1North
.36

involve attempts of the newer states to develop secure borders and to unify
ethnic/language and religious groups divided by colonial frontiers. Secessionist
movements have also generated a number of conflicts between Third World countries.
Mean while, the traditional arena of international conflict-Europe-has become a zone of
peace, where there has been an absence of armed conflict between states for a half
centure.
Table 1.4-3 supports the observation that most wars since 1945 leave occurred in what
was known as the Third world. When we investigate the genesis of those wars, moreover,
we find that most began as civil disturbances, rebellions, secessionist movements, and
civil wars. The

pattern that emerges indicates that the prime locale for wars has been ”weak states,”. If
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first half of the twentieth

century were the eras of wars between European states, and imperial wars by European
states, the last half of the twentieth century has been the era
of wars within weak states. These have often escalated to interstate wars when one or
more outside powers-usually the traditional great powers-inten’ened. Typical examples
would include the civil wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanks (all weak states)
which escalated through outside armed intervention by the United states, Russia, and
India, respectively. More recently, the weakly successor states of the former Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia have been the locales for war, warlordism, arid ethnic hatreds. The
main problem facing the world at the end of the millenium is less classical-type wars
between states, but wars arising from rebellions, ethnic secession movements, and the
birth of new states and the

collapse of old states. The figures on issues

that led to these wars support the generalization.

International Relations

The issue Fields in international conflict

What were the parties quarrelin ab

out’ Over what kinds of issues were they making threats and occasionally going to war?
If we go back far enough in the history of the modern states system, rye can see dynasts
warring over questions that strike us as bezarre by today’s standards. They fought over
claims to thrones, dynastic inheritances, and religious questions. But they, also went to
war to expend their domains, to control strategic waterways and mountain passes (thus
giving them increments-of security), over colonies, and to control fishi
give rise to international conflicts today.

The figures in Table 144 indicate that most armed conflicts have multiple issues
underlying them. This is why the columns add up to more than 100. The Gulf war of
1991, for example, involved the survival Of South Vietnam as an independent state (not
rerecognezed by communist states), government composition, . and ideology, and from
the North Vietnamese perspective, national unification.

Problems of state creation, ethnicity, secession, and national unification have been the
major issues underlying wars since 1945. All of

Issues Underlying Fifty-Nice Armed Conflicts Since 1945

ISSUE FREQUENCY APPEARS IN PERCENT

OF CONLICTS
State-creatiort/etlmic unifieatiort/irredenta/ 42 73
Protect etlmic kin abroad

ng resources-things that still

Territory or boundary disputes

Ideology;’govcnuuent composition.
Crate or regime survival
fend/support ally
sourceshrade/artd%r navigation

these are associated with the problems of weak states, government legitimacy, and the
status and rights of minorities. The search for statehood and the struggle of weak states to
survive have spread in the 1990s to the former Yugoslavia and to many of the former
Soviet republics. As of the mid-1990s there were major nationalist-inspired armed
conflicts taking place in locations as diverse as Georgia. Bosnia, Croatia, Sri Lanka,
Myanmar, Sudan, and Rwanda. In each case. there is a minority movement seeing
statehood, on one side. and a weak state seeking to suwive in its original format. on the
other;

Control over territon

underly ing armed conflicts. This catcgow

constitutes the second most important issue refers to outright land grabs. as

conflict and Conflict Resolution

lras been seen in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, as well as disputes o~er the exact
location of boundaries.

Wars have also arisen over the composition of governments. These reflect ideological
issues where, for example, a major power will inter,•ene militarily to prop up a
beleaguered
ally or to topple a regime it

considers a threat to its own security or to the security of its allies. The United States has
intervened militarily on numerous occasions as a means of overthrowing regimes it could
not. for whatever reason, tolerate, or of

supporting those that requested militay assistance. Included in the long list of such
intementions are Lebanon (1958), Vietnam (starting in the late 1950), Grenada (1982),
Nicaragua in the 1980s, and Panama 1989). The Soviet Union intervened militarily in
Hungary (1916), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) to quell reformist or
anti-Soviet revolutionary regimes.

The reader may wish to speculate on the kinds of issues that will generale conflicts in the
future. Now that the Cold War has passed into history. yvill ideological divisions
continue to drive wars? If the world’s resources diminish,-while demand continues to
increase, will we see more uses of force to maintain access to or control ever them? Will
population pressures compel some states to search for more territory’? Or, if the value

of territory in general has declined, given that national strength today in based more on
science, technology, and economic performance that on control of geographical space,
will scrambles for territory cease to be a

major source of war? Will the collapse of weak states become more frequent?

Attitudes

We can say little regarding the

unique configuration of attitudes that underlay the action taken in each of these
international conflicts. Our comments will refer, there fore, primarily to the general
conclusions that can be drawn from the diplomatic historical literature on crisis behavior,
as well as the studies of social scientists who have concerned themselves with foreign
policy decision making in conditions of great stress. These studies show that certain
attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround any serious conflict or
crisis. These frames of mind help to explain the propensity to use violence in attempts to
achieve or defend

collective objectives. The following are some of the most typical attitudes: in each case,
we can illustrate how the attitude affects the decisions policy makers ultimately take in a
crisis.

Suspicion is directed toward opponents, their intentions, and

the motives underlying their actions. Intentions and actions of friendly states not in
conflict are largely predictable. In a
lntemational Relations

conflict or crisis, however, a sudden change in relationships is likely, as well as a high

degree of uncertain) and unpredictability-as indicated by the great lengths hostile

governments will go to engage in

espionage against each other, and to deduce intentions from capabilities
should they have such large military forces if they don’t plan to use them against us?”).
Suspicion colors (usually pessimistically) speculation as to the other side’s intentions.
Peace gestures, for example, will probably be rejected as a trick.

A feeling of urgency surrounds the policy makers, at least during the crisis stage of an
international conflict. They commonly feel that only a little time is available for making
critical decisions and correspondingly believe that unless decisions and actions are taken
rapidly. disastrous consequences, ensuring from the enemy’s hostile actions, may result.

3. Under the feeling of urgency and the uncertainties

surrounding the adversary’s motives and actions, policy
makers perceive fewer alternative courses of action open to
. them selves that to the enemy. In the typical crisis situation, a
government will announce that it has ”no choice” but to
respond by some military means, yet asserts that it is in the
hands of the enemy to decide whether peace or war will
result. One’s own options appear to be closed, while it is
perceived that those of the enemy remain open.

4. Policy makers perceive the crisis, if not all conflicts, as a

turning point in the relationship between the parties and
sometimes in the history of the world. A corollary is the
common opinion that a war will somehow ”solve” the
problems between the conflicting parties.

2.

5.

In a crisis, perceptions of threat are more salient than perceptions of the opponent’s
relative capabilities. The practical consequence of this common response is that if a
government perceives a great threat to a fundamental value, it will be willing to resist
with armed force- even though the odds of staving off the enemy’s military actions are
perceived as slight.

Underlying these situational attitudes are two more fundamental predispositions. In tong-
standing conflicts, policy makers tend to become captives of their own propaganda and
stereotypes. Adversaries are ofte”,

Conflict and Conflict Resolution

174

-constructed” through the media and other means. While in any conflict there are
conflicting issues and stakes, it is also the case that our attitudes toward adversaries are
deeply influenced by our images of them. In crisis situations. these images are often little
more than gross stereotypes and caricatures.

Consider American perceptions toward Japan. In the 1960s, the media characterized
Japan as an industrious, pacifist. well-ordered society making great headway in
overcoming the ravages of World War II. by the 1990s, a spate of American books and
films appeared characterizing Japan and the Japanese in highly stereotypic and
malevolent terms. These emphasized Japanese plans to conquer the world through
financial and industrial manipulation, evil designs against American consumers and
producers. cunning, economic cheating, and Japanese racism. Now that the Cold War is
over, we can see the processes by which a new enemy is being created in the popular
imagination.

The same processes have been repeatedly observed as the level of conflict between
countries increases. Policy maders who generally have more sophisticated views of
adversaries are nevertheless prone to rely on such stereotypes: and when they have little
or no firsthand knowledge of their adversaries, they may demonstrate images as crude as
those in the popular media. hostile attitudes are also amplified by conceptions of justice.

Many serious international conflicts are based on notions of right and wrong. conceptions
of injury, lack of fair play or reciprocity: Together, they can be considered questions of
justice, and not just of ”interest.” Take the difficult problem of Israel and the Palestinians
as one example. For more than forty years territorial, resource, security, and statehood
issues, as well as stereotypes, underlay the conflict. Many of these were fairly concrete.
but all of these arose because two peoples had fundamentally incompatible goals, the
achievement of which constituted an injustice for the other. For the other. For the Israelis.
the founding of a state in the biblical lands to protect Jews who had faced systematic
persecution and genocide in Europe was an eminently moral goal. Unfortunately, the
creation of a Jew°ish state meant the dispossession of a land inhabited for centuries by
Palestinians. The creation of the Jewish state, in other words, resulted in a major injustice
to the Palestinian people. What the Jews desired-a state-was denied to the original
inhabitants of the territory. This ”as an almost perfect zero-sum situation: The gain of one
was at the expense of the other. The entire conflict, then, was fundamentally about tINo
opposing conceptions of justice-two rights. To resolve this conflict requires some sort of
compromise that subtracts from important principles of justice. The more one feels that a
great injustice has been done. the more

international Relations

175 difficult it is to negotiate a compromise. It is easier to compromise over some ing

tangible like the terms of a trade treat’ or access to resources tha it is to compromise
fundamental principles. It is for this reason that ma y wars begin.

Empirical studies show that an injured sense

of justice clouds judgment, diminishes risk-aversion, and reduces fear of loss. It also
”closes” the mind- ”don’t bother me with the facts’’--- and renders policy makers less
open to persuasion through argument, offers of rewards, or threats. In general,
compromise is difficult to achieve because fundamental principles of right and wrong are
at stake. One cannot compromise principle without appearing to be unrighteous. This is
the foundation of conflicts that are likely to escalate to war.

Action

Various research projects have demonstrated that the presence of these and other
attitudes-hostility, lack of trust, stereotypes, and sense of justice-are directly linked to the
propensity of people to overreact to provocations. The studies help to explain why armed
force is frequently the action that is ultimately taken in crisis. protest, rejections. denials,
accusations, demands, warning, threats. and symbolic actions are likely to occur, whereas
formal negotiation is more likely in the settlement stage of the conflict or crisis. Some
common forms of action include:
1. Protest notes

Denials and accusations

Calling ambassadors home for ”consultations”
Withdrawal of ambassador assigned to the opponent’s capital
5., Threat of ”serious consequences: if certain actions by the

opponent do not cease

6. Threat of limited or total economic boycott or embargo
7. Extensive official denunciation of the opponent: propaganda
at home and abroad
8. Application of limited or total economic boycott or embargo
9. Formal break in diplomatic relations
10. Exemplary nonviolent military actions-alerts. canceling
leaves, partial or full mobilization
11. Harassment or closing of travel and communication between
the antagonists’ citizens

Formal blockades

14. War-of which there may be a great variety according to the nature of the
objectives, level of force, geographic scope, and so forth.

Note that a conflict or crisis may involve any of these actions and that many may be
taken simultaneously. Also, it should not be assumed that all conflicts and crises
necessarily ”escalate” from one step to the next; policy makers may decide to go from
denunciation and warnings to use of military force rather than proceed step by step to
war. Maoz’ data set includes seven wars that erupted suddenly, without a preceding
crisis. Notice also that many of the actions in the list involve symbolic communication. A
decision to call home an ambassador for consultation commonly indicates a
government’s serious concern with a situation or constitutes a limited form of reprisal. A
partial mobilization involves more than just effecting
some military plan; its main purpose may be to impress the opponent with one’s own
resolve to fight.

A review of conflicts and crises reveals a common sequence of actions and

counteractions that may end in the use of force. One government (the ”offensive” party)
presents demands or takes actions to change the status quo or its position in an issue field.
In almost all cases, it makes its position on some principle of justice. The present
situation, in other words, is regarded as violating some standard of justice, whether ethnic
unity, ”historical rights,” rule by a repressive and corrupt government, or the like. The
”defensive” party, communicates to the initiator that these actions or demands are a
violation of a treat’ or are a threat to its security or ”vital interests.” The offensive party
responds by claiming that its actions or demands are fully justified according to various
historical, legal, moral, or ideological criteria and that it has no intention of withdrawing
from them, although it is certainly willing to negotiate. The defensive party thereupon
begins to consider various responses to protect its interests, to block (deter) the
fulfillment of the offensive state’s demands, or to repel the tatter’s actions if they have
already been taken. Moreover, the defensive party usually refuses to negotiate until the
initiator has first withdrawn its demands or physical presence from the field or area under
contention. The offensive government, however, is publicly committed to its demands or
course of action and refuses to withdraw, although it still offers to negotiate. At this
point, the defensive party, after indulging in the usual protests and denunciations, begins
to take various reprisals and symbolic actions by withdrawing diplomats or ordering
mobilizations. If these actions have no effect--and they usually don’t--the crisis stage
may follow; the decision then has to be made whether to reply with force or to seek some
avenue of

International Relations 1 77

peaceful settlement. Overall, tit-for-tat patterns are often observable, but many crises are
also characterized by escalation strategies.

One study provides some clues about the incidence of various levels of coercion and
violence in international conflict. It classified 638 twentieth-century conflicts according
to the Highest level of threat. coercion, or force used in each. The possibilities were (1)
verbal threat to use force; (2) demonstrations of force (e.g.. alerts, mobilizations): (3) use
of force with no casualties (e.g., blockades); (4) use of force involving

fewer than 1,000 fatalisties; and (5) war. involving more than 1,000 fatalities.
Only 4 percent of the confrontations ended at the level of verbal threats, 22 percent ended
with the parties involve in displays of force, 27 percent involved forms of nonviolent
coercion such as blockades and commercial embargoes and boycotts; and 31 percent
reached the level of force, but with relatively, few fatalities. The remainder 16 percent,
resulted in war.

What were the outcomes of the 827 conflicts spanning the years 1815 to 1976, as
identified by Zeev Maoz? Sixty-three ended in wars: that is, there was less than a 10
percent probability that a ”serious international dispute” involving military threats of
various kinds escalated to actual combat involving the loss of 1,000 or more lives.
Temporally, the rates of escalation to war have been declining since a peak of 20 percent
was reached in the late 1940s and early 1950s. For the period 1955 to 1976, the
probabilities have fallen to about 6 percent, but the time period is probably too brief to
establish this as a definite trend. Maoz’ figures reveal that conflicts between major
powers are more likely to escalate to war (23 percent for the entire 160-year period) than
those between minor powers (6 percent). These figures are badly, skewed by the history
of war until 1945. however. Since that time there has been no war (with the possible
exception of the Chinese ”volunteers” fighting American troops in Korea) between the
major powers. Finally. Maoz’ study reveals clearly the pattern of outcomes defined by
wins, losses, and ties. Regrettably, the conclusion is that aggression, or at least conflict-
initiation, tends to pay. Of the 827

conflicts, initiators won 59 percent and lost only 13 percent. Ties constituted the
remaining 28 percent. And, as we would expect, major powers tend to prevail when
confronting the smaller parties. In major power versus minor power confrontations,
where the former were initiators, the great powers won 68 percent of the conflicts, lost
only 8 percent, and the remaining 2:1 percent ended as ties.

The Possible Outcomes of International Conflict

We will distinguish the outcomes or settlements from the procedures of formal

diplomatic bargaining. In our discussion, then. a conflict may be ”settled’ through
conquest--with virtually no ”diplomacy”!

Copflict and Conflict Resolution 178

e`cept perhaps in drafting the terms of surryder--o’r it may be resolved through some
official compromise arrived at after extended negotiations and mediation. In other words,
we will use the term outcome or settlement to mean any sort of final result of the conflict,
no matter how it was achieved. The term procedures, on the other hand, refers only
to the formal diplomatic means of arranging some sort of settlement. There are least six
possible outcomes: avoidance or voluntary withdrawal, violent conquest, forced
submission or effective deterrence, compromise award, and passive settlement.

Avoidence

When the incompatibility of goals, values, interests. or positions is perceived by both

sides, one possible solution is for one or both parties tot’; withdraw from a physical or
bargaining position or to cease the actions that originally caused hostile responses.
Although this may not seem very likely, it is probably the most common behavior among
governments that normally maintain friendly relations. When, for instance, a government
initiates a proposal with its neighbor to make certain frontier adjustments in its favour
and the neighbor insists that the status quo must be maintained, the initiator may, not
wishing to create bad relations, with-draw the request or demand.

Conquest

A second outcome, conquest, requires overwhelming the opponent through the use of
force. Even the termination of violent conquest involves some agreement and bargaining
between the antagonists, however. One side must be made to realize that peace, even
under terms of unconditional surrender. is more desirable than the continuation of the
conflict. One side may achieve this goal by forcing the other to realize that the
possibilities of achieving even reduced objectives or successfully defending itself have
disappeared. This realization may come only after one side has achieved a symbolic or
important military confrontation, such as the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the Battle of
Waterloo, the Nazi occupation of Paris.

Submission or Deterrence

The criterion used to distinguish. submission or deterrence from conquest is whether a

threat to employ force is implemented. In submission or deterrence, one side withdraws
from a previously held value, position, or interest because the opponent makes effective
threats to ”push” him out by the use of force (in a voluntary withdrawal, or course, no
such threats are made). Even though no violence may occur. we will consider any
submission resulting from military threats a uonpeaceful mode of conflict resolution. One
of the parties accomplishes deterrence or force submission (deterrence if the initiator of
change in the status quo is forced to withdraw

lnternatlonal Relations

the offensive demand, submission if the initiator of new demands

accomplishes them at the expense of the status quo) by demonstrating to another parh~
that the probable risk of pursuing its actions or maintaining its position outweighs the
costs of retreating and withdrawing. For instance.. most observers
believe that the Allied military buildup in Berlin and West Germany in 1961 forced the
Soviet government to withdraw its plan to sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany. The Soviets apparently concluded that the risks of nuclear war were not worth
the possible gain in East German prestige from a peace treat’. ’

Compromise

The fourth outcome of an international conflict or crisis is some compromise in which

both sides agree to a partial withdrawal of their initial objectives, positions, demands, or
actions. The withdrawal need not be of the same magnitude to both parties (symmetrical).
Any settlement that entails some sacrifice of initial position by both sides can be
considered a compromise, even if one side seems to get the better of the bargain.

The main problem in arranging a compromise settlement is to get both sides to realize
that the price of continued conflict is higher than the costs and consequences of reducing
demands or withdrawing from a diplomatic or military position. An important
prerequisite for achieving a compromise thus may be a militar<stalemate, a condition
wherein both parties have neither the resources nor the will to conquer or force
submission of the opponent. Unfortunately, many governments do not raise international
issues to compromise them and are convinced at the beginning that no goal short of total -
victory” is consistent with national honor- some ideological principle. or ”sacred trust.”
Stalemate may thus come only after a protracted and tragic military encounter, as iii
Korea. Vietnam- and Bosnia. In each case. neither side was twilling to discuss a
settlement seriously- until a militar<• stalemate had developed. As long as any party
believed it could achieve its objectives even if slightly altered because of strong
resistance, settlement was not likely. The anticipation of possible victory is. thus a serious
impediment to compromise, as arc suspicion and distrust. the constriction of
communication, and a sense 01 ,justice.

:ward

A complicated outcome based on a previous compromise is thc award, wherein the

opponents agree to a settlement achieved through nonbargaining procedures. An award is
any binding decision effected by ar independent third part- (such as a court) or criterion
(such as majoriU rule), which sets out the substantive terms of settlement. Most conflicts
arc not- of course- resolved through awards. because procedurally they involer

Conflict and Conflict Resolution 180

,, surrender of bargaining and require a willingness to resolve the issue on
the basis of some impartial criterion, such as lacy, under which tlaene can
h,. only a wiener and a loser. If one side has only
a weak chance of gaining
a favorable decision, it is not likely to accept such a criterion, especially
when it sees a possibility of obtaining more favorable terms through a
bargained compromise. On the other hand, if a stalemate develops in a
conflict and if both sides trust the third pane- and expect a fair award. they
may be induced to accept the impartial determination of certain issues by
means of formal judicial proceedings. -

An award settlement need not, however, be made through litigation. As long as some
eternal and impartial criterion for settlement is accepted by both sides, the outcome may
be termed an award. even though it is administered by a nonjudicial institution. A
plebiscite to determine the allocation of contested territory and population is an impartial
device used occasionally to settle both international disputes and conflicts.

Passive Settlement

,
international conflicts have no formal outcome (deterrence, avoidance, compromise,
conquest, or aevard), but persist for a long period

until the parties implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate. Quincy Wright
has suggested that most international conflicts are resolved by becoming obsolete. That
is, both sides learn to live with a situation over a period of time, even though their formal
positions are incompatible. The involved governments have quietly reduced
commitments to their respective objectives to the point where no overt militay actions are
deemed worth the costs. It is almost impossible, however, to determine then a conflict
reaches obsolescence. Some conflicts--India-Pakistan and perhaps Cyprus. for example--
have been shelved, if not resolved, through the slow acceptance of new positions rather
than through formal agreements or settlements. These outcomes may never by very
secure, of

course, but since many recent conflicts have been handled in this fashion. ’t suggests that
sometimes the least violent method of settlement is the one ”’ Which both sides learn 1’ -

is tempted to impose a solution by force.

Any conflict evill culminate in one of these six outcomes. Some,

such as compromise and award. are usually achieved through negotiations,

°lediation or adjudication. and formal agreements, whereas others- such as
~”oidance and passive settlement, result from unilateral self-abnegation or
bilateral nonaction. The latter do not require formal negotiations or
treaties, vet they are just as much a evaO of settling g conflicts and crises as
’Ire surrenders or formal agreements.

to me evith their common problem until neither

international Relations )i

Outcomes of international conflicts, 1919-1994

Table 14-5 lists the

outcomes of ninety-eight armed conflicts for the period 1919 to 199-1. For purposes of
comparison. We can divide tile conflicts into the inter war (1919-1939) and postwar (19-
15-199=1) periods. The interwar period, culminating in the rush for territorial expansion
and empire-building by nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan,
featured a large percentage (42) of armed conquests. The figure for the postwar period is
significantly lower, at 26 percent. In the past twentv-five years. however, there have been
some significant conquests. including Turkey’s successful invasion of Cyprus in 1974,
North Vietnam’s militan-

Outcomes of International Conflict, 1919-1993

1919-1939 19-43-1994
(% Of 38 (% Of 60 % Of 98
OUTCOME CONFLICTS CONFLICTS] CONFLICTS
Conquest 42 26 31
Forced submission, deterrence 21
13

Compromise

Award

Passive settlement
Withdrawal--avoidance

Total 100 101 100

conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia ill 1979, Iraq’s
forceful annexation of Kuwait in 1990, and the Bosnian Serbs territorial expansion in
1992-199-4. The difference betty°ecn the NO periods. however. is that with only the
exceptions of the Iraqi invasion. Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, and
Bosnia. none of the conquests has led to the formal annexation of territory and the
destruction of a preexisting state. Vietnam represents a dubious exception because i) can
be argued that this was a case of national unification. not of one stag destroying another.

Also of interest is the 21 percent of conflicts that had award outcomes in the interwar
period. The figure reflects the extensive use °1 plebiscites to settle territorial issues in
Eastern Europe. Aside from tfe lower number of conquests since 19-15, the figures to
note in the posh”’ period are the percentages of conflicts solved (at least temporarily b’
,
passive settlements and voluntary Withdrawals. These have ncv cr rc•ui!y’ in formal
agreements or peace treaties.

25

2()
Conflict and Conflict Resolution
The Categories of Conflicts and Conflict Resolution

Table 14-6 establishes links between conflict characteristics and outcomes. We can
classify conflicts as class I. Ii, III, and 1V, reflecting the likelihood that they will escalate
to war, the relative difficulties of resolving them short of armed violence, and the types of
outcomes that are typical in each class. Class I conflicts have the following
characteristics:

1. The parties recognize each other as legitimate and are

therefore willing to negotiate with and generally to ”respect”
each other, as states and governments with whom they can
deal in a civilized fashion.

The issues generally refer to

concrete interests and are relatively easy to identify. The situation is often characterized
as one that, if a compromise is reached, both (or more) parties will-gain. Many trade
agreements are of this type. There may be serious differences on some issues (e.g.,
American irritation with certain Japanese trade policies), but both sides

recognize that if these irritants can be resolved. they Will gain through the otherwise
mutually profitable trade.

The attitudes of the participants are ”open.” That is, they are willing to listen to factual
arguments, they, search for data and

information to get an accurate picture of a situation before taking steps, and implicitly at
least, they acknowledge that their policies might be wrong or amendable. in which case
they indicate to the adversary ”Shoal me why, your position is better.”

-1. The parties might accept an outside mediator, but often since
the motivation to resolve the conflict is high, they do not recd
outside help.

5. While some norms such as reciprocity may be in play, class I

conflicts are seldom based on serious challenges to one or
both parties conceptions of justice and integrity Overall, then.
the parties prefer a ”solution” to the problem rather than a
mighty victory for one side at the expense of the other.

6. The means of handling flue conflict have primarily the

character of debate and argument.

7. And the possible outcomes of such conflicts are usually sonic

sort, of compromise. an agreement to disagree--let the issue ride--or one or both parties
Withdra:ving from their initial demands.

182

International Relations

TABLE I4-6

Conflict Charateristics by Type

class hiuluul issue Attgude Third PSrty Justice CoWBeneN Me

Omrome(s)
Leg6unacy^ Type Accepts- Atlssue
1 Yes loira op., Not necessary No Prefer NSnuW Agree o0
gains (search solution to dnsagree
 P.-ble for data) witm-
, ompromise
D Yes Zero- Open Yes 1’-M. . PreCm Argunreru m,nryromo>e
sum ^solutiorC’to Rewards
’win’ threats
III Yes/No Zero- Closed Perhaps, but Yes ”W’iri’ : 7tu:ats ,qmied
star-.,t
sum only toreduce ”solution;’ Puuislunern
costs(eg, ’•solutiooi’=
accept-- .. ,use’
fircl
IV No Zero- Closed Reject 1’es ”Wiri’> Punislunna
„s ^Holyw•m”to
sun solution, last mut
”lose’ urrouditioual
xolntiori’ _-der

Class II and III conflicts move up the scale of intensity, with compromise the likely
outcome of the former and armed stalemate of the latter. In class IV conflicts, the parties
refuse to recognize each other’s legitimacy. (Israel refused to recognize the Palestine
Liberation Organization as anything but a terrorist
organization between its inception in 1964 and 1993; the PLO refused to recognize
Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state until 1988.) Therefore, negotiation is out of the
question. The issues, usually based on mutually incompatible notions of justice, are
structured in such a way that any gain by one party will be perceived as a loss by the
other. Minds are closed: There is no search for information, there is absolutely no
acknowledgment that the other party might be right. and all facts are interpreted to verify
initial stereotypes and suspicions. Peace offers are usually rejected as stratagems and
deceit. Third parties are not wanted because they are suspect of being ”soft” toward the
adversary. They are also rejected because the purpose of the conflict is to win, not to
compromise. As suggested, fundamental principles are difficult to compromise. The
conflict is carried out primarily through threats and punishments. These are likely to lead
to armed violence which takes on the characteristic of a ”holy war” in the sense that
nothing short of toil victory is acceptable. Only in the case of an actual defeat or a
wearying war of attrition associated with extremely high costs will an armistice become
an acceptable option. In recent history, the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, the
Israel-Arabconflict throughout most of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the Vietnam War,
and the thirty-year war between the province of Eritrea and Ethiopia took on these
characteristics. The reader can classify other conflicts and perhaps recognize that the
lines between the classes are not fast and firm. Some conflicts waver between classes (the
Cold War), and many will escalate or de-escalate over a long period of time. The
interesting question to ponder is why they move from one category to the other

Conflict and Conflict Resolution 184

This categorization of conflicts helps raise important questions about conflict resolution
and the problems and prospects of peacekeeping and peacemaking by organizations such
as the United Nations. What kinds of conflicts are amenable to third-party intervention”
What are organizations such as the United Nations supposed to do to prevent war
outcomes, or if war should occur, to help terminate them?

The Institutions and Procedures or Resolving International

Conflicts
Conquest forced submission, and deterrence are outcomes usually achieved by
manipulation of the instruments of violence. Diplomats ma5r meet to avert crises or to
draft peace treaties at the end of a war, but the ultimate results of these conflicts are
usually determined by the threat or actual use of force, not by formal negotiations.
Voluntary
withdrawals, avoidance, and passive settlements are also usually achieved through
unilateral policies and means other than formal negotiations. Consequently, when we
discuss conflict resolution in the remainder of the chapter, we will be looking at
procedures associated primarily tvith compromises and awards.

There are three basic procedures for arranging compromises and

awards: (1) bilateral or multilateral negotiations among the parties directly involved; (2)
mediation, wherein a third party with no direct interest in the issue areas under contention
inten~enes in the bargaining process: and (3)

adjudication, wherein an independent third party determines a settlement through some

type of award.

Negotiation Among Parties

Direct negotiations among opponents are as old .as conflicts between organized societies.
Whereas the character of war and other aspects of international relationships have
changed greatly over the centuries, the techniques of diplomatic bargaining have
remained essentially the same. Bilateral discussions between special emissaries or
professional diplomats have been the historical rule, but since many canflicts involve
more than two parties, multilateral conferences have been

used extensively as well. The bargaining ploys and gambits used b,.:. diplomats or heads
of state in direct negotiations are many and .varied. so it is not possible to single out any
that are particularly effective as means of achieving settlements.

The essence of the bargaining process involves the establishment of commitments to

essential positions. determination of areas where

concessions can be made, commissioning of credible threats and promises tev”n if Only
bluffs), and maintaining patience. The necessaw. althou~t) I~°t sufllcient, conditions for
the success of any negotiation. ho(tevcr. is a

International Relations 185

common interest on the part of the opponents to avoid violence, or if that has already
occurred, to put an end to it. Without this minimal conunon interest, there can be no
compromise. If negotiations are undertaken when such a common interest does not exist.
the purpose can only be to dccci~.c the opponent, to play for time, or to make
propaganda. It should not be assumed, therefore, that all negotiations have the purpose of
ieaJhing some agreement.

Much has been written on the theory, assumptions, and practic::; of bilateral or
multilateral diplomatic bargaining. Bargaining stratcg;, and tactics are varied and
complicated, but case studies and controll; experiments suggest some conditions that are
conducive to t;’ arrangement of compromises. These findings suggest, for sample, th.~
compromises or successful negotiations
are more likely to result if.

1. The issues or objectives vender contention are specific an

carefully defined rather than vague or svumbic.

The parties avoid use of threats.

3. In their general relationships, the states in conflict ha,

.
many other common interest.

4. _ The issues are defined in such a way that payoffs can b: arranged for both sides,
or that the rewards for both partie. will increase through cooperation.

In disarmament negotiations, at least, the parties are equa milir,irily.

6. Similar negotiations have led to compromise outcome

previously.

Mediation

One of the potential consequences of international conflict is III. -spillover” or violence

between two or more parties into the territon ~~ issue fields of third parties. We can
imagine that several thousand ye,’I’ ago, the distribution of human population was so
sparse that violelconflict between two tribes, rural communities, or city-states had littl.

impact on surrounding areas. Anthropological and historical evidencindicates, however,

that even in primitive political systems, mediation b:

third parties was often practiced as a means of preventing involvement :additional parties
in the conflict. In ancient China, India, Greece. a°-elsewhere, governments commonly
recognized that they had an interest limiting the violent excesses of warring communities.
Some societies copc~ with the problem by formulating rules of neutrality: others, such as
t~’` Greeks, developed procedures for mediation and arbitration, « hereby’ eminent
citizens of a noninvolved city-state would bring representatives `

2.

Conflict and Conflict Resolution 186

the warring communities together and beargain with them until some sort
of settlement could be fashioned.

Efforts to institutionalize mechanisms for interjecting third parties into crises and
conflicts have been, in the European historical setting, sporadic. Prior to the development
of the nation-state, when Europe was carved into a patchwork of duchies, free cities, city-
states, aspiring monarchies, and semi-independent provinces, mediation services were
often available and occasionally involved the pope. By the end of the seventeenth
century, the states of the European international system had achieved some measure of
independence and, through the legal doctrines of sovereignty, recognized no higher
authority over their internal affairs, or external relations. The international law of the
period regarded force as a legitimate instrument for achieving or defending state
objectives, and no sovereign would admit that a third party had any right to intervene
diplomatically in a crisis or war. The only protection against drawing more parties in was
the specific
rights and duties ascribed to neutral states.

During the nineteenth century, a number of states concluded treaties that called for
arbitration of disputes, and almost 3()0 unimportant international disputes were resolved
through ad hoc arbitral proceedings. In the latter part of the century. owing partly to the
influence of the successful arbitration of a dispute verging on conflict between the United
States and Great Britain (the Alabama Claims case, 1871 ~. a number of private groups
began to agitate for creation of permanent international institutions for handling conflicts
and disputes. They argued that establishment of a permanent international tribunal, armed
with enforcement powers and supported by limitations on a armaments, would give rise
to a new era of peace. These sentiments eventually influenced some governments, and in
1899 and 1907, they reluctantly convened international conferences at The Hague to
discuss plans for such institutions. The only important result of the first meeting was the
”General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes” (amended in 1907), to
which almost fifty states eventually adhered. The delegates also drafted a convention
establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was neither permanent nor a
court, but a list of arbitrators (nominated by members of the convention) who could be
selected by disputing states to decide a particular case. The convention also delineated
common rules of procedure for all arbitral cases. Even though Article 38 of the General
Act urged the signatories to use arbitral
procedures for ”questions of a legal nature . especially in the
interpretation or application of international conventions.” the same
document exempted states from submitting disputes or conflicts involving
questions of ”national honor” or ”vital” national interests. It was left to the

International Relations 187

states themselves to decide which situations involved national honor. These
arrangements thus gave only a weak basis for the court’s jurisdiction and
failed to provide it with means for enforcing those few decisions referred to
it. As today, submission of cases to barbitral procedures was based on the
principle of voluntarism.

The most far-reaching innovation in establishing procedures for peaceful resolution of

international conflicts, as well as disputes, came with the creation of the League of
Nations in 1919. The major new principle of the League’s covenant was that the
international chmmunity had not only a right but a duty to intervene in international
conflicts and, correspon-dingly, that the parties to a conflict or dispute also had the
obligation to submit their differences to some procedure for pacific settlement, ranging
from bilateral negotiations to submission of the case to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, Primary responsibility for recommending solutions to disputes and
conflicts was lodged in the League Council, made up of some of the major powers plus
other elected countries, whose number ranged from six in 1922 to eleven in 1936. Under
Article 13 of the covenant, which provided for judicial or arbitral procedures, the
members accepted the obligation not to resort to force to challenge the decisions or
awards of international tribunals. To help prevent noncompliance with such decisions,
Article 15, the Council was authorized to consider any matter brought before it, even if
one party did not accept the ”jurisdiction” of the League. Once the case came before the
Council, it could attempt to effect a settlement through any means it wished. In practice,
the Council used a variety of procedures, including mediation (often performed by the
president of the Council), commission of inquiry, and conciliation commissions. In one
case (the conflict between Poland and Lithuania in 1921 over the city of Vilna), it
planned to send an international force to the scene of hostilities to separate the
combatants and organization cease-fire. In other instances, the League supervised
plebiscites to determine outcome of territorial claims. If the Council could not achieve a
settlement through these methods, it was authorized to submit a report recommending the
terms of settlement. If the report was adopted unanimously by the Council (parties to the
conflict or dispute had no vote), no member of the League could use force against the
party that complied with the report, upoil penalty of having economic or military
sanctions imposed upon it. But if the Council could not agree unanimously on the report
and its recommendations, the parties to the conflict were free to do as they wished.`
provided they did not go to war for a period of three
vote on the report.

months following the

Article 16 of the covenant provided for automatic sanctions if any

nber should ”resort to

war in disregard of its covenants under Ar’icles

Conmct and Conflict Resolution

188

12. 13, or 15.” All members of the League were to consider the use of force in violation
of these articles as an attack on themselves. While the provisions for economic and
military sanctions were designed to deter aggression and assure compliance with all
decisions or plans of settlements reached through the various settlement procedures, the
history of the League in fulfilling these commitments was disappointing.
In 1921, three Scandinavian states introduced a resolution proposing that each member of
the League, rather than the Council, should decide for itself when a breach of the
covenant had occurred; in 1923, the Canadian government sponsored a resolution that
further reserved for each member the decision s to whether aggression had occurred and
whether each should apply sanctions. Although the resolution did not pass, it had only
one vote (Persia) against it, indicating clearly that the vast majority of governments were
not ready to delegate to the Council the authority to order sanctions--or even to determine
that an act of aggression had occurred. Thus, the League Council was stripped of
whatever authority it had under the covenant to undertake action on its own authority.
From 1923 to 1939, European governments displayed repeatedly that they, rather than the
League Council, would make all final decisions relating to implementation of the
League’s efforts in the pacific settlement of disputes and collective security. The League
of Nations was notable for introducing flexible procedures to help reach accommodations
in disputes and conflicts involving small nations; but when action. had to be taken against
the aggressions of the major powers, it was powerless.

Under the charter of the United Nations, provision is again made for use of diverse
procedures for handling disputes and conflicts. Chapter entitled ”The Pacific Settlement
of Disputes” (Articles 33 through 38), obligates the parties to a conflict or dispute ”likely
to endanger ... .. international peace and security” to submit it to some procedure for
pacific settlement, whether negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to some regional agency, or any other method the parties can
devise. Under Article 2, the members are prohibited from using force, even if these
procedures should fail. There is no assumption in the charter that the United nations
should, or would, become involved in most threats or breaches of the peace, although
Article 37 stipulates that conflicts or disputes not resolved outside the United Nations
must be referred ultimately to the Security Council. Any party, whether or not a member
of the United Nations, can submit an issue to the organization; the General Assembly
may notify the Security Council of any dangerous situation; and under Article 99. the
secretary general may also bring to the attention of the Security Council any matters that
in his or her °p’nion threaten the maintenance of peace. On its own authority. the
~ccurity Council may, if the five permanent members agree. investigate
International 0elations

any situation (Article 34) and may recommend at any time ”appr p
procedures or methods of adjustment” (Article 36). Any action inclucl,
dispatch of mediators or peacekeeping forces, is of a recommending ,~, ,
only, however, and can be arrived out only with the consent of the sty:
directly involved in the conflict or dispute.

In Chapter VII, however, the Security Council is provided ~~ . enforcement powers if it

has previously determined that there a.xist. threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or
an act of aggression. li comes to such a conclusion, as in the Kuwait crisis of 1990, it can
order parties to a conflict and all member states to accept ”provisional measur;. (Article
40), such as a cease-fire or an order prohibiting intervention outside powers. Under
Article -11. the Security Council may ”decide „1 measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to g, effect to its decisions” and may call upon the
members of the Unit_ Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
pan; interruption of economic relations; that is, boycotts and embargoes. If the measures
are considered inadequate as a means of halting aggression obtaining implementation of
provisional measures taken under Article w the Security Council can use force. Under
Article 43, the members of t’ United Nations are to make available to the Security
Council ”on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the right of passn.
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security

In 1990, the Security Council voted to authorize member states t use ”any means,”
including force, to compel Iraq to withdraw-its troo: from occupied Kuwait. Eventually
twenty--nine countries contributed arrm forces in the Persian Gulf War, and many, more
supported the effort I%iT, financial and logistical assistance. The coalition forces were
comprised c voluntary contributions, and the military leadership of the coalitic remained
under American direction. This was not, then, a United Natiol1 operation, but the
application of military sanctions by individual state mandated by a vote of the UN
Security Council.

These forces are not to be confused with the internationV: peacekeeping groups. The
latter are formed primarily to effect cease-fire, separate combatants, supervise with
drawal of forces, provide humanitari” assistance, and patrol frontiers. They are not
fighting forces in the seas,

that their function is to halt aggression. Most have been organized under c the charter.
which deals with pacific settlement of disputes. the force made up of contingents
from many countries. have no directives to engk in hostilities except in self-defense and
filnction only because the part, c’ directly involved in the conflicts have accepted their
presence. Without thl~ consent, which is the basis of all action and peacekeeping forces
could nc operate It remains, however, for the United Nations to organize

190

conflict and Conflict Resolution

international army that could be used as an instrument of collective security to repeal

aggression through force of arms.

The charter gives to the General Assembly only a secondary role in handling
international conflicts. Although the Assembly may di.scrr.s.s ~n~SILu8t1Oi1, it can
recommend procedures or terms of settlement only if the Security Council is not
considering the situation. Under the Uniting for peace resolution of 1910, however, the
General Assembly has given itself the authority to determine the existence of a threat to
the peace or an act of aggression; and it may recommend appropriate action to its
members in case the Security Council, on account of the veto, fails to act. It was under
this resolution that the General Assembly organized the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) for the Suez crisis to supervise cessation of hostilities and secure a line dividing
the combatants. the Hungarian question (1956) was also considered in the General
Assembly, although its recommendations were never accepted by the Soviet Union. In
1960, the General Assembly played a key role in the Congo crisis after the agreement of
the major powers in the Security Council had broken down.

Although the United Nations charter has covered some of the gaps found in the League
covenant, the procedures for pacific settlement are restricted by tile necessary agreement
among the five permanent members of the Security Council and by the principle that any,
actions need the consent of the parties to a conflict. In effect, two agreements normally
have to be achieved before the Security Council can deal effectively with a dangerous
situation or a breach of the peace: The antagonists, with some exceptions. should agree to
submit their conflict to this body, and then the five permanent members of the Council
have to agree on the procedures to be used in attempting to effect reconciliation. The
Security Council can discuss any situation brought to its attention. but any
recommendations or actions, such as establishing commissions of inquiry or sending
peacekeeping forces, are subject to the veto.

We will see below to what extent the United Nations has worked effectively in the fields
of conflict revention, crisis management, arms conflict resolution. Before we
do so, however, let us review in more detail some of the services and functions that third-
party mediators may provide in helping arrange compromise outcomes.

It is generally recognized that in any social conflict, whether beUeen husband and wife,
trade union and industrial firm, or two states, the attitudes and patterns of behavior
commonly exhibited during the ”crisis stage” are precisely those most likely- to lead to
violence and destruction. We have already noted how, in the international crisis,
communications are constricted. symbolic actions replace explicit discussions. and
certain attitudes predispose the opponents to overreact to

International Relations

each other’s actions. Thus, the most important functions of the third pan., -a party outside
the ”emotional field” of the conflict--are to resto,-communications between the
disputants, impose cooling-oft’ period; investigate conditions in the area of conflict, and
provide, if necessan

variety of services to the parties in conflict. From a bargaining point oview, third-party
intervention into a conflict or crisis may provide feasible avenue of retreat for
governments that wish to withdraw gracefirll, without appearing to back down before
threats from the main opponent. ,A, in all conflict relationships, a .compromise yielded to
a third party may b, easier to arrange than withdrawing in the face of the adversary.
FinallN~. ~, mutually acceptable third party whose sole objective is to achieve ;;
compromise settlement will probably be perceived as a more trustworth’, bargaining
agent than will a traditional rival.

The role and tasks of the mediator are extremely complex, and the initiatives and
bargaining strategies the mediator adopts vary greatly from case to case. Intervention
ranges from passing messages between the parties to active engagement in the bargaining
and attempts to palace pressure on the antagonists to accept peace proposals that the
mediator himself has formulated.

The extent to which third parties ”penetrate” a conflict depends upon many variables,
none of which alone could explain success or failure. Since pacific settlement procedures
in contemporary international organizations are based on the principle of voluntarism--
both parties to a conflict must accept the role and functions of the third party--it is the
protagonists themselves, through their responsiveness and willingness to be influenced,
who will ultimately determine the third party’s success. Power does not seem to be
particularly relevant in mediation efforts. Small states as well as large have rejected the
initiatives of third parties, a notable example being the unwillingness of Israel and Syria
to
accept certain formulas proposed by an American mediator during the crisis over Syrian
arrti-aircraft missiles placed in Lebanon in 1981. Also, a walk state inay, be inclined to
continue the conflict rather than agree to mediation if it can generate support for its
position among allies and supporters. ImpartialitN. as perceived by the protagonists, is of
course one critical element in creating responsiveness toward mediating efforts. Few
parties to a conflict would be likely to accept intervention by an outsider if they perceived
that party to hold views on the nature and sources of the conflict greatly at variance with
their own, or if that party is not disinterested.

Adjudication and Arbitration

The final procedure for resolving international conflicts is adjudication and arbitration,
whereby the parties, by prior agreement. submit the issues under contention to an
independent legal tribunal. The

Conflict and Conflict Resolution

192

court is supposed to decide the case on the basis of international law, and jurisdiction
usually extends only to legal issues. According to the optional clause of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, a legal issug is defined loosely as: (1) the interpretation of
a treaty; (2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact that, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and (4) the nature or
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
International tribunals can take a case only if both parties-agree to its jurisdiction. This
means that there must be considerable common interest between the opponents before the
procedure can be used. Not only must they both agree that settlement of the conflict is
preferable to its continuation, but they must also agree that the settlement should be based
on rules of international law and that it should be an award outcome, whereby one party
wins and one loses, rather than a compromise. The prerequisites of successful
adjudication and arbitration--the existence of legal issues, voluntary submission of the
case by both parties, agreement that settlement is preferable to continued conflict, and
willingness to accept an award rather than bargain for a compromise outcome--are
seldom fund simultaneously in conflicts and crises. hence, as the next section will reveal,
this procedure is seldom used except to handle disputes and minor issues between
normally friendly states.

The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Conflict Resolution; Successes,

Failures, and Tasks

Most international and civil conflicts and Nvars are resolved unilaterally by conquest (for
example, Indonesia’s conquest of East Timor in 1976) or through direct bilateral
negotiations between the conflict parties. But the United Nations and regional
organizations such as the Organizatioi: for African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and
the Organization of American States (OAS) were created to act as mechanisms and
procedures for the resolution of conflicts that present a threat to peace. Since 1945, about
one quarter of all international and many civil conflicts have been submitted to the United
Nations or regional organizations. A few have been submitted to both. The absolute
numbers are impressive, however: Between 1945 and 1990, these organizations have
handled 291 cases, of which 68 (23 percent) were classified as high-intensity conflicts
(involving a high level of armed force). usually class III and IV as defined above. Since
1990, they have added significant cases such as the Gulf War, and operations in the
former Yugoslavia, in Somalia, and in Kampuchea.

Until the end of the Cold War in 1989, most successes were in the field of decolonization.
Here,, the UN and several regional organizations provided a range of services to the
conflict parties, including writing

International Relations
ROW

193

constitutions, organizing and monitoring elections, and establishing administrative and

financial organs for the new states. Most of these conflicts were class II because the
former imperial powers had more or less agreed to grant independence to their colonies.
Disputes were primarily over timing and modalities, not whether there would be
independence. Where the imperial powers resisted, as in Kenya, Algeria, Cyprus.
Vietnam. and elsewhere, war was the usual result. The organizations were also
reasonably successful in handling armed conflicts between small states. but in two arenas
their record was one of almost total failure.

Cold War conflicts pitting the United States, its allies, or its clients against the Soviet
Union and its clients were rarely managed or resolved by international organizations.
Indeed, during these years the United Nations became less a mechanisms for resolving
international conflicts than an arena in which the great powers could conduct the Cold
War. The organization was frequently paralyzed because of Soviet vetoes in the Security
Council. And, in the few instances when it passed resolutions recommending
withdrawals, mediation, or other means of conflict resolution, these measures were
ignored or bypassed by one or both of the superpowers.

The UN was similarly ineffective in the Middle East. It helped to police cease-fires, but
its efforts to bring the various parties to the bargaining
table led to no results. In the Cold War conflict, the Soviet Union xyas the object of most
complaints and was the primary wielder of the veto during consideration of its cases. Yet,
on the Middle East issue the United States and Israel have been the main targets of
complaints, and the United States was the most prolific wielder of the veto. Note that
both of these conflicts had class III and IV characteristics.

During the Cold War era, these organizations had some impact on conflict prevention or
conflict resolution (defined as the successful implementation of resolutions, not
necessarily a final settlement of the conflict) in about 25 percent of the conflicts they
considered.

Between 1985 and 1990, the success rate increased to 36 percent. and since 1990 the
implementation of important resolutions such as those invoking sanctions against Iraq.
Serbia, and Haiti, as well as the dramatic success of the Kampuchean settlement have
increased this figure. Since 1988. in fact, the United Nations has played an instrumental
role in bringing about settlements to long-running civil wars and foreign armed
interventions such as those in Afghanistan. Mozambique, El Salvador. Namibia, and
Kampuchea. It has done this in part by some innovative forms of peacekeeping.

Conflict .and Conflict Resolution

The International Court of Justice and Conflict Resolution

What about the successes and failures of the International Court of Justice? The record
indicates that governments are rarely willing to submit important problems to the Court.
Even in those rare instances when they are so inclined. they often do not abide by Court
decisions. Between 1945 and 1990. the Court heard thirty-one cases that involved state
political, territorial, militay, or resource interests. the remainder of the cases involved
private economic concerns and are therefore not classified as conflicts. Of the thirty-one,
seven were not settled for procedural reasons; in eight cases, one party refused to
participate or refused to implement the Court’s decision; and in nine advisory opinions,
on. or both parties to the proceedings ignored the outcome. In a classic case of security
interests overriding legal obligations, the United States in 1984 refused to accept the
Court’s jurisdiction or its decision in a complaint by Nicaragua that American mining of
Nicaraguan ports constituted a breach of international law since the two countries were
not formally in -a state of war.

The general pattern has been that when two countries are in a state of high hostility, they
will ignore the Court as a mechanism for conflict resolution, or they will refuse to
implement its
decisions. Between friendly countries, on the other hand, the Court has helped resolve
some minor frontier and fisheries disputes, or its actions have prompted the parties to
resolve issues through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Compared to the flexible
conflict resolution procedures and services improvised by the UN and regional -
organizations, the Court has not been a major player in the roster on international
conflicts since 1945.

Asking Peace

We have now examined the various ways that conflicts of interests between states are
resolved. Most are compromises, but significant numbers of conflicts, often involving
high costs in lives, are not resolved short of the use of force. Wars often result in
negotiated peace, but sometimes a conquest is made final through state annexation. Since
1945, a large number of conflicts have had no formal outcome. They remain in limbo,
with no formal settlement in sight. Yet in other cases, parties to a conflict resolve the
issue through negotiations, plebiscites, or other conflict-resolving techniques, and the
outcomes are registered through treaties and other formal instruments. A new situation
has been created, and it has achieved legitimacy. Peacemaking can have a grand scope, as
in 181 >, 1919, and 19:45, when after pan-European or world wards, the Parties--usually
the victor--came together to plan the postwar order. Wars are important learning
experiences, and those who plan the peace usually take steps to build institutions and
elaborate procedures so that the past.

194

and the peace--represented was a failure in the sense that the incidence f
League Nations

International Relations #- 19S

great war will not be repeated. The Congress of Vienna, whatever its other
faults, built an int’rnational order for Europe that significantly helped
reduce the incidence of war in the succeeding decades. In contrast, the
of

o war and conflict was significantly higher in the postwar period than it had been in the
previous centuw. Those who drifted the charter of the United Nations wanted to prevent a
repeat of the serial aggressions of Japan. Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union in the
1930s. As we have seen , the spot-19=15 record has been somewhat more impressive in
this regard.

Planning for peace is an extremely difficult undertaking. Those who are responsible must
try to anticipate the issues of the future as well as prevent a recurrence of the past. They
must deal with the defeated countries. Is it better to exact revenge, as the treaty of
Versailles did against Germany in 1919? Or should the defeated be re-assimilated into the
sociey, of states as quickly,
as possible? How should the peace be crafted so that the defeated parties will not seek
wars of revenge or, when opportunities are more favorable, seek to undo the peace? what
provisions should be included so that the securiy, of all parties is enhanced rather than
endangered? What mechanisms and procedures should be established to deal with
conflicting interpretations of peace treaties and other conflict-resolving instruments?
There are no hard and fast answers to these questions, but the questions must be asked as
guides to policy. Otherwise, an outcome achieved through military means and a
subsequent
likely to constitute the breeding ground for a new war.
Building a stable peace is a much more exacting task than going to war. Yet scholars,
state leaders. and politicians give these questions much less thought than they do to the
development of defense policies, militan~ doctrines, and war plans. It is unfortunate that
we do not have any proven recipes. The methods, institutions, and procedures of crisis
management and conflict resolution outlined in this chapter tell us something about how
conflicts can be abated and sometimes successfully resolved. But there is the next crucial
step. which is to elaborate the conditions and arrangements that are necessary to create
enduring peace within states and between a pair of states, regionally. or globally. While
the following list is hardly exhaustive. it does suggest some of the necessary, conditions.
You may wish to add other items, and as an exercise of statesmanship, you might
speculate how the principles could be applied to an on going and difficult conflict, such
as that in Bosnia or between Israel and its PalestiniaRi. Arab neighbors.

Conclusion
Most conflicts arise over incompatible positions in various issue areas. If the
incompatible

diktat is

values and positions of both parties arc perceived

Copflict and Conflict Resolution

196

as fundamental, the parties behavior, buttressed by hostile, stereotypic, distrustful, and

suspicious attitudes, may well be violent. Unless stalemate, obsolescence, or effective
third-party intervention occurs, the outcome is likely to be physical conquest or forced
withdrawal. The critical point in the conflict occurs when the actions of one state lead the
government of another to consider the possibility of using force. Mild threats, pressures,

and reprisals ca.i often be controlled but if tensions are high enough, actions perceived as
extremely threatening and stakes involving fundamental questions of justice, a crisis
situation--where a decision to use organized force may be required--results. In a crisis,
symbolic communication often increases wli~e overt bargaining
and negotiation

decrease; and the behavior of policy makers may well.be vitally affected by the pressures
of time, precipitous of threat, and the need to act quickly. Violence often results. It is in
this situation that the fact-finding, mediation, interposition, and supervisory tasks
developed in international organizations become important. Both the League of Nations
and its successor have in fact dealt primarily with crises rather than conflicts. In this field,
they, have been reasonably successful. In the most difficult task,

mediation, the United Nations has achieved desired results in about 40 percent of the
attempts, while in reporting, interposition, and supervision, rates of success have been
higher. However, in resolving conflicts or

promoting peaceful change--that is, arranging some sort of new legal or political situation
that is accepted by all the parties directly involved--the record is not nearly so impressive.
Indeed. one of the most discouraging facts about international organizations has been
their inability or umvillingness to cope with conflicts before they reach the crisis stage.
Yet it is probably in the crisis stage that formal settlements are least likely to be

attained. Only in the area of transition from colonialism has the organization proved truly
effective as an instrument of peaceful change.

Yet, recent involvement and successes such as Kampuchea, where innovative tasks
leading to peacemaking were employed, provide strength ’’id prestige for the UN.

CHAPTER 10

POWER AND ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Introduction.

Pprver and Its Elements 198

fey all chose power to achieve these ends they were actors on the scene of international
politics.”

Domestic and International Power.

There are certain .major differences .in the role of power in domestic affairs and in
international politics. In civil societies there exist a number of alternatives to violence.
Relating that all the relations cannot be regulated by physical strength alone, a system of
general rules,,,.af procedures has been adopted by each society- to redress the wrongs in a
non-violent way. Individuals no longer have the right to take the law into their own
hands. In International relations. due to lack of generally agreed upon rules and devices,
the states have to protect their right and to rectify injuries through use of force.
Meaning

When we speak of power we do not mean man’s power over nature, or over means of
production, or over himself, we actually mean man’s control over the minds and actions
of other men. When we speak of political power we refer to the mutual relations of
control among the holders of public authority and people
at large. Political power and physical force are tow different things. When violence or
physical force becomes the practical actuality it amounts to negation of power. Physical
power can be an instrument of power but not power in any sense. Political power is a
psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.
It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which
the former exerts over the Tatter’s mind.”

Whatever the ultimate aim of international politics, pox always the immediate aim. The
statesmen usually describe their god terms of religious, philosophic, economic or social
ideal and may tl. realize them through non-political means. But whenever they try to acl

these goals by means of international politics, they do so by resortul: power. ”The

crusaders wanted, to free the holy places from dominatio the infidels. Woodrow Wilson
wanted to make the world safe democracy: the National Socialists wanted to open
Eastern Europ, German colonization, to dominate Europe and to conquer the world.

In a layman’s language it is easy to describe one nation as more powerful than the other
but is indeed difficult to specif`_~ as to what that power consists of. For example
everyone knows that U.S.A. is more powerful than India. But what is that makes U.S.A. -
more poiverfirl? Obviously it is sum total of power which a county possesses in
comparison to the other.

The concept of power is quite complex and it is not easy to provide a commonly
acceptable definition. It shall, therefore, be desirable to discuss some definitions of power
to reach an acceptable conclusion. Prof. Morgenthau defines political power as ”a
psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.
It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which
the former exerts over the latter’s mind.” He further states that the struggle for power is
unusual in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. `Whatever the ultimate
aim of international politics, power is

~’~ays the immediate aim.’ According to Schwarzenberger the power is ~~ capacity to

impose one’s will on others by reliance on effective

~nnctions in case of non-compliance. In the words of Charles P.S chleicher h°wer is the
ability to exercise such control to make others do what they

otherwise would not do by rewarding or promising to reward them, or by depriving or

threatening to deprive them of something they value.

In the broad ~nse. power can be defined as the ability or capacity

-°ntrol others and get them to do what one wants
them to do ,md also to hat they do not do what one does not want them to do I hLrefore it
is ’h~’’t’.-- :.. control the bo’.v„ for of other star°s io ;::~r,v:: .~c o.iih onn’q

Inter”atlonal Relations

own will. According to Organski, power is ”the ability- to influence th e behavior of

others in accordance with one’s own ends. Unless a nation can do this she may be large,
she may be wealthy she may even be great, but she is not powerful.” Ebenstein says the
”National power is more than the sum total of population, raw materials and quantitative
factors The alliance potential of a nation, its civic-devotion, the flexibility of its
institutions, its technical know-how, its capacity to endure privation; these are but a fejv
quantitative elements that determine the total strength of a nation.” The power plays the
same role in international politics as money plays in market economy. However, power
occupies an important position not only as a means but also as end. ”Power is both the
capstone among the objectives which state pursues and the cornerstone among the
methods which they employ” (I’arnan van tyke). It is neither good nor evil in itself. ”It is
socially and morally neutral.”

Domain of Power

When we talk about domain, we ask they question, over whom and what is power
exercised? The obvious answer is that power is usually exercised over people territory,
and wealth. Following Deutsch’s logic, it might be useful to subdivide domain further in
terms of the hnterr7al domain and the external domain of nation states. Internal domain
coincides with the territory and population within the boundaries of a country. Internal
domain is thus easy to determine, except in the case of nation-states that are experiencing
uprisings,. guerrilla warfare, or territorial disputes. External domain is a rr~uch more
elusive concept. It includes those territories and populations outside a nation-state that
belong to its ”sphere of influence.”

The measurement of the internal domain of r;;over and the ranking of nation-states on
that basis pose relatively few problems. For example, we can rank nation-states according
to the area and population over which the central government exercises its power, as
depicted in Tables 5-1 and 5-2. Deutsch also suggests a third usable measure of internal
domain ---the gross national product (GNP). Table 5-3 ranks leading nation-states in
terms of their GNP.

External domain is a less precise concept. It is extremely difficult to devise accurate and
meaningful quantitative measures with which we can tank nation-states in terms of their
abiliy, to exercise power outside of

their territorial limits.

We can only suggest, therefore, some approaches to the measurement of,,external
domain.

power and its Elements

200

The Internal Domain of National power in Terms of Area, 1988

(Top Ten Nation-States)

7btal.-1 rea
(Square kilometers)
22.402,200
9.976,140
9,596, 960
9, 372.610
8,511, 970
7, 686, 850
3, 287, 590
2, 766, 890
2, 505, 810
2, 381, 740
SOURCE: The Ih’orld Facthook 1988 (If’ashington, D.C:
Central Intelligence .4geucv. 1988).
5.2 The Internal Domain of National Power in
Terms of
Populations, 1987
(Top Ten Nation States)

Country
Soviet Union
Canada
China
United States
Brazil
Australia
India
Argentina
Sudan
Algeria

Cnrmb;y
China
India
Soviet Union
United States
Indonesia
Brazil
Japan
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Pakistan

Popcrlation (OOOj
1,041. 09-1
765, 147
277, 563
238, 780
162. 212
135, 539
120, 579
100. 592
99, 669
94. 93 3

Growth Rate
1973--3 5
1.4
2.2
0.9
1.0
2. 3
2.3
0.9

2.8
3.0
SOURCE: The World Bank Atlas - 198 7 (Washington. D.C. The World Bank. 1987).

Once such approach would be to equate the spheres of influence of the great powers with
their respective alliance systems and then to calculate the combined populations,
territories; and GNPs of these systems.

Thus, in the case of the United States. one would calculate the combined population,
territory, and GNP of the countries belonging to the North

Atlantic treat- Organization (NATO). the Australia-New Zealand-United

International Relations
States (ANZUS) Treaty, the Organization of American States (OA all other bilateral
defense pacts in which. the United States is a member. In the case of the Soviet Union,
one would do the same with tire member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) and with

5.3 The Internal Domain of National Power in Terms of Gross

National

Product, 1987 (Top Ten Nation-States)

zot

GNP per Capita

GNP at 1985 Prices at 1981

Prices

Dollars)

United States Japan Soviet Union Federal Republic of Germany Italy France United
Kingdom Canada China Spain

Country (hr Billions of G’.,5. Dollars) (In (1 5.

$ 4, 486.2
2, G6=4, 0
2,3561.7

908. 3
743.0
724.1
556.8
-112.8
286.0
282.0

$ 18, 400
21, 820
8, 375

14. 890
12, 955
13, 020
9. 800
I5, 910
280
7, 2:10

SOURCE: The worldFactbooli 1988(YYn.shington, D.C. Centrallntelligence.4geney,

1988J.

# Gross Drmsestic Product (GDP j

all .other Soviet bilateral allies. However, the closer .we look at this
particular ”measuring device,” the more complex and unsatisfactow it
becomes. What do we do, for example. with former allies whose political
relations have become strained’? Do we include France in the external
domain of the
United States? And do we include Hungary and Romania in
the external domain of the Soviet Union? Further, as we indicated earlier
in this chapter, power is a feedback relationship rather than a static, one-
time, and one-sided entity. Thus, althot rgh we can claim that West
Germany is in the American sphere of influence, we can also reverse the
claim and say that to a certain (and naturally lesser) extent the United
States is in the West German sphere of influence.

The traditionalist literature of international politics has used terms such as colonialism,
neocolonialism, inrperialisnt, cleperrdoncy, and intementiou to denote concepts vew
similar to the concept of external domain. In another ~11ccf~0 3tt,~c~~F,t t:~ (,x-;Iniac
s~•~rmatic;Fli~ the po~vcr

relationships 4;Iilbi’i11:W1 1J”s ’i:~,._. a:i,I:~S’pty,;elll 1!,iS’CiivIJh(1 r:’

concept of penetration. Roseman defines penetration as a process in which ”members of

one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another.” We could therefore
measure penetration in terms of indicators such as military presence of nation-state A in
nation-state B ..(as

demonstrated by military bases, personnel, and so on), foreign aid given (whether
military, economic, or humanitarian), size of military missions abroad, economic
dependency of B on A, and cultural diffusion. We could then rank nation-states in terms
of their demonstrated ability to penetrate other nation-states, or, to put it differently, in tar
ns of their capacity to demonstrate an outflow of their power. We could. eventually arrive
at relatively reliable but no necessarily val&neasures of external domain as indicated by
instances of penetration.

Range of Power
Deutsch defines range as ”the difference between the highest reward (or indulgence) and
the worst punishment (or deprivation) which a power-holder can be stow (or inflict) upon
some person in his domain.”

Range of power can also be divided into internal and external components. Within
nation-states, for example, governments can exercise power over their subjects by both
benign and malignant means--that is, through techniques of reward as well as of
punishment. Tyrants generally prefer to rely on threats and punishments as means of
securing public order. Popularly elected governments, in contrast, prefer to, rely.ori
positive

incentives and rewards. The range of power of tyrants who possess only small and badly
trained military-security forces is smaller than that of heavily armed t3-rants. Be.rign
governments, on the other hand, are limited by their capacity to bestow favors and other
rewards-- that is, by the size of their budgets.

Specific measurements of
internal range can be made by using governmental budget statistics and establishing how
much these governments are spending for pubic security purposes (punishment
mechanisms) and how much for social welfare such as education and medical care
(reward mechanisms).

In the external range of power of nation-states, colonialism could be considered the

external analogue of tyranny. On the other hand, a

mutually beneficial alliance or an equitable structure for the economic integration of

nation states is more analogous to a just and benign national government. the indicators
with which one could measure the external range of power should follow logically from
the discussion of internal range. For example, security, defense expenditures of
governments would

be a reliable and valid indicator of the punishment-oriented range of national power. Bv

extension, a government’s expenses on foreign aid and

202

International Relations 203

technical assistance would be reliable and valid indicators of the regard-oriented range of
power.

Scope of Power
By scope of power, Deutsch wishes to denote ”the set or collection of all the particular
kinds of classes of behavior, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to
[governmental power].” This ”set or collection” includes all the types of activities a
government seeks to regulate, internal as well as external. It is obvious that with
technological and urban growth, the internal scope of governmental power has increased
steadily. In the days of laissez-faire government, for example, governments were
restricted to a few main functions: Thev,collected taxes, kept internal order, and fought
wars. But over time, the role of governments has expanded and their functions have
increased, especially in regulatory areas such as internal and external trade,
communications, transportation, education, medical services, labor-management
relations, scientific research, industrial management, and environmental protection.

Scope of power can also be divided into internal and external categories. Government
budgets and government organization charts can be used as evidence of the width and
diversity of functions that fall under government supervision and regulation. Experience
would suggest that the internal scope of power is usually narrower in countries with
democratic and competitive systems of government than in countries with centrally
planned economics. Generally, liberal democratic governments allow for more private
initiative and enterprise in the economic, social, and cultural spheres than do socialist
ones, especially ’those that are of the communist variety.
The external scope of power has also increased over time. Pure control relationships, in
which strong nation-states demonstrate their predominance over weak ones by collecting
tribute, showing their nava! flag, or exacting symbolic signs of submission, have given
way to complex and multifunctional systems of dependence and interdependence. Today,
one country can maintain control over another without firing a shot. Countries are
dependent on one another for such things as vital technologies; energy materials such as
oil, uranium, and natural gas; investment capital; managerial personnel; unskilled labor;
military equipment; and information processing systems.

THE POWER PROFILES OF NATION-STATES

We could continue to list at length the various ways of defining and measuring power.
We hope we have given you some ideas as to how this effort could be continued. But we
must turn now to a discussion of the elements of power (or the capabilities) of nation-
states. Summarizing our thoughts to this point. we could argue that the specific poixer of
nation-

polder and Its Elements

204

state. A over nation-state B is a function of the human and material capabilities in order
to control the behavior of B. Abdul Said and Charles O. Lerche have enumerated the
capabilities of nation states in terms of tangible and intangible components. We shall
proceed in a similar fashion. Tangible Elements (Attributes) of Power

Population:

Population can be considered a tangible element in the sense that it can be readily
counted. The assumption is frequently made that populous nation-states are also
powerful. To a certain extent this is true. But we can err seriously if we assume that there
is a direct relationship between population and power. For example, although China is
more populous than both the United States and the Soviet Union, it is still considered less
powerful than either of these nation-states. On the other hand, Israel is disproportionately
powerful, considering its small population of just over four million. Further, even a
tangible element of power such as population has aspects of intangibility. It is obvious
that all populations are not the same. A population that is healthy, well fed, unified,
evenly spaced, well informed, and loyal to its governmental authorities is likely to be
much more powerful than a population that is- badly nourished, diseased, overcrowded,
illiterate, disunited, and disloyal. Many characteristics of populations, such as unity,
literacy, and loyalty, are difficult to measure and even more difficult to assess with
respect to their impact upon power. For example, do literate soldiers fight more
effectively than illiterate
ones? Is unity a function of open and free education or of centrally controlled and policed
indoctrination? Are densely populated countries more or less likely to fight over
questions of interest, prestige, or territory?

Territory.

The second tangible element of power is territory. As in the case of population, we can
hypothesize that larger nation-states are more powerful than smaller ones. However, the
mere measurement of an area in square kilometers is not necessarily adequate even as a
small country that has demonstrated a disproportionately large amount of military power.
On the other hand, some large countries, such as Canada, Zaire, Australia, and the Sudan
are not nearly as powerful as their size might indicate.

Territory also has a dimension of intangibility, which we enter ~~-hen we talk about
territorial characteristics such as natural boundaries,

climate, strategic or peripheral location, and number of neighbors. For example, a

mountainous country would be considered more difficult to overcome militarily than a
flat country situated at a large plain and lacking

formidable natural boundaries. On the other hand, a country blessed Nvith fertile and productive plains
rather than mountains would contain a better
International Relations 203

technical assistance would be reliable and valid indicators of the regard-oriented range of
power.

Scope of Power
By scope of power, Deutsch wishes to denote ”the set or collection of all the particular
kinds of classes of behavior, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to
[governmental power].” This ”set or collection” includes all the types of activities a
government seeks to regulate, internal as well as external. It is obvious that with
technological and urban growth, the internal scope of governmental power has increased
steadily. In the days of laissez-faire government, for example, governments were
restricted to a few main functions: They ,collected taxes, kept internal order, and fought
wars. But over time, the role of governments has expanded and their functions have
increased, especially in regulatory areas such as internal and external trade,
communications, transportation, education, medical services, labor-management
relations, scientific research, industrial management, and environmental protection.

Scope of power can also be divided into internal and external categories. Government
budgets and government organization charts can be used as evidence of the width and
diversity of functions that fall under government supervision and regulation. Experience
would suggest that the internal scope of power is usually narrower in countries with
democratic
and competitive systems of government than in countries with centrally planned
economics. Generally, liberal democratic governments allow for more private initiative
and enterprise in the economic, social, and cultural spheres than do socialist ones,
especially ’those that are of the communist variety.

The external scope of power has also increased over time. Pure control relationships, in
which strong nation-states demonstrate their predominance over weak ones by collecting
tribute, showing their nav:~! flag, or exacting symbolic signs of submission, have given
way to complex and multifunctional systems of dependence and interdependence. Today,
one country can maintain control over another without firing a shot. Countries are
dependent on one another for such things as vital technologies; energy, materials such as
oil, uranium, and natural gas; investment capital; managerial personnel; unskilled labor;
military equipment; and information processing systems.

THE POWER PROFILES OF NATION-S:1’ATES

We could continue to list at length the various ways of defining and measuring power.
We hope we have given you some ideas as to how this effort could be continued. But we
must turn now to a discussion of the elements of power (or the capabilities) of nation-
states. Summarising our thoughts to this point, we could argue that the specific power of
nation-

power and Its Elements 204

state. A over nation-state B is a function of the human and material
capabilities in order to control the behavior of B. Abdul Said and Charles
Q. Lerche have enumerated the capabilities of nation states in terms of
tnrgiblc and intangible components. We shall proceed in a similar fashion.

Tangible Elements (Attributes) of Power Population: .

Population can be considered a tangible element in the sense that it can be readily,
counted. The assumption is frequently made that populous nation-states are also
powerful. To a certain extent this is true. But we can err seriously if we assume that there
is a direct relationship between population and power. For example, although China is
more populous than both the United States and the Soviet Union, it is still considered less
powerful than either of these nation-states. On the other hand, Israel is disproportionately
powerful, considering its small population of just over four million. Further, even a
tangible element of power such as population has aspects of intangibility. It is obvious
that all populations are not the same. A population that is healthy, well fed, unified,
evenly spaced, well

informed, and loyal to its governmental authorities is likely to be much more powerful
than a population that is’ badly nourished,
diseased, overcrowded, illiterate, disunited, and disloyal. Many characteristics of

populations, such as unit’, literacy, and loyalty, are difficult to measure and even more
difficult to assess with respect to their impact upon power. For example, do literate
soldiers fight more effectively than illiterate ones? Is unity a function of open and free
education or of centrally controlled and policed indoctrination? Are densely populated
countries more or less likely to fight over questions of interest, prestige, or territory?

Territory.

The second tangible element of power is territory,. As in the case °f population, we can
hypothesize that larger nation-states are more powerful than smaller ones. However, the
mere measurement of an area in square kilometers is not necessarily adequate even as a
small country that

has demonstrated a disproportionately large amount of military power. On the other hand,
some large countries, such as Canada, Zaire, Australia, and the Sudan are not nearly as
powerful as their size might indicate.

Territory also has a dimension of intangibility, which we enter when we talk about
territorial characteristics such as natural boundaries, climate, strategic or peripheral
location, and number of neighbors. For example, a mountainous country- would be
considered more difficult to

°Vercome militarily than a flat county situated at a large plain and lacking formidable
natural boundaries. On the other hand, a
fertile and productive plains rather than

country blessed with mountains would contain a better

lnternatfonal Relations 20,5

fed and more prosperous population. Further, we could assume that a country that has
common borders with five or six other countries would be proportionately more
vulnerable to attack than a country that has only one or two neighbors. Controversial
questions could also arise as to what constitutes the best natural boundaries for the
purpose of security. For example, arc insular countries such as Britain and Japan more or
less vulnerable than continental countries such as Germany and the Soviet Union? Is a
mountainous country such as Switzerland more or less vulnerable than an archipelago
such as Indonesia?

These and similar questions fall under the heading of geopolitics. This discipline, which
fuses subjects such as geography, strategy, and politics, was quite popular in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth c°ntury. Two of the best-known geopolitical
thinkers--Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred T Mahan--held fundamentally contradictory
ideas. Mackinder’s famous heartland theoyv sought to relate power to the ability of a
nation-state to control large land masses. His formula was succinct:
”He who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland of Eurasia; who rules the
Heartland commands the World Island of Europe, Asia, and Africa; and who rules the
World Island commands the World.” Mahan, on the other hand, emphasized the
importance of naval control over the high seas and the strategic sea lanes. He ranked
control of the oceans well above control of the large land masses.

Today, we find that the United States and the Soviet Union are heeding the advice, albeit
contradictory, of both Mackinder and Mahan. the United States, a traditionally mobile
and ocean-oriented power, has since World War II sought and managed to establish a
near-permanent military presence adjacent to the so-called heartland of Eurasia. the
Soviet Union, a traditionally continental power, has expanded its naval forces rapidly and
now rivals the United States in naval tonnage, mobility, and presence in nearly all the
seas of the world.

Natural Resources and Industrial Capacity.

We need riot belabor the topic of natural resources. It is clear that the possession of
resources such as coal, iron, uranium, oil, rubber, bauxite, and mau6anese is essential to
industrial production in nation-states. In recent years, for example, it has been
demonstrated that the availability of petroleum at reasonable prices is essential to the
good economic health of industrialized nation-states.

However, in evaluating the importance of natural resources, ve must view them in

relation to the ability of nation-states to process them industrially and to distribute the
products economically. Let us suppose that a countw had more than adequate natural
resources. If that coun?w do ’S r~; ~;ncS^c; the ,t~°rilItt730,p ir.ri2~:1=’~ s,o,~.:u=,,-,.yc
to t3~.,~•..~ ,.

power and Its Elements dispose of those resources adequately, it is reduced to the status
of a weak raw-material--exporting nation-state. Conversely, a country with developed
technology but without natural resources is greatly dependent on the importation of raw
materials from foreign markets. In addition, it has no firm control over supply and price
fluctuations. Placed in an economic perspective, the appearance of political power can
often be deceptive, for even those nation-states leading in industrial capacity respond to
pressure on the sensitive nerve of energy. To maintain a high level of production, the
major industrial economics are all, to varying degrees, dependent upon the importation of
petroleum. In late 1980, the delegates to the Supreme Soviet assembled’ in Moscow to
learn from a government economic survey that the production of energy was not keeping
pace with industrial requirements.
When Mikinitiated a program of perestroika (restructuring of the economy and the
government) in an effort to bolster production. Condemning eighteen years of stagnation
under his predecessor. Leonid Brezhnev, Gorbachev stated bluntly that during the 1970s.
”The most important principle of socialism, distribution according to work, was
violated.” A reform-minded Soviet leadership may remedy the shortfall in the production
of petroleum, but many industrial countries have no choice but to import it. Japan,
France, and the Federal Republic of Germany possess coal but must depend upon
overseas sources of petroleum, despite the planned growth of their nuclear power
industries. In this regard the political stability of states surrounding the Persian Gulf is
critical.

Agricultural Capacity.
This is also a tangible element of power. Countries that can feed themselves, especially
over the course of a long war, will be relatively mote powerful than countries that are not
self-sufficient. Note, however, that, even in the case of food production, intangibility and
controversy arise. For instance, one can argue that in general, communist-piled countries
are less productive agriculturally than demoractically ruled countries. but they distribute
their produce more equitably. The obvious question then is: What contributes more to the
power profile of a nation-state. superior agricultural production or more equitable
distribution?

Military Strength and ltlobility. ’-

These elements of power are related most intimately to the traditional notion that power
is backed by military force. Both military strength and mobility can be considered quite
tangible elements since they can be measured in a number of meaningfid ways. For
example, military strength can be measured in terms of funds expended for defences and
security purposes. Mobility is a somewhat more elusive concept. Basically, it stands for
the ability of a nation-state to deploy its. armed might in locations at great distance from
its territory. The traditional indicator of

2V6

lntqnnatlonal Relatlons

mobility is a nation-state’s ability to transport and effectively support military operations

on land, sea. and air. We should realize, however, that mere figures regarding military
expenditures or the size of armed forces do not necessarily enable us to conclusively rank
nation-states in terms of their military might. Factors such as readiness, training.
leadership, morale, attitudes of military personnel toward their government,
socioeconomic origins of the armed forces (especially the offcer corps), quality,
adaptability, and source of equipment should seriously affect
the performance of armed forces in a given situation. All of these factors are more
intangible than tangible.

Intangible Elements (Attributes) of Power

Leadership and Personality.

Undoubtedly, greatness or incompetence, wisdom or irrationality, effectiveness or
impotence in leadership considerably affect the power that a country had Leaders such as
Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Mao
Zedong, Mahatma Gandhi, John F Kennedy, Charles de- Gaulle. Nikita Krushchev, and
Richard Nixon have made a deep impact on world history. We must content ourselves,
however, with the inexact assessment that leadership is an important variable that affects
the power potential of a nation-state. There are unfortunately no foolproof methods with
which we can measure the positive or negative impact of personality or leadership upon
the total capabilities of nation-states or upon specific power relationships. The question
for example, whether the post 1987 rapprochement between the United States and the
Soviet Union is a product of leadership of men such as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev or the outcome of a wider set of variable remains hard to answer.

Bureaucratic-Organization Efficiency:
One of the hardest element of power to measure is the efficiencN-of large and complex
organizations, especially organization designed to serve political purposes. Yet we should
readily admit that prosperous, «;el1-armed, and even wisely governed countries cannot
function effectively unless they establish efficient bureaucracies with which to implement
their policies. There are at least four philosophies regarding the proper role. method of
operation, and adequate functioning of bureaucracies. First communist countries
emphasize larges-scale bureaucratization not only in political but also in economic and
social sectors. Second, democratic-competitive countries seek to enhance private
initiative and limit the role of governmental bureaucracies to defense, taxation, and other
regulatory functions. Third, there are those who argue for the strict separation of
”politics” from professional bureaucracies. These people believe that bureaucracies best
provide continuity by remaining outside the heitcr-

ARM

power and Its Elements 2118

skelter of political and partisan activity. Fourth, some people are eager to establish
political control over the bureaucracies, plug leaks, and ensure that political decisions are
carried out faithfully by the professional bureaucrats. Each of these four philosophies has
its merits and its demerits, and we do not propose to consider them here. We should
realize, though, that it is quite difficult
to asses the precise impact of a given bureaucratic philosophy upon the power of a
nation-state.

Type of Government.
One of the hardest unanswered questions in political science deals ~vith the relationship
between type of government (or polity) and national power. Aristotle subdivided polities
into aristocracies (political systems under mob rule). His implicit assumption was that
aristocracies and democracies (the former more than the latter) provided good
government have supplied us with a more complicated array of models--variants of the
Aristotelian types. We have at least three varieties of communist models--the Soviet, the
Chinese, and the Yugoslav. We have democratic-competitive models ranging from the
private-enterprise-oriented United States to socialist-oriented but democratic countries
such as Sweden and Norway. We also have a large category of authoritarian politics,
ranging from military regimes, such as those of Chile and Indonesia, to-traditional
monarchical rule, as Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

The intangible yet extremely important. question remains: What is the effect of these
different types of governance on national power in general and in specific situations? For
example, we can argue that authoritarian regimes can make quick and flexible foreign-
policy decisions because their decision makers are few and relatively unaccountable. One
the other hand, we should consider whether quick decision by unaccountable decision
makers are necessarily wise decisions. The checks and balances characteristic of
democratic regimes subject decisions to greater scnitiny and presumably guard against
capricious and irrational politics. One can continue to argue such questions and remain
firmly in the realm of intangibility.

Societal Cohesiveness.
This is a multivariate and therefore highly intangible element of PONver. Many of us
implicity assume that internally unified nation-states are strong whereas divided ones are
weak. The causes of disunity or unity can range from ethnic, linguistic, racial, and
religious diversity all the way to economic, political ideological, and foreign-inspired
divisions. Certain phenomena can be used as crude indicators of disunity: terrorism,
number of political prisoners, riots, demonstrations, paralyzing strikes, media censorship,
insurgency, and even civil war. Given the state of the international-relations field today, it
is still quite diffcult to assess how

International Relations 209

varying degrees of national unity affect the power profile of a nation-state, in general as
well as in specific situations.

Reputation.
One of the hardest elements of power to measure and yet one of the most important ones
is a
nation-state’s reputation. For example, it is often asserted that the Yugoslavs tend to fight
and the Czechs tend to acquiesce. So, whereas the Czechs are expected to succumb to
Soviet penetration without a fight, the Yugoslavs, on the basis of their previous
reputation, are expected to mount a desperate, even ”irrational,” fight to blunt a
hypothetical Society- invasion of their country. In the same vein, one can explain the
strenuous opposition of America’s ”hawks” to a withdrawal from South Vietnam in the
early 1970s. They were concerned that such a withdrawal and the resulting collapse of
the American .client regime in Saigon would make the United States look like a ”pitiful,
helpless giant. Power, therefore, should be evaluated not only in terms of each country’s
ability and willingness to use its capabilities when challenged, but also in terms of its
reputation for decisive action in response to previous challenges.

Foreign Support and Dependency.

Many students of international politics who concern themselves with the elements of
power merely enumerate tangible and intangible elements such as the ones described
above. This tendency proceeds from an unwarranted assumption that nation-states are
finite units of decisions, organization, and. anion. Thus, one of the most important
elements of power is usually left completely out of the picture. This element consists of
international connections such as alliances, foreign economic and military aid. the leasing
or granting of strategic bases to the great powers, and participation in regional and
universal international organizations. To ignore such factors would leave us measuring
the power of Syria and Israel, for example, without considering Soviet and American aid
and commitments to these two countries. Foreign support is not always a positive element
of power. At times, foreign support may turn to outright foreign dependency’ When this
occurs, the sovereignty and the tactical and strategic flexibility of the dependent nation-
state vis-a-vis its protector become seriously limited. In the last analysis, foreign support
and dependency remains an extremely vital, albeit quite intangible. element of power.

Accidents.
The sudden death of a great leader, an earthquake, a famine. an epidemic of a dread
disease such as the plague, a misunderstanding or
breakdown in communications during a crisis, and many other unforeseen events may
deeply affect the power relationship of nation-state. Sincc

power and Its Elements 210

accidents cannot be predicted in any other but an aggregate statistical sense, they remain
at the summit of the pyramid of intangibility. It is therefore appropriate
that we close this discussion of the intangible elements of power by nothing this factor.

CHAPTER

BALANCE OF POWER

Introduction.

Power and its distribution is one of the major determinants of

international behaviour. The traditional relations among the independent
nations have often been explained in terms of Balance of Power. The
national power was used for peace keeping peace making or even war
making. It has been effective instrument for halting aggression. That is
why many theorists have described the theory of ”Balance of Power” as a
basic principle of international relations and ”a fundamental law of
politics”. -

Meaning.

The balance of power in the ordinary sense means that there is at least rough equilibrium
of power between various notions. The concept of equilibrium has been taken from the
field of mechanics and is being put to use in many other sciences, such as physics,
biology, economics and sociology. No nation can live in isolation. A large number of
nations with varying degree of power exist and each nation tries to maximize its power.
To achieve this end various nations form groups so that single nation or other group of
nations become strong enough to fominate others. The power of one group is balanced by
the other opposing group. So long as there is this type of balance, there is peace. War is
the test for the existence of disequilibrium.

1t is indeed difficult to give an exact definition of balance of power because as Martin

Weight says the nations is ”notoriously- full of confusions.” Inis L. Claude also says:
”The trouble with the balance of power is not that it has no meaning but that it has too
many meanings

Balance of Power

But the essential idea of Balance of Power is very simple. it implies the equilibrium of
the type represented by a pair of scales. If the weights in the scales are equal the balance
results. But when,the principle is applied to the international relations, the concept of
balance of power means ”that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures, no
one power pr combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the
security of the rest” (Palmer and Perking). Prof. Fay defined the balance of power in
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as ”just equilibrium in power among the members of
the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong
to enforce its will upon the others.” George Schwarzenberger describes balance of power
as ”an equilibrium or a certain amount of stability in international relations.” According
to Harman, balance of power may be described as a system in the sense that one power
bloc leads
to the emergence of other and it ultimately leads to a network of alliances.” Thus the
concept of balance of power rests on the basic assumption that excessive power anywhere
in the system is threat to the existence of other units and that the most effective antidote
to power is power.

There are two types of balances. The simple balance which exists between two nations or
any two groups of nations of nearly equal power. The multiple balance, exists among
many nations or group of nations, balancing one another.

Lord Castlereagh referred to balance of power as the maintenance of such just

equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as ’ should prevent any of
them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the act.” But the fact is that the
nations in practice, in the name of balance of power, have usually preferred
preponderance of power.

Nicholas J. Spyman observes. ”The truth of the matter is that

states are interested only in a balance which is in their favour.” To Quinsy
Wright. It is a system designed to maintain a continuous conviction in any
state that if it attempts aggression it would encounter an convincible
combination of the others. ”In the words of Morgenthau ”It is an actual
site of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with
approximate equality.” The theory is thus an application of the checks aTA
balance theory of domestic politics to international politics. It is based on a
simple principle that the effective antidote to power is power oaily a, -d
exclusively. The term has often been used in several contradictory
meanings. The views of Morgenthau and Haas are of relevance to be
mentioned here. Morgenthau attached four different meanings to the term:

As a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs at bringing about a certain power

distribution;

Intemati”74 Relations

213 Balance of Power

2 As an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed

among several nations with approximate equality;
3 As an approximately equal distribution of power and

4 As any distribution of power

While- explaining the meaning of the term, Has gives eight different interpretations of
balance of power, viz, distribution of power, a balance or equilibrium, hegemony or
imbalance, stability and peace, instability and war, power politics, a universal law of
history and a system and guide to policy makers. Depending on the intention of the users,
it is employed simply to describe, as propaganda, to analyse, or provide a guiding
principle for those who make foreign policy decisions.

The Concept of Balance Of Power

Balance of power is not a precise and easily measurable concept.

It has been interpreted in several different ways by scholars and practitioners of
international politics. Earnest Haas, in a seminal article, criticized it as too vague a
concept for use by political scientists. He pointed out that the concept had been utilized
extensively in at least eight mutually exclusive versions:

1 Equilibrium resulting from equal distribution of power among

nation states
Equilibrium resulting from unequal distribution of power
among nation-states
3 Equilibrium resulting from the dominance of one nation-state
(the balance)

4 ’ A system providing for relative stability and peace

5 A system characterized by instability and war

6 Another way of saying power politics

7 A universal law of history

8 A guide for policy makers

Haas’s criticism is well taken. Yet we cannot discard the balance of power concept
despite its. imprecision because it is near the very core of international politics. We will
reflect on the workings of the balance of power system as it has been practiced in a
number of variations since 1648. We shall use balance of power in a descriptive and
analytical sense and as an aid to our understanding of the primitive mechanisms of
international

regulation. For our purposes, we shall assume four prerequisites for the existence of a
balance of power system that have been suggested in the literature of international
relations.

4.

Characteristics.

214

A multiplicity of sovereign political actors that results in the absence of a single

centralised legitimate, ~ and strong authority over these sovereign actors.

Relatively unequal distribution of power. (i.e., status, wealth, size. military irapability)
among the political actors that make up the system. This permits the differentiation of
states into at least three categories: great powers, intermediate powers, and smaller nation
states.
Continuous but controlled competition and conflict among sovereign political actors for
what are perceived as. scare world resources and other values.

An implicit understanding among the rulers of the great powers that the perpetuation of
the existing power distribution benefits them mutually.

The real nature of the concept could be better understood by discussing its characteristics.

Firstly, the balance of power is subject to constant changes from equilibrium to

disequilibrium. Secondly, it is not a gift of God but is achieved by the active intervention
of man. No state can wait for long to allow the balance of power to establish
automatically, they must be ready to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing
preponderance of

power. Thirdly, balance of power favours the `status qua.’

but to be effective, the policy must be changing and dynamic one. Fourthly, real balance
of power, seldom exists. its real test is war. If war takes place it means the real balance of
power was not there. Fifthly, it offers both an objective approach of a historian and
subjective approach of a statesman. ”The historian will say that there is a balance when
the opposing groups seem to be equal in power. The statesman will say that there is a
balance when he thinks that his side is stronger than the other. Hence nations which play
the balance of power game seek not a balance, but an imbalance in their favour, Sixthly,
it is sometimes identified as a policy. Seventhly, this game is meant for big powers only
and the small powers are like weights in a balance used by others. Lastly, to keep the
balance, it requires a balancing power for the successful operation of the system.

Historical Evolution of the Concept

The origin of the concept of balance of power coincided with the growth of the present
state system. It operated successfully in Europe from the sixteenth to the nineteenth
centuries. The rivalries among the princes of northern Italy and among Spain, France and
Prussia which attempted to intervene in Italian politics, seemed to represent a conscious
application of

wsl >tl~oens 215

the tt. The first explicit statement of the doctrine is credited to Bernardo Rucelfan (1449-
1514). It was further elaborated by Machiavelli (1467-1527) in ’The Prince’ Machiavelli
said whoever contributes towards advanmment of another power ruins his own.

JA the sixteenth century the concept was applied to a larger theater thWItalian city states.
Morgenthaus states that ”the alliances Francis I cmfcluded with Henry VIII and the Turks
in order to prevent Charles V of Hap” from stabling and expanding his empire are the
first modern example on a grand scale of the balance of power operating between an
alliance and one nation intent upon establishing a universal monarchy.” In the sixteenth
century, England held balance between France and the Holy Roman Empire, though she
always supported the stronger, which is considered as the violation of the principle of
balance of power, Francis Bacon (1558-1603) clearly elaborated and analysed the
doctrine as it existed in his essay ”of empire.”

In the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) can be analysed from the
point of view of the balance of power. The treaty of Westpbalia (1648) firmly established
the nation state system and clearly determined the general pattern of international
relations. As a consequence, the balance of power began to play even greater role than
before. When the
ambitious policy of Louis. XIV of France threatened to destroy the balance, he was
checked by the $combined opposition of England and the Netherlands.

In the eighteenth century the provisi ns of the Treaty of Utrecht (1714) which closed the
War of Spanish Su ssion, provided for the division of the Spanish inheritance between
Bourbons (France) and Hapsburgs (Austria) in order to restore the balance of power in
Europe. The doctrine was formally incorporated for the first time in an international
agreement conservendum in Europe equilibrium. The period from the treaty of Utrecht to
the partition of Poland (1713-1772) has been regarded as the golden age of the balance of
power in theory as well as practice.

In the nineteenth century the rise of Napoleon once again disturbed the balance of power
in Europe. The Congress of Vienna sought to establish a new balance of power based on
the principles of ’legitimacy’ and status quo. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) marks the
beginning of its gradual extension on a worldwide scale. The balance of power was
further extended beyond European soil when in 1854 France, Britain and Austria formed
a coalition against Russia declaring ”that the existence of the Otterman Empire in its
present extent, is of essential importance to the balance of power among the states of
Europe.” The Crimean War (185=1-56) followed this declaration. The Congress of Berlin
(1878) was another

Baja= of Power
attempt to prevent a great power from gaining a dominant position in the Balkan area. It
forced Russia to revise the treaty of San Steno which she
had imposed upon defeated Turkey (1877-78).

In the twentieth century the Europe was divided into two camps Triple Entente (1907)
powers England, France and Pussia vs. Triple Alliance (1882) powers Germany, Austria.
Hungary and Italy. When the balance of power in the Balkan area was disturbed in 1914
it led to the

First World War.

During the inter war years (1919-39) the doctrine was followed only in theory as it was
incompatible with the concept of collective security. But the weakness of the League of
Nations provided some strength to the system. There was formation of alliances and
counter alliances in the name of balance of power which ultimately led to Second World
War. After the war, the conditions seemed to be peculiarly unfavourable for the operation
of the old system. The newly emerged bipolar and now the multiplier system is the most
unstable and dangerous form of the balance of power. What we experience today is the
conspicuous absence of the holder of balance the balince.

Techniques of the Balance of Power

The. balance of power is not a natural phenomenon and

requires special efforts. the techniques and devices which contribute to its operation are
as under.

(i) Alliances anal counter alliances. The most commonly used

device of the balance of power system has been the alliances.
It has been the traditional instrument to strength one’s
position vis-a-vis the opponent. When a state feels that it
cannot defend itself against another big state. it enters into
alliance with another weak or powerful state for achieving its
goal. The alliances are of two types offensive and defensive.
The offensive alliance seeks to upset the balance of power in
favour of its members and a defensive alliance aims at
restoring the balance. The alliances are built up out of
necessity of common interests and are ’directed against a
common enemy. the alliances may breakup after the objective
is achieved.

The essentials of a stable long lasting alliance are enough power to achieve the purpose
may be through aggression or defence: common interest between the allying states:
strategy, geography. common ideologies. cultural similarities, complementary economics,
etc’

Alliance generally lead to alliance, e.g.. Triple Alliance (1882) vs. Triple Entente (1907)
but they do play a major role in the preservation of

216

Mtomatlonal Relations

the balance of power. The alliances tend to give rise to suspicion and nmay even result in
war. The alliance between the Axis powers was counter weight against the alliance
between France and European nations which ultimately culminated in Second World
War. In the post Second World War period also the two superpowers entered into several
alliances to counter balance the growing power of the opponent.

(ii) Compensations. Compensations of a territorial nature were a

common method for maintaining a balance of power in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Territorial
compensations have frequently been made by strong powers
at the expense of weaker ones, and almost invariable victor
nations at the end of a war. In 1919 this technique was
abandoned at the instance of President Wilson. He repudiated
the diplomacy of balance of power and substituted it with his
famous Fourteen Points programme. However, the method of
compensation was retained in an indirect manner. The
Mandate System, whereby a territory could be given to a
power in the form of trust, vas invented. After the Second
World War this technique has been altogether given up.

(iii) Partition. Partition cau also be used s an instrument for tie

maintenance of the balance of po r. Usually the major
powers divide the territory in such a~ way that there is no
danger of any one of them -acquiring a predominant
position.
Thus Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and
Austria Hungary in 1772 so that relative power of each of the
three major states of the time could be maintained.

(iv) Armament and Disarmament. Military preparedness is the

best means of national defence. This policy is bound to lead to
armaments race. The advancement in science and technology
as well as the methods of warfare has increased the fear of
destruction. To attain the balance of power consistent efforts
at disarmament are essential. in the twentieth century, the
first stem in the direction was taken by the Treaty of
Versailles. The next serious effort was made at the
Washington Naval Conference in 1922. ”The technique of
stabilising the balance of power by means of proportionate
reduction of garment is somewhat similar to the technique of
territorial compensation.”

Intervention and War. These two techniques of the balance of power are usually adopted
as a last resort. Intervention is a dictatorial interference in the -internal affairs of another
country by a powerful nation in order to extract some, specific

217

218
Balance of Power
concessions, Italy and Germany intervened in the Spanish Civil War in favour of
General, Franco, Britain intervened in Greece, United States War in favour of General
Franco, Britain intervened in Greece, United States in Cuba, Lebanon and Laos, the
Soviet Union in North Korea, Hungary and Eastern Europe. The ultimate form of
intervention is war.

`Non-intervention’ is a political term meaning virtually the same thing as intervention.

This kind of policy is usually followed by small states, and also by those, great powers
which are satisfied with the political order and can very well follow peaceful method to
preserve the balance. France and Britain followed policy of non-intervention is the
Spanish Civil War of 1936-39.

(vi) Divide and Rule. This device has been resorted to by nations who want to keep
their competitors weak by keeping them divided. This is a time honoured policy. It was
employed by the Romans to maintain their control over scattered people. Britain often
used it to keep her large empire intact. France adopted such a policy towards Germany
from the seventeenth century to .the beginning of the twentieth century. Similarly, the
Soviet Union from the twenties to the present has consistently opposed all proposals for
the unification’s of Europe. During the inter-war period even Germany took advantage of
the differences between France and England and flouted the terms of the treaty of
Versailles. Britain also made use of policy of divide and rule in the international sphere
and played Jews
and Muslims is Palestine against each other. In the post Word War II period also the .
superpowers continued to follow this policy of divide and rule, though in a different way
with a view to bring the maximum number of non-aligned states under their influence.
(vii) Buffer States. This is another techniques for maintaining the balance of power
between two powerful states. Buffer states are of great importance because of their
cushioning effect between great powers. Because of their interest in the preservation of
equilibrium of power, the two adjoining states agree to follow a policy of non-
interference towards the in between small state. The examples of buffer states are
Afghanistan in the 19th and early twentieth century when it
acted as buffer between Russia and British India. The Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan in recent years destroyed the
`buffer state’ character of Afghanistan and posed a threat to

lntemational !Relations

2lS the balance in the region. Similarly, France tried to mar

Rhineland as a buffer state between her and Germany.

(viii) Neutralisation. Sometimes a country is neutralized to create a

sort of buffer between two powerful countries and they pledge
hot to attack it or unnecessarily interfere in its affairs. Thus
Belgium was neutralized in Europe . and when Germany
violated its neutrality in 1914, it was strongly resented by
England and France.

Utility of Balance of Power.

The theory of balance of power has proved quite beneficial in many respects.

In the first place it has greatly contributed to the preservation of peace in the absence of
systeru of collective security. The principle has ensured-peace by maintaining balance of
power thus checking aggression. In the face of an equilibrium of power, no state can be
sure about its victory and hence shall not dare to resort to war. According to Car the
peace in Europe in the nineteenth century was largely due to balance of power. Even
Harold Macmillan subscribes to this view and argues that between 1810 and 1914, which
is regarded as the classic era of the doctrine of balance of power, peace was maintained
virtually unbroken.

Secondly, the principle of balance of powerhas greatly contributed to the preservation of

the, modern state system by guaranteeing independence of smaller states. This was
ensured by preventing any single state or a group of states becoming too powerful as.to
threaten the existence of smaller and weaker states. Highlighting this point Prof Taylor
has observed; ”No one state has ever been strong enough to eat up all the rest; and the
mutual jealousy of the Great Powers has presented even the small states,
which could not have preserved themselves.

Thirdly, in the absence of any effective machinery, for the enforcement of international
law, the balance of power has extorted obedience of international law. According to
Oppenheim: ”Balance of power is an indispensable condition of the very existence of
international law. A law of nation can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a balance of
power between the members of the family of Nations.” HP further argues that as there is
not, and never can be a central political authority above the sovereign states that could
enforce the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the family
of nations from becoming omnipotent.

Criticism, Though the theory of power has proved beneficial in many ways, it has been
severely criticised by the critics. In the first place it has been argued that balance of
power does not necessarily bring peace. On

0.1a»ce of Power

the other hand it has encouraged wars. Organski has expressed the view that the periods
of balance were periods of war, not periods of peace. For example, the First World War
occurred because Germany miscalculated drat her power was equal to that of her
adversaries, On the other hand peace was established after world war due to
preponderance of power of the Allies.
Secondly, the theory wrongly assumes that all actions of states are motivated by the
consideration of increasing their power. No doubt power is one of the goals of the state
but it is not the sole goal. The economic and cultural interests of the state also greatly
influence their actions.

Thirdly the theory of balance of power wrongly assumes that the states are static units.
The states increase their power not only through armaments, conquests or alliances but
also through industrialisation. improvement in national character and several other
methods.

Fourthly, the theory wrongly assumes that states can shift sides according to their sweet
will. In fact the states are chiefly motivated by the conjideration of their national interest
and choose allies to promote the same. Of course the states can change sides temporarily,
as Italy did during the First Word War, but generally they are tied to their friends by
political, economic and psychological interests. Each state selects its friends on the basis
of its national interests. It supports those nations that uphold international order from
which it benefits and it opposes those who seek to upset the international order.

Fifthly, the theory of balance of power assumes that balance of power is the rule and
preponderance of power is an exception. In fact, history shows that there has been
preponderance
of some power at most of the times. Thus Britain enjoyed a preponderant position after
the industrial revolution. At present United States has preponderance of power. Hence we
can say that balance of power is an exception and the preponderance of power has been
the rule in international arena.

Sixthly, the theory wrongly assumes that preponderance of power of one nation of group
of nations, poses a threat to the independence of smaller nations and threatens the world
peace. This is contrary to the facts of history. The world peace has been disturbed by less
powerful states than by the preponderant powers. For example between 1$15 to 1914
there was comparative peace in Europe because of preponderance of France and England,
rather than balance of power.

Seventhly, the theory of balance of power flouts all norms of international morality and
justice and attaches more importance to self-interest. In other words it lays emphasis on
principles of expediency rather than justice and fair play.

International Relations

221
Eighthly, the concept of `balance’ which occupies key position the theory of balance of
power, has also been criticised. It is assumed that the balance would join the weaker side
in order to redress the balance. This is .not a correct assumption. In fact, as Organski has
put it: ”There is no such thing as a `balance’ and never has been. There is no single nation
motivated primarily by a desire to maintain the balance.” England, which played the role
of a traditional balance for a long time, was also motivated by the consideration of
promoting her national interests rather than just acting as balance.

Ninthly, it is indeed difficult to measure the power position of states at a given time of
history and claim that a balance of power exists. Unlike the mechanical forces which can
be measured accurately there is no yardstick to measure the political power. The only
way to assess the subjective strength of the various states is through a war which is not
conducive to world peace.

Conclusion.

The balance of power has not attempted to preserve the peace but resulted in power
struggle among the states and divided the world into hostile camps. But despite its
demerits the concept cannot be completely ignored. The existence of multiple state
system necessitates its preservation either through collective security or through the
balance of power. Palmer and Perkins say ”as long as the nation state system is the
prevailing pattern of the international society, balance o_ power policies will be followed
in practice; however, roundly they are condemned in theory. In all probability they will
continue to operate even
if effective supranational grouping on a regional or world level are formed.”

Relevance of Balance of Power Principle in Modern Times

In view of the changed conditions in the post World War II period certain scholars have
asserted that the doctrine of balance of power is no more relevant and would ultimately
become obsolete. Prof. Palmer and Perkins also hold that in the present context the
doctrine has become ”too simple and too difficult a policy.” To quote them: The impact
of new forces nationalism, industrialism, democracy, mass education, new methods and
techniques of warfare, the growing importance of public opinion, developments in
international .organisation and international law, the growing economic ir.terdependence
of nations and peoples in a shrinking world, the disappearance of colonial frontiers, the
emergence of many new nations, the advent of the nuclear and space age-all these and
many other forces have shaped our contemporary world and made the balance of power
at once too simple and too difficult a policy. This decline in the doctrine of balance of
power can be attributed to the following factors:

Balance of Power

Bi-Polarity. In the first instance the bi-polar power system which emerged in the post
World War II period gave a serious set back to the system of balance of power. In the
post Word War II period Britain’s power greatly declined and she could no more play the
role of a balance which she had played for such a long time. Instead two Superpowers-
USA and USSR emerged with most of the lesser powers rallied around them. As both
these powers were actively involved in the policies of cold war they could not play the
role of a balance. According to Morgenthau: ”The power of the United States and of the
Soviet Union in comparison with the power of their actual or prospective allies has
become so overwhelming that through their own preponderant weight they determine the
balance of power between them. The balance cannot at present, be decisively affected by
changes in the alignments of one or the other of their allies. The balance of power has
been transformed from a multipolar into a bipolar one.”

(ii) Disappearance of Balance. With the emergence of two

Superpowers which are strong enough to determine the
position of the scale with their weight alone, no third power
can afford to play the role of a balance. In other words the
role of a balance has come to an end. There does not exist any
nation or group of nations which can play the role of a
balance, which was earlier played by Great Britain.

(iii) Fear of Destructive War. With the development of the

modern nuclear weapons any future war could
result in total
destruction of the world. This factor discourages any country
to play the role of a balance. The only agency which can
perform this function is the United Nations but it has
demonstrated is incapacity because of its inherent limitations.

(iv) The Limitations imposed by Ideology. The ideology of

nationalism, democracy etc. have imposed limitations. While
nationalism has prevented the feasibility of changing the
frontiers of any state, the democracy and the public opinion
have imposed checks on the freedom of statesmen to play
independent role in the world politics. Simile ly, the ideology
has infused in the group of people and has undermined the
possibility of readjustment of any kind in the international
political and multiple state system. Palmer and Perkins have
rightly observed: ”Where the foreign policy of a state is
highly flavoured by ideology, that state is usually not much

lntemational Relations

223
interested in the balance of power and is poorly equipped purse it.

(v) Increasing Disparity in the Power of States. The small states

or lesser powers are becoming weak day by while the great
power are becoming more and more power. This new
phenoriienon on the world scene resulted in upsetting the
balance of power.

(vi) Impact of Nov Forces. The system has been bran as

outdated on the plea that certain new forces are working
against the operation of the system. According to Prof.
Palmer and Perkins ”nationalism, industrialism, democracy,
mass education, new methods of warfare, importance of
public opinion, development of international law and
international organisations, the fact of economic
interdependence of nations and disappearance of colonial
frontiers-all these make the balaace of power too difficult a
policy.” Likewise Inis L. Claude also says that the most
fundamental tendencies affecting the political realm in recent
generation run counter to the requirements of a working
system of balance of power. There is nothing to indicate that
the.

The Balance of Power in Modern History

The dominant view in the literature of international relations is that the classical system
of balance of power flourished in a specific international political climate. The period
between 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia) and 1789 (the French Revolution) may be
considered the first golden age of classical balance of power. Religious conflict during
that period was de-emphasized mercantilism gave way to free trade and absolute
monarchies were gradually replaced by systems of popular sovereignty. Wars between
nation states- although numerous were quite often ritualized and limited in intensity.
Rarely did they affect the civilian populations of
the major European powers.

The primary characteristic of the period 1648-1789 was the ”corporate mentality” of the
various aristocracies ruling the European countries. (The role of elites in the formulation
of foreign policy is discussed in Chapter 7.) these elites (monarchs, princes, nobles,
diplomats, and military offcers) found much more in common with one another than with
their own people. This period was, in short, characterized by political and economic
homogeneity among states. There were no status-quo states facing revolutionary states.
There were no fundamental variations among political structures or among philosophies
of leaders. The values of the enlightenment bound the European ruling aristocracies
together. Major

Balance of Power

ears, which could result only in mutual disadvantage to these elites, were therefore
avoided.
The French Revolution radically destabilized the classical balance of power system. The
citizen armies, the electrifying slogans (”Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”.) the, fusion of
nationalism with popular sovereignty all were given a militant; messianic, and adventurist
character by Napoleon Bonaparte. His romantic and expansionist military campaigns
were directed to the creation of a new order, modeled after France. throughout the known
world. These actions were contrary to the central rules of classical balance of power
behavior. Wars should be kept limited, and qo attempt should be made by any one great
power to conquer and destroy any other great power belonging to the select club of
wealthy, militarily mobile, and; nfluential nation states.

The reaction of strong European nations-states to Napoleon’s challenge was to band

together in order to defeat him and to restore principles such as legitimacy and
moderation to the highly disturbed international system. After the final defeat of
Napoleon of Waterloo, the great powers convened the Congress of Vienna (1815) in
order to restore the European balance of power system. Under the diplomatic leadership
of Prince Metternich of Austria and Czar Alexander I of Russia, a new era of balance of
power was structured. It lasted until the beginning of World War I.

The nineteenth century (1815-191=4) can then be called the second golden age of the
classical balance of power. France under the restored Bourbon dynast’ was allowed to
remain in the ranks of great powers. These powers England, France, Prussia. Austrial-
Hungary, and Russia-returned to the practice of stable and ideologically homogenous
international politics. This meant, first, that European governments were in ideological
agreement concerning the nature of acceptable relations between rulers and ruled. A
second ideological
similarity was a desire for government that would not interfere in the social, economic,
religious, and educational spheres of national activity in other words, laissez faire
government. The European states also called for combined great-power action against
popular, nationalist revolts. Such uprisings, they feared, could threaten the legitimacy of
European monarchies and destabilize the existing distribution of political power by
dissolving multinational political entities, such as the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman
Empires.

In the nineteenth century wars were reduced to the minor status of violent but limited
political military tools for the adjustment of marginal in importance international
disputes. Holy wars, wars of national liberation. wars for pop-objectives were considered
unlimited and to undermine the existing and ”legitimate” national and international status
quoin other

224

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225

words, the status quo acceptable to the great power elites). It was during the nineteenth
century, then, that international law of war began to flourish. This growth stemmed from
.the limiting the destructiveness and ferocity of combat. The wars of this derived
fromlimiting the destructiveness and ferocity centers, were romanticized by imaginative
members of the European aristocracies and provided subjects for some of the world’s
finest literature and art.

But beginning in the 1870s, the order of Vienna began to unravel under the impact of
new and challenging social forces. It could be argued that technological breakthrough in
the industrial revolution were at the bottom of these most recent major transformations in
the international political system. The rise of mass nationalism; the emergence of
imperial armies; the increasing differences of interest among ruling elites, who began
developing strong nationalist identities and relaxing their previous ties with an
international aristocracy the production of weapons that could cause major destruction
without differentiating between military forces and civilian populations all could be
viewed as by products of the technological revolution.

Thus, the twentieth century, with its two major world wars and the psychologically
intense cold war, came to be considered a revolutionan-age. The detribalizing forces of
the twentieth century have been unleashed primarily by imperialist nationalism
rationalized by crusading and exclusives ideologies. The century has witnessed at least
three such movements; the fascism of Mussolini’s Italy and Nazi Germany, the
communism of the Soviet Union and China, and the free-enterprise capitalism of the
post-World War 11 United States and its principles allies.
Revolutionary attitudes destroy the major conditions for the classical international
balance of power, which is based on controlled competition among mutually acceptable
governmental elites. In a revolutionary environment, elites and masses indulge
themselves in dreams of national or international glory. They link their identities
completely with the ”fatherland” or with other higher causes. They believe that their
brand of world order ought to prevail universally; only then can peace be ensured and
human and social goals fulfilled. Wars cannot remain limited. pragmatic and amoral
exercises in an environment of mutually exclusive and often hate-felled ideologies,
antagonistic and expansionist national drives, deep popular involvement in political
economic and military affairs. and the availability of weapons of mass destructiveness.
One now fights for freedom, for truth, and for survival. Mutual perceptions (which are
often misperceptions) pit the forces of ”good” againsi the forces of ”civil”. Compromise
or mutual accommodation is considered reason or defeatism.

Balance of Power

one destroys rather than compromise with the devil so that universal peace and universal
good can prevail forever.
Since World War II, the unlimited destructiveness of nuclear weapons has contributed
heavily to the containment of Soviet American cold war conflicts below the threshold of
global nuclear war. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis (1962) which brought the
United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war the stalemated conflict
between in Vietnam, the unfolding of a deep and uncompromising conflict between
Soviet communists and Chinese communist and the doming to power of pragmatic as
well as elitist leaders, such as Richard Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Leonid Brezhney
Ronald Reagan (second term). and Mikhail gorbachey•, we might be witnessing a new
global attempt to restore an updated version of the classical balance of power system
modified to accommodate twentieth-century developments in technology weaponry and
information management.
For the classical balance of power system to be restored in any form great powers (such
as the United States and the Soviet Union) and near-great powers (such as Japan China.
and a Western European entity) must accept one another’s governmental legitimacy and
cease interfering in one another vital internal affairs. This requires a deemphasis of
ideological differences and a tacit agreement to contain international conflicts well below
the nuclear threshold. Under such a system the United Nations Security Council. no
longer hampered by automatic vetoes, might become more effective and humankind
might enter
zations are discussed in This peace however, will not necessarily result in a just
distribution of territow wealth, and status among and within nation states.
The Balance of Terror
Think, for a moment, about the

226

unthinkable. Imagine that you awaken in the middle of a nuclear attack Somehow, by
accident or design. ””clear war has erupted between your country and another. What
would it be like?

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s ”Nuclear Bomb Effects computer” gives us some
horriying estimates. But before it can do so, we need to set its indicators to simulate
reasonable conditions. Let’s sav, first. that you were sleeping about four miles from the
center of an important military installation, an industrial area, or a densely populated
metropolis. Second, let’s assume the area is a victim of a nuclear `surface blast” the bomb
blast”). Third. to have a measure of the explosive potential of the lveapoll, we set the
computer ”yield” adjustment at one megaton, or the explosive equivalent of one million
tons of TNT. That much TNT would eol»prise a stack reaching almost the height of the
Empire State Building. e megaton is fifty times as great as the bombs used in 19-1>
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (twenti- kilotons cacti. or 20.000 tons of TNT).

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227
Balance of Power 228

The effects of this attack will be catastrophic. It will gouge out a crater half a mile across
and 300 feet deep. Virtually ever,-thing in this area. pulverized by the blast and altered by
its heat, will be engulfed ill a fireball with a diameter of a mile and a half. The surface
temperature of this fire ball will be greater than .that of the sun. A huge mushroom-shape
cloud will form. carrying up and away- the particles that remain of former life and
structure.
But you are four miles away-. Though the effects upon you will not be quite as bad, they
will be severe. Everything combustible in your area will be ignited, and things normally
resistant to heat will be melted and misshapen. If you survive, you will be burned badly-.
(More than half of the people who died in the twenty-kiloton attacks upon Hiroshima and
Nagasaki died of fire and heat). If ),on survive skin burns, the heat of the air may destroy
your lungs. Besides, the supply- of oxygen in your area \\,ill have been reduced by the
near by fire balls.
Percussion effects will also be devastating. Building around yon will crumble from the
shock waves of the blast. Glass and other thorn materials will catapult through the air at a
speed of 200 feet per second. The misery of your barns will be compounded by injuries
sustained in collisions: arid your eardrums will have been shattered
you violent sound waves, and by the eight-mile per hour windstorm which will have been
set off by the blast. If you survive the initial dangers at four miles distance, you will be
among fewer than half of your neighbors who do.
But your troubles are not over. Radiation effects are your ne~a hazard. If you have. not
been severely injured by immediate irradiation. if your vital organs have not been
damaged by this unique penetrating power. you will have a lengthy about with
radioactive fallout. All of the particles vaporized and sucked up into the atmosphere in
the mushroom cloud «ill care- radioactivity. As they precipitate back to earth they will
contaminate everything in their path. Once again the air you breathe will be hazardous: -
our skin will be exposed once again to potentially lethal radiation: and exposed water and
food supplies will carry- certain death. Even if you are alive and mobile, you will be
confined to your location.

We have assumed that all of this destruction has been brought o» by a single one megaton
bomb. Yet in actual nuclear attack it is unlikeh that a single bomb would be used or that
yield would be limited to ot’e megaton. Warheads of three and five megatons are now
commol1 in the stockpiles of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet
Union is known to hay-a tested a,device of fifty megaton yield. Altogether th~ United
States commands about thirty thousand deliverable megatons a”d the Soviet Union
twenty- thousand more, for a total of about fifi~’ billia tons of TNT equivalent. On top of
that, Britain France, India alid Cl”1’ have nuclear weapons, with Western sources
estimating that Chill’’ I’`’`

sufficient refined radioactive materials to deploy- nearly 300 warheads of t«.e,jy kilotons
or more. Under these circumstances, al yield of one raegaton in our imaginary attack is a
conservative one. But when compared with conventional weapons, this blast exceeds all
the explosives used against Germany and Japan in World War II. and equals the total of
all bombing in the Vietnam War through 1972.
Furthermore, the attack on your area need not have been an isolated one. Suppose it were
part of general nuclear war with some enemy seeking to destroy 50 percent of your
nation’s industry and 25 percent of its population. This would mean hitting several major
cities in a matter of minutes perhaps some of them with several warheads. in order to gain
the advantage of instantaneous warfare. In the United States, for example. almost largest
metropolitan areas. which comprise almost one-fourth of the total national population.
These are, therefore. the areas of highest concentration of defcrise industry and
trained personnel: they also house some of the major military and governmental
installations. Table 9-l details these concentrations. If the enemy prefers counter-value
targeting. these areas are all vulnerable. If he chooses instead to knock out retaliatory
forces (counterforce strat„gy-), these areas may be spared.
The effect of total warfare on national suwival and the human future is immeasurable, yet
subject to some disagreement. Optimistic observers such as Herman Khan speculate drat
with intelligent planning. consequences could be limited to losses of not more than 2s
percent of national population and recovery of gross national product within as few as ten
years.
American Industrial and Population Concentrations: Likely Soviet

Countervalue Targets

Rank Ifeti-opolitanAreo Populalion (1970)

1 New York 1 I.>29.000

2 Los Angeles-Long Beach 7.030.000
3. Chicago 6,976,000
4 Philadelphia-N.J. -1.816.000
Detroit -1,196,000
6 San Francisco-Oakland 3.116.000
7 Washington-Md.-Va: 2_861.00()
8 Boston 2.7-1.000
9 Pittsburgh 2,-102.OOt>
10 St. Louis-111 2.36-4.000
Total -18.03,000
Total population was 203.18.()00. Therefore the ten largest metropolitan
~~as house about 24 percent of the total national population.
,•1:ntist Linus Paining takes quite a different view. arguing that the
d’’»age would be considerably grater and that the results for human

International Relations

sun iv al arc incalculable. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated ill 197-1 that a
massive Soviet strike would result in 95-100 million American fatalities: a strike limited
to missile sites and strategic submarine and bomber bases would take 5-6 million lives:
and a strike limited to SAC bases or ICBM sites would result in 500 thousand to one
million moralities. Such estimates are lightly sensitive to assumption about enenlN,
intentions and targeting, the number of independently targeted Nvarheads, delivery
vehicle accuracy and other variables.

The Balance of Terror

Despite these horrifying potential effects. nuclear developments, especially in the United
States and the Soviet Union, have become such common parts of our lives that we seem
unmoved by each new advance. Can it be that we have learned to live with the bomb’.’
Presumably we have though an estimate of the magnitude of the nuclear arms race and its
counts may disrupt our complacency. By estimate of the United States Department of
State, the United States and the Soviet Union alone spent over two trillion dollars on
defense between the end of World War Two and 1972, and their expenditures continue to
grow at a rate of almost one hundred billion dollars per year apiece. It is now calculated
by- one eminent greater than the two atomic bombs used in 19-15 against Japan, and that
there exist more than ten tons of TNT equivalents for even man Nvoman and child on
earth.

On what grounds are such huge expenditures and such ”overkill” justified? The
unanimous answer of nuclear strategists is that the nuclear arms race is not Aipacy at all-
that it is a carefully balanced system designed not to threaten peace, but to guarantee it.
At the heart of the program is the assumption that the more potential force each adversary
possesses. the less likely is it to be used in combat. The assumption that no nuclear state
will launch a nuclear attack against another because of the retaliatory cost to itself is an
extension of the classic parabellum doctrine. which offers the paradox that the best way
to ensure peace is to prepare for %N ar. while the most effective way to invite war is to
trust the good intentions of others.

Among nuclear state, peace is founded upon the principle of mutual deterrence.
Deterrence is a military potential coupled with a state of mind which. when sufficient to
be a credible threat, makes it clear to a potential aggressor that the cost of his attack will
be more than he is Ni filling to bear: ”Before you strike me. you had better consider that I
will strike N ou back, and I will do more damage to you than will justiA- your attack
upon me.” Thus deterrence grows not only from the ability to attack. but from the
capacity to retaliate as well. When each side is able to diesimde the other from nuclear
attack, a condition of mutual deterrence

Balance of Power 230

exists. The emphasis is not merely- one self defense but on capacity to equal whatever
damage may be done by an attacker. Since ”defense” indicates ability to repel, and since
deterrence involves not repulsion but retaliation.

mutual deterrence implies equivalent offensive capability. This system of keeping the
peace by mutual threat of horrible death and destruction was dubbed by Winston
Churchill the balance of terror. Others have referred to it. perhaps with greater irony, as
mutual superiority.

First- and Second-Strike Capabilities

Mutual deterrence requires not only the possession of nuclear arnis by two opposed
parties, but also the ability of each to absorb a first strike by the other without losing the
capacity to retaliate. Atomic stability depends on a belief in the mind of the potential
aggressor that he will suffer retaliation at an unacceptable cost (the essence of
deterrence). This means above all that a considerable portion of the defending state’s
strike force must survive the initial assault. If either or both parties can achieve a
first strike capability a capacity to destroy the adversary’s strategic arsenal by surprise
attack-mutual deterrence does not exist. Stable deterrence requires that both parties
possess secure second-strike forces capable of surviving surprise attack.

Nuclear strategists argue that it is in the interest of both parties that their adversaries have
secure second strike potential. Without it the retaliatory response, to be effective, would
need to be launched before the arrival of the opponent’s incoming attack forces.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles travel at speeds that reduce warning times to no more
than fifteen to thirty- minutes. Thus. without second strike security, a retaliatory force
would need to be on hair-trigger alert during periods of political tension. and ready for
instant launch. Such a time-urgent system would be prone to catastrophe in the event of
misinformation or miscalculation. to the determinant of all. Stable deterrence depends on
a less sensitised system that permits time to verify- the existence of an attack and even ’to
receive it before taking counteractions that are irreversible. For these reasons. the two
superpowers have fores worm the development of first strike potentials and declared their
objectives to be stable and mutual second strike deterrence.

For the American ’side. however. there is a contradiction between this goal of second
strike stability and the imperatives of defense~in the European theater. It is the declared
policy of the United States that if NATO could not turn back a Soviet attack at the
comcntional weapons level, tactical and strategic nuclear force would be used. This
nuclear I’nibrella is the heart of the Atlantic alliance. But it implies drat the l:nited States
might be iii the position of making first use of strategic nu,ae o ~\e’1pons. To reduce
damage to the American homeland. and to nn:~k< <hc

International Relations 233

issue in question wanders farther from home. This is the case with the
American pledge to defend Berlin, a small island of the Western war
surrounded entirely by Eastern Germany in the Soviet world. Its size and
location make it indefensible. The pledge to defend it seems ’to place in the
face of overbearing power from the Warsaw Pact nations. But the
American pledge was boldly underscored by President Kennedy in 1961
when the declared to a cheering throng in West Berlin, in the German
language, ”I am a Berliner!” A few years later President Nixon told a
similar audience that ”All the world’s free peoples are Berliners!” Some
have gone so far as to suggest that even God may be .a Berline! The point is
to dramatize to the Soviet Union the
American commitment to defend what
appears to be tactically indefensible. -

But how is this commitment made credible? Among the NATO forces in West Berlin
there are many thousands of Americans who, in the event of invasion, would either be
killed or captured. Their deaths or detention would commit the United States to
retaliatory action (not necessarily nuclear!), and the Soviets know this. Hence the
commitment of the United States to the defense of a most unlikely piece of territory is
made credible by the ”trip wire” character of the American forces there. It is based on
mutual knowledge that a Soviet attack might force the United States to do something
which it does not want to do. This process of voluntarily tying one’s own hands is
generally called the process, of commitment and posits this rule: credibility is assured
when you deprive yourself of the option of not honoring your own threat. Among other
things, this process signals to the other side chat the burden is on it to prevent a clash.

This signalling process leas been made most graphic by Thomas Schelling, who has
proposed the game of Chicken as a model of comnumicating to an enemy that a situation
is out of control and that yon are powerless to restore control because of the depth of your
commitment. He likens international conflict to two hot rodders on a deliberate collision
course each expecting the other to ”chicken out.” If neither does, each is the loser in a
bloody conclusion. Schelling suggests a strategy in which one participant becomes
conspicuously soused before the start and then, as the vehicles approach each other, the
inebriated driver throws.his steering wheel out of the car so as to signal to the other his
inability to restore control. The burden is now on the other, because one is irrevocably
committed. The major liability of course, is that two may play at the same strategy, and
instead of having one participant out of control, there may be two general objectives of
verification. First, each party wishes to be satisfied of the other’s compliance with
immediate obligations of the trear<-
su ’ :’iqmarztling termination of side construction, or closing of bases.

Balance of Power

Second, each part’ needs to know that the other is not undertaking to replace what has
been removed. Third, each eats satisfaction that the other has not merely moved certain
instruments to other places and concealed them from surveillance. Finally. each wants
demonstrated assurance that remaining forces are what they are said to be. Therefore,
verification of four objective must be achieved: initial obligation, nonreplacement.
nonconcealment, and remainders.
’

The problem of enforcement of arms control and arms limitation agreements is even
more difficult politically than that of verification. If two states agree to limit their arms
and only one complies, then it is difficult for the weaker to enforce the agreement against
the stronger. Ideally. therefore, enforcement ought to be left to some neutral agent which
has both the political capability to enforce agreements and the military where withal. Yet
imagine states giving over to some other party or institution authority greater than their
own, and military power superior to their own even though they. are capable of creating
more and better! To expect the United States and the Soviet Union to vest in the UN, for
example, both the political power to order sanctions against a great power, and
independent nuclear capability, is now politically naive. Hence international arms
agreements have traditionally left to states the privilege of ”national means of
enforcement.” Often implicit in reluctance to negotiate reduction of arms is the argument
that such reduction would minimize ability to enforce compliance against a treaty’
partner which violates its obligations.

Since every arms race is tied to a political context, arms reduction and political thaw are
interdependent. Where favorable political chance is lacking, most progress toward arms
reduction is dictated by cost factors. In 1899, Czar Nicholas of Russia convened the First
Hague Conference not to negotiate a new political order for Europe. but because he felt
economically incapable of competing in arms development with Germany. Likewise, the
American ”return to normalcy’ after World War I was motivated largely by budgetary
fatigue, coupled with the desire to retreat from power politics. The SALT I agreements
arose from mutual Soviet American desire to control the costs of yet another spiral in the
race between offensive and defensive missiles.

Other motives exist, such as avoiding nuclear-related hazards.

The limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) is a case in point. This was
adopted not to des-ensitize the nuclear race, but to reduce the dangers of
radioactive fallout. Prohibitions on chemical and biological warfare hardly
affect the tone of intergovernmental relations, but they may spare warfare
populations some of the potential horrors of war. Expansion (or din din) bullets were
outlawed at the start of the century because of the effects upon humans not because their
absence would enhance the political climate. The

23-I

International Relations ~ :>

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was sponsored Washington and ’vluecur`. not because
it would improve their own relation or reduce
the pruepc,:ts of war between them. nut to limit the potentra fallout by restrictin~ nncle,tr
development to a few states. and to guarantees the maintenance of at least one aspect of
the international power distribution: a small membership in the nuclear club.

The modest progress thus far made toward arms control arises
only partly because the possession of arms threatens international stabiliy.
In fact. the two principle competitors take the opposite view. namely. that
mutual deterrence is the guardian of international peace and security, -_k--
may be concluded that the overall impetus of arms control efforts in the
modern world is not to end the balance of terror, but to stabilize it at
acceptable cost and risk. The goal is not peace through disarmament; it is
peace through controlled, but precarious. mutual deterrence.

National Perceptions of the Balance of Terror

The American Perception

The popular outlook upon the balance of terror in the United States is sharply divided.
Those who object to American participation insist that the arms race is unjustifiably
costly, both absolutely and in relation to other needs. Each new generation of arms is
more expensive than is justified by the minimal gains in security; and each new upward
spiral may accentuate insecurity. Furthermore, the critics ask, are official assessments of
need built no misperceptions? Do the enmities which characterized the ;;old war still rule
world politics? Are our legitimate interests so vitally challenged that we must go to such
exorbitant extremes to preserve tham’? Critics farther to the left wonder if such levels of
arms are not maintained simply to safeguard less legitimate interests.

The official view is markedly different. It holds that in addition to the need for strategic
balance, military threats to our interests are ever present. American foreign interests are
targets of China and the Soviet Union, which seek to divide the Western allies,
undermine confidence in American leadership and the American economy, and to seize
territories ,,lid governments not vigorously defended by the United States. Only the
defense of Berlin and the resolute interventions in the Korean and Vietnam scars taught
these foes that Washington will not tolerate encroachments on as interests. Establishment
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Truman Doctrine (determination to prevent
the spread of Soviet influence). and incorporation of Japan and West Germany in our
defense alliance were the types of actions which signaled to the Kremlin our intent to
resist challenge to our interests.

Balance of Power 236

But there was another lessen well. Soviet threats dramatized the need not
only for intense political relations and institution building among our allies. but for
impressive arming. Only by being to signal the Soviet Union. with credible threat. that
the use of their arms would bring about ,nassivc retaliation, could we free our allies from
impediments to the founding or restoration of democratic political institutions. Arms
policy yeas coupled with the ”export of democracy. and provided the umbrella under
which we could ”help others to help themselves.’ If the Soviet Union proceeded to
greater threat with improved weapons. them we had to’ improve ours. Each new Soviet
development demanded American response: the Soviet Union was responsible for fueling
the strategic arms race, through its combined political threats and strategic capability.

Tile villainous interpretation of Soviet intentions abated only slightly with the death of
Joseph Stalin. the Soviet Khrushehev. But the tone did change. With the exception of rare
direct confrontations (such as the Cuban Missile Crisis). the Soviet-American arms race
began to yield to tension did not result. however. in bilateral willingness to reduce stock
piles. Before such events could take place. a new factor arose: the prospect of China. with
its immense potential power. as a nuclear state in enmity with both Washington and
Moscow. The U.S. was finally obliged to acknowledge that there does not exist a
Communist monolith, that the threats of Moscow and of Peking are political and
strategically distinct. But in the presence of a third hostile member. how do two states
reduce their arms?
The American government found itself caught in a bind. While Washington was intent
upon improved relations with Moscow and less costly strategic policy. Moscow
perceived new threats from China. necessitating a two-front strategy. The Soviet need for
stable deterrence with the United States and a separate military potential toward China is
problem with which Washington can sympathize. but which its defense policies cannot
tolerate. Regardless of presumed targets. the total amount of Soviet destructive capability
is increased by this dual targeting. Could missiles aimed to Asia be conveniently
retracted’? Could mobile marine rocketry be dispatched to sites within range of American
foreign intercRs on the pretense of being deterrents of Chinese policy? Could strategic
defense against China be a cover for potential nuclear blackmail agairst American allies
such as Japan and South Korea? What of Americm interests in Southeast Asia and the
Pacific?

In the absence of answers to these and other critical questions. the re-doubling of Soviet
defenses could not be taken without
response. Despte their occasionally favorable political effects upon Soviet American
democracy. Sino Soviet differences meant new efforts for American

International Relations z,,

strategy consequence the Seat agreements dealt only with deployment tit defence of
solidified spheres of influence, particularly home territories The Western hemisphere and
all of Europe. But they did not limit potential developments relating to the great political
question mark the a the world in which the struggle for spheres is a trilateral one. Here
’?principal villian, is China and its uncertain nuclear future. The need the Soviet Union to
prepare for this serves only as a secondaw irritant.

The Perceptions of America’s Major Allies

Caught between the need for security and the desire to liberate themselves from
American domination. Washington’s principal allies have ari ambivalent outlook on the
balance of terror. Yet there are considerable differences in their attitudes, owing
particularly to their geographic locations the external imperatives which guide their
foreign policies, and the confidence of their interests with those of the United States.

Japan.

For twenty years. Japan was paradoxically ono of the must involved states in the global
balance of terror and one of the involved. It was intensely interested in the balance
because of its location, within easy flying distance of the three Asian preoccupation’s of
its American ally: Korea. China, and Vietnam. For over twenty years Japan ser<~ed as a
major staging base for American strategy, throughout Asia, and as a principal deployment
site for American military activity and material. Yet because of this relationships, Japan
itself was not a major participant in the global balance, entrusting its defense to the
United States and maintaining a low annual defense appropriation. Despite the anxieties
of location and possible embroilment in American wars. Japan for the most part profited
from the Soviet American arms race and from global bipolarity.

More recently, however, the Japanese outlook has shifted. ’Americans withdrawal from
mainland Asia, together with the uncertainty ’,of the Nixon Doctrine, has kindled a sharp
internal debate concerning the ;Japanese government has already embarked on a three-
fold increase in defense expenditures. While its relations with both China and the Soviet
~Jnion have lent stability, to Japan’s Asian policy, assertive establishment of :egional
economic supremacy may upset contemporary tranquillir<-. Demand for natural
resources and India’s new nuclear capabiliy further destabilize the Japanese outlook, as
do the growing uncertaint<- of the American nuclear umbrella and the Nixon Doctrine.
Japans future perception of the global and regional balances of terror will evolve with the
Qability of Asia and with Tokyo’s vital economic and territorial interests Available
technology is equal to either a nueiear or a nonnuclear choice.

,,/,,/Ice of Power

Western Europe.

Proximity to the Warsaw Pact nations. the degree of American security and economic
domination. and progressive establishment of western Europe as a vital worked center all
contribute to the maturation of the attitude cbncerning the global balance of terror.
Through the years follo~rllg j’yfa Second World War. American responses to what
Europe perceived as Soviet military- threat were a welcome instrument of stabilization,
one which permitted the gradual resurgence of economic activit`- and the integration of
Western Europe. But now the Europeans are cold-war weaW, resistant to additional
increases in defense expenditures. and simultaneously desirous of more American
security and less trues, and simultaneously desirous of more American security, and less
American interference. They recognize that the two are incompatible. Unlike many areas
of the world, however, Europe does not consider the global arms race to have been
particularly wasteful. It has achieved European security without substantial reduction in
European expenditures on economic objectives, for the United States has borne the
largest burden. Indeed, in the European view, by having done so the United States has
enjoyed unequaled scientific, industrial, and technological advances which have
contributed to the means by which American manufacturers upon the United States. Thus
it is less over the fear of Soviet invasion than the growing resistance to American
penetration that the European perspective is formulated.

There is also some division of opinion among the members of the European Comlnuniy
themselves concerning the balance of terror. France, in-particular wishes to proceed at
virtually any cost to provide for a European defense force independent of the .United
States. Germany. the economic and conventional forces fulcrum of the Community.
demands American nuclear protection. Britain and the other Community- members are in
such economic condition as to require that Washington bear as much of the cost of
Europe’s defense as can be arranged. It is only as the U.S. demands redistribution of the
costs of NATO that most of Western Europe perceives the expense of Western defense,
and thus of hemispheric defense arrangements which stress costly conventional
capabilities as against minimal strategic deterrence. It is likely that if the demand for
independence from the United States continues to mount, the
choice will be forced upon Europe to. forsake costly conventional strategics and join tile
balance of terror in full b proliferating dangerous but less expensive (in the long run)
instruments of minimal strategic detcrr6nce.

Canada.

In contrast to Japan and Western Europe. Canada has been relativ0lN removed from the
balance of terror. Though it participated in the

International Relations

strategy consequence the Seat agreements . defence of solidified spheres of influence.

particularly lion

dealt only wi h deployment „, e territories TI, Western hemisphere and all of Europe. But
they did not limit potenti~,

developments relating to the great political question mark the a the N\0,.1(1 in which the
struggle for spheres is a trilateral one. Here ’?principal villia,1~ is China and its uncertain
nuclear future. The need the Soviet Union to prepare for this serves only as a secondary
irritant.

The Perceptions of America’s Major Allies

Caught between the need for security and the desire to liberatc themselves from
American domination. Washington’s principal allies lla\e an’ ambivalent outlook on the
balance of terror. Yet there are considerabl: differences in their attitudes, owing
particularly to their geographic locations the eternal imperatives which guide their
foreign policies, and the confidence of their interests with those of the United States.

Japan.

For twenty years, Japan was paradoxically one of the must involved states in the global
balance of terror and one of the involved. It was intensely interested in the balance
because of its location, within easy flying distance of the three Asian preoccupation’s of
its American ally: Korea. China, and Vietnam. For over tweny years Japan served as a
major staging base for American strategy- throughout Asia, and as a principal
deployment site for American military activity and material. Yet because of this
relationships, Japan itself was not a major participant in the global balance, entrusting its
defense to the United States and maintaining a loll annual defense appropriation. Despite
the anxieties of location and possible embroilment in American wars. Japan for the most
part profited from the Soviet American arms race and from global bipolarity.

More recently. however, the Japanese outlook has shifted. Americans withdrawal from
mainland Asia, together with the uncertainty of the Nixon Doctrine, has kindled a sharp
internal debate concerning the Japanese government has already embarked on a three-
fold increase in defense expenditures. While its relations with both China and the Soviet
Jnion have lent stability to Japan’s Asian policy, assertive establishment of regional
economic supremacy may upset contemporaw
tranquillit`’. demand for natural resources and India’s new nuclear capabiliy filrther
destabilize the Japanese outlook, as do the growing uncertainy of the American nuclear
umbrella and the Nixon Doctrine. Japan’s future perception of the global and regional
balances of terror will evolve with the stability of Asia and with Tokyo’s vital economic
and territorial interests. Available technology is equal to either a nuclear or a nonnuclcar
choice

7Plgnce of Power

,Vestern E
urope.

Proximity to the Warsaw Pact nations. the degree of American

,entity and economic domination, and progressive establishment of
’
,Vestern Europe as a vital worked center all contribute to the maturation of ie attitude
concerning the global balance of terror. Through the years glowing the Second World
War. American responses to what Europe perceived as Soviet military threat were a
;welcome instrument of dabilization, one which permitted the gradual resurgence of
economic activity and the integration of Western Europe. But now the Europeans are
rold-war veearl. resistant to additional increases in defense expenditures, and
simultaneously desirous of more American security and less trues, and simultaneously
desirous of more American security and less American. interference. They recognize that
the two are incompatible. Unlike many areas of the world, however. Europe does not
consider the global arms race
have been particularly wasteful. It has achieved European security Without substantial
reduction in European expenditures on economic objectives, for the United States has
borne the largest burden. Indeed, in
e European view, by having done so the United States has enjoyed
01lequaled scientific, industrial, and technological advances which have
’ on tributed to the means by which American manufacturers upon the
i ited States. Thus it is less over the fear of Soviet invasion than the
bowing resistance to American penetration that the European perspective
is formulated.
There is also some division of Op1111011 among the members of the European
Community themselves concerning the balance of terror. France, iii-Particular va-ishes to
proceed al virtually am cost to provide for a European defense force independent of the
United States. Germany. the economic and conventional forces fulcrum of the
Community. demands American nuclear protection. Britain and the other Conununiy
members are in such economic condition as to require that Washington bear as much of
the cost of Europe’s defense as can be arranged. It is only as the U.S. demands
redistribution of the costs of NATO that most of Western Europe perceives the expense
of
Western defense, and thus of hemispheric defense arrangements which stress costly
conventional capabilities as against minimal strategic deterrence. It is likely that if the
demand for independence from the United States continues to mount, the choice will be
forced upon Europe to. forsake costly conventional strategies and join the balance of
terror in full b proliferating dangerous but less expensive (in the 1°ng rung instruments of
minimal strategic deterrence.

Canada.

In contrast to Japan and Western Europe. Canada has been

relatiwelv removed from the balance of terror. Though it

participated in the

International Relations 2;

Korean War and has been a member of NATO. it has atoided n7,~i,,, 1171111ar1’
commitments and has chosen instead t0 be all important part . United Nations
peacekeeping efforts. While maintaining a small
relatiteh modern defense force. Canada has avoided the nuclear optic, and has chosen to
divert into economic development funds which nli,~I, nornlally, have gone to defense.

In part the Canadian position is a fortuitous result of proximih -,, the United States. EN-
en if we disregard for the moment Ottattas efforts,.

maintain friendly- relations ttith Moscow and its relatively e~rlrecognition of China, it
remains true that the closeness of Canada to t1 l,
States, and particularly to its industrial heartland, has lent strategic immunity to Canadian
policy. But this proximity is a double-ed,~ sword. For like Western Europe. Canada has
felt the penetrating effects o American industries, and of the technological and industrial
superiorin which the balance of terror has enabled American manufacturers to develop.
Thus while Canada has remained aloof from the balance of terror, as an active vigor
resisted its domestic economic consequences. 1e particular. the wastefulness which the
balance of terror imposes upon: North American natural resources note threatens to force
upon Canada < continental allocation polio’, one which trill further erode llationa
sovereignty. To Canada, them while the balance of terror mad hal’ produced coincidental
security. it has resulted ill economic relations Ili[! its congenital neighbour which have
been injurious to national self-esteer alld integrity. Thus while intact territorially. Canada
perceives itself t; hate been a casualt<- of the balance of terror through indirect ana
continental economic means.

The Soviet Perception

Far front accepting the role as antagonist n world politics and it the strategic arms race.
the Kremlin seeks to defend its island of socialise from capitalist encirclement. Bolstering
their traditional fears of caposcc, borders. the Soviets have experienced overt attempts by
Japan and th-

West to bring down their potter. Japanese and American landings 1Siberia at the close of
World War I. shortly after the Bolshevik Revolutio’ of 1917. here historic signals of the
need to maintain rigorous defers, against the capitalist industrialized states. More recentlt.
American effort’ after World War Ii to influence Soviet polio- in Eastern Europe throuc1
atomic monopoly hate accentuated the need for vigilance. NATO ” particular. and the
string of anti-Soviet alliances in general, added fun””’ to the need. Incorporation of West
Germany into NATO in apparc° violation of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 was the
ultimate sign e: American 1I11e1711017S Of 171a111talllg anti-SOt1Ct tension
throughout E””of% far from being the cause of thv balance and strategic threats.

ante of power

=4n
Bate
The new Soviet concern with Chinese growth compounds m,Ut:rs
esc two powers. previously tied in ideological and political bomls. 110%V
Th

y« for legitimate leadership of tile socialist world. The Chinese cannot he n

ue Marxist-Leninists because or the peasant base of the revolution. tr instead. they are
conservative Stalinists bent upon division of Marxism and upon anti-Soviet sponsorship
or the Third World. Ever since the estrangelllent in 1956. ttile growth of Chinese power
has been a threat to

tile Soviet Union. Violent border clashes. combined with Chinese entry into the nuclear
club. have enlivened previously dormant fears. The two Conununist giants are now
enemies. as Moscow sees it, because of Chinese adherence to old Stalinist trays. the
ideological pertersions of Maoison> and the military attempts of tile Chinese to force
settlement of old territorial questions.
The prospect of a modern Chinese nuclear force menaces the Kremlin. Hence the need to
conduct tN\-O simultaneous arms policies, one for Sotiet American strategic stability.
and one for superiority over China.
’

The failure of the United States to perceive this dual need properly is the
real remaining strategic issue of Sotiet American diplomacy. It indicates
V~ashington’s intention to maintain Asian instability by promoting Sino-
Soviet tension. Meantthile> what will the United States do elsewhere if the
Soviet Union lets dottn its guard’.’ What threat might NATO and the
United States present if the Kremlin must concentrate its strength in Asia?

For as long as the Chinese strategic future remains uncertain and the
United States is able to exploit Si17o-Soviet differences. the Soviet Union
must maintain its dual arms policy. Moscott is victimized by ttto potters
struggles. and must be prepared to deal ttith the rclaliye threats of ttto

antagonist.
The Chinese Perception

The Century of Humiliation and the grottth of potter under Mao Tsetung shape the
Chinese viett of the balance of terror. Hemmed ill by the Union to the north and America
and its allies to the nest and south. Soviet U

China has experienced a modern histoil of containment. The achievement of nuclear

combat potential has been the sole means by tthich Peking has

been able to demand that Washington and Moscott take account of it.

If political advantage is a product of equality in arms. China must compete to gain full
political potential in the international system. Only in
’

this teat can China achieve its ultimate aim of preventing the Sotict Unton
and the United States front carting the world into two giant harmonics.
But there are other objectites in the Chinese quest for full

participates in tile balance of terror. In addition to ttanting to escape fiom hall, Peking
fears the restoration of Japanese ritalrt h;is been nuclear black) one of history’s most
bitter. At the end of the last century Japan dcC`,’LCd

1
international Relations 2-11

Chilicse ill war, and propelled itself far ahead of China i rnodernization, China took
advantage of this during World War I, From 1 31 to 194 the
were embattled again. American occupation of Japan was the first Chinese reprieve front
the Japanese threat. but the respite terminated in tile American decision during the
Korean War to establish Japan as the prime Asian link in the American Pacific security
program. The establishment of a formal treat’ of alliance in 195 1 signaled the fusion of
the Japanese and American threats to the Maoist government. which has come to power
on the mainland only in the last month of 1949.

By the late 1960’s the close identification of these two enemies began to divide. The
return of Japan to full economic competition with the United States brought jealous and
recriminative actions from Washington. The Nixon Doctrine-a plan for the post-Vietnam
years for decreased American participation in the territorial defense of allies threatened
the terioration in Japanese American security policy. Leftist political ground in Japan
demanded increased independence from Washington, even if that should mean
constitutional change (the current constitution nonounces the development of combat
nuclear potential) and development of nuclear forces. The threat of a Japanese nuclear
potential separate from that of the United States is one to which China must react.
The final motive is China’s desired leadership of the Third World Knowing that the less
developed countries wish to break the bipolarity world politics, China has set its
sights on championship of this ground Sharing with them a history of imperialism, of
forced racial inferiority.-reterritorial exploitation and involuntary constraint, China plays
a interest role. In addition, sharing the problems of underdevelopment, but having
enormous productive potential because of population reserves. China itself as the future
industrial center of the Third .World. But to achieve or American overtures and threats.
from neoimperialisin and from their attempts at co-operation. All of this requires tit

Balance of Powyer
242

fledgling governments, or even to aid old and trusted, though impoverished, friends. But
the Third World has been a casualty of the nuclear era in yet a second way. At the height
of the cold war, when both t,e United States and the Soviet Union sought the allegiance
of newly independent nature their aid programs were considerably larger than at the
present time stay then, the strategic race has stabilized and the expensive quest for?. As a
result, development assistance from the superpowers has dominant and the two wealthiest
and most powerful governments have only restantly participated in enlarged
multinational aid programs through national institutions.

conclusion -
With or without arms races the world will continue, for as long as the nation-state
remains the dominant actor, to face problems of power, competition, and potential
conflict. Disparities of wealth; ideological distrust, conflict of interests, confrontation of
objectives, perceptions and misperceptions these and other aspects of international
relations will continue to ensure that states will apply their power in pursuit of their
interests and of their needs. And, regrettably, they will also continue to ensure that
humans will expand their scientific genius and their technological achievement as much
to destructive purposes as to the betterment of the human condition.

e ability to offer a credible nuclear force, both to attract partners through the status of
nuclear membership and to make serious threats of coercion.

The Third World Perception

Faced with the costly and difficult problems of modernization in a world 111 which the
rich get richer and poor get poorer, the Third World nations, deplore the unproductive
squandering of natural, human. and economic resources. The balance of terror fits
especially into this vision, in as much as it has absorbed over three trillion dollars during
the past quarter century.

But it is not merely the cost of tile strategic arms race which is objectionable. Added to it
is the unjustifiable vigor with which the United `t,nc~ and the Soviet Union deny their
economic capability to assist tile
CHAPTER 12

NON-ALIGNMENT
Meaning

The term non-alignment dencies different meanings to diiferem people. The western
scholars like Bans J. Morgenthau, George Liska Lawrence W. Matron and others have
preferred the term ’neutralism’ to ’non-alignment’. George Schwarzenger refers to a
number of terms lik? isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralisation,
unilateralism and non-involvement, which are often taken as synonymous with the nom
alignment. But each term has different meanings. Isolationism stade for policies of
aloofness. Non-commitment refers to politics of detachment for other powers in a
multiconrer relationship. Neutrality describes the political and legal status of a country at
war with respect to the beligerents Neutralization means political status of is a example of
a neutralized state) Unilateralism is identified with policies of calculated risks such as the
destruction of own thermonuclear weapons at one’s own instance. Non-involvement
means keeping away from the struggle between the different superpower ideologies.
Schwarzenberger says that non-alignment and the above mentioned six concept do not
mean the same thing, and they ’ fundamentally differ.

`Non-alignment is a policy of keeping out of alliances in general and military pacts in

particular’. The term is very close to neutralism, since the basic object of the two is `non-
involvement in cold war’ in particular. and in actual war in general. Some scholars have
used two terms interchange early, but non-alignment has broader meanings. It means that
a nation following such a policy need not be neutral under all circumstances. It can
participate actively in world affairs under exceptional circumstances. Non-alignment
being an attribute of foreign policy ’s

subject to change. That is why a change of government in a non-aligned county often

results in the change of the attitude. The new government

Non,Alfgnment 244

has to make a specific declaration to the effect whether i would continue

or a bandon non-alignment, as happened in case of India during the period
1977-80 under the Janata Party. Non-alignment taken in this context is not
equivalent to neutralism or neutrality, which on the other hand is adopted
as a result of international agreement. The commitment to neutrality
remains permanent and is not affected by a change in government unless
international agreement is abrogated. -

In short, it can be said that political neutrality means keeping away from particular issue
while non-alignment means the same thing wrath a difference. Non-alignment also aims
at keeping away not only from a particular conflict or issue but
from a continuing international situation-the cold war. Since military alliances constitute
an important feature of cold war, non-alignment naturally insists on keeping away from
these alliances.

Non-Alignment as Antithesis of Alignment

Before analysing the factors which led to the development of non-alignment it is relevant
to study the factor which led to the traditional system of alliances.

The system of alliances or alignments is and was based on the traditional thinking with
regard to relations between sovereign states, `that international politics is nothing but a
struggle for power amongst a number of small and large units each of which is
aggressively inclined and each prepared to exercise superior power in the pursuit of an
important interest.
On the assumption that the design of all governments is to be independent and at peace,
alignment is in some degree involuntary-each aligned state presumably considers that it
has no option in the existing circumstances but to belong to an alliance. In majority of
cases the alignment is neither imposed nor is a consequence of imposition. On the other
hand it is a deliberate response by a nation to a set of circumstances which in the view of
its leaders compel it to seek the protection of another power. The basic factors which led
to the conclusion of such alliances after 1945 was the cold war (where the small powers
became aligned to other great power as though they were directly involved in a common
ideological struggle), the internal unrest (due to’ two conflicting groups supporting
different ideologies when the ruling group in Philippines and Malaya entered into
alliances), fear of subversion (when internal unrest was inspired or assisted by foreign
agents for purpose of obtaining a strategic or political advantage).

J.W. Burtain is of the view that the causes of alignment may be varied, they do not
always relate to the struggle for power being waged by the leading nations, nor -do
ideological conflicts associate with that struggle. ’Alignments arise out of preconceived
notions regarding the

lntematlonal R~Jations I 245

behaviour of nations out of subjective expectations, out of integratanding enmities and

traditional fears, out of internal unre t and out of policies which isolate nations, in many
cases the major power conflict is but a clod under which other reasons for alignment are
disguised.

The non-alignment is based on the widespread desire of national independence and non-
involvement in the conflicts of others. The policies of non-alignment are the policies
every government would follow in an ideal world of sovereign state in which there were
no power conflicts
or threats to independence that called for special defence arrangements or alliances.
There are widespread circumstances which influence the countr< or countries to accept
non-alignment as the basis of their foreign policy, Post-way- nationalism and anti-
colonialism and the pressing problems of economic underdevelopment are the
background circumstances in which non-alignment has flourished.

Factors Responsible for Adoption of Non-Alignment

The factors responsible for the adoption alignment are given here under.

1. Nationalism. The most important feature of the freedom

movements in Asian and African countries was nationalism.
It was tot the nationalism of the west, a mounting devotion to
one’s own country or race but a movement to obtain freedom
after a long and persistent struggle and the people were
conscious to preserve it at all costs. To preserve the freedom
the nations were determined to follow a course whereby the
did not become tools in the hands of big powers. Hence they
preferred to follow the policy of non-alignments.

2. Anti-Colonialism. The anti-colonial feeling which persisted in the countries of

Asia and Africa even after the attainment of freedom also largely contributed to the
growth of policy of non-alignment. These powers were afraid that they may be again
subjugated by the colonial powers and were, therefore, determined to keep off from these
colonial powers. This could be possible by avoiding membership of both the blocs and
adopting an independent course of action by keeping out of all sort of alliances. Their
position was identical to the position of a child who `dreads fire.’

Underdevelopment and a economic aid Most of the countries of Asia and Africa who
gained independence were poor and underdeveloped. They were very keen to improve
the standard of living of their people and promote systematic development of their
country. As they needed capital and

NW_7qlfgnment

the blocs to

achieve their objectives at a fast rate, they thought it proper to keep off from political
alignments and pursue a policy of non-alignment.

Racial and cultural aspects. For a long time the colonial powers had fed the Afro-Asian
nations with the idea that they were racially as well as culturally backward. The- feeling
proved to be boon in disguise and evoked mutual sympathy among the people of the
newly, emerged states of Asia and Africa. Being victims of common economic
exploitation and political domination by the European nations they felt a sense of affinity
and decided to cooperate with each other.
5. Need of peace for development. Finally, the newly
independent states wanted peace in the world so that they
could
concentrate on their development. Consequently, they
decided to keep off from the military alliances and the two
power blocs.

Motives of Non-Alignment.

Every foreign policy has some definite motives, even though the
basic motives of all foreign policies is to promote the national interest. The chief motives
of non-alignment are as follows:

4.

and development of non.

Urge for independence in formulation of policy: All the erstwhile colonies after throwing
off the b n$age were keen to secure their hard won independe~e. As they were
economically, politically and miliy, quite weak and could not compete favourably with
the older and stronger nations, they felt it desirable to keep out of power blocs so that
they may be able to pursue an independent foreign policy.

(ii) Desire to avoid involvement in general mar: The non-

aligned nations want to avoid entangling themselves in the
various political feuds so that they may be able to concentrate
fully on the economic and material development of their
people. With this objective in mind they generally avoid
alliance with the two power blocs so that they may not be
unwittingly dragged into the war. The non-aligned nations
are quite aware chat in case of a general war they ’Will not be
able to escape its impact. Yet they aWd6termined to avoid
direct involvement in such wars as far as possible.

(iii) Preservation of world,r xdc : Another motive of the

non-
aligned power is to presewe the world peace. Non-aligned
states~,feel that the curse adopted by them is best designed to

24’l prevent war. y end that throughout history, alliances and arms race have eventually
resulted in war. Non-aligned nations are able to mediate between the power blocs, as they
did in Korea, Indo-China and Congo. They may also supply impartial policemen and
observers. They can provide ’ manpower for U.N. Emergency Force . Therefore, the
`neutralists’ who constitute a larger, group, can play an important role in avoiding war
and preserving world peace.

(iv) Economic Development: The aprn-aligned .countries are

underdeveloped. they must get on with the work of social and
economic development. They cannot afford to direct their
limited resources to armaments and defence at the cost of
neglect of the economic development of the country. Though
countries like India are often compelled to organise defence
in the face of hostile attitude of some of their neighbours, but
by and large the non-aligned states prefer to concentrate on
the policy of economic development to better the conditions of
their people.

(v) Moral argument: Non-alignment is considered to be a moral doctrine while the

system of alliances and counter-alliances
is the clear manifestation. of `power politics’. The unaligned nations regard themselves as
morally superior even if, on perhaps because, they are weaker and lack material wealth.
The non-aligned stages consider it their proud duty to influence the international scene
with moral force rather by taking recourse to power.

(vi) To help U.N. to function successfully: Another motive of

the non-aligned nations is to ensure that U.N. functions
successfully in fulfilling its objectives especially of
preservation of world peace and economic development. This 4.
is possible only if this forum is freed from the game of power
politics. The non-aligned states who constitute the third
forces, can playa useful role in international politics by
judging each issue on its merits and finding a viable solution.

Economic and technical assistance. Non-aligned nations

-:ceive concrete advantages by remaining friendly with all the big powers. They are able
to secure economic and technical .assistance from both blocs. They can also receive help
from one bloc when threatened or actually attacked by the other power. Sometimes, this
attitude is considered immoral as it

.in zoixnts to playing of one side against the other. But it is the classical tradition of
politics generally and international

lignnreit= polifics in particular, that the state must protect its interests by all sorts of
methods.

248

Evaluation of the Concept ,, . .

Scholars have ~ expressed conflicting views regarding the

Sirigcance of the concept. While some have greatly lauded it, the others bitterly criticise
it. The main points of criticism against non-alignment are

oollov`s1.

The doctrine is unclear. James Burton has said that ”there has been no full treatment of
the concept, no analysis and precise description, no exposition through which others
might estimate the significance and future prospects of policies of non-alignment.”

2. It lacks analytical precision. The term is in common sue but

no effort has been made by the propounders of the concept to
properly analyse it. This cask was done by the western
scholars. As a result there is no popular understanding of the
concept among; the majority of the people.

3. Not a model of international behaviour. The exponents of

non-alignment claim that the concept is of great significance
in so far as model of international behaviour which all
countries should follow in the interests of peaceful relations.
It serves as a solution for the grave problem of nuclear age.
But the aligned nations, small and rage appear, to have the
wrong image of non-alignment for which they deduce that it
is a ”shining policy of unrealistic expediency of blackmail

and
of irresponsibility likely not to be permanent and to be even a danger to the world peace”
(J. W. Burton).

Represents a policy of national self-interest. Western scholars have alleged that non-
alignment is nothing but a policy designed to fulfill the selfish interest of the nations

professing it. No doubt this is the characteristic of all foreign policies, but the general
expression that non-aligned countries are not self seekers, has not been admitted by the
western

scholars. Therefore like all other concepts--laissez Jnire, balance of power party
parliamentary government etc.--this concept too has developed out of expediency and self
interest.

The concept is confused with other ternis.,bite often the concept of non-alignment is
confused with terms like neutralism. Even the advocates of non-alignment like U.N. of
Burma once said in a speech. ”This pollcinon-augnniellt) has been called neutralism in
cold war. Perhaps that is the

International Relations

Merits

right name for it.:” Therefore some advocates and prop of the doctrine themselves are not
very clear as to t correctness of the term.

However, non-alignment is not an unmeritorious system. It has i predominant merits

which have led most of the Afro-Asian countries ~ adopt it as the basis of their foreign
policy. The chief merits are as follow

1. Preservation of the world peace. All polities includil

international politics are struggles for power. This gives ri
to alliances and counter alliances, armaments race aN
militarism; etc. The non-aligned nations try to keep out of
this power struggle which is ultimately conducive to world
peace.

2. Preservation of Independence. The nations which have

adopted the policy of non-alignment were once under the
political subjection of the great powers. They had to wage a
hard and long struggle to win their political independence. As
they do not want to lose their harVon independence they try
to keep out of world power struggle lest their independence
may be jeopardised again.

3. Economic aid and development. Non-aligned countries can

win the favour of both the blocs and receive economic
assistance for their development from both. For example
India received the maximum aid from the Soviet Union as
well as the U.S.A. It has been estimated that India received
up to 1962 $ 2726 m from U.S.S.R. and $ 963 m from U.S.A,
while Pakistan received only $ 1329 m in total. This clearly
shows that India as a non-aligned country secured more aid
from both the sources in comparison to Pakistan which!
received aid from the western bloc countries alone. ’
Check on the big powers ambitions. The superpowers,
U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. and
now even China have embarked
upon ambitious policies of economic domination of the world.
Non-aligned nations by keeping aloof have thwarted, the i
imperialistic ambitions of all the superpowers. Thus non-
alignment rejects power politics in the field of internatio:
relations. As Schwarzenberger states, ”it signifies a type
relation between states in which certain patterns of behavic ::are predominant; hegemony,
imperialism, alliances, balau
of Power and war.”

4.

5.

No”’qllgnment

250

Recession in cold war. Ever since the emergence of non-aligned group the cold war
between superpowers has somewhat subsided. the decision of the Afro-Asian countries at
Bandung Conference 1955, to take independent course and keep away from the
involvement of any kind greatly helped in this process. With the decision of non-aligned
countries to keep off from all kinds of military pacts with either of the big powers, the
continuation of cold war became difficult, if not impossible.

Support of U.N. In U.N. the members of non-aligned nations because of their numerical
strength have exercised great influence on the decisions of the General Assembly, even
though they cannot do anything against the use of veto in the Security Council.
Therefore, no majority decision can be taken without their support. As the non-aligned
Nations are peace-loving there can be no cases in general when the obligations of the
United Nations may conflict with the obligations of impartiality. The non-alignment has
helped U.N. to carry on its peace-keeping function effectively.

7. Independence of Judgment. The non alignment envisages

independence of judgment. The various events and problems
are judged on merits rather than preconceived ideological
notions and other affinities.

8. According to J. W. Burton there are four reasons for the

importance of the non-alignment: (a) non-alignment is a
special feature of the current world system; (b) non-
alignment reflects some of the features of a developing world
community; (c) non-alignment lies in herent within it
certain features which are developing amongst aligned states;
(d) ”non-alignment offers an alternative game and set of
rules which is likely to be important once nuclear deterrence
is no longer credible.”

Non-alignment has minimised the armaments race. Non-alignment supports all activities
that aim at the relaxation of international tension and encourages all institutions which
work for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Therefore, support for disarmament and faith in
the U.N. are as important to non-alignment as independence of foreign policy.

Concluding the discussion on relative merits and demerits we can say that despite some
of the glaring
defects and imperfections of the non-alignment it has a strong positive aspect. It is
offering a model for the world and is expected to lead an ideal world society. Further its
wide

inimmtAonai Relations 251

I nd the
respect it has evoked from the leading countries of the East as we .
acceptance by nations of almost all continents, races and colours~,

I as the West itndicate how, dynamic and desirable the concept is.

. NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ITS ROLE

Origin of Non-aligned Movement

After examining the meaning, features and the merits of non alignment, it shall be
desirable to know about the Non-aligned Movement. The Non-aligned Movement is
generally traced from the year 1955 when 29 Asian and African nations met at B andung
(Indonesia) to devise the means of combating colonialism. Jawaharlal moving spirits of
the Conference, said that

Nehru, who was one of the the coming together of the leaders of Asian and African States
was an event of great importance in so far as it marked the birth of Asia and a new
Africa.

Belgrade Conference (I961)

However, non-alignment an international group emerged at the Belgrade Conference of

September 1961. In this Conference 26 Afro-Asian Nations and one European nation
took part. In addition three Latin American countries also took part in the Conference as
obser<ers. The Conference adopted a 27 point Declaration. Some of the important
features of this declaration were that.it made an appeal to the superpowers to preserve
and protect international peace and condemned all manifestations of loniaiism and -
imperialism. It demanded freedom for all colonial pple and condemned the policy of
radicalism being practised in certain its of the world. If praised the freedom struggles
being waged by Algeria, Tunisia, Angola, Congo etc. and called for withdrawal of
foreign force: It called for just terms of trade for the developing countries and laid en
hasis on the economic, social and cultural progress ofthese countries. The Conference
also made appeal for complete disarmament. These prsiples greatly appealed -to the
newly independent countries of Asia and Afric,A and they joined the movement.

Cairo Conference

The next meeting of the non-aligned group was held at Cairo in October 1964. This
Conference was attended by 47 countries and element observers from all over the world.
This Conference was significant because since the last non-aligned meet at Belgrade a
number of important devetlopments had taken place. The world had passed through the
Cuban miscible crisis; there was a conflict between India and China in 1962. which gave
a staggering blow to Panchsheel; and Jawaharlal
Nehru the pick feer of the non-aligned movement had passed away. The Cairo
Conference adopted a Declaration entitled ’Programme for Peace arid International
Cooperation’. The declaration asserted that peace could be

Alignment 252

,engthened only if principles of universal freedom, equality and justice Were observed
and imperialism, colonialism and neon-colonialism were abolished. It laid emphasis on
the principle of peaceful co-existence and insisted on the settlement of all international
complete disarmament, and appealed to the nations without nuclear arms to’,refrain from
making them. It pleaded for the extension of the test ban treaty to underground nuclear
test. It also demanded the liquidation of the foreign military bases. The principles
emphasised by the Cairo Declaration were non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, support to armed struggle of colonial people against colonial powers who we
suppressing their natural aspiration and fill cooperation by the developed countries to the
developing countries in the economic sphere.

Lusaka Conference (1970) ,.

The third non-aligned summit was held at Lusaka (Zambia) in

September 1970. The summit was attended by 54 countries. In addition 9 other countries
sent their observers. This c:oruerence emphasised that ”the non-aligned countries can use
their collective wisdom and influence to tip the balance of power in favour of peace and
international cooperation” and insisted that the ”non-aligned countries must be in the
vanguard of movement to create the world of tomorrow and to enrich the content of
human life.” The Conference produced a General Declaration and six major resolutions.
The General Declaration Non-Alignment and Economic Progress, highlighted the
relevance of non-alignment and called upon all countries in general and the superpowers
in particular to resolve their conflicts through pacific methods alone. It pleaded for the
dissolution of military alliances with a view to reduce tension. It also laid emphasis on
the need of accelerating the process of decolonisation a^d economic cooperation among
all countries. It took a decision to break off economic and diplomatic relations with
Portugal and South Africa who had failed to comply with the UN Decisions with regard
to decolonisatien and ending of recial discrimination. It also called upon Israel to
withdraw from the occupied areas.

Algiers Conference (1973)

The fourth non-aligned summit was held at Algiers in 1973. The Summit was attended by
76 members and observers from nine countries. which constituted more than half of the
members states of international community and represented the
majority of world population. The Algiers Conference adopted a very detailed set of
political and economic resolutions; and outlined an action programme for economic
cooperation.

It laid emphasis on the need of strengthening struggle for freedom and peace throughout
the world. It welcomed the growing world detonate and

wanted it to be further strengthened and extended to the entire world. 1t

International Relations 253

condemned the policies of colonialism and apartheid being pu ued by. certain powers and
called for peaceful settlement of all disputes with a view to secure international peace.
This Conference also called for complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the
occupied Arab territories. In the economic sphere it called for ending economic
exploitation and laid emphasis on the need of ordering international economic relations as
to ensure that the basic interests of developing countries were not affected adversely. It
asserted that the primary responsibility for ensuring rapid development of developing
countries rests with themselves. It also supported the principle that every state has the
right to nationalize its natural resources and control its internal economic activities. It
condemned the activities of the multinational corporations which were playing havoc
With the economy of the poor countries and undermining their sovereignty. Above all the
Conference called upon the developing countries to ”take concerted action of promoting a
greater interchange of ideas among themselves and plan for concerted action. The
message of the Algiers Conference was best summarised by India Gandhi in her speech
of 6 September 1973. She said: ”We are responsible not to our individual countries alone
but to peace and prosperity of the whole world ....Non-aligned countries should speak for
those whose number were large but whose voices were muted. Their claims to a just
share of world’s goods, right to a life of dignity was indisputable and could not be
resisted ....Indian tradition helps to look at the world as one, and today science and
technology open immense possibilities to transform this dream into reality. How much
more necessary it becomes to ensure that various hues of radicalism and other form of
narrow mindedness do not come in the way of man’s freedom.

Colombo Conference (1976)

The fifth non-aligned conference was held at Colombo in August 1976 and was attended
by 86 countries. The conference was significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it was the
first conference to be held in the continent of Asia, the original home of non-alignment.
Secondly, the African and Latin American issues dominated this conference.
Thirdly it discussed the concept of collective self-reliance and emphasised the right of the
developing countries to secure their legitimate economic rights in international
transaction through use of collective bargaining power. Further, it demanded abolition of
veto s~-stem in the Security Council through amendment of the UN Charter. Fifthly, it
gave a call for the establishment of a new and just international economic order.

The Conference also outlined an action programme entitled Economic Cooperation

among Non-aligned and the Developing Countries. It called for the creation of new and
expanded trade flows among

ignment ’ --

developing countries based on the selection of specific products which have immediate
potential for trade among developing countries taking into amount the reciprocity of
benefits, and of the measures and machinery needed for creating these new trade-flows,
including in particular, long term purchase and supply commitments as appropriate and
other

contractual arrangements for direct trade among developing countries and operations by
State trading organisations where appropriate.”

It may be noted that though the non-aligned group wanted to

achieve economic emancipation of the developing countries, it did not favour
confrontation with the rich nations. Instead it stressed the need of meaningful cooperation
with the developed countries. , Havana Conference (1979)

The Sixth Non-aligned Conference was held at Havana (Cuba) in September 1979. This
Conference was attended by 9=t countries which constituted two-thirds of the world
community and represented more than half of the world population. At this conference
for the first time the non-aligned movement was confronted with divisions. Some of the
radical members like Cuba, Vietnam etc. asserted that in view’ of spirit of ’detonate’ and
cooperation prevailing between the two blocs, the movement could not afford to maintain
equidistance between two blocs and must ally itself with the socialist bloc which was
committed to principles of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. On the other hand
states like Singapore and Zaire insisted that the non-aligned should move closer to the
western bloc because west along with its abundant resources, and

technological superiority could help the non-aligned countries to attain economic

developing and realise its aspirations. However, ultimately wise counsels prevailed and
the majority of the members of the movement endorsed the stand that the movement must
retain its independent nature.

Another serious threat was posed to the unit’ of non-aligned movement by the demand of
the Arab members who wanted Egypt to expelled from the group
for betraying the cause of the Arabs and agreeing

to sign the Camp David Agreement with Israel. However, on this issue also a
compromise was found and the question of expulsion of Egypt was kept in abeyance and
was to be taken up at a later date. However. both Egypt and Israel were condemned for
the unilateral Camp David Agreement.
The Declaration issued at the end of the Summit condemned the

he gemonistic politics of the superpowers and gave a call for dissolving military bases. it
emphasised the need of more vigorous steps to bridge the gap between the rich and the
poor nations and keeping the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It also gave
movement.

a call for strengthening the non-aligned

international Nola tions

New Delhi Summit (1983)

The seventh non-aligned meet was held at New Delhi from 7_12 Mach 1983 in which 99
nations took part. Two of the members could not take part in the summit. While St. Lucia
did not turn up, the seat of Kampuchea was kept vacant as per decision of the Foreign
Ministers of Non-aligned nations to prevent the question of Kampuchean representation
from casting a shadow over the deliberations of the Conference. In addition 20 countries
were invited as observers and 19 countries and organizations were invited as guests.

At the end of the Summit a Message was adopted in which an impassioned appeal was
made to the Great Powers imploring them to desist from disastrous drift towards a
nuclear conflict. An appeal was made to them to give up their protectionist and
wardlooking policies; to work for a new world economic order; to participate in the
proposed international conference on money and finances for development and promote a
spirit enlightened multilaternalism free from tension and confrontations. The Summit also
adopted political, economic and other declarations in which the need of collective self-
reliance among the non-aligned and other developing countries through south-south
cooperation was emphasised.

In the political declaration it called for immediate prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons and a comprehensive treaty banning test of nuclear weapons; nuclear
disarmament under effective international control; nuclear weapon free zones in different
parts of the world, starting of a process of reducing military presence by big powers in
the Indian Ocean and return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius; unconditional withdrawal of
Israel from Palestine and other occupied territories; condemned USA for giving military
and political support to Israel; demanded withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan
and Kampuchea; called for support to the people of Palestine. Namibia and South Africa
in their struggle; and urged
the non-aligned nations to sort out their different by peaceful means.

The Economic Declaration insisted on new measures to bring about new international
economic order. It pleaded for official Development Assistant to the least developed
countries as well cancellation of their debts; increase in IDA finance for developing
countries; creation of another trust fund to provide additional development finance to the
developing countries; early establishment of a food security system of the non-aligned
and other countries; it sought the creation of a special international programme countries:
it condemned the use of food as an instrument of political press and urged the developed
countries. international institutional and other does to substantially increase development
assistance to food and agricultural sector in the developing countries. The declaration
also called for a thorough going restructuring of

Aron.,,qlfgni»ent

,Ile existing economic order through a process of global negotiations, It pledged to impart
fresh impetus to collective self-reliance on the basis of principles of equality justice,
mutual benefit and full respect for „,dependence and sovereignty. It impressed on the rich
nations that the economic revival of the North was not possible without economic
survival of the South and urged them to help in the restructuring of the existing
international economic order. It urged the elimination of restrictive, conditional, selective
and discriminatory measured with a view to promote world trade. The Summit also called
upon the members and other developing countries to strengthen bilateral and multilateral
co-operation in the field of sports. It favoured organisation of sports events at national,
regional and international levels for this purpose.
The Declaration received general approval all over the world. However USA expressed
regret over the political parts of the declaration

which made an attack on the United States without in any way criticising Soviet Union. It
expressed the hope that the non-aligned movement shall remain true to the principles of
Non-aligned Movement and apply these principles more faithfully in future. Despite this
criticism it cannot be denied that the non-aligned meet at New Delhi was an event of
great significance. It displayed the unity, vigour, wisdom and remarkable sense of
purpose among the non-aligned nations. A notable achievement of the meet was that the
tilt towards USSR in the movement, which had existed

since the Havana Summit, was corrected. The Summit for the first time called upon the
two great powers to halt the arms race through a formal message. Another notable
achievement
of the movement was that it

succeeded in maintaining unity despite differences on Kampuchea by taking a decision to

keep the Kampuchean seat vacant.

Harare Summit (1986)

The Eighth Non-Aligned Summit was held at Harare, the Capital of Zimbabwe from I-7
September, 1986 and was attended by leaders of 101 countries. Robert Mugabe, the
Prime Minister bf Zimbabwe was elected as the new Chairman of NAM. The Summit
adopted a concrete plan to strengthen the African front-line states facing destabilisation
due to actions of racist Pretoria reguine. It also decided to establish a fund under the
chairmanship of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to take suilable projects in this behalf. The
summit unanimously adopted a packagesurCs-1° be applied against Pretoria regime
pending the adoption of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions by the UN Security
Council. The Summit also urged the United Nations~-Co take necessary steps in this
regard without further loss of time. The package measures to be taken by the members
against South Africa included prohibition of transfer of technology to South Africa,
cessation of export, sale transport of oil, snapping of air

lntematfonal relations

links, and termination of visa free entry privileges to South Africa, the Summit also
demanded the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly to ensure
independence of colamibia. It set up a committee to place the case of Namibia in the
United Nations.

Another notable decision of the summit was setting up committee of Foreign Ministers of
some of the non-aligned countries. This committee was to visit the United States, Britain,
West Germany and Japan and persuade the government of these countries to impose
sanctions against South Africa. The Summit made an appeal to the President Reagan of
United States and Mikhail Gorbachev of Soviet Union, to impose a permanent
moratorium on nuclear tests.

The Summit set up a standing Ministerial Committee to review and harmonise policies
and programme of non-aligned and other developing countries to ensure economic
cooperation among them in the light of the changing world economic situation.

The Summit reiterated the recommendations made at the Delhi meet in 1983 with regard
to Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq war. It pledged support to the Palestinian
demand for a homeland and expressed solidarity with Cyprus. Summit condemned US
aggression against Libya in April 1986 and its bid to eliminate Col. Gaddafi, the Libyan
leader and his family by bombarding his house. Finally, the Summit reiterated its resolve
to carry on struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, racism,
Zionism and
all forms of foreign aggression occupation, domination, interference or hegemony.

Belgrade Summit (1989)

The Ninth Summit of the non-aligned countries was held in Belgrade from 4-7 September
1989 in which leaders of 102 countries took part. The leaders urged the rich nations to
impart an economic content to the political detente and called for an early end to the
external debt problem which was proving a crippling burden on the poor counties. The
non-aligned nations supported the four-nation Paris initiative for international economic
summit to ensure higher growth rate for all nations. They asserted that world peace and
security would depend increasingly and directly on developmental issues.

The Summit called for pursuit of complete disarmament. especially with regard to
weapons of mass destruction to secure the existence of the human race on the planet. It
insisted on full respect for human rights and emphasised that without human rights
economic development would have no meaning. It reaffirmed the right of all people to
self-determination and called upon the international community to join them in
increasing, widening and tightening sanctions against South

No„.,i11/ignment

258

Africa with view to isolate the abhorrent regime and to eradicate the apartheid system.
The leaders urged the United Nations to create minimum conditions for holding free and
fair election in Namibia and to enable the SWAPO to campaign freely in all parts of that
country.

In the political sphere the summit called for solution of problems of Afghanistan, speedy
democratisation of Latin America, restoration of rights of the Palestinian people etc. It
called for convening an international peace conference on West Asia under the auspices
of the UN with the participation of the parties concerned, including PLO to work out a
settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all
occupied Arab territories and securing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian
people in accordance with the relevant U.N. resolutions. The summit urged the new
NAM Chairman to undertake an initiative to settle the decade old Afghan conflict.

A perusal of the development of non-aligned movement as outlined above. shows that the
movement has steadily grown in size as well as contents. Whereas at the first conference
of the non-aligned at Belgrade, the members merely made general appeal to United States
and Soviet Union to refrain from nuclear tests in the interest of world peace in subsequent
meetings it tried to extend the sphere of its interest. At the Cairo meeting the principle of
peaceful co-existence was emphasised. At the Lusaka meeting the movement criticised
military alliances and condemned the practice of leasing out bases to the foreign powers.
It also emphasised the need of economic co-operation. The Algiers Summit laid emphasis
on elimination of tension and creation of climate of peace. The Colombo meet went a
step further and laid emphasis on economic emancipation of the developing countries and
creation of a new international economic order. The scope of the movement was further
widened in the Havana and New Delhi Summit and it laid emphasis on the need of South-
South co-operation. It also pleaded for greater co-operation in the field of sports. In the
Harare Summit it decided to set up AFRICA fiend to help the border line states to
frustrate the design of Pretoria regime. The Belgrade Summit of 1989 emphasised the
need of tackling the problem of external debts facing the Third World countries and took
the stand that world peace and security greatly depended on development. It also urged
the international community to set aside financial resources for environmental
cooperation. In short the scope of the non-aligned movement has greatly grown over the
years and it has become a strong constructive moral force in the international politics. It
has greatly contributed to international understanding and promotion of world peace. It
has enabled the non-aligned countries to inetrate their fragile states into ,I volatile
rntcrnational system dominated by the two major powers. It has

promoted collective self-reliance among the non-aligned countries and helped them to
retain their sovereignty and authenticiy in a predominantl`. bipolar international system.

RELEVANCE AND ROLE OF NON-ALIGNED IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Critics have alleged that the Non-Aligned Movement has not been able to live upto the
expectations of the founding fathers. The movement stands completely discredited today
and is not in tune wish the hard realities of the present-day world. They have argued that
the various countries’ adopted policy of non-alignment with a view to protect and
promote their national interests. Objectively speaking the movement has failed to
preserve peace and some of its members have been involved in disputes such as
Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq. Cambodia. Namibia. Western Sahara etc. The members of non-
aligned movement have not been able to play any effective role in resolving these
disputes. Similarly the non-aligned movement has failed to keep the arms race under
check. In fact most of the non-aligned countries themselves are spending huge amounts
on defence preparations. Non-aligned movement has also failed to resolve some of the on
going problems like Apartheid, Lebanon, Cyprus and Palestine.
No doubt, policy of Apartheid has considerably weakened. but this has become possible
due to increasing economic pressure from the West European powers and America. rather
than pressure from non-aligned movement. In fact some of the black African states,
which arc members of NAM, are active partners of South Africa. Another major
shortcoming of the non-aligned movement emphasised by the critics is that there is
dichotomy- between what the NAM leaders preach and what they actually practice. Some
time these leaders take stand on various issues in United Nations which is at variance
with the consensus evolved at the meetings of NAM.

The above criticism is. however, not wholly correct. The non-alignment has not become
obsolete. On the other hand it has grown in popularity. This is evident from the fact that
in comparison to 1961 when 2s states participated in the Non-aligned conference at
Belgrade, the number of non-aligned countries has increased to over 100. Despite miner
differences among members of Non-aligned movement, it has played important role in
favour of world peace. disarmament. development and decolinisation. It is well known
that the non-aligned countries have played an active role at the United Nations and have
refused to deviate from their chosen path despite all pressures. The main contributions of
the non-aligned areas udder:

The increasing number of non-aligned countries in the world is the proof that cold war
and the belies in svstent of

Iyon Alignment
260

alignment is fast losing ground. The alternative to the current world situation is non-
alignment which can to a great. extent help in the solution of the problems posed by
power politics.

t2) The United Nations which was just a tool in the hands of a
few big powers, no more continues to be so with the increase
of non-aligned membership in the General Assembly. No
doubt, the use of veto in Security Council may be a hindrance
in the way of United Nations but the overwhelming majority
of non-aligned countries in the General Assembly can form a
world public opinion and can impose moral checks to refrain
big powers from adoption of arbitrary course of action. Thus
the working of United Nations becoming more and more
effective with the emergence of this power.
The non-aligned nations can play the role of balance. Though
the term has won the odium but to work as an honest balancer
not involving in the power struggle is a new type of role
which the non-aligned, nations can play. As a consequence
both the superpowers want to win the favour of non-aligned
nations. This is in a way a healthy feature of the present
world politics.
(-1) The ideology
or co-existence or ’live and let live’ is gaining
more and more importance. The ideologically divided world
can adopt the programme of co-existence with the effective
support of non-aligned nations.

(>) Non-alignment also discourages the armament race which in

its turn can contribute to the world peace. World peace
through world law or world government is a dream to be
realised much later but the disarmament can serve as a big
means to achieve tote desired end to a great extent. The
Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1966 was made possible largely
through the efforts of the non-aligned states.

(6) As the non-aligned countries at one time or the other were the
colonies of the western powers and were exploited
economically. degenerated socially and ruined politically.
they want to stage a comeback. Therefore. these nations have
played a significant role in the process of decolonisation and
ensured freedom for a large number of colonial people
through their joint efforts.

(7) The Non-aligned nations greatly contributed to the formation

of the UNCTAD by taking initiative in solving the problem of

International Relations

economic development at the Cairo Conference. They were also instrumental in the
formation of the Group of 77.

(8) Non-aligned movement played Limited mediator role i~t

Cuban crisis of 1962 and the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962. It
also took initiative to resolve other conflicts. Though it could
not find definitive solutions to various conflicts it cannot be
denied that its intervention was conducive to conflict
management.

(9) Non-aligned countries are contributing a lot in the direction

of racial equality. They are against the policy of racial
discrimination being followed by the white nations. They
have been frantically fighting for ’equality of all men’ from
the fonun of U.N.O. and other Afro-Asian conference. Their
slogan is ’world brotherhood.’

(10) Non-alignment not only offers a model for the future and thus
only belong to the realm of idealism but it is very much
concerned about the power politics game which it seeks to
end. It is not ’a mere utopia but a blend of idealism and
realism. In the context of coldwar it has a great relevance.

201

Non-Alignment Movement at Present

The non-aligned movement has undergone coYisiderable changes
since its origin. It is faced with an international situations which is far
more complex. Numerous power centres have appeared which have deep
inter-relationship with various non-aligned and developing countries.
There is a greater political consciousness amongst the people of poorer How to
strengthen Non-
countries and they have come to insist on removal of inequalities
and B.K. Kaul in his book New Horizons of Non-Alig7m7ejtr
disequilibriums in the social and economic spheres. Further, majority of for the
strengthening of the non-aligned
the resources have been monopolized by the developed countries and the
gap between the developed and developing countries is getting wider day
by day. Seventy per cent of the people who live in the developing and
underdeveloped countries get only 1 > per cent of the world production.
Even the traditional colinalirtis which has virtually reached a point of
extinction has been replaced by a neocolonialism and capitalist
imperialism. The Afghanistan crisis, the non-ratification of SALT-II by
USA, the growing tension in the Indian Ocean Zone. Iran-Iraq war etc.
posed serious threat to world peace.
Another notable change in the non-aligned movement is drat at
present it is led by a new generation of leaders. This point was highlighted
bN - India’s Foreign Minister P.V. Narsirnlra Sao at symposium organized at
the Jawaharlal Nehni University. New Delhi. He said: -’The first
generation of leaders who founded and nurtured the non-aligned mop cnlc”t

yqli nmert

262
NO’

were influenced by their respective struggles for freedom in the anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist tradition. They were imbued with a value ~~stem and framework of idea
derived from their experience of the colonial or imperialist rule in their respective
countries. Today, however. the n1ovement is led by a new generation of leaders, who
though steeped in
national arid political traditions are tempered by the real
their respective politics of international relations of the decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Above all the non-aligned movements has greatly expanded and at present over hundred
sovereign states are members of this movement. These states professing and practicing
different ideologies, have by an large presen-ed the unity of the movement by obser< ing
the basic principles of the movement steadfastly.

Threats to Non-Aligned Movement .

Though the Non-Aligned Mwejucnt has enormously grown it is also confronted with
serious problems. Firstly, some of the members of non-aligned movement, though
committed to solve their problems through

peaceful methods, are involved in open conflicts which has tended to render the
movement weak. Secondly, some of the non-aligned countries are spending enormous
amounts on their defence which has contributed to their slow development due to
diversion of their limited resources to military preparations. If the non-aligned movement
is to be effective and pose a serious challenge to the anti-imperialist forces, the member
states must avoid policy of confrontation and concentrate on their
development.

Aligned Movement

suggested following measures movement. First, the non-aligned nations and other states
sympathetic to the non-aligned nations should try to solve their mutualdisputes by
peaceful means only, avoid armsrace (such as are going on between India and Pakistan),
should not have any direct or indirect military connection

with any power bloc, and eliminate all kinds of strategic bases on their soil. All this
would reduce the burden of their defence budgets. Secondly. al the non-aligned nations
should declare that an aggression against any one of them would be treated at aggression
against all--and they should promise to give every possible moral and material support,
including military help, till aggression is defeated. Such a declaration would act as a
deterrent to future aggression. Thirdly,- the non-aligned nations should ty to bring about a
real and effective disarmament among the big powers. This is vital to effect swing in
expenditure on armament- which ,can be, fruitfully diverted for the development
purposes and elimination of poverty. Fourtblu. the non-aligned nations should fight
against

the exploitative and

lnternatlonal Relations 263

restrictive practices of the advanced countries and in to reduce their dependence on aid
from these countries.. They should try to develop and cultivate mutually beneficial
economic and trade relations with the advanced countries as well as among themselves.
Insistence should be laid on equitable exchange of manufactured goods and payment of
adequate prices for the primary products exported by the countries of the Third World.

Role of Non-Aligned Movement in Present Conditions

In the present day world though cold war between the super powers has subsided certain
points of conflict still persist, between ;the two super powers viz. military presence in the
Indian-cean and divergent stands on production of nuclear weapons and legitimatisation
of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned countries can certainly contribute to the reduction
of the rigidity of the bipolar alliances and denigrate the role of nuclear weapons in
international politics. If the non-aligned nations challenge the legitimacy of the weapons
of mass destruction and brand the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humaniy, the
super powers shall not be able to flout the world opinion. This may ultimately pave the
wax for the conclusion of the universal convention forbidding the use of ti:e nuclear
weapons.

The non-aligned movement can also play an important role in the direction of evolving
one world by exerting pressure on those ”who hay c sought to divide it through power
politics based
upon the nuclear rsenal and advanced delivery system through economic blocs based*
upon exploitation, through racial politics based upon traditional beliefs.” In fact. at
present when so many regressive forces are operating in the direction on disturbing the
oneness of humanity. the non-aligned movement can play a vital role in curbing these
divisive and destructive forces and creating one world based on respect for each other’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity: non-interference in internal affairs, now-use of force
or threat of force to settle international disputes. the equality of all sovereign nations and
peoples, respect for the dignity of the human personality and tight of all the people to be
free and enjoy the fruits of freedom. Until this is achieved. Non-alignment has a role to
play and when this is achieved. Non-alignment will find self-fulfilment in its own
Nirvana.

Non-Alignment in the Wake of End of Cold War

The policy of non-,alignment which was conceived in the context of the cold war and
environment of competing power blocs. has to be adjusted in the present contest when
vast changes have taken place in the form of_melloming of cold war and disappearance
of adversan relationship between the two super powers. In addition to this certain other
factors also warrant adjustments in the policy of non-alignment. These include the

No».,iUignment

s~r~al and economic metamorphosis of Eastern Europe: the non-going experiments for
the politico-economic restructuring of Soviet Union,

unification of Germany, the socio-political forces generated in the Gul etc. However. it
cannot be denied that the policy of non-alignment can still play

an important role in fostering peaceful co-existence between different societies and

different social systems. In fact the ideology of NaM possesses sufficient flexibility to
meet the nquirements of our changing world.

Non-Aligned Movement and the New International Economic

Order
Another question which deserves consideration is as to what role the non-aligned
movement has played in evolving the New International Economic Order. The basic
principles of non-alignment include ’struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism. apartheid. racism.

Zionism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation. domination; interference of

hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.
This clearly shows that the mov2ment is opposed to all kinds of oppression.
exploitation and injustice. In the economic sphere the port-aligned movement has worked
for the achievement of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The movement for
NIEO did not originate with the UN resolution of 1 May 1974 but is intimately
linked with the struggle for the liquidation of colonialism. In a way the straggle for N1E0
is intimately linked with the non-aligned movement’s wider struggle for the elimination.
In this respect the non-aligned movement and the struggle for the NIEO were
contemporary and they have been intimately licked from the very beginning.

During the initial stages the non-aligned countries worked through the United Nations to
get the principle of state sovereignty over

natural resources accepted. At the Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian countries held
in 19» they laid emphasis on the need of dmcrsification of the export of the non-aligned
countries. However. at this stage as the non-aligned movement was chiefly occupied with
political aspects of decolonisation and preservation of peace. independence and national
sovereignty etc. it did not lay much emphasis on the economic issues. It

was only in the 136i)~s that the non-aligned movement started thinking in
terms of the NIEO because by this time the process of decolonisation had
made fiarther progress and it began to be emphasised that economic
emancipation was an essential ingredient of the emphasised that economic

emancipation w as an essential ingredient of the political decolonisation. By

thrs [11110 they wre also convinced that the economic sy stem evolv.,d at
T1tuov WmoUs was not helpful in realising their economic obje_m’c6. In
1`~ ~1 u c nt n-a; „rred smunri[ at Belgrade called for ampena&•no . ’t w-

international Relations 265

emphasised that the ever widening gap in the standards of the people 1
in advanced countries and the less developed countries could be bridged only through
accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development. The very next year at the
Cairo Conference the attempts to and it was asserted that this was obstructing the
economic development of the developing countries. Concerted efforts were also made at
the United Nations, which culminated in the establishment of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The UNCTAD and the Group of 77
ultimately became the principle instruments for carrying on struggle for an NIEO.

The second non-aligned summit at its Cairo meet in October 196:1 laid emphasis on
economic development and cooperation and urged ”all the countries to contribute to the
rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without
fear or want or despair and rise to their full stature in the fancily of nations (because) the
structure of world economy and the existing international institutions of international
trade and development and the existing international institutions
of international trade and development have failed either to reduce the disparity or to
rectify serious and growing imbalances between developing countries”. The Cairo
declaration thus emphasised the same principles which were emphasised by the UN in its
resolution of 1 May 197:1 concerning New International Economic Order. However;
inactual practice the third world countries became increasingly dependent on the
developed countries due to ”deteriorating terms of their-trade and economic relations
with the developed countries.” Therefore the non-aligned countries emphasised the need
of greater mobilisation, particularly in the preparation for the Second UN Development
Decade and future activities of the UNC TAD.

After the Cairo Conference the non-aligned countries played a leading role in the
evolution of the New International Economic Order and adopted a number of resolutions
and declarations. The important steps taken in this regard include the Algiers Charter
(1967) and the Second UNCTAD Resolution and Declaration (New Delhi, 1968).

It was only in I970’s that the non-aligned movement made a determined bid to establish
and NIEO. A blueprint for the NIEO was prepared at the Lusaka meet and specific
guidelines for policies and action programme for economic progress were prepared.

The Lusaka Declaration held the structural weakness of the present world order
responsible for the distressing economic condition of developing countries and asserted
that the ”rapid transformation of the world economic system requires achieving
implementation of concerted and coordinated policies and the measures so as to build a
partnership

]MOMM loom”,

l ynn,,qlignment

between the developing and developed countries on the foundations of equal and mutual
advantages and for the commoh goals of peace. progress and prosperity.” The impact o
the Lusaka Declaration was evident in the debate on international °’ strategy for the
Second United Nations Development Decade.

The Algiers Conference made more forceful plea for fundamental changes in the existing
inequitable international economic relations and the need for a new international
economic order. The Conference emphasised that self-reliance and collective reliance
were pre-requisites for the attainment of international economic development goals.
Above all, it

asked the UN General Assembly ”to draw up a charter on economic rights and duties of
states.”

The idea was developed further at the non-aligned meet held at Colombo (1976) and
Havana (1979). The Colombo Summit paid special
attention to the Economic Action Programme. It expressed regret that the capitalist
countries were not responding to an implementing
the decisions of the UN and suggested an Action Programme to achieve New
International Economic Order. One of the outstanding feature of this action programme
was emphasis on a new universal and equitable monetary

order. The Havana Conference in its Declaration also asserted that ”the establishment of
the New International Economic Order is one of the most

important and most urgent tasks facing the non-alVoed CCovement and that
democratisation of international economic relations constitute its political subsistence.”

The Seventh Non-aligned Conferent (New Delhi, 1983) again emphasised the need of
establishing a New International Economic Order and emphasised that the prevailing
international system which runs

counter to the basic interests of the developing countries was profoundly unjust and
incompatible with the accelerated development of the non-aligned and other developing
countries and warned that failure to establish

the NIEO based on equality and justice would have serious adverse economic and
political consequences for all. The conference asserted that ”The Movement of Non-
Aligned countries has played and will continued to play an important role in the struggle
for the political and economic independence of all the developing countries and their
people, for the attainment of full and permanent sovereignty and control over all types of
natural resources and economic activities; and for the promotion of a fundamental
restructing by the establishment of NIEO.

It is thus evident from the above development that the demand for NIEO was put forward
by the non-aligned countries on account of their growing frustration and helplessness in
dealing with the developed countries. By their efforts through UNCTAD, the UNIDO and
the Regional

266

lntematlonal Relations

Economic Commissions of the United Nations, the non-aligned countries have defined
inclear term the New International Economic Order. At the same time they tried to
impress on the developing countries the need of greater accommodation and cooperation
with the developing countries
even though in this respect them failed to secure the desired objectives.

In view of the widening gulf between the developed and developing countries North-
South dialogue was initiated with a view ,o establish a New International Economic
Order. ’The non-aligned countries acted with remarkable unit at UNCTAD 1 and passed
a unanimous resolution emphasising the responsibility of the international community
with regard to stabilisation commodity prices, volume and terms aid and preferences.
Effort to protect the interests of the developing countries continued at
the subsequent UNCTAD meetings. At the UNCTAD I V meeting held at Nairobi in
1976 the non-aligned countries extended fiili support to the shaper rise in oil polices by
OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). The developing countries felt
that they could emulate the example of OPEC in the use of commodity power. However,
soon they discovered that there were limites to the use of commodity power and the
success of OPEC could not be repeated in the case of the commodities.

At the UNCTAD IV meeting at Nairobi the idea of Integrated Programme of

Commodities based on establishment of buffer stocks or a wide range of commodities
including tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, iron-ore etc. and a Common Fund for ensuring
stability of prices of these key commodities. Though initially the problem of finances for
fund posed a serious problem but ultimately the non-aligned countries were successfiil in
floating this fund. With a view to reduce the burden of debt on the developing countries
the UNCTAD IV demanded cancellation of debts for the least developed, landlocked and
for rescheduling of debts over a 25

island developing countries. A demand years period vas also made. However. most of the
developed countries were opposed to cancellation of debts or a moratorium on debt
service payments. As a result no concrete success could be achieved in this direction.

Yet another proposal for evolution of the NIEO was taken in 1979 when UNCTAD
insisted on the establishment of a Common Fund to Finance buffer stocks in a price
stabilisation scheme. It urged the developed countries to reduce and eliminate
protectionism specially with regard to imports from the developing countries. It also
insisted on doubling of the targets of official development assistance.

Thus. we can say that the non-aligned and developing countries have been consistently
working for the evolution of at New Intcrnation~ Economic Order with ;, view lo e:nn
greater slmr;: is tlm w,,;fd
ecc~nc~m~

268

Non,;gnment

fog the developing countries of the Third World. The progress was icopardised because
of the unhelpful attitude of the affluent countries.

HoNjevcr, due to persistent efforts of the nonaligned countries the attitude of the affluent
countries has somewhat softened and an atmosphere has been created in which we can
expect that the developing countries. But it 1,.ould certainly be too much to expect that
the advanced countries, who are facing the problem of energy, inflation and recession,
would be willing to make any major concessions to the developing countries. Fully
conscious of this fact, the non-aligned countries at the Havana summit held in

September 1979 recommended promotion

of collective self-reliance among the non-aligned and other developing countries. It urged
coordinated action in the field of raw materials, trade, transport, industrialisation, food

and agriculture, fisheries, insurance, health. tourism, sports. telecommunication, currency

and finance and other areas. It also called on

richer non-aligned member countries to increase financial assistance to the poorer non-
aligned countries and make more foreign investments in other non-aligned countries. This
clearly shows that the non-developed countries have now come to realize that the major
responsibility for their

development lies with themselves and they mustw to achieve development through
mutual cooperation.

CHAPTER 13

NATIONALISM

Definition of the Nationalism

6.

Humanity is naturally divided into nations. Each nations has its peculiar character. The
source of all political power is the nation, the collective whole. For freedom and self-
realization, people must identify with a nation. Nations can only be fulfilled by their own
states. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other (political) loyalties.

Nationalism, then, is both cohesive and a divisive force. It has allowed and continues to
allow larger political entities to form where feudal, tribal, and other local loyalties had
once existed. But nationalism has also been destructive. It makes us see ourselves as
essentially different from (and often superior to) other nationalities, it promotes the idea
of self-intemateti sovereignty, and it blocks the path to a global consciousness and loyalty
that some claim to be the wisest course of the future.

Nation,-.lism: Past, Present, Future

There is not enough space in this text to give a complete review of the development of
nationalism. Instead, the goal of this brief historical survey is to show that nationalism
has not always existed as a primary political focus, nor is it necessarily the best course for
the future. It is also worthwhile to consider some of the ”faces” of nationalism, to see that
it is ~t varied and changing phenomenon.

Thse of Nationalism--to 1945

Given the strength of our nationalistic political, focus, it is difficult to envision almost
any other system of loyalties. But consider this: pnlv seventy, years ago (until the end of
World War I) most of the nation-states of central Europe. such as Poland and
Czechoslovakia, were all or in pad within the realm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Only a little earlier than that. there was no Germany or Italy. We often suppose countries
like that always existed, but they did not. Before the 1860s Germany was a collection of
dozens of kingdoms, principalities, and other small entities.
Italy v-as in part controlled by France and Austria and also was subdivided into Sardinia.
Lombardy. Parma. Moderna. Tuscany, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies. ,

Before the age of nationalism, political organization was generally characterized by

universalism, on the one hand, and localism, on the other. At the macropolitical end of
the extreme. there existed a series of great empires. The Roman Empire was the most
univ ersal, but after its decline it was followed in the West by the empire of Charlemagne,
then the Holy Roman Empire. and finally the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the early
Middle Ages. the overarching authority of the Catholic church was also present. Farther
to the east. the Byzantine Empire and then the Ottoman (Turk) Empire rose and fell. To
the north of those. the Russian Empire was expanding, and this multiethnic conglomerate
still exists in many ways. In Asia, the Chinese Empire dominated the continent. There
were also empires at this time in the yet ”undiscovered” Western Hemisphere. such as the
Aztecs and Incas, and also in Africa, including those of Ashanit. Mali, and Benin.”

On the mecropolitical end of the scale, organization was localized in its focus. People
saw themselves as attached to tribal, or provincial groups. The patchwork feudal systems
that existed were dominated by the lesser nobiliW. In many areas, beneath the imperial
canopy. a mosaic of autonomous political structures held sway. It was true, as Voltaire
quipped. that the Holy Roman Empire was ”neither holy, nor Roman. nor an empire.”

ORIGINS.

Some scholars trace the origins of nationalism to the Hebrew tribes and ancient Greeks,
but full-blown nationalism did not truly begin to emerge for almost another two
millennia. Gradually during the Middle ngeo and the Renaissance, nationalism began to
take hold, in part as a result of economics . and technology. As manufacturing. trade.
t1.meportation. and communications grew, larger economic units were med;d for
efficiency. and people became more aware of and cooperative Mnh their ethnic kin in
other areas. The Protestant Reformation (1517>

.international Relations

bcgan to bleak down the authority of the papacy. and the break VIII tl>tt9-1i-17) from the
church was a pivotal point in the gro«11l of English nationalism. Military technology,
especially gunpowder. made the feudal estate indefensible. ~’ There was also a growing
sense of national identity as people associated and identified with their larger ethnic
groups. That sense of nation can be seen in the plays of Shakespeare, who in 159 had his
exiled Richard II proclaim:

Where’er I wander, boast of this

I
can,

Though banished, ~~et a true-born

Englishman.

During the next several centuries, as economic and social interaction expanded and as
monarchs such as Louis XIV of France. Frederick 11 of Prussia, and peter the Great of
Russia expanded and consolidated their domatains, the genesis of nationalism continued.
It still lacked one key element. however. Missing was the concept that the state was an
embodiment of the nation, not a possession of the king, who ruled by divine right.
Symbolic of that God-given dominion. Louis XIV of France could proclaim: ”L’etat.
c’est mot [I am the state].” Also symbolically, it was the French Revolution the ended
that monarchical assumption.

Modern Nationalism.

Because of its violence and the dramatic shift from aristocratic privilege to relative
”libery. equality. fraterniy.” the French Revolution (1789) is considered by many scholars
to be a landmark in the growth of nationalism. French thinkers such as Rousseau.
Voltaire, and Montcsquieu were the philosophers of popular power, and the idea’s
influence spread far beyond France’s borders. Adding the sword as an ally to the pen. in
1792 the National Convention proclaimed that ”The French nation ... will treat as
enemies every people who. refilsing liberty and equalih ... treat with a prince and
privileged class.” Within a decade. Napoleon’s legions were forcibly spreading the
philosophy of the democratic-national revolution throughout Europe.

The growth of popular nationalism sometimes occurred through both evolution and
revolution. Its growth in England was mostly evolutionary. and by the time of the French
Revolution. the poorer of the English parliament (and people) over the king was
established. Also predating the French Revolution. Americans lad proclaimed their
independence in favor of a government of, b v. and for the people.

From its beginnings in England. France, and the United States.

tile idea of popular sovereignty spread around the globe until. by the

low’’ s’ationalism

luiddlc of the twentieth century, virtually all of Europe and the Western lleluisphere had
been divided into nation-states, and the colonies of Africa a,id Asia were beginning to
demand their own identity. Nationalism reigned supreme: despite winstion Churchill’s
bravado statement, the sun ,vas setting on the age of empires.

Nationalism after World War 11 Obituary Notices.

While visiting London in 1897, Mark Twain was astonished to read in the paper one
morning that he had died. Reasonably sure that n fact he was alive, Twain hastened to
assure the world: ”The reports of my, death are greatly exaggerated.”

That anecdote and Would War 11 relate to nationalism because in the after
math of the second would conflict, there were reports that nationalism was dead or dying.
In Twain’s terms’ those predictions were greatly exaggerated.
The assumptions of a pestantionalist period were based on the belief that we had learned
from the horrors of war that he anarchistic , system of sovereign states could no longer
continue. E.H. Carr suggested in 19-45 that ”certain trends ... suggest that ... nations and
international relations are in the process of undergoing ... clearly definable change ....
[Current nationalism] can survive only as all anomaly and an anachronism in a world
which has moved on to other forms of organization.” The development of nuclear
weapons, in particular, led scholars such as John Herz to theorize that the sovereign state
could no longer cart’ out the primary task of protecting the nation and therefore was
doomed. The emphasis on free trade and growing economic interdep(rndence also
seemed to augur an end to the nationalist age. Finally, the newly established (194>0)
United Nations sewed as a symbol of progress away from conflictive nationalism and
toward cooperative universalism.

Resurgent Nationalism.

The trouble with these rosy projections is that they turned out to be wrong. Nationalism
not only refused to die, but it has been rejuvenated as a world force. The primary force
behind the resurgence of nationalism has been the anti-imperialist independence
movement in the Third World. As Figure 4-1 indicates, the numbers of new nation-states
gaining independence have accelerated greatly.

If anything. nationalism in the newly emergent states has been more strident than in their
older counterparts. The newer countries hay c been undergoing rapid modernization,
which breaks down old ties (nuclear family, tribe., etc.) and promotes nationalism: they
have a history of colonial rule, which makes them assertive of their independence they
are

international Relations
271
began to break down the authority of the papacy, and the br ~k of F?elln

~’lll t1?tl`~-1~-t7) from the church AN’s a pivotal point in the =r b o~ th of English
nationalism. Military technology, especially gunpowder. jade the feudal estate
indefensible. ’ There was also a growing sense of n

101181
identit\ as people associated and identified with their larger ethnic grollp~ That sense of
nation can be seen in the plays of Shakespeare, who in 15yil had his exiled Richard II
proclaim:

Where’er I hander, boast of this

I can,
Though banished, Jet a true-born

Englishman.
During the next several centuries. as economic and social interaction expanded and as
monarchs such as Louis XIV of France, Frederick II of Prussia, and
peter the Great of Russia expanded and consolidated their domatains, the genesis of
nationalism continued. It still lacked one key element, however. Missing was the concept
that the state was an embodiment of the nation. not a possession of the king, who ruled by
divine right. Symbolic of that God-given dominion. Louis XIV of France could proclaim:
”L’etat_ c’est moi [I am the state].” Also symbolically, it was the French Revol ’
assumption.

Modern Nationalism.

Because of its violence and the dramatic shift from aristocratic privilege to relative
”liberty, equality. fraternity.” the French Revolution (1789) is considered by many
scholars to be a landmark in the groAqll of nationalism. French thinkers such as
Rousseau. Voltaire. and Montesquieu were the philosophers of popular power. and the
idea’s influence spread far beyond France’s borders. Adding the sword as an ally to the
pen. In 17)_ the National Convention proclaimed that ”The French nation ... will treat as
enemies every- people who, refusing liberty and equality ... treat with a prince and
privileged class.” Within a decade. Napoleon’s legions ~SClc forcibly spreading the
philosophy of the democratic-national rcvolui~ou throughout Europe.

The growth of popular nationalism sometimes occurred throu-’1 both evolution and
revolution. Its groWh in England was mostly

evolutionary, and by the time of the French Revolution, the power of 111,2 English
parliament (and people) over the king was established. AkO predating the French
Revolution. Americans lead proclaimed their independence in favor of a government of.
by. and for the people.

From its beginnings in England. France. and the United State=. the idea of popular
so\ercignt-- spread around the globe until, by tlr’-

utlon the ended that monarchical

l
7 yationallrmr

272

I11iddle of the twentieth century, virtually all of Europe and the Western Hemisphere had
been divided into nation-states. and the colonies of Africa and Asia were beginning to
demand their own identitv. Nationalism reigned supreme: despite winstion Churchill’s
bravado statement, the sun was setting on the age of empires.

Nationalism after World War 11

Obituary Notices.
While visiting London in 1897, Mark Twain was astonished to read in the paper one
morning that he had died. Reasonably sure that n fact he was alive. Twain hastened to
assure the world: ”The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”

That anecdote and Would War 11 relate to nationalism because in the after math of the
second would conflict, there were reports that nationalism was dead or dying. In Twain’s
terms’ those predictions were greatly exaggerated.
The assumptions of a postantionalist period were based on the belief that we had learned
from the horrors of war that he anarchistic , system of sovereign states could no longer
continue. E.H. Carr suggested in 19-15 that ”certain trends ... suggest that ... nations and
international relations are in the process of undergoing ... clearly definable change ....
[Current nationalism] can survive only as an anomaly and an anachronism in a world
which has moved on to other forms of organization.” The development of nuclear
weapons, in particular. led scholars such as John Herz to theorize that the sovereign state
could no longer cart’ out the prinlay task of protecting the nation and therefore was
doomed. The emphasis on free trade and growing economic interdependence also seemed
to augur an end to the nationalist age. Finally. the newly established (19450) United
Nations served as a symbol of progress away from conflictive nationalism and toward
cooperative universalism.

Resurgent Nationalism.

The trouble with these rosy projections is that they turned out to be wrong. Nationalism
not only refused to die, but it has been rejuvenated as a world force. The primary force
behind the resurgence of nationalism has been the anti-imperialist independence
movement in the Third World. As Figure a-1 indicates, the numbers of new oration-states
gaining independence have accelerated greatly.

If anything, nationalism in the newly emergent states has been more strident than in their
older counterparts. The newer countries have been undergoing rapid modernization.
which breaks down old tics (nuclear family, tribe., etc.) and promotes nationalism: they
have a histon- of colonial rule, which makes them assertive of their independence they
are

international Relations ~~ 273

,,tru;glmg to regain their traditional cultures; the lack of~ethnic unity in many makes the
conversion to nationalist feeling vital fir stability, and economic, social, and political
difficulties tempt regimes to encourage national pride and unity by emphasizing outside
enemies. Each of these factors spurs strong nationalist feelings. so that nationalism
continues as
strong force driving modern countries.

It should also be noted that there is resurgent nationalism in the West. Countering the
trend toward European unification. a number of nationalist movements are reasserting
their emotional pull. Great Britain has Irish, Welsh, and Scottish separatist sentiments.
Spain has Basque and Catalan movements and Belgium (Flemish and Walloon) and
Yugoslavia (Serbs and Croatians) are strained by group conflict. In the Western
Hemisphere, the French Canadians
of Quebec are demanding greater cultural and political self-direction.

As john Herz, in a commendable reevaluation of his earlier prophecy, admitted,”

Developments have rendered me doubtful of the correctness of my previous anticipations
.... There are indicators pointing
. to retrenchment to a new self-sufficiency toward a ’new territory in short’. to a new
nationalism.

The issue of microstates.

Nationalism Tabt,• 4-2. Characteristics of a Microstates, a U.S. State, and a U.S. city
>eychelles Rhode Island Phoenix

population (1979)

Territory (sq.mi.)

03.000 974,000 _ 764,000

166

1,214

326

Many of the current microstates do not have the economic or political ability to stand as
truly sovereign states. Let’s compare the Republic of Seychelles. the smallest American
state, Rhode Island, and phoenix, Arizona (Table.4-2).

Tanzania’s president Nearer once made the sexist but vivid

~meni that ”small countries are like scantily clad women-they tempt the

The rapidly growing number of independent countries, many of which have a marginal
ability, to survive on their own, has increasingly raised the issue of the reasonable limits
to the principle of self-determination. At what point does a lofty principle become
pragmatically unrealistic? The basic issues revolve around the wisdom of allowing the
formation of what have been called microstates, or countries with tiny populations,
territories, and /or economies. In one sense, such countries have long existed. with
Monaco, Andorra, and San Marino serving as examples. But in recent years, as
colonialism has become discredited, more of these microstates have become established.
Table 4-1 lists three such states and some of their characteristics.

Table 4-1. Characteristics of These Microstates.

Tonga Maldives Seychelles

fopulation(1979) 94.000
Territory (sq.mi) 270
Cash exports copra, coconuts,
bananas, swamp
taros

143,000 63,000
ll 156
bonito copra, cilmamor
bark, guano
(bird dropilingsu
coconuts, frozen
t1Sh

COL

wicked. ”In that vein. countries like the Seychelles, which are unable to defend
themselves and which have a marginal economic existence, invite

outside interference by and clashes between stronger powers. The Seychelles, in fact,
have been a group of mercenaries led by the infamous Colonel ”Mad” Mike Hoarse flew
into the islands in 1981 on a commercial jetliner in an attempt to seize the government.
They were defeated, but an earlier commando raid was over-turned only any France’s
intervention.

If countries are unable to defend their own existence, they invite meddling by outside
powers. That has the potential for conflict, Certainly,
in a truly peaceful and beneficent world, impoverished nationalities would

be helped and their weakness would not tempt aggression. Unfortunately. that sort of
world does not exist, and microstates create a power vacuum that threatens to draw more
powerful states no to confrontation.

It is easier, of course, to raise the issue of microstates that to supply the answers. In an
ideal world, where the lambs and lions lay down together and where universal mutual
responsibility reigned. independence for anv self-identifying group would be admirable.
In the real would, that

idea is not only unattainable, it is destabilizing. It may well be that levels of domestic
autonomy and guarantees of human and political rights for subcultural groups are a wiser
course than the support of self-determination to the point of reduction ad absurdum.

The Beneficent Face of Nationalism

Most scholars agree that in its philosophical and historical genesis nationalism was a
positive force. It has a number of possible beneficial effects.

International Relations

1. Nationalism promottes democracy.

One analyst points out that through nationalism ’’the concept of popular sovereignty
replaced the concept of the divinely or historicalk-appointed ruler; the concept of citizen
replaces the concept of subject.’- In short, nationalism promotes the idea that political
power legit-imately resides with the people and that governors exercise that power only
as the agents of the people.

2. Nationalism encourages self-determination.

In modern times, the notion that nationalities ought to be able to preserve their cultures
and govern themselves according to their oiN n customs has become widely accepted.
The English utilitarian philosopher john stuart Mill (1806-1873) argued that ”Where the
sentiment of nationality exists ... there is a prima facie case for unity of all the members
of the nationality under ... a government to themselves apart.” Self-determination was
also a key element of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen points. and in recent years it has been
especially strong in the Afro-Asian countries.

3. Nationalism allows for economic development.

Many scholars see nationalism as both a facilitator and a product of modernization.

Nationalism created larger politidal units in-which commerce could expand. The
prohibition of interstate tariffs and the control of interstate commerce by the national
government in the 1787 American constitution is an example of that development.
Further, as modernization, with its industrialization and urbanization, broke down the old
parochial loyalties of the masses, they needed a new focus-and that was the nation-state.
4. Nationalism allows diversity and experimentation.

A related argument is that regional or world political organization might lead to an

amalgamation of cultures or, worse, the suppression of the cultural uniqueness of the
weak by the, strong, Diversity of culture and government also promotes experimentation.
Democracy. it could be said. was an experiment in America in 1776, and it might not
have occurred in a one-world system.

The Troubled Face of Nationalism

Despite its possible good, many contend that nationalism has become primarily a
destructive force. Pope john XXIII. in his 1963 encyclical pacem iii terries, reviewed
nationalism and sovereignty .end found that ’ the present system of organization and the
way its principle of authority operates on a world basis no longer correspond to the
objecliN-e requirements of the universal common goose.” The ills that nationalioll

/Nationalism
_ 276

brings arc many bad serious and can be subdivided into three categories: lIl how .vc
relate to others, (2) the lack of fit between states and nations, and ( 3) the issue of
microstates, which has already been discussed.

HOW WE RELATE TO OTHERS

Nationalism can lead to insularity.

Because we identiy with ourselves as the ”we-group,” wd tend to consider the ”they-
group” as aliens. Our sense of responsibility--of even human carriage-for the ”they” is
limited. This is an especially pronounced effect of the American national experience.
Isolationism was a standard sanctioned by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson that
lasted for a century and a half. It has retreated somewhat, but the isolationist impulse still
can be felt. Some -LO percent of Americans still favor a ”fortress America” foreign
policy.

Domestically, we Americans accept the principle that we have a responsibility to our

least fortunate citizens. The social welfare budget in the United states is in the hundreds
of billions of dollars, and we engage in countless acts of charity. from donating blood to
distributing toys for tots. Internationally, to be blunt, most of us don’t give a damn. Atidal
wave kills hundreds of thousands in Bangladesh, an earthquake killed a million in

China, disease and hunger debilitate millions in Africa and Asia, and, well, yawn-”I
wonder what’s at the movies. ”’ We may give a few pennies for UNICEF to Halloween
kids or donate a few dollars at religious services for’international relief work, but all in
all. these Asians. Africans, and others seem far away. not like us at all, and certainly not
our responsibility-.
Nationalism often leads to a feeling of superiority.

It is a small step from feeling different and liking your group to feeling superior. At its
extreme, this manifestation festered in Nazi Germany. The German nation- or race-was at
the top of the ladder, which descended downward to where, at the bottom, Slavic peoples
were to be kept as virtual and expendable slaves in segregated and degrading conditions,
and Jews and Gypsies were ”nonpeople” and ”racial vermin’
to be exterminated.

Nationalism may lead to xenophobia.

Nenophobia is a suspicion or fear of other nationalities. The belief that other nationalities
are hostile is widespread and leads to world tension. Xenophobia is also related to regular
disruptions as alien residents are expelled from one country or another. Whether the south
Asia. Ghanaians in Nigeria, or (before that ) Nigerians in Ghana, banning or expelling
aliens has caused human mesery and conflict between the host

countn and the they-group’s country of origin. As the international

migration ?77
of lab

or increases, this cause of cortilrct is likely to become more

pronounced.

Nationalism is jingoistic.

Too often nationalism leads to Jingoism, the belief that your

country, can do no wrong. It combines with patriotism-or love of country-to the point that
a Stephen Decatur can say, to our applause. ” Our country ’ mail)” she always be in the
right; but our countn right or wrong.” NatiopaGsm can be messianic.
If you like yourself or your we-group too much, it is easy to imagine that your fate-
indeed, your duty-is to ”save” others and brie them to
the ”way of truth--that is, your waN~ ~ This is, essentially.

messiapisrrt. Consider, for example, the messiah complex found in Fcodor Dostoevsh,~s
The possessed: ”If it did not believe that truth is ori15~ to be found in itself alone, if it
did boat believe that it alone is destined to save all the rest by its truth, it would... not
remain a great people. But there is only- one troth therefore only a single one out of the
nations can have the tnie God. That is the Russian people.”

Nationalism can be aggressive.

Feelings of xenophobia superiority- jingoism, and messianism

can easily lead to aggressive- behavior. Again, Hitler’s Germany and the supposed
destiny of its Aryan super-race to be master of the world in an especially strong example.
But there are many others. Nationalism has been a major factor in the aggressiveness of
the United States, the Soviet Union, arid, to a lesser degree, China and has led each of
these powers to expand’ colonize, and/ir tr< to dominate its neighbors.

The Lack of Fit between States and Nations

Nations and states often do not coincide. As we have seen. the concept of a nation-state in
which ethnic and political boundaries are the
same is more ideal than real.
In fact, most states are not ethnically unified, and many nations arc not politically united
or independent. This lack of ’’fit” bet~>een nations and states is a significant source of
international (and domestic) tension and
conflict. There are two basic disruptive

patterns: (1) one state. multiple naUons, (2) one nation, multiple states. i
States with ,pore than one nation.

The number of multinational states far exceeds that of riatioriallv unified stags, One
study, found that only about 9 percent of all countries tnily fit the nation-state concept. as
Figured a-1 shows. The rest of the ~;ouiUries fall short of the ideal by at least some
degree, 29.5 percent havin~no national rliajoritv.

Nationalism

We are. for example, used to thinning of Soviet citizens as Russians Yet, in fact, only
about 50 percent of the people in the USSR are ethnic Russians. Additionally, there are
fifteen major nationalities and many smaller national/ethnic groups. Some of these groups
are closely akin to Russians, but others are quite dissimilar and have different

religious heritages, languages, and racial/ethnic physical characteristics.

Many multinational states are unstable because the various ethnic groups perceive that
they, have little in common, and one or more may wish to establish an independent
political entity. Indeed. in many African and Asian countries ” nationality” is largely a
fiction based on colonial boundaries. Nigeria. Africa’s most populous county, is a prime
example.

When Nigeria became independent in 1960, there were few within-its borders who truly
considered themselves Nigerians. As one political leader put it. ”Nigeria is not a nation. It
is a mere geographical expression .... The word `Nigeria is merely a distinctive
appellation to distinguish those who live in Nigeria from those who do not. ` 2 ’ Instead
of being a nation,

Nigeria’s 50 million people were divided into a number of ethnic groups with different
languages, religions, histories, cultures, and subracial

backgrounds. Once independence was gained from Great Britain, the semblance of unity
built around anticolonalism began to breakdown. Within a few years divisions among the
Hausa. Vonrba. Ibo, and other ethnic groups had become mine pronounced, and in May
1967 the

Ibonation declared its independence and established the Republic of Biafra. The result
was a tragic civil war that led to 1.5 million deaths before the ’Ibo independence
movement was crashed in 1970.
A Civil war, like Nigeria’s, is of course a domestic event and not formally a part of
international affairs. But very often the discord within a county threatens to draw outside
powers in as supporters of the
various factions. A combination of cold-war politics. Nigeria’s oil production. and
humanitarian concern created considerable international jockeying for position although.
happily, inter<eution was largely avoided.

In other cases, outside powers have been drawn in. IN 1971 Pakistan dissolved into civil
war when the Bengalis of East Pakistan declared their independence and established
Bangladesh. In the ensuing struggle India (which lay between East and Wheat Pakistan )
joined the struggle against the dominant Punjabis of West P’,trkistan. thus

internationalizing the civil war.,

I
Another possible link between multiethnicity, and international

bl’ha\ for is based on the theory that leaders may use international conflict t° ”nih a
country by diverting attention from internal problems such as divisions. Studies in this
point are, so far, inconclusive. One ~!rah,is found that between 1815 and 1939
approximatcly half of the

lntemational Relations 2’k)

international wars were preceded by domestic unrest ; in one of the belligerent countries.
Other studies have found little connection betNkeen domestic factors and international
conflict. while still .others halve concluded that some types of countries (dictatorial and
developing) were more subject to the link between internal and external conflict than
others. Thus were cannot say that domestic instability necessarily lease to international
adventurism, but we can say that it creates a temptation to which troubled leaders
sometimes succumb.

Nations in more than one state.

A second type of departure from the nation-state ideal involves multistate nationalities.
This phenomenon occurs when a nation overlaps the borders of two or more states. One
pattern that can be found is a nation-state with elements of its national group in one or
more surrounding states.

Figure 4-3 depicts such a situation in which state B and nationality X form a nation-state.
Nationality X, however, also forms a minority group in multinational states A and C,
which are dominated by nationalities Z and Y respectively. Such a situation creates the
potential for conflict. The nation-state (B-X) serves as a manger for the minorities (A-
X,C-X), who want to separate and join the ;;fatherland.”

This situation also fosters claims by the nation-state that the minority areas (A-X, C-X)
should be part of a greater B-X nation-state. This type of national feeling is called
irredentism, after the phrase Italia irrendento (”Italy unredeemed”). Further, if the X
nationality in state A or Cis oppressed as a minority group by the Zs in state B may try to
intervene on behalf of their national kin. This pattern was a major cause of conflict
before World War 11 as Germany sought to incorporate the German nationals in the
Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia), Austria, Poland, and other areas into a greater Germany.
Illustrating the protection of ethnic brethren, Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and nearly
became involved in a war with Greece over the issue of the oppression (according to
Turkey) of the Turkish-Cypriot minority by the Greek-Cypriot majority.

In another variation of the multistate nationality phenomenon. a nationality is a minoritv

in two or more states and has no nation-state of its own. as in Figure 4-4. Palestinians,
who are spread throughout Israel. Lebanon. Jordan. and Egypt, are a current conflictual~
example, as are Kurds. who live in Iran. Iraq, Turkey. Syria, and the Soviet Union. In
such cases, there may be conflict between the separatist nationality and the states in
which it is a minority or even the states themselves as they iii to deal with the nationalist
agitation.

Nationalism

280

Finally, there is the pattern of a nationality split between two states and being a majority
in both, as in Figure -1->. North and South Vietnam. North and South Korea, East and
West Germany, and the two Yeurens are or were examples. Such a division causes almost
a natural urge to reunite, but there is usually conflict over which of the two political
systems will dominate. This has led to armed conflict in three of the examples (K-,rea,
Vietnam, Yemen) and considerable cold-war tension over Germany.

Overall, then, the lack of fit betNyeen nations and states has been a major source of
conflict. Given the rampant nationalism that still exists, it is likely to continue as a
problem. One study. for instance, found some sixth--one national groups with separatist
potential. Areas like Africa are such a patchwork quilt of nations and states that the
Organization of African Unity has refused to give ”African boundaries are so absurd that
they need to be recognized as sacrosanct. That may be a good thought for states that are,
but it will surely meet with violent objection from nations that wish to be.

Nationalism: Tomorrow and Tomorrow

This discussion of nationalism began with the observation that nationalism has not
always been , nor will it necessarily always be, the world’s principal form of political
orientation. What will follow it and when. however, is difficult to predict. At least for the
immediate future, barring a major upheaval, nationalism seems to have a firm grip oil
our’ consciousness. We still revere Nathan Hale for regretting that he had but one life to
lose.fo° his country, and we still sympathize N\itli Philip Nolan. the tragic figure in
Edward Everest Hale’s .flan it’ithoru o c oirnti,l-.

There are voices. however. that see nationalism as a weakening philosophy and those
who advocate its end. Lotus Snider, one of the leading scholars oil nationalism. has listed
the argunicilts of those Nlho sec a coming end to nationalism: (t) Increased cross-cultural
interaction is lessening the nationalistic we/they image of other peoples in the world. (2)
The intermestic (merging of international and domestic issues) nature of politics is
creating a heightened sense of internationalism. (3) The nation-state can no longer cope
NN ith problems such as ecology. foo”oduction. and disease prevention. (-4) In a
supersonic. nuclear age. file nation-state can no longer protect its people. (5) Given its
piston of causing conflict. nationalism , is condemned by the moral judgment of history.
(61 %hittin,itional corporations and interdependence are ending economic 1i iowiah,nl.
(7) There is an indefinable. but real, psychological trend ’o~a d l ;~=NN \Norld order.
International organization is expanding. and ’aI ;a 11 11,11 I)hilosopllics (sncli as
communism) liaNc a strong appeal.

International Relations

Still. Snyder concludes that. for a variety of reasons, :cOonali.,~, remains the world’s
most powerfid and resilient ”is.” We can bemusdcl, tolerate a politically powerless Albert
Einstein saying. ”It is beyond me t~ keep secret my international orientation. The state to
wh i:;l? I belong as ~~ citizen does not play the least role in my spiritual life; 1 regard
al(egianc-. to a government as a business matter. somewhat like the relationship will; a
life insurance company.” But it is a different story when a presidential! candidate like
Jerry Brown in 1976 tells us that we all live together o:? ”spaceship earth and should
have to sacrifice for humanity’s common good. In that case, we sighed and wrote Brown
off as one of those oven, mellow Californians. A peanut farmer seemed a much safer
presidential choice.

THE ROOTS OF NATIONALISM

It is to antiquity that we must turn in order to understand the forces that have evolved into
contemporal nationalism. From the beginning of recorded history, humans have banded
together in groups in order to face collectively the animate and inanimate challenges of
nature Consequently, throughout history we see various territorially based political
organizations. The earliest of these, crude and anomie bands, eventually gave way to
tribes, villages, walled cities. manors, principalities. empires and their subdivisions, and,
most recently, nation-states and regional economic communities.

The recorded history of the human species is about ten thousand

years old. A review of the rise and decline of ancient peoples and their cultures supports
the we -versos-they phenomenonon which nationalism is based: One of the first peoples
whose history has been reconstructed is the Sumerians. They live in valley s adjacent to
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and organized themselves into an agriculturally oriented
city-state system. These city-states were independent of one another, accepted no central
authorit<•, and settled their disputes through conflict or bargaining processes premised an
power. The earliest known treat’ was concluded between the kings of the Sumerian citv-
states of Umma and La ash about 3000 B.C. This treat’ called for the two rulers to submit
a frontier dispute to third-panty arbitration.

At the sortie time, and gradually thereafter, , other great civilizations developed among
the Egyptians, the Hittites. the Indians, the Chinese. the Hebrews, the Assyrian. the
Phoenicians, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Mayas and Aztecs in what later came to be
known as the New World.

The ancicat Greek ci1-state system that was flourishing five mnrics before the binli of
J~wi~s provides us with some examples of trory AbLit p .n )chio Forms of ”a:ti;ea:alisn?.
The famous funeral oration of

Nationalism
282

T’uccl,~ss (-195--129 B.C.), a ruler of ancient Athens. to his fellow Athenian dc,,d after a
battle with Sparata, Pericles justified the terrible sacrifice on tl?c grounds of preserving
Athens. His speech was a glorification of the ciy of Athens. its ancestors. and their
accomplishments. Athenian culture. government, military organization. and way of life
were second to none, according to Pericles. He was proud to belong to Athens, and he
placed it

above all other cities in ancient Greece. The distinction between ”we” and ”they” cannot
be made more emphatically than it was in this speech. Pericles praised Athens for being
an open and creative city distinguished by a unique system of government called
democracy, a great love for education, leisure, and the fine arts, respect for begun and
poetry, and an unceasing commitment to improvement and growth. ”In a word,” he
concluded. ”I claim that our city as a whole is an education to Greece ..... Noother city of
the present day goes out to her ordeal greater than ever men dreamed: no other is so
powerful that the invader feels no bitterness when he suffers at her hands, and her
subjects no shame at the indignity of their dependence.”
If we continue briefly to look at the history of the Western world,

we see a constant ebb and flow between patterns of political integration and patterns of
political fragmentation, represented
by empires and city-state systems respectively. For example, the Greek city-states were
united forcibly by Philip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.) His sun, Alexander the Great (3>6-
323 B.C.) , led the, Greeks to adventurous growth and empire. Alexander’s empire can be
under stood both as an elementary form of Greek nationalist expansionism and as an
early attempt at supranational integration. The Macedonian Empire gradually but steadily
began to fall into fragments, and eventually it succumbed to a new and vigorous
expansionist force originating in Rome.
The Roman Empire provides us with a good example of the coexistence

between nationalism and multinationalism. For instance, the Romans had two systems of
law--one for themselves and one for the ”nations” that were under their control. In its
heyday the Roman Empire extended from India to Scotland and from the Danube to the
Sahara. It was a model of world government, a heir archy controlled vigorously by Rome.
After the collapse of the empire in A.D. :176, its western half disintegrated--into
numerous

political units. Centuries later (A.D. 962). a halfhearted attempt was made to revive the
empire by combining these units into the Holy Roman Empire.

the eastern and southern half of the fallen empire passed into the
;,ands of the Byzantine and Arabic empires, which were dominated by
(]reeks and Arabs respectively. After many centuries of adventurous and

International Relations

„rcative existence, these two empires were also overtaken by a new and mgorous national
group know as the Ottoman Turks, and the Ottoman Empire was born. This empire also
flourished for centuries. Its formal ”death”occurred with the breakup of the empire at the
ebb of World War I and the emergence of the modern nation•state of Turkey in 19 2 3.

The western half of the Roman Empire, unlike the eastern half, followed the road of
political fragmentation rather than of empire. Small feudal states persisted in an
atmosphere of continual but controlled religious and temporal warfare. Territorial
rearrangements were most often the result of military conquests or marriages of
convenience among rulers. It is in this atmosphere of ethnic pluralism and political
fragmentation that we can trace the genesis of modern nation-states.

The first large and politically centralized entities in the West developed in Spain,
England, and France between the middle of the thirteenth century and the middle of the
sixteenth century. These nation-states were at first loose and pluralist agglomerations of
people held together primarily by the absolute authority of monarchs. Spain, for example.
emerged as a single country as a result
of the fission of Aragon and Castile evolving from the marriage of Ferdinand and
Isabella.

Dynastic legitimacy rather than national and ethnic cohesiveness provided the cement
that kept countries such as Spain. France, and England together. The rising merchant and
professional middle classes found that the absolute power of the king was a convenient
device for eroding the power of corrupt and decadent traditional aristocracies and distant
imperial bonds. But for the process of modern nationalist development to be completed,
supreme authority had to be transferred from kings and queens to the people.

THE RISE OF MODERN FORMS OF NATIONALISM

Seventeenth century England is usually presented as the first modern nation state in
which nationalism and its related concept of patriotism became coequal with the idea of
individual libertine and popular participation in public affairs. The American Revolution
(1776) and the French Revolution (1798) are land marks in the development of
heterogeneous nationalism (in the United States) and homogeneous nationalism (in
France). The United States was the result of the unification of former British colonies that
had fought against their metropolis to obtain political rights, tolerance of religious
diversity. and individual liberties. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed a brand
of nationalism based on the perpetuation of a system of liberal ideas and a pluralist and
secular way of life. Certain ”truths” were held to be self-evident.” that all men arc created
equal, that they are endowed by then- Creator with certain inalienable rights. that among
these are life. liberty. and the pursuit of

284

Illationalism

llappiness.” Given the subsequent ethnic and religious diversity of Americans, the
coining of the patriotic slogan phrrihrr.s return is not surprising.

French nationalism NvaS more vigorous. romantic, and ethnically

hon 5ogeneous than the verbally restrained Anglo-Saxon versions, but
equally expansionist. Maximilien. Robesierre (17>8-9-4), one of the

masterminds of the French Revolution. exemplified the French spirit with these words of
self-sacrifice: ”I am French. I am one of they [France’s] representatives .... Oh sublime
people! Accept the sacrifices of my whole being. Happy is the man who is born in your
midst: happier is he who can die for your happiness.” Napoleon Bonaparte transformed
patriotic and nationalist sentiments such as these into an expansionist ideology. The
institution of mass conscription called for deep and tangible involvement of citizens in
the life of the nation-state. Napoleon’s ”citizen armies” carried hull to victory after
victory throughout Europe and Middle East .Eventually,
he was defeated by the yen’ forces of nationalism he had helped awaken

A third variation of nationalism is associated with the North

American frontier of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and with the political
unification of Germany (1864-71). Some of the proponents of this

brand of nationalism likened the state to a living organism passing through the pleases of
birth, adolescence. maturity, and finally old age. Often. they claimed a dominant role for
their nation because of its presumed superior

biological heritage. Others saw, the nation-state as inspired by a divine idea and charged
it with a unique historical mission. Whatever the nuances of interpretation, a central idea
unites what came to be known as the organic school: the state must, expand or die: the
concamc to be known as the organic school: the state must expand or die: the conquest of
living space (Lehen.srarmr) is therefore vital. Germany in the 19 >3--1s period, under the
totalitarian rule of Adlof .Hitler, epitomized an extreme and reckless version of organic
nationalism: Bentio Mussolini (1883-19-45). the Duce of Fascist Italy. expressed the
organic view of the nation-state most graphically: T

Fascism is nn historical conception, in which man is what he is only insofar as he works

with the spiritual process in which he finds himself, in the fancily or social group, in the
nation and in the history in which all nations eollaborate...Orrtside history man

is nothing. Consequently Fascism is opposed to all the individualistic abstractions o/’ a

materialistic nature lie those of the eighteenth centrwv; .... .4gain.n individuali.crrr, the
Fascist conception is,/<nr the .State: ar7cl it i.s,;or the indiriclnal insorcrr as he coincides
0t1T the State, which is the con.seienco acres rrnrver.sal

International Relations
285 vriJl ofnran in his hi.stor-real existence... The nation as the .Stat<> ,, an ethical
reality which exists and lives insofar- as it develop y
~, armest its develapnrent is to )rill it... Thtr,s (the State) can he likened to the human will
-which knom.s no limits to it, de aelopnrent and realizes ItS’e~ll9 testing its omn
limitlessness.

The organic and mystical conception of the nation-state was built substantially on the
philosophical foundations provided by George Wilhelnl Freidrich Hegel (1770-18;1), the
German philosopher. Hegel viewed the histoy, of human civilization as a succession of
national cultures. For hi, the national state was the highest form of political unit. the
embodiment of political power. The l nlksgeist, the genius and ’the spirit of a nation,
imbued the nation with tlie’qualities of huge, collective. living and growing organism.
The part
of this organism (such as individuals, groups, regions. and political parties) were to be
subordinated !o the whole. A tack of such subordination would result in anarchy, and
chaos. The freedom could be dound only within the strict disciplinary, lines of the nation-
state. The state (as a government) thus emerged as the embodiment of a nation’s will and
destiny. Finally, the stale was seen as having no higher duty, than to preserve and
strengthen itself.

According to this conception individuals are best understood as ”means” of the state,
their value to be measured in terms of their contribution to the survival of tile state
organism. History is seen as proceeding according to organic laws that are beyond the
control of individuals. Thus, concluded Hegel, true political genius could be found
among those persons who knew how to identify with higher principles such as the
survival, growth, and prosperity of their nation-states.

It was in the spirit of organic nationalism that a Japanese petty officer, having chosen
todie as a kamikaze pilot, could write these words to his dearest ones on October 28,
19:14:

Dear Parents:

Please congratulate me. I have been given a splendid opportunity to die. This is my last
day. The destiny of our homeland hinges ol: the decisive battle in tile seas to the south
where I shall fall like a blossom frond a radiant cherw tree.

I shall be a shield for His Majesty and die cleanly alongtvith my squadron leader and
other friends. I ;wish that I that I could be born seven times. each time to smite the
enemy.

How I appreciate this chance to die like a ritanl I am g;atefiil from the depths of sly heart
to tlae paren!s who have reared me with their constant prayers anti tender love. And 1 am
grateful .as well

Nationalism
286

t0 my squadron leader and superior officers who have looked after me as if I were their
own son and given me such careful training.

Thank you, my parents, for the twenty-three years during which you have cared for me
and inspired me. I hope that my present deed will in some small way repay what you
have done for me. Think well of me and know that your Isao died for our country. This is
my last wish, and there is nothing else that I desire.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
A major characteristic of the nation-state is sovereignty. In the literature of international
relations, sovereigns’ has been defined as supreme state authority, subject to no external
limitation. The French Philosopher Jean Bodin (1>.’i0-96) is associated with the earliest
clear definition of this concept. Bodin was concerned with the fragmentation and
sectionalism that had led to frequent civil wars and chaos
in France. His main object, therefore, was to strengthen the position of the monarch as the
source of order and unit’ throughout France. Writing in 1 >86. Bodin defined the state as
”a lawful government of several households. and their uncommon possessions, with
sovereign poorer ” Citizenship became the subjection of an individual to the sovereign.
Scvcrcignty was defined as :`supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by
law.” Thus. the king was given the right to make, interpr-c:t, and execute lair unrestrained
by all human arrthorrtv. He was subject only to the laws of God and to fundamental
natural ~ laws such as those requiring the keeping of agreements and respect for private
property.

Thomas Hobbes (1>88-1679). the famous British political Philosopher, elaborated on the
concept of sovereignty. subtly shifting its emphasis from the person of the king to the
abstraction called government orstate. During the turbulent years from 1G-ttl to IGSI in
England. which were marked by factionalism and bloodshed. Hobbes wrote with the
purpose of strengthening the authority of the king and of absolute government. Hobbes
felt that if human remained in a state of nature (i.e. . prior to being organized politically).
leading a ”solitary-. poor. nasty. brutisk, and short” life, bloody and uncontrollable
conflict would be inevitable. Thus, in order to limit conflict and to preserve the
collectively. it was necessary to concentrate all social authority in the sovereign. The
sovereign. a ”mortal God”’ on earth, was equated with the state. which 111 turn was
equated with the governalignt:-For-sovereignty to shift to its !bird and contemporary
please. ultimate authority had to be transferred symbolically from the government to the
people inhabiting the nation-state.

The French Revolution (1789) epitomizes the symbolic transfer of soveley-nt; from the
king and the government to the people. Since it has proved difficult, however, for the
people as a totality to rule in other than

International Relations’-.-- __ , __. ___, ,. _~_-_____ ; , - -.-- __-2g’ .

atfonalism

small-town settings, sovereignty has remained substantially in the hands of governments

who rile in the name of their people. In such states. there ie ,in implicit understanding that
the people will scrutinize goicninient actions and as a last resort. will revolt should their
government betra. lts implicitly contract with them.

A helpful distinction should be made between internal oncl external sovereignty. Internal
sovereigntt, concerns the supreme and lawful authority of the state over its citizens.
External sovereigr?tv, on the other hand, refers to the recognition by all states
of the independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of each state as represented by
its government. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (t 583-16.15), reputed to be the father of
international law. defined sovercigntt, as ”that power whose acts are not subject to the
control of another.” For Grotius, sovereignty was manifested when a state. in dealing
with its internal affairs. remained free front the control or all other states. Thus defined,
sovereignty has become tire cornerstone of the modern international system. :where
power and authority remain consciously divided and decentralized.

In the final analysis. sovereignty is the ability of a nation-state-through its government,

to’ be master in its house, to have control over its domestic affairs, and in its foreign
affairs to have the options of entering or (caving alliance. of going to war or remaining
neutral so as to best defined its interests. In practice. however we find that certain
countries have been ”more sovereign” than others: some of the great powers enjoy the
substance as veil as the letter of sovereignty. whereas smaller countries. especially, if
they are strategically located, arc penetrated quite often by the great powers and can be
called ”sovereign” only in a relatively unauthentic sense of the word.

This discussion of sovereignty brings us to the provocative arguments of John Herz. a

thoughtful scholar of international relations, regarding the rise of nation-stales and
nationalism. Herz maintains that the nation-state is the kind of political unit that. given
the nature of available weapons systems, is best designed to keep a territory
”impermeable” and to protect its inhabitants. He feels that throughout history the unit
which has afforded the best protection and security to human beings has also become the
basic political unit. People, according to Herz. tend to recognize in the long run the
authority, any. authority, which possesses the power of hrote clion.

So, in Herzs view. technology and weaponry (both defensive and offensive) are directly
responsible for the type of political organization of the international system. Herz
maintains convincingly that the death of the !~:udal system and the walled city-state as
units of political autonomy came onlv after the I11wC11t1071 Of gllllpo•wdCr by the
GCrlilall monk Berthold

Schwarz (who was also the maker of the first powers gam, used at Ghent in 131=I).
Gunpowder, according to Herz, was responsible for the transition resulted in the
neutralization of castles in the interior of territorial etatcs and the construction of
elaborate fortifications along the states borders. Once nation-states, as
fundamental units of protection. had been forged, the resulting ease of economic and
social interaction within them and the relative isolation of their populations from
neighboring states helped solidify the different cultures, institutions, and linguistic and
religious patterns of behavior that we identiy with nation-states today.

According to Herz, international law from the sixteenth centun, on increasingly

legitimized national lerritorialiy. Each nation state (and especially its rating elite) was
jealous of its independence and wished to maintain its political and military
”impermeability.” Therefore. we find that early international law focused on the
delimiting of national territorial jurisdiction in order to help legitimize and safeguard the
independence and sovereignty--in short,, the impermeability--of nation-states. War.
recognized as well as sanitized by international law. remained the ultimate means of
settling disputes among sovereign territorial states whenever peaceful methods of
settlement failed to bear fruit. Once established. sovereign authorities sought to perfect
and strengthen their administrative control over their subjects. For their part, the people -
sought and in many instances gained access to the political process, either through
electoral participation or through the indirect method of representation. Political
democracy, especially as manifested in the extension of the franchise-became the
hallmark. of the conversion of the stale from a dynastic to a panicipatoy entity.

In international as well as in domestic affairs, governments have

tried to endow their actions with an aura of legitimacy. _C- 6nsequently. by
adhering to treaties and to customary international- Iaw. different ruling
elides found that they could benefit mutually. Over time, the development
of a nation-state system founded upon an acceptable balance of power gave
impetus to the renaissance of the international law of which Grotius was a
leading spokesman. The formalization of diplomatic procedure, the
establishment of . collective defense systems through alliances. and the
acceptance o the principle of sovereignty- and its corollary of
nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states--all of these were
developments that strengthened the hand of nation-slate builders. But in
the case of ideologically or ethnically fragmented societies. coercive means
such as subversion and war were often employed to overthrow legitimate
governments. Without a fine basis in a - stable political community.
Sovereignty often proved to be all illusion.

International Relations

The modern doctrine of popular sovereignty has transferred the source of absolute power
from the monarch
to the ”people.” But this transfer of power does not mean necessarily that individual
citizens become more able to check the transgressions of expanding administrative states.
Indeed, the popularization of sovereignty gave rise to the ideology of mass nationalism,
which equates the fate of the citizenry with that of its political leadership. Mass
conscription for either military or industrial service, government control of the mass
media for tile purpose of propagandizing foreign-policy objectives. and the centralization
of educational systems to ensure an uninterrupted process of political socialization
combined to spread the fecer of nationalims that produced the major conflicts of the
twentieth century.

CHALLENGES TO NATIONALISM

The biological acrd mystical conception of nationalism possesses

the formidable weapon of assuring its adherents that they alone have a
world historical mission to fulfill and that. by implication , their actions in
world politics must be just. A typical by implication certainly not exclusive
representative of this point of view was Senator Albert J. Beveridge,, who in
1900, while arguing for the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the
United States. asserted that the American nation had been chosen to ”lead
in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America.
and it holds for us all the profit, all the glom. all the happiness possible to
not. We are trustees of the world’s progress. guardians of its righteous
peace.”

Nationalism grew steadily in tile last two hundred years to reinforce the identification of
the individual with the state. The process of political socialization, carried out by the
family, schools. and peer groups, taught the citizen the inescapable lesson that loyalty to
the state fulfills not only an ideological but also a pragmatic purpose. For it is the state
that. in return for obedience to its laws, provides innumerable concrete services. Thus.
citizen allegiance and government efficiency in the performance of its functions are
mutually supportive.

The rise of modern states that were based on a strong nationalistic sentiment was a
logical historical response to the industrial revolution. But in the nation-state is coming
under increasing attack from three quarters: the advance of military technology. the rise
of supranational organizations. and the growing role of transactional ideological,
religious. functional, and political movements. In the 1950s, many, analysts pointed out
the increasing military vulnerability of the state. Principal among these was John Her/,
N%ho wrote of tile ”demise” of the state, arguing that it was no IonRer capable of
protecting its citizens
in the event of a three-dimensional n10drrn war invol0ng nuclear, psychological, and
economic lveapons.

Nationalism
290

Herz foresaw the transformation of the international system into a condition dominated
by conflicting regional alliances. Some year later. seeing the impact of decolonization.
Herz gradually abandoned his notion of the demise of the state. Yet, as long as the
economic and military viability of many of the new states remains in question, tile image
of a bipolar or tripolar international system retains some validity. In a future time. George
Ornell’s dreary 1913-1 scenario may indeed materialize, and our earth may be dominated
by the three superpowers of Oceania. Eurasia, and Eastasia.

Assuming that the hallmark of national sovereignty is the rigorous application of the
doctrine of nonintervention in the affairs of one state by another the development of
supranational organizations poses the second problem for the future of presumably
.impermeable nation-states. Among the democracies of the West, notably those of
Europe. supranational collaboration to achieve shared goals in the fields of economic
development. health, and education is proceeding swiftly. Member states of supranational
organizations with policy-making and policy-implementing powers. such as the European
CztnununiO and the Nordic Council. employ the argument (or perhaps tile
rationalization) that their sovcreigny remains unaffected because they have delegated
governmental authority to the international civil servants who staff the executive bodies
of these organizations. 1n a legal sense this argument merits respect. but the politics of
interdependence have eroded tile absolutist quality of the concept of sovereignty and are
likely to create rivals for the nation-state as the sole focus of political loyalty.

Transactional ideological/political movemouts of the twentieth century. such as fascism

and communism, present a third formidable challenge to nationalism. The ”New Order”
o~ the German National Socialists led by Adolf Hitler (1889-19-4i) castigated the liberal
nineteenth-centuy version of the nation-state and called for tile formation of a
hierarchical European system dominated by what Hitler considered a biologically select
race committed to an ideology of purity and power. In accordance with this objective. the
Elite Guard (SS) of the Nazi movement organized non-German units throughout
occupied Europe and sought to use them as a basis for a new Praetorian state whose
military despotism mould sound the death knell of the conventional European national
communities. The outcome of the Nazi assault on tile traditional European
nation-states was a cataclysmic war from which humankind has yet to recover materially.
and from which it may never, completely recover spiritually.

Marxism--from a very different angle -- also sought to challenge tile nation-state and
nationalism. In the Coi»»runist _t la»iTe.stn (18-I8) Karl

91

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Mary and Friedrich Engles rejected nationalism, viewing it a• au instrument of the

bourgeois class to divide workers across national frontiers. Although Joseph Stalin (1879-
193) modified this ideological doctrine by making Soviet policy in 1928 a policy of
”socialism in one coulltrv ’and also by appealing to the historic force of Russian
nationalism during the great war with Germany. orthodox Marxists continue to this day to
treat the nation-state as a ”category of history”’ that is designed to serve the interests of
capitalism.and that is doomed to disappearance once working classes everywhere rise to
power.

On the tactical level, however. revolutionary communist movements have readily

espoused the cause of nationalism and have; sought to align themselves with anticoonial
forces in the Third World. F
instance, the support of a coalition of nationalist forces such as the Popu ar Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been an integral art of Soviet policy. Demands for
political self-determination in Eas rn Europe. on the other hand, tend to receive a
markedly different respol se. Ruling Eastern European Communist parties subscribe
rather. to e doctrine of ”proletarian solidarity” and accept an obligation to comb t
presumed couvterrevolutionar\ tendencies within their bloc. Under the\, leadership of the
Soviet Union. the members of the Warsaw Pact (with the exception of Romania)
occupied Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to limit revisionist Czech liberalism and by
extension Czech nationalism.

The Polish events of 1980-81 reflected yet another powerful example of the gradual
fission between nationalism and communist. The attempt of Polish workers, peasants, and
students (supported by the powerfill Roman Catholic Church of Poland) was obviously
aimed toward the objective of attaining communism with a ”Polish face.”

In 1976. on the occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist Part’ of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and at a subsequent meeting of European Communist leaders in
East Berlin. the hard line of ”proletarian solidarity” was softened somewhat. much to the
satisfaction of the leaders of Communist parties in France. Italy. and Spain. who assert
that their parties must formulate policies reflecting the diversity of their national settings
rather than blanket guidance from Moscow. Moreover. national communism is still in
evidence
in Eastern Europe: Hungarian history books continue to refer to Hungary’s border with
Romania as a historical injustice. ’and Romanian scholars continue to remind their
readers of some Romanian provinces that were lost to the Soviet Union in
19-1s When confronted with nationalist fervor in the form of unresolved frontier
disputes. the plea of ”proletarian solidarity” begins to weaken in appeal.

Nationalism

292

Despite the threat of multidimensional warfare, the rise of supranational organizations.

the challenge of expansionist fascism, and the partial success of communism as a
transnational political movement, nationalism remains a vibrant force in world affairs and
a solid point of entry into the web of motives surrounding foreign-policy decision
making. In Parts IV and V of our text, we shall consider in greater depth the question of
whether or not nationalism can surmount the challenges currently posed by international
organizations and by global ecological interndendency.

PROSPECTS FOR NATIONALISM

Careful researchers have found that international wars waged to regain lost territon~ and
revolutions undertaken by an ethnic minority in the interest of national self-determination
have accounted for 70 percent of all international conflicts. Given the strong relationship
between 111t1o11a11S111 and war. a difficult question arises: Are nationalism and its
corollary. the nation-state. useful or harmful forces in world affairs? The answer must be
carefully qualified.

Nationalism can be a useful force when it provides the individual with a sense of identiy
and belonging. 1t allows the individual to unite with fellow citizens in the pursuit of the
common good--a behavior pattern that may well reduce individualism and alienation.
This pattern may also engender competitive and even mildly conflicting behavior in the
form of national assertiveness in tile face of obstacles. This type of competition and
managed conflict is a key element in the process of social evolution. However, national
self-actualization in this sense should not be synonymous with violence and
expansionism. To the extent that social systems compete to overtake on another by
improving their own quality of life, people in general benefit.

Nationalism can be a destructive fore when it postulates a hierarchy of peoples and seeks
to impose this world view by force. Whenever a nation ascribes to itself a superior role
that can be fulfilled only at the expense of the territory and welfare of others, armed
conflict becomes unavoidable. The histow of the twentieth centuw is filled with the t!-
ogedv wrought by such nationalist-expansionist movements.

Idealists often argue

that only a structural reform of the international system--a reform that eliminates
sovereign and unaccountable nation-states--can provide an effective safeguard against
nationalists who arc prepared to accept destruction for themselves and their followers
rather tlon the abandonment of their grandiose political goals. The realists retort tlmt the
struggle for poWr is inherent in all political-collectivizes. and they point out that the total
casualties from civil wars exceed those from international wars. Given the staggering
number of human losses resulting

international Relations

293

from internal strife, who is to say that the blight of civil conflict would not also page a
world state?

If--as Barbara Ward argues--nationalism is one of the most pervasive concepts with
which the student of international relations must cope. it is important to ask whether
nationalism is on the rise or on the wane. Although precise quantitative measures are
difficult to develop, it is notable that the membership of the United Nations has increased
threefold since the organization’s founding in 19.15. and some states are still awaiting
admission. Moreover, even in regions such as Western Europe--long held to be the
prototype of successful supranational integration--the pressures of ethnic separatism
appear to be growing and in some case, threatening established states with political
fragmentation. In Great Britain, local self-government for Scotland and Wales is now a
fact of political life: Belgium has amended its constitution to grant cultural autonomy to
the Flemings and the Walloons: and Italy has established an autonomous provincial
government for the South Tyrolcans. a Gerinan-speaking minority. While the European
Communrtv continues to striv~ for political integration. its member states decentralize
their govermuelllal processes in order to satisfy ethnic or nationalist hopes that they have
long ignored.

The processes of international politics are dyrlanllc. the phenomena of national

integration and disintegration can and often do occur simultaneously. Nationalism can be
a force for either the unification or the fragmentation of a state. On the international level
as well, the satisfaction of nationalist demands can have either stabilizing effect. In order
to understand and cope with this most powerful force, social scientists representing
various disciplines and approaches have employed their techniques and findings in an
effort to synthesize nationalism and internationalism in such away that humankind will
not have to sacrifice cultural pluralism in the name of world order and at the same time
will not have to subordinate
its general welfare t the wishes of a few powerful and acquisitive nation-states.

CHAPTER 1

COLLECTIVE SECURITY
”Since World War, 11 the concept of collective security has been
persistently advocated and attacked, defended and criticized: it has figured
prominently in the theoretical and ideological debate concerning the
management of international relations. Moreover, there has been recurrent
movement toward and away from translation of the collective security
principle into a working system. Few terms ore more popular to-day in the
Western world than ” collective security”; and few are used in such vague
and diverse ways. There is considerable point to Charles B. Marshall’s
tongue-in-check observation that collective security is a ”generalized
notion of all nations banding together in undertaking a vague obligation to
perform unspecified actions in response to hypothetical events brought on
by some unidentifiable state. w

When General MacArthur, who had just~een relieved as commander of the United
Nations forces in Korea, where’presumabh the principle of collective security was
meeting its greatest test. was asked in the course of hearings before the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees in May, 191 to indicate his attitude toward
this principle, he replied: ”What do you mean by ’collective security””? This question
must be answered before we can assess the true significance and possibilities of
collective security in international affairs.

The Nature of Collective Security.

Although it appears to be simple and almost self-explanatory. the concept is in reality a

complex and elusive one. It has been defined by George Schwarzenberger as ”machinery
for join action in order to prey ent or counter any attack agaiit5t an established
international order. li clr:irlv

international Relations

implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace. In a serrsc Earnest A.
Gross, United States Deputy- Representative to the United Nations. stated a truism when
be declared: ”There is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security.
The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity.” But not all collective action is
colfective security. Very few ventures in collective action are designed to carry- as far as
collective security; of those that are, most are in fact limited by the vague and general
nature of the commitments and by the unwillingness of the states concerned to take
sufficiently vigorous action to deal with major emergencies. Some efforts of this sort may
in truth be better described as pointed toward noncollective insecurity.

Whereas collective action may

mean the limited collaboration of a few states on an adhoc basis, collective security
implies far-reaching commitments and obligations on the part of the majority of the states
of the world, including all or at least most of other great powers. It is clearny
incompatible with neutrality and with a balance of power policy except tinder most
unusual conditions of balanced stability over a period of tile. As Quinsy Wright,
explained, ”The relations of the balance-.of power to collective security have been at the
same time - complementary arid antagonistic.” Hence there is no necessan- contradiction
between Professor Wrights’s assertions, on the .one hand, that the principles of collective
security are ”not antithetic but supplementary” to those of the balance of power and that
”International organization to promote collective security is only a planned development
of the natural tendency of balance of power policies,” and, on the other hand, that `the
fundamental assumptions of the two systems are different.

Under usual circumstances collective security and a balance of power policy are
incompatible because the object of the one is to align all other states against an offending
or war making state. whereas the other contemplates the maintenance of such an
equilibrium of power that no state will dare undertake a resort to arms. The substance of
the first is ~: world front against a possible aggressor: the substance of the second is N
«~

approximately equal and opposing fronts. Collective security also implies far greater
degree of systematization than does balance of power. ”Balam~ of power is a system
only by courtesy: while the accusation that it amourrl’, to. anarchy is too strong it is
assuredly a most unsystematic system Collective security. on the other hand, represents
the urge fol systematization, the institutionalization of international relations.

A collective security system, to be effective, must be stroll= enough to cope with

aggression from any power or combination of poANer` and it must be invoked if and as
aggression occurs. ”The principle 01 collective security requires that states identify, their
national interest -~c

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Collective Security

completely with the preservation of the total world order that they stand ready to join the
collective action to put down any aggressive threat by any ,tatc. against any other state
anywhere,” It involves a willingness. and even to go to war. As Stanley Baldwin, himself
anything but a stout hearted champion of collective security in spite of his professions,
declared in April. 193). ”Collective security will never work unless all the nations that
take part in it are prepared
simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and to fight if necessary an aggressor.

Such a system must be far more than an alliance. ”The typical

instrument of advance commitment in the balance system is an all iancy.
which collectively envisages a broader arrangement. usual( involving
obligations of common action undertaken in the constitutional document of
a general international organization.” It calls ”upon nation to go beyond
alleging themselves with each other to meet the threats emanating from
common national enemies and to embrace instead a policy of defense
directed against aggression in general amwltere. It must be open to those
states which are willing.to accept its obligations in good faith. It must not
be directed against any specific power or combination ’pf powers. The
decisive tests would seem to be whether the system is strong enough.
whether the states associated in it abide by the obligations to the fullest
extent necessary in times of crises, and whether all, or at least most. of the
great powers adhere to it. It should be emphasized that such a system
involves acceptance of the view that the national interests of the
participating states can in grave emergencies best be defended by collective
action, even at the cost of limitations on the freedom of decision of the
individual states. As Professor Friedman explains: -

A successful system of collECtive security does not neccssarih; presuppose a complete

abandonment of ’national irLlependence or -individualiy. It does. however. require the
sribmission of the individual national will to collective decisions and in order to be
effective it requires the international control of military forces and vital weapons. which
is certainly not possible without a severe restriction of national sovereignty.

This is asking for a more binding con unitmertt than the states of the world.are willing to
assume, a fact which explains why collective security is so generally subscribed to in
principle and so universally ignored in practice. ”In any event.” as professor Claude has
pointed. out. ”the doctrine of collective security requires a more thoroughgoing
renunciation of the free hand in foreign policy, a more nearly<~romplete acceptance of
advance commitment to participate in sanctions against any .ygrcssor. on behalf of any
victim. under any circumstances. than leaders of states are prepared to acknowledge -,i’s
either necessary or desirable~or h~:, mi;sibie. green their obligations to the states which
tha, represent states

International Relations

are not prepared to do, or convinced that they should do. the things that a„ operative
system of collective security
would require them to do.”
+-++
Collective Security and Regional arrangements.

It is often stated that regional arrangements for collecti\ a defense

and for other purposes establish a collective security system. This is seldom
if ever true, not so much arrangements are geographically too limited as
because they are not sufficiently binding in character and do not represent
such an aggregation of military strength that they ca -’ h any other
power or combination of powers. The North Atlantic Treaty Org” ’
alone
alone among regional arrangements past or present may possibly be ch an aggregation of
strength; but even if it possesses adequate might, it w’ 1 not provide real collective
security unless its members voluntarily assume more binding obligations than they were
willing to accept in the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO in fact seem to be moving in the
other direction. Largely as a result of De Gaulle’s noncooperative policies, its entire
organizational and command structure has been curtailed, and the future of the
organization itself is very much in question.

Regional arrangements, however. could conceivably be an important part of a broader

collective security system. This point was stressed by the Collective Measures Committee
of the United Nations. established under the Assembly’s Uniting for Peace Resolution of
November, 1950s. in its first report to the Assembly in October, 1951. Regional
arrangements, the report stated, constitute an important aspect of the universal collective
security system of the United Nations. There should be a mutually supporting
relationship between the activities of such arrangements or agencies and. the collective
measures taken by the United Nations. Thus, collective self-defense and regional
arrangements or agencies may. within the limits of their constitutional status, provide
effective forces and facilities in their respective areas in order to carry out the Purposes
and Principles of the Charter in meeting aggression.

The exact relationship betiNcen regional arrangements and the United Nations has never
been clarified. Presumably the former ’are supplententarv to the UN system and do not
supersede it; but the final wording of a.UN resolution of January 12, 1952, suggested that
many of the member states of the UN viewed their obligations to regional arrangements
as superior to those of the Character. Before giving the resolution final approval. the
Assembly accepted an amendment proposed by Argentina and Chile which made it clear
that obligations under regional agreements and arrangements such as the Rio Treaty of
1947 and the Organization of American States. provided for at the Bogota Conference in
1 948,. had priority o\ er the; recommendations of the General .Assemble

29- Collective Security

Collective Security and Disarmament. ’

The relationship between collective security and disarmament has received little
attention. For the most part they have been regarded as separate approaches to the
problem of war and peace. While it has not vet appeared feasible to link the two in an
interdependent way iv a practicable measure for maintaining peace, it may be well to
observe their theoretical relationship. A forceful statement of .this was

made in Januay. 1952, by

Benjamin V Cohen of the United States delegation to the General Assembly:

I should like to stress the fact that there is an intimate relationship between a program of
collective security and a program of disarmament. The two, by their nature, go hand in
hand. In the disarmament field, we look to the day when no nation will have armed forces
or armaments which could pose a threat to a neighbor. In the collective security field, we
look to the day when nations will not rely so much on their own forces as on the United
Nations for their security. If states are assured that in case of attack they will not stand
alone, they will need fewer arms for their defense. As

progress is made in disarmament, the task of building collective security becomes

simpler. The two march together Disarmament and collective

security are the two great enterprises for peace that this General Assembly has before it.
If a substantial reduction of armaments could be achieved, this

might make the task of developing a collective security system a simpler anti more
feasible one, always assuming that the force which can be

mratered for collective security purposes is greater than that available to a would-be
aggressor. If the arms race continues, and particularly if the nuclear giants add to their
already great capacity to ”overkill” and other nations enter the nuclear club, the hopes
and prospects for effective collective security will grow increasingly= less.

Collective Security and the League System.

As an instrument for the development and enforcement of collective security the League
of Nations was severely handicapped and indeed virtually important from the start. The
failure of the United States to join. the rise of the Soviet Union outside the League
system, the reluctance of Great Britain to assume international obligations, and later the
open defiance of Japan. Italy, and Germany all these combined to destroy any hopes that
the League would be effective in major international crises. From the beginning it was
not sufficiently broad in membership: it never included
all the great powers- and those which belonged were by no means stout champions of
ccllective security. France and the Soviet Union may appear to be exceptions to this
judgment; but France was interested in security against Germany rather than in a genuine
and universal security

International Relations 299 300

Collective Security

system. and Russia was primarily concerned with security against the
rising menace of fascism. Although Lit1-invo and other Soviet delegates
spoke eloquently and often of the need for collective security. Russia would
have been prevented by her ideological orientation from joining in good
faith with capitalist states in implementing a permanent system of
collective security. Presumably the members of the League were committed
to undertake measures of collective security. if necessary. under Article 16
of the Covenant. The article, however, was never really implemented.
Many of the League members had misgivings about it from the outset. and
from time to time resolutions interpreting the obligations of the members
under it were adopted. Most of these resolutions were of a limiting and
restrictive nature. Together with unilateral interpretations of its meaning
and the general failure of league members to pay more than lip service to
it, they took the heart out of the article.

At no time did the League assume even the external appearance of

an effective security organization. In some of the disputes brought before it.
especially in the early years, it rendered useful service. but in every- major
case involving open defiance of the Covenant by a great power the
League’s security structure proved unequal to the test. From the
Manchurian crisis in 1931-32 to the series of acts of aggression by Nazi
Germany which culminated in the attack on Poland and the beginning of
World War II, the absence of any effective security, system was tragicalh
revealed in one act of international banditry after another. In the
Manchurian crisis, which began the march of aggression by the totalitarian
powers, the League sent a commission to the Far East to make a first hand
investigation, discussed the question at length in Assembly meetings.
usually at the insistence of the victim of aggression. China. and finally.
early in 1932, passed a resolution branding Japan as the aggressor. This
step, which provoked Japan to withdraw from the League. helped to keep
the record straight, but it was not followed by any concerted action against
the aggressor only by ineffective protests and fulmination’s.
In the history of the League the most extensive effort to give teeth
to the Covenant and to make the embryonic provisions for collective
security work was made during the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-36. When
Italian forces invaded the independent African state, the matter was
immediately brought to the attention of the League, and when Italy refused
to suspend of Italian protests, voted to impose sanctions against Italy. The
halo-Ethiopian War thus-became the chief test case indeed, the only real
one of the effectiveness of the League’s security system. As all the world
knows, the League failed in this crucial test. With strong moral support but
little official cooperation from the United States, the members of the
League did not apply sanctions ”automatically, simultaneously and

”,nlprehcnsively,” but ”haltingly. gradually and piecemeal.” Oil sanctions ,,,,rc never
applied, and the Suez Canal remained farce was over, vtn„Mini had added Ethiopia to his
dominions and the weakness of the L_caguc as an instrument of security had been clearly
revealed. Haile Selassie. the diminutive but dignified Emperor of Ethiopia. appearing

bdfore the League’s Assembly-, spoke more as the voice of international conscience than
as the fugitive ruler of a backward African state. he , jcminded the delegates that
Mussolini’s successful defiance of the League had not only resulted in the loss of
independence of his country but had also dealt a body blow to the hopes for world peace.
Gently but firmly he v arned the hushed gathering that there would be more Ethiopian
incidents and still more until the totalitarian incidents and still more until the

totalitarian states dominated the world or until the peace-loving nations united to resist
further acts of aggression, even at the risk of war.

The gloomy prophecies of Haile Selassie, provided all too correct. Not long after Italy’s
occupation of Ethiopia came the Nazi conquest of Austria. then the surrender to Hitler at
Munich, then the obliteration of Czechoslovakia. and then the invasion of Poland that
began World War II. After 1936 the League as such made no further attempts of any
consequence of events. The year 1936 was ”the year of decision.” England and France.
after the dismal failure of appeasement, began frantically to rearm. The United States was
still influenced by the delusion of isolation, although she protested strongly- against the
acts of aggression, and although President Roosevelt, after 1937 at least, did his best to
arouse the

county to the possible dangers to it from unchecked aggression by the Axis powers. The
Soviet Union, unable -to __gain- support for collective

security. developed a deep-seated suspicion and distrust of the policies of the major
Western states, and turned more and more to
alternative courses in diplomacy and to an accelerated defense program at home. In
March, 1939, soon after the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, Stalin made this

bitter but accurate remark: ”The non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the
United States have rejected, the policy of collective security, the policy, of collective
security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position
of non-intervention, a position of ’neutrali>1-.’” ”The policy, of non-intervention..” he
warned, ”means

conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war
into a world war.” Within six months after Salin had uttered this warning. the series of
acts of aggression, of the ”little wars,’

had brought forth hitter fruit.

Ffom the experience of the League of Nations we may conclude that half-hearted efforts
in the direction of collective security are almost certain to be unavailing. The Leay~ue
never did develop a security system

worthy of the name in spite of Article 16 of the covenant, C11111111a,i~ Oil security m
the inter war period, and the extensive dismssluns of (he principle of collective security
in the 1930.s. The failure of the l.cague III this vital respect was due to no absence of
machinery but to the acillatiouh and myopia of what Stalin called ”the non-aggressive
states.’ particularly the major democratic nations, and to their unreadiness and
un;villingness to take the risks which an effective system of collective security-
necessarily entailed. ”The League experience might be summarized as an abortive
attempt to translate the collective security idea into a working system. The failure of
collective security in this period was not so much the failure of the system to operate
successfully as its failure to be established.”

Collective Security and the United Nations.

The price of the failure to provide collective security after World War I was World War
II. It was too high a price, and during the second global conflict within a single
generation much more careful preparation was made for a postwar order. Even before V-J
Day the states of the world. again with the major states bearing primary responsibility,
were confronted ;; ith the same choice they had faced after November, 1918 the choice,
as Hans Kohn once described it, `between making the post-war system of lai; and order
genuinely- work or else seeing the frail structure relapse into the chaotic anarchy which
had begotten not only the war of 1914-1918 but one war behind another before that. What
choice did they make in 19-15? Dil. they this time lay the foundations for a really
effective collective
securit<_~ system, and erect a strong edifice on these foundations’?

1. Provisions of the Charter.

At first glance it may seem that the foundations were well laid. The provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations for collective action are much more extensive and
apparently much more far-reaching than those of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Furthermore, the UN system has been buttressed by regional arrangements and
agreements, some of which, notably those existing in Western Europe, the Atlantic
Community, and the Western Hemisphere, establish strong regional security systems
which are presumably consistent with and supplementary to the UN system.

Article 1 of the UN Charter calls for ”effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace,” and Chapter VII of the Charter points out in great detail what
these ”effective collective measures” may be. If the Security Council finds that an act of
aggression or other threat to the peace has occurred, and if the parties concerned do. not
comply with such measures as the Council shall deem necessary. the UN body may call
upon the member states to take any of a

;t12
Collective Security

wide variety of nonmilitary and, if necessay. militay measures against the offending state
or states. Article 43 provides that ”All Members of the United Nations under take to
make available to the Security Council, on its call or in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces. assistance. and facilities necessay for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security.” Article -I5 stipulates that ”Members
shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international
enforcement action.” Article -I7 provides for a Military Staff Committee ”to advise and
assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Securiy Council’s military
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security. the employment
and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible
disarmament.” Here again problems of security and disarmament are related.
Article -19 states that ”The Members of the United Nations shall

join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the
Security Council.” The famous Article 51 specifically recognizes ”the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations,” but it also plainly states that `measures taken by Members is the
exercise of this right shall
not in all\’ way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at
any time such maintain or restore international

action as it deems necessay in order to peace ands security.” Chapter VII of flue
Charter thus clearly envisions collective action of afar-reaching nature, and the members
of the UN, by adhering to the Charter, accepted a commitment to abide by and give fall
support to the decision of the Security Council.

Until the Korean crisis developed in 190, the potentialities of the

United Nations for collective action against aggression were largely
untested: but because of the very nature of the organization it was obvious
from the beginning that it could not become an effective instrument of
collective security without radical changes in the Chapter. Even the
preliminaw planning necessary to put into effect the measures proyded for
was by no means adequate, and many of the provisions of this chapter have
remained a dead letter. The Military Staff Committee held lengthy sessions
in secret. but was unable to agree on the nature, employment, and
command of the forces which members states were expected to place at the
disposal of the Security Council. In point of fact these forces were
noucwstent. in spite of the obligations under Article 43, the strong
re;Jfilwatron of these obligations in the General Assembly’s Uniting for
Pcacc R,:olirtion of November. 1910. and the replies of many members

International Relations 3(J;

Mates to tile inquiries regarding the steps they were taking to make armed forces
available. They, are still non-existent.

It could hardly be expected that an organization ”based on the principle of the sovereign
equality, of all its Members,” and in which the great states had a special position to the
extent that they were largeh exempt from the provisions of the Charter by virtue of their
veto power in the Security, Council. could satisfy the tests of an effective collective
security system. No amount of praise of the United Nations could gloss

over its basic limitations in this respect. Collective security would be meaningful only, if
it applied to great as well as lesser powers. and only, if all or at least most, of the major
powers cooperated to the fullest extent in supporting it. The United Nations was based or.
a very, different concept. As George Schwarzenberger observed. ’collective security, as
understood at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. meant collective security against
danger to peace from the middle powers and small states and collective insecurity in the
face of aggression by any, of the world powers.” This was exactly the opposite
of what was needed. ’When minor parties to a dispute though that the Security, Council
might act.’ adds Schwarzenberger. ”tile need for collective action did not arise. When the
contingency, arose, the world power which backed the aggressor, or was itself held by,
the other members of the Securiti, Council to be the culprit made action impossible.”
There is much truth, therefore. in the following observations by Professor Claude: ”The
League of Nations failed to establish a universal collective security, system; the United
Nations began by declining to make the effort. In the final analysis, the United Nations
has never been intended or expected to apply, the principle of collective security on a
universal scale.”

2. UN Action in the Korean Crisis.

But what about Korea? Did NT the concerted action of the United Nations in the Korean
crisis prove that collective security, under the UN was possible? The Seventh Report of
the Commission to study, the organization of peace, issued in July 1951, stated: The
enforcement action tinder taken by the United Nations, under its resolution organized
community of nations, in accordance with the principle of collective security, has
employed armed force against an aggressor.” Assistant Secretary of State John D.
Hickerson declared in October, 1950: ”Korea has become a tremendous spur to the U.N.
efforts to build an effective system of collective security. Let us examine briefly the role
of the United Nations in the Korean affair, with the United Nations in the Korean affair.
with the object of determining whether this did in fact, as Benjamin V. Cohen hoped,
”mark the beginning of the progressive development of an effective collective security
system.”

Collective Security

In resolutions of June 25 and 27 and in subecqtieni recommendations in early July the

Security Council took prompt action to deal with the attack on the Republic of Korea
from the northern part of the countn’. If found that aggression had occurred, it called
upon the members of the United Nations to send troops and other assistance to Korea,
and it asked the President of the United States to designate a supreme commander of UN
forces. Thus the Council demonstrated that even though it had no armed forces at its
disposal, as provided for in Article =43 of the Charter. it was not impotent in the face of
open aggression. The demonstration, however, was not a conclusive one. That the
Council was able to agree on positive action at all was due only- to a series of unusual
circumstances. including the temporary- self-imposed absence from the Council of the
representative of the Soviet Union. and the presence of substantial
units of American air, land, and naval forces in Japan. the Ryukvus, and adjacent ~~;tters.
If the Council had not acted promptly, and if sufficient strength to meet the first on
salutes of the surprise attack had not been available and fnmediatelv ordered into action.
in all likelihood the UN would have been faced with a fait accompli in Korea before it
had proceeded beyond the discussion stage. As soon as Jacob Malik assumed the
presidency of the Security Council on August 1, 1950. a complete stalemate developed.
This continued throughout the entire month of August, while Malik was president;
thereafter, with the Soviet representative in vigilant attendance, t!te Council was
virtually, impotent..

Because of this situation, anq because of the clear lesson in Korea that the UN”s
procedures for collective security needed strengthening. the Fifth Session of the General
Assembh~.Jn the fall of 1950. endorsed proposals which seemed to herald a considerable
shift in emphasis or even m<rjor change in the character of the United Nations. The
proposals, first outlined specifically, by the American Secretary of State. Dean Acheson,
\~ere known at first as the Acheson Plan. but in Resolution. adopted by the Assemble on
November 3.

3. The Uniting for Peace Resolution.

This historic measure was a three-part affair, but onh_ Resolution H. the longest and most
important of the three parts, is customarily referred to in comments on the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. After a lengthy preamble, Resolution A contained four significant
provisions. The first called for immediate consideration by the General Assembly of any,
situation involving an act of aggression or other threat to the exercise ”its primary
responsibility”; if the Assembly were not in session at the time, an emergency meeting
could be held within twenty, four hours. The second p;irt established a Peace Observation
Committee of fourteen designated ”ierrlbers, including the Soviet Union. The third in
effect recommended

International Relations

30s

that the members of the UN fulfill their obligations under Article 43 of the Charter. In it
the General Assembly recommended to the State Members of the United Nations that
each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized
and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its
constitutional processes. for service as a United Nations unit or units. upon
recommendation by the Security Council-or General Assembly, without prejudice to the
use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

Part
four of Resolution. A established a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen members
and instructed it ”to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods which might be used to maintain
and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter.” In a final and more general section Resolution A recognized
”that enduring peace will not be secured solely, by collective security arrangements.” and
urged the members of the UN to cooperate in other important ways.

Resolution B urged the Security Council to ”devise measures for the earliest application
of Articles -13. -4s. .IG, and -47 of tire Charter regarding of the Security Council by the
States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff
Committee.” Resolution C recommended that the permanent members of the Security
Council ”meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise all problems which are likely,to
threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view
to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the
spirit and letter of the Charter.”

The Uniting for Peace Resolution was a conscious effort to develop and implement the
security provisions of the United Nations Charter. It ”was clearly put forward as a device
for making the United Nations a collective security system.” Since its adoption, more
attention has been given to problems of implementation than ever before: in this sense it
has indeed been a major land mark in the progress toward an effective collective security
system. The Peace Observation Committee is ready to function as needed; some of its
members have been given specific assignments. The Collective Measures Committee has
made sonic significant reports, which have been carefully considered by the General
Assembly exploration. The Assembly itself has passed a resolution on collective security
as a result of its consideration of the first report of the committee. and has instructed the
committee to continue its work. Nothing of any importance has been done to carr< out
Resolutions B and C of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

Collective security 306

A year after the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution only twen t<- nine states
had given even generally affirmative responses to inquiries regarding their plans for
maintaining UN units within their armed, forces; twenty two had not even deigned to
reply. Almost every one of the states expressing a willingness to implement the
recommendation simply pointed to-certain units of their
armed focus which were then engaged in overseas operations, particularly in Korea. The
United States, referred to her forces in Europe. and in Korea and tried to gloss over her
evasiveness by diplomatic double-talk: ”After termination of hostilities in Korea and after
the United States forces have been withdrawn, the extent to which the United States will
maintain armed forces which could be made available for United Nations services will be
reviewed.” If any such review has been made since 1953, when the truce in Korea
entered into effect, the results are not apparent.

4. Reports of the Collective Measures Committee.

The first report of the Collective Measures Committee, approved for submission to the
General Assembly on October 3, 1951, was a pioneer
study in the sense that it constituted the `first systematic attempt by the United Nations to
study the whole field of collective security.” It analyzed u wide variety of political,
economic, and military sanctions which might be applied in dealing with acts of
aggression. ”In respect to each sanction, the report outlines basic considerations which
should underlie a decision of the United Nations to apply collective measures; it
considers national action’ which should be taken by cooperating states the extent to
which the coordination of national action is necessary, and the techniques and machinery
that should be established to make the imposition of a particular
sanction most effective.” It also explored the relationship between collective and regional
security arrangements and summarized the replies of the members of the UN to the
committee regarding the organizing and earmarking of United Nations units within their
armed forces.

In 1952 the Collective Measures Committee continued its analysis of the developing
situation in Korea, studied how best it could assist member states of the UN to coordinate
their efforts to implement the Assembly’s Uniting for Peace and collective security
resolutions, and considered ”the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should
have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-
security organization.” In its second report to the Assembly, I the fall of 1952, the
committee made useful suggestions on all of these important matters; but the General
Assembly `watered down the very mild recommendations proposed by its Collective
Measures Committee so as to make absolutely clear that each state would act just as it
chose in a

International Relations

that the members of the UN fulfill their obligations under Article -13 of the Charter. In it
the General Assembly recommended to the State Members
of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces
elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly- be made available.
in accordance ix ith its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or,
units, upon recommendation by the Security Council-or General Assembly. without
prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

Part four of Resolution. A established a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen

members and instructed it ”to study and make a report to the Security Council and the
General Assembly. not later than 1 September 1951, on methods which might be used to
maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the Charter.” In a final and more generl-ll section Resolution A
recognized ”that enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security
arrangements.” and urged the members of the UN to cooperate in other important ways.

Resolution B urged the Security Council to ”devise measures for the earliest application
of Articles -4 3, .15. =46, and -l7 of the Charier regarding of the Security Council by the
States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff
Committee.” Resolution C recommended that the permanent members of the Security
Council ”meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise all problems which are likely,to
threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view
to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the
spirit and letter of the Charter.”

The Uniting for Peace Resolution was a conscious effort tc develop and implement the
security provisions of the United Nations Charter. It ”«vas clearly put forward as a device
for making the Unitcd Nations a collective security system.” Since its adoption, more
attention has been given to problems of implementation than ever before: in this sense it
has indeed been a major land mark in the progress toward an effective collective security
system. The Peace Observation Committee is ready to function as needed: some of its
members have been given specific assignments. The Collective Measures Committee has
made some significant reports, which have been carefully considered by the General
Assembly exploration. The Assembly itself has passed a resolution o» collective security
as a result of its consideration of the first report of the committee. and has instructed the
committee to continue its work. Nothieig of any importance has been done to carry out
Resolutions B and C
of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

collective Security

306

A year after the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution only twenty nine states had
given even generally affirmative responses to inquiries regarding their plans for
maintaining UN units within their armed, forces: twenty two had not every deigned to
reply. Almost every one of the states expressing a willingness to implement the
recommendation simply pointed to. certain units of their armed focus which were then
engaged in overseas operations, particularly in Korea. The United States, referred to her
forces in Europe. and in Korea and tried to gloss over her evasiveness by diplomatic
double-talk: ”After termination of hostilities in Korea and after the United States forces
have been withdrawn, the extent to which the United States will maintain armed forces
which could be made available for United Nations services will be reviewed.” If any such
review, has been made since 1953, w-hen the truce in Korea entered into effect, the
results are not apparent.

4. Reports of the Collective Measures Committee.

The first report of the Collective Measures Committee, approved for submission to the
General Assembly on October 3, 1951, was a pioneer study in the sense that it constituted
the `first systematic attempt by the United Nations to study the whole field of collective
security.” It analyzed A wide variety of political, economic, and military sanctions which
might be applied in dealing with acts of aggression. ”In respect to each sanction, the
report outlines basic considerations which should underlie a decision of the United
Nations to apply collective measures: it considers national action which should be taken
by cooperating states the extent to which the coordination of national action is necessan-
and the techniques and machinery that should be established to make the impositiorr of a
particular sanction most effective.” 1t also explored the relationship between collective
and regional security arrangements and summarized the replies of the members of the UN
to the committee regarding the organizing and earmarking of United Nations units within
their armed forces.

In 1952 the Collective Measures Committee continued its analysis of the developing
situation in Korea, studied how best it could assist member states of the UN to coordinate
their efforts to implement the Assembly’s Uniting for Peace and collective security
resolutions, and considered ”the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should
have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-
security organization.” In its second
report to the Assembly, I the fall of 1952, the committee made useful suggestions on all
of these important matters; but the General Assembly `watered down the very mild
recommendations proposed by its Collective Measures Committee so as to riiake
absolutely clear that each state would act just as it chose in a

International Relations

particular situation.” Since then the committee has been largely inactive and wholly
ineffective, except perhaps in a long-range educational sense.

’S, Lessons of the Korean Experience.

In the opinion of an official of the United States Department. ”the collective effort
against aggression in Korea, the pragmatic adaptation of the Charter in the security field
by means of the ’Uniting for Peace resolution, and the more undramatic.. yet no less
significant analyses made by the Collective Measures Committee” plus, it ma.,- be added,
the continued concern of the General Assembly, the Secretariat, and other UN agencies
with the whole problem of collective, security ”represent concert progress toward a goal
which has eluded man for ever 2.000 years.” We may endorse this state-men without
sugge,~Iing that the ”concrete progress’ under UN auspices has been very great. From
the experience of collective
\’action in Korea and from our study of the efforts of the United Nations to profit fro this
experience, we can find nothing that forces us to change our original conclusion, namely
that the United Nations. by its very nature, was not. is not now, and never eau be an
effective instrument for collective secureh.

In actual fact, the operations in Korea never even remotely assumed the aspects of a
collective security effort. To be sure. in a symbolic way, and to some extent in actuality,
the action was a collective one. Besides the United States, fifteen or more member states
of the UN sent armed forces to Korea, and nearly fifty countries provided various kinds
of material assistance. More than ~sixy nations, including some not in the United
Nations, endorsed the UN’s recommendation of a strategic embargo against Commturist
China But

in spite of this brave front. Korea was primarily a Korean and American effort; the other
military units.were of small size; most member most member states of the UN cooperated
only in a token fashion an ambulance unit, a medical team, a hospital ship, and the like:
some members not only did not cooperate, but bitterly attacked all the actions of the UN
in and regarding Korea and gave active support to the forces which the UN had branded
as aggressors. Under such conditions real collective security could hardly be hoped for; it
was, in fact. impossible.
Even the most sanguine interpreters of the Korean experience could not claim much for it
beyond the fact that the action had compelled the United Nations to consider more
seriously and more realistically the whole problem of collective security. Secretary of
State Acheson, in a’1 address of June 29; 1951, declared: ”Korea’s significance is not the
~lual crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea of collective security. It is important,
perhaps. for the inverse reason that in Korea we prevented tl2c invalidation of collective
security.”

307 collective Security

Korea did ”not establish the practicability- or reality of collective security. Instead of
being a case of nations fighting `any aggressor amwhere~ and for no other purpose than
to punish aggression. and to deter potential aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act
of collective military defense against the recognized number-one enemy of the United
States and ofall the countries which associated themselves with its action.”

CHAPTER 15

DISARMAMENT, AND

ARMS CONTROL

Arms race is not a new phenomenon in international relations. It was as well a feature of
human society in medieval times. However, at that time arms race was not as consistent a
feature as at present. It was resorted to only at the time of acute tension among the
nations. As and when the tension subsided the arms race also came to halt. Further, at that
time the race for armaments was quantitative and states preferred~to acquire more and
more armaments. But with the advancement of technology the arms became more
sophisticated. With this emphasis of arms race shifted from quantity to quality, viz, the
states started acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons. In fact after the Second
Word War there was a mad race between Soviet Union and United States of America to
outwit each other in the acquisition and development of more and more sophisticated
weapons.

In modern times the arms race can be traced back to the late sixties of the nineteenth
when Bismarck, the iron Chancellor of Germany. started the system of conscription and
tried to make Germany a world power. The spirit of intense rivalry and competitipn
among the French and the English also contributed largely to this race. This race assumed
serious dimensions during the period between 1884 and 1914 because, as Prof. Philip
Noel-Baker has put it armaments produce fear, and far produces more armaments, with
disastrous results for the national security of all people concerned.” Both France and
England were highly suspicious of each and tried to strength their respective positions by
acquiring more and

Disarmament
more arms. The situation was
further aggravated in the fiat decade of the twentieth century when Japan, in the wake of
her victory over Russia in 1904-5. also jumped into the fray. During this period not only
arms were produced in large quantities out improvement was also effected in their
quality. This process continued till the outbreak of First World War on 1914. During this
period more sophisticated weapons, warships, submarines fighter planes, bombers, tacks,
poisonous gas and arms of

various other varieties were discovered and perfected. It may be noted that although all
the powers claimed they were piling up the arms for their defence and preservation of
peace, this created a sense of fear, suspicion and hatred among the nations and ultimately
culminated in the First World War.

Arms Race after First World War:

Theularge scale destruction of the First World War encouraged

seine of the powers to think in terms of putting stop to the arms race. In 1922 U.S.A.
convened the Washington Naval Conference with a view to limit the tonnage and gun
power of the various naval powers. The Temporary Mixed Commission (1920-2-k), set
up by the Assembly of the League, tried to fix the strength of the land forces of the
various countries in accordance with their national needs. However, its efforts did not
prove fruitful. Yet another serious effort to check the armament race was made by

the World disarmament Conference but without any success. After the failure of these
efforts among the various powers. Sweden’’ increased her x defence expenditure from
125 million crooners in 1932 to 29> >nillion crooners in 1939. Brazil and Argentina
increased their p!Agels’ two and

a half time. Even the countries of British Common wealth tooky.part in the armament
race and spent huge amounts on increasing thei power. On the other hand Germany and
her allies not only multiplied dhcir arms and weaponry but also tried to make it more and
more sophisticated., This made. ,

race for armaments ended in -Second World W„r with more serious consequences than
that of the First World War.’

Arms Race after Second World War:’

The enormous destruction caused by the Second World War could

not act as a deterrent and put an end of further race for armaments. On the-other hand in
the Post World War a more acute arms race began between the two superpowers namely
Soviet Union end U.S.A. This race was further sharpened by the ideological differences
between the uvo’. The other powers were, however, pushed out of this race because they
were completely shattered as a result of destruction caused by the Second World War 1n
the post World War II period these super-powers
tried to increase their influence in the international sphere not only by increasing their
armaments and military strength but also by concluding military alliances.

310

lntematlonal Relations

The armament race now became more qualitative due to tcchrologi:al advancement.
There was a complete technological revolution in the art of war. New nuclear weapons
were invented and the existing ones greatly perfected. Some of the new weapons which
were invented or perfected including satellites, L.C.B.Ms, Titan, Polaris, Mirmtement
and a variety of space and thereto-nuclear weapons. .

As a result of arms race. in our times the dangers of nuclear war have greatly increased.
There is a growing realization amongst the world statesmen to put a halt to this road race
and to evolve some mechanism so that the peace of the world is not threatened. This was
sough to be achieved through disarmament and arms control.

Disarmament

The history of disarmament can be traced back to the Treat’ of Westphalia in 1648. The
treaty stipulated that all existing fortifications be demolished and no new fortifications be
created. However. the first systematic proposal for the reduction of armaments was
mooted by Czar of Russia in 1816 when he proposed to the British Government the
reduction of all types of armed forces. However, these proposal were not seriously
received and failed to produce any impact. In the years 1863 and 1869 France also
submitted certain proposals for the reduction of armaments to the Great Power but they
also met the fate of the proposals submitted by the Russian Czar. Other powers like
Britain (1870) and Italy (1877) also initiated steps to put a stop to armament race but
without any success.

The most systematic effort to reduce the armament was made by Tsar of Russian in 1898
when he addressed a note to the various powers of Europe to meet at Hague and work out
a scheme for reduction of arms. These proposals received warm response and resulted in
the First Hague Peace Conference. This Conference was attended by 28 states. The
Conference appointed a Committee of military and naval experts to study the problem of
arms control. However, the Committee expressed the opinion that the time was not
mature for an agreement on arms limitation. The next Conference held in 1907 also
initiated. proposals for the reduction of arms and expenditure on military forces; but this
also did not find favour with the powers. Thus both the Hague Conferences failed to
solve the problem of arms race.

Disarmament after. First World War:

The devastation caused by the First World War greatly stirred the conscience of mankind
and the statesmen
of the world started giving serious though to the need of abolition of arms and
ammunition. President Wilsona in one of his Fourteen Points insisted that armament
should be reduced to ”the lowest point, consistentwith domestic safev.” The Treaty

312
Disarmament

o_ which established. peace after World War I specificalh provided that `the maintenance
of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with
national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” The
seriousness of the World statesmen to regulate arms is evident from the fact that the
charged the League of Nations ,with the duty of securing an agreement on the general
disarmament. To facilitate the task of the League it was provided in the Covenant that the
membership of the League shall he available only to those countries who were willing to
accept arms regulation proposed by the League. A Permanent advisory Committee was
yet up to formulate a programme for education of arms. But as this Committee was
mainly composed of military representatives, if failed to make much progress in the
direction of disarmament.

Temporary Mixefl Commission:

Iri 1920 the Assembly of the League urged the Council to appoint a new Commission.
Accordingly, in 1921 the Council created the Temporary Mixed Commission, containing
majority of the civilians as its

members. The Commission during its life of four yearsmade efforts to secure
disarmament through fixation of land forces of the various countries, according.to their
national needs. and limited the navel

armaments of the great naval powers. For the attainment of the same objective it also
proposed ’international aid to the victims of aggression,’ and compulsory arbitration.
However, all these proposals of the Temporay

Mired Commission were turned down by the states ’and it failed to accomplish anything.

Preparatory -Commission and Genera Conference:

In 192 the League set up the Preparatory Commission and. entrusted,it with the
responsibility of preparing a provisional draft treaty

concerning various questions of di.sa>;mainent..The Commission afte_ a hard work of

six years completed the draft of a treaty which was considered by the Geneva Conference
in .1’932. Sixty one states. including five non-members of the League, discussed the
”Draft Convention on Reduction and Limitation of Armaments’ submitted by the
Preparatow Commission. The discussions continued for nearly two years. Despite serious
differences the members, agreed to the reed of arms limitation, international, supervision
of arms business and publicity of arms budget. However, these efforts were greatly
jeopardised
by the changed international situation. Japanese attack

on Manchuria and reluctance of Germany to follow the restrictions regarding

disarmament imposed by the Treat’ of Versailles made

disarmament impossible. In 1933 Germany formally withdrew from the Disarmament

Conference. With this the efforts at disarmament came to end.

international Relations

Efforts outside the Lebgue:

Outside the League also efforts to control the arms and secure disarmament were
made:,In 1912-22 at the Washington Conference the five major powers (Britain, U.S.A.
France, Japan and Italy) agreed to f,-their respective naval strength. They made an effort
to come to some understanding regarding cruisers, submarines, destroyers and aircraft’s
but could not succeed. As the treaty remained ungratified the understanding automatically
lapsed. In 1927 a Conference was held at Geneva which ended in failure because two
major powers France and Italy did not participate in it and certain differences cropped up
between British and U.S.A. In 1930 the representatives of the five major powers (Britain.
U.S.A. Japan, France and Italy) met at London to effect naval disarmament. But this
Conference also ended in failure. In 1935-3t anooer naval conference was convened at
London which met the fate of its predecessors. In 1935 Britain reached an agreement
with Germany by which she conceded to Germany the right to increase her battleships by
35 per cent of the British naval power and build ships of various types. This was done
purely with a view to protect her interests against possible German aggression.

The efforts at disarmament in the inter-war period both through the League of the Nations
and outside failed to achieve anything substantial. In fact almost all the states were
interested in strengthening their respective positions rather than reducing the weapons.
The failure of the League to deal effectively with states like Japan, Italy and Germany
who resorted to arms in violation of their obiigati,pn under the Covenant made the states
lake warm in their support to the proposals of disarmament. They were convinced that
they could not rely on the League for their security- and had to raise their own forces to
meet any unforeseen eventually. Some of the other factors w trich obstructed the progress
of disarmament were differences among the members of the Disarmament Conference on
various issues, the difficult’ in arriving at an accepted distinction between the aggressive
and defensive weapons. Above all the failure was due to the fact that the statesmen failed
to focus attention on the economic. psychological and political conditions
prevailing in various corurtries. In the presence of mutual distrust and suspicion, fear and
hatred all around disarmament could :rot be possible.

Disarmament After World War II

The enormous destruction caused by the Second World War roused the conscience of the
world statesmen. Fearing that another mar may completely wipe out the human race they
started making more frantic efforts to regulate the armaments. The UN Charter also laid
great emphasis on the rceullan of armaments. At least three of its articles were devoted

Disarmament

to this problem. Article Il (1) while directing the General Assembly to consider the
general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
authorised it tQ make recommendations to the members states regarding the general
principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments, Article 26 likewise
insisted that international peace and order should be promoted with ”least diversion for
armaments of the world human and economic resbiirces.” It entrusted the Security
Council with the responsibility bf formulating a plan for the regulation of armaments.
Article 47 (1) provided for the establishment of Military Staff Committee, which among
other things was to assist the Security Council on the regulation of armaments and
possible disarmament. However, U.N. Chapter did not vest any specific authority on any
of its organs to impose a system of disarmament or regulation of armaments among
members. In view of this lacuna Prof. Eichelberger has asserted that the obligations under
the Covenant of the League were more positive and possessed greater binding force.

1. Atomic Energy Commission:

Soon after the adoption of the UN Charter the Atom Bomb was exploded on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in Japan. The untold suffering caused by the bombardment of these two
towns of Japan led to a widespread demand for the devising a system of control to
prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and use for humanitarian and
peaceful purposes. Accordingly on 26 January 1946 the General Assembly decided to set
up an Atomic Energy Commission consisting of all the permanent members of Security
Council and Canada. The Commission was expected to enquire into all aspects of the
problem and make recommendations with specific proposals for (a) extending between
all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends: (b) control of
atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) the
elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction; and (d) effective safeguards
by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of
violations and evasions.” The Commission was subordinate to the Security Council and
was expected to submit its reports and recommendations to it. It is note worthy that in the
establishment of this Commission both the superpowers offered their co-operation.

. At the very first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946
differences cropped up between the two major powers. Mr. Baruch of U.S.A presented a
plan in which he insisted on managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy
activities potentially, dangerous to Nvorld security: power to control, inspect and license
all other atomic

International Relations 3I

activities; fostering beneficial use of atomic energy: and research and development of
responsibilities of an affirmative nature. He also offered to destroy all atom bombs of
U.S.A. and to stop their further manufacture after an adequate system of international
control had been established. In short, Baruch Plan insisted on tight international control
of all aspects of the use of atomic energy and a certain punishment ,for violations.
According to Collart. The Baruch Plan was uniquely significant because `it came from
the only country which had atomic weapons at that time. it aimed at submitting the
prod>lction. development and application of nuclear energy to a very extensive system of
international administration.”

As at that time Soviet Union had not tested nuclear weapons she was reluctant to support
any- agreement that would preclude, Soviet development of nuclear capacity. Therefore.
at the second meeting of the Commission on 19 June 1946 she submitted two proposals.
In her first proposal Soviet Union suggested the prohibition of the production and
employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass
destruction, prohibition of production and storing of weapons based on use of atomic
energy and destruction of all atomic weapons within three months of the convention. She
suggested that the violation of this should be treated as an international crime. In the
second proposal Soviet Union suggested the establishment of two committees concerned
with exchange of scientific information and making of recommendations for the
prevention of the use of atomic energy respectively.

A comparison of the proposals submitted by Soviet Union and U.S.A shows that while
U.S.A. insisted on effective international control and inspection before the abolition of
atomic weapons. Soviet Union insisted on first outlawing the atomic weapons and their
destruction. She argued that subsequently an appropriate inspection
system. could be evolved. The main plea taken by the Soviet Union against international
inspection was that it violated the sovereign rights of the states. In view of this divergent
stand of the two superpowers the Atomic Energy Commission could not accomplish
anything.

2. Commission on Conventional Armaments:

In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of December 19-46, the Security

Council set up a Commission on Conventional Armaments in February 19-17. The
Conwission was expected to prepaic and submit to the Council within three months
proposals for ”the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces;” and
to suggest practical and effective safeguards. It may be noted that atomic weapons and
their control. The Commission held its first meeting on 2=1 March, 1947 and finally
adopted a resolution on 12 August, 1948. In this resolution the Commission
recommended (a) a system for the regulation and reduction of

p;sarmament

armaments of all states; initially only those having substantial military resources: (b)
measures for reduction and deregulation of armaments to encourage further regulation
and reduction; (c) the establishment of an adequate system of international control of
atomic energy and conclusion of peace settlement with Japan and Germany: (d)
regulation and reduction of armament to make possible tile least diversion for armaments
of the world human and economic resources and maintenance of armaments and armed
forces which are indispensable for the maintenance of international peace and security;
and (e) adequate method of safeguards and provisions for effective enforcement action in
case of violation.
When the resolution came up for discussion before the Assembly, the Soviet Union
strongly opposed it. She came forward with a new proposal requiring all the permanent
members of the Security Council to reduce their land, naval and air forces by one third
during one year and establishment of a control body within the framework of the Security
Council to supervise the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic

weapons. However, the Russian proposal was rejected by the Western nations. In view of
the differences the Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Commission for
Conventional Armaments to continue its work and formulate proposals for the receipt,
checking and publication by

international organ of control of full information to be supplied by members states with

regard to their conventional armaments. However, the Soviet Union refused to co-operate
with the Commission. Ultimately, Soviet Union withdrew from both the Commissions
(Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments)
in 1950 on the question of the representation of Red China on it.

Disarmament Commission:
The failure of these two Commission did not deter the world

leaders and they continued their efforts to regulate the armaments. On the suggestion of
the American President Truman that the two Disarmament

yC * ion should be merged, the General Assembly set up a

Committee
irurl, ’ss I
T N elve members (11 members of Security Council and Canada) to
report the ways and means whereby the work of the two commissions could

be combined. The Committee . recommended the merger of the two

Commissions. Its recommendations were accepted by the General
Assembly .and a Disarmament Commission was created on I 1 January
of all the members of the Security Council plus

1952. It was to consist

Canada. In 1957 the General Assembly increased the strength of the
Disarmament Commission to 14. In 1958 all the members of the U.N. were
included as its members. The Commission was requested to prepare a draft

treaty for the regulation of conventional as well as atomic armaments. The

Commission took up a number of issues concerning arms and their

international Relations 317

reduction but failed to make much headway because of the divergence of views among
the superpowers. To resolve these differences in 1953 the General Assembly set up a
Great. Power Sub-Committee. This Committee considerably succeeded in narrowing
down the area of disagreement, although the two powers continued to hold opposite
views on the question of controls.

Atoms for Peace Plan (1953): . .

In 1953 President Eisenhower of USA came out with a new plan for peaceful use of
atoms. He suggested the establishment of an international pool of fissionable materials to
be used for peaceful purposes. This plan popular known as Atoms for Peace Plan
contribute the same to the Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations. The
Commission was to ensure that these materials were used for peaceful purposes and for
the promotion of international please and security. This plan was also turned down by
Soviet Union who insisted on prior agreement on prohibition of atomic weapons.

Anglo-French Plan (1954):

In June 1954 Britain and France took an initiative and submitted a memorandum
outlining a comprehensive plan for disarmament. TISe memorandum outlined three
phases of disarmament. During the first phase a control organ was to be set up and the
military expenditure and manpower of the members states was to be frozen at specific
levels. During the second phase, after the establishment of control organ, first half of the
’hgreed reduction of armed forces, conventional weapons and militarN
expenditure was to be carried out. Further manufacture of nuclear weapons was also to be
stopped at this stage. The third and the final stage envisaged the second half of the agreed
reduction and total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Though initially
Soviet Union rejected the proposal but subsequently in September 1954 she
communicated her willingness to the General Assembly to accept - the Anglo-French
Memorandum as a basis for the step by step approach to the nucicar problem. Thus it
looked that the plan would be able to make mach headway. However, in March April
1955 Soviet Union reverted to its earlier position.

Soviet Proposal of MT v 1955:

In May 1955 Soviet Union suddenly submitted row propos”l which was quite identical to
the Anglo-French Memorandum in so far as it accepted the same force levels. However,
this proposal was quite distastefll to U.S.A because in insisted on dismantling of all
United States oversees bases and a ban on nuclear tcsts. Though the proposal fell down, ’t

’` 318

pisarmament

certainly contributed to the spirit of detente and paved the way for the Geneva Summit of
1955.

The Geneva Summit and Open Skies Plan:

In July 1955 the chiefs of state from France, U.K. USA arid USSR met at Geneva to
discuss among others the problem of disarmament. At this meeting U.S.A proposed the
open skies’ plan. Under the plan both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R were to exchange military
information which could be verified by mutual aerial reconnaissance. Soviet Union was
prepared to accept the proposal regarding exchange of military blue prints, supervision

of military because and prohibition of atomic armaments, provided her proposals

regarding reduction of armaments (which she had earlier submitted) were accepted.
However, Russia did not feel convinced as to how inspection of the concealed nuclear
weapons shall be Security Council’s decisions and hence veto of the permanent Members
of the
Security Council. As these conditions were not acceptable to U.S.A. the plan fell.

Six Point Plan of USA (1957):

In 1957 the US. representative Henry Cabot Lodge proposed

another plan before the General Assembly indicating American’s willingness to take
steps towards arms reduction subject to adequate inspection. The basis objective of the
plan was to check the trend towards
large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and reduce the further nuclear threat; provision
against surprise attack lessening of the economic burden due to armaments and utilistion
of the money thus saved for the improvement of the living standards reduction of political
tension among nations and to help in settlement of political issues; and devotion of
research and development
activities concerning propulsion of objects through outer space for peaceful purposes.
The plan envisaged the establishment of inspection posts at strategic points in the eastern
half of United States and western boarder regions of Russia. After a favourable initial
response Soviet Union turned down the plan.

However, In November 1957 the General Assembly endorsed these proposals and
insisted on (a) immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt
installation of effective international control; (b) cession of production of fissionable
materials for purposes of weapons

and its future utilisation for peaceful purposes; (e) reduction of stock of nuclear weapons
through a programme of transfer of stocks of fissionable

materials for peaceful purposes; (d) reduction of armed forces and armaments with
adequate safeguards; (c) progressive establishment of open

inspection to guard against the possibility of surprise attack; and (f1

establishment to ensure that the sending of objects
through outer

of an inspection s~°stem space was exclusively for peaceful scientific purpose.

Gnternational Relations

The same years the General Assembly also adopted two others resolutions emphaising
the need of an accord on disarmament and enlargement of the Disarmament COntmrsslon
by addition of fourteen members. Soviet Union, however, insisted that all the UN
members should be included in the Disarmament Commissions. As her proposal was not
accepted she announced her withdrawal from the Disarmament Commission and its sub-
Committees.

Nuclear Test Ban:

Encouraged by the announcement of Soviet Union in March 198 regarding a unilateral

ban on tests of atom and hydrogen bombs, there nuclear powers U.S.A. U.S.S.R and
Britain held a Conference at Geneva from October 1958 to April 1961. After long
deliberations the three powers agreed to suspend forth with all tests in the earth’s
atmosphere in outer space, in ocean and underground. This was to be ensured through a
world wide detective system to be operated by a single neutral administrator and an
international staff. However, Soviet Union, in violation of this agreement went ahead
with the explosion of Megaton Bomb. This provoked U.S.A. to declare that she would
also go ahead with similar explosion. As a result the progress made in the direction of
securing nuclear test ban at the Geneva Conference was watered down.

Antarctic Treaty (199):

In 1959 the Antarctic Treat- was signed which provided for demilitarization of
Antarctica. This treat- for the fast time put in practice the concept of nuclear weapon free
zone, in so far as it prohibited in the Antarctic region all military maneuvers,
weapon tests, building of installations or disposal of radioactive wastes produced by
military- activity.

Ten Nations Disarmament Conference (1960): In 1960 ten nations five from each block
(U.S.A. U.K. Canada, France and Italy from Western bloc and Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria from the Communist bloc) met at Geneva and made
another serious bid to secure disarmament. As a result of prolonged deliberations the
differences between the rival camps were considerably narrowed down. The Soviet
Union went to the extent of announcing that she was willing to prohibit atomic weapons
and even offered to destroy the atomic and hydrogen bomb, if the western powers
reciprocated. She proposed a. four years plan of complete disarmament spread over three
phases. During the fast phase the forces of the powers were to be reduced. During the
second stage the forces of all states were to be dissolved and militarv bases demolished.
At the final stage all the nuclear weapons were to be destroyed. The Western nations did
not respond favourably to the Soviet Plan and came forward ~.vith their own plan on 15
March 1960 suggesting publication of data before the release of atom bomb or missiles
formation of central

Disarmament org sation for collection of data relating to army, nay and air force of all the
countries, system of verification of information supplied by different states: assessment
of military budgets of different countries; installation of the system for controlling outer
space: advance notification of launching of long range missiles; prohibition of certain
specified missiles materials and use of the materials for non-military purposes; institution
of proper system of imprecision to prevent production of armaments security and
provision of adequate measures to ward against surprise attacks. This plan was not
acceptable to the Soviet Union and her allies. As a result a stalemate was reached and
finally the Soviet Union and her allies walked out of the Conference. With the
Conference came to an abrupt end.

Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference (195:,’):

In 1962 another conference was held at Geneva which is popularly known as Eighteen
Nations Disarmament Conference. Actually in this conference only seventeen nations
took part. Almost at the important powers, with the exception of France, were present in
this Conference. At this Conference also separate plans were submitted by U.S.A and
Soviet Union. In is plan U.S.A. proposed a cut of thirty per cent in the nuclear delivery
vehicles and major conventional armaments, within three years. It also proposed a ban on
the production of
the nuclear weapons. On the other hand Soviet IJnwn insisted on general and complete
disarmament within four years under strict international control. According to the Soviet
Plan this was to be accomplished in three stages beginning with the destruction of all
means of deliven~ of nuclear weapons and elimination of all International Commission of
Scientists to process the data received from the observation posts and to report on all
nuclear explosions. The Eighteen Nations Conference also could not accomplish anything
and faltered over the issues of verification.

320

Linuted Test Ban Treaty (1963):

In June 1966 President Kennedy emphasized the need for a nuclear test ban treat’. The
proposal received favourable response from Soviet Union and culminated in the Test ban
”prohibited the states from carving out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control wit (a) in the atmosphere
beyond its limits, including outer space or under water including territorial waters or high
seas; (b) m any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such
explosion is conducted.” Though initially the treat- was concluded by the three Nuclear
Powers U.S.A. U.S.S.R and U.K it was made open to all the states.

It may be observed that the treaty made on provision for control through parts, spot
inspection or international bodies. If merely prohibited

,*

Int®mational Relations 321

those tests which could be detected made no effort to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. In
fact both China and France (the other nuclear powers) refused to sign the treaty because it
did not insist on the destruction of nuclear stockpiles of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R The decision
of China and France to keep out greatly copardised the attempt at disarmament.

In 196=4 China went ahead with her first atom bomb explosion which healthy stirred the
General Assembly and it decided to convene a Conference of the five nuclear powers. In
November 1965 it adopted a resolution urging all the nation to suspend all tests of
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. It even sought to extend the ban to the underground
tests which were permitted modern the Moscow Treaty of 1963. However U.S.A and UX
refused to comply with the General Assembly resolution unless a guarantee was provided
against similar explosions by other states.

Severn Point Plan (1966):

Seven Point Plan was presented by President Johnson of U.S.A at the Geneva Conference
in February 1966. This Plan called for a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear activities. It suggested the strengthening of the international
security organisation and the establishment of a system of inspection. It gave a call for
freezing all ”offensive and defensive” strategic bombers and missiles designed to earn -
powers weapons. However, the plan was not favourably received by other powers and
was abandoned. The progress of disarmament suffered a further setback following
nuclear tests by France.

Outer Space Treaty of 1967:

This treaty laid down the principles governing peaceful activities of the states in outer
space and prohibited nuclear weapons and their landing on the moon and other celestial
bodies for military bases. The treaty was formally signed on 27 Januay. 1967 and came
into force on 10 October, 1967. Under the treaty the signatoy states agreed not to place in
orbit around the earth any objectives carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction. It also forbade the use of militay personnel for scientific research for
peaceful purposes. It was agreed that all stations installations equipment and space
vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to the representatives of
other States parties to the Treaty, on the basis of reciprocity. The treaty was thrown open
to other states for signature, who could accede to it.

Treat.), of Tlatelaco 1967:

. In 196’, the Tlatelolco Treaty was concluded by Mexico and El Salvador at Mexico.
which prohibited tile testing. use. manufacture. production or acquisition by any means.
as well as receipt. storage.

Disarmament

;nstallatlon. development and any form of possession of nuclear wc;lpons ;n Latin

America. Under tile Additional Protoco ll, the nuclear weapon states Undertook to
respect the statute of military denuclearisation of Latin AnrericT and not to contribute to
acts involving a violation of the Treaty. nor to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
against the parties to the treat’. hfowevcr. tile treaty permitted the explosions of nuclear
devices for pcac$ful purposes.

(’anfererrcc qf’Non-Nrrclear Weapon Statec (19(8):

In August Scpicmber 1968 a Conference of the Non-Nuclear \Vcapon States was held at
Geneva at the initiative of the General Asscmblo. The Conference was attended by 96
states including tile four nucleyr poucrs- U.S.A.. U.S.S.R. France and U.K. The
Conference in all adopted fourteen resolutions and declarations concerning four subjects.
vin. security of tile non-nuclear weapon states.. establishment of nuclear weapons free
cones. effective measures for prevention of proliferation of ,nuclear weapons and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to tile
security of tile non-ntlelear \1ea11)o11S states, the Conference reaffirmed the

principle of non-use or threat of use of force between states. It asserted drat every state
lord right to cdualits. sovercignO. territorial ihcgriy, non-,intel-\ cntion in internal affairs.
collcctivc defence. etc.

With regard to tile cstablishntent of tile nuclear weapon fan: cones. the Conference
recomntendcd that the non-nuclear weapons stam~,

should examine tile possibility and desirability of establishing mili(;m. clcnuclcarisatiolt

of their respcclivc zones.

On the question of effective means for tile prevention of do proliferation of nuclear

weapons. tile cession of tile nuclear arms race :ilul nuclear, disarntanrent. the Conference
reconinrended to rite General Assenlblv to ur`.;c the Eiglucen ’Nations Disarntanlcnt
Conuuittce to

unclcrlal:e ncgotialions for prevention of further dcvclopntcnt and yorovenlent of nuclear

\\e,lpons. reduction and subsequent elimination of ;111 stock piles of nuclear \\eapons
conclusion of
trc;m. etc.

On tire issue of peacelill uses of energy tile Conference fivoured tile idea of examining
possibility of establishing an international frnanced Shecial \’uclcar Fund. w loch could
give grants and loans at lox rates to

lin;lltcc such nuclear project in the non-nuclear stales. These Irconinicndations of tile
Conference were accepted by the General Asseniblv and it re<lllested tire courerlcd
international bodies like JAEA. II;Rf~ arid UNDP to take action for tile implementation
of these -OIIIIIICIICI,ltlolls

comprehensive test,-ban-

International Relations

Non Proliferation Trcutt~ (19<8):

The treaty oil Non-Prolifcr<ttiott of Nuclear Weapons N~a;

SI111t111anCOliSlw signed at London., MoscoN\ and Washin~ton July 1`)6altd
actually came into force on March 1970. The Treat\. based oft tile draft
submitted bw tile Seventeen Nation DISilrnlaltlCttl Conunit(cc prohibited tile
transfer by nuclear weapon states to am recipient \whatsoewer erf nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over them. The
signatory states were nbt to encourage or indilcc am non-nuclear weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear \Neapons or other
explosive deices or control over such \\eapons or explosive devices. The
 non-nuclear states acceding to the treaty wrre also not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear Nwcapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Ho\wecer. the treat\ granted the right to the members states to develop
research. Itproduclion and use of nuclear energy _ for peaceful purposes
v
ni ~_
I
t
1.
cn without discrimination. The sionatorv st,.ucs were to conduct I_0 t good faith
regarding effcctk c ntcastllcs to put .In cltcl to tile
Inl,acar awts race at an early date and to make efforts to acltlewe ;~cltct;ll and
l
complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective interlrttloltal control.

The treaty was significant in so far it unposed an obligation on tile nuclear and non-
nuclear states to abstain from expanding nuclear weapons. Hovwevcr it left the issue of
inspection and control nnresolwcd.

Disarmament I)ecucle:

Despite itttport<tltt agrecrttcltts for lilttitatton and re`.;tlhttiotl of armaments. global

expenditure on inns and armies continued to utount and the limited human and ntaterial
resources. N\ hich could be N\ ell ntiliscil for de\’clop111C111. continued to be fruited
a\\a\. To check this trend in 1969 ttile General Asserttblw decided to obscr\c I9?tt’s :IS
the Dls;trltl<tltlcltt Decade. It urged tile gowernnlenl to intcnsik efforts to stop nuclear
arms race and eliminate \\Capons of mass destruction. In 1976 the Assentbt\ felt unhappy
over the meager achieN elnettts of the Decade and decided to hold a special session on
disarntantcltt to I`)?~,
-

Sea-Bed Treat), of 1971:

In Februar 1971 the trcat\ on tile proltlhitioll of tile enlplacclllcllt of nuclear \\capons ,tad
other N\capons of nl;l» destruction on tile
~cahccl

alld tile ocean floor and in tile subsoil tllercol. Nt;t5 con,andccl h\
l’ h

l.S..A and Sdwict Union The treaty actnalk ~:ontc into Force Oil I~ \1,1~
1972. The treaty provided that the si,.~.nator\ states Xwuld not ~nlpl;lnt or

cmPlowcc on the seabed and the ocean floor ,tad ill the sub-soil tllcrcol
.

bewond tile outer limit of a sea-bed zone ll2miles) am nuclear wcnpol’ °r am other type
of weapons of mass destruction a” tell a~ ~tnt~tur~•.

p;sarmament
1,111Ilchutg installations or in\- other facilities specifically designed for storing. testing
or using such weapons. The member stairs x\crc not to ,ISslst. encourage or participate in
om.actions in am- other way. To ensure tllnt the term of the treaty were being complied
with by ;111 the signator ,fates. the members vwere given the right to verify Htt’arILII
obser\atioll tile ,Ijivities~of other state. provided such an act did ’not interfere with such
activities measures to prevent an arms race on the seabed. tile ocean floor arid tile sub-
soil.
Biok,ieul Weapons Convention(1972):

An effort to check the use of bacteriological and chemical wc;lpons yas made in 1972 by
signing the Coliwcntion on the Prohibition of tile Dewelopmeat. Production and
Stockpililtl• of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction”. Tile C’onwcption signed on lU April 1972 at London. Moscow and
Washington, ,IC.t.l,lllw come into force on 26 March 1 97. . The convention impressed
tile need of achieving
effective progress towards general and complete disarmantcnt. including the prohibition
and climinatiop of all Opcs of weapons of mass destruction. It held that the prohibition of
dcmlopntent. production and stockpiling, of chemical and bacteriological weapons and
their elimination will facilitate tile achiewcntent of the objective of complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control. The signatoy states agreed
not to develop. produce. stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents or toxin vweapons equipntenl of tateans of delivery designed to use
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. They were to either
destrow or divert to peaceful purpose vwithin nine months of the ettiforcemcnt of
Convention. all agents toxins. weapons. equipment and means of dcliwcrw. The\ were
also not to encourage or assist ,in\- state or organisation. of states to manufacture or
otherwise acquire am_ of the above agents etc. If a signatory to the Convention found the
other signator- with the Securitw Council. Thereafter, tile other members were obliged to
corporate vwith the Security Council in carrying out investigations. The also agreed to
continue negotiations to reach an early figreement on effective measures for tile
prohibition of their development. production ind stockpiling

•S’trutegic Arms Limitation an cl.S’ult (1972):

Simultaneous attention vwas also paid to the limitation of tile strategic arms vwith a view
to achieve disarmatitent. The W -o super powers U.S.A. and USSR held prolonged
negotiations at Geneva and-Iinallw ~Il4ICCd to uteet at Helsinki. This \%as indeed a
significant step in the dilation of disarmament because the Uwo povwers agreed in
principle to ’~’tt tm and put, a stop to the fierce contpclition for tlic acquisition of S,
’I’t~:icatcd NA-capons. Though the tails did not prove fruitful they

International Relations

indicated the willingness of the two super powers to reduce armament and other hazards
;without jeopardising their security and prestige, The negotiations continued for nearly
four years before the cor!ch4ion, of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treat- of 1972. it is
said that the two countries held as man as 127 plenary meetings before the conclusion of
the above treaty. ’

The Salt (Strategic Arms Limitations Treat.)):

Was formalhv signed on 26 May 1972 ;with a yic;; to curb the race in nuclear arms
bet;veen the two super po;vers. Ill’ fact. the. agreclvtent broadly arms bet;;-een the two
super po;vers. III fact, tile agreement broadh consisted of two separate treaties. viz. Treat
on the Limitations of Anti-consisted
Missile System and the Interim Agrecqlcnt on Certain Mc~lsllrcs with respect to the.
Limitation of the Strategic Offensi;e Arms. While the former was concluded for art
unlimited period, the latter was of five-;cars duration.

The Ai!ti-Ballistic Missile SNstcm Treaty permitted the Mo super po;;crs to have only
two sites. for ballistic missile defcnccs. one for tile protection of their national capital
area and the other for tile protection of the field of ICB Ms. The treat; also laid’ don!
details regarding the dimensions of the ABM system the t;vo countries ;;ere to 1!a;e.
Each system ;vas to have not more than six ABM launchers and IUtI ABM il!tereeptor
missiles at launching sitef. The national capital area ;vas not to I!~IVc more than 133
ABM radaf complexes. each with a diameter not c\cecding 3 kilometers. The complex
around the Missiles launching region ;;as not to have more than 18 ABM radar’s.and two
large phased ABM rackrr’s. The mo po;;ers also agreed not to develop. test or deplo\
:ABM If!Und!Crs;;l!icl! coujd launch more than one interceptor missiles at a lir!!c. The
tre:rtv 4Ilso prohibited the-testing and development of automatic. senu-murorn !tic or
other similar systems for rapid reloading of ABM launchers. The mo po;;crs ;;ere
permitted to lnoderr)ise their ABM s.-sicrns through rel)laccrnent. bill this ;;as to be done
stricllv ;within the quantitative ceiling pi-ON rdccI under tile treat%.

’File interim Agreement ;vitl! regard to the Limitation of the

Strategic Offensive Arms was a ;cry complex agreen!eht. it coNercd boll! kind based
ICBMs arid submarine launched ballistic missiles. Tile strcl!btl’ of ICBi%ls for Soviet
Union and U.S.A. ;vas fixed at 1618 and It
rcspectivcl;. vii.. on tile basis of their actual strengths oil I Jill;- 1971. The Mo po;;crs
undertook not to convert their land based launches into HvOW ICBMs The f;;Q powers
;;ere permitted to undertake.tnoderr!izatior! ~!’!~I

replace their `strategic Offensive Arms. but they had to scrupulously folio’\ the numerical
limits prescribed by the treaty. An agreement rcgardin the
procedure of agreement ;vas also reached bct;;ccn the m-o po;\crs. o

325

_pisarmament
US oviet Accord on Limitation ofArnls (1973):

A further accord for checking the armament race ;vas reached bet;veen U.S.A. and Soviet
Union limitation of nuclear weapons by the end of 197-1. They emphasized that an effort
by either of the two powers to obtain a nuclear advantage would be inconsistent with the
peaceful relations between the two countries. They agreed to adequate verification
measures. Tlie significance of this accord ivies in-the fact that it made an effort to control
nuclear fission as well
as research on the fundamental properties of physical matter.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (T7BT) 197=1:

This Treaty was signed by Uniicd States ilnd USSR on I July 1974 and proposed a ban on
carving out of underground nuclear ;weapon tests having a yield of more than 150
kilotons. The two parties also pledged to limit the. number of their underground weapon
tests to :! li!In11nW111. Ho;sever; the treaty could not come`inlo force due to non-
ratification by the US. Senate.

VS-Soviet Arms Pact 197=1:

Further progress in the direction of disarmament was made in 1111v 197-1 phen U.S.A
and Soviet Union signed a 10 year pact. stipulating not only the limitation of the
offensive nuclear vacapons but also the stoppage of ail underground tests of more than
IsU kilotons. New limits of missile defence ’systems were agreed by the countries. But
probably the nmst significant feature of this agreement veils that a formal understanding
was reached by the two countries to permit each obsewer to ensure that the terms.of the
agreement were being compiled with. The same year in November the two countries
concluded another agreement regarding limiting of nuclear arsenals. It was decided that
the nuclear arsenals of the two countries shai6bc equal to overall number of delivewi
vehicles. The new treat also incorporated the relevant provisions of the existing interim
treaty also incorporated the relevant provisions of the existing interim agreement which
was due to expire in 1977.

The PeacefullVclcleurExplo,doll 7reclth(PNF.T) 1976:

This treaty was signed by United States and Soviet Union on ?8 Mt!s 1976. but could not
come into force due to non ratification be: the U.S. Scltate. Despite this both the parties
pledged to obsen-e the main provisions
of the treaty. Till end of December the PNET had not formally come into
force ~’

_International flelatitbns

h’iua! .1 ct of the Conference of Se’curith and C -operation in Europe:

Ill Jul\-August. 197-i U.S.A U.K. Sovict Union and a number of olltcr European states
held a conference ill Helsinki with a number of other European states held a conference
at Helsinki with a vic~\ to find out tile means for strengthening peace and security of the
world. After due deliberations they signed the final act of conference of securit- and co-
operation in Europe Oil 1 August 1975. Under this act the signatory states agreed to resist
from use of force in their lltutual as well as international relations. With a view to
promote mutual understanding the\- agreed to exchange observes by invitation. at inilitan
maneuvers. However. for such a purpose a twenty-one day notice was to be served. With
a vici%
to build mutual confidence among the states. the signatory states agreed to nottk-their
tuajor military moNernent. In order to strength European security. the signatory states
agreed to avoid militar< confrontation and promote disarmament. However. complete
disarmament under strict and effcctl\c int.crnational control was to be accomplished
through stages.

Convention on Prohibition of Military or other Hostile Use Environmental Modif cation

Techniques:

In May- 1197 a -Convention was signed at Geneva with a vicN~ to

strengthen world peace and bring about complete disarmament through prohibition of
military or offer hostile uses of the environlncntal modification techniques. The signatory
states agreed not to engage ill military or other hostile use of environmental ’modification
techniques. Tile\- were not to assist. encourage or induce any State. group of States or
international organisation to engage in activities contrary to-the provisions of the treaty.
However. the Convention did not impose an` restrictions on the use of environmental
modification techniques for peacefitl purposes. They were to contribute individually or in
cooperation with other states to the preservation, improvement and peaceful utilisation of
the environment with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the
world.

Special Session on Disarmament:

Disarmament

eliminate danger of nuclear war and take measures to halt and reverse the amts race. The
declaration asserted that genuine and lasting peace call only be created through effective
implementation of the .security, system provided by the charter of United Nations and the
speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces leading ultimately to general
and complete disarmament under effective international control. The declaration
emphasized the urgency of revitalising existing disarmament machinery and of
establishing appropriate forums for disarmament negotiations and deliberations under a
more representative character.

In 1979 the general assembly declared the 1980’s the Second Disarmament Decade to
achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

328

SALT ll (1979):

The first special session on disarmament was held from 23 May to 1 Julv 1978 which was
the largest representative meeting of nations. At this session a consensus was reached on
the need for comprehensive disarmament. The Assembly adopted a final document which
stressed the
 1 role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in tile field of
central p -
disarmament and outlined specific measures to strengthen the machines available in the
UN system to deal with disarmament. The final
document

impressed on the states the need tc continue general and Iotuplete disarmament under
effective control. It called for immediate action to

Salt I signed by USA and USSR lapsed in October 1977. Both the powers continued to
observe its provisions and continued efforts for a new agreement. After prolonged
negotiations they signed at Vienna on 1 June 1979 the SALT If treaty to¢limit the
strategic offensive weapons for period up to 31 December 1,85. While concluding this
treaty both the powers reaffirmed their desire to take further measures for further
limitation and redaction of strategic arms with a view to achieve general and complete
disarmament. As this agreement was in the nature of a treaty, it was sent to the US Senate
for ratification, as required under the constitution. But before the Senate could ratify the
same the cordial atmosphere was disturbed by the Soviet intewenlion in Afghanistan
which .jeopardised the ratification of Salt 11. However U.S.A continued to adhere to the
limits proposed by Salt lI. for some time: Ultimately on 27 May 1986 President Reagan
of USA announced that United States would no longer be bound by the limits set by Salt
II. This evoked strong reaction in USA and the House or Representatives passed a
resolution on 19 June 198(5 calling upon President Reagan to stick to the limits set by the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Number 2. The arms services committee of the Senate
also made an amendment to defence department bill and called upon the President to
honour Salt II limits. Agreements concerning Activities of States on Moon and other
Celestial Bodies

In 1979 an agreement governing the activities of states on the Moon and other Celestial
bodies was worked out. The agreement amplified the relevant prdv isions of the Outer
Space Treat\ by prolubiting’anN threat or rise of force or any other hostile acts or threat
of hostile acts on the Moon as well as the use of the Moon in order to COllllllll any such
act or ow-,age in any such threat in relation to earth the moon space raft- tile personnel of
spacecraft or man made space objects

International Relations

During the year 1980 only limited contact took place bcwmn WA and Soviet Union oil
the question of arm control. The l’.J Government motivated by the events in Afghanistan
proceeded to review and to expand its armament programs. Despite this Soviet Union
repeatedly expressed its willingness ’to negotiate. On 18 February 1980. Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Grontvko indicated the readiness of Soviet Union to carry oil
disvrmament talks with tile Nest. particularU oil the reduction of nuclear’ ,gins in
EuropeR of NATO’s decision’ of~ December 1979 regarding modernization
y hick . im olved employ mint of Perishing Its and Crusie missiles) was canceled or not
implemented. In mid-August 1980 President Breahnew tvrote to western leaders
expressing his willingness to engage in talks oil intermediate range nuclear missiles.
President Carter of USA responded favourably and -]greed to hold unconditional talks oil
this subject. As a result Prcparator, US-Soviet talks oil strategic arms limitation were held
in Geneva from I(> October to 17 November 1980 which resulted in greater
understanding of each others position and they agreed to resume negotiations in 1981._ .

.After his election. President Reagan indicated on 2 Fcbruaw. 1981 his readiness to
discuss a•legitimate reduction of nuclear weapons. However. he insisted~t%at the USA
should have a military presence in the Middle East to discourage am reckless moves by
the Soviet Union. On the other land President Brcahnev also called for an active US-
Soviet dialogue at all levels and proposed a moratorium on the development m Europe of
new medium age nuclear missiles by NATO countries and the Soviet Union. On the
development in Europe of new medium age nuclear missiles by NATO countries and the
Soviet Union. Soviet Proposals regarding Probation of’Stationing of Weapons in Outer
Space.

In 1981_ Soy ict Union proposed a trcaU oC unlimitcd duration to prohibit the stationing
of weapons oil am kind’ in outer space. including stationing of ’reusable manned space
vehicle. The parties to the treat.\ were to unctcrtakc not to destroy. damayc or disturb the
normal functioning or change the (light tryjectorv of space objects of other states. if such
objects were placed in the orbit in strict accordance with the ,).boNc mentioned
provisions. Howcvcr_ the Soviet proposal did not spcci.~ uhcthcr tile development and
testing of anti satellite svstcrns would be prohibited and uhcthcr the states would’ be
obliged to dismantle those systems which they lime already developed and tested.

In December 1981 tile .U.N. General .Assembly taking into account tile proposal of the
Soviet Union’. acquired the Cotiunittec oil disarn tamcnl to embark oil negotiations with
a view la achieving agreement oil the Icst of an appropriate treaty to prevent the spread of
arms race to other space l llrough another resolution. it rcclrr_st<d th; C’ontmUtcc Oil
Dis~lry<mecn!

Disarmament

!o consider as a mater of prioriU. the question of negotiation ,m uffe:liw ,md variable

agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. 1-lanmer. mml, progrcss could not be made
due to the difficulties in reaching further cons control agreements relating to outer space
because most of the satellites arc used for militan
purpose. Further. the competition going oil betwe4n the o,vo super powers was bound’to
general pressure for pre-emotive action and thus decrease rather than increase the sense
of security of the powers in ;pestion. bringing no advantage to either side.

Prohibition ’of Inhumane Weqpons:

New Small Arms Ammunition (1981 j: On 10 April. 1981 the

Convention oil Prohibition or Restriction oil Use of certain Conventional
’Weapons was opened for signature at the United Nations. This.com•ention
,vas in the nature, of an umbrella covering a number of,protocols covering
landmines and body traps. incendiay weapons and fragments not
_Jctcctable by X-ray. `
•• i
Ef forts hh the UN General Assemb4y:

During the Year 1981 the UN General Assemble also initiated a number of measures of
check nuclear weapons. chemical weapons as swell its to promote the disarmament. The
Assembly expressed concern over continued nuclear weapons tests and urged UK. USA
and USSR to resume their trilateral negotiations (which were interrupted in 1980) oil a
comprehensive test ban treaty and to bring them to an early conclusion. It also suggested
the conclusion of au international conventional oil the non-,1sc of nuclear weapons in
general and declared that the use of such weapons would be a violation of the UN Charter
and a crime against lmmaniW . It also called upon the nuclear weapons states to submit
their v icws. proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of
negotiations oil convention prohibiting chemical weapons called oil all the ,,!ales to
refrain from ant’ action which could impede such negotiations and t~ specifically refrain
from the production and development of binary and other new types of chemical
weapons. It also requested that chemical ~\copons should not be stationed in those states
where there arc no such v~ capons at present.

With a vices to promote disarmament. the General Assembly

mconunended that a world disarmament campaign should be launched and
n conference be held a( the United Nations to Finance Finance Ilic campaign. It
m\pressed the view that a worldwide collection of signatures in support of
!On.,nsures to prevent the nuclear war and arms race be started. which would
~mlp in creating favourable clime tr’ for achieving progress in the field of

International Relations 33

However- despite its active interest to effect arms coy trot the Ujncial Assembly could
not attain much scoops due to an atmosphere of increased international tension. The sharp
polemics beW een4lle USA and the USSR characterised by mutual ’cold war accusation
of aggressiveness and bad faith negatived - the effects of the international, arms control
endeavours.

Reagan Plan of 18 Not-ember 1981:

On 18 November 1981 President Reagan of United States proposed a four point agenda
suggesting (1) that the United States was prepared to cancel its deployment of Perishing ll
and ground launched crusade missiles if the Soviet Union would dismantle its SS-20. SL
.I and SS- uiedium and intermediate range ballistic missy-les: (2) that USA would seek to
negotiate substantial reduction in nuclear arms which would result in equal and verifiable
levels and the to symbolise this the negotiations would be called Start (Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks): (3) that action should be taken to achieve equally at lower levels of
conventional forces in Europe; and (4) that USA urged flue USSR to join with it and
many other nations to establish a western proposed conference on disarmament in
Europe. The United States leadership expressed tile hope that the acceptance of these
proposal by the Soviet would benefit the people of East and West and the Third World
and promote peace and security all over the world.

However , these proposals were outrightlv rejected by the Soviet Union. The Soviet
President Breznev said that if the United States were prepared to agree to complete
reduction of all kinds of nuclear weapons in the East and West; Soviet Union would be in
favour.

INF Walks at Geneva November (1981)

On 30 November, 1981 talks between USA and Soviet Union on intermediate range
nuclear force (INF) commenced at Geneva. The deliberations were held in camera. But
much progresses could not be made. On 3 February 1982 Brezhnev proposed that both
the sides should reduce their medium range nuclear weapons by two thirds by 1990- but
the proposal was rejected by President Reagan. On) February 1982 Soviet Union
proposed a modified plan but this was also turned down by USA the next day.

USA reacted sharply and stated that it would not ’tolerate Mi\ stationing of nuclear
missiles in Cuba. On 31 March 1982 President Reagan said ’ I want an agreement on
strategic nuclear weapons th,it reduce the risk of war, lower the level armament and
enhance global securih. We ran accept no less.”

Di;armament ’ ’ 2 lire4hnev Announcement of March 19$2:

On IG March 1982, the Soviet President Brezhnev announced that Soviet Union had
”decided to introduce unilaterally a moratorium on the deployment of medium range
nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union” of the weapons already;in
place as wcll,as the suspension of the planned replacement of the existing SS--1 and SS--
1 missiles by the new SS-20 models. He asserted the moratorium would remain in force
either until the USA and the Soviet
Union a reached agreement on a planned reduction of nuclear weapons or on the other
hand until practical preparation began for the deployment of Perishing II and ground
launched cruise nrissiles in Europe . He warned that if NATO attics went ahead with their
plans to renew their nuclear strike capacity, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to
take retaliatory steps.

Start Negotiations:

On 9 Mav. 1982, US President suggested that formal Start negotiations be held between
the two countries at Geneva in June 1982. He proposed two stage. During the first stage
the number of the ballistic missiles war heads was to be reduced by at least one-third
below current levels. During the secondestage they were to achieve equal ceilings on
ballistic missiles. The plan also- insisted on effective verification procedures. But the
plan.was dismissed by Soviet Union ”as a hopeless attempt to ensure US superiority.
However, the plan said nothing about the programme to deploy MX missiles strategic B-I
bombers and Trident nuclear missiles submarines.

On 18 Mav 1982 President Brezhnev made an offer of which the delegations of USA arid
USSR took part. Though the talks were secret, the two delegations made certain
statements regarding their respective positions, which virtually reflected the views that
had already- been expressed. At these talks USSR offered to make substantial cuts in the
long-range missiles, and bomber forces in return for US agreement to fort go the
deployment of new medium range missiles in Europe and to accept stringent restrictions
on all further cruise missiles deployments. The Soviet Union tried to like INF and Start
talks. On the other hand USA A was very keen to restore the credibility of its nuclear
umbrella I the eyes of its friends and opponents and wanted to eliminate the enormous
advantage which the Soviets had gained in land based missiles and prevent all risks of
black mail.

Second Special Session Disarmament:

The Second Special Session on Disarmament of the General Assembly vas held in 1982
in which more than I-10 states took part. Over

3
UCtO ninesentatives from 450 non-governmental organisations in 47

In ternstionai Relations

countries around the world also attended the session. After prolonged deliberations the
.General Assembly categorically and unammou’;lN reaffirmed the validity of the Final
Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament. and urged the member states to
consider as soon as possible proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war.
particularly nuclear war. The Assembly also stressed the need for strengthening the
central role of the United Nations in the
find of disarmament and enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament
’(now known as conference on Disarmament) as the single multilateral negating body.

Nov US Proposals on Salt:

In 1983 USA proposed build down whereby each side while modernising its force’s
would effects i per cent reduction of its forces year until 199 2. According to this plan
each new unit ICBM fire .power developed was to be matched by reduction of two old
units of IC$M fire power and each new unit of submarine launched dire power N%as .to
be matched by dismantling the two old units. The proposals also envisaged the
establisluiient of a commission to work out the details of a build down.

The Soviet Union responded to US proposals and called for reduction of strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles from about 2400 to 1800 or 18;0. while demanding that the US must not
deploy am new intermediate range missiles in Europe whatsoever. Soviet Union also
indicated its willingness to accept an overall ceiling on nuclear explosions, but did not
put fornard a specific number. Soviet Union also demanded that the British and the
French forces be counted in INF process. However. tile British and French were
determined to maintain indcpZndeut deterrents which were not subject to US USSR
negotiations.

On account of persistent tension between USA and Soviet Union no further progress
could be made beW een the East and West’ on arms control and eventual disarmament.
The Soviet Union refused to resume Gencv a Disarmament talks both negotiations on
intermediate range nuclear farce (INF) which were suspended. in November 1983 and
strategic anus reduction talks (Start) which wre talks unless .the policy of deploy tnent of
Perishing if and Crusie missiles in Western Europe was reversed.

Effart.v,fnr I)i.carnrcrnrent bt Getreral.~t.s~cnrI311.Aftor 1982:

Since 1982 the General Assembly o regular toter\als called for impl~n~ntaa,~n of the
decisions and recommendations of the first and ~._.end special sessions of disarmament.
It lots called for ( 1) cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons including,
undergroimf tmclear weapons test and ,:upped for’conclusion of comprcltcn.sivc nuclear
test ban Ircan: 00

Disarmament negotiations for cessation of nuclear amts and prevention of nuclear war.
(iii) freeze on nuclear eveapons by all. nuclear weapons states: (iv) establishment of
riuclear• weapon free, zones in Middle East and South Asia and implementation of
Declaration of the India Ocean as a Zone of-Peace-(v) conclusion of an international
comentiott for strengthening security of non-nuclear weapon states agait>St use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons; (vi) measures to prevent arms race
in outer space: (vii) conclusion of convention of prohibition of the development.
production. stockpiling and use of all chemical. radiological and nuclear neutron
weapons: (vii) an agreement on the prohibition of the development and ’manufacture of
new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and (ix)
reduction of naoititars budgets and rcallocntion of resources now being used for military
purposes to economic ,met social development m developing countries ~ ’

However. these rccomntcndations of the General Assembly. though unanimously

;adopted lime not been laithfuLly implemented and much progress has not been made in
the direction of disarmament.

Talks between NAT() crud Warsaw Payt (.~ountries:

Talks between delegations from NATO and Warsaw Pact centuries on Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe were resented on 16 March I98-1 (which
lyd been suspended in December ~I98:). On 19 April I9S.I NATO members submitted a
plan which em isaged first of all a reduction in combat. and satpport troops in Centr;i!
Europe by 13.(ttl fo/ USA and .’4).OE)() for the USSR. and thereafter :m eventual
reduction of the wo sides to 7ttti_tuU) for the USSR. and thereafter an eventual reduction
of the t \\o sides to 70t).(i00 ground ,troops ate! 2l)(l.()0(> air force members for each
side within four or five vicars. This plan was~rejected by the Warsaw Pact delegation on
the ground that the proposal was ’neither constroctivc nor realistic.’ 15espite these
differences the talks continued till 19 July 1 914.

3 i-t

lnrprovenrent of Hotline:

In July. 198-1 USA and Soviet Union agreed ~to add a fact sintilc transmission capability
to the Direct Coll, munication Link (DCLt popularly known as ’hallinc~. The hotline vas
first established in .August 1963, with a view to lessenino of the dan`;cr of n outbreak of
hostilities by accident or miscalculations. The new improvement enabled the W ’o sides
to send graphic material via the DCL.

Four (’uniitront Peace ~iitiative:

oil 22 Mm - 198-1 a plan on bclialf of six political lydcrs from the t,oir ;ontinents of
Africa: Asia. Europe and Lady America. vis. Prcsiclcnt EZ,mI Alfonsin Argentina: Prime
Minister Andrews Papandrcou of Grccce.

international !relations .

Prime Minister India Gandhi of India: President Miguel dela Madrid of Njemco. Prime
Minister Olof Palrtic of Sweden and President Johlis N~crcre of Tanzania : \\as presented
to tile UN Missions of the li\c nncl,:ii tttapon poNtcrs (Cliiua.•France. USSR. UK and
USA). The plan a•:encd ”The escalating arms race. the rise in international tensions and
the lack nl constructiN-e dialogue aitiong nuclear NNeapon states
has increased the risk of nuclear war. The people \Ne represent arc no less threatened by
tutcle;ti Nv-ar than the citizctis of the nuclear’ it-capon states. It is printaril\ the
responsibilitN of the nuclear \\,capon states to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. but this
problem is too important be left to those states alone.” It stated that ”agreeinettfs which
merely regulate an arms build-up are clearly insufficient and the leaders called oil the fne
nuclear NA-capon poNters as a iiccessan first step to halt all testing production and
deplo\ nient of iuiclear neapons and their deli\er\ sNstetn, to be ininiediatcl\ follo\ted by
substantial reductions, in nuclear force.”

Though USA appreciated the utitftili\ a and sincet’it\ of the leaders in taking art initiative,
it asserted ”\t c do itiot think that global freeze by tile nuclear po\\ers Nwuld strength-
stabilit-- or reduce the risk \\ar.”
Initiative hy Inditi umd Non-aligned Countries:
In kAugust
y 198 India and 20 other non-aligned, and neutral,
countries suggested setting up of <in adhoc committee of ’the UN
Disarmament Conference to negotiate measures for preventing a nuclear
Atar. However. USA and other Western countries did not respond
faA ourably. ,

Geneva Talks (198i):

A welcome development took place in Januan 1985 when tile foreign Minister of USSR
and USA (Ancri Grom.ko and Qeorigc Shultz) ntet at Gcneva oil 7th and slit jamiam
Negotiations at Geneva could not make much progress because USSR sought to link-
controls of offensive missiles Nvith the termination of Reagan’s Strategic Defence
Initiative (SDI). popularly known as Star Wars programmes. NNhilc USA NNaited to
enhance the prospects of SDI by limiting tile offettsi\c.itiissiles which SDI \\ould oppose.
USA. refused to link tile two and argued that a ban oil research programme (SDI is
currently a research agenda) cannot be verified. Though the two countries could not reach
am accord. the resumption of talks «as significant development. Thc.t,.No sides agreed
that the space weapon s\-stein and the intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe be
brought into the lice oliation that originall\ co\ered strategic nuclear missiles. The
delegations of SoNict Union and USA agreed to split into three groups to negotiate oil
the areas of strategic. intcrntedialc range aitd space Nwapons wth a ~-ieN\ to ”\tork out
cffecti\c agreements ~iitiicd :it presenting an amts race in space and tcriuinatiitg it oil
earth.” The rail

Disarmament

,t,,nificante of the Geiie\-,i talks \\as that it succecded in brcahtng tlt~ ke. l’SSR had
pledged not to hold am talks unless Crisis and Pot~h~ng ll iitissiles NNerc dismantled.
but 1 relented oil this po11tt and agreed for tAk~, ;tt C;eneva Like NNise USA also
shoNNed spirit of accommodation
and ~igrecd to broaden the scope of tle\N negotiations b\ including \t ithin their purN ic\t
tile threatened arms race zit space as >tell.as existing stockpiles. T4ic t\to suites pledged
to work for cffecti\ a agreements aimed at prey eating yin arias race in space and
terniiiiating it oil Ltrth. , Six IN’tition.s Summit at New Delhi (1985):

Oil 26 JanuarN 198 a six nation summit teas held at Nc\N Delhi Much mad attended bN
President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina. Prime Minister Andrea Papandreou of Greece.
Prime Minister Olof Politic, of SN\Mcn. President Miguel Dcla Madrid of Mexico.
Prcsidcnt Julius Nearer of Tanzam;i and Prime Minister Ra,jiv Gandhi of India. The
Summit appealed to tile nuclear \\capon pot\crs to,Itelp and rc\crse tile nuclear arms race.
It urged them to immediately halt tile testing of all kinds of

iittclear N\-eapons and to conclude a treat\ oil a.nuclear \te;ipon test ban at ail carp date.
It called for prohibition of tile do cloptnctit. testing

production. depImnicnt and use of all space \tcapons. lt’~\arited that ,tit ;sans race zit the
space \\ould be enormousl\ cOSlh and ha\c grape cJi::~tabilising effect. The other points
cntphasircd b) the Summit \\crc the n,_,cd of strengthening of tile UN s\stent and
dt\’cr~ion of expctiditurc from arms to dc\clopiitcitt. The six leaders also agreed to visit
nuclear po\\crs

<tltd other capitals to impress oil carious po\ters the urgent need to put the ;ti tits race
into reverse gear.

Rccrqun Gorhcrchev Summit: ’

Disarmament suffered a serious setback in 191-1 8,5 and mo <,::pcrpo\\crs embarked oil
a massive programme of rearmament. This trend Ntas reversed to\e-ards the close of
1995 \\hen President Ronald Rcigaii of U.S.A and Mikhail Gorbachev of Soy ict Union
nict at Gone\ a hem I`)-21 November. Though the contents of the discussion Nacre not
i;cidc public. it \\as quite apparent that So\ let hostility to Prcsidcnt kc;igan’s Strategic
Defence lnitiati\c tpopttlarl\ knoN\n as Star W;trs) Project pro\cd lobe end of tile talks tile
tN\o leaders issued a joint st,ttcniciit i;i t\liicli tile\ compassed the desirabilit\ of
intensified dialogitc bcmecn tltc Mo I)rnters throtigli regular meetings at tile highest IC cl
They also

:_rced to accelerate the peace of negoti<Itions so that carp pro”re,s could he made in
areas Ntlicre there ,\\as a contnion ground such its ~;tt pct cent Mitt in tile overall lcNcl
of armanmits and tile possibilit\ of an tntemn 1\1-,y~rccntcnt.

After tile GeneN:i Sttnimit the process of arrk ing at settlement opt dts;trntamciit
cotitiitucd both :tt multi I;ttcrtl ~tnd bt-I:ttcral forum,, iii

owl -

International Relations. : •,
Jatitrir~ 11)86 Gorbachev proposed a time bale for a ,fifteen Ne;irs step b~ step ptoccss
for ridding the earth of nuclear teapons He presented
flit, progranmle ill the formal talks between USA and SoN let Union oil 10 Jann;irN
1186. but it iN”as not accepted b~ USA. . - ,

Reykjavik tlleetin- (1980): .

The most significant. effort in the direction of disarmament tas nrldc in October 1986
then a meeting tas held at Rc\kjavik bcmecit Prcsident”Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachc\.
Tltougli the tnecling did riot lead to ~in~ tangible agreement. it settled many of the
bil;rteral arios-control issues thiclt had cluded negotiations. for Nears. There t;t>
agrcetncnt on INF and fratue~ork for 50 per cent reduction in strategi-l-offensiNe
teapons. But no formal agreement could be concluded oil account of differences over
Strategic Defence Initiati\e programme (SDI) So\-iet Union Canted America to cut back
research and testin(l oil the SDI programme to just the laboratorN. thick \\as no(
acceptable to USA

Despite their diffcrenccs frcslt Idglt level talks terc held brmecit USA and USSR at
Vienna on 5-6 No\cluber 1986 ill %\]itch Slitilii acid Slievardnade took purl on behalf of
the tto countries. Hox\eNcr. rite lalk~ X\ere jedprirdised due to U.S.. So\iel acrimony
over diplomatic e.\pttlsiottl~ and colinler expulsions.

In February 1987 Soy let le;idcr Gorbaclre\ took gel ;utotlicr initiatkc atict, called for tile
elimination of 1NF missiles Europe. tills :i limit for each side of lttt) tarlmads else tlicre.
He also ;wrecd to proceed titliout first rcsok ing cliffcrcnccs oicr SDI.

Intermediate Ran l;e lfrrclear Force (INF) Treat), (1987):

Tins trettl~. The first to abolish alt entire ;,i1e,,or\ of’ nuCIC,11
te<ipons \\as assigned by President Reagan acid..Gcncral Sccrctar.\
Gorbticlte\ al the Washington Suillink iii December. 1917 arid ratified ti-
the Senate and Presidium of the tto countries on tire eye of the Nloscov,
Summit in 1\-laN- June. 1988. The treat\ provides that during lice next thr2-,
~c;irs kited based missiles having a range of >t)I) knis,lo 5tlt)o kites and tits
Ittutt~hcrs on X\hiclr these missiles <irc to be mounted. till be clitnhtatcd. It
Aso plo\idcs for the clirttiwition of the short range missiles titltin Item IN,
inontlis fn <iccordancc t-ith this SoNict Union Could clitititt;itc 17~’
itns:iles based its Ecistent Europe. Chile the Soviet Uniou. The tmit.k also
:hccific• tit,: in;itiner in thiclr these missiles shall be dcslro\ed. T Ile Im
’-s 1itt,lerlooh to foritt each otlicr of the tNpe of itiissiles ;itid the pc~icc
NO, rc lit-,c ,\\cte being dcstro\ed. 16 also inakcs prop isiotis for cict;tiled on
gyp, 11 )ti to c itetire that ncitlier Side \\as \ iolatitw lice lcritt, of tile

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338

New Six Nation Disarmament Plan:

Encouraged by the treaty between Soviet Union and the USA for the elimination of
Intermediate
Range Nuclear Missiles the leaders of six nations (India. Argentina Greece. Mexico.
Sweden and Tanzania) from five continents prepared a plan for disarmament to be placed
before the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament. This plan
envisaged an important role for the United Nations 1 the verification of disarmament
agreement. It is note worthy, that earlier in 1986 the sip nations had offered to assist the
two superpowers in verification of ban on nuclear tests. They proposed establishment of
temporary monitoring stations at the test sites and inspection of large chemical
explosions.

Third ,S`pecial Session of UN General Assembly on Disarmament (June 1988):

The Third Special Session of UN General Assembly on Disarmament was held in June
1988. but it could not achieve any positive results an account of adamant attitude of the
USA on the issue of shedding armaments and making commitments regarding nuclear
weapons. However, the special session looked into the progress in the implementation of
the first two special UN sessions on disarmament held in 1978 and 1982. It is noteworthy
that while the first special session on disarmament had indicated that the final objective
should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control. the
immediate goal was elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the halting of arms race.
The second session reaffirmed its faith in the above objectives and urged the member
states to consider proposals for avoidance of war. particularly nuclear war.

Geneva Talks on Strategic Arms Reduction (June 1989):

After a gap of seven months U.S. Soviet negotiations on reduction of long range nuclear
forces were held at Geneva. However. soon it became evident that sharp differences exist
between the two. While Soviet Union insisted on linking of Start accord and the
development of space weapons USA was, opposed to the similarly while Soviet Union
insisted on inclusion of submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in the agreement.
the USA did not approve of it. Differences also existed between the two on question of
mobile land based missiles, certification procedure, counting rules for
war heads carried by strategic bombers etc. In view of these differences both the sides
made it clear that full agreement on strategic arms reduction traaty was trot in sight.

Further Progress:

Undeterred by the failure of the Geneva talks the two super-powers continued to make
efforts to reach some agreement: In September

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319

agreements and armounced their decision to hold a Super Pow Summit in 1990 (early
summer or spring).
Soviet Union made a ke-y concession and announced that Soviet Union would move
ahead towards a long range weapons agreement despite’s objections to the U.S. Strategic
Defence also reached an agreement on chemical weapons by the end of years. visits by
inspectors of other side to the stockpiles and plants by June 1990. The other accords
provided for verification long range mtclear weapons was completed etc.

US Proposes cut in Chemical Weapons:

On 25 September. 1989 in the course of his address to the General

Assembly President Bush of USA proposed a treat- suggesting elimination of all
chemical weapons from the surface of the earth within 10 years from the date on which it
is signed and indicated US readiness to destroy 98 per cent of its chemical stockpiles in 8
`ears provided the Soviet Union joined it in doing so.-The proposal of President Bush
was accepted by Soviet Union. Soviet Union offered to comply with the proposals even
before the conclusion of the multilateral treat if the United States agreed. This was a
welcome development and indicates the desire of the two super powers to get rid of their
stockpiles of chemical weapons for the sake of world peace.

It is evident from the above account that as a result of the positive dialogue between the
two super powers since 1985 considerable progress has been made and they have reached
significant substantive agreements in the areas of arms control. They ratified the 1987
INF Treaty (a focal point of controversy between the two for nearly a decade): took
preliminary steps in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Start) towards an agreement to
reuse strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%. All these developments greatly contributed to the
easing of tension between the two super powers.

Washington Summit:

At the Washington Summit meeting between President GorbacheN and President Bush
further progress in the directions of disarmament was made. The two countries conceded
a number of agreements on nuclear. chemical and conventional arms. The most
significant arms control agreement related to the chemical ~Neapons. The two sides
agreed to destroy thousands of toners of these mass destructive weapons and reduce their
stockpiles to 5,000 tonnes each. It was decided that the destruction would begin in 1992
and would last upto 2002. They also agreed to immediately stop further production of
these weapons. This agreement greatly improved the prospects for a global ban on the
production. procession and use of chemical weapons being negotiated by the 40 nation
conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

Disarmament 340

At the Sunuuit that two leaders also agreed on certain principles which were
to govern the Strategic Arms Reduction Treat’ (Start) to be ready for signature by the end
of the year. Another arms control agreement related to the verification protocols for the
implementation of earlier treaties of mid 1970’s restricting the size of underground
nuclear explosions. In addition to the above agreements the two President reiterated their
commitment to complete the negotiations on the conventional force reductions in Europe
(CFE Treaty) before the end of the year.

Treaty ont Arms Cut:

The neat II11pOCtilllt step in the direction of disarmament was taken in September 199(5
when a treaty was signed by President Bush. President Gorbachev and other European
leaders at Paris which seeks to cut conventional forces in Europe. Under this treaty these
leaders agreed to destroy tens of thousands of tanks. artiller, and armoured combat
vehicles Europe. Each alliance was allowed a maximum of 20,00() tanks, 30.000
armoured personnel carriers. 2(1.000 artillery pieces. 6.800 aircraft and 20()0 helicopter
in four zones. .

T reath Between NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries:

On 19 November. 1990 the heads of state and governments of NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries signed a treaty which drastically reduced their conventional arsenals for the first
time since World War II. This treat, described as the most comprehensive and far
reaching arms reduction accord ever negotiated paged the way for new cooperation in
Europe and marked the formal end of cold war.

Implications of’Ar°ms Race and .Strggestions for Future:

The implications of arms race have been beautifully brought out by UN Report thus. The
Arms race represents a waste of resources, a diversion of the economy away from
humanitarian a waste of resources, a diversion of the economy away from humanitarian
purpose, a hindrance to national development efforts and threat to democratic process.
But its most important future is that in effect it undermines national, regional, and
international security. It involves the constant risk of war engaging the largest Powers.
including nuclear war and it is accompanied by an endless series of wars at lower levels.
It rises an even greater barrier against the development of an atmosphere in which the
role of the force in international relations ntav be downgraded. In addition, it impedes
rclatmns between countries affecting the volume and direction of evchanycs. diminishing
the role of co-operation atnong States and obstructing cfiorts towards establishing a new
international economic order on a more ;quitable basis.’

The Committee made certain suggestions to acllic\c the objecti\c

of complete disarmament It proposed that a comprehensive disarmamc”t
scheme should be i
prepared
ml c

\N ih partial measures would nn doubt F ,11c

a place. However. in this context it would be imperative that ncgoti;1tio”`

International Relations

In the international sphere the arms r< has the °, t ~t<i consequences. In the military
sphere it increase the possibilit_v oi w,o, rather even the possibility of a nuclear
conflagration. In the ecoa iiii,, sphere it has far reaching effects. Lot of money is spent
not only on aiw• race and military preparations. but vast resources are also diverted away
fro production and growth. which contributes to inflation and economic crisis. Arms race
contributes to the maintaining and widening of the gap between and within developed
and developing countries and impedes co-operation between states. As regard its
implicate on the international political conditions, it changes the atmosphere with high
military preparedness and even minor conflicts tend to assume serious dimensions.
Generally the security considerations come to occupy a prominent position in the policy
formulation. Most of the states tr<’ to create spheres of influence in which even local
conflicts become linked to regional or even global confrontations.

The Committee of experts appointed by the Secretary General under directive of General
Assembly in 1976 to look into he social and economic consequence of arms race whole
emphasizing the deed of disarmament observed that ’`the most important goals of internal
commonly are disarmament and development. which the members of the UN committed
to pursue virorouslv. In fact both these goals are intimately linked. Development at an
acceptable rate would be hard, if not impossible. to reach with a continuation of the arms
race. Research and development is one are where the misdirection of efforts is glaring. In
this. as other respects. vast resources badly needed for development are being consumed
as countries make even greater sacrifices for militaw purposes. The Committee argued
that ”Progress towards disarmament would release internal material financial and human
resources. both in developed and in developing. The r ration of the climate of fear.
hostility and confrontation which pr ress towards disarmament would remove some of the
barriers now hamper ng international exchanges in general and the free circulation of raw
mate ials and advanced technology in particular, and would greatly facilitat the free
choice by each country of its particular path towards devel ment. As a result of
disarmament the industrially developed con ies would save a lot on their military
expenditure which could easily be passed on to the developing nations in the shape of
old. This aid shall go a long way in improving the
living standard of the people in these countries.

3-12

Disarmament

nn general and complete disarmament should receive greater and more urgent attention
than they have received in the pat. With a view to impart new momentum to disarmament
efforts. it insisted on the need of involving all countries on the basis of equally
simultaneous curtailment of the qualitative arms race and reduction of military budgets. It
emphasized that nuclear disarmament must be given highest priority partly because of the
intolerable threat posed by the nuclear weapons and partly because of the possibility- of
their proliferation of new states which would enhance the threat and make disarmament
more difficult in future.

Finally. the committee also emphasized the need of expert advice. It recommended
”There is always a need for expert advice and assistance on a more continuous basis to
follow developments closely to advise the

General Assembly, the Secretary Gencr ;I and members states on questions of

disarmament and to assist in the elaboration, specification and adjustment of targets and
programmes,” Improvement of the machiney of the United Nations in this direction
appears to be necessaW if the world organisation is to fulfill its task in the field of
disarmament.

Arms Limits

By far the most common approach to arms control is tying to limit development and
deployment of future weapons systems. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids
the difficulties of scrapping existing systems. The disadvantage of course, is that it leaves
an awesomely dangerous stockpile of arms in place. Like reductions limits arc usually
attempted through negotiation, but they arc also possible throuo:h unilateral action. The
Soviet Union announced in mid 1984. for instance.

that it would not deploy any antisatellite weapons in space as long as other countries
similarly restrained themselves. Even consemativcs in the Reagan administration have
begun to float the idea that it may be possible

to pursue arms control through ”individual but (where possible parallel policies”- that is.
unilaterally or bi-or multilaterally. on the basis of parallel self-restrain rather than treat<-.

The idea of a nuclear freeze is one approach to arms hmit,Uion that enjoys considerably
popular support in the United States. in Western Europe. and elsewhere. At its center. the
nuclear freeze mm ement advocates an immediate halt to the development production.
trnnsfC.r. and
deployment of all nuclear weapons and deliver` systems. 13eynd that point, the
movement diverges. Some advocate a unilateral 1 .S tr~ic. at least temporally. as a
”confidence-building•measurc° thin will brr.ik
the arm.-race spiral and encourage the Soviets and others to fulluv suit. uu~r~ .ill for a
”mutual and veri(iablc- freeze that euhcr could be iti it’d )r could result policies of
restraint by the nuclear power s.

International Relations

Critics of a nuclear freeze make most of the argun~nts d,:un,it,-”The Case for Arms,”
They argue that unilateral remains ~ncour;igC ih,: Soviets by showing weakness, that it
would clock Soviet advantage in strategic weapons, and that it would eliminate the
incentive for more meaningful arms reduction talks.

It is beyond our scope here to evaluate the varying positions freeze. It can be confidently
said. though. that the freeze above it has not achieved its announced goal, has sewed as a
form of activity it the United States and has brought significant pressure the Reagan
administration to pursue a more vigorous arms ?

There are a number of possible ways to limit new weapon restrictions on research and
development, testing deployment weapons. and military budget.

1. Research and Development.

One way to avoid weapons is representative a sort of military birth control that would
ensure that weapons systematic over begin their gestation period of research and
development.

The advantage of this approach is that it stops the arms race before it begins. Once R&D
begin;,, there is a pressure on the other side to match it. Moreover. R&D begins an arms
acquisition, momentum that is hard to stop because the military is reluctant to give up a
weapon that is in its inventory even experimentally. There are several U.S. systems, such
as the cruise missiles, that were begun as a potential ”bargaining chip” with the Soviets,
but once they were developed. the ”stake” in them resulted in their becoming a
permanent part of the inventory rather than begin bargained away for concessions by the
other side.

The difficult’ in applying brakes to R&D comes from two hard-to-deny

counterarguments. The nrst is that RED is not really adding arms but just seeing what is
possible. he second. more potent contention is that if R&D funds are not granted. he other
side may get a quantum lead and advantage. Thus. R&D is ersuasively portrayed as a
”modest down
payment on the lure.”

2. Testing.

A second point at which weapons can be restrained is in the testing stage. This is
technically part of R&D. but it is the critical stage when a system comes off the drawing
board and is actually tried out.
Restraints on resting can be effective, even if R&D has proceeded to that point. becau~,:
the technological complexity of most modern weapons swtem: vow,l le,ivc their untested
reliability highly questionable.
WNW

Disarmament

34=1

Countries would be prone to

keep what they have rather than develop new. destabilizing weapons that are unknowns.

There are, however, numerous problems with and objections to testing limits. These
include the arguments that other evaluation methods (such as simulation) could be
,:eveloped. that verification: of contesting is difficult, that testing is needed to keep
existing arms up to date, and even that testing can be beneficial, as in developing lower
radiation nuclear devices.

3. Deployment.

The neat stage at which arms can be limited is at deployment. This approach would
restrict the combat-ready positioning of weapons system. The 1972 A.BM treat’, for one.
banned the further deployment of existing U.S. and Soviet antiballistic missiles. Some of
the most acrimonious bargaining in recent years was over the unsuccessful Soviet
attempts to prevent the deployment of Perishing and cruise missiles in Western Europe
and the reciprocal and equally unsuccessful attempts to have the Soviets withdraw some
or all their SS-20s fro firing positions in the European areas of the USSR. Limits can also
apply to total arms Hans in geographic areas., such as Antarctica.

Deployment limitations can additionally be applied to conventional weapons and to the

positioning of conventional forces. Restrictions on the deployment of Egyptian and
Israeli troops and weapons in the buffer area east of the Suez Canal are one successfiil
recent example.

Although deployment limits can work. their greatest drawback is that they create the
potential for dangerous violation. Nuclear missiles are increasingly mobile. and airlift and
mechanization capabilities allow rapid redeployment of conventional forces. Thus.
should one side choose to rapidly reintroduce its arms into an area. it would create a
highly unstable and explosive atmosphere as its alarmed opponents rushed to reposition
their defenses to meet the threat.

4. Numerical limits.

By tar the most common approach to arms control is to limit the number or capacity of
weapons and or troops that each side niav possess. Both Salt I and Salt II relied heavily
on this approach. looking to cap future expansion rather than to reduce existing levels.
The Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact have focused (unsuccessfully ) on conventional arms in that region.

International Relations

The attraction of numerical limits lies in their seeming simplicity. The attempts, however.
usually founder over questions of what to count and how to equate different types of
systems. Numerical restrictions alone also do not prevent the development and
deployment of classes of weapons, and it is relatively
simple to escalate numbers at a later date it tensions increase.

5. Budgetary limits.

Another possible approach to arms control would be to control military spending rather
than weapons as such. Limiting arms by an international agreement to limit military
spending has not been seriously attempted. Its advantage is that it might avoid many
existing counting and verification problems by letting each country structure its armed
forces subject only to dollar limitations. Spending might, for example, be limited to a per
capita dollar figure or to a percentage of GNP.

There are, of course, substantial problems in determining and equating military- budgets,
as we sav’in Chapter 8. Different formulas would also tend to favor one group or another.
A GNP- based formula would, for example, favor rich countries. and a per capita plan
might eventually leave China stronger.

6. Shortcomings.

As our discussion has amply indicated, there have been many frustrations and failure for
each success in arms control. At the conventional level, the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction talks in Europe have languished. After real hope in the 1970s. nuclear arms
talks’ fell into almost-total disarray in the early 1980s. The Salt II Treaty existed in a sort
of twilight zone for several years, ungratified vet generally observed by Moscow and
Washingto . Nuclear relations went even further awry because of the East/West con
ontation over the deployment of U.S. missiles in Wester Europe an in the face of
generally deteriorated relations. In the wrote f 19 .. -198-1, the Soviets broke off both the
Start and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) talks far over a year. Thus. the
lights in the negotiating halls were dark while those in the armament factories continued
to burn. In early 198>, the two sides finally again sat down in Geneva, but even the most
optimistic were predicting long. arduous negotiations.

Obstacles to Arms Control

At this somewl..t discouraging juncture we should ask. ”Whv’.’-Why can’t we achieve

arms control” We need it, we say we want it. ~we negotiate ;shout n. vct the race goes on
Why’? There are several answers to

Disarmament

that question, and in this section we will examine the barriers to arms control.

National Pride

The Book of Proverbs tells us that ”pride go the before destruction.” and u.at statement is
as applicable to the modern arms race as it was in biblical rimes. Whether we are dealing
with conventional or nuclear arms, pride is a primary drive behind their acquisition.
The pride factor, of course, is seldom stated in those terms. Rather, it is discussed in
terms of the dangers of being behind on opponent. But you can dearly hear the pride
in President Reagan’s justifying the massive militaiv buildup as a remedy for the fact that
”America had simpl_s ceased to be a leader in the world,” but now in response to ”a
national reawakening of new sense of responsibility a new-sense of confidence in
America.” the United States was once again striving ”to play its proper role in the world.”

The have-nots.

For newly independent and/or less developed countries, arms represent a tangible symbol
of sovereignty. Often amid poverty, the military can be a flashy, assertive showpiece of a
country’s ”equal” status. In addition to urging the acquisition of planes, .tanks, and ships,
pride promotes the proliferation on nuclear power. Pakistan’s nuclear project, for one. is
partly the result of nationalistic and pan-Islamic pride. As one Pakistani official
complained. ”The Iranians have oil. Indians have the Device bomb, it’s only fair that
Pakistan should hay°e at least the bomb,” or as another said, ”The Christian, Jewish, and
Hindu civilization have the bomb. Only the Islamic civilization is without it.”

(ii) Thn haves.

Pride also affects countries with substantial conventional and or nuclear arms inventories.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union are prone to project themselves as in second
place military and as in the classic slogan of the car rental business, those in second place
need to try harder. Further. even though both the Srj, Ws and the Americans profess a
willingness to Fc,:ept ”parity.’ the tendency to overestimate the other’s strength plays in
.v.-ith pride to promote a quest for superiori;N. which is impossible for two opponents to
achieve sinu:aLaneouslv.

International Relations
2. What to Count

A related equation problems is what to count. A long standing point of disagreement in

Soviet/American arms talks is whether to count the copsiderable inventory of British and
French nuclear arms. The Americans insist that in bilateral talks only American and
Soviet weapons are on the table and that the British and French systems are independent.
The Soviets assert that American/British/French weapons are part of an alliance system
and should be counted as one. ’

Thrice of China’s nuclear capability shows signs of further adding to this counting
controversy. Inasmuch as the Soviets must devote some weapons to deterring their quasi-
hostile neighbor, Moscow is more likely to be concerned with ”equal security,” while the
United States will probably continue of favor equal (U.SJUSSR) numbers.

3. Divergent Approaches

Earlier in this chapter we saw that the arms race is subject to a chicken and egg
controversy. Which came first, tension or weapons? That same issue plagues arms
control. American
arms control policy making, for one, has long been divided between those who would
reduce arms first and those who would reduce tension first. The Carter administration
initially leaned toward the arms first approach, but the Reagan forces began by believing
that meaningful arms talks were impossible with a belligerent Soviet Union. Similarly the
Soviets withdrawal from all nuclear, arms talks in late 1983 through early 1984 was in
part promoted by their reaction to the Reagan hard line. In short, the question is, where
do you start? Do you try to ease political differences/tensions or do you negotiate
weapons reduction? The a swer, it would seem. is both.

4. Complexity o Weapons Sys ms

A fourth barriers t ms trol is the extreme complexity of the weapons systems involved.
This is especially true for nuclear weapons. The main problem is how to compare apples
and organs. Technologically. ~I missile is not just a missile. How, for example, do you
compare U.S. missiles, which are less powerful but more accurate, and the Soviet’s
gargantuan but less sophisticated ICBMs.? How can the fact that Soviet ballistic missile
submarines are more vulnerable than their U.S. counterparts be factored into a formula to
achieve parity? Given the mix of s\ stews. how iuany bombers equal an ICBM. and how
many ICBMs equal I SLBM° These equations have been mace even more complex by
the Reagau Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). If, as the Soviets inset, the (as yet
undeveloped) weapons are negotiable, what is their trade-off value?

347 Disarmament

348

The point is that simple numbers mean little in arguments, particularly of the nuclear
variety. In addition to a vast array of different tN.pes of weapons. factors such as quality,
capability, capacity, and Vulnerability all greatly complicate the equation process. The
result is that negotiations are extremely difficult, and agreements are subject, to domestic
political attack by opponents who misiled the public by pointing out numerical
”inequities” without accounting for offsetting technological factors.

5. Suspicion

As with Og and Ug, doubts about the other side’s motives are a prime barrier to arms
control. The discussion of perceptions in Chapter 2 pointed out that there is a propensity
to see an opponent as more hostile and more directed the we see ourselves. According to
this process, any proposal for arms control we make it self perceived as a genuine effort
to achieve peace. A n opponent’s offer, by contrast, is viewed as a grandstanding attempt
to sway world opinion that must be suspiciously examined because it is undoubtedly an
attempt to gain
and advantage.

6. Verification

Because of suspicion, justified or not, the problem of verification is yet another hurdle in
the arms control race. Monitoring compliance with any arms agreement is important not
only to detect cheating but also as a way to case.

As our discussion of spying in Chapter 10 indicated there have been great advances in the
national technical means (NTM) of monitoring weaponry. Yet the progress in NTM
capability has been matched and sometimes exceeded by- our ability to improve and
conceal weapons. Quantity is easier to monitor than quality and for example the
introduction of multiple warhead (MIRE missiles has made it difficult to keep track of
how warheads an opponents has. The introduction of long range small mobile missiles
has also compared verification. A curse missile for one can be hidden in a bar a runnel, or
a tractor trailer truck.

One possible advance in monitoring procedures would be the introduction of on sit

”inspections” that would permit neutral inspectors or representatives from the other side
to visit military installations and sites of suspected cheating. Unfortunately. such a
procedure can be construed as an abridgment of sovereignty- or a license for spying and
the Soviets arc porticularlv suspicious of on-site inspection proposals.

3-t9

International Relations

7. Possible Cheating

We can list the potential for cheating as a separate barrier to arms control although in
essence it as a melange of factors relating to suspicion complexity and verification.
Geneva our the nature of something that both sides accept as existing). and the stakes if
the other side gains all advantage. the issue of cheating is a major obstacle to arms
agreements.

Do countries cheat? That question is a major battleground in the mid 1980s as the Soviets
and Americans begin a new round of nuclear negotiations. Both sides have accused the
other of cheating on Salt II and other treaties, but the supposed violations are less than
certain. The United States has claimed, for one., that the Soviets are developing an SS-2>
missile in violation of Salt II. The Soviets counter that they are merely modernizing their
old SS-13 missiles. For their part. the Soviets denounce Washington for funding ballistic
missile defense projects in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Mis-Bile (ABM; Treaty.
Washington counters that research and development lasers and other electronic-transfer
weapons are not covered by the ABM Treat,-.
The point is that gross violations of SovietlAmerican treaties do not seem to have
occurred. The complexity of armaments has, however, led to charges that depend on on’s
point of view,
and the difficulties of verification heighten already strong suspicions by both sides.

8. Domestic Factors

A variety- of domestic factors also undermine arms control.

Economically. arms are big business. and economic interest groups
pressure their governments to build and sell weapons and/or arms-potential technology
such as nuclear p ~ nts. In America industry has been a prime supporter of the MX l,l s
and stands to `lose billions if the project is scrapped, as Table 15-2 in icates.

The armaments industry is also important in the Soviet Union. Nicknamed ”the metal
eaters,’ arms anufacturers form a power bloc in Soviets politics, or as one view has it,
”The United States has a military industrial complex; the Soviet Union is a military
industrial complex.

Additionally, there are often bureaucratic elements in alliance with the defense industry.
In the Soviet Union, the uncertaill

process of leadership change gives a strong voice to the military. A leader who hay
achieved his position with the backing of the military is unlikely to t:.rcc his benefactors
to reduce their arms and budgets.

pisarmament

The military establishment is less influential in the United States. but it is still a powerful
force. Because of its connections with economic interest groups. its support in Congress.
and its technical expertise. the Pentagon has been able to exert considerable restraint on
U.S. arms control efforts.

15.2 MX missile contractors.

Company Contract Plants
Martin Marietta $ 38U,OOU.OOU Colorado. California

Rockwell

Morton Thiokol
Boeing
Aerojet Strategic
Propulsion
GTE SylvaNia
AVCO

Hercules

TRW
Westinghouse
Honcw~el l

>71.UOU.UOU 187.1>UU.OUO

149,000.0010 133.000.000 122,000.000

1 IU.UUO,()OU

l O6.0UO.UU() 80,000,000 36,000.000 22,000,000

California California. Massachusetts

Utah

Washington State

California

Massachusetts
Massachusetts.
Pennsylvania
Utah
California
California ,
Florida

Based on Defense Department sources published in The New York Times. December 7,
1982, p. DI.

Finally. in more democratic systems. arms control becomes entangled in the electoral
process. The positions of policy”Inakers in the executive branch and legislators in
Congress are affected not only by what they think but also by the partisan implications of
their positions. Particularly because arms control is such a complex subject dealing with
such a dangerous issue. advocates from all perspectives arc apt to oversimplify and to
appeal to popular emotions in a bid to gain support. For its part, the American public has
highly divergent views on arms control. The vast majority fear nuclear weapons and
favor arms control. Yet. in 1984 61 percent
also agreed that the Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty they’ve ever signed,’
and 58 percent agreed that in past ayreclilents- the Soviets always got the better part of
the bargain.’ These c(Iuntenailing attitudes make arms negotiations seem almost as
dangerous ,Is,, nuclear battlefield to elected officials.

International Relations

:lrrus Control And the Future

The final question we must ask is ”What of the future’ The answer. as with much of
international politics, is that the case- history is discouraging, the prognosis is guarded,
but there are glinmmerings of hope.

Among the forces working for arms control is the chance to limit new technology. On of
the more fruitful areas of arms control has been the effort to limit the spread of weapons.
Nonproliferation has had a fair amount of success and is supplemented by geographic
nuclear free zones (such as Latin America). Space is a new frontier. and treaties may be
possible to expand current agreements in this area. At this writing. for example, there are
beginning moves toward U.S./Soviet talks on banning antisatellite weapons and other
aspects of what is called ”Star Wars” technology. In short, restricting the proliferation of
weapons and the development/deployment of new types of weapons is a more probable
area of success than reductions/limits an existing systems.
A second hopeful sign is domestic pressure. Mass concern with the possibility of nuclear
war has never been higher. The antinuclear movement in Europe has been particularly
spurred by the deployment of U.S. Perishing and curies missiles in NATO countries.
There is also a strong movement in the United States, which has recently focused on the
nuclear freeze-issue. Such domestic pressures are, of course, of less consequence in
nondemocratic political systems, but there are some signs of antinuclear sentiment in East
Germany Rumania and even the Soviet Union itself. Additionally the overall budgetary
cost of military systems is generating a negative reaction in the United States and
elsewhere. Especially is the West then but to a degree everywhere the cost and horror of
extensive nuclear and convention wear owns systems may serve as a source or restraint.
International initiatives are a third source of hope in the continuing effort to make
progress. Despite pe ’ breakdowns. arms control talks between the United States and t
Soviet Ultion have become a virtually ongoing process. The norm is ow to negotiate. It is
easy be discouraged by what remains to be done, ut the achievement of thirteen
multilateral and nine bilateral U.S./Sow et agreements in the last two decades is cause for
hope.
There is also considerable
effort (In the multilateral level. The
United Nations serves as a focus of effort and information and, in
particular may serve as a potential inspection agency. as the International
Atomic Energy Agency now is with respect to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.

In sum. theta, there is a need and there are possible solutions. The question is NN hcther
we will do enough, soon enough.

CHAPTER 16

DIPLOMACY

The Nature of Diplomacy

While the sentiments of Still well and Stalin have some justification. they do not suggest
the real nature of diplomacy, which consists of the techniques and procedures for
conducting relations among states: it is. in fact. the normal means of conducting
international relations. In itself diplomacy. like any machinery. is neither moral nor
immoral; its use and value depend upon the intentions and abilities of those who practice
it.

Diplomacy functions through a labyrinth of foreign offices, embassies, legations.

consulates. and special missions all over the world. It is commonly bilateral in character.
but as a result of the growing importance of international conferences. international
organizations, regional arrangements. and collective security measures, its multilateral
aspects have-become increasingly significant. It may embrace a multitude of interests,
from the simplest matter of detail in the relations between two states to vital issues of war
and peace. When it breaks down. the danger of war. or at (east of a major crisis, is very
real.

Definition:

No general definition of dip] ontacv can be vey satisfactow or verS~ revealing. The
Oxford English Dictionan- calls it ”the management of international relations by
negotiatio.” or ’the method by Evhich these relations are adjusted and managed.” A
charming characterization. though vague and inadequate. is given in Sir Earnest Satonvs
Guide to Diplomatic Practice, a work which has been the bible of British diplomats for
man ~ years. ”Diplonnacy.” wrote Sir Earnest. ”is the application of intelligence <tlid tact
to the conduct of official relations beW een the bo\ernnteuts of independent states.’ Since
the eminent author of these lines is no longer

lntemational Relations

liv ng. we cannot ask him this impertinent. but timely qucation- if intelligence and tact
are lacking in the relations betueeu states. is diplomacy impossible?
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.

A necessary distinction to bear in mind is that between foreign policy and diplomacy.
The foreign policy of a state, as JR. Childs has said. is ”the substance of foreign
relations.” whereas ”diplomacy proper is the process by which policy is carried out.”
Policy is made by mom- different persons and agencies; but presumably on
major matters in any state, whatever its form of government, it is made at the highest
levels. though subject to many different kinds of controls. Then it is the purpose of
diplomacy to provide the machinery and the personnel by which foreign policy is
executed. One is substance: the other is method.

One of the most astute students and practitioners of diplomacy in the twentieth century-,
Harlod Nicolson. is particularly insistent on calling attention to this distinction. In some
cases, however, his efforts to be yew precise in this matter seem to raise further
questions. For example, in his interesting study. The Congress of Vienna. Nicolson
wrote:

It is useful, even when dealing with a remote historical episode, to consider where
diplomacy ends and foreign policy, begins. Each of them is concerned with the
adjustment of national to international interests. Foreign policy is based upon a general
conception of national requirements .... Diplomacy, on the other hand. is not an end but a
means; not a purpose but a method. It seeks. by the use of reason. conciliation and the
exchange , of interests, to prevent major conflicts arising between sovereign states. It is
the agency through which foreign policy seeks to attain its purpose by agreement rather
than by- war. Thus when agreement becomes impossible diplomacy, which is the
instrument of peace, becomes inoperative: and foreign policy, the final sanction of ~ ~ ’ -
war. alone becomes operative.

The last sentence tends to destroy the ice distinction between diplomacy and foreign
policy which Mr. Nic Ison makes: and it is misleading in that it suggest that diplomacy
cease to function when major international crises arise. especially- if they lead to war.
The object of diplomacy, as of foreign policy, is to protect the security- of a nation by
peaceful means if possible. but by giving every assistance to the military operations if
war cannot be avoided. Diplomacy does not cease to function. as Nicolson suggests. in
time of war: although it necessarily plays a different role in wartime. the work of
diplomates. as of foreign ministers. Ind.%, even wpand. The diplomacy- of the two world
wars of this centun pirnude• , onmivcing support for this contention.

Diplomacy

Functions of Diplomats

354

A diplomat is at times spoken of as the eyes and ears of his government in other
countries. His chief functions are to execute the policies of his own country. to protect its
interests and its nationals. and to keep his government informed of major developments
in the rest of the world. In an address before the America-Japan Society- in Tokyo, on
November 22. 19 38,
Joseph C. Grew. United States Ambassador to Japan,

commenting on the work of the professional diplomat, thus explained the ”supreme
purpose and duty of an ambassador”:

He must be, first and foremost, an interpreter, and this finction of interpreting acts both
ways. First of all he tries to understand the country which he serves--its conditions. its
mentality. its actions, and its underlying

motives, and to explain these things clearly to his own government. And then.
contrariwise. he seeks means of making known to the government and the people of the
country to which he is accredited the purposes and

hopes anddesires of his native land. He is an agent of mutual adjustment between the
ideas and forces upon which nations act.

The work of a diplomat may be broken down into four basic fiutctions: (1)
representation. (2) negotiation. (3) reporting, and (=I) the protection of the interests of the
nation and of its citizens in foreign lands. These functions. as well shall see. are closely
interrelated.

1. Representation.

A diplomat is a formal representative of his country- in a foreign state. He is the normal

agent of communication between his own foreign office and that of the state to which he
is accredited. In the eves of main citizens of the countr\- in which he is stationed. he is the
countw he represents. and that country is judged according to the personal impression he
makes. The diplomat must cultivate a wide variety of social contacts. with the ranking
officials of the foreign office and of the foreign government in general, with his fellow
diplomats, with influential persons in all walks of life, and with articulate groups in the
country. Social.

contacts can be enjoyable. stimulating. and profitable: they can also be hard on the
stomach as well as on the pocketbook, trying to the diplomat’s patience as well as to his
intelligence. Whatever else they may be. they seem to be an inescapable adjunct of the
important duty of representation.

Although these contacts have tended to become less formal. they have at . the same time
broadened inscope. Ambassador Grew, a career diplomat of

long experience. referred to them as ”the X-Ray language vibrating beneath the surface of
the spoken and the written ward.” which is simply a diplom,O’s wax of saving that a
trained mixer-obser,-er-auditor can often

Inf ernational Relations

Mack.’ up information or intelligence of great value in -- or from. --c -)ltycrsations at
social functions.

2. r , Negotiation.

Virtually a synonym for diplomacy. negotiation is par excellence the pursuit of

agreement -by compromise and direct personal contact. Diplomats are by definition
negotiation.
As such, they have duties that. as described by Mr. Ghilds, include ”the drafting of a wide
variety of bilateral anti multilateral arrangement embodied in treaties. conventions.
protocols. and other documents of a political. economics. and social nature. Their subject
matter ranges from the creation of an international security organization, through
territorial changes. establishment of roles to govern international civil aviation. shipping
and telecommunications’. and the adjustment of international commercial relationship. to
such particular matters as immigration. to such particular matters as immigration, double
taxation. waterway rights, tourist travel, and exchange control. Almost the :mire gataut of
human activities is covered.’

Because of the developments in communications and the increasing resort to mufti-lateral

diplomacy. as well as for other reasons. diplomats do not play as great a role in
international negotiations as they once did. Most agreements between states are still
bilateral and are concluded through negotiations between the foreign offices by the use of
ordinaw diplomatic channels. But the rnqjor international agreements, especially those of
a multilateral character, are usually negotiated directly by foreign ministers or their
special representatives. often at international conferences. Diplomats also have less
latitude than they once enjoyed: they arc now bound more closely to their foreign offices
by detailed instructions and constant communication by cable. diplomatic pouch, and
transoceanic telephone: but, although their stature has been somewhat reduced, they are
more than glorified messenger boys at the end of a wire. and the value of the personal
factor in diplomacy is still \-cry great.

3. Reporting.

Reports from diplomats in the field ar two raw material of foreign policy. These reports
cover nearly every c nceivable subject. from technical studies to appraisals of the
psychology of nations. Diplomats must. above all. be good reporters: if they have the
abilito estimate trends accurately. if they keep as eve out for all useful information. and if
they present the essential facts in concise and intelligible or. they may be Worth a kings
ransom. According to a publication of the United States Department of State on the
American Foreign Service. diplomats ’Ire expected to -observe. analyz and report on p
wtical. social and cconol»”
conditions and trends of signi t e isa country in mhicl, tloy ~Jlc

Diplomacy 3 >6

assigned. Some major subjects of these reports are legislative programs, public opinion.
market conditions, trade statistics. finance, production, labor. agriculture. forestry. fishing
mining. natural resources, shipping.
freights. charters, legislation, tariffs and law.” American diplomatist alone prepare
thousands of reports of this sort every year.

4. Protection of Interests.

Although a diplomat is expected to get along with the authorities

of the state to which he is accredited --that is. he must be penso> na grata to
the government of a state--he is also expected at all times to seek to further
the best interests of his own county. However selfish this approach may
seem to be, it is the bedrock of the practice of diplomacy. While it is

assumed that the interests of each state will be so interpreted that they will harmonize
with those of the international community. it is not the function of the diplomat to make
the interpretation. His duty is to look after the interests of his country as interpreted by
the policy-makers back home and in accordance with treaties, other international
agreements. and principles of international law. He also has the more specific duty of
attempting to assist and protect businessmen, seamen. and all other nationals of his own
country who are living or traveling in the country in which he is stationed or who happen
to have interests there. He seeks to prevent or

Diplomacy as Communication

We often think of diplomacy in stereotypic terms. There is an image of somber

negotiations over green-felt-covered tables in ornate roosts. Modern diplomacy certainly
includes such interactions, but it also extends much further. Indeed. diplomacy includes
the entire range of communications between two or more governments.

As a communications process. diplomacy has two elements. The

negotiation. When two parties are tal~ing with each other.
citlscr directly or through an intermediary. they are negotiating. The
second aspect of diplomacy is signaling--saving or doing something with
the intent of sending a message to another government. When leaders

stake bellicose or conciliatory speeches. when military forces are alerted of relaxed. when
trade privileges are granted or sanctions invoked, or when diplomatic recognition is
extended or relations are broken, these events arc. or at least should be, signals. Indeed,
the use of military power is a form of signaling. As Clausewitz said, war is not the end of
diplomacy but continuation. Militarv actin can be designed as a signaling process to
:nt,tis goals rather than to defeat enemies, and nonviolent signals and ”~,gciiatiun should
continue during conflict.

first element i:

International Relations

The Evolution of Diplomacy

Diplomacy is as old as recorded history and almost certainly even predates it. Modern
diplomacy has its origins in the practices of the
Greek cite-states. and this section will examine their contribution as well as the
diplomatic practices of Rome, Byzantium. the Italian city-states.. France. and nineteenth-
century Europe. This historical review will bring us to about World War I. which marks
the transition from the ”old” diplomacy to tile ”new” diplomacy. Current
in the following section.

1. Greece and Rome

It is in the writings of ancient Greece that we first encounter many of tile terms (such as
reconciliation, truce. alliance, and commercial treaty) used in modern diplomacy.
Diplomatic missions are also described in the Homeric epics. Ambassadors were
dispatched. on an ad hoc (case by case) basis. Negotiations were conducted orally. but
treaties were written. The Greeks also recognized neutrality, used arbitration. and had
officials charged witi: furthering commercial practice, the status of aliens, and other
principles that -(-,main important today were also evident in Greek practice.

Rome. Ouch practiced conquest more than diplomacy. was important for organizational
improvements on Greek practice. Ambassadorial appointments. instructions. and status
became more formalized. Diplomatic immunity became more Nyidely recognized. at
least in theory. The Romans, with their penchant for laws. also stressed the sanctity of
contracts. thus elevating the status of treaties.

2. Byzantium

The Byzantine Empire. which flourished after Rome’s collapse. was noted for the
beginnings of ”professional’ diplomacy. Diplomats were specificalh trained as
negotiators- and the first department of foreign affairs was established. In an age of
chaos. and surrounded by o~yerfiil barbarian foes. the Byzantines also emphasized the
rker sees of diplomacy. such as deceit and spying. They also create elaborate protocol
procedures for military reviews and homage to the emperor designed to enhance beyond
reality the image of Byzantine strength

3. The Italian City-States

The diplomacy of the Italian states beginning iii the fifteenth century is best known for its
improvements oil the Byzantine practice of cunning and. artifice. The names Niccolo
Machiavelli of Florence and Cosinlo de’ Medici. Duke of Florence. are synorlv_ ous with
scheming conduct. Machiaveli counseled that it N%as best to b as powerful as a lion and
as sly as a fox and summed up h1 mlatro human nature NN ith tile observation that one
”must start Nyith assuming that all men arc b:id ~,nd

diplomatic trends will then be discussed

358

ever ready to display their vicious nature whenever they may find occasion for it.” `
The Italian ciy-states also made more positive contributions to the evolution of
diplomacy.
They first established permanent diplomatic missions. Treaty making and protocol were
improved. Summit meetings were also introduced as diplomatic practice.

4. The French System

The direct predecessor of modern diplomacy is the French system. which is strongly
identified with the contributions of Cardinal Richelieu in the seventeenth century. He was
the first to see diplomacy as an ongoing process rather than a short-term expediency. He
also began the practice of building public opinion support. Honoring treaties became an
ethical as well as a pragmatic responsibility. Richelieu also insisted on precision in
drafting agreements and consolidated all foreign affairs functions under one ministry.

Under Louis XIV. the minister of foreign affairs became a member of the king’s cabinet,
and permanent embassies were established in all the major capitals, with lesser-ranked
missions in minor capitals. It was also during this era that the diplomatic manual was
written.

5. Europe in the Nineteenth Century

The post-Napoleonic congresses at Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chappelle (1818) were

important in codift-ing the status and functions of diplomatic agents. The nineteenth
century was also both the height and the beginning of the end of the ”old” style of
diplomacy. Kings and emperors still held sway in a world dominated by Europe. but the
American and French revolutions signaled the onset of the decline and fall of that system.
Diplomacy of that day was characterized by Eurocentrism. great-power status, executive
control, elite conduct. secrecy. and bilateral negotiations.

6. Eurocentrism

In the 1800s, Europe was the center of the globe. America was isolated behind its oceans,
and the rest of the world was either impotent or colonized.

7. Great-power status

The six great powers (Great Britain. French Italy. Austria-Hungary, Prussia-Germany,
and Russia) were considered to have both special status and special responsibilities.
Lesser states were bullied and sometimes divided up among the big six. Intervention and
imperialism were common. The powers also had a special ability to maintain order. both
by ”policing” minor powers and colonial dependencies and by consulting and
maintaining a balance of power themselves. 1t was a system

Intemational Relations

that worked reasonably well for a centun’ before it catastrophically collapsed with World
War I.
8. Executive control

Foreign policy making was dominated by the king. Louis XIV quite literally believed, ”I
am the state.” Richelieu was concerned with public option, and legislatures were gaining
power in Britain and America, but democracy was still the exception
rather than the rule.

9. Elite conduct

The diplomatic corps was recruited exclusively from the nobilitv and gentry. It was an
era when that class had similar values and members often were even related. Great
Britain’s King Edward VII. Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Russia’s Czar Nicholas 11
were all cousins. Nationalism was enveloping, but to a substantial degree the elite
diplomats were ”men of Europe” who had as much loyalty, or more, to the ”system” of
elite and great-power dominance as to then national entities. In part, this elitism provided
a common frame of reference and a mutual confidence that benefited negotiations.

10. Secrecy

Diplomats of the nineteenth centur<. adhered to the belief that public negotiations caused
undue posturing and a reluctance to compromise. Negotiations were almost always
confidential and treaties were often secret.

11. Bilateral negotiations

Although there were a few noted multilateral conferences. such as the Congress of
Vienna, bilateral diplomacy (direct negotiations between two countries) was the normal
form of negotiation. Practitioners felt not only that conference diplomacy was slow and
cumbersome but also that it confused the power relationships on which international
relatio ing zl:,,
e

Modern Diplomacy

Although diplomatic practice has evolved sl wly over the centuries. the years around
World War 1--symbolize by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points--are generally
recognized as a benchmark in the transition to modern diplomacy as part of the modern
political era. The ”Great War”. was the beginning of the end of European world
dominance. It also marked the fall of the German, Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian
emperors. Nationalistic self-determination was on the rise in Europe and other parts of
the world. New powers--the United States, Japa : and China--were beginning to rise and
join or replace the declining E opean powers. The ”old diplomacy” did not vanish. but it
was substanti y changed in the decades following the ”war to end all wars.” As will
become clear, the

Diplomacy .
„gin diplomacy’’ is characterized by an expansion of geographic scope.’ multilateral
diplomacy, parliamentarianism, democratization. , open` diplomacy, and summitry. Each
of these new practices has been greeted as ,, ”reform,” but as we will see, the changes
have not necessarily been for the better.
1, Multilateral Diplomacy

Although .conferences involving a number of nations occurred at times during the

nineteenth century, that practice has expanded greatly in the modern era. The rise of
multilateral diplomacy is symbolized by Woodrow Wilson’s call for a League of Nations.
There are now a number of permanent world and regional international organizations. Ad
.hoc conferences and treaties are also more apt to be multilateral. Before 1 X00, for
example, the United States attended an average of one multilateral conference per year.
Currently. American diplomats average more than one such conference per day.

2. Parliamentary Diplomacy

Parliamentary diplomacy., which includes debate and voting in international

organizations, now sometimes supplants negotiation. compromise, and accord as the
vehicle of diplomacy. Furthermore, with the decline of the legitimacy of great-power
special status and responsibility, voting is often done on the basis of sovereign equally,
China and Chad each casting one vote. The old system has not completely died out,
however, and the UN Security. Council, dominated by the five permanent members and
their veto power, is the primary example.

3. Democratization

The elite and executive-dominant character of diplomacy has changed in a number of

ways. One is that diplomats are drawn from a wider segment of each country’s society.
This has the advantage of making diplomats more representative of their nations and
more sympathetic to the individuals therein. It also means, though, that diplomats have
lost their common frame of reference and are apt to suffer from the antagonisms and
misperceptions that nationalistic stereotyping causes.

A second democratic change is the rise of the roles of legislature’s and public opinion in
foreign policy making. Executive leadership still dominates that process, but it is nn
longer the exclusive domain of princes. presidents, and prime ministers The rise in
representative and popular power is certainly in accord wit4t democratic theory, but it has
its drawbacks. Democracy is too often i(opatient, crusading, and xenophobic, and
executives have lost a degr::e of flexibility. Legislative and public opinion is also usually
less. well informed than the eacc:utivc. although information and wise policy are far
froan svncmymous.

International Relations

4. Open Diplomacy

Of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, his call for ”open covenants. openly arrived at is the best
remembered. One advantage of open diplomacy is that it fits nicely with the idea of
democracy. It also has the potential of avoiding perceptual errors that can occur if an
opponent misjudges your commitments. Offsetting these advantages

361
arc several drawbacks. The majority of scholarly and practitioner commentary favors
both open discussion of foreign policy goals and public treaties. It is the ”openly arrived
at,” or negotiation, phase that is troublesome. Here, most analysts agree that
confidentiality is important. Early disclosure of your bargaining strategy will compromise
your ability to win concessions. Public negotiations are also more likely to lead diplomats
to posture for public consumption. Concessions may be difficult to make amid popular
criticism. In short, it is difficult to negotiate (or to play chess) with someone kibitzing
over your shoulder.

Finally, it should be added that even secret treaties and understandings are not totally
without merit. There are times when a desirable agreement cannot be made in public. The
agreement ending the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -included an oral pledge by the United
States never to invade Cuba. President Kennedy would have found it difficult to give that
assurance in public. X1.5. involvement in the Vietnam War ended with north Vietnam’s
seeming to agree not to forcibly conquer the South in return for a pledge of over a billion
capitalist dollars in U.S. foreign aid. Neither country could have made that agreement in
public.

5. Summitry

Modern transportation has spawned an upsurge of high-level diplomacy. National leaders

regularly hold bi-or multilateral summit conferences, and foreign ministers and other
ranking diplomats jet between countries, conducting shuttle diplomacy. One hundred
thirty years of American history passed before a president (Woodrow Wilson) traveled
overseas while in office. Richard Nixon departed on his first state visit to Europe only
thirty-three days after his inauguration. In early 198> the funeral of Konstantin
Chernenkn occasioned the journey of the leaders of Britain. France, West Germany,
India, Canada, and other countries to Moscow to meet his successor, Mikhail Gorbachev.
Further. within three days of assuming power. Gorbachev had accepted invitations to visit
Paris and Bonn and was considering a proposal by Reagan that he come to Washington.
Indeed, *given this century’s transportation and communications. national. leaders have
often become chief diplomats in practice as well as theory:

Diplomacy

The advent of globe-trotting. leader diplomacy, or summitry, is a mixed blessing. First

among its ndvnntage.c is that leaders can sometimes make dramatic breakthroughs. The
Camp David accords were produced after President Carter, Egypt’s president Anwar
Sadat. and Israel’s prime minister Menachem Begin isolated themselves at the
presidential retreat in \lar<-land. Second, it can be argued that reciprocal visits help
leaders gain firsthand impressions of their counterparts and their cultures. Lack of
international contacts increases stereotyping and other misperceptions. A third advantage
of personal contact among leader
is that mutual confidence or even friendship may develop. Henry Kissinger recalls that
even though they were a ”strange pair. Brezhnev and Nixon ultimately developed a
modus vivendi because they came to understand the other’s perception of his self-
interest.”

Summit diplomacy also has strong disadvantages. The first is that ii may lead to ill-
conceived agreements. According to Kissinger, ”Some of the debacles of our diplomatic
history have been perpetrated by Presidents who fancied themselves negotiators.”
Second, mistakes made by lower-rauking officials can be disavowed by their superiors.
”When Presidents become negotiators no escape routes are left .... Concessions are
irrevocable without dishonor.” Third, and again in Kissinger’s words, leaders are afflicted
with a ”healthy dose of ego.” arid ”negotiations can rapidly deteriorate from intractability
to confrontation.” In other words, contact may bring animosity instead of cordiality.
Tensions between the United States and India during the early 1970s were heightened
because ”Nixon had no time for Mrs. Gandhi’s condescending manner. Privately he
scoffed at her moral pretensions, which he found all the more irritating because he
suspected that .... she had in fact fewer scruples than he.” Fourth, and finally, the failure
of summitm can lead to increased tensions. High-level negotiations create hope; when
they collapse, the resultin tsappoir went and manual recriminations can leave matters
worse an before. If a summit conference is the ultimate negotiation, then ’ s failure makes
it seem that no solution is possible. In such a case c nflict may be the response.

362

CHAPTER 17

FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS DETERMINANTS

In’ modern times no state can avoid involvement in the international sphere. This
involvement must be systematic and based on some well-defined principles. The
principles and the purpose of a state is reflected in the foreign policy. The important of
the foreign policy has be~;n highlighted by scholars in various ways. According to one
scholar, v spate without a foreign policy is like a ship without a radar which dr;fts
aimlessly without any direction by every storm and sweep of eve. its. According to Prof.
Taylor ”Foreign Policy of a sort will go on so long as there are sovereign states.”

Meaning of Foreign Policy

There is no unanimity amongst scholars regarding the meaning of foreign policy and
various definitions have been offered. According to Padelford and Lincoln: ”A state’s
foreign policy is the totality of its dealings with the eternal environment. Foreign policy
is more than a collection of official documents, formal records of
actions and public statements. A foreign policy statesmen can be simple and sucient .... or
it may be complicated and imprecise .. Policy is the overall result of the process by which
a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into specific courses of action
in order to achieve its objective and preserve its interest.”

Prof F.S. Northedge says that foreign policy implies ”the use of political influence in
order to induce other states to e~,ercise their law making power in a manner desired by
the state concerned: it is an interactiori between for es originating outside the country’s
borders and those works w’ ’ them.”

foreign Policy 364

Prof Joseph Frankel says that ”foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which
involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others.” Huge Gibson
defines foreign policy as ”a well-rounded comprehensive plan based on knowledge and
experience for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is
aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nations. This calls for a clear
understanding of what those interests are and how far we can

hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less than this falls short of being a
foreign policy.”

George Modelski says that foreign policy is ”*the system of activities evolved by
communities for chaining the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own
activities to the international environment.” According to Rodee ”Foreign policy involves
the formulation and

implementation of group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while
negotiating with other states to protect or firrther its interests.”

The Brookings Institution in its book rllajor Pnoblenr.s of United States Foreign Policv
1952-53, used the term foreign policy, to refer to the

complex and dynamic political course that a nation follows in relation to other states.
According to it the foreign policy of a nation is more than the

sum total of its foreign policy (thought out courses of action for achieving objectives), for
it also includes its commitment, the current forms of its interests and objectives and the
principles of right conduct that it professes.

A perusal of the above definitions of foreign policy, shows that scholars have laid
emphasis either on the plan of action or policy as executed. However. they all agree that
the foreign policy is concerned with the behaviour of a state towards other states.

Objective of Foreign Pouch.

The main objectives which the foreign policy, of a country seeks to achieve are as
follows:

Firstly, it seeks to protect the territorial

integrity of the country and protect the interests of its citizens, both within and tside the
untry. Generally, for this purpose the states prefer to follow olicy of status q ro. If

a state pursues a policy which seeks to upset the stat s quo it is branded as revisionist and
arouses the suspicions of other mem rs of the international community. It has to protect
the interests of its citizens both inside and outside the state, for the maintenance of its
prestige.

secondly, the objective of foreign policy is maintenance of links with ot$er meriibers of
international community and adoption of policy of conflict or cooperation towards them
with a view to promote its own interests. It is well known that India has deliberately
avoided exchange of

International Relations

diplomatic relations with Israel so that its relations with the Arab countries do not get
strained. primarily because of close trade relations with the Arab countries.

Thirdly, the foreign policy of a country seeks to promote and further its national interests
of the country. The primary interest of each state is self-preservation, security and well
being of its citizens. Often the interests of various states come in clash and the states have
to protect their interests bearing in mind this factor.

Fourthly, the foreign policy aims at promotions of economic interests of the country. As
the status of a state in international arena is largely determined by its economic status, the
states try to pursue a foreign policy which can contribute to their economic prosperity and
enable it in turn to play a more effective role in international politics. Most of the treaties
and agreements concluded by the states with other members of international community
are essentially designed to protect and promote the economic interests of these states. The
importance of this factor is evident from the fact that India opted to keep out of two
power blocs, which had come into existence when she gained independence, and
adopted policy of non-alignment chiefly because she was keen to concentrate on her
economic development. Further, she hoped to get every possible help and assistance from
both the superpowers to accelerate the process of economic development. Similarly USA
and China were obliged to patch up that differences, despite their ideological differences,
due to economic considerations.

Fifthly, the foreign policy aims at enhancement of the influence of the state either by
expanding its erea of influence or reducing the other states to the position of dependency.
The policy of United States and Soviet Union in the post World War II ,period have been
largely motivated by these considerations.

Determinants
of Foreign Policy (Factors Influencing Foreign

Policy)

The foreign policy of a country is influenced by so many factors that it is not possible to
enumerate all of them here. Some of the important factors which influence the foreign
policy of a country or constitute the inputs of the foreign policy are given thereunder.
Broadly speaking these factors fall into two categories, viz., internal and eternal.

INTERNAL FACTORS

i. Size. In the first place the size of a state’s territory as well as

its relatio greatly influences its foreign policy. Generally the
leader and people of countries with small territory and
`population do not expect their country to carry great weight in

foreign Policy

366

international affairs. On the other hand the leaders and people of large countries are ready
to assume special responsibilities. However. sometime even small states which have rich
resources also leave a deep impact on world politics. For example, the oil-rich countries
of Middle East though small in size. are playing significant role in the international ’?’?.
Likewise if a country possesses large territow which is barren and a ?’?which is
unskilled, it may not be able to play any effective role in ’.’? politics.

Geography. The geography of a country. including its fertility. climate location in

relation to other land masses, and water-ways etc. also influence the county’s foreign
policy. It is a major factor in determing self-sufficiency of a county. Generally land-
locked countries. nations in the topics and those bordering a superpower arc less self-
sufficient in comparison to the which have to warm-water ports or re located in the
countries temperate zones and far removed from superpowers. For example in the
nineteenth century USA adopted isolationist pulley chiefly on account of its geographical
location. Though the importance of geographic factors is acknowledged almost at all
hands. its importance has considerably declined due to technological and scientific
developments. ’For example. due to improvement in the means of transport and
communication the world has greatly shrunk and the perception of large bodies of water
as natural barriers to military attack has greatly diminished. But still geographical
location of a county has a deep impact on the determination of ifs foreign policy. India
adopted policy of non-alignment because of geographical location. .The presence of two
myjor powers on its borders (USSR and China) deterred it from joining power s.

Culture and History. The cultur and histori 1 traditions of a country also deeply influenc
the foreign poll v. Generally people possessing a unified common culture a d
historical experience can pursue an effective foreign poll y because of the support of all
sections of society who share the same values and memories. On the other hand. a
country which is culturally and historically fragmented cannot pursue unequally
eCfectivc foreign policy. According to Prof Roseau -the influence of cultural factors is
not limited to the impact of societal unity upon the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy, ~ Equally important arc the processes throuth

international Relations

6.

which the contents of shared norms and practices of society. as distinguished from the
degree of unity that supports them. shape the plans that are made and the activities that
are undertake with respect to the external world.’

-f. Economic Development. The stage of economic

development which a county has attained also has its impact
on its foreign policy. Generally the industrially advanced
countries feel more deeply involved in relations with other
countries because they have to import different kinds of raw
materials and commodities from other countries. They are
also on the look out of latest relations with their trading
partners. All this leads to intimate links between the groups
and people of one country with their counterparts in the other
county. Again, an industrial county, is expected to have a
higher gross viz., economic aid programme. military ventures
and extensive diplomatic to actively involve themselves in
external affairs. The lack of scientists. engineers and other
specialists in the countn prevents them from taking
advantage of the technological break-through abroad.

Technology. Advancement in technology, which effects the military and economic

capabilities of a state, also exercises profound influence on the indirect manner. viz.. by
influencing other sources of foreign police.

National Capacitt% The national capacity of a state also exercises profound influence on
the foreign police of a state.

National capacity of a state depends on its militar<preparedness; its technological

advancement and economic

development. It is swell known that United States which continued to pursue police of
isolation till the beginning of the present century got decph involved in the international
arena in the present century mainly- due to tremendous increase in her national capacity
due to rapid economic development. Similarly, the foreign police of Britain underwent
great transformation in the post World War II period, ma’ _- due to decline iii her
national capacity-.

7. Social tr 13 ucture. The social structure of a society also

exe ises profound influence oil its foreign polio-. A society
wli cli is sharply divided
oil tile basis of iwealthy.religion.
rc Tonal unbalances. etc., cannot pursue effective foreign
poi cy on account of division and lack of co-operation among
various groups: On the other hand a homogeneous socict\possessing strong sense of
national unitw can pursue a nnorc

Foreign Policy

9.

effective foreign policy., it is well known that Britain stood as one person under the
leadership of Churchill during the Second World War and the people gladly suffered all
kinds of hardships to preserve their unity because of social solidarity. No doubt. it is not
easy to trace the impact of social stntcture on the foreign policy plans and behaviour,
because of the

involved subtleties. but no student of foreign policy can ”afford to ignore the external
consequences of the internal social structure and of the slow changes it maw be
undergoing.’*

88. Pubic Mood. Public mood is another important determinant

of a country’s foreign policy. Though it is generally held that
the public mood usually follows rather than guides the foreign
policy making process. it can exercise lot of influence on the
determination of a foreign police of basic realignment in the
prevailing great power stricture takes place and the state
becomes more involved or more isolated from the world
affairs. It may be noted that generally in an authoritarian
system the public mood does not influence the foreign policy.
but in a democratic system based on political accountability
considerable weights has to be accorded to the changing
public mood and sentiments.
Political Organisation. The political organisation found in a
county also greatly influences the foreign policy. Generally
under authoritarian systems quick foreign policy decisions are
possible because the decision making power rests with an
individual assisted by his clique. But as the leaders under this
system are isolated from the operational environments and
the subordinate policy makers provide the information which
is perceived by the superiors. re t ’en possibility of a
discrepancy between the psychological and operational
aspects of the foreign policy. Further, un er this system
undesirable opposition can be suppressed thr ugh censorship .
and promulgation of regulations. On the ther hand in a
county possessing a democratic structur the citizens can
freely express their opinion on the domestic as well as foreign
policy which naturally leaves its impact on the foreign policy
of the county. Under democratic system there is very little
discrepancy behween what the officials- want to believe about
the state of world politics and the actual position because the
subordinate policy makers make available
critical and
detached information.

.’ ’- :G _~. ,.’ ._. \ , .,.

International Relations -1 69
foreign Policy 3 70
Within the democratic system itself tire difference in political
,~iludtlre has its impact on foreign policy. For example, under <l extent
of its relevance to the requirements of the role, his or
p;lrlialnentan systein of government based oil co-operation bcween . the her
emotional needs and most of other personality traits--
L1-4 ature a’i ’ these are but a few of the idiosyncratic factors that
can
c isk id the Executive. the cordial relations bemeen the wo Nvings have an
impact oil country’s foreign policy. On the other hand under influence the planning
and execution of foreign policy.” No
presidential system based on the principle of separation of powers. the doubt,
the qualities of leadership have a deep impact on the
relation bemeen the two wings arc likely to be more strained. «hich affect
country’s foreign policy but their role is greatly constrained
tire ambiguity or continuity of foreign police. Similarly. different foreign by the
governmental and social structure. Further the role of.
policy is likely to emerge under bi-party svstenr and multi -party systems.
leadership is not identical krr all countries. In less developed
Generally under bi-party system the government is likelN Lo have a clear-
countries their role is greater as compared to industrialised
cut majority and conduct itself ill a more decisive llt,lnl11er regarding the
societies the individuals enjoy very limited discretion in high
conduct of foreign relations. In contrast of this. under nrtllti-party system
governmental and non-governmental positions.
conflicting view points and interests nray have to be reconciled. This nraN
EXTERNAL. FACTORS
lead either to the avoidance or postponement of the decision. In addition to the
internal factors which influence a country’s

10. Role of Press. The press also plays a vital role in foreign
policy formulation process. The press contributes to this
process by supplying factual information on the basis of
which the people take decision: by publishing specialised
articles on current international developments in their countn
in relation to the past developments-, and by analysing the
policy of the government regard to foreign affairs. Tile press
also plays an important role in publicising the foreign policy
of the counti’v.
The role of tire press, however. depends on the political system prevailing in the county.
the rate of literacy as well as the attitude of government.

11. Political Accountahilitv. The nature of political

accountability prevailing in a system also greatly influence
the foreign policy of the country. Generally in an open
political system. the demands of citizen and groups get
articulated and tr smitted to foreign policy formulators. The
framers of for gn policy cannot ignore these demands. In fact
quite oftel the policy formulators anticipate these demands
while for mlating the foreign polio. On the other hand under
a closed ystem the public reactions are neither available nor
given nit eh importance.

12. l.eadersl ip. The leadership also plays a vital role in the
shaping of a country’s foreign polio. According to Rosenau
”A leader’s beliefs about the nature of international arena amt
tile goals that ought to be pursued therein. his or her pcAlliar
intellectual strengths and weddress for analysing infornroioo
and making decisions. his or her past background and tll;;

foreign policy discussed above, a number of external factors also exercise considerable
influence on the foreign policy of a country. In our times the world has become so
interlinked that incidents in other countries have their immediate impact on other
countries. Thus a coup d’etat in a neighbouring country: or nationalisation of oil
companies in middle east or release of a-proposed arms control agreement are events
which influence the actions of leaders in other countries.

1. Power-Structure. The great power structure prevailing in the

world politics also greatly influences the policy of a country.
In this regard three possibilities can be envisaged. First, a
number of powers, may enjoy great power status and their
relations may be based on balance of power system. Secondly,
there may be only two powers which dominate the world
scene and the other states are compelled to side with one or
the other. Thirdly, more than two states attain great. power
status and the two powers at poles are less able to
command strict allegiance of those in t orbit (the system is
known as loose-bipolar). The nature f power structure
prevailing in the world has a substant al impact on the
foreign policy of a country. Highlighti this point Prof
Rosenau says: ”where’ve a nation is loca d in the prevailing
herachy of world politics, rules governing the conduct of its
foreign relations tend to be embedded in the arrangements
whereby the great powers cope with their conflicts or
otherwise interact to frame and shape the major issue of an
era. These rules may not be explicitly identified and their
operation as inputs may take many forms, but their relevance
to the deliberations of foreign policy officials is likely to be
pervasive.”
Intemational Relations

371

2. International Organisation. The contemporary

international
organization also greatly influences the foreign policy of a
country. While formulating its foreign policy the country has
to take note of the international law, treaties and contracts.
No country can ignore these factors without jeopardising as
own interests. Apart from the structure at the global level, the
structures at the regional and sub-regional levels also greatly
influence the foreign policy of a country.

3. Reaction of Other States. While formulating its foreign

policy a country has to take note of the reaction of other states
to its various actions. No country can afford to pursue
interests which are fundamentally against the interests of the
other states because any policy based on narrow national
interests is likely to evoke strong reaction from the concerned
state and produced disasterous consequences. It is well known
that in 1939 Hitler embarked upon invasion of Poland
unmindful of the British reaction with disasterous
consequences. Similarly Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour,
unmindful of the strong American sentiments, produced
disastrous effects for their.

Alliances. Alliances concluded by various states also greatly influence the foreign policy.
The states parties to alliance have to respond to the requests and demands of their allies
and refrain from formulating policies or taking actions which are offensive to them. It is
true that generally the alliances give great amount of independence with regard to the
plans and actions, yet they operate implicitly and explicitly as important elements in the
process through which foreign policy is formulated and implemented.

World Public ’ Opinion. The world public opinion also exercises profound influence on
the foreign policy of country. It is true that the world public opinion influences the
foreign policy of a country only occasionally and is not a factor. Further, it i e to exercise
influence on the foreign policy
of t tj if it is supported by the domestic public
~ a s a c/ only i opinion. is well known that U.S. Government was made to effect changes
in its Vietnam policy largely due to hostile world opinion.

it can be said that the foreign policy of a country is the domestic factors as well as the
international environ-

5.

Thus determined bs IS1enlS.

CHAPTER 18
NATIONAL INTEREST

National interest is one of those terms that drive political scientists to distraction. It is
very used by political leaders to explain actions. What politician has ever announced a
policy or action and declared it ”not in the national”? Atomic attacks, conventional
invasions, and subversive activities Lve all been declared in
the national interest. Peace treaties, foreign aid.’ and the insistence on humanitarian
conduct have also been described as fulfilling the national interest.

This use of the term to describe every conceivable sort of policy

for good or evil has led some political scientists to discount the term as meaningless.
Others say that it is so elastic and ambiguous that it is of little use in describing what has
happened, predicting what will happen, or prescribing what policy ought to be adopted.

Political scientists have also been generally confounded in their attempts to devise
”scientific” and measurements for the national interest. Several scholars have tried to
look beyond t - erving, rationalising use of the term by politicians, but progress has been
s w in constructing objective outlines of what national interest is or ought to e.

The combination of diverse use of the term by decision makers plus academic conceptual
difficulties had led many s holars simply to

ignore national interest. Indeed, one recent look at the ubject has accused the academic
community- of. ”copping out.”

Whether or not that charge is fully true, it is plain, at least to this writer, that we cannot
afford to ignore national interest. First, if it is true, and this study holds, that nation-states
are the prime movers in international politics, and if as is surely true, these actors have
interests, then national interest is a vital topic. However it is used or abused, it s an
important source of international behavior. Second; and more important.

intemationai Relations = :-. ””

we heed to develop our own systematic concept so that we will not have to
National interest 374
accept the definition of regime leaders. As, responsible citizens, we can 3.
Whose Interests? Determined by Whom?
being to develop an,overall view of ”what ought to be,” and we can begin The
problem here is that national interest is a highly subjective
to evaluate individual policy options according to those standards and term. As used
by decision makers, it is a projection of the perceptions of a
priorities. Even a limited ability to. do that will eleiate your analytical particular
regime or even a single political leader in a given international
ability above that of some reactive, narrow-perspective decision makers. . or domestic
environment. It has been argued, for example, that the soviet
In this chapter w-e will examine several aspects of ’national communist
regime follows an aggressive policy in order to maintain itself
interest. First, we will look in detail at problems with the concept. Why is in power. On
the individual level, it has also been argued
that president
it so slippery? Second, we will look at some attempts by seculars to arrive Kennedy
engaged in the Cunan missile confrontation partly to save his
at useful definitions and dimensions of national interest. Third, we will own political
skin. Thus, the national interest can be interpreted, all or in
explore an approach to the subject that will help the reader begin part, in terms of a
regime’s interest or an individual’s interest.

evaluating policies by a more sophisticated set of standards. 4. Retroactive

Justification

Issues and problems

In one of the best essays in recent years on national interest, Fred sondermann has
outlined the major difficulties that political scientists face when they try to discuss the
subject.

1. Vagueness

Sendermann’s first argument is that the term national interest lacks precision. French
political philosopher Raymond Aron contends that national interest is a concept beyond
meaningful comprehension, that ”the plurality of concrete objectives and ultimate
objectives forbids a rational definition of national interest.”

Even this who do not find a definition of national interest impossible concede that it is
difficult to ”operationally define in the sense that empirical referents can be identified
easily.” In simpler words, that means that national interest has not been defined in terms
which are clear an widely acceptable and which also can be applied to describe, predict,
and. prescribe the real-world actions of countries.

2. Ends/Means Confusion

In international politic, we often confuse ends (goals) and means (methods). The concept
of ”power” is particularly important here. Hand Morgenthau has argued that ”sta en think
and act in terms of interest defined as power.” Without lying into all the controversy
caused by Morgenthau’s formulation, we can point out that, in part, power becomes an
end in itself. But power is a so a means insofar as its possession alloy’s a countrv to
achieve other ends, such as security. Thus, power presents an ends/means ambiguity. Is it
in the national interest to acquire power, or is power a tool to achieve the national
interest?

Ideally, a decision maker should fashion policies to meet the national interest. In practice,
leaders often react to events with less than perfect rationality. Top American leaders
defined South Korea as outside the perimeter of American interests in 1950. Yet when
North Korea invaded its neighbor, president Truman’s feisty personality led him to resist
militarily. It was only later, with hindsight, that justifications on the basis of national
interest were made to Americans and the world.

5. Existence and Transcendency

Numerous scholars
have argued that national interest does not really exist. Their point is that a society is a
collection of subgroups, each with its own set of interests. It can also be said that the
”intermestic” mangling of international and domestic issues has increased both the
number of subgroups concerned with foreign affairs and the level of the stakes involved,
thus making the search for.a single national interest even more difficult. Beyond this
problem, and even if a nationwide interest does exist, the question of transcendency
remains. The issue is whether the national intetest takes priority over the interests or
rights of subgroups or individuals. Jews are oppressed in the S ” P ”national interest.”
The world War II confinement of Japanese Americans ’n concentration camps was also
justified by that lofty term. The question is. then, what is the balance between
majoritarianism and minority rights:

6. National Egocentrism

A last issue is one of operation rathe than definition. Some students of world politics
charge that, as it is used in the world, national. interest is a destructive phenomenon. This
indictment is ’closely related to the attack in nationalism discussed in Chapter 4.
According to this view, the concept as used has become a ”synonym for national egoism”
and must be abandoned to avoid world shattering conflict. In the estimation of one critic,
”The bird’s-eye view of the political will of mankind in relation to globate problems and
their solutions does not present an encouraging

national interest. From its beginning, the U i d h and this factor worked against early
isolationism and theist the country outward. Unlike isolationism, however, trade
continues to be a significant and growing American national interest. The United States’
economy and its national security are heavily dependent on trade. Protection of American
trading partners in Western Europe and Japan is a mainstay of current American policy.
Energy dependence also makes the Middle Fast/Persian Gulf area a vital concern, and
even as noninterventionist a president as Jimmy Carter warned that he would move
militarily to keep that region’s oil flowing to the united states and its major trading
partners.

Maintaining a sphere of influence consisting of the Caribbean. central America, and (to a
lesser degree) South America is another basic tenet of U.S. national interest. Rejection of
Old world influence and belief in the special status of the New world led, in part, to the
formulation of the Monroe Doctninc>, which proclaims that the New World should not
be dominated by the Old and that the United states has a special role in ensuring that no
such domination
be allowed to develop or persist. Since Franklin Roosevelt announced the Good Neighbor
policy, the United states has in theory stopped trying to be the hemisphere’s police
officer, but in practice American troops or U.S.- st rted rebels have moved against the
governments of Cuba. the Dom’ scan Republic. Grenades, Nicaragua,
and

others in recent history.

Containment of co imunism is a third basic part of America’s perceived national interest.

_ lmost everything about communism as practiced raps counter to American tradition and
ideals. Soviet-stvle communism is atheistic and totalitarian and thus is antithetical to
American democratic-liberal ideals about free government. freedom of religion. and other
civil, and political liberties. Communism is also dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism.
or the fee-enterprise system end

International Relations . . .. 375 u., , . ., „ „,. ,; fr

._. ,

intent on their immediate material benefits. [ands N

National interest 376
picture. People are i
leaders play the game of power and wealth while the clouds of doom gather
private properly, which is the basis of the American economic system.
Added to all this, communism is wedded to the
Soviet Union, which means
overhead.” that it is a physical as well as a
spiritual and economic threat. As such, the
National Interest, American Style United States has long opposed communism.
Woodrow soon after its 1917
A great deal of American policy is influenced by the ideas and
revolution, in at least an indirect attempt to topple the Bolsheviks. More
experiences of the past. These, of course, are not static. Instead, they are
and are modified by intervening experiences and current
War l important, containment has been a major part of America’s post-World
evolutionary needs. American have never really had to protect their territory from
serious conquest, for instance, but that, of course, is a base interest of any
The reverses in Vietnam and the obvious revelries within the
communist world modified some of the
automatic anti-Communist
country and can be seen in deterrence and other defense policies. The
reactiveness. They did not end it, though, and with Ronald Reagan in the
convergence of these influences leads to some consistencies in the United
white House, the now unspoken commitment to
containment persists.
States’ particular definition of its national interest.
 Making the world like America is another
aspect of the American
Protection of trade is one important component of American
impulse. Americans believe in themselves and their system, and their
mte as been a trading nation, heritage
convinces them that they can and should bring the blessings of the
American political and civil libertarian system to the world. Despite the
warnings of John Kennedy (1962) and others that ”we must reject ... the
theory that the American mission is to remake the world in the American
image,” the result is a tendency to try to pressure others to live up to
American ideals. This can be condemned as ”ugly Americanism” or
applauded as ”humanitarianism,” depending on one’s views, but the basic
urge is the same.
National Interest, Soviet Style

Just like the United States, the Soviet Union has a history of ideas and experiences that
combine with current needs to influence its concepts of national interest.

Defense of the motherland is a key element of Soviet thinking. All countries, of course,
emphasize defense of the home territory, but the Soviets share a sense of impending
danger unknown to Americans and many others. Conflict history-. Peace has been the
exception in Russian history, and the Russians a major rev ion and borne the brunt of two
world wars. During world war 11, for ex amp seventy-five Russians died for every
American who was killed. Thus, ’n part because of their expansionism but in larger pat
because the have been repeatedly bludgeoned from nearly every direction, the Rus fans
have some reason to regard danger and struggle as the norm of inter ational relations.

The Soviet Union’s adoption of_ ommunism has,enhanced this feeling of struggle and of
being surrounded by hostile capitalist forces. The rise of China as a power, particularly
against a history of earlier corfliCt with Asiatic peoples, and as an ideological rival
further adds to Soviet fears and defensiveness.

international Relations °° 375

picture. People are intent on their immediate material benefits, [and] leaders play the
game of power and wealth while the clouds doom gather overhead.”

National Interest, American Style

A great deal of American policy is influenced by the ideas and experiences of the past.
These, of course, are not static. Instead, they are evolutionary and are modified by
intervening experiences and current needs. American have never really had to protect
their territory from serious conquest, for instance, but that, of course, is a base interest of
any country and can be seen in deterrence and other defense policies. The convergence of
these influences leads to some consistencies in the United States’ particular definition of
its national interest.

Protection of trade is one important component of American national interest. From its
beginning, the United has been a trading nation, and this factor worked against early
isolationism and thrust the country outward. Unlike isolationism, however, trade
continues to be a significant and growing American national interest. The United States’
economy and its national security are heavily dependent on trade. Protection of American
trading partners in Western Europe and Japan is a mainstay of current American policy.
Energy dependence also makes the Middle East/Persian Gulf area a vital concern, and
even as noninterventionist a president as Jimmy Carter warned that he would move
militarily to keep that region’s oil flowing to the united states and its major trading
partners.

Maintaining a sphere of influence consisting of the Caribbean, central America, and (to a
lesser degree) South America is another basic tenet of U.S. national interest. Rejection of
Old world influence and belief in the special status of the New world led, in part, to the
formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, which proclaims that the New World should not be
dominated by the Old and that the United states has a special role in ensuring that no such
domination be allowed to develop or persist. Since Franklin Roosevelt announced the
Good Neighbor policy. the United states has in theory stopped trying to be the
hemisphere’s police officer, but in practice American troops or U.S.- supported rebels
have moved against the governments of Cuba. the Dominican Republic. Grenades,
Nicaragua, and others in recent history.

Containment of communism is a

third basic part of America s perceived national interest. _ Almost everything about
communism as practiced runs .counter to American tradition and ideals. Soviet-style
communism is atheistic and totalitarian and thus is antithetical to American democratic-
liberal ideals about free government, freedom of religion, and other civil, and political
liberties. Communism is also dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism. or the fee-
enterprise system and

National Interest

private property, which is the basis of the American economic system. Added to all this,
communism is wedded to the Soviet Union, which means that it is a physical as well as a
spiritual and economic threat. As such, the United States has long opposed communism.
Woodrow soon after its 1917 revolution, in at least an indirect attempt to topple the
Bolsheviks. More important, containment has been a major part of America’s post-World
War 11 policy.

The reverses in Vietnam and the obvious revelries within the communist world modified
some of the automatic anti-Communist reactiveness. They did not end it, though, and
with Ronald Reagan in the white House, the now unspoken commitment to containment
persists.

Making
the world like America is another aspect of the American impulse. Americans believe in
themselves and their system, and their heritage convinces them that they can and should
bring the blessings of the American political and civil libertarian system to the world.
Despite the warnings of John Kennedy (1962) and others that ”we must reject ... the

theory that the American mission is to remake the world in the American image,” the
result is a tendency to try to pressure others to live up to American ideals. This can be
condemned as ”ugly Americanism” or applauded as ”humanitarianism,” depending on
one’s views, but the basic urge is the same.

National Interest, Soviet Style

Just like the United States, the Soviet Union has a history of ideas and experiences that
combine with current needs to influence its concepts of national interest.

Defense of the motherland is a key element of Soviet thinking. All countries. of course,
emphasize defense of the home territory, but the Soviets share a sense of impending
danger unknown to Americans and many others. Conflict history. Peace has been the
exception in Russian history, and the Russians a major revolution and borne the brunt of
two world wars. During world war 11, for example, seventy-five Russians died for every
American who was killed. Thus, in part because of their expansionism but in larger pat
because they have been repeatedly bludgeoned from nearly every direction, the Russians
have some reason to regard danger and struggle as the norm of international relations.

The Soviet Union’s adoption of communism has,enhanced this feeling of struggle and of
being surrounded by hostile capitalist forces. The rise of China as a power, particularly
against a history of earlier conflict with Asiatic peoples, and as an ideological rival
further adds to Soviet fears and defensiveness.

lntuMatlfonal Relations 377

National Interest 378

The Soviet stress on massive military might is one result of this defensive psychology.
The Soviets’ long refusal to allow in-site unclear inspections and pleas of their suspicious
fear of outsiders.

Domination of Eastern Europe and other buffer states is a related key element of Soviet
policy. To a large degree, the Soviets perceive Eastern Europe as a defensive buffer
against NATO. If there is to be another war in Europe, they mean to have it fought far
from the Soviet border. Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia, and soviet Siberian areas in
dispute with China are, in the same sense, buffers against danger from that quarter. The
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, can be interpreted as and extension of
Russian interest in that area since
the clashes with colonial India’s British Raja in the rugged Hindu Kush.

Somewhat paradoxically, the soviets also still pursue expansionism. .Russian history is a
record of expansionism. From its beginning 500 yeas ago as the 15,000-square-mile
Duchy of Moscovy, half the size of Maine, the Soviet Union has grown to be the world’s
largest country (Figure 6-1). Thus, the Russians have a long history of expanding their
borders and areas of control. Recent history has witnessed a traditional increase in the
size of the Russian state.

The messianic element of communism also helps drive Soviet expansionism. What has
changed is that communism and the growth of Soviet power have urged and allowed that
country to project its influence far from its borders.

The desire to be a true superpower in influence as well as in might also stems from the
Soviet Union’s reaction to its own sense of inferiority. Because they were so often
besieged, and because they lagged behind Europe culturally and economically, Russians
not only are suspicious of outsiders but also have strong pride and insecurity that make
them react very negatively to any sense of being second and to any real or perceived
insult. They intend to put their country in a position where no one can ever look down on
them again.

The triumph of communism is another basic Soviet goal. The Russians have a long
messianic tradition. This urge to ”spread the belief
manifested itself in the early Russian idea that their system inherited the mantle of Rome
(the word czar is a derivative of Caesar) and was
obligated. fo protect Western civilization and,. in particular, Christian orthodoxy. In
somewhat later times, the messianic tradition spurred the belief among Russians that they
had a special mission to protect their ethnic Slavic cousins in Eastern Europe, a belief
that, in part, led to World War.

The belief that the Russians should spread communism fits in with their disposition
toward messainism: The Soviets believe in and work toward the eventual spread and
success of their economic and political system. This means that they continue to support
”liberation” movements, hope to neutralize and eventually convert Western Europe, and
desire increasingly to isolate and weaken the United States.

Like all messianic movements, communism also leans toward the idea of one truth and
one focus of leadership, and the Soviet struggle with China over leadership of the world
communist movement is another ideologically inspired aspect of Soviet national interest.

for the U. S. to intervene in El Salvador (U. S. sphere of influence) while condemning

Soviet interference in Poland
(USSR sphere of influence).

This somewhat existential standard of conduct also helps unravel some of the issues of
consequences for domestic majorities and minorities. We cannot ask farmers not to sell
wheat to Russia unless other segments of the economic community are also ready to
suffer financially. Domestically and internationally, then, ganders need to be ready to
accept the same sauce they advocate for the geese. . Dimensions of National Interest

With these preliminary principles in mind, the next step is to consider the possible
dimensions of national interest. Some contend that there are so many complex and often
conflicting national interests that ordering them is beyond human capability. National
interest is, indeed, a complex phenomenon, but it is not beyond comprehension, Frederick
Hartmann, for one, has argued that there is an ”irreducible core” of interests based on the
function of the state.

And Hans Morgenthau has similarly identified a ”hard core” of interests that are
relatively permanent. What is needed, then, is to devise a hierarchy of interests that will
at least begin to allow us to order our priorities. That is the task of this section, which
explores the work of scholars toward that goal.

Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer in this area, described interest in a variety of terms. These
can be broken up into four basic groups according to priority, time frame, specificity, and
compatibility (with the interests of other countries). The categories are shown in Table 6-
1.

More recently, Donald rleuchterlein has contributed a study outlining five dimensions of
national interest: basic interests, defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable
world order, and promotion of values (such as ideology or humanitarianism). These are
combined with the four levels of intensity (survival, vital, major, peripheral) to form an
analytical matrix.

International Relations. .,. ., ..~.,` 379

These efforts and the current author’s own work can also be
combined into a matrix that can be used. to help evaluate rational interest.
It contains four issues areas of national interest: physical safety, material
well-being, political environment, and national cohesion. The matrix also
distinguishes between two time frames: long-term and short-term. Finally,

Table 6-1. Dimensions of National Interest

According to Morgenthau.
Priority: Primary
Secondary
Time Frame: Permanent

Variable
 Specificity: General
Specific
Compatibility: Identical
Complementary
Conflicting

the matrix includes two levels of importance: primary and secondary. The combination of
these three dimensions is shown in Table G-2, and its use and terms are
explained more fully in the, pages that follow.

Issue areas.

Our four issue areas of national interest are objective in that each is a direct requirement
of the welfare of the nation and, therefore, a legitimate goal of the state.

1. Physical safety. This issue is largely self-explanatory. The essence of a nation is

its people, and the physical survival of the people is an irreducible element of national
interest. It

Table 6-2. Matrix for Categorizing National Interest Issues.

Long-Term Short-Term
Primary Seeonary Primary Seeonary

Physical safety

Material well-being

Political environment

National cohesion

should be noted that this does not necessarily include territory preservation or regime
maintenance. The safety of the nation is more important than the state or its government.
as such. Ask yourself this question: If a U.S. president had to either surrender the United
States to Moscow or face the certainty of the total annihilation of the nation, which
choice should she or he make?

National interest 3~

2. ?Material well-being. The state also has an obligation to ensure that its citizens
enjoy adequate food, housing: clothing, medical care, and other human needs. It is
unlikely, for example. that the West could long tolerate a complete cutoff of Mideast oil.
Subsistence is primary: opulence is secondary.

3. Political environment. This dimension is akin to a nation’s liberty to choose its

own sociopolitical structure or favorable world order. When, in 198-1, Mikhail
Gorbachev was criticized by a British member of Parliament for the oppessive Soviet
system, the communist leader shot back, ”You govern your society, and you leave us to
govern ours.” There is an element of free choice here, but it is not necessarily
synonymous with sovereignty. It is possible to argue, for
example, that a form of world federal order that allowed only limited autonomy would
better ensure a favorable political environment than the current Darwinian process of
survival of the fittest.

=t. National cohesion. This is probably the most controversial

of the issue dimensions. It is related to Neuchterlien’s

promotion of values,’ which he equates with ideology or the protection and furtherance of
a set of values that citizens share and believe to be good.

Considering again the nature of a nation, we can see that

perceived mutual identity is a crucial element. Without that sense of mutuality, potential
nations do not form and existing nations dissolve. It follows, then, that any goal or action
that contravenes a nation’s values and thereby fosters disintegrative forces has a
deleterious effect on the nation. The Vietnam War, for one, was one of the most traumatic
attacks
on the American self-image in the nation’s history. Whatever other interests were
involved, it is reasonable to argue that U.S. disengagement was necessary to avoid a
further tearing of the national fabric.
In the sense in whcih it is used here, the national cohesion

dimension includes ideas, ideology, and morality as discussed in the preceding chapter. It
allows for the introductin of moral, humanitarian

goals even if they are self-sacrificing. These types of goals have been described as
*’transcending” the national interest, but insofar as they promote national cohesion or, as
will be discussed presently, are in the long-term national interest. then values are not
necessarily self-sacrificing at all.

Finally, by looking to national values, we avoid the swamp of controversy surrounding

universal values. By combining the principle of

lnternational’Relations

381

generalization with nationally generated ideals, we thus have a valid set of values.

Time frames.

It is also important to distinguish between time frames. Longterm interests clearly

outrank short-term interests (all other factors being equal). At the time of the hostage
crisis, many advocated military action against Iran. Retrieving the hostages and/or
smiting the Ayatollah may have been in the United States short-term interest, but a stable,
independent Iran, given its economic and geostrategic position, is in the United States
long-term interest.

Considering time frames also helps to meet some of the objections that idealists raise
about the concept of national interest. As the well-known scholar Inis Claude recently
pointed out, idealists and realists are not necessarily divided over whether there is a
national interest; they differ over what the national interest is. If, however, we approach
the search for world order (based on humanitarianism, limited sovereignty, and peaceful
coexistence) as necessary for the long-term survival of civilization, then that goal clearly
falls within both idealist and realist values. Disarmament is a long=term interest, while
arms spending to stimulate the domestic economy is short-term. Concern with world
socioeconomic development through such vehicles as foreign aid is a long-term interest.
Cutting aid to balance the budget or economically exploiting developing countires is a
short-term goal. Clearly, the former, long-term ends shoudl prevail.

Levels of importance.
It is, finally, necessary to establish priorities. The choice of Morgenthau’s ”primary” and
”secondary” over other, more complex schemes of intensity is based mainly on
simplicity. The line between primary (essential to national continuance; can be
compromised only in extrentis) and secondary goals if
sufficient for our purposes here in an introductory text.

The issue of Pland provides an apt illustration of how this priority dimension might be
used. What if Poland revolted and called for help by U.S. paratroopers? That might help
Poland gain true independence. It also would run the risk of starting Wolrd War III. Both
alternatives affect America’s’interest, but avoiding war is primary, whereas an
independent Pland is secondary. American decision makers were faced with exactly that
choice during the 1956 Hungarian uprising, and President Eisenthower refiLsed to
intervene. It is likely that a similar chice in Poland Eisenhower refused to intervene. It is
likely that a similar choice in Poland in the 1980s would bring a similar (notO reaction.

National Interest

Possibilities and limits.

It is important not to overestimate the utility of the matrix presented in Table 6-2. It is a
beginning tool for understanding and evaluating the use and abuse of national interest. By
plugging in what decision makers say, we can gather evidence on why they acted or how
they might act.

We can also use the matrix as a tool for planning and evaluation. Is overshort-term
consequences? Are the impacts primary or secondary?

Finally, use of the matrix helps ensure that we follow the principle of consequences. We
need to consider nil the consequences all the time. Stringing up the Ayatollah in 1979
would have felt ”good” to a lot of Americans, but -woudl it have been worth it? All
things considered, probably not.

There are also distinct limits to the matrix. Assigning policy questions to one or another
category (short, long; primary, secondary) will often be debatable. Making trade-offs
between interests will also be controversial. What if two primary, long-term interests are
mutually exclusive? No matrix can account for all possibilities or substitute for informed,
rational judgement. In real life, though, such dilemmas exist and choices must be made,
and a matrix helps us see the myriad factors. Finally, calculating consequences cannot be
accomplished by this or any matrix. By seeing how a policy will affect another country’s
interest--whether the interests will be ”identical, complementary. or conflicitng”--we can
begin to estimate reactions and consequences, but we can only begin. In short, there is no
mechanical substitute for insight. That is what the study of world politics is all about.

GLOBAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

If we accept the proposition that it is the business of governments to protect only their
national interests, then whose business is it to protect global interests, and are such
interest identifiable? Richard A. Falk and
Sail H. Mendlovitz have ranked the major problems foacing humankind and suggested
global objectives tht would control these problems:

World Problems

1. War

2. Poverty

3. Racial oppression and _, _u:;.:;I sm

Environmental decay

5. Alienation

lntemational Relations

Global Objective

1. The minimization of violence

38 3

2. The maximization of social and economic welfare

3. The maximization of social and political justice

4. The maximization of ecological balance

5. The maximization of participation in authority processes

[governmental decision. making]

Who is going to worry about global problems such as war. poverty, unemployment,
discrimination, alienatin, and environmental decay? Our answer is, given the quasi-
anarchical structure of today’s international system, no one. Global action will alive to
await the development of institutions led by officials whose mentality will parallel
Lincoln’s, but at the global level. In short, we cannot make legitimate and effective
policies on the basis of global interests until we develop a global government with a
global leadership whose official task will be to save the ”Union of the Earth.”

In the meantime, concern with global interests will probably continue at the level of
private national and internationa organizations, and among well meaning academic and
business people, who are at times dismissed unfairly as utopians, do-gooders, and
eggheads. Throughout history, necessity ahs been the mother of invention. Global
problems such as nuclear war, ecological imbalance, depletion of resources,
environmental pollution, and population groNvth call for the development of new
institutions with global rather than notional orientations. We shall discuss in some detail
those new global challenges, and some responeses to them, in Part V of this book.

CHAPTER 19

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Meaning of International Law

Numerous definitions of international law have been offered by the scholars of the
subject. According to Frenwick, international law in broad terms means a ”body of
general principles and specific rules which are binding upon the members of the
international community in their mutual relations.” According to Lawrence international
law means ”the rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilised states
in their mutual dealings.” Stowell defines international law as ”certain rules generally
observed by the mankind and enforced primarily through the agency of the governments
of independent -communities into which humanity is divided”. According to Sir Henry
Maine international law is ”a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It
consists of general principles
of right and justice, equally suited to the conduct of individuals in a state of natural
equality, and to the relations and conduct of individuals in a state of natural equality, and
to the relations and conduct of nations; of collection of usages, customs, and opinions, the
growth of civilisation and commerce; and a code of positive law.”

According to Prof. Hall International Law means the ”rules of conduct which modern
civilised states regard as binding to them in their relations with one another with a force
comparable in nature and degree to that binding the conscientious person to obey the law
of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by appropriate means in
case of infringement.”

Probably the most comprehensive definition of International LaxN has been given by
Prof. Oppenheim, a great authority on International Law. He says ”International Law is
the name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally
binding by civilised states

lntemational Relations ~ 385 in their intercourse with each other.” He further adds that it
is ”a w for the intercourse of states with one another, not a law for individuals” ”a law
between and not above, the single states.” An equally comprehensive definition of
International Law has been offered by Starke. According to him International Law may
be defined as that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles or
rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to observe and therefore, do
commonly observe in their relations with each other and which includes also (a) the rules
of law relating to the functioning of international institutions or organisations, their
relations with each other and their relations with States and individuals; and (b) certain
rules of law relating to individuals and non-State entities so far as the rights or duties of
such individuals and non-State entities are the concern of the international community.”

An analysis of the above definitions of international law shows that almost all the
scholars emphasis that international law is a body of customary rules which the states
consider is binding upon themselves. These rules not only relate to the functioning of the
international institutions but also concern the actions of stateand individuals in so far as
their rights and duties are affected.

The Nature of Law

Any law, whether international or of the more familiar domestic variety, is a combination
of expectations, rules, and practices that help govern behavior. First, as we shall see, all
law systems are dynamic, continually evolving systems. Second, no law system
is perfect. Even in the most law-abiding societies, rules are broken arid the guilty
sometimes escape punishment. Third, law both reflects and directs a society. In other
words, to a substantial degree, law is a mirror of the norms of a society. We legalize what
we do in practice. Law, however, can also lead a society to change its behavior by
enacting philosophical principles into required standards of conduct. Fourth, and finally,
law depends on a mixture of voluntary compliance and coercion to maintain order.

The Dynamics of Law

A system of law is not something that just happens. It grows Similarly, a political system
does not just happen. It also grows, advancing from a primitive level to ever more
sophisticated levels of organization. This concept, that of a primitive but evolving legal
system in an evolving political system. is imoaortant to understanding international law.

lntennational Law

Primitive Nature of International Law

A primitive society has a number of features that we also find in international law and
relations. First, there is no formal rule-making, or legislative, process. Instead, codes of
behavior are derived from custom or from explicit agreements among two or more
societal members or groups. Second, there it little or no authority in any formal
government to judge or punish violations of lacy. Primitive tribes have no police or
courts. Third, a primitive society is often made up of self-defined units (such as kinship
groups), is territorially based, primarily governs itself, and resorts to violent ”self-help”
in relations with other groups.

In its current state, international law is very akin to a primitive political system. As
discussed more fully, below, there is at best a

rudimentary legislative system. Further, the enforcement and adjudication systems are
extremely limited. In addition, international law exists within a

system of sovereign, nation, If v. a accept this abalogy, then we can conceive of

international law as a primitive eagle system. This view allows us to be encouraged by
the thought that international law and its society

may evolve to a higher order rather than to be discouraged by its current lack of
sophistication.

Growth of International Law

Just as our ”primitive but dynamic” concept would predict, international law is a growing
phenomenon.

Early growth.
The beginnings of modern international law coincide with the origins of nationalism. As
sovereign, territorial states arose, there was a need to define and protect their status and to
order their relations. Gradually, as this political system emerged. elements of ancient
Jewish. Greek, and Roman precise combined with
fewer Christian concepts and also with custom and practice to form the rudiments of
international law.

This early development was given voice and encouraged by a number of important
theorists. The most famous of these was the Dutch

thinker Hugo Grotius (183-16-45), whose study De j»re Belli ac pads (o» the Law of irnr-
a»d peace) earned him the title ”father of international law.” Grotius and others discussed
and debated the sources of

international law as well as its application to specific circumstances such as the conduct
of an justification of was, the treatment of subjugated peoples. and the relations of states.

During the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, international law expanded and
changed. As the international system became more complex. the cope of international law
green to cover ~manv

International Relations

new areas of commercial and social interchange. Older areas of law NA ere also refined;
for example, the rules of diplomacy were substantialh formalized during the immediate
post-national state, the concept of the state, rather than the individual monarch. as the
subject of law evolved.

The twentieth century.

The current century has seen a significant expansion of concern with and practice of
international law. As already discussed m a number of places, ever-increasing
international interaction and interdependence have rapidly increased the need for rules to
govern a host of functional areas such as trade, finance, travel, and communications. The
ever more apocalyptic consequences of war have encouraged the formation of
conventions governing the conduct of war and have also promoted an increasingly
accepted ethic aggressive war.

These needs and reactions have been evident in a variety of forms. First, the Hague
conferences, followed by the League of Nations, and now the United Nations have been
founded on and have incorporated principles of international law Second.

these international organizations and others

have also included the beginnings of institutions that resemble the legislative,
enforcement, and judicial elements of a developed domestic legal system. A third element
of growth is he increase of multilateral ”lawmaking” treaties governing such subjects as
genocide, atmospheric nuclear testing, proliferation, use of the oceans, and human urghts.
These treaty-established norms of conduct have not always been followed. but their
violation has drawn increasing condemnation. This point leads to the fourth factor in
current growth, which is raised expectations. The increased rhetorical emphasis on law
plus enhanced communications means that world opinion is more likely to be aware of
and to condemn violations
of the norms of international conduct. What were once ’’splendid little wars,” fought out
of sight in remote places, now are apt to appear gruesomely on the seven o’clock news
and to be condemned as violations of the UN charter. All these elements are reflected in a
fifth factor, which is the increased need felt by national leaders to justify actions in teens
of international law and even, on occasion, to give way to the pressure of lay’.

Effectiveness of Law

One of the charges used to discredit the existence of international law is that it exists only
in theory and not in practice. As evidence, critics cite the continuing presence of war,
imperialism, and other forms of `’lawlessness’ that exist today.

The flaw in this argument is that it does not prove its point. In the first place,
international lam is effective in many areas. Besides. the fact that law does not cover all
problem areas and that it is not alit-0.1’s folloNN ed

International Law 388

does not disprove its existence. There is, after all, a substantial crime rate in the United
states, but does that mean there is no law?

International law is most e~fectiae in governing functional international relations. In line

with our earlier discussion of functionalism cooperation in and regulation of functional
relations -that is, those in ’nonpolitical” areas-have been rapidly, increasing. This has
been marked by organization and laws that regulate various functional areas.

International law is least effectiae when applied to the vital interests of sovereign states.
When important political interests are involved, governments still regularly bend
international law to justify their ,actions rather than alter their actions to conform to the
law.

That does not mean, however, that the law never influences political decisions. To the
contrary, there is a growing sensitivity to legal

standards. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and American air strike was deferred in
part because of Robert Kennedy’s reluctance to be remembered as a General Tojo
(convicted at the Tokyo war-crime trials). The soviets were also greatly tempted to
invade Poland in the early 1980s.

but world reaction, based on the norm of sovereignty, would have been outraged, and the
soviets were dissuaded. Thus, even where it works the least, international law works
some of the time and works more often than before.

Sources of The International Law

The sources of any system of law can be divided into

considerations of philosophy and practice.

The Philosophical Roots of Law

Where do laws come from? Theie are two basic sources. One of these is exterJ7al to the
society. Here the idea is that
some ”higher” metaphysical standard of conduct should govern the affairs of humankind.
An important ramification of this position is that there is or ought to be one single system
of law that governs all people. The second source possibiliy is that law is derived from
factors internal to the society. This school of though sees law as reflecting the will and
practices of each individual society.

External roots.

The external source can be further subdivided into two s;,hools. One relies on divine
principle, or a theological basis. Many of the early «’estern proponents of international
law relied on Christian doctrine as a
tm.mdation for law. There are also elements of long-standing Islamic. <onfucianist, and
Buddhist law and scholarship that can be cited as forming a basis of international
conduct.

International Relations . .. 389

A second school of external-source thought is that based on the nature of humankind.

Naturalists believe that humans, by nature, have certain rights and obligations. Examples
of rights would include life and security; obligations would include not-stealing or
murdering. Since states are collectives of individuals. and the world community is a
collective of states and individuals, nature’s individual rights and obligations also apple
to the global stage and form the basis for international law.

Internal roots.

Some legal scholars reject the

idea of divine or naturalist roots

and, instead, focus on the customs arc! practices of society. This is the positivist
approach. Positivists believe that law reflects society and the w°av people want that
society to operate. Therefore, law is and ought to be the product of the codification or
formalization of a society’s standards and practices.

Critics condemn this approach as ”amoral,” and cynics argue that it legitimizes immoral,
albeit common, practice. It should be carefully noted here, though, that widespread
practice. such as aggressive war, does not necessarily imply legitimacy. In the first place,
peace is the statistical norm in practice. And, second, international society condemns
aggression in theory. Thus, despite frequent misbehavior. aggression is a lawless act.

Current Sources

Modern international law is drawn from a number of sources, with an emphasis on the
positivist approach. These sources are best summarized in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).
International treaties.

Agreements between and among states are binding according to the doctrine of pucta suet
servunda (”the treat’ must be servedlcarried out”). All treaties are lawmaking for their
signatories, but it is possible to argue that some treaties are
even applicable to nonsignatories. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. for one, has been ratified by over eight’ states.
Some would argue. therefore, that it is ”recognized” and ”codified” practice and therefore
is binding even on those states (including the United States) that have not formally agreed
to it.

International custom.

Norms are the second most important source of international law. The old. and now
supplanted, rule that territorial waters extended three miles from the shore grew from the
distance a cannon could fire. If you were outside the range of land-based artillery, then
you were. its
aal waters. Maritime rules of the road and diplomatic practice ale

International Law

390

two other important areas of law that grew out of custom. Finally, it might be noted that
treaties (e.g., the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961) often are
established to formalize long-standing custom.

General principles of law.

According to this standard, the ICJ applied ”the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.” Although such language is vague, it does have its benefits. It allows
”external” sources of law, such as ”morality”, to be considered. The principle of ”equity”,
what is fair when no legal standard exists, also has some application under general
principles.

Judicial decisions and scholarly writing.

In many domestic systems, tie legal interpretations of the courts set precedent according
to the doctrine of .slave decides (”let the decision stand”). Similarly, the rulings of the
ICJ. other international lazy, help shape the body of law that exists. Additionally, the
work of legal scholars is sometimes considered by courts in their deliberations.

Role of International Law in International Relations

It is an irony that the significance of the role played by International law in International
Relations has been completely ignored by the scholars. Generally the scholars do not
attach any importance to the role of international law in international relations, and even
if it is acknowledged they consider it as one of the lesser instruments of state policy.
Some scholars have so much undermined the role of international law in international
relations that they go to the extent of arguing that it is useless in so far it has failed to
prevent wars, and plead that it should be discarded. However, this opinion hardly does
any justice to the important role played by international law. It is true that international
law has not been able to prevent wars, but it is also true that international law can
strengthen the case of a state which appeals to it. According to
Kleffens International Law is ”a wrong shield. giving those who possess it, better morale
and a consideration undoubtedly of special importance to the armed forces. A shield is a
weapon of defence, not offence. No weapon can be more legitimate.” He further asserts
that ”International Law is the only objective and impartial yardstick in international
relations: a solid basis for any international policy worthy of that name, a sure touchstone
for the settlement of international disputes; and an effective reducing agent of mere
statecraft, cleverness and opportunism. It sets up a standard to which the good and the
just can repair. International optimism, confidence and tranquility are in direct proportion
to its strength.and advancement.’

The significance of the international law has been acknowledged bY most of the
countries. They grant constitutional or atatutow recognition

lntemational Relations 391

to this body of laws. For example, in India the Constitution has clearly laid down in part
IV of the Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy) that the government shall
give due respect to the principles of international law. The Constitution of U.S.A. also
emphasis the binding nature of the international law. It clearly states that the treaties
concluded by the government shall form a part of the supreme law of the land. The
Courts in U.S.A. have gone a step further and asserted that not only the treaties but the
entire body of international law, including the customary law--shall form part of the
American law. Even in other countries where no constitutional or statutory recognition
has been accorded to international law, the binding nature of the law is not denied by the
state. As the real sanction behind law is not legal force but the will of the state, the
international law is given due respect. Prof Klefl’ens has rightly observed ”the ultimate
basis of the respect due to international law (and to all laws, for that matter) lies outside
the realm of law--it is of a moral and sociological order. We respect law and its
enforcement because we fell in out heart and conscience, it is right and useful that the law
be observed, and not because there is any fundamental rule of law commanding as that
we must accept it as right, whether we agree to accept it. or not.”

Pro. Palmer and Perkins while admitting the defects and limitations of the international
law consider it absolutely essential for a better international order. They say ”With a
consciousness of the defects and limitations of international law--the inadequacies of the
legislature, judicial and executive functions, the. narrowness of the
range and the too frequent misunderstanding of its nature and of its proper role--the men
and women who seek a world of peace and order see that law as an index to their
progress. Offering no formula by which the putting of words on paper can compel states
to follow a course of justice and friendship, international law does provide almost the
only means by which states can register and secure the gains which they make towards a,
better international order.”

After agreeing in principle about the important role which international law plays or earl
play in the sphere of international relations. it shall be desirable to examine how
international law is inevitable for the conduct of international relations. In fact, the need
of systematic relations at the international level, as in the case of other societies, requires
that there should be some rules of understanding which the members may observe in their
complex relations and avoid chaotic conditions. There is hardly any sphere of state
activity which is not regulated by some or the other rule of international law. Take for
example the question of the usrisdiction of the members of the international community.
To a large event it is regulated by International Law. In the absence of a clear cut border
and jurisdiction of the states. disputes are bound to arise. as it did

International Law happen between India and China in 1962 in view of their under
marcated boundaries. Similarly, the flight of an aircraft to or across a foreign country
requires the consent of the concerned countries. This problem has been resolved through
the civil aviation treaties to which most of the states are signatories. In the absence of
these treaties the international movement of aircraft would be impossible. The flight of
the military aircraft is, however regulated under different set of rules and generally the
military planes of one country are not permitted to fly over the territory of another state
far-obvious reasons.

The bilateral relations between different states are possible only due to existence of rules
of international law. In the absence of rules pertaining to diplomatic envoys and their
immunities, the foreign ambassadors would not have enjoyed exemption from the
jurisdiction of the state to which they are accredited. In the absence of these rules it
would not have been possible to exchange envoys and establish regular dealings with
other countries. The International Law by bestowing special status on the diplomats has
made more intimate bilateral relations possible.

The commercial relations between the members of the international community have
grown largely because of
international law. The commercial relations between different countries are regulated
under numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties which constitute an important part of
international law. Likewise the military and financial assistance rendered by the states to
each other is made possible by the various treaties and agreements among the concerned
states.

Even the social and political changes which take place in international society are largely
due to international law. For example the Human Rights have come to occupy a
prominent position in flue constitutional systems of all the countries since World War II.
This was made possible by the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ’this
declaration challenge the long established convention of the states that what they do to
their own nationals is their own concern. The Declaration by exerting necessary moral
pressure on the states to concede certain basic rights to ifs citizens, brought about a
revolutionary change. Subsequently, these rights were accorded legal status through
incorporation in the two treaties concluded in 1966.

International law has also greatly helped in the technological advancement of the states.
Fore example, after World II when the question of utilising the, resources of the
continental shelf arose, there was every possibility of conflict arising amongst various
states due to absence of any enact law. This conflict was eliminated through the creation
of new law on the subject. Similarly. in the late sixties L’N sponsored a treat’ containing
- (`)Uer Spain. ;nut tlms eliminated the possibilit, of

392

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fiictpn among the powers. Likewise the problems of hija~king of aeroplanes, kidnapping
of diplomats and exploitation of the sourcL< of iiic deep sea, which could have posed a
serious challenge of mieni,rional peace, were resolved through necessary laws.

International law indirectly influences the conduct of the international relations by

providing the framework for the international organization and society. It also contributes
towards social justice by encouraging the international society to move in a particular
direction. No doubt, in comparison to the domestic law, which is more readily obeyed by
the people, the international law does not receive willing obedience. of the member
states, yet it can be said with sonic amount of confidence that it does exercise some
influence in this regard. This influence is greater when the law itself is not under dispute.
The states tend to respect international law because by do not like to be charged with its
breach.

The above discussion makes it amply clear that international law has played
a significant role in international relations. It provides a normative framework within
which and with reference to which states take their decisions. Generally the states try to
achieve their goal in keeping with the provisions of the law or in a manner which is not
contrary to the law. Hence it can be said that international relations can be systematically
conducted because of the existence of a body of international law. Without international
law the international system would not be able to survive or work smoothly. According to
Alan James ”the significance of international politics, but it does provide an
indispensable framework for the political process. Without it, relations, if not minimal,
could not be other than anarchical in the most drastic meaning of Ae word. International
as elsewhere, law is a concomitant of ordered re0tions.”

CHAPTER 2O

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

DEFINING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

What is international organization, and how can it be defined? As with all complex and
inclusive concepts, definitions at first appear elusive. For our needs, we have decided to
approach this definition problem at three different levels. First, international organization
could be defined in terms of its intended purposes. Second, it could be defined in terms of
existing international institutions or in terms of ideal models and blueprints for future
institutions. Third, international organization could be defined as a process approximating
government regulation of relations among nation-states and nonstate actors.

Purposes of International Organization

The concept of international organization is complex, and its advocates are divided on
proper goals and roles. These differing aims include world government, comprehensive
cooperation, functional cooperation, and/or political advantage.

1. World Government

Vision.

Some proponents of international organization envision of day when there will be one
World Government. They argue for a ”top down”. revolutionary approach to solving
world problems. According to this approach, the current national states would give up
most of their sovereignty to a new, supranational organization. which would have central
lawmaking. enforcing, and adjudicating authority. Within this

International Relations

395
general goal, there are several approaches that van according to how hierarchical the
organization would be. That structure could range from a unstarv world government with
submits serving only administrative purposes. through federalism, in which a central
authority and member units share power, to confederalism. in which the members are
highly interdependent but retain all or most of their sovereign
authority.

There is also dispute about the proper locus of supranational government(s). Some argue
for a single, world system, while others propose regional supranational structures.

Critique.

The image of a peaceful and cooperative world is highly attractive, but there are many
who doubt that world government can be attained. These skeptics argue that, first, there
are practical barriers to world government. The assumption here is that nationalism has
too strong a hold and that neither political leaders nor masses would be willing to
surrender independence to a universal body. In short, are we ready to ”pledge allegiance
to the United States of the World?”

Critics of the world government movement also pose theoretical objections. They worry
about the concentration of power that would be necessary even to begin enforcing
international law and addressing the world’s monumental economic and social problems.
Critics further doubt that any such government, even given unprecedented power, could
succeed in solving world problems any better than less (potentially) authoritarian
alternatives. Finally, some skeptics argue that centralization would inevitably diminish
desirable cultural diversity and political experimentation in the world. A last criticism of
the world government movement is that it diverts attention from more reasonable avenues
of international cooperation such as the United Nations and other existing international
organizations.

2. Comprehensive Cooperation

Most supporters of international organization limited role f IGO

advocate a more
or s. This school of thought believes that IGOs can best
serve as vehicles to promote cooperation among states rather than through
the subordination of states to a global authority.

The United Nations and some regional organizations are designed to advance
international cooperative efforts to maintain peace, better economic conditions, protect
the environment, and, in general, improve the human condition. Insofar as IGOs play an
”independent” role, proponents of .this approach argue that it should be enc m-sinlx of
mediation and

international Organization

conciliation rather than coercion. The object here is to teach and allow, not to force,
national states to work together.

396
3~ Functionalism

An even more limited approach to international organization is functionalism. As noted

above, functionalists favor a ”bottom up,” evolutionary approach to international
cooperation. They argue that by cooperating in specific, usually nonpolitical areas, we
can learn to trust one another. This, in turn, will lead to broader and higher levels of
cooperation.

The best-known proponent of functionalism,

David Mitrany, argues, for example, that ”sovereignty cannot be transferred effectively
through a formula, (but) only through a function,” Mirtrany then argues that in time ”the
accumulation of such partial transfers” of sovereignty will ”overlay political divisions
with a spreading web of international activities” that will promote world peace and
integration.

A recent extension of functional cooperation is the creation of t!?lei’r9arlOnQI regimes

that deal with particular issue areas. A regime is not so much a single organization as a
complex of international organizations and generally accepted rules of behavior in areas
such as monetary relations, trade, health, or air traffic control. In short, regimes represent
an advance from national cooperation through one functional organization on one issue to
cooperation through a complex of related organizations on a complex of issues.

4. Political Advantage

Finally, it should be noted that many approach international organization as a tool to

further their self-interested concept of the wcorrect” international order. This approach is
rarely stated openly, but it is ahvious in the struggles within the UN and other IGOs. The
East/West, ~ ~rth/South, and other struggles are waged with vengeance. This se::mingly
contradictory use of supposedly integrative international organizations to gain national
advantage is part of the world’s struggle be” ween the forces of order and the forces of
anarchy.

International Organization: Structure and Issues

One important aspect of international organization is structure

and related issues. Constitutions, rules of procedure, finance, organization

cli:-irts, and other administrative details are often dismissed as
sssconsequential by the political novice. They are not! To the contrary, such
”nitty-gritty” items are often extremely important in determining political
oat=_oincs. In : is;:ossiou of the sfn:cture of intcrnational

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organization and the issues related to that structure, we will etamine membership,
representative bodies, administrative structure, and financial arrangements. As will
rapidly become obvious, the discussion will focus on the UN, both as the leading IGO
and as an example of the structural issues facing all attempts to organize internationally.

1. Membership

Theoretically, membership in most international organizations is open to any state which

falls within the geographic and/or functional scope of that organization and which
subscribes to the principles and practices of that organization. 1n practice, politics often
become heavily involved in membership questions.
A. Admitting members.

Most IGOs have procedures for admitting new members.

From 19-45 to 1955 in the UN, membership svgs a cold-war issue, the United States and
the Soviet Union each blocking the membership of states sympathetic to the other
superpower. Then, in a compromise, sixteen new members were admitted all at once.

Today the UN has nearly universal membership, although a few

gaps and problems remain. Switzerland has never joined because of its
absolute neutrality. North and South Korea have not been admitted. There
is also the issue of possible Palestinian representation, but U.S. opposition
has blocked any serious considerations. -

B. Expulsion and withdrawal. -

There are also issues related to members leaving international organizations. At times
members have voluntarily withdrawn usually for political reasons. Indonesia announced
withdrawal from the UN in 1965 but never followed through. Countries can also be
expelled from the UN. Nationalist China was effectively, if not technically, expelled from
the UN when the seat was transferred to the mainland. There was also an unsuccessful
attempt to expect South Africa for violating the UN (charter.

Membership, then, can be an important issue. It is advantageous to have all appropriate

states as members. They should, however, follow the principles and rules, and that
”qualification” sometimes opens up the issue to politics.

2. Representative Bodies

A. Types: plenary and limited membership:

Almost all IGOs have some form of plenary (all members) rcprescntitive body. The
theoretical basis for plenary bodies is the

international Organization

collective and equal responsibility of all members for the concerns and policies of the
organization.

In the United Nations, the plenary organ is- called the General Assembly, but in other
IGOs it may be termed a. council, conference, commission, or even a parliament. These
plenary bodies normally have the authority to involve themselves invirtually all aspects
of their organization and, thus, in theory, are the most powerful element of their
organizations. In practice, however, the plenary organization may be secondary to the
administrative structure or some other element of the organization.

. A second type of representative body is banded on limited membership. The theory here
is that some members have a greater stake. responsibility, or capacity in a particular area
of concern. The United Nations’ peacekeeping Security Council has fifteen members.
Ten arc-chosen by the General Assembly for limited terms, but five are permanent
members. These five (United States; Great Britain. Soviet Union. China, and France)
were the five leading victorious powers at the end of World War II and were thought to
have a special peacekeeping
role to play.

Limited-membership bodies have advantages. First, smaller bodies function more

efficiently. Second. a strong case can be made for focusing responsibility on those
members with the greatest concern.

Limited membership also has disadvantages. One is that it detracts from the concept of
mutual responsibility. It can be argued, for instance, that in an increasingly interactive
world there is little of significance that does not concern everyone. Another problem is
that the existing membership may become outmoded. The ”big five” of the Security
Council were something of a fiction in 19-15, when, for instance, a chaotic China was
seated at the insistence of the United States. After the Chinese Communist takeover in
19=49, the situation became even more unrealistic. the rump Nationalist government on
Taiwan occupying China’s seat until 1971 (at which time the seat was transferred to the
Beijing government).

Further, the current Securiy Council stricture does not reflect the changes in the bases of
power or the strength of states that have occurred during the last four decades. The
United States and the Soviet Union certainly remain the powers, but if France and Britain
are powers, what

about Japan, West Germany. India, Brazil. Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria? In short. ought
there be permanent members. and, if so, who should they be’?

B, Voting issues.

One of the difficult issues to face any international organization o the formula for
allocating votes. Three major alternatives as they exist today are majoritarianism.
voei`~hted N on r,’o. and unilateral negative voting.

_ , .. .... -` 398
-

,.,.-,~.~.~,~.., „w.~..~::.-:..,n
International Relations 399

The most common voting formula used in IGOs is majoritarianism. This system has two
main components: (1) each member casts one equal vote, and (2) the issue is carried by
either a simple majority (50 percent plus one vote) or, in some cases, an extraordinary
majority (commonly two thirds).

The theory of majoritarianism springs from the concept of sovereign equality and the
democratic notion that the will of the majority should prevail. The UN General Assembly
and most other UN bodies operate on this principle. There is. however, as discussed
substantial difficulty with the concept of sovereign equality. Although this idea has a
level of philosophical appeal, it does not reflect reality. Should Costa Rica, with no army,
cast an equal vote with the powerful United States or Soviet Union? Should Nauru, with a
population of thousands, cast the same vote as China, with its billion people’? It might be
noted, for example, that in the General Assembly states with less than
15 percent of the world’s population account for two thirds of the vote.

An alternative to majoritarianism is weighted voting, or a system that allocates unequal

voting power on the basis of a formula. Two possible criteria are population and wealth.
The European Parliament is, for example. based in part on population. Voting in the
Council of Ministers of the European Communities is based on a mixture oi’size and
strength, with votes ranging from ten (e.g.. Wes( Germany) to two (Luxembourg).
Finally. a number of international monetary organizations base voting on financial
contributions. The United State`s, for instance, casts 20.6 percent of the vote in the World
Bank. 29.5 percent in the International Finance Corporation, and 20.01 percent in the
International Monetary Fund.

The desirability of weighted voting depends on your perspective. A good philosophical

case can be made for population, and most domestic representative institutions are based
on that factor. Americans might well agree that their country should outvote Mexico four
to one. but would the same Americans be as willing to be outvoted by China by a similar
four-to-one margin? The financial contribution standard also makes some pragmatic
sense, but a we have seen, many Third World states contend that ”wealth weighted”
voting continues the system oL” imperial domination by the industrialized countries.
Weighted voting, in short, is most attractive NN lien the balance is in your favor.

A third voting scheme is unilateral negative voting, in which a member can unilaterally
block action. The most common variation is a requirement for unanimity. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Arab League, and others
operate on that principle.

International Organization „.. , .... .,. n ,..~, . . . . 400

T nauimity preserves the concept of sovereignty but can easily Lead to

stalemate and inaction.

A second variation is the veto, most prominently found in the UN Security Council.
Following the theory of major power responsibility, any of the five permanent members
can, by its single vote, veto a policy statement or action favored by the other fourteen
members. Since 1945 the veto has been cast well over one hundred times, each of the
members using us special prerogative to protect its interests. Whatever arguments might
be made for or against such a system, its existence in the UN is unlikely to ;:hinge
because of power realities and because of the difficulty of revising the charter.

3. Administration

In addition to representative/legislative bodies, most international organizations have an

administrative structure. We will not be concerned with the details of
organization and procedure but viii concern ourselves with the appointment. allegiance,
and role of international bureaucracies. In the UN the administrative structure is called
the ”secretariat.” and the ”secretary-general” is the chief administrator; our discussion
will use those terms in reference to ill IGO bureaucracies.

A.

. Appointment.

In the UN, the secretary-general is nominated by the Security Council, then elected by the
General Assembly for a five-year term. The secretary-general then appoints his principle
deputies and other members of the secretariat.

These simple facts do no, however, adequately emphasize the political considerations that
govern the appointment of administrators. Because nomination of the UN secretary-
general is subject to veto in tae Security Council, that position has been one of inteNSe
struggle. The current secretary-general. Javier Perez de Cuellar, was named only after a
protracted stalemate, and in the early 1960s the Soviet Union even proposed a ”troika”
plan that would have hid three secretaries-general.

Politics also heavily influences the appointment of the understaff. Several of the principal
deputy positions are, by tradition, reserved for and. iii practice, named by one big power
or another. There has also been pressure by Third World countries to distribute secretariat
positions on a geographical basis.

International Relations 401

International Organisation

B. Allegiance. Hanunuarskold’s independence was not appreciated by all

the big
A second administrative issue is the proper allegiance of fN r po«ers.
however, and it caused a Soviet attempt to drive him from office
officials. The issue is where their primary- loyalty lies. Are they UN and water
down the.position. He fended off that threat, but after his death
officials? Or are they representatives of their home governments’’ Most his successors
have had to take a more careful path, although each has
international organizations subscribe to the principle that their bcen active in areas of
quiet diplomacy.
administrative officers should be free from nationalistic influence and, in
particular, ought not to take direction from their home governments. International
Organization: Roles and Issues

In practice, however, ignoring one’s home governments preferences, especially if one

expects to return home someday, is difficult. At the very least, administrators may
subconsciously possess an orientation based. on their national heritage and loyalties that
affects their decisions. Whatever the theory, the contest in the UN and other IGOs over
the appointment of administrators indicates that a pure international perspective has not
fully
evolved.

C. Role: Restraint versus activism.

A final administrative issue is the proper role of an international secretariat. The

possibilities range along a state from a relatively restrained concentration on
administrative matters to activist political leadership. ’

The change in role of the UN secretary-general gives a capsule view of the possible
positions along the restrain/activism scale. The UN secretariat is, symbolically, the last
major organ discussed in the charter. and it was originally conceived as largely
administrative. although the secretary-general could bring peace-threatening situations to
the attention of the Security Council.

The first secretary-general, Trygve Lie of Norway (I9-16-I953)_ and his successor, Dag
Hammarskjold of Sweden (19>3-1961), were activists who steadily expanded the role of
their office. Hammarskjold was especially assertive, broadly interpreting his powers to
include taking the initiative to uphold the principles of the charter even when the General
Assembl; and Security- Council would not or could not act. The height of 1-
lamnlarskjold’s power came during the Congo (Zaire) crisis in the earl 1960s. The
secretary-general used UN forces to try to avert outside i nterv ention and to establish
domestic peace during the post independence trnmoil in that African country. It is
somehow symbolically fitting. if ;wyc. that he was killed ,N lien his plane crashed during
a personal mission LO flit area in 1961_.

At the heart of the value of any international organization is the question of the roles it
can or should play. In essence. we have’ to ask ourselves: What is it that we want
international organizations to do. and how well arc they to do it? In the following pages
we will examine their wide scope of activity. The discussion will particularly` emphasize
the political roles (conflict avoidance and peacekeeping). Other roles will also be noted
but will be discussed more fully in later chapters.

1. Political Roles

The United Nations and many’ other IGOs play a variety of political roles that focus on
tying to prevent international conflict or on restoring the peace when violence occurs.

A. Maintaining peace.

International organization play both a passive and an active role in avoiding conflict.

One role for IGOs is the passive one of a forum in which members publicly- air their
points of view and privately negotiate their differences. The UN is thus like a theater or
set where the world drama can be played out without some of the dire consequences if
another ”shooting locale’’ is chosen. This public debate aspect involves denouncing your
opponents, defending your actions, trying
to influence world opinion, and winning symbolic victories. One scholar has termed this
function the ”Grand Debate Approach to Peace.” In this role the UN serves as a sort of
safety valve that allows the venting of frustrations in a controlled environment. (See
Figure i 3-1 for a look at the structure of the UN).

The UN also serves as a basis for diplomatic discussion among members. In addition to
the diplomatic interchange that occurs within the main organs. the UN sponsors many
other conferences that address specific problems such as arms control.

International organizations also regularly play a more active role in resolving political
disputes. They perform the following functions:

inreinarionai ireiarions 4u i

13.1 General Assembly All 157 U.N. members one vote per member

Security council
15 members permanent, 10 serve two-year teens. veto power to permanent members

Secretariat

Headed by secretay-general five-year term

Economic and Social Trusteeship Council

Council 5 members
-t members sere three-
vear teens One vote per
One vote per member member

Associated Agencies 2() intergovernmental organizations with close ties includes World
health Organ-ization. World Bank. Food and Agricultural Organization

1.. Inquirl--factinding by neutral investigators.

2. Good offices-encouraging parties to negotiate: acting as a

neutral setting for negotiations.

3. Mediation-making suggestions about possible solutions.

-I. Arbitration-using a special panel to find a solution that all
patties agree in advance to accept.

5. Adjudication-submitting disputes to an international court.

These activities do not often capture the headlines, but they are a vital purl of conflict
avoidance. For example, in studying the effectiveness
International Court of Justice

is judges

sews nine-year

international organization

of the UN ill this area. one schol

404

ar found that, of over 130 disputes considered by the UN from 1946 to 1977, all but a
dozen were settled successfully.

B. Restoring the peace.

In addition to its diplomatic resources, the United Nations has at least a limited ability to
intervence militarily in a dispute. There is also a limited histoy of other organizations,
such as the Organization of American States, undertaking collective military action. In
the UN, this process is often called ”peacekeeping.” It is normally conducted under the

auspices of the Security Council, although the General Assembly has sometimes
authorized action.

In theory. but not in practice. the peacekeeping function of international organization

rests on the concept of collective security. This idea was first embodied in the
covenant of the League of Nations and is also reflected in the character of the United
Nations. Its basic tenets are these:

1. All countries forswear the

2.

Ilse of force except in self-defense.

All agree that the peace is indivisible. An attack on one is an attack on all.

Everyone pledges to join together to halt aggression and restore the peace. and all agree
to supply whatever material or

personnel resources arc necessary to that end.

-t. The peacekeeping force will be under the control of an

international organization.

If you think about, it this theory is something like the theory that governs domestic law
enforcement. First. acts of violence are considered a transgression against the collective.
If you assault someone in California, the case is not the victim versus you but California
versos you. Second, except in self-defense. we cannot resort to violence to settle domestic
disputes. Third. we rely on a collective security force, the police. and jointly support that
force through laves.

Collective security. then. is not that works--domestically. It has

only an appealing idea but one not. however, been a success on the international scene.
There are a number of problems of specific application. such as how to tell tile aggressor
from the victim in some eases. But these uncertainties also exist domestically and arc
resole vd The real breakdown in collective security is the unwillingness of count*ccs t~,

subordinate their sovereignty to collective action. Thos tar. 5.ncrtlm’;us haVe generally
maintained their right to view conflict in terms o` yhei

1lational interests and to support or oppose UN action on she ~:usk ,fil,,cir °atlonalistic
points of view. The Soviet Union, for cvany>le. has :vfi-:d to

international Relations

pay its assessed dues to support earlier UN operations in the Middle East or in the Congo.
Thus, collective security exists, only a goal. not as a practice.

Despite the theoretical ideal of collective security. in practice the UN has been able to
take only limited action in a limited number of armed conflicts. Between 19-4S and 1980.
the UN mounted fifteen operations that utilized armed units and eight military obsen-
ation missions.

Several characteristics of these missions can be noted. First. most have occurred in Third
World locations. such as the Middle East. Cyprus, the Congo. the India/Pakistan border.
Yemen., and Indonesia. Second UN. forces have generally utilized military contingents
front smaller or nonaligned powers. Canada. the Scandinavian countries. Ireland. and
India are some of the most frequent contributors. Third. UN forces have generally acted
as buffers between
the conflicting parties.’and with the exception of Korea and the Congo. UN forces have
not conducted active military operations. Instead thcv lave positioned themseh,es
between the combatants. At times this provides an ”excuse” to stop fighting, and at other
times. given the status of UN personnel, it provides an inhibiting effect.

United Nations peacekeeping. their. is not a process of a stern international enforcer

srnitting aggressors with powerful blo;\s. Few arc willing to invest any international
organization with that much power and independence. Rather. UN peacekeeping is a
”corning between.’ a positioning of a nutralforce that creates space and is intended to
help defuse an explosive situation. That in no way should lessen the at times valuable role
the UN has played. In the early 1960s, UN troops kept the Congo from exploding into a
cold-war battlefield, and UN forces were an important factor allowing the disengagement
of Egyptian and Israeli troops in 1973.

2. Other Roles

In addition to maintaining and restoring the peace, international organization engage in. a
wide variety of other activities. We will briefly note these roles here and then examine
most of them more fully in the following three chapters.

A. Law promotion.

An important and expanding role of international organizations is their contribution to

international law. As discussed more filly in the next chapter. the signatories of the UN
charter and other constitutions incur obligations to obey the principles therein.
International organizations al~;o sponsor multilater altreaties. which may establish a
presumption of

lam. The resolutions of international representatiNe bodies such as tl’c

international Organization

-t06

General Assembly also contribute to the growth of law. Finally. tribunals such as the
International Court of Justice help establish legal precedent.

B. Promoting arms control and disarmament.

International organizations are not only involved in individual conflicts, they are
concerned with conflict in general. Consequently. they are active on a number of fronts
trying to regulate or eliminate the weapons of war.

Promoting the quality of human existence.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of international organizations to date has been
in the ;::~w; _-,f individual human betterment. A wide variety of IGOs and NGOs devote
their energies to problems of the environment, humanitarian causes, economic progress,
and social concerns such as health, nutrition. and literacy. As we shall see further the
need is staggering, but a start has been made.

D. Promoting self-government.

Yet another role of the UN and other IGOs is to encourage

national self-determination. The UN Trusteeship Council once oversaw the status of a
large number of colonial dependences, but with the wave of independence in recent
decades, only one trust territory. Micronesia. remains under its direct auspices. There are,
however. a number of related issues that come before the UN. One is the case of Namibia
(South West Africa). South Africa originally governed this territory on a mandate from
the League of Nations and has refused to give up its hold despite UN and Organization of
African Unity demands. The question of the Palestinian people is another issue of
national status that the UN (and the Arab League) has considered, and some countries
have tried to introduce the status of Puerto Rico into the UN debate.

E. Promoting international organizations and integration.

A final role of the UN that deserves mention is its promotion of other international
organizations. The United Nations not only operates in association with a variety of other
regional and speJalized IGOs, it also grants consultative status to nearly 700 NGOs.
Thus. international organizations of all types cooperates to encourage and strengthen one
another.

CHAPTER ~1

FIRST WORLD WAR

Causes of First World War

The death of the heir to the Hapsburg throne was merely the incident that marked the
beginning of World War I. For, in the preceding fifty years Europe had been growing
explosive. A madman’s shots detonated it.

Nationalism

several factors had imparted this eruptive disposition to the European people. Perhaps the
most important of these was the principle of nationality. In the interval between 1789 and
1914, fifty-four wars and rebellions were chargeable directly or indirectly to the
advancement or repression of national aspiration. Though Italians and Germans
respectively had united (1859-1871) to form national states, yet there were millions of
Europeans in 1914 who were still governed by foreign rule. These subject people longed
for union with the motherland and refused to be content with any other concessions.

While the Italians clamoured for their unredeemed nationals in Dalmatia, the Danes
demanded the return of their Schleswing brothers. Side by side Poles, Finns, and Czechs
planned national restrictions. Thus Europe was not only suffering from ”running sores
but also ailing from agonising birth paints”.

Imperialism
The second factor which added to the tension that produced the First World Wai was
imperialism. The rapid industrialisation of ~ all western European nations after 1860
narrowed the markets which formerly

first World War

had been enjoyed by a few nations. While the markets became few. rapid
industrialsation and production-oriented research was on the increase. which made
further demands for industrial outlets. This compelled advanced nations to search for
markets in areas which hitherto had been underdeveloped and where competition could
be avoided by monopolised trade. The need to have more markets for their products had
made the European nations to compete for more colonies. This situations created tension
and suspicion. In the German zeal for colonies. British and French statesmen believed
that they merited. When one nation blocked another’s efforts to acquire a colony,
resentment was evoked in the fnistrated country and anew tension was established
between old rivals. Though the aim of imperialism was not towage wars yet it had created
competition so much so that European states saw no alternative but to expand or expire.
They chose expansion, for they preferred war to national suicide.

408

Militarism

Another factor which caused the outbreak of the First World War vas militarism. Though
standing armies were maintained in order to guarantee peace and security-. they also
advanced the prospect of war. Militarism was popularised by many who sincerely
believed in the cult of force. They viewed war as a risk that had to be ~ taken. in
pursuance of national goals. War was given preference to diplomacy in the solution of
intricate problems.

On December 11, 1897, the Foreign Secretary of Germany declared that ”without power,
without a strong army and a strong navy. there can be no welfare for us... In the coming
centuw the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil.” Following the maxim
of Frederick the Great that ”diplomacy without force is like music without instnunents.”
German army became so large that in 191-1 Germany was described not as a ”country
with an army. but an army with a countr,.” while England’s nay- was, in fact, her army
afloat.

Serious naval rivalry. after 190!) troubled the relations between England and Germany.
England in 1889. adopted the W o-power standard. by which she aimed to have a nay ;-
as large as the combined navies of her two nearest competitors plus 10 per cent. This
made Germany decide to build a fleet so strong that ”even for an advcrsar,~ with the
greatest sea powers. a war against her would involve such dangers as to imperil its
position in the world.”

International Anarchy
Yet another cause that generated the First World « ar was
international anarchy. Each countn~ bean to pursue its goals unmindful of
the interests of other nations. In-order to gratify the demands of their
ARM

Diplomatic Moves and Alliances

The diplomatic
alliances and entente that were formed in the period from 1871 to 191=1 have been aimed
at the preservation of peace, but in reality they had contributed to the development of
hostilities.

(i) The Three Emperors’ League (1873)

To isolate France, Bismarck the German Chancellor. established diplomatic relations

between the royal families of Germany and Sweden, of Holland and Italy. In 1873, he
further restricted France’s -prospective allies by organising the Three Emperors’ League,
by which Germany and Russia pledged mutual aid in case either should be attacked,
while Russia and Austria adjusted their differences in the Balkness.

Astro-German Alliance (1879)

Against the fear of Russian invasion Bismarck entered into a defensive alliance with
Austria in 1879. According to its provisions, German%- and Austria-Hungary promised
to come to each other’s support in case of attack by Russia or by two other nations. The
alliance was defensive in character and aimed at the preservation of the status quo and
peace.

lnter”ational Relations -t09

citizens, statesmen felt that they were entrusted with the sole respoiWbilitv of developing
not only the resources of their own country, but also of those of the backward regions.
The world, they said, had ”a right to enjoy the fruits of the earth”. Thus. if a country
possessing vast natural resources refused to develop them, a forcible intervention, for
their exploitation was justifiable. This created nothing but anarchy. In pursuance of this
policy. England and Russia, exchanged proposals for the dismemberment of the Turkish
empire. England and Germany planned the division of Portugal’s African Empire;
England, France and Italy by a tripartite treaty envisaged the expropriation of Ethiopia;
and all the imperialist nations delineated their spheres of influence in China.

Pressing o>tsiderations and temptations made many of the European nations bypass
international law and bid goodby to ethics. Treaties imposing inconvenient obligations or
restrictions were considered ”scraps of paper”. Statesman reminded themselves that the
English fleet had twice bombarded Copenhagen on the ground that ”necessity knows no
law”. When Nicholas was contemplating the opening of the Straits of the Dardanelles in
1908, he avowed, ”God help those who help themselves.”

Such codes of international ethics made nations infringe upon one .another’s sovereignty
and honour. Absence of international organisation to uphold the sanctity of convention or
laws or agreements forced the individual states to fend for themselves.

First World War

410
(iii) The Three Emperor’s Alliance (1881)

The arrangement left both France and Russia unattended and

if they were united. it would spell danger for Germany. Hence in 1881 Bismarck
negotiated the Emperors Alliance whose membership consisted of Germany. Austria-
Hungan and Russia which continued until 1887.

When Russia withdrew in 1887 because of differences of the three

powers on Bulgaria. Bismarck negotiated the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, which
lasted from 1887 to 1890. It provided that if either should be at war with a third great
power, the other should remain benevolently neutral and endeavour to localise the
conflict. These terms were not to apply in case Russia should attack Austria or if
Germany should attack France.

Triple Alliance (1882)

In the meantime Italy asked for entrance into the Austro-German Alliance. The Italians
.were motivated more by their distrust and hatred of the French than by their love of the
Germans. Besides this, Italy also desired prestige and colonies, and believed that her
association with the two northern powers would facilitate the realisation of these
objectives. By the terms of this treaty, Austria and Germany pledged themselves to
support Italy if France should

attack her, and Italy should accordingly, render her allies full military assistance. Italy
and Austria pledged to each other reciprocal gains in the event of a change in the status
quo to the

Balkans. A supplementary provision of this alliance stipulated that nothing in the treaty
should be regarded as directed against England. The Triple Alliance was repeatedly
renewed and was still in force when the war broke out in 191.

During the entire Bismarckian era, England was a ”sleeping partner” of the Triple
Alliance which consisted of Germany, Austria and
Italy. However. after the retirement of Bismarck in 1890, William II refused to renew, the
Pre-insurance Treat), with Russia which freed Russia

and France from commitments as well as alliances. The very strength of Germany
reflected the insecurity of these isolated countries. Therefore, in 1891, France and Russia
negotiated an extent which matured into a military alliance in 189:1. It provided mutual
assistance if either should be

attacked by Germany or by one of her allies supported by Germany. The terms were to be
kept secret, and the treaty’s duration was to be identical with that of the Triple Alliance.

England comes out of Isolation: In the period follotying 1870, of all the European ?,-aers
England alone remained isolated. Basically.

lntemational Relations -- ’109 First World War -l 1 U

citizens. statesmen felt that they were entrusted with the sole responsibility of developing
not only the resources of their own country. but also of those of the backward regions.
The world. they said.
had ”a right to enjoy the fruits of the earth”. Thus. if a country possessing vast natural
resources refused to develop them, a forcible intervention, for their exploitation was
justifiable. This created nothing but anarchy. In pursuance of this policy, England and
Russia, exchanged proposals for the dismemberment of the Turkish empire. England and
Germany planned the division of Portugal’s African Empire; England, France and Italy
by a tripartite treaty envisaged the expropriation of Ethiopia; and all the imperialist
nations delineated their spheres of influence in China.

Pressing .oRsiderations and temptations made many of the European nations bypass
international law and bid goodby to ethics. Treaties imposing inconvenient obligations or
restrictions were considered ”scraps of paper”. Statesman reminded themselves that the
English fleet had twice bombarded Copenhagen on the ground that ”necessity knows no
law”. When Nicholas was contemplating the opening of the Straits of the Dardanelles in
1908, he avowed, ”God help those who help themselves.”

Such codes of international ethics made nations infringe upon one another’s sovereignty
and honour. Absence of international organisation to uphold the sanctity of convention or
laws or agreements forced the individual states to fend for themselves.

Diplomatic Moves and Alliances

The diplomatic alliances and entente that were formed in the period from 1871 to 191-1
have been aimed at the preservation of peace, but in reality they had contributed to the
development of hostilities.

(i) The Three Emperors’ League (1873)

To isolate France, Bismarck the German Chancellor. established diplomatic relations

between the royal families of Germany and Sweden, of Holland and Italy. In 1873, he
further restricted France’s prospective allies by organising the Three Emperors’ League,
by which Germany and Russia pledged mutual aid in case either should be attacked,
while Russia and Austria adjusted their differences in the Balkness.

(ii) Astro-German Alliance (1879)

Against the fear of Russian invasion Bismarck entered into a defensive alliance with
Austria in 1879. According to its provisions, Germany and .Austria-Hungary promised to
come to each other’s support in case of attack by Russia or by two other nations. The
alliance was defensive in character and aimed at the preservation of the status quo and
peace.

(iii) The Three Emperor’s A !!lance (1881)

The arrangement left both France and Russia unattended and if

they were united. it would spelt danger for Germany. Hence in
1881 Bismarck negotiated the Emperors” Alliance whose
membership consisted of Germam-. Austria-Hungary
and Russia
which continued until 1887.
When Russia withdrew in 1887 because of differences of the three
powers on Bulgaria. Bismarck negotiated the Re-insurance Treatv with
Russia, which lasted from 1887 to 1890. It provided that if either should be
at war with a third great power, the other should remain benevolently
neutral and endeavour to localise the conflict. These terms were not to
apply in case Russia should attack Austria or if Germany should attack
France.

(!v) Triple Alliance (1882)

In the meantime Italy asked for entrance into the Austro-German

Alliance. The Italians .were motivated more by their distrust and
hatred of the French than by their love of the Germans. Besides
this, Italy also desired prestige and colonies, and believed that her
association with the two northern powers would facilitate the
realisation of these objectives. By the teens of this treaty, Austria
and Germany pledged themselves to support Italy if France should
attack her, and Italy should accordingly, render her allies full
military assistance. Italy and Austria pledged to each other
reciprocal gains in the event of a change in the status quo to the
Balkans. A supplementary provision of this alliance stipulated
that nothing in the treat’ should be regarded as directed against
England. The Triple Alliance was repeatedly renewed and was
still in force when the war broke out in 191.
During the entire Bismarckian era, England was a ”sleeping
partner” of the Triple Alliance which consisted of Germany, Austria and
Italy. However” after the retirement of Bismarck in 1890” William II
refused to renew, the Pre-insurance Treaty with Russia which freed Russia
and France from commitments as well as alliances. The very strength of
Germany reflected the insecurity of these isolated countries. Therefore, in
1891, France and Russia negotiated an extent which matured into a
military alliance in 1894. It provided mutual assistance if either should be
attacked by Germany or by one of her allies supported by Germany. The
terms were to be kept secret, and the treaty’s duration was to be identical
with that of the Triple Alliance.
England comes out of lcolalion: In the period following 1870. of
all the European powers England alone remained isolated. Basically.

International Relations -t 1 1 First World War 412

England wanted no change in the European situation as the existing balance of power
prior to 19114 A%as highly favourable to British interests. To preserve the status quo
England had opposed Russian expansion at the Straits as well as German construction of
the Berlin-Baghdad railroad.
However. by 1900 Britain realised the futility of pursuing the
policy of isolation and made efforts to have an alliance with Germany, which did not,
however, succeed. At the same time the Germans were not eager to enter into any
alliance with the British. After 1901 Anglo-German relations became steadily worse.

(v) Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902)

To fortifj• herself against dangers from continental rivalry not only German but also
French and Russian, England in 1902 negotiated an alliance with Japan. It provided that
if either signatory. in defence of its interests in China or Korea, should become involved
in a war with a third power, the other should pursue a policy of benevolent mentality.

(vi) Anglo-French Entente (1904)

England had entered into a treaty with France according to which France granted England
a free hand in Egypt, while England allowed France similar licence in Morocco. French
fishing rights on the banks of Newfoundland, in dispute since 1713, were redefined. In
Africa, England granted important concessions to France.

(vii) Anglo-Russian Entente (1907)

With Russia England formed an entente which provided that both

England and Russia should abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Tibet.
Afghanistan became an English protectorate. Russia was divided into three spheres of
influence --the northern was to be of special interest to Russia and the southern of special
interest to England while the remaining part to be open to both British and Russian.

Backdrop to World War I

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the great powers of the globe were Austro-
Hungarian Empire, France. Germany, Italy, Japan. Russia, USA and Great Britain. Most
nations of the world in this year and particularly the European states were polarised by
regional alliances based on their own concerns for-security and stability. Alliances were
forged to balance the power of one state against the other or to restore a balance disturbed
by a limited war. In 191-1, the two major alliances of Europe were: (a) The Triple
Alliance; and (b) The Triple Entente.

Most European nations «-ere members of these two alliances. While the first was led by
Germany and included Austria and HunganI, with a brief appearance of Italy, the second
was led by France and included Russia and Britain. The objective’ of the Triple Alliance
was to check and isolate France while members of the Entente wanted to overcome this
isolation. The broad purpose of both the alliances was to again the upper hand in
European politics and tilt the balance of power in their favour. At a later date, the Central
and the Allied powers hovered round these alliances. While the Central powers mainly
referred to
the Triple Alliance state. the Allied powers were the Entente nations. Although Europe
had

neutral states also such as Belgium and Greece, they could not maintain their neutrality
for long and opted or were made to opt for either of these two major groups. Powers
beyond Europe such as the USA and Japan were closely linked up with one or the other
European power and though they were not members of these alliances, both used their
power to operate the balancing system in Europe.

Despite these alliances, the wave of nationalism rode rough-shod over the whole of
Europe with either hatred or indifference of one nation against the other. Germany and
France, Russia and Austria, and Germany and a little distantly placed Britain were bitter
rivals. A formidable power in her own right, Germany for various reasons was central in
this chessboard. in which ”ch was jealous of the other with no concern for the world at
large, and the policy of each state drifted along ’my country. right or wrong’. ,

At this stage imperialistic interest got mingled up with nationalism. The rivalry for
strategic points in Europe and colonies outside was fierce. Germany, the most powerful
industrial nation, then wanted a passage from Berlin to Baghdad for her trade markets.
Russians had an eye on Constantionople, the capital of the Turkish Empire. The
distribution of the inherited European part of the Turkish Empire, (the Balkan question)
had indeed become a major imperialistic issue in that period. It assumed serioud
proportions in 1908 and thereafter when Austria-Hungary incorporated Bosnia and
Herzegovina -- the two former Turkish provinces in their empire. The British and the
French along with Japan had their own colonial interests to safeguard in different parts of
the world.

These colonial interests along with mutual fears and hostilities were reflected in the
disproportionate increase of military expenditure and militarism in Europe. Apart from
the major powers, even small sates such as Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania maintained
large armies. Militarism was

in a way inevitable since nations wanted to forestall any change in power relations which
NAas likely to be to their disadvantage. Austria ’and Germany, for tct;~ ,a~c_ wanted a
hold in the Balkans before Russia was in

International Relations 41 ,

position to strike and claim them. Russia. in turn, had decided lot to Illo%N the power
balance to shift in favor of Austria. These mutual siispicioas and fear of imperialist
designs resulted in a general feelings of insecurit` and brought Europe to the brink of war.
Any spark would have been sufficient tonight a fire throughout Europe. In fact. bemeen
19(.15 and 191-4, several crises such as the Moroccan (1905 and 1911). the Balkan
(1908), and the Turco-Italian (1911) arose and were resolved. It was. lio\Never, realised
that these crises had assumed the nature of conflicts between the Alliances and were no
more confined to two states. Any miscalculation in such an atmosphere would have
disturbed the equilibrium and consequently peace which would have led to an inevitable
and open conflict. Such an accident did occur in the form of the Austro-Serbian crisis of
1914 which led to World War 1.

The Austro-Serbian crisis was the product of the hostility between Austria-Hungary
(which constituted one state under a system of dual monarchy since 1867 when Hungary
having been overrun by Austrians had become a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire)
and Serbia over the issue of Serbian nationalism. The immediate issue was the status of
the Slavic people who were not being treated on war with the other ethnic groups such as
Germans and Magyars in the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia, taking
advantage of the situation had been propagating the cause of Slavic nationalism and
encouraged Serb, Croats and cause of Slavic nationalism and encouraged Serbs, Croats
and other ethnic groups to revolt against the ruling Hababurg House of Austria which had
remained in power since 1278. Its heir apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, sensing the
danger to the territorial integrity had followed ”trailism”--a policy which placed Serbs on
an equal footing and as partners with other groups. This, however, did not satisfy the
rrulitant nationalistic elements in Serbia and during a visit to Bosnia in the deep south of
Austro-Hungarian empire, the Archduke was assassinated along with his wife in
Sarajevo, the capital city, by a Serbian with the alleged connivance of the Serbian
Government. Austria-Hungary reacted by deciding to teach Serbia a lesson and declared
war on her on 28 July 1914. Germany, their out > ally, supported them after initial
hesitation, France and Russia in turn supported the cause of Serbia. Russia, particularly,
mobilised her army, which led to counter-mobilisation by Germany. Events moved so
fast that Germany declared war on both Russia and France. In order to attack France,
Germany opened its flank from Belgium, a new region of war. The invasion of Belgium
was also a violation of Belgian independence and perpetual neutrality which were
guaranteed to her by a treaty to which Austria, Russia, Prussia. France and Britain were
signatories. Britain. placed across the English Channel and close to Belgium, was now
brought in to the war against Germany. The Austro-Serbian war which had its

First World
War

4 I -1

origin in the punitive measures against Serbia had thus transformed itself into a World
War.

The Central Powers and the Allies

The pace of movements was sufficiently fast. Among the neutrals. Turkey and Japan
being bound by treaty obligations to Germany, and Britain respectively attacked Russia
and Germane. Turkey supporting Germany entered the war on November i, 1914 and
bombarded Russian ports. Japan. under obligation to Britain through an alliance to 1902,
was also lured by her expansionist policies. Italy which was neutral could no longer resist
the temptation of the promised share of territories by the aliti-German nations. now
grouped as Allies and joined the war oil their behalf. The smaller countries joined either
of the two groups. While Bulgaria ,joined the Central powers on October 14. 1915.
Rumania and Greece supported the Triple Entente forces. Thus the NN hose of Europe
and part of Asia were involved in the war. Germany. Au.aJa-llmigary, Turkey and
Bulgaria (Central powers) were ran--ed against Britain, France, Serbia. Belgium, Japan
and Russia (Allies). More and more neutral states like Rumania. afraid of the
ovenyhelruingly powerful Germany, joined the Allies to contain the likely emergence of
German domination. At a later stage in April 1917, USA also terminated her apparent
neutrality on the issues of the unrestricted German submarine warfare on the high seas.
The American decision was also based on the profits that US had earned by supplying the
war machine to the Allies and partly on the lurking fear of Germany conquering part of
Asia and Africa along with the whole of Europe.

The conquests of the Central powers were impressive at the beginning: Serbia, Belgium.
Romania. Italy were successfully subdued and Russia too was successfirlly penetrated. A
series of debacles stdfered by Russia resulted in the collapse of the Tsarist regime and
eventually in the October Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The conclusion of the treaty
between Russia and Germany (Brest-Litovsk Treaty, March 4. 1918) implied Russian
surrender. All this brightened the prospects of the Central powers but the Allies gained on
the sea what they lost on the land. The American intervention changed the fortunes of the
N%ar. Her naval power proved decisive enough to establish the superiority of the Allies.
In their counter-offensive they could force back the Germans from Belgium and Bulgaria.
Despite early victories. by Novernber 1918, the Central powers 1,xhausted their human
and material resources and consequently the will to the enemy. Their political structures
also crumbled. The successful Arab territorial
uprisings in Syria, Palestine. Mesopotamia (Iraq) within th;: Turkish empire were
responsible for its disintegration. Even in tfermanv, the anti-monarchist parties forced
Emperor Kaiser 11 to abdicate

International Relations

its throne and retire to Holland. The Weimar Republic was then formed iitd Germany
signed a humiliating armistice.

World War I ended oil 11 November 1918. The war revealed ,everal shortcomings in the
state system. The domination of a single nation or groups of nations through concepts
such as ’blood and iron’ and determination backed up the intrigue and force. short-
sighted and selfish Nationalism, a dangerous system of national sovcrcignty. the ambition
for .olonial expansion. mistaken diplomatic inanetl\erlngs and worst of all, ,~ ar as an
arbiter of all the differences among nations. were all manifested ~_ the catastrophe. None
prior to 191-4, could ever imagine that a war. When it came, there was no regular
procedure and machiner, to press the ir to a halt. The absence of a universal svstem left
each state guessing Aid anticipating aggression and shaping its policies accordingly.

Such was the situation that promoted several changes in the ;aftermath of the war. A new
distribution of power be the redra« ing of the :nap of Europe based oil the principle of
national self-detcrnunation and !!ic caning of such new states within Europe as
Ciechoslovakia. Vugoslavia, Estonia. Lithuania. Lata\-ia. Poland and Hungary folloNsed.
!’he tsar also impressed upon the statesmen the need to ensure national Mdependence and
individual liberties through the cooperation of all the i!ations. The approach of balancing
one against the other power. it was felt. heeded a change. The substitute found was
collective security based on ioralit-v and the collective strength of nations forged against
the aggressor. lens a basic reform in the state system was thought of an accepted. Its ~,ed
was realised,by the dominant Allied powers throughout and after the ,., ar. While France
emphasised security. Britain insisted oil peaceful ~;atlement.

Indicentally the Allied powers also constituted the major :1_mocratic governments of the
then existing world. Thos had fought the ,.; ar to put an end to future war. TheN- were in
a position to set the stage for < <Icxs order international relations based on peace and
justice for all. Plans .,;re formulated for such an order and in repealing the pre-war
alliances. -c first institutional approach to the peace movements took a concrete ,’~~ipe.
Along with the conclusion of a series of peace treaties such as St. ~crman with Austria.
Trainon with Hungar<. Neuilly with Bulgariii.
,_nes and Lausanne with Turkey. and the most notable. the Trcat_s of ’; ,rsallies signed
on June 28. 1919. a new structure for peace \%’Is ;:orporated in their texts. The name of
this structure was the League of Alons.

Treaty of Versailles

The basis of the Versailles Trcat_s i~;i, ~1

Wilson. President of the United

First World War

Wilson’s Fourteen Points

Of the fourteen points proposed by Wilson which referred to Germany and which
influenced the final peace terms were:

The Removal so far as possible of all economic barriers and the

establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace
and associating themselves for its maintenance:

Adequate guarantees given and taken shat arntaritents will be reduced to the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety:

A free. open-minded and absolutel impartial adjustment of all colonial claims:

The righting of the wrong done to France by Russia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-
Lorriane:

An independent Poland: and The establishment of the League of Nations.

Formulation of the Treaty

The important problems which demanded immediate solution by the peace conference
were: (i) the establishment of the League of Nations. (ii) French security and the German
boundaries. (iii) the fate of Cornier German colonies. (iv) the Commercial Status of
Germans. (v) reparations. (vi) disarmament. (vii) Army. (viii) the Condemnation of War
Criminals. and (ix) the signing of the trcat_N.

(i) League of Nations

Wilson was named as the Chairman of the Committee which

drafted the covenant that constituted an integral part of the peace treats. Wilson presented
his draft to the peace conference consisting of 26 points which formed the basis for the
Covenant of the League of Nations. When the Treat of Versailles was drawn in its final
form the League of Nations covenant constituted the first 26 articles of that document.
(ii) French Securill• and the German Boundaries

Alsace-Lorraine was. restored to France. Germain_ was to retain sovereignty of the area.
in which there was to be no German troops. It was. however, to be occupied. but there
would be withdrawal at regular intervals depending upon German fulfilment of the treat’
obligations. In addition to this, a strip of Rhineland was to be demilitarised. This
arrangement would. it was thought, facilitate a quick invasion from France if Germans
should again threaten to start another war.

International Relations

Germany also lost through the application of Plebiscite. certain

towns to Belgium and Denmark.

(iii) Emergence of Nov Poland

To constitute a iiew Poland. West Prussia arid Poison Nxere taken from Gcrmanv and
assigned to
Poland. To give Poland access to the Baltic outlet. the Peace Conference created a
corridor from Poland to Danzig. Because of this arrangement. contact between East
Prussia and Germany proper was made difficult.

The allies also deprived Germany of Memel and the surrounding

districts. while Teschen. a small area adjoining upper Silesia, was given to
Czechoslovakia.

One of the most serious problems confronting the Peace

Conference was that of upper Silesia. Both the French and the Polish dfOcgates
demanded that this territon- be transferred to Poland without any plebiscite. It was,
however, decided that those districts which voted to join Poland were to be assigned to
Poland. while those districts which voted in favour of Germany were left with Germany.

(iv) German Colonies

German colonies were mandated to England, France and Japan. France was given parts of
the Cameroon and Toso areas. while England was allotted the remainder. Almost all
German East Africa was mandated to England. In the Pacific area. all the German
colonial interests north of. the equator were mandated to Japan. while those south of the
equator went to Australia.

(.,) Commercial Provisions

Fearing the German competition the Allies made German) surrender almost all her
merchant marine. All cargo vessels. above 1,600 and 1.000 tons, and one-fourth of those
below 1,000 tons were to be turned over to the Allies to reimburse them for losses
sustained through submarine depredation.

The imposition of Allied control upon German river traffic denied her the power to
regulate her own internal marrine commerce.

Because of the exploitation and destruction of mines in countries occupied by Germany,

she was required to make deliveries of coal annually for ten years. The scheme of these
deliveries. which were to be credited to her reparation account. was 7,000,000 tons to
France. 8.000,000 tons to Belgium and -1,500,000 tons to Italy, in 1919-211. with annual
increments w hich would raise the amount to 8, 500.00() tons by 1928-29. To cap this.
whatever,commercial rights Germany possessed in China. Siam. Egypt Liberia- Bulgaria.
Morocco and Turkey were divested from her.

First World War -118

(vi) Reparation

Germany was compelled to pay for ”damages done to civilian

population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of
Germany by land. by sea and from the 4r.~: In terms of cash the
amount Germany was made to tI
$ >.000.000.000.

(vii)

Disarmament of CernrunY
To prevent German %, from endangering the security of countries

surrounding her. the Allies provided for the disarmament. According to the Greatly of
Versialles. the German Army was reduced to 1.()0,000
men inclusive of staff, officers and men of all ranks. Further she was prevented from
possessing niilitan- and

navel airplanes, poison gas. and gams exceeding four inches in caliber. The import and
export of arms was forbidden and their manufacture in Germany itself was restricted to
certain specified factories.

The treat- also reduced the German naval fleet to six battleships.

six cruisers. six destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. Germany was to have no
submarines. The naval personnel was not to exceed 13.500 enlisted men and 1.600
officers.

(viii) German War Criminals

The Allies held Germany solely guilty of having started the war and accused many
German leaders as war criminals. In addition.

830 German officials were cited for atrocities. on demand they were to be surrendered for
trial. Eventually the Allies gave up their right to try the ’ War Criminals and instead. they
permitted the German government to prosecute its own citizens at Leipzig.

(i-v) Signing ojthe Treutt~

Despite protestations Germany was made to sign the Treat- of Versailles of that portion
affecting her. On June 21, 1919 the Weimar Assembly approved the Treaty. On the
following day a Berlin newspaper carried an article with the caption Lest ure Forget, ”the
German people will strive to attain that place among the nations of the world to which we
are entitled. Then. Vengeance for 1919.’

Evaluation of the Treaty

The Treaty of Versailles was subjected to criticism from the day it Was signed by
Germany. Germans began to resent it. It has been said that

the Peace Conference was not a conference at all but a tribunal before which the Central
po~ . \ ere summoned to hear their doom. Despite the

o pay t ~e Allies was around

International Relations

claims. of clemency, that the conference having ”called in all parties, concerned” and that
”all who had anything to say were heard” the Treaty was an imposed one. It has the
following weaknesses.
First, since Germany did not participate in drafting the Treaty the Conference was
deprived of any opposition which would have moderated some of the extreme provisions
that made Germany totally resentful and humiliated, and second, since no German had
been consulted in drafting the treaty, it was almost impossible to moblise any opinion in
Germany in support of the Treaty.

The Treaty was no altogether without deception. The Germans had been promised peace
on terms which were not observed at the Conference. The 14 points were observed only
when they were to the advantage of the victors. Simultaneously, with the disarming of
Germany, the Allies voluntarily assumed the obligation of reducing their own military
establishments. But no disarmament
ensued among the victors.

One unfortunate result of the Treaty was the fragmentation of Europe. Before 1914,
Europe comprised nineteen states, now after the Peace Treaty there were twenty-six
states. Many of them were so small that from the economic point of view they could not
sustain themselves.

The most serious failure of the Treaty, however, was that it was not enforced. Almost as
soon as it was signed England and France assumed different_ attitudes toward Germany.
While England felt that Germany would take at least sixty years to recover, France was
worried over Germany’s military potential. These differences, together with the breach of
many provisions of the Treat’ by the Allies, enabled Germany to bypass w the Treaty -
and escape from mostr its obligations.

CHAPTER 2

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Conception and the Establishment of the League

The League of Nations ,was the realization of the ideal of an international organization
that had evolved since the Middle Ages. The idea of such an association composed of
sovereign independent states to maintain peace and outlaw vyar was expressed by both
political thinkers and jurists. International grouping that did come into existence had
taken several forms. Although international cooperation nas promoted to an

extent. it remained confined to the non-political field. Efforts. nevertheless. were not
lacking in the area of political cooperation wrong states. These

could be traced back to the Congress of Westphalia X16-18). the Holv Alliance and the
Concern of Europe. Both the Alliance and the Concern were a notable promising feature
of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The Holy Alliance initiated by the
then Czar of Russia had been

formed at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, and Austria. Prussia. France and Great
Britain were parties to it. These nations had agreed to

meet frequently and take concerted action to maintain the peace and prosperity of Europe.
The Alliance was based on the principles of

Christianity and the moral consensus among European nations. Set’^ral conferences were
held under its auspices and the bilateral relations. Later, difficulties developed and the
Alliance ceased to (`unction. Similarly. the Concert of Europe’. a loose arrangement
among big powers. continued up
to 191-1_ It met whenever the international situation demanded united action. But despite
these forums the Crimean War (191-1-16) could not be a\oided. All that these grouping
could achieve was the cementing of the conferences and peace settlements for resolving
international affairs. The chief aim had alvyays been the i,2;ii;Ucnance of the balance of
power with

International Relations -121

tile supremacy of the big po-wers

as its liallinark. It NNas ad-hocism all through and neither a procedure of political
cooperation leas eNolved nor NNas there an effort to form gill or-anisation to deal «ith
broader political questions. Yet certain political questions \\cre settled through these
narrow political groupings. Tile conference s\steln gained strength. Bemeen 18-4U and
19(19. the number of conferences held increased from a mere 9 to 1.082.+-++ The
codification of international laic and the discussions on disarmarrierit can also be traced
to this period.

The non-political international unions established long before tile formation of the
League of Nations are also notclN-orthy and some of then( continue evcri to this daN.
These organisations focused oil the administrative and technical questions. These here
not general but special bodies both in terms of membership and functions. Some of these
lNere:
(a) International Burcau of Tclegrtipll Administration (1860).
Universal Postal Union (1875).

(c) International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875).

(d) International Copyright Union (188f>).

(e) International Office of Public Health (l90_>).
(f) International Institute of Agriculture (19(1x).

Impact of the War

Thus in both the political and non political fields. international effort was not lacking and
nlanv people in many lands articulated the ideas of international organisation. Thcv were
inspired not only by the human conscience and its moral (ones but also b\ the
interdependence of nations boundaries. It was however World War I. which through its
vast disaster affecting most nations in more or less equal proportions. brought to the fore
the demand for an international arrangement to maintain peace. During World War 1. US.
Great Britain and France had committed themselves to the future ;association of nations.
In face they claimed to fight the ’war to end war’ and to make the world safe
for.democracv. It vas generally agreed upon that while the state system in the form of-
iseparatc states could be maintained an attempts should be made to reform them through
an international tic-up. World War I had shocked the peoples and the politicians alike for
then (lad believed that in\ war would be limited ill scale and area. It was generally
believed flail had there been a rcgi1l~t’ procedure and machines to call a conference of
the representatives 0
(

nations. the World War could have been avoided. Even the unofficial
organisations in US. Great Britain. Netherlands and other contincntttl countries tried to
promote the idea of an international bolo. Due cl0cl’t

League of Nations
422

,must be given to the American President

Woodrow Wilson who played a ’major role in the formulation of the League of Nations
and piloted it as his wn project. On January 8, 1918. he announced his famous 14 points
>’vchich among other things insisted upon the formation of

n general association of nation.c nrTdm~ .v7xci/ic commanl ,Jar- !ho prnTrrse of af nr-
clir~g nrrrtrrnl Qurnnntec.c n/ pnlilical inclopenclonco and lerrilonial inlegnilV to arc°nl
nncl.vrnnll.cteNe.c crlrl,o

Blueprint for the League

At the conclusion of the war, the Peace Conference was held at Paris wherein the
peaceful settlement of disputes beW ecn the states was the first item on the agenda. The
joint draft of US and Britain (Hurts-Miller draft) became the basis of discussions for the
formation of the League of Nations. A special commission of 19 members of the Peace
Conference under the chairmanship of President Woodron Wilson wars appointed to
draw up a covenant for the League of N;ttions which Ivas

wholly approved by the Paris Peace Conference on April 28. 1919. The covenant was
made an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles through its first 26 articles. It was
similarly incorporated in the other treaties. The covenant expressly and precisely declared
the establishment of the Lcaguc in the name of the ’High -Contracting Parties and Ltid
down (lie followine broad objectives of the new organisation:

Promotion of international cooperation and achievcntcnl of international peace securiU.

2. Acceptance of obligations not to resort to war.

3. Prescription of open just and honourable relations ,tmong
nations.

Firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of

conduct among Governments. and

The maintenance Of _justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the
dealings of organised peoples with ogle another.

With the ratification of the Treat.\ of Vesailles. the League came into existence on 10
January 192(1 with 49 original nlentbers---India begin

one. Thus emerged the first cooperative institutional arrangement among states through
an agreement to perform mutually advantageous function through its periodic meetings
and staff activities. as a part of both the enforcement of peace treaties and the-peace
programme following the First World War. With its emergence began a new ambitious
epoch thletration and cot~r,in.:pon in several aspects of international i.;.olons

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Structure and Functions of the League
-12t)

Objective of the League

The Preamble of the League of Nations committed the High Contracting Parties to the
promotion- of international cooperation and peace and securiy by the
acceptance of obligations not to resort to ;car by:

1. The prescription of one. just and honourable relations

between nations,

7_ The firm establishment of understanding of international larv

as the actual rule of conduct among Governments. and

The maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treat’ obligations in the
dealings of organised people with one another.

At the functional level. the League was meant to serve as an agency for the prevention of
war and the pacific settlement of disputes. It was declared competent to face the threats to
peace from any quarter and its avenues of arbitration, adjudication or conciliation were to
channels and contain all controversies. The League was also to promote international
cooperation in the economic and social fields and to act as the, coordinator for the
existing international unions.

Further. the League was expected to preserve and 1111111ta111 the stntrr.c quo
established by the Peace Conference of Paris in 1920. It ryas with this background that
the supervisory functions normally performed by the victors were conferred upon the
League. The operation of the Mandate Sys! m and the protection of the national
minorities along with other administrative functions were examples of such functions.

The Lea Q!;c ~t,stem

Like any other covenant. the League Covenant had also left much of the detailed.
working of the international body to its day-to-dar experience and sewed merely as a
starting point. The basic structure was however provided for. The League system was
made of three main bodies. the League. the International Court of Justice and the
International Labout Organisation. Each one of these bodies had its orvn constitution and
organisation.

The plain body. the League, had three organs---the Assembly. the Council and the
Secretariat In addition a dozen or more auxiliary agencies such as the Economic
Organisation. Organisation of Communication tend Transit and isle Permanent Mandates
Commission were associated with the League with varied structure and func!ions.

Leagltre of Nations

(i) The Assembly

The Assembly of the League of Nations was its political and representative organ which
included all the member states. The membership was open to the states, dominions and
colonies which could be admitted by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The highest
membership of the League was in 193’-38 when 58 member states were represented. Six
states, Saudi Arabia. Yemen, Oman, Nepal, Manchuko and the USA never applied for the
membership. The US, one of the most ardent supporters of

the League plan, failed to ratty the peace treaties after the war. mainly because of
domestic compulsions. As the American Senate failed to ratifi-the peace treaties after the
war, the US could not become a member.

Member were also free to withdraw front the League. Incidentally, rchile US was not a
member, some of the other big powers also were not members throughout the history of
the League.

Each member state had the right to exercise only one vote, based

on tile principle of equality. A state could send three delegates and several alternates for
the Assembly meeting. The rote. however, was collectively

cast. Several member states used to maintain permanent delegations at Geneva, the
headquaFters of the League.

The Assembly was required to meet annually in September in Geneva. Special sessions
could also be held. The Assembly had its own presiding officers and wiles of procedure
ill conformity- with the Covenant. he agenda of the meetings was prepared by the
Secretary General subject to the Assembly’s approval.

The Assembly functioned snore or less as a parliament and ryas assisted by six standing
committees which dealt with matters conceding: (i) Constitutional and legal questions;
(ii) Technical organisations: (iii) Reduction of armaments: (iv) Budgetm~ matters: fv)
Social and luumanitarian issues, and (vi) Political questions.

The functions of the Assembly were fairly broad and could be c!v tided into the electoral,
constituent and the deliberative spheres. In the a~:ctoral sphere, it could admit new
members, elect the non-permanent members of the council, approve the nomination of
the Secretaw General end elect 1> Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice
along rr ith the Council. The constituent power of the Assembly involved the amendment
of the Covenant with the approval of tile Council and the r,lilflCat1011 by the majority
Of the member-states.

The Assembly was mainly visualised as the deliberative organ of t!ie League. It had the
right to discuss and problem within the sphere of action of the League and could deal
with all general and technical, political tlud economic qplestions It could render binding
d;,cisions not only in

International Relations

routine matters but also in important political problems. The decisions taken however
required the agreement of all the members present at a meeting and unanimity was
insisted upon. Tile idea behind this was that the effectiveness of the League depended on
tile observance of the obligations by members. Tile unanirnrtl’ rule howevcr did not
hamper the functioning of the Assembly. A way out was readil_N- found. A distinction,
for instance, was made between a decision and a recommendation. The latter did not
require
unanimity and could be made by a majority. Since tile decisions of tile Assembly xlere
not binding on parties. the Assernblv always relied upon its ’wishes’ (recommendations)
arid refrained from taking decisions

61 The Council
0
Tile Council was designed to be a more compact and active body than the Assembly. It
had a small ruenibcrship divided into two broad categories of permanent and non-
permanent members. Originally. the total number of members. France. Italy. Japan and
Great Britain here the -4 permanent members; while the lesser powers «ere taken as the
non-permanent one. In 1922, two additional non-pernlarlcnt seats were created and the
total increased to 10. Later, with the admission of Gernlarly and her claim for a
permanent seat in the Council, a further reorganisation and accommodation became
essential and by 1939. the Council had
permanent seats and I I non-permanent members, but in 1939. with resignation of
Germany. Italy and Japan, the Council was left with only France and Britain.

From among the non-permanent members, 3 were elected each year by the Assembly for
a three-year term. The Assembly. by a tNNo-thirds majority, could also declare non-
permanent members eligible for re-election. Thus the non-permanent members had a
majority over the permanent counterparts although they were subject to the controlling
influence of the big powers. .

The Council was expected to be the centre of the Leagues activities. It was authorized to
deal NN itll questions which needed continuous attention. It had to meet at least -4 times
a year. Ili practice it met more frequently. Like the Assembly it could deal with any
matter within the sphere of the League of Nations or affecting the peace of tile world. It
paid attention to matters of peace and security and to the Mandate System. The member
states could also expand its owners further by their treat), agreements and give
jurisdiction to the Council over their disputes.

The Council had the authority to take action against any state violating the Covenant and
was obliged to carry out the recommendations of the Assembly. It nominated the
Secretary General subject to tile Assembly ratification. The Council could evoke Articles
10-1G to rnobilisc

°’ 4 * League of Nations

sanctions against an -aggressive state. More often it utilised Article I I which declared
that any war or threat of war was a matter of concern to tile whole League and that the
League was to take am- action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations. The Article did not specify the action to be taken. It was left to the
Council to utilise it in whatever manner it found appropriate
to deal with any threatening situation. There were other modes which provided for
specific measures. Article 12, for instance, laid down the three modes of pacific
settlement--arbitration. judicial decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice
and the inquiry- by the Council in any dispute likely to lead to a conflict. In no case the
parties were to resert to war until three months elapsed between the award, decision or
report of the Council. This provision later proved to be a weakness. The Council could
only ask the states to ser`-e all trade and financial relations with the Covenant-breaking
state. The states were left to take their own decisions. The Council could only use its
influence and appeal to the member-states.

The Covenant had not defined in any exact manner the relationship between the Council
and the Assembly. In practice the Assembly rearely interfered with the Council’s work.
The decision-making process of the Council. however. required unanimity. It meant that
any member-state, whether permanent or non-permanent. could veto a decision. In
practice. however. there were many departures to the rile of unanimity. Important
exceptions were made for matters of the procedure which were decided by the majority of
votes. Parties to the international disputes were not permitted to vote. Amendments to the
Covenant were effected by a majority vote. The judges of the International Court again
were elected by the majority.

(iii) Secretariat

The Secretariat of the League was headed by the Secretay General who was appointed by
the Council with the approval of the majority in the Assembly. His term of office was not
fixed and the first Secretay-General Eric Dnnlunond of Great Britain whose nomination
was a part of the Covenant resigned in 1933. Thereafter. t :e Assembly fixed a ten-year
terns for the post. Joseph Avenol of France and Sell Lester of Ireland were the other
Secretaries-General of the Lcaguc.

The appointments to the Secretariat were made by the Secretan-General based on

professional competence and geographical representation. These were subject to the
approval of the Council. the Secretary-General functioned with help of 2 Deputy
Secretaries-General and 2 Under-Secretaries. The Secretariat had other staff which varied
in strength (7s0 in 1931 to 0-! in l04-1) and vas divided into several sections headed by
directors.

42 0

IN ”I

International Relations

The functions of the Secretariat included the preparation of the Budget. formulation of
the agenda. translation of speeches. publication of the Assembly and Council minutes and
general coordination of the League bodies and outside agencies
spread over the entire globe.

Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)

The establishment of an International Court of Justice, autonomous in nature, represented

the League”s approaches to peace. It was an attempt to evolve a legal framework for the
settlement of international disputes and to bring in international law into international
politics by transforming part of the disputes into justifiable issues. Article XIV of the
League Covenant provided:

The Council .drall,Jomrrtrlale and submit to the members of the Leagtre.for adoption,
plans fin- the estahli.shntent (?I’o permanent Court orlntcnnatiot7al Justice.

Accordingly. the Court was established after a series of discussions on drafts and reports
presented by specialised bodies. It started functioning from Februay 1922 with a statute
of its own drafted by a commission of jurists. Spread aver G-4 Articles this statute was
ratified separately by the members of the League. It demonstrated the autonomous nature
of the court. Although it was an integral part of the League, neither the Assembly nor the
Council could enact any law binding upon the court. The independent nature of the Court
could be assessed by the fact that the states could join the PCIJ without being members of
the League and that the court could exist and function as an international institution even
if the League disappeared.

Composition: The Court originally was composed of II Judges and -1 Deputy Judges.
Later, in 1930, the number was increased to is and at a still later date (1936) the posts of
Deputy Judges were abolished. The composition was conditioned by the statutory
directive that the Court should represent. ”the main forms of civilisation” and ’the
principal’ legal systems of the world.

The Judges were elected for a ternt.of 9 years concurrently by the Council and by the
Assembly front lists of candidates nominated by the national groups of members of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Judges enjoyed diplomatic privileges and
immunities. were eligible for re-election, and could be removed only by a unanimous
vote of their fellow judges.

The seat of the Court was the Hague (in the Netherlands).

(ii) Jurisdiction: Article 3.1 of the statute laid down that only
states as parties could approach the court for the settlement of

League of Nations

=128

disputes international in character. Countries which were not members of the League
could also present their cases before the court provided they agreed to accept to honour
its jurisdiction and decision. The state could either approach the Court on its own or in
agreement with the party/parties to the dispute.

The Courts jurisdiction

was fairly wide and Article XIV was comprehensive enough t0 contain 1 general
reference to its domain. ”The Court shall be colhpetent to bear and deterutine any dispute
of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it.” Likewise Article 36
of the statue spelt out that the jurisdiction comprised ”all cases which the parties refer to
it and all matters specially provided for in the treaties and conventions in force.” The,
states could recognize the Courts jurisdiction ”as contpulson- ipso fiaclo and without
special agreement’’ in all or any cases concerning (a) the interpretation of a treaty. (b) the
question of international law. (c) the existence of any fact which. if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation, and Id) the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Although statutory- the cases brought before the Court had to be between or among the
states. operatively the Court also heard disputes between one state and the private citizens
of another state with tile mutual consent of both the governments. In cases of dispute as
to whether the court had jurisdiction, the matter was settled by the decision of the court.
The PCLT was to be the tribunal of the League whenever a treaty or convention in force
provided for the reference of a matter to a tribunal to be instituted by the League of
Nations.

The .4dvisor.v jurisdiction of the court covered all questions referred to it by the Council
or the Assembly. The opinion offered was not binding but was regarded as constituting
the final legal decision on the point submitted. The Court could also refuse to give any
opinion on matters referred to it.

The Permanent Court of International Justice was thus. designed to be the first
international judicial body for the pacific settlement of the disputes. During its existence
between 1922 and 1939, the PCJI dealt with some 79 cases. But most of these cases were
not of much importance or significance in so far as the maintenance of international
peace and security were concerned. With the outbreak of the war. when the League
system collapsed. the CJl also died along with it. Hoix-ever. its work was l,Iken over the
International Court of Justice created in 19-4~- which _ . ,~ ~,~ m op crate to this day.

International Relations

Mandates Commission

Among the other mechanisms set rip by the League. the Mandates System assumed
importance for it dealt with the improvement in the political status of the ’dependent
people’ ill the ’backward areas.’ The arrangement however was partial and was restricted
only to territories which
were won over by the Allied powers from Germany and Turke\-during the First World
War. Other colonial people were still left to their fate. In a way it was politically
expedient on the part of victors to establish an international super-ison- set-up which.
without antagonising the colonial powers, would promote the interests of colonial people.
Article 22 of the Covenant was fairly clear about tl

re objects of the nnandator-

SwSteill: -

(1) To those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the State which formerly governed them and which
arc inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves... there should be ;replied the
principle that the well-being and developing of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilisation.

(2) The tutelage of such people should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best
undertake this responsibility.

The League’s Covenant set up a permanent Mandates Commission to deal with the
dependent people in specified areas spread over communities belonging to (a) Turkish
Empire, (b) Central Africa. and (c) South-West Africa and South Pacific islands. The
Commission established by the Council was originally composed of 9 members with the
majoriy, drawn from the non-mandaton powers. In 1927 the number was raised to 10.
These members received reports about tire governance of the mandatory regions from the
mandatoy powers. heard petitions submitted by the people in these regions through the
mandatory government and forwarded recommendations to the Council which took
decisions on all maters relating to the observance based on such advice. The Commission
obser-ed and inquired into the governance of the mandated territories and could pull up
the incompetent and guilt powers which did not discharge their functions in accordance
with the recomnrendatio

guidelines. ns and suggested

The mandated regions were I-I and were broadly classified as A, B and C. This
classification was based on the face of a region-s progress towards self-governance,
geographical situation and economic conditions. Placing the territories in different
categories and under different mandator%- powers was indeed a fhought.joh which
involved bargains to the

League of Nations

event of barters in which the wishes of the population in the mandated area were more
often than not overlooked. The League could ultimately settle for the following
arrangement as shown on the following page.
The ’A’ group territories were considered to have reached a stage of development where
these were closest to the status of an independent nation. The ’B- group areas were at a
stage where the mandator\- power

.-mlrt,tll,. 1.
2.
13 Croup: 1.

c Group:

Mandatory Power
Great Britain Prance Great Britain

Belgium
NCX\r Zealand
Japan
Australia

Britain
Union of SoxUh .Wi-ica

9landatud’l en-itories
Iran. Palestine and Trasnjordan Syria and Lebanon

langamii:a. Togalanct (in [,arts) C’ameruon (in parts) .

Ruanda-I’nnuti Cameroon (in palls) sat„,,;,
Marshall. Marianna, I’clcvc ((;cnuan Islands)

I1;IISer\\llhelnlSl:,nd and Bismarck Arch (’.dew t3uirna)

Gilhert. \auru. Solomon Islands Ciel7nan South West .UT ica

had to remain responsible for the administration of the territov for their goal of self-
determination and independence was a little distant. The ’C’ group mandates were
remotely placed from self-governance and owing to the sparseness of their population.
small size. remoteness from the centres

of civilisation could best be administered as integral portions of the mandatories and

more or less as annexed territories.

The Mandate System thus represented a significant step in both international

management and the transition in imperialism.

The major organs of the League were thus fairly functional and structurally made
competent to enforce the ambitious provisions of the Covenant, which extended to all
shades of political relations.

International Labour Organisation

International Labour Organisation was another main organ of the League which. despite
considerable ’autonomy. functioned in close association with the League. It was devised
as in adwisor bodw to provide rut international platform to discuss and deal with the
problem of labour. It was visualised as an organisation to promote uniformitw of
standardised

and protective labour legislation through international .sanction. It was also meant to
crvstallize the attitudes and policies of governments. etuplowers~ associations and the
labour unions on the problems of labour. Article 23 of the Covenant of the League while
explaining social and other activities of the League attempted to determine the purpose of
the body as secure and maintain fair and human conditions of labour in all ~:ountrics.-

International Relations

All members of the League. by virtue of their membership. %%crc also members of the
ILO. although others were not barred. The Organisation accordingly- dealt %%ith the
labour problems of the member states. The ILO comprised 3 main bodies:

1. The General Conference:

The Conference represented the member-states, and the employers’ and workers’
organisations within the states. It made recommendations on labour legislation and
submitted these
for the approval of the respective state legislatures spread over the world.

2. The Governing Bode:

The supervisory and administering unit of the ILO. its Governing Body consisted of 32
members chosen for 3 years.~Half of the these Nyerc appointed by the member-states
while the other half, in equal proportion. was elected by the employers’ and workers
delegates at the conference. They met every three mouths. prepared the agenda of the
Conference and supervised the ofce of the ILO.

3. International Labour (off ce:

The office consisted of 350 experts in various fields and was the main springboard of
action for the Organisation. The appointments were made by the Director of the Office
wlro in turn was appointed by the Governing Body.

The ILO headquarters were at Geneva.

Political History of the League

The political history of the League rn<iv be broadly divided into the follo«-ing five
phases with its changing fortunes: (i) 1.919-1920: (ii) 1921-1925; (iii) 1926-1932; (iv)
1933-1939: (v) 19.1(1-19.15.

The formati\-e phase of t:he League (1919-1920) is marked b. various development

which proved dismal for its future. The N\ithdrawal of’ the United States and the
exclusion of Sovict Russia and Germane \\eakeried its effectiveness almost from the
beginning. Without them. the maintenance of the Security was but a myth. It meant that
quite a few bi~ powers outside the fold of the League could depend on methods beyond
those visualised through and international order. Direct diplomatic negotiations had to
continue and the Le;wuc could not claim to be the undisputed body to charter and direct
%\orld e\ eats.

The second phase (1921-1925) had a linkage with the first German and Russia were
hostile to the organisation. Nevertheless
number. of problems were tackled b\ the League. The disputes bemecir nations which
were settled were:

League of Nations

(a) Sweden and Finland over Aland islands (1920).

(b) Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia (1922).

(c) Lithuania and Poland over Vilna (1923)_

(d) Lithuanian claims over Memel (192-1). and

(e) Greek-Bulgaria over the border (1925).

In addition, the Yugoslav-Albanian border dispute. Persian and Russian claims over
Enzeli were looked into. The League established a preparatory commission for a
disarmament conference. The Geneva Protocol whereby the states accepted of these two
agencies would amount to an aggression. The League also established the mandates
system which
provided the machinery for the governance of those colonial territories
which were taken over by the Allies from Germany ’and Turkey after World
War I. The League administered them through the Permanent Mandates
Commission which supervised the governance
of these areas. Under this
system each area was administered by a big power which sent reports to the
Commission. As noted earlier. in all there were 1-t mandated regions divided into three
groups: A. B and C. Group ’A’ included those areas which were likely to become
independent states in the near future. Former Turkish territories of Irtrq’. Lebanon.
Palestine. Transjord and. and Syria were part of this group. Britain supervised the first
three while Lebanon and Syria vyerc looked after by France.

Group ’B’ had such territories whose independence would be long delayed. The former
German colonies--Tanganv.ika. Togoland (one-third) and the Cameroon (one-sixth) --
were placed .under the British mandate while Belgium administered Ruanda and Unmdi.
The remaining parts of Togoland and Cameroon were placed under French mandate.
Those territories whose self-determination was only a remot,p possibility. were placed
under category ’C~. These were South-West Africa (administered by South Africa).
Western Samoa (administered by New Zealand.) Nauru (administered by Great Britain,
Australia and New Zealand), former German Pacific Islands south of the Equator (trader
Australian mandate). former German Pacific Islands north of the Equator -- Marshall.
Colonies and Marianas --were administered by Japan.

The League. during this period. also devised a mechanism to protect the minorities and
hundreds of complaints were handled to establish precedents for the rcdressal of attacks
on minorities.

. The League relied heavily upon the support of the big powers for the settlement of the
disputes referred to it. It could not make a claim to an automatic intervention in an
explosive situation even when warranted by circumstances. Many countries were not
prepared to concede this right to the Le<y~_ ’->;~: may observe that most the settlements
wlrich the L.caguc

International Relations

arrived at were applicable only to the small states causing little disOrbance to the big
power hegemony.

The third phase of the League (1926-19>2) was its heyday. Its system was utilised by the
major powers which consented tb work through the League. Even non-members came
round to support. It. was a period when treaties for pacific settlement which bout US and
USSR took pal-t. although no treaties could be concluded. The Locarno settlement (1925)
had.just been finalised which with its seven treaties guaranteed some of the European
frontiers and made Belgium. France and Germany promise that they would not resort to
var and would settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Locarno settlement. arrived at
under the auspices of the League. was heralded as the beginning
of a new era in international relations. The League. through the General Act of 1928. also
encouraged arbitration. non-aggression and mutual assistance among states.

Nevertheless tensions continued and Costa Rica. Brazil and Japan chose to leave the
organisation. The authority of the League was challenged by various countries following
purely nationalist policies.

The fourth phase (1932-1939) gave a testing time to the League. It failed to stop Japanese
aggression on Manchuria (1931-1932). and later Shanghai. despite Chinese protests.
Japan ignored the resolutions of the League and ultimately resigned from the
Organisation. Encouraged by her success in China, she adopted a hostile attitude to
Soviet Russia. Germany. dominated by Adolf Hitler. emulated Japan. Mussolini who had
earlier invaded Ethiopia (193x) also found no reason to observe the Leagues Covenant
for such a backward and uncivilised stale as Ethiopia. Gernrom
,a
ttacked Spain. The League was a silent witness to the Spanish Civil War. Hitler went all
out to absorb Austria. Czechoslovakia and Poland (193>). Crises after crises rocked the
League., The delegates used the veto power freely and destroyed the concept of collective
security for their bilateral relations and understanding. The policy of ’sanctions~.against
nations was criticised and demands were made to amend the Covenant itself. The big
powers were already involved in the race for navel supremacy and the disarmament
efforts were called off. The parties to the dispute were just not prepared to resolve them
at the forum available. viz.. the League. Both Britain and France refused to play their
proper role and were busy making territorial adjustments without communicating them to
the Leagues Council of which they were the only important members left. Their policy
wo to appease Italy to form a joint force to defeat Germany. Accordingly. no assistance
was given to Ethiopia Ialln1117y devoid of life but dressed up w nh ,ill the luxuries. and
splendour of living. Even smaller states such as I~,oa~uav rejected the League’s peace
proposals in her war with Bolivia <<t”111 Chaco war of 1935). These big blows proved
to be fatal and

League of Nations

overshadowed the small efforts made by the League in condemning Soviet attack on
Finland and throwing Russia out from the League. Even this was a futile effort for no
other actions were proposed against Soviet Union when she attacked Finland. As a result
of the frequent withdrawals from the League. its membership was reduced and in 1939
only 32 states remained in this organisation.

The final phase of the League (19.10-19.15) was a sad reflection of the treatment
given to the international body before, during and after the Second World War. It was
hardly called upon the performance political function but maintained its shadowy
existence by transacting routine non-political ftmctions. No state asked for any meting of
the League Council or Assembly either before or after the German attack on Poland. The
situation worsened in May 19-10, and the League’s Secretary General M. Avenol reduced
the strength of the Secretariat personnel and resigned. The officials of the International
Labour Organisation and the Judges of the World Court had to seek position elsewhere.
After the conclusion of the Second World War, the general agreement was that the
League was no good and should be replaced by the United Nations. Even the League

agreed that the UN should take over. It transmitted all its assets to the UN and on April 8,
19-46 its last session was held to resolve itself into a new assembly. Thirty-four members
attended on April 19. 1946 and a motion was passed:

With effect from this day. following the close of the present session of the Assembly, the
League of Nations shall cease to exist except for the sole purpose of the liquidation of its
affairs.

This died the first international institutional arrangement for peace. In its place, a new
one was to emerge.

Causes for the Failure of the

) 3-1

League of Nations

Weaknesses of the League

The League of Nations. by and large. proved to be a disappointment. 1t not only failed as
an ambitious utopian international organisation, but could not even cope up with its own
defined objectives. The hopes pinned an it could never be realised and it had to be
replaced by another successive order, the United Nations. Several factors--political.
structure and constitutional--contributed to the weakness of the League.

(i) Political Shortcomings

Institutions are very often the product and refection of their environment. An effective
international system can only- be devised with the help of the member-states. Yet,
internationalism and sovereignty of a state are regarded as incompatible. The League was
designed to protect the >ccuriw of all the nations through their collective efforts to punish
the

International Relations
Covenant-breaking nations. It meant that the member-states had to accept limitations on
their sovereignty- for the sake of a wider peace system. As a collective security
arrangement it had to function as a power system for tire orderly settlement of disputes.
This. it was never allowed to do. It could rarely act as a unit in tire face of the threat. The
divergent national interests pursued’by the great powers
often overcame tire compulsions of justice and none seemed to be interested in a genuine
and universal security. After a promising beginning, when it rendered some useful
service. the Council of the League became a divided some useful service, the Council of
the League became a divided house with rearmed France and Britain conflicting with
each other. It was obvious that the great powers wanted to use the League for maintaining
the power distribution in their favour. The mandate agreement among tile Allied powers
in 192(1, for instance. granted global respectability- to the Balfour declaration of 1917
for the establishment in Palestine, a national home for Jews against all Arab reasoning
that Palestine had been an Arab land for 1.30() yeais. The exchange for the Jewish
support to Britain during World War I and reflected on the incapacity of the Arabs to
rebel against the imperial international sanction. Other poNr crs_ both inside and outside
the League forum. similarly pursued antagonistic policies. The power of veto in the
Council could be used leading to inaction whenever a decision seemed possible.
Individual nations nei,er subordinated themselves to the political objectives of an
international order and continued to be guided by their vital interests and their alleged
nationals honour. The result was that the League could never claim the right to intervene
in any explosive situation. Its solution were halting. gradual and piecemeal. Its
resolutions were of a limited and restrictive nature. Whenever a great power defined the
law of nations, the League could only and ineffectively protest and therefore was found
wanting in taking action. Even in minor disputes, its enforcement machinery was
ineffective. The economic sanctions. which, under the Covenant were supposed to be
automatic severing of all financial and economic relationship with the defaulter state
could never be applied as collective action and each member on the basis of its political
priorities decided as to whether these would be applied at. all and determined the manner
and pace of its application. Military sanctions were never applied although the Covenant
contained a provision that the members shall contribute to the armed forces. The
voluntary nature of the militan sanction was always quoted against it. Collective security
and its institutionaslisation was thus defeated at the execution level.

League of Nations 43~

and Soviet Union. But the hostilities between Bulgaria and Greece could easily cease in
1926 as tire League’s inter` ention to restrain Greece was supported by France and Great
Britain. Tile league was silent when Italy Occupied the
Greek island of Corfu (1932) and when Japan invaded Manchuria (1931) and the Chinese
mainland (1937). When the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay broke out in 1932,
the League proved ineffective. The incapacitated League was used by on nation against
the other. Germany, for instance, while,joining the League. wanted to alter the .clams
qrrt) of power distribution to her own advantage. Italy likewise wanted to weaken France
and her allies with the help of Germany. France. in turn. wanted security against
German\. At a later date. Japan. Germany and Italy openly defied the League and ignored
its resolutions. Soviet Union, after the Bolshevic revolution, was not acceptable to France
and Great Britain for any common action. Japan wanted to humiliate the Western powers
in the Far East by closing the door to china. pals occupied Ethiopia. In the rapidly
changing power positions the smaller nations as members, of the League were neither
confident nor empowered enough to defeat tire game of the great powers then dominating
the European scene.

The Nazi conquest of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland was the last straw and after
19.36. the situation arising out of
hopeless beyond the feeble control of the League.

The League thus could prevent no ma _jor war. much less maintain
international order. Had its members been willing to sacrifice their
respective narrowly circumscribed interests it could have become an
effective body but the leadership of several nations did not rise to the
occasion.

these little wars was

The League was successful only in such cases where the big power interests were not
affected or they themselves wanted the League to intervene. Thus in 1920. when Poland
captured Vilna. the capital of Lithuania. the League could not act because Poland was an
ally of France

(ii) .S’tructural Shortcomings

The League seas expected to be a symbol of world fraternity but it could never become a
universal organisation because some nations did not join it and some were not allowed to
join. The United States and a few small states never joined the League and initially
German \- Soviet Russia were not welcome. Several nations also withdrew at. intervals
for various reasons. such as finance. prestige, extinction and even expulsion.

weakening the writ of the League in the process. In the last stages only one great power--
Great Britain--and only 31 smaller states were left in the League.

From the outset, the League had been predominately European,

The powers that mattered at the League. France and Great Britain, were European. Soviet
Union became a member only in the last few years of the last few years of the League’s
existence (1937-1939), Japan. a 11011-European nation was a member but withdrew at a
later date. Ironicallv it

-1 39

lnlernational Relations

Hans J. Morgenthau, an academic expert in the field of

ernational relations, expresses the view that one of the factors inducing perialism is a lost
war. Germany had lost the First World War and was cod to sign a yen- humiliating treat`-
by the Allies at Paris. A yew proud d talented people like the Germans would not accept
this humiliation for - ::r. The victorious nations neither had the magnanimity to revise the
~atY to make necessary concessions to German nationalism nor the termination to
enforce it where Germany under Hitler’s leadership began alating the provisions of the
Treaty. The victorious nations lost both d:, s. The remained villains in the eyes of the
Germans for their failure to k.ise the Treatx and even for their unwillingness to enforce it
when its ..visions were violated by Hitler. Hence. the credit for successfully ,allenging the
victors went to him.

The resurgence of..jGermany must be viewed in the light of the

caty of Versailles concluded between her and the victorious Allies at the ,;1 of the First
World War. The German delegation to the peace laference and those of the victorious
nations met face to face only on two ~:asions first, at the time of the presentation of the
draft treaty prepared the Allies themselves without the participation of the Germans and
4ond, at the signing of the Treaty. Even during these meetings usual rrrtesies were not
extended to the German delegation: they were not :awed to sit during these meetings.
While the Germans were allowed to bmit comments on the draft treaty and some of their
comments were also ken note of they were served with an ultimatum that unless the
revised _atv was accepted by them within five days. the Allies world start the war =ain.
Even when Germany agreed to sign the Treaty, her delegation was A treated with respect.
The German delegation was, to borrow the ,pressioar used by E.H Cary, ”escorted in and
out of the hall (where the r;ning ceremony took place) in the manner of criminals
conducted to and oru the dock.”

Under the Treaty of Versailles. the Saar ~ alley was to be =,aainistered by the League of
Nations for fifteen years at the end of which - ;ate would be decided by a plebiscite: the
coal mines in the valley were ;;tasferxed to France by way of compensation for French
mines deviated :ring the war: the port of Memel and its hinterland were given away to
rthuania: the province of Poison and greater part of the province of west ussi;a with about
a -10 mile ”corridor . NNlaich divided
east Prussia land’ and Danzi ~. a German

World War l!

-140

In terms of sources of raw materials. Germany lost s> per cent iron ore. =1i per cent coal,
72 per cent zinc. and 57 per cent lead. All her colonies (900,000 square miles of territow
and 13 million population) were also ceded to the allies or their associates.

Germany was required to reduce her army to 100,000 men and

that too without tanks. heavy, guns and armoured cars. She was denied the right to have
an air force; her navy could only have six battleships and an identical number of cruisers
and destroyers. She was denied the right to . have submarines or build military
fortifications and conscription was also forbidden. Allied military, naval and air
commissioners (sat one time

numbering 2,000) were stationed on German territory until 1927 to enforce military
provision of the Treat’. The Treaty also prohibited union between Germany and Austria
against the spirit of Wilson’s 1-4 points.

On top of it all, Germany was also required to pay reparation: her total liability wider this
count was fried at f>.Gt)0 million by the Reparation Commission 011 27 April 1921.
Although the payment of two thirds of this amount was indefinitely sfielved in view of
her incapacity to pay. Germany was required to pay the balance at the rate of I;tO million
a year plus 2s per cent of the value of her exports. The new republican .government oC

Germany was given the schedule of payment along with an ultimatum that if was not
schedule of payment along with an ultimatum that if it was not accepted by 12 May
.1921, Ruhr, the centre of German metallurgical industr<-, would be occupied. This
caused a cabinet crisis in Germarrv which any way accepted the schedule on I l May
1921. In August 1921. Germany paid >0 million, this was to be her last rash payment for
more than 3 years. But even this had a telling effect on the German economy of the time.
The Mark (a unit of German currency) fell, from its normal value of 20 to the pound to
l.t>00 to the pound by November 1921.

France, still fearful for her security, adopted a tough line towards Germany unlike Britain
which wanted to pursue a somewhat soft policy in view of the mess in which Germany
found herself fit addition to strengthening her position through anti-German treaties with
Belgium.

Poland. Rumania. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia benvccr: tire years 1920 and 1921,
France under its tough Prime Minister Po:ncare. also worked towards keeping Germany
weak by prevcaating her economic reconstruction. France was not willing to give
Germany any respite. Wlu n
Germany failed, in December 1922, to pay in kind
(supply of coal) b_• a small margin. France and Belgium occupied Ruhr under an article
of !he Treaty which authorised Allied governments to take necessa r<, action: in case of
voluntary default by Germa;is-. This made Germany bankrupt.

This .short sighted policy contributed to a great extent, to the f;rilnre of rhr first
experiment with democracy in Gernaaw. Tlac economic

from

hc rest of German-,,. were ceded to Po g town

wit a natural port of Poland. became for all practical purpose a Polish
;ossession though given the status of a free city. Thus. Germany lost 13 per
:nt of her territory (2.>00 square miles) and 6 million population in

International Relations

burden imposed on Germany and the resultant hardships caused to the Germans made the
republican government unpopular. The humiliated and discontented Germans turned to
those among them who wanted to do away with. this ”dictated peace”. The harshness of
the treaty and the sufferings caused to the Germans by it could have been exploited by
any ambitious politician to his advantage. A jingoist and a grant like Hitler would not
lose an opportunity, and he skillfully exploited the situation in Germany to his benefit,
which ultimately ruined his and many other countries in Europe.

If the Germans were bitter with the Allies for what was taken away from them, the
Italians and the Japanese were sore with them for what ryas not given to them. The
Italians and the Japanese, who were with the Allies during the First World War, expected
a large share of the spoils of the war and felt betrayed when their expectations were only
partially fulfilled. Italy had an alliance with Germany before the war broke out but
remained neutral in the First World War for one year. She joined the war in May 1915 on
the side of the Allies on the basis of a Secret Treaty of London on April 26. 1915, in
which she was promised territories like. Trentino, Tyrol, Trieste,. Gorzia, Istria and
Dalmatian. In addition to these. Italy was also interested in Fiume and Albania.

Italy lost 600,000 lives in the war and two million were wounded. The net cost of the war
for Italy was $12,000 million and the property damaged amounted to $ 3.000 million.
The Italians felt that their territorial demands were justified in the light of the sacrifices
may by them. But President Wilson refused to recognize the secret treaty under which
Italy was promised the territories mentioned above. His view was that since Tyrol
(Austria) was inhabited, by Germans and Trieste with its hinterland were inhabited by
Slavs, Italian demands to these territories were not justified. Only on Tyrol he was
prepared for
a compromise at the expense of the Germans. Italy also got Trieste and Istria. The Italians
also occupied Fiume. But Dalmatian went to the new state of Yugoslavia.

While France’ giants at the Paris Peace Conference amounted to 253,000 square miles of
territory and 6 million people, and those of Britain 989,000 square miles and 9 millions
people. Italy got only 8,900 square miles of territory and 1,672,000 people in Europe.
There was national disappointment with what the Italians considered to be meager gains.
Mussolini, the Italian dictator after 1922. therefore demanded the revision of tire Paris
Peace Treat’ so that Italy could receive, ”a material reward more consonant with its worth
and dignity.”

The primary aim of Japan at the Paris Peace Conference was to consolidate her gains in
China. Those were the days when noel-white nations were still looked down upon.
Therefore Japan suggested the

World War ll inclusion of a clause on racial equality in the Covenant of the League, but
this met with stiff opposition from the USA and UK.
The dissatisfaction among the people of Italy. Japan and Germany was utilised by the
Fascist leaders to come to power and establish totalitarian governments in these
countries. Benito Mussolini formed his Fascist movement in Italy in 1910, promising to
gain for the discontented ca-sewicemen at home and for Italy abroad a status
commensurate with their wartime sacrifices. It used to be said of Italy that it was a
second class state with the ambitions of a great power. It hardly had any raw materials. In
19=10 Italy used to produce only 8 per cent of her coal requirements, 20 per cent of iron
and 7 per cent of crude oil. Her hopes of realising her ambition by securing a large share
of the spoils of the war at the Paris Peace Conference were unfulfilled, as we have noted
earlier.

In the meantime. italy. economic problems increased. Lire, the Italian monetay trait,
which was worth 19.3 US cents in 191:1 stood at 5 cents in 1920. Prices rose by 300--100
per cent. Added to all these and October 1922, six ministries came and went. The soil
was fertile for the rise of Fascism. This mass discontent and political instability was
exploited by Mussoline to establish a totalitarian regime in Italy. His followers broke up
the meetings of their political rivals. Ultimately their strong-arm methods paid them.
Unnerved by the `March on Rome’ of Mussolini and thousands of his supports on
October 28,1922, the Italian king invited him to become the Prince Minister of the
county. Mussolini banned all political parties excepting the Fascist party and established
a dictatorship in 1926.

The Fascist government

adopted measures. after 1927, to increase the population and to use population pressure
as an excuse for Italian imperialism. Under democratic forms of governments healthy
public opinion exists which can effectively act as a brake on unhealthy tendencies of the
governments. This is not possible under totalitarian regimes where all freedom and
dissent are smothered. Like Hegel, Fascists also glorifi~ the state; for them. the state is
the ultimate goal and fulfillment of man’s social existence: it is entitled and indeed
obliged to control and direct the lives of its su>Jjects. Therefore. Fascists stand for order
and obedience and reject individual freedom.

Japan underwent a process of Westernisation after 1868. She emerged as a strong

industrial and military power in Asia by the beginning of the 20th century. Her greatest
weakness was that she has no raw materials. She was on the side of the Allies during
World War I. She was prevented by Allied opposition from securing demands on China
which would leave reduced that countrv to a subordinate position. This was naturally
resented by the Japanese in general and the army in particular. The cabinet had not
jurisdiction over the operations of the armed forces

=tat

International Relations 443

and it was obliged to concur with a policy of aggression towards China followed by the
military leadership. This nationalist policy was supported by the revival of old Japanese
beliefs in the drv111In’ of the Emperior. whose authority was used to by pass the
politicians. Gradually the involvement of the military forces in politics increased and
October 1942 marked the final control of the military over the political affairs of the
countn’. General Hidaki Tojo became the military dictator of the country.

We have already discussed how Germany was given a very harsh treatment under the
Paris Peace Treaty. It was the new republican regime which signed the Peace Treaty: this
gave the counter revolutionaries spended opportunities for discrediting the new gov
ernment. The depressing economic and political conditions of the country were exploited
by Hitler. who came the leaders of the National Socialist German workers party, the Nazi
party in 1920. His thesis was -Struggle is the father of all things. virtue lies in blood,
leadership is primary and decisive.’ Hitler also glorified the state and stressed the
obligation of other individual to serve it. He rejected the Marlin concept of class divisions
within the society. For hire race is more real; for its role in history has been central.
Inequality is also natural. From this thesis he concluded that
of all races in the world the white races ;sere superior: of the whittle races, the Ar’y’ans
were superior; among the Aryans the Germans were pure. Therefore, he claimed for the
German the right to conquer and subjugate the world.

Severe economic problems were created for Germany as also to all countries in the
world. by the Economic Depression of the 1930s. There was also political instability in
the country January 1933; 19 ministries were formed in of economic crisis and political
instability,

between February 1919 and Germany. In such conditions people longed for a strong
government. It was under these conditions that president Hindenburg invited Hitler to
become the Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. Like Mussolini in Italy. Hitler
also banned all other parities excepting his own and established a dictatorship.

Another important factor which. indirectly, led to World War II was the Economic
Depression of the 1930s which lasted almost a decade. During this period there was over
production of goods both in agricultural as well as industrial sectors in developed
countries. Consequently prices touched the lowest level for years. This led to the
imposition of tariffs by governments to protect their farmers and industrialists from
external competition. This shrinkage of markets. unemployment accentuated by
demobilisation after World War 1 and falling purchasing power caused the Great
Depression. It affected all countries in the World. But it presented a ~,mons challenge to
the Fascist rulers. The depression ruined Japan’s vital ,ill, er,iric-.:’„id thrcatrncd an
already depressed agriculture with further

World War 1I disaster. This agrarian distress radicalised the army. most of those recruits
and junior officers were of rural origin. In Germany unemployment rose from 1.320.000.
in September 1929 to 6.000,000, in February 1963. The Fascist rulers sought to solve
these problems through military conquests and expansion of their military establishments.
Professor Morgenlhaus is of the view that it is difficult to detect imperialism because it
never reveals its true face: the true, nature of imperialist policies disappears behind a veil
of ideological discourse. However once imperialism is detected, says Morgenthau, an
appropriate policy should be formulated to counter it. He prefers a polio’ of containment
towards imperialism.

As we have discussed earlier, a collective security mechanism was devised at the Paris
Peace Conference. The League guaranteed the security an independence of its member
states. Since the League’s fiction in support of \’1Ct1111 nations could succeed only if
the great powers supported
such actions President Wilson told the peace conference on May 31, 1919. ”That in the
last analysis the military and naval strength of the Great Powers will be the final
guarantee of the peace of the world.”

How. then, did the league. and the great powers guarantee world peace? Was the League
of Nations an adequate organisation to preserve peace? The firs test case was that of
Japanese aggression on Manchuria, a rich Chinese province, in September 1931. Japan
occupied Manchuria and set up a puppet regime in Manchukuo. China appealed to the
Council of the League which appointed a Commission in February 1932 to go into
Chinese complaints. The Commission leisurely submitted its report in October of the
same year. Though the Japanese action was condemned by the League no concrete help
was given to China to recover its territory. This was so because Britain, which was then
tire foremost in the world, felt that the collapse of Japan would lead to Soviet domination
in Manchuria. Inner Mongolia and China. And so Japan was allowed to enjoy the fruits of
aggression with just a censure by the League.
The second instance of inaction on the part of the League to discharge its duty towards
the weak countries was that of Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Making the border incident
at Walwal (involving the Italian forces in Italian-Somali land-Ethiopian forces in
December 1936, in which 30 Italian soldiers were killed) a pretest, Bonito Mussolini
invaded Ethiopia on October 3_ 1935. Emperior Haile Selassie appealed to the League
for help. While this time the League acted more forcefully. the measures it adopted were
half-hearted, an October 11. 19 35 the League imposed sanctions-, but oil was not
included in the sanctions. Britain arid France Mussoline with defeat because they wanted
to wean him away from Hitler. Ewa the Sores Canal which waswnder British control was
not

-t-4-4

International Relations .14 5

closed for Italy. The result was that the sanctions imposed by the League did not harm
Italian interests. On 1 May 1936, Addis Ababa fell, and the sanctions were lifted in July
1936.

Thus, the then great powers, which were considered to be the backbones of the League by
President Wilson, were not prepared to uphold the principles of territorial integrity and
independence of weaker and smaller states. They adopted a policy of appearing the
Fascist dictators which only whetted their appetites.

Germany then began probing the resolve of Britain and France to contain her. In March
1935. Germany announced the creation of an airforce in defiance of tile provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles: the same month conscription was introduced, again in
violation of the treat provisions. The strength of the German army was raised to 5 lakhs,
this went up to 2 million by i938. Hitler also denounced the Locarno Pacts in 1936 and
militarized Rhineland. The British
only criticized this action but did not react.

It was evident that the three Fascist states- Italy, Germany and Japan were following
similar policies of aggression and had identical goals of world conquest. All three of
them justified their wars of aggression on grounds of their need for living space
(lebensraum, as Hitler would call it). They, therefore, wanted to come together by making
an alliance. But at that stage, they probably did not like to heighten the fears of British
and France. The first treaty made between Japan and Germany in November 1936 was
made to sound anti-Soviet. It was called the Anti Comintern Pact. Italy joined the pact in
November 19 37.

Then Hitler unfolded his policy of conquest. In March 1938 he occupied Austria on the
ground that it was a German state. In September 1938 Hitler demanded Sudeten (I 1,000
square miles) from Czechoslovakia on the ground that it was inhabited by German too. In
those days Britain and France had weak and Pacific’s Prime Ministers. Chamberlain of
Britain and Deladier of France wanted to avoid war a lvitll Germany at any cost. Instead
of dissuading Hitler from making such demands on his neighbours, they signed the
Munchi Agreement with Hitler and Mussolini on September 29. 1938 which forced
Czechoslovakia to cede Sudeten to Germany. A small natio.l like Czechoslovakia could
not have defied four great powers of Europe and sun-ives a and independent nation. So
the Czechs reluctantly gave Sudeten to Germany. That did not satisfy Hitler. On March 5,
19 39. the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, was asked to come to Berlin and wis
intimidated into signing the surrender of his country and the Nazis occupied that
countr<’. This alarmed Britain and France.

and French Government

World War ll

4=16

At this stage it is in order to discuss Soviet reactions to these developments in Europe.

The fact that the Fascists called their pacts Anti-Cominent Pact was bound to be
disquieting to Moscow. Therefore, after the occupation of Austria by Hitler in March
1938, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Litvinov, issued a statement on March 17, 1938,
appealing to ”all ;he states and the Great Powers in particular. to take a firm and
unambiguous stand’ before it was too late. But Britain felt it was undesirable to divide
Europe into two groups. And therefore, the Soviet Union signed the Russo-German Non-
Aggression Pact on August 2=1, 1939. Under a secret clause of the Pact.
Finland, Latvia, and Estonia were included in the Soviet sphere of influence and
Lithuania, in German spheres. Poland was divided into two spheres. each getting one._
Thus Hitler also avoided war on two fronts for a while.

To resume the narration of Nazi conquests. Britain and France ,~-ere as we noted earlier.
alarmed by the Nazi conquest of Czechoslovakia. and on 31 March 193.9. they-
guaranteed Polish territorial integrity. Hitler did not take ;his guarantee seriously. On 1
September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland: on 3 September 1939. Britain and France
declared war on Germany. The Second World War had begun.

The Course of `The War.

As we have discussed earlier Germany, Japan and Italy had Loncluded the Anti-
Comiiltern Pact in 1936 and 1937. More often than atat, ideology is used in international
politics as a facade behind which are ,concealed the actual ambitions of the nations. Anti-
communism was not the real goal of the three Axis powers as the three Fascist states cane
to be i;3lown during World War 11. They all had territorial designs. The Soviet Union
had not hesitated to conclude a treaty of non-aggression with Hitler in spite of his anti-
Communist fulmination’s.

We shall now discuss 1110 campaigns conducted by the Axis ;)oevers. the conduct of the
Soviet Union in the initial stages of the War and response from the Allies. the group of
countries which opposed the Fascist ;comers.

German Campaigns

Hitler attacked Poland on 1 September 1939; and Britain and ~7rance declared war on
Germany on 3. September 1939. Warsaw. the ,:apical of Poland. fell on 27. September
1939. when the Allies failed to mount their promised counter-offensive. Hitler then-
attacked Denmark and ’0nvay in April 19-10. and Belgium ald Holland in May 1940. All
these countries surrendered to Germany. The leaders of the governments of Norn-ay,
Holland and Belgium fled their countries and tormed governments in exile in London.

International Relations

4=17

Simultaneously. powerful Nazi tank forces struck at France through Luxembourg,

outflanking the Maginot Line. The encircled Anglo-French forces. numbering 338.00()
were evacuated front Dunkirk bridgehead between 26 Mad and :I June 19-1(); this was
considered a feat in military history. Paris surrendered on 1-1 June 19-10. The new Prime
Minister. Marshal Petal. Concluded an armistice on 22 June 19=40. This NNas
unacceptable to the nationalists: General de Gaulle. their leader. in his London broadcast
on 23 June 19-10. asserted Frances determination to fight 011.
In tile meantime there was a change of leadership in Britain. The pacifist Prime Minister.
Chamberlain. was replaced by Sir
Winston Churchill. who formed a national government. i.e., a government consisting of
the three major British political parties .on 10 May 19=10. Britain now faced the Axis
alone. Failure to defeat the Royal Air Force (RAF) in tile Battle of Britain (Aug-Sep 190)
forced the Germans to abandon Operations Sea-lion, the code name for the invasion of
Britain and with it the hope of quickly defeating an almost defencelles Britain.

Prospects of a long Nvar compelled Germany to look for rai\ materials and industrial
beasts large enough to match those of the United States « hichilad been mobilised as the
”arsenal of democracy.”

At this stage it is necessary to discuss the United States’ reaction to the war. Since
isolationism was the bedrock of the American foreign policy in those days, the country
was apparently neutral in the war. But there was no doubt that Washington’s sympathesis
lay Nvith the democracies. The United States extended help to the countries opposing the
Axis. In Septenlber 19-40. America had transferred >0 destroyers to Britain. In March
1941, the Lend-Lease Act was passed by the American Congress. Under it, the United
States would supply war materials to the nations opposing tile Axis powers to enable
them to overcome the problems of payment. O«nership of supplies remained nominally
in tile USA and payment for them was deferred until after the end of hostilities or
discounted in return for long term leases of military bases to Washington.

Hitler’s desire to control areas which could be exploited for supplies and his fear of
Soviet internationals led to Operation Barbarossa. the code name for the invasion of the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet actions. wItch must slave frightened Hitler, trerethe acquisition of territory
from and bases in Finland after a brief war with that country (Dec 1939-March 19-40),
tile annexation of Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania between June and August 1940 and
seizure of the Rumanian territories of Bassarabia and northern Buko\ ina in June 1910.

World War ll , ... . .. .„ , . 448

Hitler decided upon a policy of ignoring his Non-Aggression Pact
with the USSR and invading that countn. Operation Barbarossa began on
June 22. 19-41. Hitler had assembled a formidable military force for the
operation: 3.2 million men. 2.000 aircraft and 3.500 tanks. Rumania.
Finland. Hungay and Italy had also joined Germany in the invasion of tile
Soviet Union. In the initial stages, the Nazi forces registered quick
victories. By December 1941. the Germans had captured 2 million Russi<-1:
prisoners. had overrun Ukraine. the industrial Donctz basin and tlac
Crimea. They had besieged Leningrad and were within sighs
of Mosco~.
But by December 1941. ttile Red Army began hitting back. 1o Decenlinc
194 I the United States had entered the War.

Atlantic Charter

An important development of the period was the signing of’ tit. Atlantic Charter by
President Roosevelt of tile US and Prince Minict: Churchill of Britain at their mid-
Atlantic meeting in August 1941. T’~c Charter enunciated 8 basic principles: no
territorial aggrandiscnlcnt: no territorial changes without consent of the population
concerned: ss:Jf government by all nations: international cooperation: Crcedont froth
warn= and fear: equal access to essential rain materials. freedom of navigation on the
high seas: total disarming of the:Auis.pow-c.rs and general dis;trmamcni. after the War.
This charter was later accepted by all nations. including tile Soviet Union, fighting the
Axis.

Italian Campaigns

Mussolini’s desire to establish Italy as the dominant power in South-East Europe.. North
Africa and tile Middle East led to his wars of conquest. Italy annexed Albania on 7 April
19.:9. Besides. Mussolini had also joined Hitler in his invasions of France and the Soviet
Union. In Africa, the Malian viceroys of Ethiopia invaded British Somali land in August
19-10. A month later, on Italian army advanced from Libya towards Egypt where there
was a strong British force. The British had strike back in December 19-10 and chased the
Italians to the borders of Tripoiitaniat, taking 130.000 prisoners. Italy requested German\
for help: this led to tile formation of tile ”Africa Korps’ under Field ~ Marshal Rommel.
His counter-attack pushed the British back to Egypt in May 19-11. For tile nest two years
the British and the Axis forces surged backwards and Cornards across these battlefields.
in October 19-42. Field Marshal Montgomery inflicted a defeat on the Axis forces at El-
Alamein. In November 19-12. General Eisenhower landed his Anglo-American army in
North Africa Under the pressure of forces of Eisenhower and Montgomery. the Axis
forces surrendered in May 19-13: 250_000 prisoners were also captured. This victol-y
enabled the Allies to attack southern Europe.

lnterhational Relations 449

On 10 July 19-43. the Allies invaded Sicih. This resulted in the collapse of the Fascist
regime: Mussolini was forced to resign and was arrested oil 25 July 1943. The new Prime
Minister Marshal Badoglio signed an armistice. on 3 September 19-43. There upon Hitler
attacked ItalN. His forces captured Rome and freed Mussolini, who declared Italy a
republic. But the new Badoglio regime declared war on German- oil 1 3 October 1943.
The Allied pressure from the south continued. Rome fell to the Allies on June 194-4; and
the German forces in Italy finally
surrendered on 28 Switzerland and shot dead.

The War in the Pacific

Meanwhile. having thrown her lot with Germany and Italy. Japan began implementing
her imperialist plans in South East Asia. In September 19-40. Indo-China was occupied.
Like Hitler’s Germany. Japan also concluded a neutrality with the USSR in April 1941 to
avoid a war oil two fronts. Just as the US had opposed the Japanese designs in China- it
had also opposed the Japanese conquest of Indo-China. Washington ended all trade
relations with Japan to force her to quit Indo-China. After General Tojo came to power in
October 1941. Japan had asked the United States to reopen trade relations. But the United
States demanded the Nyilhdrawal of Japan from China and Indo-China. Not only had
Japan accepted this demand but had also bombarded Pearl Harbour in Hawaii Islands on
7 December 1941, thus resulting in the direct involvement the United States Philippines
in Jarman- 19-42, Singapore and Malaya in Februar< 1942. Indonesia in March 1942, and
Burma in May 1942. In all these countries Japan fostered an anti-white and anti-
colonialist movement.

But by June 19-42. the tide began turning against Japan. In the battles between the carrier
borne planes of the United States and Japan, the latter had lost air-sea superiority. By the
summer of 1944, the US long-range bombers began attacking Japan itself. In October
194-1. General MacArthur occupied the Philippines.

At this stage let us return to the European theater of the war. War in Europe.

The United Slates, the Soviet Union and the UK became Allies once the first two entered
the war.

by October 19-42. the Germans lead occupied most of Stalingrad. Tile Russians offered
heroic resistance to the Nazi occupation. The So\ iet victory under Marshal Zhukov in the
battle of Stalingrad constituted the decisive turning point in the war against Germany. By
February 1943, the German Sixth Anuy had surrendered: 90.000 prisoners were captured.
From then onwards the initiative ryas iyith the Russian. By the summer of 194-1. the Red
Army captured most territories occupied by the Germans.

World War// . . .. .. .. . . ., . 450

Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria were liberated from the Nazi control. Yugoslavia was
liberated by Tito’s partisans, the Red Army ,helping them only towards the end of their
mission. Warsaw fell to the Russians in January 1945.

On the Western front the Anglo-American forces had begun

inflicting defeats on the Germans. Operation overlord the code name for the Channel
coast landings was launched on D-Day (June 6, 1944). On that day, a huge Allied force
landed on the Normandy Coast and by 25 August
1944, Paris, was liberated from the Nazis. Montgomery liberated

Brussels on 4 September 1944. A second Allied landing near Nice on 15 August 1944,
forced the Germans to withdraw from Southern and Central

France. By September 1944, the Anglo-American French forces were at the German
frontier. By February 1945, the Allies were at the Rhine. On the eastern front, the
Russian pursuit of the retreating Germans continued; the Red Army entered Germany
too. While the Allied forces were in Germany, the leaders met in Yalta to decide upon the
post-war policies.

The End of War and The Yalta Conference

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at a conference at Yalta in the Soviet Union in
February 1945. They agreed upon: (1) the division of Germany into four zones of
occupation and the establishment of an Allied Control Council in Berlin; (ii) Germany’s
complete disarmament and obligation to reparation payments; (iii) the re-establishment of
Poland within new frontiers, with eastern Poland to be ceded to the USSR and east
German territories to be ceded to Poland by way of compensation; (iv) the establishment
of democratic governments in all liberated countries on the basis of free elections
governments in all liberated countries on the basis of

free elections: (v) a Soviet declaration of war on Japan and the cession of certain
Japanese Islands to the USSR, (vi) the re-establishment of the Independence of Korea
after a period of joint occupation by American and Soviet forces; (vii) the endorsement of
the Atlantic Charter as the basis of Allied post-war policy; and (viii) the convening of a
conference for establishment of the UN.
In the meantime the Allied forces march into Germany continued. The Russian forces
went past Berlin, which they besieged and reached the
river Elbe where they linked up with the Americans, who had arrived there from the
West; the Russians and the Americans met as Torgan on 24 April 19=15. Hitler
committed suicide on 29 April 1945. and Berlin surrendered on 2 May 1945. Germany,
cut into two, surrendered on 7 May 1945.

In the Far East, the war continued a little longer. In the Spring of 1945 Lord
Mountbatten’s forces had broken the Japanese stranglehold on Burma. The British forces
continued their pursuit of the Japanese in the c-0, r’-zt Asia. The .Americans, who had by
then perfected nuclear

International Relations

On 10 July 19-13, the Allies im tided Sicily. This resulted in the collapse of the Fascist
regime: Mussolini was forced to resign and was arrested on 25 July 1943. The new Prime
Minister Marshal Badoglio signed an armistice on s September 1943. There upon Hitler
attacked Italy. His forces captured Rome and freed Mussolini, who declared Italy a
republic. But the new Badoglio regime declared war on Germany on I
October 19.1;. The Allied pressure from the south continued. Rome fell to the Allies on
June 1944: and the German forces in Italy Finally surrendered on 28 Switzerland and shot
dead.

The War in the Pacific

Meanwhile, having thrown her lot with Germany and Italy. Japan began implementing
her imperialist plans in South East Asia. In September 1940. Indo-China was occupied.
Like Hitler’s Germany. Japan also concluded a neutrality with the USSR in April 19-41
to avoid a war on two fronts. Just as the US had opposed the Japanese designs in China. it
had also opposed the Japanese conquest of Indo-China. Washington ended all trade
relations with Japan to force her to quit Indo-China. After General Tojo came to power in
October 1941, Japan had asked tire United States to reopen trade relations. But the United
States demanded the withdrawal of Japan from China and Indo-China. Not only had
Japan accepted this demand but had also bombarded Pearl Harbour in Hawaii Islands on
7 December 1941. thus resulting in the direct im-olvement the United States Philippines
in January 1942. Singapore and Malaya in February 19-12_ Indonesia in March 1942,
and Burma in May 19-42. In all these countries Japan fostered an anti-white and anti-
colonialist movement.

But by June 19-42. the tide began turning against Japan. In the battles between the carrier
borne planes of the United States and Japan, the latter had lost air-sea superiority. By the
summer of 191-1. the US long-range bombers began attacking Japan itself. In October
19-1-4. General MacArthur occupied the Philippines.

At this stage let us return to the European theater of the war. War in Europe.

The United States, the Soviet Union and the UK became Allies once the first two entered
the war.

By October 19-12. the Germans had occupied most of Stalingrad. ’The Russians offered
heroic resistance to the Nazi occupation. The Soviet victory under Marshal Zhukov in the
battle of Stalingrad constituted the decisive turning point in the war against Germany. By
February 19.13. the German Sixth Army had surrendered: 90,000 prisoners were
captured. From then onwards the initiative w as with the Russian. Bv the summer of i
944_ the Red Armv captured most territories occupied by the Germans.

450 World War II

Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria were liberated from the Nazi control. Yugoslavia was
liberated by Tito’s partisans, the Red Army ,helping them only towards the end of their
mission. Warsaw fell to the Russians in January 1945.

On the Western front

the Anglo-American forces had begun inflicting defeats on the Germans. Operation
overlord the code name for the Channel coast landings was launched on D-Day (June 6,
1944). On that day, a huge Allied force landed on the Normandy Coast and by 25 August
1944, Paris, was liberated from the Nazis. Montgomery liberated Brussels on 4
September 1944. A second Allied landing near Nice on 15 August 1944, forced the
Germans to withdraw from Southern. and Central France. By September 1944, the
Anglo-American French forces were at the German frontier. By February 19.45, the
Allies were at the Rhine. On the eastern front, the Russian pursuit of the retreating
Germans continued; the Red Army entered Germany too. While the Allied forces were in
Germany, the leaders met in Yalta to decide upon the post-war policies.

The End of War and The Yalta Conference

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at a conference at Yalta in the Soviet Union in
February 1945. They agreed upon: (1) the division of Germany into four zones of
occupation and the establishment of an Allied

Control Council in Berlin; (ii) Germany’s complete disarmament and obligation to

reparation payments; (iii) the re-establishment of Poland within new frontiers, with
eastern Poland to be ceded to the USSR and east German territories to be ceded to Poland
byway of compensation; (iv) the

establishment of democratic governments in all liberated countries on tie basis of free

elections governments in all liberated countries on the basis of

free elections: (v) a Soviet declaration of war on Japan and the cession of certain
Japanese Islands to the USSR, (vi) the re-establishment of the Independence of Korea
after a period of joint occupation by American and Soviet forces; (vii) the endorsement of
the Atlantic Charter as the basis of Allied post-war policy; and (viii) the convening of a
conference for establishment of the UN.
In the meantime the Allied forces march into Germany continued. The Russian forces
went past Berlin, which they besieged and reached the

river Elbe where they linked up with the Americans, who had arrived there from the
West; the Russians and the Americans met as Torgan 01124 April 19=15. Hitler
committed suicide on 29 April 1945 and Berlin surrendered on 2 May 1945. Germany,
cut into two, surrendered on 7 May 1945.
In the Far East, the war continued a little longer. In the Spring of

19=15 Lord Mountbatten’s forces had broken the Japanese stranglehold on

Burma. The British forces continued their pursuit of the Japanese in the
South East Asia. The Americans, who had by then perfected nuclear .

lntel”atlonal Relations

weapons, dropped the first ever

atom bomb on Hiroshima on August 1945 and the second atom bomb on Nagasaki on 9
August 194 ~n 10 August 1945 Japan had surrendered. Thus ended the Second World
War.

Consequences of the War

Every major war leaves its impact on the society. World War II ~~as fought on a colossal
scale. The enormity of losses can be gauged from the fact that the Soviet Union alone had
lost 20 million lives in the war: six million Jews were killed in Hitler’s gas chambers.
The impact the war made on the world was profound.

President Wilson’s collective security mechanism depended upon the military forces of
the great powers. The League failed to go to the rcue of the victims of aggression in the
inter-war period because the united States had not joined the organisation and the other
great powers had not adopted a common strategy to contain Fascism. During the war the
USA, USSR, UK, France and China fought as allies. It was hoped that this alliance
between them would continue in the post-war period and that they would act in consort to
prevent wars. The United States gave up its policy of isolation. At the San Francisco
Conference, where the UN Charter was drafted in June 1945, the Security Council was
made Articles 41 and 42 the Security Council is authorized to impose sanctions and take
military action against a country which disturbs international peace. But since the
Security Council cannot take effective action without the cooperation of all five great
powers of World War II, who were made its permanent members, of World War II, who
were made its permanent members, they were given the right to veto by substantive
measures even if it had the support of a majority of the members. This is also a guarantee
against the UN going to war with a permanent member of the Security Council which is
bound to be dangerous, particularly if it is a war against the US or USSR. Had the war
time Allies remained united, the mechanism devised by the Charter would have worked
effectively.

Though victorious in the war, the pre-World War II great powers E3ritain and France,
emerged from it as weak countries, both militarily as cell ~as economically. France
remained under German occupation for nearly 5 years. Britain, though never occupied,
was very much weakened. It was massive American economic aid under the Marshall
Plan between 1947 and 1951 which rehabilitated their economies. Therefore their
colonial empires could not be maintained. There were strong nationalist movements in
various Asian countries even before World War II. The war and its weakening effect on
the imperial powers only strengthened these movements. Britain vas the first to see the
writing on
the wall. She began
her decolonisation process in August 1947 by gram : to

451 °° World War 11

India and Pakistan; the following your Burma and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) were given
freedom too.

452

France and Holland however resisted the nationalist movements in Indo-China and
Indonesia respectively. But world public opinion and the armed struggle of other people
of these countries forced them to retreat. Indonesia emerged as an independent nation in
1948 and the three Indo-Chinese kingdoms of Loas, Cambodia and Vietnam became
independent in 1954 after the Geneva Conference, Vietnam having been divided
temporarily into two. Once Asia was liberated with Malaya’s independence in 1957 the
emancipation of African countries was a smooth affair. Only in the case of Algeria there
was a bloody and prolonged war. France ultimately granted freedom to Algeria in 1962.
Before the mid-1960s almost all African countries also became independent. Thus ended
the nearly 200-year-old colonial domination of Asia and Africa by Europe. This
contributed to the comparative decline of the influence of the international aristocracy,
the European colonial powers, and a measures of democratisation of international
politics. During the cold war, which began closely on the heels of World War II, when
the contestants for powers and influence, the USA and the USSR, sought to win the
hearts and minds of the peoples of Afro-Asia they refused to be taken in by the
propaganda of these powers. Most Afro-Asia states followed independent foreign
policies, asserted their right and demanded concession to enable them to make economic
progress. The USA and the European powers were forced to reckon with this new force.

The decline of the great colonial power of Europe saw the emergence of two
superpowers, the USA and the USSR. The United States emerged from World War II
practically unscathed with a booming economy and formidable military might, being the
only nuclear power until 1949, when the Soviet Union also acquired nuclear capability.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had a weak economy, having suffered terrible
destruction in the war, but a strong military power. Until the early 1960s the two
superpowers dominated the world with almost all European countries, China and Japan
being the camp followers of either the USA or the USSR.

As has been mentioned earlier, it was hoped that the war time alliance among the USA,
UK and others would continue and that this combine would be a guarantee for world
peace. But this hope was belied. Political friendships are _ rarely permanent. Once the
common enemy, the Fascist powers was eliminated, the difference between
the West and the Soviet Union began to surface. There was distrust between them which
led to the Cold War. Stalin, the Soviet Prime Minister, sought to bolster up his country’s
defence by creating statellites in Central Europe. He imposed

International Relations

453

pliant communist regimes on Poland, East Germany. Hungary Czechoslovakia, Rumania

and Bulgaria, the countries that the Red Arm), had liberated from the Nazi control.
Yugoslavia and Albania became communist almost entirely due to the local movements.
The communisation of Central Europe caused fear in Western European countries which
were reeling under the impact of the War. They naturally feared for their independence.
This fear was reinforced by Stalin’s decision to impose blockade on West Berlin, the
Western sector of Berlin city in March 19-18, though the soviet Union was treaty bound
to allow the Western countries to use the surface supply lines to West Berlin through East
German territory. The weakness of West European countries forced the United States to
accept the responsibility of defending them. This led to the new American foreign policy,
the goal of which was to contain Soviet Communism. The United States created a series
of military alliances; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, the South East
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 195:1, the Baghdad Pact (later known as the
Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO in 1955. The United States also acquired military
bases all around the Soviet Union. Moscow responded by creating the Warsaw Pact in
1955. Propaganda, economic aid, subversion and all other methods short of war were
used by the two bloc to promote their interests and weaken their adversaries.

Even during world War II vast sums of money and great effort were expended on
improving military and development of weapons of quality and greater destructive
powers. It was during the last stages of the war that the United States developed the atom
bomb and used the new weapons in Japan. The end of the war did not see any let-up in
this field. Cold War fears accentuated the arms race. It was in the post-war period that
hydrogen bomb, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) multiple independently
targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRY) etc. were developed. And then came the neutron
bomb. It was estimated that in the year 1978-79 the world spent $400 billion on defence
while 50 per cent of the world’s population suffered from malnutrition. Both the
superpowers developed the capability to destroy each other and the wvorld many times
over. Yet the race continues. Some defence analysts feel that the balance
of terror, i.c_ the terrible knowledge that each can destroy the other, prevents the
superpowers from going to war with each other. Anyway, the world sits uneasily on the
powder keg.

Germany, the country which was responsible for starting two world wars remained a
dangerous problem until recently. At Yalta it was agreed that Germany would be divided
into four zones, one each for the USSR. USA, UK, and France. At the Postdam
Conference, attended by

World War ll 454

Truman, Atlee and Stalin in July-August 1945, it was agreed that Four Power Control
Council would be set up to control Germany.

Similarly, the Four Power Statute (June 1945) kept authority over Berlin in the Allied
command made up of the generals commanding the city’s four occupation zones. Mutual
distrust and fear led to the division of the city into two zones, East Berlin and West Berlin
by June 1948, and separate municipal administrations by-Now-Dec. 1948. The Soviet
Union had tried to squeeze the Western powers out of West Berlin by imposing the
Berlin blockade (March 1948-June 19-19). the Western powers had defeated the purpose
of the blockade by airlifting supplies to West Berlin.

Khrushchev had floated the idea of a demilitarised free West Berlin in 1958: but this was
rejected by the west.. In retaliation. Moscow permitted

East Germany to build the Berlin wall in August 1961. to keep the people of the two
zones of the city out of touch with each other.

In the case of the two Germany’s Soviet refusal at the Moscow Foreign Minister’s
conference in July August 1945 to let her also
participate in the process of integration that had produced the Anglo-American bi-zone in
January 1947, had induced the western January 19-18. The Soviet Union introduced
reforms in its zones too. This formalised the division of Germany. In May 19-19_ the
British. American and French zones were united and the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany)

was created; it became a sovereign state in 1955. The Russians created the German
Democratic Republic (East Germany).
Until 1967, West Germany used to follow what came to be known as Holstein Doctrine
according to which Bonn would not enter into or maintain diplomatic relations with any
county (expect the USSR) which

had extended diplomatic recognition to East Germany. The doctrine was based on the
claim, that democratically consiscuted West Germany was the only authentic and
legitimate representative of the German people.
. Since the Soviet Union insisted ,upon the recognition of post-World War II borders in
Europe as final and West German y refused to recognise East Germany and its now
border with Poland lived by the Soviet
Union on the rivers Oder and Neisse. a potentially yen- dangerous

problem had existed since the end of the war. However, after,Willy Brand became the
Chancellor of West Germany in 1970, he followed a conciliatory policy to -improve
relations-with the Communist East. The Policy was known as Ostpolitik. Under it he
signed treaties with the Soviet

Uioii and Poland in May 1972 which gave de facto recognition to the n
Oder-Neisse Line and East Germany. At a later stage both the Germanys

recognised each other. And the Four Power Agreements of September 19’71 also
recognised the inviolability of West Berlin.

international Relations

Trouble in Korea

Like wise Korea, which was to be established as an independent state after a period of
joint occupation by the USA and the USSR under the Yalta Agreement, was divided into
two states communist North Korea and non-communist South Korea. In June 1950, the
Soviet trained and equipped North Korean army invaded South trained and equipped
North Korean army invaded South Korea which appealed for UN help. Sixteen countries
sent their armies to South Korea to help defend it. South Korea remained independent
with American help; thereafter divided Korea and divided Germany became the legacies
of World War II.

Another important consequence of the Second World Wars was the birth of the United
Nations. It was evident from the mid-1930s that the first ever international organisation,
the League of Nations, was a failure. Even as the Second World War was in progress the
need for a second and more effective international organisation was stressed by the leader
of the Allied nations. It was President Roosevelt of the United States who coined the term
United Nations. The UN Charter was drafted at San Francisco in June 1945 and the UN
came into existence on 2:1 October 1945.

It was based on the assumption that the war time alliance among the USA, USSR UK and
France would survive and that the Allies would act in unison to maintain international
peace and security. The aims of the UN as mentioned in the preamble of the Charter are
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war reaffirm faith in the fundamental
human rights (and) promote social progress. The Charter forbids interference in the
domestic affairs of member nations by the UN agencies. The Security Council is the
custodian of the collective security mechanism devised by the charter. It can impose
economic sanctions and as a last resort, take military action against countries which
disturb peace.

The USA, USSR. UK, France and China Formosa became the permanent members of the
Security Council. Since the maintenance of international
place depends upon great power unity, provision has been made for veto by the
permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., on all substantive issues, unanimity
among the permanent powers is necessary, opposition by any one of them would kill any
move. This is clearly against sovereign equality of the members of the UN, recognised by
the Charter.

But the assumption on which the UN was built ceased to exist almost with its very
inception. The permanent members fell apart, and their old fears and suspicions returned.
The great powers began interfering in the internal affairs of small and medium powers
either overtly or covertly. What came to be known as the Cold War had begun.

CHAPTER 2

DECOLONIZATION AND
EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

Colonials was one of the dominant features of international politics during the past three
centuries. Its origin can be traced back to the discovery of India by Vasco-da-Gema. The
Portuguese and the Spanish were the first to establish their dominations overseas. Soon
they were joined by other European powers like the English, French. Dutch etc. Soon
Britain because of her mastery over these as and industrial head start emerged as the most
powerful colonial power. The British steadily extended her way over India, while France
made encroachments in Algeria and Indo-China. The other European powers like the
Dutch and the Spaniards also set up some colonies. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century the imperialist powers embarked on ruthless colonialisation and divided the
whole world between themselves, They not only consolidated their hold over the existing
colonies but also carved out new colonies in Africa Asia, Germany, Italy, Japan and U
S.A. also jointed the fray for colonies. Thus Colonialism reached its height in the closing
years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the present century.

Before we examine the process of. Decolonisation i.• shall be desirable to know about the
meaning of colonialism and policies followed by some of the colonial powers in some
details.

Meaning of Colonialism

Various definitions of colonialism based on the value and emotions. have been offered.
According to the western concept Colonialism

Intematfonal Relations ~ 457

is the establishment and maintenance for an extended time, or rule\over an alien people
that is separate and subordinate to the ruling power. It implies rule over people of
different race inhabiting lands separated by salt waters from the imperial centre. More
particularly .it signifies direct political control of European states or state settled by
European, over people of other race notably over Asians
and Africans. The main features of colonialism according to the western concept include
dominations of an alien minority asserting racial and cultural superiority over a materially
inferior native majority, contact between a machine oriented civilization with Christian
origin, a powerful economy and rapid rhythm of life and nor.-Christian civilisation, that
lacks machine and is marked by the backward economy and a slow rhythm of life, and
the imposition of the first civilisation upon the second.

The leftist scholars, who consider colonialism a an evil, define it as ”the military or
economic enslavement of any dependent country”, and see it as accompanied by bestial,
exploitation and extermination of the indigenous.

The African and Asian scholars also tend to agree with the leftist definition of
Colonialism. For example, President Sukarno of Indonesia defined colonialism in the
course of his opening address to the Bandung Conference of 1955 thus: ”I beg of you not
to think of colonialism in the classic form which we know. Colonialism has also its
modern dress in the form of economic control, intellectual control and actual physical
control by a small but alien community within the nation.” Another definition of
colonialism which was accepted for a long time was offered by J. A. Hobson in his book
Imperialism: A study He says ”Colonialism, in its best sense is a natural overflow of
nationality; its test is the power of colonialists to transplant the civilisation they represent
to the new natdral and social environments in which they find themselves”.

Varying Colonial Policies

there has been a wide variation in the policy pursued by various colonial powers towards
their colonies. It is .not possible to deal with the policies of all the colonial powers here.
However, we may deal with the policies of some of the major colonial powers viz.,
Britain, France. Belgium and Portugal, to form an idea about the attitude of the colonial
powers towards the colonies.

British Policy:

Great Britain adopted a very flexible policy towards her colonies. She did not treat the
colonies merely as integral part of the mother country but as countries with their own
distinctive ways of life aid facilitated their autonomous development. She provided
increasing share to the people of

Deco%nigatfon and Expansion of International 458

Community

the land in the governing ~md t) prepare them for ultimate independence. Starting with
India in 1947 4::a West Indies, the British transformed most of the colonies into
independent states in-keeping with their long-established policy. However she had to face
some difficulties in colonies like Rhodesia, Kenya,
and British Guinea because of the presence of a large number of white settlers in these-
colonies.

French Policy:

France followed quite a different colonial policy. Though she extended enormous aid to
her colonies and introduced a number of reforms after Second World War, she was not
willing to grant independence to these colonies. As result of this policy the French
colonies of Indo-China and Algeria had towage violent struggle for their independence.
In case of Guineva also the French leadership did not approve of its decision to opt out in
1958 and treated here as an outlaw. However, in subsequent years the French to a number
of African colonies and tried to cultivate intimate relations with them after grant of
independence.

Belgian Policy

The colonial policy of Belgium was quite at variance with -the policy persued by Britain
and France. She did not associate the people of her colony (Congo) either with the local
administration (as was done by the. British) nor with the imperial centre (as was done by
the French). She took no steps to create an elite class which could take over the reins of
power once she decided to withdraw. As a result, when in 1959 in the wake of riots in
Leopoldville Belgium hastily severed her ties with Congo and left the country, the people
were in lunch because they neither possessed trained leaders and officials nor an army
manned by the African officer possessed trained leaders and officials nor an army
manned by the African officer.

Portuguese Policy

The Portuguese, the oldest colonial power, followed a colonial policy which was quite
different from the one followed by Britain, France and Belgium. She did not provide
education to the people in her colonies and kept them away from modernity. In 1961 in
the wake of Angolan rising, the Portuguese government introduced a number of reforms
and provided the colonial people an equal status within the Portuguese domain. She
deliberately encouraged the Portuguese peasants and workers to emigrate to PortuguesF
Africa to solve the problem of poverty and to strengthen her hold on the African territory.
In fact, because of leer own backwardness she had hardly any capacity to secure the
advacenment of millions of people overseas.

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459

Decolonization

It is commonly held that the idea of decolonization is the product of the twentieth century
and particularly of the post World War 11 period. However, this is not correct. The
feeling of anti-colonialism first manifested itself in the eighteenth century when the
thirteen American colonies revolted against the colonial rule of Britain and set
themselves as an independent country.
Subsequently, the Latin American countries also waged anticolonial struggle and attained
independence. Philosophers like Bentham also strongly pleaded that Britain and France
should rid themselves of their dependencies. But it was only after the First World War
that the problem of colonies received serious attention. The peace-makers at Versailles,
who were confronted with the problem of the territories of the defeated powers, thought it
proper to pay due attention to the well-being and development of these territories.
Accordingly, they incorporated certain provisions in the Covenant of the League of
Nations to deal with this problem. The Covenant laid down that ”the well-being and
development” of the people of these territories was ”a sacred trust of civilisation” and
entrusted these territories to various Allied and Associated powers as mandatories on
behalf of the League. However, these powers were not genuinely concerned with the
welfare of the people of these territories and treated, these territories merely as a status
symbol.

In the post-World War I period the spread of nationalism in the colonial areas of Asia and
elsewhere posed a serious challenge to the colonial rule. Though the process of
declonisation aid not start during this peril but no further colonies were established. The
only notable exceptions were the seizure of Ethiopia by Italy and drive of Japan on China
and South-East Asia. It was only in the post World War II period thqt..1he process of
Decloonisation was greatly speeded up. According to Rupert Emerson, ”After 1945 the
floodide of anti-colonialism swept awaN the colonial system with a speed and
thoroughness that watched colonialism’s advance at the close of the 19th century. The
poss.,ssion of colonies, so long a matter of pride and prestige, now became a si n to be
expiated only, if at all, by the granting of immediate independence. Tn:. League of
Nation’s indifference to the _problem was --replaced by the profound involvement of the
United Nations in the process of decolonisation”.

UN Charter and Colonial People

In view of the rising tide of nationalism in the colonial areas tile delegates to the San
Francisco Conference made elaborate provisions concerning the e9lonial people which
constituted an advance over the League Covenant. They incorporate a Declaration
Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories in the UN Charter which imposed an
obligation on

Decolonigationand Expansion of lntemational 460

community

the members regarding the administration of territories whose people had not yet reached
a full measure of self-Government. The Declaration, contained in Article
73, is of great significance and deserves to be quoted in full. It states:

”Members of the United Nations which have to assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories
are paramount, and accept, as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,
within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter,
the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and to this end:

(a) to ensure with due respect for the culture of the people
concerned their political, economic, social and education
advancement, their- just treatment, and their protection
against abuses;

to develop self-government, to take due account of the

political aspirations of the people, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and their varying stages, of development;

(c) to further international peace and security;

(d)

to promote constructive measure of development to encourage research and to co-operate

with one another, when and where appropriate, with specialised international bodies with
a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic and scientific purposes set
forth in the Article; and

(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information

purposes, subject to such limitations as security and
constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other
information of a technical nature relating to economic, social
and educational conditions in the territories for which they
are respectively responsible.

Article 74 of the Charter asserted that the other members of the UN have interests in the
colonial territories. If the administering powers adopt arbitrary policies with regard to
immigration, trade and commerce etc., the non-asminitering countries can complain. In
short, the UN Charter held out hopes of self-government for the colonial areas.

Commenting on the significance of the Declaration Regarding Non Self-Governing

Territories of UN Charter, Ball and Killough say ”it

Wow
international Relations 461
represents perhaps a great advance in international responsibility for the
welfare of the dependent people that does the trusteeship system. In the
Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories the .... powers recognized
for the first time an international instrument that th. ,%elfare of the
dependent peoples was the paramount consideration in Lhe -administration
of all dependent areas.
The declaration in the Charter goes further and
carries with it an obligation also undertaken for the first time for all
dependencies--to report to an international agency on the steps taken to
implement the basic principles.”

It is true that the. provisions of the UN Charter provided a new impetus to the
decolonization movement but it would certainly be wrong to assert that all declonization
in the post Wainhouse who has made special study of the role of the United Nations Rin
ending colonialis, says ”Whereas the Charter enshrined the principle of self-government
and the U.N. bodies have provided the main arena of the colonial debate, the direct role
of th, Organisation itself in the .process of decolonisation has been a limited one In some
countries such as India. Burma and Syria the nationalistic movements had develop before
it was founded. In others, such as Indo-China, Morocco and Algeria, decisions were
deliberately kept outside of United Nations by the states concerned. notably France.” The
United Nations did play an important role, however, in the ending of colonial rule in
Indonesia and in certain African trust territories and it was very mucl involved in the
disposition of the former mandated territory of Palestine. A special case in which the
Organisation had a decisive role was that of th. Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and
Somaliland, for which the Genera Assembly provided a solution when the four Foreign
Ministers of the Allied Powers. were unable to settle the problem after several years of
efforts.”

However, he asserts that the most importance of the UN has been ”the creation of a
climate of opinion which has given the decolonisation movement a considerable impetus.
This it has done merely by being a world forum where claims, demands and protests
inevitably have had a hearing and by providing organised channels for the making of
resolutions and decisions bearing the stamp of the world organisation. Through the
Trusteeship Council and the subsidiary organs of the General Assembly. the United
Nations has spurred the colonial power to improve the lot of their dependent peoples. The
widespread concern for their welfare it has helped to arouse has in turn served as a form
of pressure on the imperial powers to speed up the process of decolonisation.”

From the very beginning the United Nations started playing ai,, important role in
speeding up the process of decolonisation. Though in the first few years the discussion on
Non-Self-Guy c: tying Territories were

’Pecolonigation and Expansion of irternational 462

community

mainly concerned with establishing procedure for the transmission and examination
of information, but the basic issue underlying this whole discussion was the question of
the competence of the General Assembly reading the political and constitutional progress
in the non-self-governing territories. Soon the General Assembly was able to assert its
right to examine the information transmitted by the administering Powers and to make
recommendations on the conditions in the territories. It also asserted its competence to
determine whether a territory should be classified as Non-self-government or not. In 1946
the General Assembly listed 74 territories in respect of which the administering powers
were to ’transmit information. Subsequently it added some more territories, which were
under the administration of Spain and Portugual, to this list.

In 1947 the General Assembly set up a Committee of lE> members--equal representation

being given to the colonial and norl-colonial powers. This Committee was to assist the
Assembly in dealing with the reports submitted by the administering power. The Colonial
powers objected to the setting up of the Committee on the plea that they were merely
expected to send report for the information of the General Assembly. They further
contended that them were expected to send reports only with regard to the areas which
had not yet become self-governing in the social, economic and education fields, and that
the right to determine whether a territory was self-governing or not rested with them. The
non-colonial powers on the other hand asserted that the administering powers were
expected to send reports until the territory was a self-government. As regards the
questions whether a territon was a self-governing or not the decision should rest with the
General Assembly. In view of the rigid stand taken by the colonial and non-colonial
powers on these issues lot of tension wars generated. Ultimately. the non colonial powers
succeeded in pushing through the General Assembly a number of resolutions. in the face
of protests from colonial powers, asserting that the non-self-governing territories were a
matter of international concern.

Despite this tension the UN was able to secure independence for a member of colonies
during the first fifteen years of its life. It laid down the condition for the eventual
independence of Libya. Eritrea and Somaliland and secured their independence. On the
surrender of mandate over Palestine by Britain, United Nations took a decision regarding
the partition of the territory and created the independent state of Israel. It also played an
important role in securing independence of Indonesia from the Dutch rule. It ma) be
noted that the independence of the colonies was not solely due
to the policy and efforts of the UN, it was also largely due to the liberal policy adopted by
some of the colonial powers. For example, Britain granted

Intematlonal Relations

independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceyon, Malaya etc., on her own. Similarly
France, voluntarily granted independence to most of her colonies except Algeria, USA
also granted independence to Philippines on her own. Bandung Conference

The countries which gained independence from the colonial rule organised themselves
and tried to exert pressure for speeding up the process of decolonization At the Bandung
Conference of 1955 they mounted a diplomatic offensive for ending the colonialism.
They declared that ”colonialism in all its manifestation is an evil which should speedily
be brought to an end.” They declared that the subjection of people to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary
to be Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world
peace and co-operation.’ What is more significant is that they tried to cover all the
colonial territories. regardless of the degree of enlightenment with which the people were
ruled or of their readiness for independence.

Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and people

A new era of decolonisation set in with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to the colonial countries and people. By 1960 a number of Afro-Asian
countries had gained independence and were admitted as members to the United Nations.
Their strength had increased so such that they carne to acquire virtually a two-thirds
majority in the General Assembly. Fully aware of their strength these Afro-Asian
countries sought to take more effective steps to speed up the process of decolonisation
and ensure emancipation of the rest of the colonies. After prolonged negotiations forty-
three African and Asian delegates introduced a draft which was adopted after a long and
momentous debate by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960. This resolution was
adopted by a vote of ninety to zero with nine abstentions. The members who abstained
were all important colonial powers. This resolution ,vas in the shape of a Declaration,
which has been described as charter of independence for the dependent people. The
Declaration stated;

t - The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes

a denial of fundamental human right is contrary- to the Charter of the United Nations and
is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

All peoples have the right to self-determination: by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic. social and cultural
development.

2.

Deco%nlgatlon and Expansion of International 46-t

Community ’

3. Inadequanc,~y of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should

never serve as pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed

against dependent people shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and
freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of other national territory
shall be respected.

Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all other
territories which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the people
of those territories, without any conditions or resen~ations, in accordance with their
freely expressed will and desire,

without any distinction as to race, creed or colour. in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence to freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the

national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.

7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of

the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality non-interference in
the internal affairs of all states

end respect for the sovereignty rights of all people and their territorial integrity.

Ever since the adoption of the Declaration on decolonisation the General Assembly has
repeatedly called upon the administering powers to implement the Declaration and to take
all necessary steps to ehable the
dependent peoples of the territories concerned to exercise without further delay their right
to self-determination and independence. It has asserted that the continuation of
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, including racism, apartheid, the
exploitation by foreign and other interests of economic and human resources and the
waging of the colonial wars to suppress the national liberation movement of the colonial
territories in Africa, is incompatible with the Charter. the Universal Declaration of
Human Right and the Declaration on decolonisation and poses a serious threat to the
international peace and security. While recongnising the legitimacy of the struggle of the
colonial people by all the means at their disposal, it has urged the other states to render
moral and material
assistance to the people. It also impressed on the specialised agencies and international
institutions to withhold
assistance from South Africa and

International Relations

Southern Rhodesia till they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial
discrimination. Above all it condemned the practice of using mercenaries in these
territories and has prohibited the nationalism from serving as mercenaries. It has appealed
to the colonial powers to withdraw their military bases and installations from the colonial
territories and to refrain from establishing new ones. Above all the Assembly has
repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the widest possible dissemination of
information on colonialism on the efforts of the colonial people to achieve liberation and
on the assistance being provided by the international community to eliminated the
remaining vestiges of colonialism.

Special Committee on Decolonisation

With a view ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

independence to Colonial Countries and people, the General Assembly set up a Special
Committee on Decolonisation in 1961. While adopting the resolution for the creation of
Special Committee in November 1961 the General Assembly noted with regret that with
few exceptions, the provisions of the Declaration had not been carried out and in
particular that armed action and repressive measures continued to be taken against
dependent peoples. The Assembly called on all the concerned states to take action
without further delay with a view to faithful application and implementation of the
Declaration. It set up a Special Committee consisting of 17 members (it was enlarged to
2-1 at the end of 1962). These members were to be appointed by the President of the
Assembly and ’vvere expected to examine the application of the Declaratio=- as well as
to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of its application.
The Special. Committee was also entrusted with the functions of three other Committees
before it started working in 1962. Thereafter, it has remained the main United Nations
body concerned with the matter relating to the progress towards self-determination and
independence, of peoples in the dependent Territories.

In 1962 the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to propose specific
measures for expediting the process of decolonisation. It also requested the Committee to
appraise the Security Council of developments in the Territories covered by the
Declaration which posed a
threat to international peace. In 1965 the General Assembly made a
request to the Special Committee to pay special attention to the small
Territories and to recommend necessary steps to enable the people of these
Territories to exercise fully their rights to self-determination
and
independence. It asked the Special Committee to recommend, wherever
appropriate. deadline for independence in each Territory in accordance
\\ith the wishes of the people. Thus the S ’ ”’~1!!?!ttcc continued to

pecoionigation and Expansion of International 466

community

«ork actively. in co-operation with the General Assembly and the Security Council to
expedite the process of decolonisation.

In addition the Special Committee also sought to secure the co-operation of the
administering powers. It dispatched a number of visiting missions to some of the non-
self-governing territories to obtain first information on the situation in the territories as
well as to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants regarding their future. Some of the
territories n-hich were visited by these missions included Aden (1967). Nine (1972).
Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Gilbert the Ellice Islands (1974). Cape Verde. Montserrat
and Spanish Sahara--now Western- Sahara (1975): the British Virgin Islands and Tokelan
Islands (1976); and the Cayman Islands and the United States Virgin Islands (1977). In
1972 a Special Mission visited the liberated areas of the independent State of Guinea-
Bissau. The Special Committee also held meetings at the African capitals in 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1972, and in Portugal in 1975 in connection with the examination of the
colonial territories in Southern Africa. The Special Committee set up a sub-committee on
petitions for looking into complaints of the people from the non-self-governing territories
and on the basis of these petitions made necessary recommendations to the General
Assembly. The Committee in its recommendations to the Assembly impressed that the
”colonial conflicts constitute a serious threat to the world peace” and ”all the peoples
have an inalienable right to complete freedom.”

Probably the most outstanding accomplishment of the Special Committee was that it
succeeded in getting a special resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1970
concerning the ”programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on
the granting of independence to colonial countries and people.” By virtue of this
resolution, the General Assembly acknowledged the right of self-determination of the
colonial people as well as the right to carry struggle against colonial powers with all the
means at their disposal. For effective implementation of the objectives laid down in the
Declaration it impressed on the members states to render every possible moral and
material assistance to the people in their struggle. It asked the Security Council to impose
sanctions against South Africa and Portugal and to widen the scope
of sanction against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. .

In subsequent years also the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on the
recommendation of the Special Committee in which it . asserted that foreign economic,
financial and other interests operating in Colonial territories constitute a major obstacle to
the political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those
territories by the indigenous inhabitants. 1t asserted that this constituted a

International Relations 4(,7

violation of the obligations under the UN Charter. It called upon the administering Rows
to abolish all discriminatory and unjust practices applied to the inhabitants of the
territories under the administration and in all other Territories under colonial and racial
regimes notably in Southern Africa.

It appealed to the Colonial Powers and other concerned states to prevail upon those
nationals who were operating enterpresised in tile colonial territories to abandon such
activities. It further requested them to stop supply of funds and other forms of assistance
to colonial regimes which used such assistance for the suppression of liberation
movement.

Both the Special Committee and the General Assembly have felt concerned over the
growing military activities of the Powers in the colonial territories which greatly impeded
the implementation of the Declaration. In 1975 the Special Committee reported to the
General Assembly that the colonial powers and minority racist regimes had continued to
defN Assembly resolutions calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all
military bases and installations from colonial territories. The Committee expressed the
view that such activities were allied at subjugating the colonial peoples and repressing
their liberation movement. It considered that strategic military considerations were an
important factor in prolonging the colonial rule in many parts of the world, particularly in
smaller territories. Accordingly, in 1976 and 1977 the General Assembly renewed its call
to the Colonial Powers to withdraw immediately and unconditionally their bases and
installations from colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

In 1978 the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on Namibia containing

programme of action in support of self-determination and national independence for
Namibia. The Declaration stressed the commitment to end South Africa’s illegal
occupation and right of self-determination and independence for the Namibian people. It
appealed to the member states to render increased and sustained support and assistance to
SWAPO and to desist from all kinds of
direct and indirect co-operation or collaboration with South Africa.

In April 1979 the Special Committee of 2-1 on Decolonization met in Yugoslavia and
adopted a Final Document on the Decolonisation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, in which it
called for extended sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and mandatory sanctions against
South Africa. It also condemned the ”Wanton and increasing resort to violence and
intimidatioli against the African peoples under the domination and their cynical defiance
of United Nation in its effort to bring about the genuine ai)c1 complete decolonisation of
Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.’

Decolonigation and Expansion of international 468

Community

In subsequent years also the General Assembly continued to adopt resolution

condemning colonialism and reiterate its determination to eliminate colonialism.

The General Assembly at its thirty-ninth Session held in 1984-85 adopted a series of
resolutions on decolonisation. These resolutions were largely identical to resolutions
approved during the earlier session, and reiterated Assembly’s condemnation of activities
of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the
Declaration on Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples. It called for
frill implementation of the 1960. Declaration by the specialised agencies and
international institutions of the UN System. It deplored
’military activities and arrangements by colonial powers (i.e. South Africa) in territories
under their administration which might be impeding implementation of the 1960
Declaration.

The Assembly -also adopted a series of resolutions rearming `the inalienable right to self-
determination and independence of the peoples of U.S. Pacific dependencies of
_American Samoa, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands in Caribbean; and the British
dependencies of Bermuda. British Virginia Islands, the Cayman Islands, all in the
Caribbean. the Assembly

also adopted a similar resolution in respect of the U.K. dependency of Anguilla.

consideration of which had been deferred at its thirty-eight session. Through another
resolution the U.N. Assembly adopted an extensive programme of activities for 1985 to
mark the 25th Anniversary of the adoption of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to
Colonial Countries and People.

Recently the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution forwarded by the Non-aligned

Movement declaring 1990-2000 as the International Decade for the Eradication of
Colonialism. The resolution urged the UN Secretary General to submit a resort to the
44th session of the General Assembly leading to the adoption of an action plan aimed at
ushering in the 21st century a
world free from colonialism.

It is quite evident from the above discussion that the United Nations has made significant
contribution towards the process of decolonisation by creating a climate of opinion which
provided a new impetus to the decolonisation movement. ’This it has done merely by
being

a world forum where claims, demands and protests inevitably have had a hearing. and by
providing organised channels for the making of resolutions and decisions bearing the
stamp of the world organisations. Through the Trusteeship Council and the subsidiary or
gains of the General Assembly. the United Nations has spurred the colonial powers to
improve the lot of

tl~-`= -~ =~ndew peoples. The widespread concern for their welfare has

International Relations

469

helped to arouse and has in turn senZd as a form of pressure on tile imperial powers to
speed up the process of decolonisation.”

According to Jacobson the most important contribution of the United Nations has been
that it has prevented to use of the violence in the settlement of colonial issues. He says
”On balance, the colonial revolution has probably been more peace full because of United
Nations in volvement. A case can also be made to the effect that the United Nations has
contributed to International stability through its activities at the time of the accession of
dependent territories of self-government or independence.”

It is evident from the above discussions that the United Nations (including its various
agencies and committees) has played a commendable role in the process of
decolonisation. As one writer has observed it has acted as a catalyst in the process of
decolonisation. It has provided impetus, cohesion and direction to the forces of anti-
colonialism. Even Perez de Cuellar. the Secretary General of United Nations. greatly
lauded the achievements of the United Nations in the field of decolonisation. He told the
Special Committee colonisation ”The achievements of the United Nations in the historic
process of decolonisation are among the organisation’s most extraordinary elements.”
However he warned that ”our satisfaction with those elements should not halt or diminish
our efforts. On the contrary eve must our efforts on what remains to be done. There are
many complex and difficult problems that must still be solved. It is important to maintain
the religious achieved in the past two decades until we have achieved the final goal
complete decolonisation.”

Expansion of International Community

As a result of the process of decolonisation. a large number of territories which were
formerly under the control of various colonial powers have since gained independence
and the sire of the international community has greatly expanded. This is evident from
the fact that whereas UNO in 1945 consisted only 51 members. its membership rose to
159 in the 198-1. We can form an idea about the steady groNvth of the international
community from the showing Table:

Growth of Membership of UNO between 1945-1989

Years
1945
19:46
1947
19=18
1949
1950
1955

76

DecolonJgatfon and Expansion of International

community

1956 1957 1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 196=4 1965 1966

Years

1967 1968 197() 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 198=1
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

80 82 83 100 104 110 112 115 118 122

Number of Members

123 126 127 132 132 138 144 147 1-49 151 152 15=1 157 158 159 159 159 159 1_59
159

(Contd. )

Number of Members
51
55

57
58
59
GO
The emergence of a large number of new countries and their entw into the UNO has
exercised profound influence on the international relations which has been discussed in
one of the subsequent Chapters.

Though the Afro-Asian countries as well as the United Nations have made serious efforts
to eliminate colonialism, it has not beer completely abolished and still persists in certain
areas. For example birth South Africa and Portugal have consistently flouted the
resolutions of the General Assembly and continued their policy of colonialism and
apartheid.

international Relations ”’ 171

It has been alleged by scholars that these two countries have been able to pursue policy of
colonialism because of the support extended by the former colonial powers like United
States and Great Britain. The Afro-Asian countries have openly charged the countries of
encouraging colonialism by siding with these two powers and passed resolutions though
the General Assembly condemning their attitude and policy.

It is a well known fact that the rebel government of Ian Smith in

Rhodesia could withstand the various sanctions imposed by the United
Nations because powers like U.S.A., Portugal, South Africa continued to
trade with her. In 1971 the United States imported chromate from
Rhodesia in complete violation of the Security Council resolution. This
action of in complete violation of the Security Council resolution. This
action of U.S.A. not only invited international condemnation but was
serverly condemned by the people and Press of U.S.A. For example the
New York Times in one of its editorials said ”This country, which has
probably spoke up more often than any other at Turtle Bay in support to the
Declaration on decolonisation in 1960 on the plea that it tantamounted to
interference on the domestic sphere of the administering Powers. In short,
we can say that
take warm attitude of countries like U.S.A. and Britain,
and at times their open support to the colonial powers like South Africa
and Portugal has greatly hampered the process of decolonisation. However,
it cannot be denied that due to persistent fight by the Afro-Asian countries
against the colonial powers and full support extended to them in their
efforts by the United Nations, only a small fraction of the population has

been left under colonial rule. It is hoped that these colonial powers will not be able to
resist the pressure of the anti-colonial forces and the international body for a long time
and coloni, t~ r-< <•.-ill be completely eliminated.

CHAPTER 25

COLD WAR: ORIGINS,

EVALUATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The cold war has defined by Florence Eliott and Michael Summer skill in :4 Dictionayv
eJ’Politics as ”a state of tension between countries in which each side adopts policies
designed to strengthen itself and weaken the other, line falling short of actual hot war”.
The cold war has been a predominant factor in determining the conduct of international
affairs in post-Second World War period. It envisaged an era of neither peace nor war
between Soviet Union and her dozen allies on the one hand and United States and a score
of its allies on the other hand. the term ’cold war’ was first used by Bernard Brach, an
American statesman who in a speech to South Carolina legislature on April 16, 19-47
said: ”Let us not be deceived. we are today in the midst of a cold war”. Walter Lippmann
popularised the term in 19=17 with his little book by the same name wherein he
described the situation that had arisen between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union.
The Western powers and the Soviet Union had come together to fight against the Axis
aggression during the Second World War but, however, their relations, though cordial.
were suffering from an under current of mutual distrust and jealousy. The Soviet Union
had harboured the suspicious abut Anglo-American moves on -account of delay in
opening the second front during war to relieve German pressure on Soviet front, the
secrecy maintained over the atom bomb, and the denial of invitation to the Polish
provisional government to San Francisco. Similarly, the West had entertained the feeling
that Russia had annexed considerable territory by waging war against Japan at the last
moment.

Intematlonal Relations

Thus the mutual distrust had led to sharp rivalry as soon as the World War II come to an
end.

Origins
There is no eanimey amongst scholars regarding the date of origin of cold war. Some
smolars place it as far back as the Bolskevik Revolution in 1917. Desmond Domelly in
this book ,ftruggle
fir- the Morld said: ”The cold war has its origins in the struggle for power in the Central
Asia between the rival imperialism of Britain and Russia in the Nineteenth century. There
was that strange period of history known as the ”Great Games” when names such as
Smarkund and Bokhara were the traditional doctrine of mutual suspicion--even before the
Red Flag floated over the winter palace on that cataclysmic day in 1917”. Een Frederick
L. Schuman in his book The Cold 11 ar• : Resbrospect and Prospect also opined that ”At
all events. what we have seen the ’cold war’ did not begin in 1945, in the aftermath of
World War II and of the Yalta and of the Potsdam conferences. In a broader sense it
began with the second Russian Revolution of 1917... within ten months after Russia’s
October Revolution. Soviet Union and the West were at war. And the war was not a cold
war but a hot war. marked by many casualties and vast destruction. Be it remembered,
lest we forget what the Russians never forget. that this war was begun by communists
sending armies against Soviet Russia .... The legacy of mutual fear and suspicion and
hatred which nourished the cold war of the 1940s and 50s originated in the hot war
between East West in 1918-1921.”

The cold war in Soviet bloc was officially regarded as a unilateral attack by ” capitalism”
and ”imperialism” of the socialist countries, and where ”socialist warriors were regarded
as Anti-COmlnunlst ”hawks”. Sonic official Soviet versions of the cold war would
attribute the origin of cold war in Churculull’s Fulton speech of 5 March 1946, wherein
he said: ”If the Western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of
the United Nations Charter. their influence for furthering those principles will be
immense and no one is likely to molest them. If. however, they become divided or fail in
their duty and if these all importantly Nears are allowed to slip away. then indeed
catastrophe may overwhelm us all”.

There is no precise consensus among the scholars about either its essential nature or the
time and circumstances of its origin. Paul Seabury in his book The Rise and Decline of
the Cold irar holds that to ”date its origin is to suggest its central meaning”. The majority
of authors treat the emer--nee of cold Nxar His a post-Second World War Phenomenon.

Cold War

Evolution of Cold War

474

Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Russia had emerged as a power to be

reckoned with in Europe. The: Western powers had initially refused to recognise the
Bolshevik government in Russia. Prior to the beginning of Second World War, Soviet
Russia had missed many
opportunities where it could bring the Western powers together under so-called security
system and could bring the Western powers together under so-called security system and
to a disarmament programme within and outside framework of the League of Nations.
There had been frequent denouncements by Russia of the policy of appeasement pursued
by America, Britain and France towards Germany. One can say that the cold war was at
embryonic stage during that period. With the advent of second World War. Soviet Russia
started cooperation with the Western countries but this did not help in mitigating the
mutual distrust and suspicions. The differing war aims of the two powers also greatly
contributed to the groWh of cold war. While Soviet Union was keen to ensure her future
security by partitioning Germany and by creating a buffer zone of friendly East European
countries. the United States was keen to restore the conditions necessary for prosperity
and to ensuring that a destructive depression did not recur. Refusal of Soviet Union to
open the Black Sea straits and the Danube as international waters. due to her fear that it
would pave the way for US commercial penetration on Soviet Eastern Europe. also
caused friction. The formal declaration of cold war was made by Winston Churchill of
United Kingdom in his Westminister College (Fulton) speech on 5 March 1946. He said
”A shadow has fallen upon the scene so lately lighted by the Allied Victory. Nobody
knows what Soviet Russia and its communist international organisation intend to do in
the immediate future .... From Stetting in the Baltic to Terieste in the Adriatic. and iron
curtain has descended across the continent.” He emphasised the need of Anglo-American
alliance and emphasised that Soviet Union understands only language of force. He thus
predicted the inevitability of post-war struggle against Soviet Union.

The U.S. decision in 1947 to remilitarise Greece following UK’s withdrawal, on the plea
that if United States did not fill the vacuum left by British departure. the Soviet Union
would. also contribute to cold war. President Truman asserted: ”I believe that it must be
the policy of the United States to support the free people who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities and by outside pressure .... If we falter in our leadership
we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this
nation. ”In view of this attitude of United States. Soviet Union also became reluctant to
withdraw from Eastern Europe. It felt that by continuing to occupy Eastern Europe, the
Soviet

Intematlonal Relations ` 475

Union would at least

negate any threat of nuclear aggression. The net impact of all the above developments
was an aggravation of cold war and estrangement of relations between Soviet Union and
Western powers.

Basis of Cold War

In the main scholars have offered three Interpretations about the

basis of cold war.

Firstly,

some scholars see cold war as a product of mutual antagonism. They hold that the
mistrust and the consequent fears were the basis of this conflict. The mutual fear and
suspicion produced hostile interaction between two parties and both the parties were not
willing to take any initiative to reduce tension. No doubt, the diplomacy of co-existence
and the rise of neutral nations in Asia and Africa contributed to the dampening of the cold
war, but it was kept alive by the fear of the capitalist world about the ultimate motives of
Soviet expansion and the fear of the communist countries that the imperialists were
determined to destroy the Marxland. Thus, the cold war was kept alive due to illusions of
both the capitalists and the communists.

Secondly, some scholars have expressed the view that the cold war was rooted in
ideological incompatibilities. For example James F. Bynes, the U.S. Secretary of State
contended that, ”there is too much difference in the ideologies of the USA and Russia to
work out a long term programme of cooperation.” He held that the expansionist and
crusading Communist ideology was intent upon converting the entire world. They were
scared of Communism because it was essentially totalitarian and anti-democratic and
therefore posed a real threat to freedom and liberty throughout the world. President
Eisenhower also said: ”We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character,
ruthless in purpose and insidious in method.” To counter this threat the United States
embarked upon ,a crusade to eliminate the salient set of ideas from the globe. This view
looks upon the cold war as a ”battle for allegiance of men’s minds” on the pattern of
religious ears of past. The conflict was quite bitter because the ideological foes
recognised no virtue in conciliation or co-operation with enemies.

Third, some scholars see the roots of cold war in the mutual misunderstanding.
According to them, both the parties saw in their own action only virtue and in the action
of the adversary only malice. This naturally gave rise to distrust towards each other.
According to Kegley and Wittkoff ”this interpretation of the origin of the cold war is
difficult to deny, given the perception that became accepted as dogma.”

The Soviet suspicion of America was based a on latter’s intervention idRussia in 1918-
19; refusal
to establish diplomatic ;~l~;n:-us

Cold War

-X76
till 1933: and the war-time experience--viz.. American refusal to iNorm the Soviet Union
about Manhattan project to develop atomic bomb: delay in sending the Soviets promised
Lend-Lease support; and the failure to

open up the second front which made Stalin suspect that the American policy was to let
the Russians and Germans destroy each other so that the United States could then pick up
the pieces from among the rubble; and use of atomic bomb against Japan. In short, the
Soviet distrust of American intentions was presumed to stem at least in part, from fears of
American encirclement but tressed by a historical record of demonstrated hostility.

Likewise USA nourished hostiliy towards Soviet Union because

of increasing indications of growing Soviet belligerence. This feeling arose because of

Russian unwillingness to permit democratic elections in countries liberated from the
Nazis: their refusal to assist in post war

reconstruction in regions outside Soviet control; the maintenance of an unnecessarily

large armed forces after war; stripping of supplies from Soviet areas of occupation and
often obstructive behaviour in the new international organisation; and above all their anti-
American propaganda.

Phases of Cold War

The evolution of the cold war passed through various phases which are as under.

First Phase 19x6-49: In an atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicions, Western bloc
had nourished the feeling that if strong pressure

could be exerted on the Soviet Union, the Communist regime would soon crumble down
like a house of cards. The Western bloc was labouring under this idea because America
had the atom bomb monopoly and Russia lacked it. it was generally held that American,
which was militarily superior to USSR could be in a command of the world and influence
the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. The America’s policy of condemning Russia
could not be implemented because the other partners of the American bloc were not
militarily well equipped like USA and the memories of World War II were still fresh in
their minds which dissuaded them not to resort to a another war. .

The United States resorted to direct military action during their phase through Truman
Doctrine of March 19-17 and economic integration of West European powers as
envisaged in Marshall Plan of June 1947. America pursued the policy of intervention and
defender of status quo during this period. Anti-communist feelings. which the USA
endeavoured to implant throughout the world, were the hallmark of this period. On the
other hand Stalin also looked upon the USA with suspicion and in his speech of
February, 1946 referred to the ”inevitability- of conflict with the capitalist powers.” He
urged the Soviet people not to be deluded that the

1t

1f 1 1, M-11- -1, MW

international Relations

end of the war meant that the nation could relax and empalisised that rather intensified
efforts were needed thereafter.

During this phase the German problem also greatly contributed to tension bet,,v-cen the
two blocks. In 19-48 the Nvestern powers merged their occupation zones and formed
Trizonia. A year later they proclaimed the Federal Republic of Germany. Similarly Soviet
Union established German Democratic Republic in her occupation zone. Tension further
increased following introduction of new currency in trizonia in 19-48 and Soviet Union
retaliated by imposing blockade of Berlin which the western powers sought to nullify-
through gigantic airlift to Berlin. Yet another factor which contributed to the tension
between two Super powers during this phase was refusal of USA to accord recognition of
the communist government of China and sot the Formosa government.

The Second phase (19-I9-53): The second phase witnessed the continuation of America’s
policy and military and economic aid against Soviet Union. The United States concluded
security treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) and peace Treaty with Japan in
1951. The Korean War also occurred during this period. This were proved a major
confrontation between USA and Soviet Union. During the Moscow conferences held in
December 1945, The Ministers of Russia. America and Britain had agreed to form a joint
commission comprising the representatives of the America’s military regime of South
Korea and those of a pro-Soviet military regime of North Korea Majority of Koreans
were in favour of complete independence. The Russian proposal was,. to hold talks with
those groups or parties which would accept the mandate acceding to a decision of the
Moscow conference. But America was opposed to this proposal. The joint-commission of
America and USSR formed in March 19=46 could not succeed and the phase continued.
Lastly, the Korean issue Nvas referred to U.N. But in June 1950 North Korea sudden]
invaded South Korea. Ho\Ncver, this war was brought to a close by, alt armistice
concluded in July 195 3. America launched intensified propaganda against Communism,
spending millions of dollars on it. This period was marked by subversive activities by the
power blocs against each other. Soviet Union also exploded the atom bomb and entered a
nuclear race with USA.

Yet the American and Russian troops remained stationed on both sides of Korea. Despite
the signing of armistice,
the hostility continued. During this phase both Soviet Union and USA played game of
power politics with a vengeance and both tried to curtail the influence of the adversary
and stop its presumed effort to conquer the world. During this period there were moments
of co-operation, (viz., lifting of Berlin

~’ Cold War

blockade), but these acts of co-operation were little morn than the I,~ncis of
communications between the adversaries necessary to contlnm the cuntesi

Third phase (1953-57). During the third phase w hicH lasted from 1953 to 1957, the
United States continued its policy of military and economic offensive against the Soviet
bloc. Two new US sponsored treaties emerged. One was South-East Asia Treaty
Organisation (SEATO) and the Middle East Defence Orgainsation (MEDO). The
emergence of these W o new treaties forged news defence links with NATO. America
also endeavoured to enhance its area of influence in the Middle East by extending the
Truman Doctrine to the region. The United Stales succeeded in establishing number of
military bases around Soviet territory and entered into defence treaties with -43 turned
out to be a climax of cold war.

The Soviet Union during this period did not lag. Russian concluded WARSAW
TREATY with East European powers to counteract NATO . It entered into defence
treaties with 12 states. Even the American bid of counter-revolution in Hungary has
foiled. This period was also marked by the permanency of the potsdam partition of
German.\,. The division of Germany into two-German Democratic Republic (GDR) in

Soviet bloc and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in American bloc occurred during
this period. Both the USA and Soviet Union exploded hydrogen bomb simultaneously
during this period. During this period both the powers talked as if war was imminent but
in deeds both acted with increasing caution and restraint However. this phase was marked
by the

healthy trend that a dialogue between the two powers was initiated. This marked the
beginning of a new phase characterised by the spirit of negotiations. This phase also
witnessed the first the two rivals held mutual discussions on world problems.

Fourth phase (1957-62): The Fourth phase that lasted front 1957-62 was marked by two
extreme trends. On the one hand the principles of co-existence were pronounced and on
the other hand the world saw the

most dangerous Cuban Missile crisis which virtually brought the entire mankind on the
brick of the third war. Beginning years of this period witnessed the province of the spirit
of coexistence between USA and USSR. There had beer mutual exchanges of cultural
and political delegates.
Even the heads of governments of both the countries visited each other’s country. Both
the powers having agreed for Paris Summit was a clear indication that the cold war
attitude had obliterated. But their congenial spirit was marred by the U-2 incident.

However, the damage incurred by the U-2 incident was repaired

to some extent by the General Summit of 1960 and on Vietnam meeting

bemeen KHnlshchev and President Kennedy in 1961. The Berlin crisis of
l`h,l tollowing USSR threat to unilaterally. terminate American access to

lnterrrational Relations 479

Berlin and to make peace with East Germam also gave a setback to efforts at
improvement of relations between the two countries. The crisis arose due to erection of
miles long Berlin Partition wall by Soviet Union to check the fleeing refugees from East
Berlin to West Berlin. Again the Cuban crisis brought both the superpowers at the
threshold of war. However, the mankind was saved from destruction of nuclear war
following an agreement between Khurshchev and Kennedy by which USSR agreed to
withdraw the missile base in exchange for the American guarantee for not invading Cuba.

Fifth Phase (1962-69): The fifth phase which commenced from 1962 was marked by a
deep appreciation of the futility of nuclear weapons. There was a worldwide concern
demanding ban on nuclear weapons. The partial test ban treat’ was concluded in 1963.
The Geneva Hot-line Agreement of 1963 brought USA and USSR more closer. The Non-
Proliferation Treat’ (NPT) of 1968 was also made possible due to good offices of both
the superpowers. However, the problem of Germany and Vietnam was still a riddle for
both blocs. Having felt the need for peaceful coexistence the only means to let the
mankind sur`ive, call was given for disarmament. Premier Khurshechev had advocated
the policy of coexistence in 1959 and in pursuance of.this policy he visited Washington
and met president Eisenhower. During his visit, Khurshchev addressed General Assembly
of the UN and proposed that all the states should completely disarm themselves within
four years.

The signing of partial Nuclear Test Ban Treat’ in 1967 was regarded as a landmark in
easing the cold war. This Treat’ envisaged provisions for limited ban on all nuclear tests
in the atmosphere including territorial water and High seas. In pursuance of the
recommendations made by the General Assembly. United States. Soviet Union and Great
Britain adopted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The provisions of this treat’
implied that the countries equipped with nuclear capabilities were not to transfer their
nuclear weapons or control over them to any, non-nuclear power
or to provide know how in producing these weapons.

Sirth Phase--Deterrte (1969-78): The sixth phase commencing from 1969 was marked by
detente. During this period the co-operative interaction became more common place than
his tile relations. In simple words the relations between USA and USSR became quite
normal and visits, cultural exchanges, trade agreements and co-operative technological
ventures replaced threats, warnings and confrontation. This change took place on account
of a realisation of a necessity to avoid suicidal war and awareness that cooperation
between the two was in their mutual interests. Probably the escalating cost of a continued
arms race also contributed to the development of detente. The congenial climate for
detente was created

Gold War 480

in 1919 when Khmschev pleaded for peaceful co-existence. The subsequent moves for
demanding ban on the spread of nuclear weapon, of Nuclear ban treaties were the trend-
setters for reading the cold war. In 1962. President Nixon of USA paid a visit to Moscow
and signed two agreements. These agreements included the Treaty on the limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile system and the interim Agreement on certain measures with respect
to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The first treaty imposed limitations on
United States and the Soviet Union to two sites for ballistic missile defences, one to
protect their national capital areas and the other to protect the field of ICBMs. The second
agreement encompassed both the land based ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic
missiles. Both these treaties went a long way in effecting improvement of relations
between the two blocs.

In 1970, Soviet Union signed a treat’ with Nest Germany and agreed not to use force
against her. This greatly contributed to the reduction of tension in Europe. This was
followed by an agreement over Berlin between Soviet Union, Britain. U.S.A. and France,
which was indicative of the intentions of all powers to reduce tension.

In November 1972 East Germany and West Germany concluded a treaty whereby they
not only acknowledged each other’s existence but also agreed to cooperate in different
spheres. The same year North Korea and South Korea also concluded an agreement
covering wide range of subjects.

In 1973, Berzhnev, the Chief of the Communist Party of the USSR, also visited
Washington where Summit talks were held. Both the world leaders discussed important
maters concerning the peace in world and agreed to work together for enduring peace and
to end the nuclear arms race. These summit talks resulted in signing of four important
agreements between America and Russia. These
agreements envisaged the cooperation in the field of research exchanges between the two
countries. It was also agreed to negotiate a mutual treat’ aiming at the reduction of
nuclear weapon and cooperation in nuclear power research. Both the powers agreed to
avoid the confrontation of a nuclear war not only between themselves but also with the
third state. The leaders of the two countries asserted that lasting peace in Europe was the
main goal of this policy.

The progress in mutual relations between Moscow and Washington was not affected in
the wake of change in leadership in USA when President Nixon resigned following
Watergate scandal. The new US President Ford did not envisage new changes in the
foreign policy especially with USSR and rather continued efforts for reduction of nuclear
weapons. President Ford concluded an agreement with Brezhnev for limiting strategic
offensive weapons for the next ten years. The summit conference by both the leaders. It
marked the preva’ ~ ~f ~n atmosphere

International Relations 481

of almost complete detente between the two superpowers. The same year also witnessed
the participation of superpowers in the joint Apollo-SOyliz space mission.

A new dimension was added to cold war in the wake of Sino-Soviet rift. A new tension
built tip between USSR and China as well as China and U.S.A. However, after the period
of detente set in there was considerable improvement in relations between United States
and China. In 1971 Henry Kissinger. the U.S. Secretary of State paid a secret visit to
China to explore the possibilities of rapprochement with China. This visit was followed
by Shanghai Communique which gave signals of the possible detenet between U.S.A.
and China. The cold war between China and USA virtually came to an end with the
exchange of ambassadors in January 1979, even though some irritants still persisted in
their relations.

The Detente between USA and USSR also did not automatically lead to mitigation of all
strains of cold war. There ~cere still inany points of conflict between the two
superpowers and they continued to pursue the policy of containment of the opponent. For
example, the United States continued to support armed build up in Iran to retain her
influence in the Middle East and to counteract the growing influence of Russia in the
region. Similarly, the American move to convert Diego Gracie into a military- base was
primarily designed to check the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area. On the other
hand Soviet Union submitted proposals for Asian Collective Security with a view to
replace the American sphere of influence in South-East Asia as well as to contain
China. During the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 and the Egypt Israel War of 1973 also the
two superpowers extend support to the opposite sides.

Seventh Phase---S-ILT ll (1979-onirards): The treaty on the limitation of strategic

offensive arms signed in 1972 between US and USSR lapsed in October 1977. But both
the sides endeavoured to obsen-e its main provision. The Ford administration made little
efforts for negotiations on new agreement. However, after prolonged series of
negotiations, a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of
strategic offensive arms during the period up to 31 December 1985 was signed in Vienna
on 18 June 1979 by American President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, the President of the
Soviet Union. This treat- is popularly known as SALT 11. This treaty envisaged the
determination of both the super powers in limiting the expansion of the nuclear weapons.
It noted the will of both the countries in ”reaffirming their desires to take measures for
the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms having in mind the
goal of achieving general ,rod complete disarmament. The SALT-11 treaty documents
were sent to US Scnatc on 22 Jime 1979. because President Carter had announced on 1 5

Gold War ., ,. „ , .. . _ . . . , . , . .. 482

January 1979 that the agreement would take the form of a treaty rather than an executive
agreement. Under the US constitution the President is empowered by and with the advice
agreement. Under the US constitution the President is empowered by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate to make treaties provided two-thirds of the senators present
concur. Hence SALT-II would become effective only if it is ratified by the US Senate. So
far no development has occurred on this side. The cold war was perhaps on its last leg
had the SALT-II been ratified earlier. As the circumstances would have it, the prospects
of mitigating cold war were marred by sudden developments in Afghanistan where
Russian- armed intervention rather aggravated the situation. If farmed the embers of cold
war.

From SALT-II to Afghanistan Crisis: The process of normalisation of relations between

USA and Soviet Union had travelled a long way to reach the stage of SALT-II. The
conclusion of the SALT-II coincided with the sudden political developments in
Afghanistan. On 27 April 1976 Daud Khan’s Government was overthrown by an Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council and Noor Mohammed Taraki emerged as the new
President. Soviet Union which shares 900-1000 km long common border with
Afghanistan recognised the Taraki regime on 30 April 1978. During May 1978 Kabul and
Moscow signed various agreements of mutual interest. In December 1978 a treaty of
friendship and cooperation was signed between Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
Development took dramatic turn on 16 September 1979 when Hafizuallh Amin replaced
Taraki as head of the Government. Even the Amin regime was also overthrown in a
sudden coup on 27 December 1979. He was replaced by Babrak Karmal. The Karmal
regime was backed by the Soviet troops who had landed in Kabul during December 1979
and January 1980. The initial estimates were that the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were
numbering between 15.000 to 20,000 but later the number swelled to over one lakh.

The Russian intervation in Afghan crisis added a new dimension to the process of detente
and reactivated the forces of cold war.

Implication of Cold War

The Cold War had far-reaching implications in the international affairs. In the first
instance it gave rise to a fear psychosis which resulted in mad race for the manufacture of
more sophisticated armaments. Both the power blocs tried to acquire more and more
sophisticated weapons. This set in motion a mad race for armaments.

Secondly, cold war led to the formation of various alliances during the peace time. Both
the blocs formed alliances and counter e13..:~:.~ to conn;cr-b~31<o,,.: i’m ::,~.t;s~,_ ..
.,:: of the opponent. Some of

lntemational Relations 483

the alliances which were thus formed include NATO, SEATO, CENTO, Warsaw pact
etc. The existence of these alliances added to world tension.

Thirdly, a large number of nations of Asia. Africa and Latin America after attainment of
independence decided to keep away from the military alliances sponsored and supported
by the two super powers. Instead they preferred to follow policy of non-alignment. Thus,
it can be said that the emergence of policy of non-alignment is also the direct outcome of
the cold war.

Fourthly, cold war greatly undermined the chances of attaining the goal of one world. On
account of mutual rivalry the two super powers were not willing to trust each other and
often took opposite stands at the United Nations. This often resulted in blocking entry of
certain members to the United Nations. It is well known that United States did not permit
people’s Republic of China to take its seat in the United Nations only because China was
a camp follower of Soviet Upon. This prevented by United Nations from attaining
universal character and jeopardised the chances of evolving one world.

Fifthly, the mad race for amament which was the logical outcome of the prevailing cold
war between two power blocs resulted in diversion of enormous amounts to acquisition
of sophisticated weapons.
This adversely affected the development of the states, and prevented improvement in the
living standards of the people.

Finally, Cold war rendered the UN ineffective because both the Superpowers tried to
oppose the actions proposed by the opponent. Thus, Soviet Union exercised its veto to
prevent action in Greece, Triests etc. because she distrusted the western powers. Likewise
United States made use of its veto power on the uesti
on

Nations. q of Red China s membership of United

In view of the serious implications of cold war the leaders of Soviet Union and United
States thought of affecting improvement in their relations and reducing international
tension. This paved the way for detente. However the policy of detente did not last long
and towards the close of 1970s the two superpowers relapsed into Second Cold War.

Difference between New and Old Cold Wars

The new cold war differed from the cold war of the 1960s in many respects. In the first
place, unlike the cold war of 1950s in the new cold war alliance partners were not
actively involved. For example China, Japan and even Western European countries were
quite lukewarm in their support and the war persisted mainly between the two
superpowers. Secondly, in the earlier cold war nuclear armaments build up was not an
issue and the main stress was on quantitative build-up of conventional

Co’d jr
W
7C s nold jr ”’Is ’argelv due tc f Soviet U mon i~
had ach eved

S , _ et h A ’Ind tht
T is
ucl e ted States of America was
arms. This was largely due to the fact that Uni in I all ad 0
S U
much ahead of Soviet Union in nuclear armament and technology. By noN%
vlet Ilion
Soviet Union had achieved a sort of approximate equation in nuclear
0
lam nts JJi
armaments with USA, and the new cold war naturally resulted in nuclear
rn U
arms race between the two superpowers. Both the super powers also tried
to achieve greater sophistication in conventional weaponry. Thirdly, the
new cold war was more threatening than the cold war of 1950s. As one
writer has observed ”Not only has the size of the nuclear arsenals held by
the superpowers vastly increased, but nuclear war has begun to be seen as
fightable and winnable by strategists on both sides. The sheer quantity of
nuclear devices, the complexly of their new technology and the fallible

sophistication of the early warning methods of detection also increase the possibility of
eventual use, by accident or design. ”Fourthly, the first cold war was the result of struggle
for world leadership whereas the second cold

war was based on the question of parity or its erosion in the relation between two
superpowers.
Finally, unlike the first cold war, which greatly centered around ideology.. the second
cold war centered round the arms

race because the weapon ?echnologies had advanced so much that they can easily be
converted into deplorable weapon.

Impact of New Cold War on World Politics

The new cold war left a deep impact on the international politics. Unlike the first cold
war in which the European colonial powers were actively involved and dealt with former
colonies, in the new, cold war USA

trended to deal with the former colonies directly. Generally, the United States sided with
the reactionary regimes in the developing world with a view to maintain status quo. This
has encouraged the Marxist leader’s in these countries to lean more heavily on the Soviet
Union. In this respect the attitude of USA in the developing countries has contributed to
the spread of Marxism in the developing world.

Secondly, the new cold war gave a fresh impetus to the non-aligned movement and more
and more countries joined it. No doubt some of the countries of the Third World extended
facilities to the two superpowers regarding stationing of military personnel to maintain
and -service the sophisticated weapons and equipments, but these states showed

greater inclination to maintain their autonomy. As a result more and more countries,
joined the non-aligned movement with a view to have greater nianocuwabiliy in their
foreign policy between the two superpowers.

Thirdly, the new cold war. which was charaterised by high-technology arms race and
increasing intervention and pressure on the ’developing world, increased the chances of
the two superpowers engaging ’n proy tears in ?~^ dcvel,;-;; .
id rat, having a direct
Confrontation

International Relations 483

the alliances which were thus formed include NATO, SEATO. CENTO, Warsaw pact
etc. The existence of these alliances added to world tension.

Thirdly, a large number of nations of Asia. Africa and Latin America after attainment of
independence decided to keep away from the military alliances sponsored and supported
by the two super powers. Instead they preferred to follow policy of non-alignment. Thus,
it can be said that the emergence of policy of non-alignment is also the direct outcome of
the cold war.

Fourthly, cold war greatly undermined the chances of attaining the goal of one world. On
account of mutual rivalry, the two super powers were not willing to trust each other and
often took opposite stands at the United Nations. This often resulted in blocking entry of
certain members to the United Nations. It is well known that United States did not permit
people’s Republic of China to take its seat in the United Nations only because
China was a camp follower of Soviet Upon. This prevented by United Nations from
attaining , universal character and jeopardised the chances of evolving one world.

Fifthly, the mad race for amament which was the logical outcome of the prevailing cold
war between two power blocs resulted in diversion of enormous amounts to acquisition
of sophisticated weapons. This adversely affected the development of the states, and
prevented improvement in the living standards of the people.

Finally, Cold war rendered the UN ineffective because both the Superpowers tried to
oppose the actions proposed by the opponent. Thus, Soviet Union exercised its veto to
prevent action in Greece, Triests etc. because she distrusted the western powers. Likewise
United States made use of its veto power on the question of Red China’s membership of
United Nations.

In view of the serious implications of cold war the leaders of Soviet Union and United
States thought of affecting improvement in their relations and reducing international
tension. This paved the way for detente. However the policy of detente did not last long
and towards the close of 1970s the two superpowers relapsed into Second Cold War.

Difference between New and Old Cold Wars

The new cold war differed from the cold war of the 1960s in many respects. In the first
place, unlike the cold ’war of 1950s in the new cold war alliance partners were not
actively involved. For example China, Japan and even Western European countries were
quite lukewarm in their support and the war persisted mainly between the two
superpowers. Secondly, in the earlier cold war nuclear armaments build up was not an
issue and the main stress was on quantitative build-up of conventional

Cold War
484
arms. This was largely due to the fact that United States of America was much ahead of
Soviet Union in nuclear armament and technology. By now Soviet Union had achieved a
sort of approximate equation in nuclear armaments with USA, and the new cold war
naturally, resulted in nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. Both the super
powers also tried to achieve greater sophistication in conventional weaponry. Thirdly, the
~I new cold war was more threatening than the cold war of 1950s. As one
writer has observed ”Not only has the size of the nuclear arsenals held by
the superpowers vastly increased, but nuclear war has begun to be seen as
fightable and winnable by strategists on both sides. The sheer quantity of
nuclear devices, the complexity, of their new technology and the fallible

sophistication of the early warning methods of detection also increase the possibility of
eventual use, by accident
or design. ”Fourthly, the first cold «’ar was the result of struggle for world leadership
whereas the second cold `var was based on the question of parity or its erosion in the
relation between two superpowers. Finally, unlike the first cold war, which greatly

centered around ideology.. the second cold war centered round the arms race because the
weapon •.echnologies had advanced so much that they can easily, be converted into
deplorable weapon.

Impact of New Cold War on World Politics

The new cold war left a deep impact on the international politics.

Unlike the first cold war in which the European colonial powers were actively involved
and dealt with former colonies, in the new cold war USA trended to deal with the former
colonies directly. Generally, the United States sided with the reactionary regimes in the
developing world with a view to maintain status quo. This has encouraged the Marxist
leader’s in these countries to ]can more heavily on the Soviet Union. In this respect the
attitude of USA in the developing countries has contributed to the spread of Marxism in
the developing world.

Secondly, the new cold war gave a fresh impetus to the non-

aligned movement and more and more countries joined it. No doubt some of the countries
of the Third World extended facilities to the two superpowers regarding stationing of
military personnel to maintain and service the sophisticated weapons and equipments, but
these states showed greater inclination to maintain their autonomy. As a result more and
more countries. joined the non-aligned movement with a view to have greater
manocurvability in their foreign policy between the two superpowers.

Thirdlt>, the new cold war, which was charaterised by high-technology, arms race and
increasing intervention and pressure on the

developing world, increased the chances of the two superpowers engaging i° proxy wars
in cl,c developing world rather than having a direct

Confrontation

International Relations 485

Fourthh~, the new cold war also greatly contributed to the
economic difficults of the superpowers and adversely affected the
international economy. The high defence spending resulted in high interest
rates which in its train has brought in numerous economic difficulties. The
USA tried to make up its decline in economic. technological and political
power by increasing its military power.
In conclusion we can say that the new cold war left deep impact on all the countries--
developed as well as developing. In the case of the developed countries this impact was
chiefly economic in character. in the case of developing countries it adversely affected
the social and
political development of the developing world. This in turn produced political instability
and enhanced chances of superpower intervention in their affairs.

Cooling of Second Cold War

In the midst of the second cold war, the leaders of the two superpowers continued to feel
the need of coming to some sort of understanding and must a number of times at Geneva,
but could not arrive at arrive at any agreement. At the summit meeting held at Geneva in
November 198>, the leaders of Soviet Union and USA emphasised the desirability of
regular and intensified dialogue between the two powers. Thereafter a number of
meetings were held at bilateral and multilateral forums, but probably the most significant
meeting took place at Reykjavik in October 1986. But unfortunately no agreement could
be arrived at this meeting on INF, strategic weapons, reduction or other issues because
Soviet Union insisted on an overall package, including an agreement. on SDI. Despite its
failure the Reykjavik meeting was a step forward in the right direction. It was followed
by fresh talks at Geneva where proposals regarding elimination of INF missiles in Europe
and elimination within 10 years of all ballistic missiles, land based or submarine based--
were discussed. But once again no agreement could be arrived at. A welcome
development took place in December 1987 when at the Washington Summit the two
powers reached an understanding on intermediate range of missiles. Though this
agreement was quite limited in scope in indicated the intention of the two superpowers to
eliminate nuclear weapons as far as possible. They also called for a halt to nuclear
proliferation. Further progress in this regard was made at the Moscow Summit of May-
Jung 1988, where the two countries not only exchanged documents o
ratification of Intermediate-range Nuclear (INF) Treat’ but also pledged to strive for a
Treaty of strategic Arms Reduction (START). They also agreed to give advance notice
about the launching of inter-countinental range sO and ground missile tests and hold joint
verification of the testing of nuclear

486

weapons. Despite repeated failures the two powers continued to make ~- persistent
efforts is to empower relations.

An important step in this direction was taken by Soviet Union in December 1988 when it
announced unilateral reduction of Soviet troops and armaments in Europe. Soviet Union
also indicated its intention to have more closer relations with the western world. This
change took place probably because Soviet Union has come to recognise that the
preservation of any kind of closed societies is hardly possible and because the world
economy is becoming
status, can normally develop outside it. All this greatly led to the reduction of the tension
between the two super powers.

In the subsequent months the two super powers showed greater spirit of accommodation
on various international issues and tried to remove the irritants existing in their mutual
relations. The various summit meetings between the leaders of Soviet ~Jnion and USA
greatly contributed to the elimination of the cold war which had characterised their
relations for most of the time since the Second World War. The culmination of these
summit meetings was the Malta Summit held on 2-3 December 1989 aboard ships near
Malta. Though no formal announcement about the agenda and the decisions arrived at the
Summit was made, both the sides expressed satisfaction over the outcome. It is generally
held that the Summit greatly contributed to the removal of the barriers which arose
because of cold war.

In May-June 1990 the Second Summit between U.S. President Bush and Soviet President
Gorbachev was held at Washington. Though the Summit was not a complete success it
greatly contributed to the reduction of cold war. The two leaders not only concluded
agreements for increasing economic and cultural cooperation but also pledged to
conclude a pact for trimming conventional military forces in Europe and to intensify the
pace of negotiations for reaching rapid agreement on all outstanding issues. They also
announced their decision to destroy chemical weapons and settle disputes over limits on
cruise missiles. On the questions of Unification of Germany and Gulf War also the two
super powers showed complete understanding. All these are clear pointers to the end of
cold war which had characterised their relations for several decades since Seonc World
War.

End of Cold War

The cold war, which dominated international relations for over four decades after World
War II and was characterised by subtle military and political strategic of the Super
Powers. a minous race for destructive armaments and establishment of military bases on
distant lands and across the scis. came to an end rather abruptly. This was accompanied
by the

International /Relations 487

lifting of the Iron Curtain, breach in the fortress of apartheid and demolition of ttie Berlin
wall.

The process of end of cold war started in the second half of the 1980s when there wa`s
softening in the attitude of the top leaders and thev adopted conciliatory postures towards
each other. The first concrete manifestation of this change was the Malta Summit
between President Bush of United States and Mikhail Gorbachev of Soviet Union. Ill this
summit, held abroad ships off Malta on 2 December
1989. the two leaders made a serious bid to reduce tension and check the growing threats
of conflicts in various areas like Middle East. It has rightly been asserted that the Malta
Summit marked the beginning of a new phase in post world war II international politics.
It also laid the foundation of political co-operation between United States and Soviet
Union in shaping the post war order in Europe.

The Washington Summit (May 30-Julie 2, 1990) farther contributed to the easing of cold
war. At this summit President Bush and President Gorbachev concluded a number of
agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms. The two sides agreed to destroy
thousands of tons of chemical weapons and rescue their stockpiles. They agreed to start
destruction of these weapons in 1992 and finish it by 2002 A.D. They also agreed to
cease further production of these weapons with immediate effect. Another important
outcome of this summit was that the two leaders agreed on set of principles regarding the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to be ready for signature by end of year. The
two leaders also reiterated their commitment to complete the negotiations on the
conventional force reductions in Europe before the end of the year. However, no
agreement could be reached between the two leaders on controversial regional conflicts
like Afghanistan, Kashmir, Cambodia, the Middle East and Cuba.

Factors Contributing to End of Cold War

A number of factors contributed to the end of the cold war. Some of the important factors
were as under.

1. Firstly, In the first place the changed strategic perceptions of

the two super powers--the United States and Soviet Union--
greatly contributed to the end of cold war. As the two super
powers attained parity in nuclear weapons, they, realised that
nuclear weapons would be suicidal for both. None of them
would be able to win the war, while both would be ruined
beyond redemption.

2. Secondly, the enormous expenses being incurred on the

maintenance of militan, bases across the seas, was greatly

488

straining the economy of United States and it was thought desirable to curb this futile
expenditure, particularly in view of the fact that the maintenance of military bases
provided only nominal gains.

3. Thirdly, the two super powers case to realise that the regional
conflicts and prosy wars (as in Vietnam, Angola and
Afghanistan) had served no useful purpose. On the other
hand these wars had caused serious financial burdens on the two Super Powers. This
economic strain, in turn had led to deterioration of the economy of the two countries.
This resulted in record trade and budget deficits in United States. Likewise
the military commitments in lands situated far away

had upset the Soviet economy. All this obl two Super Powers postures and reduce
military expenditure.

lged the leaders of to climb down from the earlier rigid

Formal End of Cold War

Though the process of easing of cold war started in the mid 1980’s it formally came to an
end in mid 1990 when the NATO leaders formally announced the end of the cold war at
their summit meeting held in London. In the communique issued at the end of this
summit. it was

Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East which were our adversaries
in the Cold War and extend the hand of friendship.” The London Declaration emphasised
a number of points which are indicative of the changed nature of the Atlantic alliance. It
asserted that nuclear arms should be used only as a last resort. US nuclear arms in Europe
should be reduced and a limit was imposed on United Germany’s armed forces. It teas
asserted that NATO would try to persuade united Germany to become member of NATO.
The NATO leaders decided to invite Soviet President Gorbachev to Brussels to address a
special meeting of NATO. The leaders pledged to carry out radical reforms in the
military forces of NATO and envisaged a new role for nuclear weapons to reflect a
transformed Europe minus the Cold War.

At the London Summit United States showed its willingness to have fewer nuclear
weapon in Europe and pledged to begin withdrawal of 1:170 nuclear tipped artillery
shells based mainly in West Germany. as soon

as clear from the London Declaration that there was a marked change in the basic thrust
of NATO from war-making to peace-searching.

The NATO declaration was widely acclaimed by the world leaders. Even the Soviet
leaders described it is ’realistic and constructiv c.
It met the long Standing Soviet demand that the Western Alliance should giN’e ~; L<„;:
;~itm~nt that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

asserted that ”The

International Relatlons

The commitment of NATO ’ no early first use’ of nuclear weapons greatly

met this demand.

Impact on Future Course of. International Relations

The end of cold war is bound to have far reaching impact on the
future course of international relations.

1. In the first place it would lead to the emergence of a new

kind of world which shall be free from military alliances and
adversaries. This would in turn curb the armament race
because neither of the alliance would be facing any military
or political threat. In the changed context there would be no
justification for building stocks of various types of weapons.

2. Secondlv, the enormous savings in military expenditure,

would help in
diverting these funds to development activities
in the lesser developed regions of the world and would greatly
contribute to world peace.

Thirdly, it would necessitate a new look on the role of Non-Aligned Movement. AS.A.P.
Venkateswaram, former Foreign Secretary of India observed: ”The new alignments in the
international system call for a reappraisal of the movement that once served a valuable
purpose of reinforcing the independence of the third world countries and enabled them to
take decision on merit.”
4. Fourthly, the reconciliation between USA and USSR can
facilitate amicable settlement of long-standing disputes in
Vietnam, Cambodia and Korea. In fact United States has
already initiated moves to accord diplomatic recognition to
the ruling group in Vietnam, which she had firmly ruled out
for all these years. North Lirea and South Korea have also
given significant indications regarding their willingness to
forge unity. In July 1990 North Korea announced its intention
to open its tightly sealed border with South Korea to attract
visitors and to hold discussions regarding unification of
bifurcated Korean peninsula.

5. Fifthly, End of cold war is also bound to have far reaching

impact on the foreign policy of India, and she would be
obliged to make several adjustments in her foreign policy to
meet the changed conditions. The clear bid by Soviet Union
to improve relations with the prosperous western countries is
bound to have its impact on a Indo-Soviet Union, which she
has been getting in the past. In the economic sphere, Soviet
Union’s close relations, with prosperous western countries are

489

3.

bound to operate against the i.~terests of India. Likewise in the political sphere. India
cannot hope to get the same amount of support on the Kashmir issue from Soviet Union.
6. Sixthly, The end of cold war is also bound to bring about far
reaching changes in U.S.--Pakistan relations. In the changed
context the United States to longer needs China as a second
front or Pakistan as a regional surrogate to counter Soviet
expansion. This is bound to result in great reduction in
economic and military assistance to Pakistan, and indirectly
contribute to better relations between India and USA.

7. Seventhly, it is bound to affect Soviet Union’s policy towards

the Third World. On account of the bad economic conditions
and process of decentralisation in operation in Soviet Union,
there is greater possibility of Moscow developing declarations
with the prosperous western countries and she may not be
able to make same economic-cum-military gestures towards
countries of the Third World.

8. Eightly, End of cold war is bound to provide a new

thrust to
Indo-Pakistan relations. As the two countries shall not be able
play US and Soviet Union against each other to promote their
interests on account of the understanding reached between the
two Super Powers, they shall have so conduct their relations
on realistic plane.
The Causes of the Cold War

Determining the origins of the twentieth century’s third hegemonic battle for domination
is difficult because the historical evidence is open to different interpretations.
Nonetheless, an evaluation of its postulated causes can help us to understand the sources
of great-power rivalries and.also to explain why this one, unlike other twentieth-century
conflicts, ended without recourse to great-power violence.

1. A Conflict of Interests

Realism provides one structural explanation of the Cold War’s determinations: The
preeminent status of the United States and the Soviet Union at the top of the international
hierarchy made each naturally suspicious of the other and their rivalry inescapable. These
circumstances gave each superpower reasons to fear and to struggle against the other’s
potential global leadership (Tucker 1990).

But was the competition truly necessary and predetermined? The United States and the
Soviet Union each had demonstrated an ability to subordinate its ideological differences
and competition for power to larger
purposes during World War II (caddis 1972, 1983). Neither had sought

International Relations hope 491

unilateral advantage relentlessly, while both had expressed their cooperation would
continue and had reached agreement F toward that

purpose. President Roosevelt, for example, advocated preserving accommodation through

an informal accord to let each superpower enjoy dominant influence in its own sphere of
influence, or specified area of the globe. Rules written into the United Nations charter,
obligating the United States and Soviet Union to share (through the UN Security Council)
responsibility for preserving world peace, further reflected the expectation of continued
cooperation.

If cooperation was the superpowers’ hope and aspiration when World War II ended, then
why did they fail to achieve it? To answer that question, we must go beyond the logic of
realpolitik and probe other explanations of the origins of the Cold War. .

2. Ideological Incompatibilities
A second interpretation holds that the Cold War was simply an extension of the
superpowers’ mutual disdain for each other’s political system and way of life. As U.S.
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes argued at the conclusion of World War II, -”there is
too much difference in the ideologies of the U.S. and Russia to work out
a long-term program of cooperation.” To the extent that such assumptions were widely
held in both Washington and Moscow, as they undoubtedly were, ideological differences
made the Cold War a conflict ”not only between two powerful states, but also between
two different social systems”.

U.S. animosit5 was stimulated by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, which brought to
pe;wer a government that embraced the Marxist critique of c:.pitalis~ic imperialism.
Whether re,l or imagined. U.S. fears of Marxism stimulated the emergence of ~
nticimmunism as a counter ideology (Commager 1983; Morgentbau 1983). Accordingly
the United States embarked m a missionary crusade of its own. dedicated to containing
and ultimately removing the despised atheistic communist menace from the face of the
earth.

American foreign p,rlicy wa. fueled by the fear that C01’111T1UIl1S1rl’s appeal to
Furopeans and the world’s less-fol-tur.ate countries would make its continued spread
likely. ’: his prol hecy was popularized in the 1960s as the deomino theory, the view that
one reaction like a row of falling dominoes, thus bringing the entire world under
communist domination unless checked by U.S. power

Sir.rilarly. Soviet poaicy was fueled by the belief !hat capitalism could not coexist with
comm,misn-. in the long run since the two systems were incompatible. Each was destired
to struggle b ~ pushing the pace of the historical process in which e( mmunism eventi.ally
v,otll,l prevail.

492

However, Soviet planners lid not believe that this historical outcome would automatically
occur. They felt that the capitalist states, led by tae United States, sought to encircle the
Soviet Union and smotl.er communism in its cradle, and that it was the Soviet obligation
to resist. As a result, ideological incompatibility ruled out compromise as an option.
Although the adversaries may have viewed ”ideology more as a justification for actin thar
as a guide to action,” once the interests tt.at they shared disappeared, ”ideology did
become the chief means whi;,h differentiated frienJ from foe”.

3. Misperceptions

A third explar:ation describes the Cold War as rooted :n psychological fac~ors,

particularly in the superpowers’ misperceptions of each other’s motives. Their conflicting
interests and ideologies v ere secondary.

Mistrustful actors are prone to see in their own actions only v’rtue and in those of their
adversaries only malice. When such mirror il.iages exist (in which adversaries see each
other in similar terms, as themselves as good and the ”other” as evil), hostility is
inevitable (Bronfenbrenner 1971). Moreover, when perceptions of an adversary’s evil
intentions become
accept:d as dogma, prophecies often become self-fulfilling.

Mirror images and self-fulfilling prophecies contributed heavily to the onset of ape Ccld
War. The two countries leaders imposed on eirents their definitions of really and then
became captives of those vision;. As expectations shaped how leaders interpreted
developments, what they saw influenced what they got. George F. Kerman, the American
ambassanor to the Soviet Union in 1952, noted that misread signals were common to both
sic’~_

The Ha-shall Plan, tire preparations for the setting up of a I3e.ct Grrnran government, and
the first moves toward the establishment
of NATO mere taken in ,Voscoii, as the beginnings of a canrp,rig» to deprive the Soviet
Union of the frrrits of its victory over Gerrna•av. The Soviet crackdown on
Czechoslovakia (1948) and tire mounting of the Berlin blockac%, both essentially
defensive.. ructions to these Il’ester-n stoves, were then similarly misread on J’re 61 ~
stern side. S7rortlv thereafter there came tire. crisis of t ae aoreaa War, rrher-e the Soviet
attempt to employ a satellite militcr.y force in civil combat to its ormr advantage, by vrav
of reaction to the American decision to establish a perr»arrcrrJ military presence in Japan,
ryas read in lhir.shirrgton as the heQianirrg of the final .Soviet push fir world conquest;
whereas 117c actroe American »rilitarv response, provoked by this »ni£e.

International Re%t:rns

appeared ire A,loscow... as a threat to the Soviet position in both Alanc%aoria and ire
Eastern Siberia.

Thus in the Cold War’s formative stage. U.S. leaders and their
allies in the West saw the many crises that erupted as part of a Soviet plan for world
domination. The Soviets saw these same crises altogether differently---as tests of their
resolve and as Western efforts to encircle and destroy their socialist experiment. Both
states operated from the same ”inherent bad-faith” image of the rival’s intentions. In this
respect, their
images were identical. Mistrust led to misperceptions, which in turn conflict.

Additional factors beyond those rooted in divergent interest, ideologies, and images
undoubtedly combined to produce this explosive Soviet-American hegemonic rivalry.
Scholars have yet to sort out their relative causal influence. However, to grasp more
completely the dynamics of this great-power rivalry in particular (and others in general),
it is useful to move beyond its causes and examine its character.

The Characteristics of Cold War

As the Cold War evolved over the next four decades, its character
changed in part because of the two rivals’ policies and in part because of changing global
circumstances. Several conspicuous
patterns are observable, however; amidst continual change. The history of the
superpowers’ Cold War interactions reveals three primary characteristics:

o Periods of intense conflict alternated with periods of relative

cooperations; and reciprocal, action-reaction exchanges were also
evident (friendly U.S. initiatives toward the Soviet Union were
reciprocated in kind).
o Both actors were willing to disregard their respective professed
ideologies whenever their perceived national interests rationalized
such inconsistencies; for example; each backed allies with
political systems antithetical to its own when the necessities of
power politics seemed to justify doing so.
o Throughout the Cold War contest. both rivals consistently made
avoidance of all-out war their highest prioriry. Through a gradual
learning process involving push and shove, restraint and reward,
tough bargaining and calm negotiation, the superpowers created a
security regime, or rules for the peaceful management of their
disputes.
These characteristics become visible when we inspect the
evolution of the superpowers’ relationship. For this, we divide the Cold
War into three chronological phases.

Cold War

Confrontation, 1945-1962

A brief period of wary Soviet-American friendship soon gave way t0 mutual antagonism
when the Cold War began. In this short period of unipolariy--one charcterized by a single
dominant power center in the international system--the United States alone possessed the
capacity to devastate its adversaries with the atomic bomb.

Despite this restraining factor, all pretense of collaboration rapid( vanished as the
superpowers’ vital security interests collided iu confrontations in countries outside their
clearly defined respective spheres of influence. At this critical juncture, George F.
Kerman, then a diplomat in the American embassy in Moscow, sent to Washington his
famous ”long telegram” assessing the sources of Soviet conduct. Kerman’s conclusions
were ominous: ”In summary, we have here political force committed fanatically to the
belief that with (the) U.S. there can be no permanent nrodrrs oivendi, that it is desirable
and necessary that the internal harmony of our sociey be disrupted, our traditional way of
life be destroyed, the international authority- of our state be broken , if Soviet power is to
be secure”.

Kerman’s ideas were circulated widely in 1947, when the influential journal Foreign
Affairs published his views in an article signed ”X” instead of with his own name. In this
article, Kerman argued that Soviet leaders forever would feel insecure about their
political ability to maintain power against forces both within Soviet
society and in the outside world. Their insecurity would lead to an activist--and perhaps
aggressive---Soviet foreign policy. However, the United States had the power to increase
the attains under which the Soviet leadership would have to operate, which could lead to
a gradual mellowing or final end of Soviet power. Thus. Kerman, concluded: ”In these
circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the
Soviet Union must be that of along-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of
Russian expansive tendencies”.

Soon thereafter, President Harry S Truman made Kerman’s assessment the cornerstone of
American postwar policy. Provoked in part by violence in Turkey and Greece, which he
and others believed to be communist inspired, Turman declared, ”I believe that it must be
theliolicy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Eventually known as the
Truman Doctrine, this statement defined the strategy that the United States would pursue
for the next forty year to deter the Soviet Union’s perceived hegemonic ambitions, over
Kerman’s objections. This s!!-:oe.=v. called containment. sought to prevent the
expansion. of Soviet

494

i
Intemational Relations 495

influence by encircling the Soviet Union and intimidating it with the threat of a military
attack.

A seemingly endless seri°s of new Cold War crises soon followed. They included the
Soviet refusal to withdraw troops from Iran in 19-16; the communist coup d’etat in
Czechoslovakia in 19-48; the Soviet blockaded of West Berlin in June of that year the
communist acquisition of power on the Chinese mainland in 1949; the odtbreak of the
Korean War in 1.950; the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 19 50; and the on-again, off-again,
Taiwan Straits crises that followed. The ” war” was no longer merely ”cold”, it had
become an embittered worldwide quarrel that threatened to escalate into open conflict.

Nonetheless, superpower relations began to improve in the 1950s. After the Soviet broke
the U.S. ltornlc monopoly in 1949, shifts in the balance of power prompted a movement
away from confrontation. The risks to massive destruction necessitated restraint a^d
changed the terms of the struggle. In particular, both siperpewers began to expend
considerable resources recruiting allies. Their s,lccess produced a distribution of
1111litar,-power charactrized by bipolarity, with the United States and its allies at one
pole and the Soviet Union and its allies at the other.

The focal point of the superpo•xers’ jockeying for influence was Europe, where the Cold
War first
enpted. The principal European allies of the United States and the Soviet Union divided
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and t’le Warsaw Treaty Pact,
respectively. These alliances became the cornerstones of the superpowers’ external
policies, as the European members o: each alliance willingly yielded to tile leadership of
its superpower patrons.

To a lesser extent, alliance formation outside of Europe involved other states in the two
titans’ contest. The United States in particular sought to contain Soviet (and Chinese)
influence on the Eurasian landmass by building a ring of allies, including countries not
only in Europe such as Turkey and Greece, but beyond in Iran and South Korea, on the
very borders of the communist world. In return, the United States promised to protect
these new client states from external attack in a strategy known as extended deterrence.
Thus the Cold War expanded across the entire globe.

In the rigid two-bloc system of the 1950s the superpowers often talked as if war were
imminent, but they both acted cautiously, (especially after the Korean War). President
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State. John Foster Dulles, pursued,a strategy termed
”rollback,” which promised to move what was called the ”Iran Curtain” separating East
and West by ”liberating” the ”captive nations” of Eastern Europe. They pledged to
respond to aggression -,with ”massive retaliation,” and criticized the allegedly ”~ ~!’~” -
a’ ”restrained” Truman Doctrine, claiming to reject

Cold War

containment in f-

496
vor of an ambitious ”winning” strategy that would finally
-- ---- _ „ nation with godless communism. However,
containment
was not replaced by a more assertive strategy. Despite their threatening
language, U.S. leaders promised more then they delivered. In 19:6, for
instance the United States failed to respond to a call for assistanc:; from
Hungarian freedom fighters, who had revolted against Soviet control with
armed resistance.

Because the Soviet Union remained strategically inferior to the United States, Nikita
Khrushchev (who assumed the top Soviet leadership position following Joseph Stalin’s
death in 1953) pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalism. (Communist
China, protested, accusing Khrushchev of ”revisionism” and challenging the Soviet claim
to leadership of the international communist movement). Nonetheless, the Soviet Union
at times cautiously sought to increase its power inplaces

where opportunities appeared to exist. As a result, the period following Stalin’s death saw
many Cold War confrontations. with Hungary, Cuba,
Egypt, and Berlin becoming the flash points.
Despite the intensity
and regularity of U.S.--Soviet confrontations, no threat to peace resulted in open warfare
as both superpowers tool: accommodative steps toward improving relations. For example,
the 19-)Geneva summit provided an important for the antagonists meaningful

dialogue about world problems, and in 1956 the Soviets dissolved the Coninfornr (the
Communist Information Bureau, which coordinated the work of communist parties in
other states).

From Coexistence to Detente, 1963-1978

Despite the Geneva conference a dark shadow loomed over hopes for a superpower
rapprochement. As the arms race accelerated, the threats to peace multiplied. In 1962 the
surreptitious placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba set the stage for the greatest test of the
superpowers’ capacity to manager their disputes--the Cuban missile crisis, which became
the Cold War’s most serious challenge to peace. The superpowers stood eyeball to
eyeball. Fortunately, one the (the Soviet Union) blinked, and the crisis ended. This
”catalytic” learning experience both reduced enthusiasm for waging the Cold War by
military means and expanded awareness of the suicidal consequences of a nuclear war.

The growing threat of mutual destruction, in conjunction with the growing parity of
American and Soviet military capabilities, made

coexistence or nonexistence appear to be the only alternatives. Given this equation,

finding ways to coexist became compelling. At the American University- commencement
exercises in 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy explained why tension reduction had
become essential end war could not be risked:

International Relations

Among the many traits the people of (the United States and the Soviet Union) have in
common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the
major world powers. we have never been at war with each other ....

Today, should total war ever break out again--no matter how--cur two countries would
become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest
powers are the two in the most danger of devastation... We are both caught up in a
vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other
and new weapons beget counter weapons.

In- short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a
mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race ....

So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common
interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. Arid if we cannot
end now our differences, at least we can help
make the world safe for diversity.

Kennedy signaled a shift in how the United States hoped thereafter to bargain with its
adversary, and the Soviet Union reciprocally expressed its interest in more cooperative
relations. Installation in 1963 of the ”hot li,.e”. a direct communication system linking the
White House and the Kremlin, followed. So did the 1967 Glassboro summit and several
negotiated agreements, including the 1963 Partial Test Bain Treaty, the 1967 Outer
Spa.ce Treaty, and the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treat’. In addition, the
superpowers agreed to accept the permanence of European borders, including tacitly
those that divided Germany. Thus, in style and tone the United States and Soviet Union
began to depart from past confrontatiot,al tactics, laying the foundation for ”detente.”

Soviet-American relations took a dramatic turn with Richard Nixon’s electioia in 1968.
Coached by his national security adviser, Henr`-A. Kissinger, Pt;sident Nixon initiated a
new approach to Soviet relations that in 1969 he officially labeled detente. The Soviets
also adopted this term to describe ti:eir policies toward the United States.

In Kissinger’s words, detente sought to create ”a vested interest m

cooperation and restraint”, ”an environment in which competitors can regulate and
restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.” To
engineer the relaxation of superpower tensions, Nixon and Kissinger pursued a linkage
strategy to bind the tw rivals in a common fate by making peaceful superpower relations
dependent on the continuation of mutually rewarding exchanges (such as

Cold War

498
trade concessions). Furthermore. linkage made cooperation in one policy area contingent
on acceptable conduct in other areas.

The shifts in policy produced results. as relations between the Soviet and Americans
”normalised.” Visits. cultural exchanges. trade agreements. and joint technological
ventures replaced threats. warnings. and confrontations.

Arms control stood at the center of the dialogue surrounding detente. The Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT). initiated in 1969. sought to restrain the threatening. expensive
and spiraling arms race. The talks produced two agreements. the first in 1972 (SALT I)
and the second in 1979 (SALT II); however. SALT II was signed but never ratified by the
United States, due to opposition in Congress. This failure underscored the substantial
differences that still separated the superpowers.

From Renewed Confrontation to Rapprochement, 1979-1991

Despite the careful nurturing of detente, its spirit did not endure. In many respects. the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 catalyzed detente
’s demise. As President Jimn tv Carter viewed it. ”Soviet aggression in Afghanistan---
unless checked---confronts all the world with the most serious strategic challenge since
the Cold War began.” In retaliation. he advanced the Carter Doctrine declaring America’s
willingness to use militaw force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf In addition. he
attempted to organize a worldwide boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and suspended
U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union.

Relations deteriorated dramaticalh thereafter. President Ronald Reagan and his soviet
counterparts (first Yuri Andropov and then Konstantin Chernenko) delivered a barrage of
confrontational rhetoric. Reagan asserted that the Soviet Union ”underlies all the unrest
that is going on” and described the Soviet Union as ”the focus of coil in the modern
world.” The atmosphere was punctuated b _v Reagan policy advisor Richard Pipes’s bold
challenge in 1981 shat the Soviets would have to choose between ”peacefully changing
their Communist system .... or goi~..
to war.” Soviet rhetoric was equally unrestrained and alarmist.

As talk of war increased. preparations, for it escalated as well. The arms race resumed
feverishly. and the contestants out weapons above all other priorities, at the expense of
addressing domestic econornic problems. The superpowers also extended the
confrontation to new territon-, such as Central America. and renewed their public
diplomacy (propaganda) efforts to extol the virtues of their respective systems throughout
the world.

Dangerous events punctuated the renewal of conflict. The Soviet destroyed Korean
Airlines flight 007 in 1983; !he United States invaded

International Relations 499

Grenada soon thereafter. Arms control talks then ruptured, the Soviets boycotted the
198.1 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, and the RR eagan Doctrine pledged U.S. support
of anticommunist insurgents who sought to overthrow Soviet-supported governments in
Afghanistan. Angola, and Nicaragua. In addition. American, leaders spoke loosely about
the wvinabilin” of a nuclear war through a ”prevailing” militay strategy that included the
threat of a ”first use” of nuclear weapons in the event of conventional war. Relations
deteriorated as the compound impact of these moves and countermoves took their toll.
The new Soviet leader. Mikhail Gorbachev. in 198 summarized the alarming slate of
superpower relations by fretting that ”The situation is yew complex, yew tense. 1 would
even go so far as to say it is explosive.”

However, the situation did not explode. Instead. prospects for a more constructive phase
improved greatly following Gorbachev’~s view that it was vital the Soviet Union practice
what he referred to as ”new thinking” in order to achieve a rapprochement or relaxation
of tensions. He sought to reconcile the Soviet Union’s differences with the capitalist West
in order to halt the deterioration of his country’s economy and international position. In
Gorbachev’s words. these goals dictated ”the need for a fundamental break with many
customary approaches to foreign policy.” Shortly thereafter, he embarked on domestic
reforms to promote democratization and the transition to a market economy. .

Acknowledging that Soviet economic grOw2h had ceased and its global power had
eroded, Gorbachev proclaimed his desire to end the Cold War contest. ”We realize .that
we are divided by profound historical. ideological, socio-economic. and cultural
differences.” he noted in 1987 during his first v isit to the United States. ”But the wisdom
of politics today lies in not using those differences as a pretext for confrontation. enmity.
and the arms race.” Soviet spokesperson Gcorgi Arbatov elaborated. informing the
United States that ”we arc going to do a terrible thing to vpu--we are going to deprive
you of an enenlv.”

Surprisingly. the Soviets did what the\, ,promised: They began to act like an ally instead
of in cllem_v. Building on the momentum .Created by the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (INF) disarmament agreement. sighed in 1987. the Soviet Union agreed to end its
aid and’ support for Cuba. withdrew from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and
announced unilateral reductions in nlilitan spending. Gorbachev also agreed to W o new
4isarnlament agreements. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) for deep cuts in
strategic arsenals. and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to reduce the
Soviet presence in Europe. In addition. the Soviet Union liberalised its emigration
policies and permitted greater religious freeduul As these seismic changes shook the
world. the Soviet

500 Union then sped its reforms to introduce democracy and a market

economy, eagerly seeking (and receiving) economic assistance from the West.

The pace of steps to rapprochement--the establishment of cordial relations--than

accelerated. and the ”normalization” of Soviet-American relation moved rapidly. The
Cold War--which began in Europe and had centered on Europe for forty-five years--
ended there in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved. All communist governments in
the Soviet ”bloc” in Eastern Europe, including even hardline Albania, permitted
democratic elections in which Communist Party candidates routinely lost. In all
instances, capitalist free market principles replaced socialism. To nearly evcyone’s
astonishment. the Soviet Union acquiesced ill these revoiutionary
changes. Without resistance. the Berlin Wall came down. Germany reunited. and the
Warsaw Pact dissolved.

The failed consewative coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 put the nail ill the coffin
of Communist Party control in Moscow. the very

heartland of the international communist movement. As communism mss repudiated in

the Soviet Union, a new age began. Communism was in retreat. and as a result massive
changes swept world politics.

The abrupt end of the Cold War suggested something quite different from the lesson of
the two World Wars. that great-power rivalries are doomed to end in armed conflict. The
Cold War was different: it came

to au end peacefully. This suggests that great powers are capable of settling their
struggles without bloodshed. and that it is sometimes possible for them to manage their
competition and resolve their disputes.

The Consequences of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War has altered the face of world affairs in profound and diverse
ways. It held out the promise of international peace but. at the same time, raised the
spector of new kinds of global instability.
As George Bush lamented in November 1991. ”The collapse of communism has thrown
open a Pandora’s box of ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment. even revenge.”

One consequence warrants particular attention: What does Russia’s decline (and the
rising popularity of Communist Party politician’s) bode for the future’? Call we expect
another fifty years of great-

power peace’? Or will the transformed balance of power be a prelude to . another great-
power rivalry. and possibly war?

In the long run. Russia could again emerge as a superpower if it overcomes its long-
neglected domestic problems. Lying in the heartland of Eurasia. a bridge between Europe
and the Pacific Rini. with China and India to the south. Russia stands militarily tall--
although it is ringed by

International Relations

501 -----------------
emerging great-power rivals. However. the immediate consequence of the Cold Wars end
is a transformed global hierarchy in which the former Soviet Union is no longer a
challenger to U.S. hegemonic leadership, In accepting the devolution of its.

Post-Cold War Scenarios

The peaceful end of the Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. On the contrart. the
insights of long-cycle and realist theories predict pessimistically that prevailing trends in
the diffusion of economic power will lead to renewed competition. conflict, and perhaps
even warfare among the great powers, and that the range of new problems and potential
threats will multiply. As political scientist Robert Jewis explains.

Cyclical thinking suggests that, freed from the constraints of

the Cold War world politics will return to earlier patterns. Many of the basic
generalisations of international politics remain unaltered: It is still anarchic in the sense
flat( there is no international sovereign that can stake and enforce laws and agreements.
The security dilemma remains as well. with the problems it creates for slates who would
like to cooperate but whose security requirements do not mesh. Many specific causes of
conflict also remain, including desires for greater prestige. economic rivalries. hostile
nationalisms, divergent perspectives oft and incompatible standards of legitimacy.
religious animosities. and territorial ambitions. To put it more generally. both aggression
and spirals of insecurity_ and tension can still disturb the peace.

To realists, great-power rivalry for power and position is likely to resume because the
international anarchy that promotes it continues to shape the international conduct of
states. Realists also foresee probable instability resulting front the changes unfolding in
the international systems structure if U.S. hegemoni~ preponderance continues to decay.
As rivals rise to challenge U.S. leadership. a new structure will emerge.

A Twenty-First-Century Multipolar World

While the distribution of power in the Cold War system was bipolar. the post-Cold War
world promises to be vcn different. Russia’s demise produced a new unipolar structure.
fleeting thought it may be. In early 1991. when it victoriously fought ’the Persian Gulf
War. the United States basked in a ”unipolar moment.” It was the ’one first-rate power
(with) no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it [It
wash the only counts with the militan. diplomatic. political ,std cconontic
assets to be a decisive player in am conflict in whatever part of the world It
[chose to involve itself’ (Krauthanumr 1991 b;

502

This condition is not likely to last into the next millennium, however. Shoves, the long-
term trajectories of histow unmistakably point to the coming of a world in which China.
and perhaps other great powers. AN-ill rapidly rise to challenge U.S. financial
prominence and political clout. even if U.S. military supremacy remains unchallenged in
the short nut. China. Japan, and others are growing in economic power relative to the
United States. and this suggests that the pecking order of the worlds countries is likely to
look yen’ different by the year 2020 than it does now. We call such a future world
multipolar in order to contrast it with situations where either one (unipolar) or two
(bipolar) countries possess ovemhelming power.

The Challenge of Multipolarity

The character
of a new multipolar structure may be very different from the stability that characterized
the unipolar and bipolar phases of international politics since World War II. In part this is
because the emergence of a number of comparatively equal great powers will introduce
more complexity and uncertainty about allegiances and alignments. This nay also be the
case because ”intentptional security issues w ill exhibit themselves in all their variety
once again--issues .of markets. resources. technology. ethnic animosities. political
pllilosoph\. and different conceptions of world order. as well as armies and nuclear
\\capons. The multipolar global agenda will encompass continuing concerns with ntilitay
security--the focus of realism--alongside mounting concerns about the great powers’
economic relations. the topic on which liberal international relations theory concentrates.

Many theorists point out the dangers inherent in nulltipolar

distributions of power. Their earnings arc inspired by the historical record.
which suggests that if we look to the past to anticipate the future. we have
ntanv reasons to fear the reemergence of this kind of sv stem Tocl,w~s hopes
for great-power cooperation in tile wake of the Cold War have ’utatSv
precedents. The end of every previous great-power war was folhowcdan
initial-hopeful burst of collaborati\ c institution building to Cbry~o a stable,
new order among the victorious powers., But each of tlt4sc great-powLr
designs. constructed at the conclusions of-;r’niultipolar pcriods~s war.
ultimately proved temporary. Precedents include the t’cme of Westpltali,t
( IG-18). the Treats’ of Utrecht (1 713). the Concert ,n Luropc t 1 X 1 15). tile
League of Nations (1919).:and the United Na~tiolis (1’)4s) Jr. -Al. C’T’S’C. as
the new distribution ’of.power uitdcrnent changes in tln .grew- :~wcr,
relative strength. collaboration g<ivc wtN to cc~pupetitioott,i or t :;cr. c\ cry previous
murtipolar system .collapsed. as one ar more of 114c m;yur powers expressed
dissatisfaction with the. existing l.t*rychv. rejected the rules on which they had agreed to
manage tlieir relations: and attempted by

International Relations

force to overturn the status duo. Rivalry has routinely resulted in hegemonic struggle for
supermacv ending in a new catastrophic general war, each more destructive than the
preceding one. This invites the sobering conclusion that

in a world of sovereign states a contest among them over the distribution of power is the
normal condition and .... such contests often lead to war .... The reasons for seeking more
power are often not merely the search for security or., material advantage. Among them
are demands for greater presige,
respect, deference, in short, honor. Since such demands involve judgements even more
subjective than those about- material advantage, they, are still harder to satisfy. Other
reasons emerge from fear. often unclear and intangible, not always of immediate threats
but also of more distant ones, against which reassurance may not be possible. The
persistence of such thinking in a wide variety, of states and systems over the space of
millennia suggests the unwelcome conclusion that war is probably part of the human
condition and likely to be with us for some time S-et.

Multipolar politics looks especially menacing when Awe take into account the interplay,
of military, and economic factors in the perceived rankings of the great powers. In a new
multipolar environment, without the stark simplicities and the self-evident symmetries of
a bipolar system, any-effort to maintain partnership is likely to prove problematic. In
such a system, differentiating friend from foe will be more difficult because .1ll.ies -in
mllitarl’ security, are likely to be rivals in trade relationship. ’In Lester Thurow’s (1992)
apt phrase. the United States: Europe. and Japan are likely, to go ”head to head” on the
economic battlefield. In this arena we can expect China and perhaps a re~isceirdanl
.Itassia.’ India. and Indonesia to join the fraN The U.S.--Japan and U.S.--- China disputes
in the mid-1960s about security issues at the very time they Nverc alsb” arguing about
”fair trade” illustrate the tensions that can easily escalate between powers at the pinnacle
of the global hierarchy.

The diffusion of wealth predicts the likely intensification of great-power political

competition. Throughout history. changes in comparative tcononric advance have
preceded Political competition. When multipolaritv has existed. economic rivals ha\c
struggled to protect their wealth and have competed politically for econoanic position.
with militar. conflict usually following.

A ”new Cold War” could emerge between any pair of great Powers. such as the United
States and China. if their competition escalates. HONNever. this need not always be the
case: cooperation could increase as

_Cold War

well. Quite different and inconsistent political n-pes of great-power relations could
immerge in the economic and military spheres. The probability, of economic cooperation
for many of these same relationships is also high. For example. the United States. Japan.
and China exhibit conflict in their commercial relations but also have shown a capacity to
manage their security relations collaboratively. It presents a projection of the kind of
cross-cutting bilateral relationship that could
develop among the great powers in the next century. It estimates the probability of
militay cooperation and economic conflict between any pair of five major powers. The
potential for economic conflict is given in the upper right-hand portion of the diagonal
and the potential for military. cooperation through alliances in the lower left portion.

Awareness of these different possibilities may have been behind U.S. Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger’s warning in 1989.

We are.... returning to a more traditional and complicated time of multipolariy, with a

growing number of countries increasingly able to affect the course of events despite the
wishes of the superpowers .... The issue ....is how well the United States accomplishes the
transition from over<vhelming predominance to a position more akin to a frost among
equals status, and how well America’s partners--Japan and Western Europe--adapt to
their neWound importance. The change ill not be easy, for any, of the players, as such
shifts in power relationship have never been easy.

Few observes see advantages resulting from the situation that former U.S. Secretary of
State Hen-\.,, A. Kissinger described in 1996: ”for diplomatic -purposes there are no
longer two superpowers, but fire or six more or less equal power centers... The United
States is militarily the strongest, but the circumstances in .N-hich its militar,’ power is
relevant are diminishing.” This. Kissinger summarized. poses a serious challenge because
”the United States has very little experience with a world that consists of many powers
and which it can neither dominant nor from which it can simply withdraw in isolation.”

Yet. we have no way, of knowing whether the fiit,ire will resemble the gloomy past
history of multipolar systems. Patterns and practices can change, and it is possible for
policymakers to lean: from previous mistake and avoid repeating them.

Responding to Multipoiarity’s Challenge

What, then. eau the great pomers do to prevent the resumption of their riyalr<’? What
security policies should they pursue in order to avoid

504

lnternatio a/ Relations

505

the dangers of shared power and rapid transitions in their position and strength in the
great-power hierai,:hv ’

The answers are highly uncertain. As ;ve will discuss, debate about the methods of
guaranteeing international security in Washington, Moscow. Berlin. Beijing, and Tokyo
today revolves around four basic options. Each is actively under consideration, and each
will become more or less practical, prudent. or problematic for each great power
depending on the circumstances that materialize in tomorrow’s multipolar world.

A
unilateral conception. of a great-powers role represents one possible option. Acting alone
is especially attractive for a self-confident great power assured of its independent
strength. With Sufficient power, a potential hegemony can be self-reliant. UnilateraGsm
can involve isolationism, an attempt to exert llegcmonci leadership, or an effort to play
the role of a ”balancer” who skillfully backs one side or another in a great-power dispute.
belt only when necessan to maintain a military equilibrium between the disputants.

Cultivation of a specialized relationship with another great power. similar to that between
Great Britain and the United States in this century. illustrates a second approach some
great powers might pursue. The ”condominium” partnership bet;veen the United States
and Russia advocated by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Fred Charles Me
(1991-1992) suggests the kind of relationships that could develop. There are several
variants of this strategy. including informal understandings. cooperations (sometimes
termed ententes). and formal alliances concretized by treaties.

A third strategy udder consideration is construction of a concern. or a cooperative

agreement among the great powers to manage the international system jointly and to
prevent international disputes from escalating to war. The Concert of Europe. at its apex
bet -eon 181 > and 1822. is the epitomic of previous great-power efforts to pursue this
path to peace.

Finally. some policymakers recommend shat todav~s great powers unite with the lesser
powers in constructing a true system of collective security. The principles rationalizing
the. formation of the League of Nations in 1910 exemplify this multilateral approach to
peace under conditions of multipolarity.

Whichever combination of approaches predominates in the strategies forged to prevent

great-power rivalries from escalating to war in a multipolar future, the ultimate outcome
will not depend on the treat powers alone. The policy response of other, less-powerful
actors is likely to

Cold War

50o

be increasingly important in shaping ;world politics, and their role meet also be
examined. We begin in Chapter s with a consideration of the history and characteristics
of those stales at the bottom of the international system’s hierarchy. the Global South.
and of the foreign policy interests and. goals that motivate their behavior.

CHAPTER ~6

FASCISM AND NAZISM

Political Conditions in Italy

The first few decades of the twentieth century, particularly the years that followed the
defeat of Germany in the First World War, had witnessed important developments such
as the Treaty of Versailles, continuation
of the age-old rivalry between France and Germany, emergence of the first communist
state ’and the Economic Depression of the 1930s. These developments were of historic
importance and they directly or indirectly, were responsible for the rise of Fascism in
Italy and Nazism in Germany. Fascism and Nazism in turn were primarily- responsible
for the Second World War. In Europe, Italy was the first country where a Fascist state
was established in 1922. The Nazis cane into power in Germany in 1933.

The geographic position and natural environment of Italy has greatly influenced its
international and external policies. Geographically it is in the southern part of Europe.
Italy’s mainland is a narrwv peninsula and the distance from the seacoast is not more than
seventy-five miles. It is so situated that it can easily be subjected to blockade or attack
from sea. That is why Italy is described as the ”prisoner of the Mediterranean”. If the
Mediterranean was controlled by an enemy. Italy had no choice but to go to wars. This
was the reason behind Italy’s ambition to become a Mediterranean power and establish
its supremacy to safeguard its commercial and maritime interests.

Italy’s growing population necessitated migration to other countries. But countries like
Britain and the USA had enacted legislation to control immigration. The Fascist policy of
increasing the population and

Fascism and Nazism 508

the measures taken by other countries to stop immigration also led to a
policy of conquest and expansion by Italy.
Different views are expressed about the conditions in Italy after the First World War.
Those who supported the Fascist revolution argued that there was terrible confusion in
the political. social and economic life of Italy. The Versailles Peace Treat’ had
disappointed the Italians since it could not obtain any share in the German overseas
territories which the other Allied powers had secured. The economic structure had
collapsed due to war and there was scarcity of natural resources. It was argued by the
supporters of Fascism that Italy. under such terrible conditions. was really saved by the
Fascist revolution. It was said that the Fascist revolution had popular support since it had
originated in the ”aspiration of all classes of society for peace and permanence”.

A different argument is put forward by those who oppose this view-viewpoint. It is

argued that, like other European countries which were

involved in the war, Italy also suffered terrible losses from riots. strikes and disorders and
there was nothing special about the Italian situation. In fact. the economic condition of
Italy after the war, i.e., between the
years 1919 and 1922, had improved considerably. So they dispute the contention that the
post-war conditions alone were responsible for the rise of Fascism in Italy.

Not with standing the short-lived post-wars economic prosperity,

the economic conditions Ill Italy were not satisfactoy and there existed considerable
unemployment. This resulted in strengthening the revolutionary movements, especially in
increasing the influence of the Communist party. There were strikes, lockouts and closure
of industrial establishments. At the political level, the government was not able to save
the situation as there existed chaos and corruption, loss of faith in the

parliamentary institutions due to administrative inefficiency and disorder. Such a

situation alarmed the middle-classes and the well-to-do, who were haunted by the specter
of Bolshevism. The success of the Russian revolution was another. factor in making them
suspicious about the intentions of the communists at home.

The Treaty of Versailles too had disappointed the Italians. Italy

had joined the Allies after the secret treat’ of London of 191. The Allies had agreed to
give Italy certain areas like Eritrea and Trieste and later backed out. This gave a
justification to Italy’s grievance against the Allies.

The militan leaders in Italy were disappointed as the Octon had not benefited their
country_ in any way. The conditions and circumstances that e,.imtcdv..in Itch were
highly conducive to the rise of fascist dictatorship iviiderL~Bentio Mussolini. From 1922
to 19-43 the Fascist party. under the dictatorship of Mussolini gave the nation the
appearance of being totally

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509

coNcrcd to the Fascist ideology. though in reality a small minoriy of conformed Fascists-
20.000.000. strong-alone were active while the nryoritv of people simply submitted by
accepting the new regime.

The forces that were released in Italy after World War I were socialism and nationalism.
These (No forces were particularly more prominent in Italy than in any outer country in
Europe. We have already referred to the disappointment of Italy in not getting any
significant al;trc in the spoils of victory. viz.,, territories compared to England and Franm.
The Italians felt that they were like the poor relatives among the rich western allies. This
resulted in discrediting the parliamentary government in Italy. This resulted in
discrediting the parliamentary government in Italy. From 192() onwards. Prime Minister
Giolitti’s government began to be increasingly discredited fox its inability to solve the
mounting post-war socio-economic problems. Both the Nationalist and the
Socialist parties in Italy were fighting against each other amidst an atmosphere of
violence and rebellion. The parliamentary government under Giolitti appeared to be
ineffective and helpless. While Italy was passing through a critical period there appeared
on the national scene a ’prophet’.-Mussolini, who promised to reconcile the seemingly
conflicting forces of socialism and nationalism. He formed a new political party after the
wars, called Fascist, which suggested a happy union of nationalism and socialism. The
name Fascist was derived from the Italians word fascio which literally meant `bundle and
figuratively a bundle of rods and an axe, a symbol of imperial authority in ancient Rome.
The party had these as a symbol for the party flag. To the Italians `Fascist’ suggested
national unity and strength.

Mussolini who had formed his party in 1919, proved himself to be a shrewder politician
than the veteran Prime Minister, Giolitti. Mussolini claimed that the post-war labour
unrest and discontent in Italy were leading the countw towards communism and his party.
Fascist, alone could save the society from the danger of communism. He argued that the
weak government of Giolitti was incapable of containing the Communist threat. The
Fascist activities, the Black Shirts. so called because of their dress. opened a violent
campaign against the Socialists and the Communists. In 1921 the coalition government of
Giolitti was defeated. In the elections that took place in November 1921. the Fascists
gained thirty-five seats ill the Chamber of Deputies. In October, 1922. the Fascists felt
strong enough to attempt the overthrow of the government by force. Mussolini
announced his famous ’March on Rome’ which began on 28th October. 1922.
Meanwhile. the government decided to dealer martial law. But the king. Victor
Emmanuel III. refused to sign the declaration. Instead. on 29 October. 1922. the king
invited Mussolini to form the government.

Fascism and Nazism

Mussolini accepted the imitation and agreed to form a coaliticn government. His
government was approved by the Chamber of De1mUl:s h. a vote of >06 to 116. The
Italians also gave their approval to the wfas;ist revolution’ and expected a firm and strong
government as was promised From the beginning however. the Fascist state was based on
force. ’The ’Black Shirts’ subjected their opponents to brutal persecution. The Opposition
was not allowed to function. A socialist deputy. Matteotti was murdered for his
denunciation of Fascism.

Mussolini has often expressed his contempt for parliamentary methods. He proclaimed
himself as the head of the government leaving Victor Emmanuel to his throne.
Italians were forced to accept the dominance of the Fascist party through an election law
which stated that the party that led in the elections would be allotted two-thirds of the
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In this manner the obedience of the Chamber of
Deputies to the Fascist partwvas manipulated. Mussolini not only virtually suspended but
paralysed the parliamentary system of government in the country.

Not being content with paralysing the parliameutan system. he destroyed the
independence of the Council of Ministers by creating a stew policy-making organ known
as the Grand Council of some thirty members.
This Grand Council was the real organ of state power and directly responsible to
Mussolini. its chairman. The state, thus. assumed dictatorial
powers. The fascists were in power from 1922 omva’rds. Mussolini joined Hitler and
entered the war in 1940. Italy was, however. defeated in 19-1
and Mussolini’s regime was overthrown.

Territorial Expansion

Though Italy had entered the First World War with the objective of gaining territories, it
was totally disappointed. A feeling existed among the Italians that though Italy had won
the war. it had lost the peace. The disappointments and frustrations of the Italians were
fully exploited by Mussolini. He succeeded not only in uniting the people under his
leadership but also in increasing his personal hold over Italy. The people had a feeling
that their high ambitions which could not be achieved under a democratic Italy would be
realised under fascist Italy. Although Mussolini had not contemplated any changes in
Italy’s foreign relations. on assuming power in 1932. Mussolini decided to change the
weak foreign policy of the previous government and make Italy a world power.

The Chief objective of Mussolini’s foreign policy was territorial expansion. Increase in
population within the county was a reason -oo,i enough for territorial expansion and
establishment of colonies. Italy .il,~, needed raw materials for its industrial development.
Peace trcatic, wc.,c 1 of compatible with territorial expansion. Hence Italy had to rev i,;v,
h:•

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ill

relations with France, England, Germany and the Soviet Union. realise hc~’policy of
territorial expansion Italy adopted the policy of setting England against France: England
and France against Germany; England, France and Germany against the Soviet Union.
Thus, through a systematic policy of dividing the major European powers and through
invasion and conquest, Mussolini succeeded in expanding Italian territories.

Italy and Greece

Soon after the First World War Italy was compelled to transfer Dodecanese Islands to
Greece. But by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Italy’s claim over these islands was
recognised. Italy had a strong Naval base in this whereby its position in East
Mediterranean improved considerably. During the same period. because of other disputes
between Italy and Greece, the Italian army bombed the island of Corfu. The matter was
taken to the League of Nations by Greece without any success. This event however raised
the prestige of Mussolini at home.

Italy and France

The relations between Italy and France had gone sour. They represented two different
systems of ideologies, fascist and democratic. Relations between these two countries
worsened when France gave shelter to anti-fascists elements. Fascist Italy had claimed
French territories of Corsica and Nice. Italy had also demanded the strategic port of
Tangier. Besides rivalry on the Mediterranean region. these two were vying for
supremacy in south-east Europe. In the Anglo-French rivalries. Italy chose. for apparent
reasons. to support with France seemed to improve but this was only for a brief period.
Very soon Italian French relations deteriorated as France did not oppose the resolution of
the League of Nations branding Italy as an `aggressor’ after its attack on Abyssinia. With
the formation of the Axis between Italy and Germany. Franco-Italian relations further
worsened.

Italy and Yugoslavia

Yugoslav ia’s enmity towards Italy was the most persistent between the two World Wars.
The Yugoslav territory of Fume was essential for Italy’s territorial and commercial
expansion in the Balkan region. Italy promptly occupied Fume and the Treaty of Rapallo
recognised Fume as a part of Italy. However the quarrels between these two countries
remained unresolved and their relations deteriorated further with the rise of Hitler. As a
result of the policies pursued by Mussolini. Italy’s supremacy in the Adriatic and south-
east Europe was recognised.

Italy and Albania

Albania was greatly helped in its development by Italy. A rebellion in Albania resulted in
a treaty knowoi as the Treaty of Tirana.

Fascism and Nazism

between Italy and Albania in 1928. This treat’ entitled Italy to interfere in
the domestic and foreign affairs of Albania. Yugoslavia had reason to be
alarmed as the treat, \, was a threat to its interests. After 1932. when anti-
Italian feelings increased in Albania. Italy did not hesitate to occupy it in
19_39.

Italy and Abyssinia

Italian interest in Abyssinia was both strategic and economic. Abyssinia’s rich mineral
resources and as a link to Italy’s African possessions such as Somali land, were too
tempting to resist. Mussolini attacked Abyssinia at the most appropriate
time. The League of Nations and the great powers had failed to take any action on Japan
for its aggression on Manchuria. Mussolini- therefore. concluded that in spite of the
principle of collective security no one would stop him in his conquest of Abyssinia.
Further the European countries in particular and the world in general was already
preoccupied with the consequences of the economic depression. Moreover. the rise of
Hitler and his aggressive policies were considerably alarming to Europe. In these
circumstances flue European statesmen regarded Italy to be a lesser evil and also a
bulwark against the advancing tide of communism. The European democracies saw no
threat to their existence as Fascist Italy would fight communism. Strangely, they saw no
threat from Fascism itself. Thus. when in October 1936. the Italian troops crossed into
.Abyssinian borders and in May 1936, the Italian king was proclaimed the Emperor of
Abyssinia. the League of Nations failed to take any collective action against Italy even
though the conquest of Abyssinia was a flagrant violation of the Covenant of the League.
In any event, the League was a defunct body after 19.66. The Italian action emboldened
Germany to conquer Austria and thereby alter dramatically the balance of power in
Europe.

Italy and the Spanish Civil War, .1936

When the Spanish Civil Wars broke out in 1936. Mussolini decided to give military
assistance to General Franco and recognise his government despite Soviet opposition.
The idea behind the help to General Franco was to check Russian influence as well as to
increase the Italian influence in the western Mediterranean through friendly Spain.

The civil war in Spain caused awietj- in Europe. The conflict between the republican
forces and the milital\ led by General Franco became a struggle bemcen democracy and
faSCISIII. Many pcoplr. iutcllectual and artists in Europe openly supported the
republican forks. Yet a large number of states decided to remain neutral and accordinszlv
entered into non-Illtetl’CIII1011 agl’eC111ellIS and thus promised lot to llclp am of the
parties in tile civil War. Mcamvhilc Hitler’s recognition ~~f Italian sovereignty over
Abyssinia and Franco’s government iu Sp;liu lead

5I2

International Relations

brought Mussolini and Hitler closer and so leas formed the Berlin~onle nxk. 111 1936.
the Anti-Colnintern pact was signed bemeen Germany and Jap;in. 111 1937, Italy joined
the pact and thus the Berl in-Ronle-Tokyo axis canlc into existence. Hitler described the
’axis as a great world political triangle. Japan’s expulsion from the League of Nations
following its attack oil Manchuria
and the Japanese resentment of western democracies brought Japan closer to Germany
and Italy. The prc;nnble to the Anti-Comintern pact stated that Japan and Go-nlarN ^.crc
Aware of tile aims of the Communist International, the Condntcrn. The activities of tile
Comintern were deemed destructive of international peace and a threat to existing states.
The Anti-Colnintern Pact had therefore enable Italy, Gerlnanv and Japan to forge a united
front against Conlnlunisnl.

Besides the anti-Conlnltrnist positions taken bN Italy. every attempt was made to
strengthen further the bond between Italy and Gerrllany. In 1939 Italy signed a steel pact
with Germany. Through this pact both the countries agreed to promote their common
interests and secure peace in Europe. 111 1940_ that is. after tile outbreak of war in
Europe in 1939. Japan signed a ten-years treaty of cooperation with Germany and Japan.
agreed to recognise and. respect each others leadership.

Thus Fascist Italy. through its policy of expansion and conquest had no the one ]land.
threatened or destro\ed tile existence of small nations and oil the other hand, rendered
illcffcctive the League of Nations as a custodian of international peace. The police of
European democracies. England and France, towards Italian expansionism. N\as
evidently short-sighted. The countries believed that Italy «-ould be a bnhNark against
communism and as such they should not bother about Nxllat Italy did to smaller nations.
Such a polic. of appcasenlent enabled Italy to gro\N- in strength, disregarding
international public opinion. The Axis polvers. Germany Italy and Japan joined hands
under tile pretext of anti-coninninisin. and lndlvldll,lllN each folloNyed a policN of
conquest le<lding finally to the Second World War.

Fascist Doctrine and Its Impact

The chief exponent of the fascist doctrine leas Giovanni Gentile (1875-19.14). a disciple
of Hegel and a great admirer of Benito Mussolini. His ails was to unify ”the infinite
variclv of mall arid nature in <ln absolute one. in which the .human is divillc and the
divine is llturlan.” He had dcscribcd his own philosophy as anti-lnlelleclnal. Total
submission to nliholitN and a certain contempt for reason were typical of tile la,,cist
du:trlnc Gentile was of the \ ie\v tlult there never existed am antagonism t),’\\ ::chi the
individual and tile state. He believed that ”lllaxillunn of liberty

WNW

Fascism and Nazism 51-i

coincides with the maximum force of the state,” and praised violence when
suede in the interests of the state.

Gentile became the official philosopher of Fascism and described it ”as a total conception
of life” and the fascist state was to be an all
embracing or a comprehensive system. However, in 1928. Gentile explained that Fascism
was not a philosophical system but rather a plan of action. Therefore, in reality Fascism
remained to the end what was enacted ’by its leader. Mussolini, without any intellectual
framework.

Mussolini claimed that the Fascist state was to create a new socio-economic and a
political system as all other forms liberal, democratic and socialists or communist
systems were defective.

In the Fascist state emphasis was laid on duties of citizens rather than on rights..
According to Mussolini, ”Fascism proclaims the right of the state, the pre-eminence of its
authority and the superiority of its end. No aspect of social life escaped the wise
discipline of Fascism.”

The Fascists were opposed to democracy, liberalism and all forms of socialism.
Democracy was described as stupid, corrupt, slow moving and the worst form of
government ”a decaying corpse.” The institution of parliament was ridiculed as a useless
talking shop. The Fascists contempt for democracy meant their opposition to majority
rule, individual freedom and equality. To quote Mussolini again. ”Fascism combats the
whole complex system of democratic ideology and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical
premises or in its practical application.”

Similarly. the Fascists were opposed to all socialist ideas-evolutionary or revolutionary.

The socialist emphasis on class conflict, the material interpretation of histon and the idea
that everything in life was determined by economic factors was rejected by the Fascists.
According to Mussolini, ” economic well-being would reduce man to the level of
animals.” The Fascists thus rejecting the idea of class war stood fir cooperation between
all sectors of society in the glory of the state. ,

Fascism was based on narrow and extreme nationalism. It glorified the nation and
regarded total commitment to the state on the part of the individual as constituting
supreme duty. In other words. Fascism emphasised total loyalty on the part of the
individual to the state. It was therefore natural that it considered it necessary to control
the mind of the individual in the interests of the state.

Fascism was opposed to international peace and harmony and advocated war as national
policy as it was believed by its advocates that war alone could provide the people of a
nation the opportunity to show their strength. Emphasising the importance of war in the
life of a nation. Mussolini had said, ”War is to nlan what maternity is to wonlatl.’~ In the

International Relations >1i

same vein Mussolini had impressed upon the Italians the necessity
to expand the boundaries of the state through conquests.

The economic ideas of Fascists were reflected in the establishment of the corporate state.
It was set up to show that Fascism V’as not just a reaction to capitalism and socialism but
a creative philosophy with an idea of a state that would result in the creation of a new
socio-economic organisation. This concept was based on the principles that the
community alone had the right to decide what the national interests required.

In the interests of smooth functioning of the economic system, strikes and lockouts were
banned. The Economic Depression of 1)29 which hit the world enabled Mussolini to
implement his ideas with greater ease. All the key industrial and financial institutions
were brought directly under governmental control. It must be remembered however that
the concept of the corporate slate was realised only on paper. In reality, similar to
political control. the economic life was brought under Fascist rule through the Institute of
Industrial Reconstruction which pursued the military goals of the dictatorship. In order to
realise the military goals all financial institutions and the heavy industn were brought
under Fascist control and the entire state was transformed into one single industrial
complex geared to meet the deeds of war. This also meant controls over all forms of
economic activity, including individual economic activity.

In the Fascist corporate state. the state exercised control over organisations of
industrialists (capital) and workers (labour). Each enjoyed monopoly in its own field and
yet did not enjoy independence since there was organised state control, over them. The
Fascist plan of ( ; orate state was implemented by the Corporation Act of 1934. Under the
Act each district was to consist of sndicates of employers and of employees for every
trade or occupation. IC at least ten per cent of the members. employers. and workers in
trade came together they could form a syndicate. These syndicates of employers and
workers in turn were to form separate federations.

The federations so formed were to conic together and form confederations. There were to
be nine confederations: four of employers and four of the workers in industry. agricultum
commerce. credit .and insurance. One confederation was to be formed of professional
men and artists. Up to the level of confederation the organisation of employers and
employees were to be separate. But at the level of corporation they were to be merged
into one. For each trade there was to be one corporation composed of representatives of
employers and employees. Each.coporation was to have a president appointed
b_vthe head of state. In all there were to be twenty two corporations.

iiiiiiiiiiiim~ WPM

fascism and Nazism 516

In addition, there was to be a National Council of Corporation representing nearly 500

members from among the twenty-two corporations.

The first striking feature of Fascism was Mussolini, who was the leader. He was yew
ambitious and was preoccupied with the task of attaining and being in power. This he
achieved through the Fascist party and came to power constitutionally. Once in office he
lost no time tin destroying the constitutional structure for personal ends. A number of
constitutional privileges were bestowed on the leader tb forestall any threat to his
position. Constitutionally. Mussolini was the Head of State .and all offices subordinate to
him were kept rotating so that there was neither challenge nor competition for his office.
His unique position as the charismatic leader was maintained through constant
propaganda and control over the means of communication. The identification of Fascism
with Mussolini was maintained in all official gatherings. party meetings and every form
of group life. a totalitarian state, essentially being a leader state, every effort was made to
isolate the leader and put him on a position of preminence propaganda, persuasion.
violence and terror, the masses were mobilized in support of the leader.

Once the Fascists came to power all other political parties were nithlessly suppressed.
The leader of the party. Mussolini was the head of Government. The Grand Council of
the pare was the supreme assembly of the state. All high office of the state were resewed
for the party members. The party laid down policies. made laws and administered the
stale.

The party was thoroughly organised all over the county and functioned through its
thousands of units. It was the instalment of contact and propaganda all over the state. it
spread in all directions affecting all aspects of social life of the people.

In the name of `History.’ Law.’ and the supreme interest’ of the party, the l:gal order was
subverted. In 1931 the Penal Code was amended to include offences against the state
which provided for heavier penalities including that of the death sentence. The
independelaee of the judiciary was eclipsed as magistrates and judges were required to
examine whether enjoyment of individual rights conformed to the higher justice of state
interests. This effect, nullified individual freedom. However. in contrast to Hitler
Mussolini’s subjugation of the judiciay was only partial.

The purpose of a legal order is to safeguard individual liberty. But the importance
attached to the party and ideology tended to
destroy it. The Fascist philosophy stated that there was no place for private judgment
”nothing private and no limits to action.” The result was ban, censorship, control over
information, propaganda. Mussolini also came to an understanding with the Pope in order
to enlist the support of the Church to this regime. The chief instalments used in order to
strike terror into the

fntemationaf Relations

minds of the instruments used in order to strike terror into the minds of the people were
the special Tribunal for the safety of the state, the secret police and the Black Shirt
militia.

Another distinguishing feature was Mussolini’s claim to his legitimate authority on the
ground that there was mass support to his rule. It was on the strength of mass support that
he justified the policies regarding war.

We have seen that the most essential aspect of Fascism was its leader, Mussolini. In order
to remain it? power he used the three instruments of ideology, party and administrative
machinery, which also included among others the army and the police. This way,
Mussolini was able to appeal to nationalism and emphasis the importance of the
supremacy. of the state. The party ryas primarily set up as an instrument to capture and
retain power. Thus with 11?e aid of an ideology mid the rise of force he established a
dictatorial role and transformed Italy i__ ... .. totalitarian regime. All media of public
enlightenment was brought under Fascism rule. In 192=1, freedom of the press was
denied, and in 1928 the right to practice the profession of journalism was granted to those
approved by the government. The educational institutions were transformed into centers
to teach Fascist philosophy and to train the youth in militarism. Emphasis was laid on
physical education. drills, warfare, and girls were taught to become mothers of brave
soldiers. Freedom of though and independence of mind were considered to be hostile
towards the state and show of individualist?? which amounted to disloyalty towards the
state. To have a check over the intellectual in the universities loyalty tests were
administered. The university teachers were required to train students who would be loyal
to the Fascist regime. Wherever submission was not voluntary, violence and terror were
let loose and the opponents were forced to submit to the dictates of the party. In this
manner the Fascist control over the lives of the people was total and complete.

Besides the Fascist impact on the Italian society, the emergence of Fascist Italy with its
expansionist policy through aggression and conquest not only engulfed Europe. but the
whole world into war. The Second World War was primarily
the result of ambitious dictators like Mussolini and Hitler who wanted to rule over the
entire world. A discernible influence of Fascism on a large number of states ryas the
`emergence of charismatic leaders. shift from multiparty to single-party system, and the
increasing transfer of power from the legislature to the executive. As an ideology.
Fascism gave a new concept of the state. the totalitarian state which was to become a
mode for future dictators.

Though Italian Fascism has become a part of histeW> Neo-Fascist movements have
emerged in parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa. The

Fascism and Nazism 518

conditions for the growth of Neo-Fascist movements have been a semblance of

democratic experience, some degree of . industrial development, technological
organisation and know how, existence and perpetuation of tensions in society to be
exploited to promote the interests of the party. Absence of,the pressure of public opinion
is another factor that strengthens the Neo-Fascist forces. The presence of a charismatic

leader to whip up mass enthusiasm and mass support greatl the interests of the Neo-
Fascists. Political Conditions in Germany

>~ strengthens

Germany occupies a central - position in Europe. Extreme

militarism had led the country into two World Wars in the first half of the
20th century. Being centrally situated it is the center of European trade and
commerce. Vast natural resources, industrialisation, prosperous agriculture
and an industrious people contributed to the rise of Germany in Europe.
Naturally in world politics Germany played a prominent role after its
unification in 1871. As a result of its defeat in World War. I the surrender
of Germany was total and complete. This monetan• eclipse of her power
resulted in the loss of her overseas colonies and certain parts of German`
itself. _

More important was the imposition of tile peace treaty of Versailles, which was
humiliating to Germany. the victors so designed the treaty as to keep Germany in a
perpetual state of weakness. To prevent

Germany from becoming a military power again, Rhineland was demilitarized and the
strength of the arm), and the navy was reduced. The

Allied powers forced Germany to confess and assume its responsibility for the First
World War and compelled her to pay heat’- reparations. The humiliating and harsh terms
of tire Treaty of Versailles wounded the national pride and helped in the rise and growth
of Nazism.
Hitler took advantage of this situation and made efforts to restore Germany to its former
status. Within the domestic sphere the emerging threat of communism was also factor
which acted as powerful
stimuli to the increasingly pauperised middle classes to turn towards. Nazis. The growing
strength of the communists becomes to the Riechslage (parliament) in 192-1 per cent.
The Nazis raised the bogey of communist revolution in Germany. Peoples attention was
drawn to the Russian revolution Raising the bogey of communism. the Nazis enlisted the
support

of the industrialists at?d the wealthy section of the population. The Nazis were looked
upon as protectors of democracy and rights of the people. Thus

the fear of communism was regarded as one of the causes for the rise of Narism in
Germany.

The Nazi party also capitalised on the economic dislocation in post-war Germany. The
runaway inflation set in 1923, the extremely bad

International Relations

shape of agriculture and occupation of Rtrhr by France in 192 3 resulted in economic

collapse of Germane. At that time the anti-capitalist feeling was high and the Nazi party
succeeded in drawing into its fold and in obtaining the support of the small businessmen-
the middle class, the peasantrl- and the unemployed youth. Though there was a short
interval of prosperity between 192 and 1928 the worldwide Great Economic depression
which set in, in 1929 struck new panic into tile minds of Germans. There were signs of
extensive unemployment. During this period, the Nazi party exerted -considerable
influence upon a large . the Nazi party exerted considerable influence upon a large
section of Germans with a promise et’ recovering the country from the economy crisis.
Fortunately for tile Nazis. Germany was already on the road to recovery from the
economic blizzard, when they came to power. To quote Burns. ”It seems obvious that the
triumph of Nazism was not the result primarily of philosophical influence. Instead. it
grew out of the humiliation and despair of the German people and their feeling that
almost any change would be a change for the better The despair was so great as to induce
them to accept almost any messiah who promised to deliver them from confusion and
fear.” Hitler and his Nazi party appeared to Germans to be tile only saviours, who would
restore the German nation to its health and glom.

Hitler’s Rise to Prominence

Adolf Hitler was born in 1889. His early life was full of discorttetri and frus.ration. He
had participated in the First World War. Hitler joined ii group organised by Anton
Drexler which started the Nazi movement. The members of the group of which Hitler
was an influential member told the German people that Germany was not really spirit
among the Germans and made the Nazi movement revolutionary and militant Hitler said,
”What
we have to fight for is security for our race and our nation, nourishment of its children
and .purity of its blood, freedom and independence for the Fatherland.”

Hitler led the Nazi party, seized power in Germany and brought great changes in
Germany. The Nazi park was other<vised called the National Socialist Party which had
its origin in the German workers party The Nazi pay did not receive the support of the
capitalists and the uppci middle classes, since it advocated nationalisation and taking over
of lan’! Through its policy of anti-Semitism. a policy to destroy the Jews and ami-
communism, it spread hatred and became increasingly popular with the military forces
and the students.

In 1923, Hitler attempted to overthrow the government but failed Consequently he was
arrested and jailed. While undergoing imprisonmc(1t he wrote his autobiography Mein
Crimps (My struggle). Though Hitler failed to capture power tile sympathy of the
German peoale were with hrnr

Fascism and Nazism

The party capitalised on the frustration and suffering of tile young. II soon formed the
militant wing, `the storm troopers and the youth of Germany were made to feel that there
existed an organisation which could channelise the emotions and feelings of the people
and with their support. rebuild Germany. Since the party had the dynamic leadership of
Hitler it rapidly grew in strength. The appeal of the party proved to be meaningful .to one
and all. When the nation appeared paralysed by the economic crisis. the people found in
Hitler a saviour, who promised them a rosy future.

The Nazi pay took part in the elections to Parliament (Reichstag). The election results
proved that the Nazi party was becoming increasingly popular with the Germans. While
in 192-1 the part.; had just 32 seats in the parliament, in 1933 it had won 288 scats. In
1933 tile ,.President Hindenburg invited Hitler to be the Chancellor as the earlier
chancellors like Bnrnning and Steersman were unable to stem the deteriorating situation
in the county. Ore the death of Hindenbur. Hitler ’;got himself elected as President and
thus became the President as ;yell as ”,the Chancellor. Hitler thereafter abolished the
’rVeimar Republic. proclaimed the establishment of the Third Reich and became the
unquestioned leader of the country. In this Manner. through the democratic methods of
elections introduced under the V’ein.ar Republic. Hitler rose to power. After tile
assumption of power. Hitler destroyed all democratic norms and structures and
established a dictatorship w ith the help of the Nazi party. By 1933. Hitler and his part’
were well entrenched in power. Their grandiose plans of conquest were to plunge tile
world into ;i deviating war.

Nazi Conquest of Europe

For Hitler, farce was the basis in the conduct of foreign affairs. He saw no reason to
honour international treaties and agreements and repudiated them all. To the Nazis. the
League of Nations. disarmaruent. security and the policy of appeasement. came in tile
4y,r; of progress of a nation Hitler has written in Mein Camps. ”Germam uithrn l;cr
cvistin,~ frontiers could attain on1O a ver<- limited self-suffi;:ien’-A Ill i;r1v-
IriatCri<r1S and none at all on foodstuff.” To Hitler tile solution to thes: problems lax in
greater acquisition of territow. For the purpose of tcrritc! ial expansion Hitler turned to
south and ease of Europe.

The chief enenw of Germany was France. It was neces5ars t-a be friendly with England
and Italy in order to isolate France. Tic ob’jective of German expansion was ”space in
which our peoplct`mnst live.- Such nn expansion was possible only by turning to the
East, i.c.. ”Russia and the harder states.” But France was art obstacle To occupy Russi;i it
way n(:,:c-sarN to destro: France. In short, the G:rman foreign policy vas ba~ee!

~.~1WilCS ( 1) ~rc(ji:ijltlUtl OI` tCrtit(W!C,. 01 \ VOlt111011 of 1!x.111::,. ,1,

s20

Intematfonal Relations 521

the Treaty of Versailles which proved to be an obstacle for German territorial expansion.

Germany had begun war preparation since 1934, but its membership of the League of
Nations (she joined the League in 1926) was an obstacle. Likewise it had no interest in.
disarmament, and quite the Disarmamebt Conference in 1933 and also withdrew from the
League of Nations. This action of Germany was a warning to Europe of her aggressive
designs. But Germany did not wish to alarm its enemies. It therefore adopted a policy of
caution to give confidence to the European nations and prove to them its bona fides as a
nation that believed in peace. As such, Germany entered into a ten year non-aggression
pact with Poland in 1934. This was just to show that though Germany had left the League
of Nations it had no war-like designs. The real motive behind the pact, however was to
weaken the defence of France by separating Poland from France.

Policy Forwards Austria

The Austrians were separated from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles as the Allies did
not want a strong and powerfiil Germam threatening peace and security of Europe.
Germany, however considered Austrians as Germans ’and was determined to annex
Austria. Germany encouraged the Nazis in Austria to revolt and capture the government.
But, France. England and Italy were determined to preserve the independence of Adstria
It was not until 1938 that Hitler succeeded on
the Anschluss’ of Au,tria. Prior to this Germany had befriend Italy and had thus removed
the Italian hurdle. MorcVver. to create a favourable opinion Germany entered into a pact
with Austria. Thereafter the German Nazis in Austria created problems for the
government and ultimately the Austrian Chancellor wN ..ed Hitler to save Austria from
internal disturbances. In March 1938 iiit~cr entered Vienna while the Western democratic
nations watched the d r<: ma.

The annexation (Anschluss) of Austria gave certain advantages to Germany. Germany

had direct communications with Italy, Yugoslavia and Hun,,ary. Its manpower and
military strength increased and Czechoslovakia being isolated, was left at the mercy of
Germany.

Occupation of Sara

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, Sara was given to France for exploitation of
natural resources for 15 years. It was also provided that a plebiscite would be held under
the auspices of the League of Nations to decide ,vIiether the people would go back to
Germany. Nazi influence was alrc ady growing in the Sara. In 1935 a plebiscite was
arranged and the

Fascism and Nazism 522

people decided to join Germany. Thus Sara was handed over to Germany, which greatly
added to her material resources.

Occupation of Rhineland

The Treaty of Versailles incorporated a provision by which Germany was forbidden to

station its troops in Rhineland. This was thought to be essential for the safety and security
of France and Belgium. However, in March 1936, the German troops occupied
Rhineland. Hitler had also repudiated the Locarno pacts of 1926. These pacts were signed
by Germany, France, England, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Belgium in 1921. If
collective security was ensured by the Treaty of Versailles to the European countries, the
Locarno pats were to lesson tensions and bring the European countries closer. This was
se, particularly between Germany and France. Yet Germany violated the Locarno pacts
and occupied Rhineland. As a result of the German occupation of Rhineland, France and
Belgium

were exposed to German attack. By 1936, the European situation had become favourable
to the aggressive policies of Germany.

Formation of Berlin Rome Tokyo Axis

The Abyssinian crisis and the Spanish civil war had brought Mussolini and Hitler closer.
In 1936, Hitler entered into the Anti-Comintern pact whit Japan. The pact was signed to
oppose communism. In 1937, Italy joined the pact and thus the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis
came into being.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia had been created by the peace settlement of 1919-20. There were many
minorities in Czechoslovakia, the most important among them being
the Sudetan Germans. These Sudetan Germans could never forget their German
nationality. When Hitler came to power these Sudetan Germans began to look up to
Germany for their absorption into Germany. The Sudetan Germans were encouraged to
fight for their demand to join determination to Sudetan Germans. The situation in
Czechoslovakia continued to deteriorate even day. Chamberlain, even if it meant
adopting a policy of appeasement. In September, 1938 an agreement was signed with
Hitler known as the Munich Pact.

According to the terms of the Munich Pact, the Czech army was withdrawn from
Sudetanland and the German army occupied the territory-. The Czechs also lost a large
part of their territory. Czechoslovakia was given a guarantee of safety by Britain, France,
Italy and Germany.

The Munich Pact was described by Chamberlain as ”Peace with honour” and Hitler had
assured the British Prime. Minister in Munich that ”this is the last territorial claim I have
to make in Europe. Germany had no
l

International Relations

territorial problem in Europe.” Soon this ledge was violated and Hitler marched into
Czechoslovakia and annexed it in March 1939.

The Munich Pact was severely criticized as ”a disaster of the first magnitude” and ”a
triumph of sheer naked force”. According to Prof Schulman.”’The Munich Pact was the
culmination of appeasement and warrant of death for the Western democracies. It was the
symbol of the collapse of collective security.” The Munich Pact encouraged Hitler not
only to destroy Czechoslovakia but prepared the ground for the takeover of Poland. It
also encouraged the aggressive designs of Mussolini and changed the balance of power in
Europe.

Invasion of Poland

Hitler simultaneously with the invasion of Czechoslovakia had made preparations for the
conquest for Poland. Though Germany, had entered into a Treaty of Friendship with
Poland in 1924. it had been certain demands against Poland. The demands were, the Free
city of Daniz be returned to Germany, and the people of the Polish corridor were to
decide through a plebiscite either to remain in Poland or to be with Germany. When these
demands were refused by Poland, Germany declared war on Poland. Before Hitler took
this step. a Non-Aggression Pact (1934) was entered into between Germany and the
Soviet Union. The objective of this pact was to ensure against possible attack from the
Soviet Union and to weaken the defences of Poland, England and France. The war
between Poland and Germany developed into a global war.

We have noticed th it the methods adopted by Hitler were similar in domestic and in
foreign affairs. These methods yielded success
as they were based on force and not on compromise. Hitler also adopted the policy of
tearing up treaties by unilaterally repudiating them rather than by modifying through
negotiations. Divided counsels and vacillation of democratic European countries
immensely benefited Germany. Germany always rroflerred that it had no aggressive
designs against its neighbours but proceeded to annex one country after the other. Once a
demand was conceded it b,:came a stepping stone for a fresh demand. Thus Germany. Ni
fhin a brief span of time. emerged as the most powerful nation under Hitler. A weak
divided Europe was greatly responsible for the rise of Hitler and the Second World War.

Impact of Nazism

The Nazi party (Na•ional Socialist German Workers Party) began tts political activities in
191c%. When E;itler joined flit party. it was .c sw:jil group and within a short pe:iod it
bee=me a mass movcmem tlrrnyl”nut
Germany. In 1•33 Hitler asked the Reichstag (parliament) fog d„;n;to~,~a!
powers and got them. Hitler lost no tin:: in establishing ,i iut;oil,crucn

~~’ascism and Nazism

egime under his personal dictatorship. ”This was the only- case of a podern totalitarian
regime that was set up by a majority of the electorate hrnd approved by the parliamentary
body of the nation.” The impact of the azi nrle was direct and severe on the people of
German-v. indirect yet paralysing on Europe and the rest of the world.

Nazism was greatly influence by the teachings of Nietzsche,. Hegel Viand Rosenberg. If
Hegel gave the ideas of extrer.re militarism and narrow ~natiovalism. Nietzche’s nihilism
rejected the we stern ideas of morality and rgnity.of men. This nihilism came out clearly
in the terror and the murder f the innocents, the concentration camps ar.d the gas
chambers. Nihilism vas the essence of Nazi process which manifested itself through the
organised killings of millions of people by destroying the individual as a moral being.
The purpose of Nazi nihilism” was to transfer a human into a on-human and to restrict the
quality, of being human to those who were acceptable to the Nazi rulers.”

Nazi racism and anti-semtitism find their sources in t e teachings f Rosenberg. Rosenberg
held the superiority- of the Nordic race as (responsible for the great cultures f Greece and
Rome in ancient times. The ’;decline and decay of these cultures was attributed to their
mingling with ’the inferior races. Rosenberg’s faith in the superiority, of Nordic race was
such that he advocated the replacement of Christianity by Nordicism as a religion. The
Jews were held primarily responsible for decadence and looked upon as the chief
conspirators against Nordic purity.
Hitler had also believed in such ideas as ’Lebensraum’, living space for a nation. No
nation could be strong unless its land was fertile and the peasantry contented. A
contented peasantry was a guarantee against any radical socio-economic changes.

The Nazi rule had a tremendous impact on the political, socio-economic and cultural life
of the German people. As soon as the Nazi came to power they acted quickly to bring
about uniformity and conformation to their rule. Political oppression was unleashed,
denying the people of all civil and political liberties and freedoms. All political parties
were banned, newspapers were either censored, Nazified or abolished. The press was
largely, controlled. Gobbles said. ”The fate of the cinema and the theater was not
different. They too were forced to the party line. All the lahoar unions were banned and
in their place was the government sponsoured labour front. The Nazis completely
rejected Christianity and the Church as they were considered to be a deliberate Jewish
plot to weaken the manliness and vigour of the Gee man race. Even the institution of
family did not escape the Nazi attack.
According to the Na: ’s the purpose of education was to drape the young minds into good
Na,.is. Therefore schools were transformed into

52-1

lntsmational Relations

propaganda machines, school curriculum was rearranged to is d subjects like race studies
and genetics. Books that were not supposed to be read by good Nazis were burnt publicly
writers with a liberal outlook were either forced to stop writing or were blacklisted. Thus
a total control was established over thinking, reading and writing of the people.

On the economic front the reparations and the economic depression had greatly worsened
the economic life of the German people. There was untold misery and unemployment. By
1931 there were sip million unemployed in Germany. When Hitler assumed power in
193=1 there was improvement in the economy, situation and the credit for the ”economic
miracle’ was claimed by Hitler. To establish control over the
economy a series of four-year plans were formulated and the industry, was centralised in
the hands of corporations such as Krupps, who were under the control of the Nazis. After
1935, because of massive rearmament plan and as the country was geared to war there
was boom in heavy industry providing ample employment opportunities to the Germans.

Since the Nazi party had provided full employment, workers willingly parted with their
freedom and liberty and the labour unions lost their independence by becoming the Front
organisation of the Nazi party in exchange for full employment and social
security. Similarly the salaried employees, the socially, and economic<.it: important
upper class of industrialists such as krupp. the big landowners, all supported Nazism. The
industrialists and big landowners lent them support because they were promised the
abolition of free labour unions. The industrialists and big landowners lent them support
because they were promised the abolition of free labour unions. The industrialists had
also realised that demilitarisation of Germany meant expansion of industry which
resulted in more business and more profits. Thus out of selfishness the various sections of
German society lent their support to the Nazi rule.

However the worst victims of the \ ”i rule were the Jews. The Jews were alleged to have
stabled the nation in the back in 1918, and indulged in speculation causing untold misery
to the German people. It was easy to blame the Jews because they \\,ere the leaders in
business and in politics during the period of the Weimar republic. As we have already
noted Hitler’s racism and anti-Semitism were inspired by Rosenberg. Hitler substituted
`Aryan’ for the `Nordic’ race. To Hitler, the Germans. the Dutch and the British were the
Aryans. He had also classified people as ’culture creators,’ `culture bearers’ and ’culture
destroyers’. The Awans were the `culture creators, and the Jews the culture destroyers’.
Hitler had therefore regarded the Jews as the enemies of Aryan supremacy since tree
were an embodiment of `cultural decadence,’ ”a gaing of international bankers more
interested in money and profits than the well-being of the

Fascism and Nazism

Germany people.” Hitler’s theory of racial superiority resulted in his hatred for the Jews.
The policy of anti-Semitism caused untold misery to the Jews not only in Germany but in
other German occupied parts of Europe during the Second World War.

A policy of systematic persecution of the Jews was unleashed. Professors of Jewish

descent were dismissed from universities, books written by the non-Aryans were
removed from the libraries, a Jew or a person married to a Jew was not permitted to hold
government office and by the Nuremberg Laws the Jews were denied the German
citizenship. The worst aspect of Hitler’s anti-Semitism was the concentration camps and
the gas chambers to which millions of innocent Jews children, men and women were
sent. At Auschwits in Poland millions, of Jews were sent to the gas chambers to be stifled
to death. Hitler had thus systematically decided to exterminate the Jews from the face of
the earth. In the official Nazi language the extermination of the Jews was called ”the final
solution of the Jewish question.” During
the period 19-40--1d the entire European continent was under the control of Hitler and
the people of Eastern Europe provided the slave labour to the Germans. Hitler’s hatred
for the Polish people was so much that he had said that they deserved only one master,
the Germans.

The influence of Nazism was not limited to Germany only, though within Germany it
gave rise to the establishment of a totalitarian state, denial of basic human equality and
persecution of the Jews under the dictatorship of Hitler. The expansionist, militarist
policy of Hitler had led to military conscription in 1936. militarisation of Rhineland in
1936, annexation of Austria in 1938, of Czechoslovakia in 19 39, and the beginning of
the Second World War by the tnyasior of Poland in September, 1939. France was
vanquished in 19=10. The Nazi, while in possession of large parts of Europe. attacked the
Soviet Union in June 19-I 1, and declared war on the United States in December, 1941.

Such was the rapid course of the spread of the Second World War which ended in the
defeat and suicide of Hitler in 19-45. Though Hitler is dead and gone the sinister ideas
advocated by him still reappear in parts of the world. The apartheid in South Africa and
racial discrimination a_e.a~:._.. the American Negroes are all manifestations of the Nazi
concept of raci:, superiority.

X26

CHAPTER

N11
~_JCLEAR TEST BAN

Introducti: n.

Because ttttc .;ar wcapottshave revolutionized tN orld politics. it is only natural that p
liticians have struggled with various schemes to control the risks of nuclP,tr war. One- of
the most persistent, and possibly productive, m.ans of nuclear arms control is the effort to
halt the testing of nuclear arms These efforts are based on the principle that no one is
going to risk usin nuclear weapons unless they are pretty confident they will work. A tes
ban would undermine such confidence. Nuclear weapons would then b come museum
pieces.

A1 ttottgh this simple idea may, be attractive. it also has its dangers. For example.
nuclear deterrence is based on the knowledge that the oppo gent can devastate any
attacker with a second strike. If a test bats makes tl•e devastation in the deterrent less
credible. the deterrent itself may not oe oelievcd. The nuclear age with added test bans
might become more n stable. What is more. not all weapons are equally dangerous and a
s~nsible test ban might eliminate all defensive .or less dangerous tcclt ~toiogv.
`Tot surprisingly. it has been difficult to agree on test bans. Concern al out nuclear
weapons testing has essentially taken two fonts. Initially it .Xused on the fall-out from
above-ground tests and the people. In the
late 1’5Os. various Soviet and American propaganda proposals were made for a t,-,t
moratorium. In November 1918 the Supetpoweis and Britain ;then the only three nuclear
powers) began serious talks on a test ban An adhoc moratorium was obse>1cd until
September 1961 when. after

Nuclear Test Ban 52 8

the United States. announcFd it would return to testing and France carried
out its own program of tests. the Soviet Union broke themoratoriunt.

Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the negotiations were given a new impetus.
On 5 August 1963, a limited test ban was signed in Moscow. Tests in the atmosphere,
outer space, underwater (and undergrout.d, if they caused fall-out outside- national
territory) were banned. The treaty entered into force on 10 October 1963 and has been
ratified by over one hundred states (though not France or China both nuclear weapons
states). Although it limited the fall out, the partial test ban did nothing to limit the nuclear
arms race. New technology allowed states to test effectively underground and still stay
within the terms of the treaty. Thus concern now shifted to limiting testing so as to
prevent an
,arin
s race. The logic v;as that if new weapons could not be tested there would be no certain
W that they would work and therefore there would be no point in deploying them. Yet
negotiations foundered on the same problem that bedeviled the partial test ban talks
verification. How much on site inspection was needed to verily that au earthquake was
not a nuclear test. and how much inspection of sensitive militay sites should be allowed
to a potential enemy’? About one hundred and fifty, events larger than four on the Richter
scale (wJtich measures earthquakes and other seismic phenomena) take place in the
Soviet Union every years. The Soviet Union was opposed to widespread on-situ
inspection and so the United States claimed no progress could be made. But in the
meantime, the4technology for independent verification of tests has improved.

It became clear in the late 1960s that few tests could be carried out without visible
surface effects, verifiable with satellites. Since a series of tests would be needed for full
confidence in a weapon, supporters of arms control claimed a tough treaty was possible
which would ban all tests above 10-20 kilotons without on-site inspection. Unfortunately.
by that time most of the Soviet tes’_s of MIRVS were below 20 kilotons. and in any case
the Soviets were also example in major construction projects.

In the spirit of East-West detente, in 1974 the Superpowers signed a Threshold N tclear
Test Ban, prohibiting tests above 150 kilotons without any on -site
inspection. They also agreed to exchange geological data on test sites. In 1976 a treat’
restricting peaceful nuclear explosions to the same limit was agreed and for the first time
the Soviet Union accepted on site inspection. However, neither treaty- came into force
officially as the United States Senate refused to ratify them. Both Superpowers.
nevertheless, agreed to abide by the treaties.

In 1977 the Superpowers and Britain opened a new round of talks on a comprehensive
test ban. Although initial agreement was reached on a limited term treaty (it would be
unlimited if France and China joined),

_____ . ~ ..e~,~ivrys ~ 529

with national technical means of verification and some on-site black boxes (called
passive means), the United States suspended the talks in 1980. The Soviet had also
agreed in 1978 to challenge inspections, where the United States could quite a treaty if
Moscow refused to allow an inspection. The Reagan administration ended the talks
because of a desire to test new weapons and because of domestic pressure from military
laboratories and sections of the armed forces.

As with much of the rest of the Superpower nuclear weapons negotiations agenda, the
ending of the Cold War led to renewed optimism that some progress might be made on a
test ban.

Estimated number of nuclear ex pl ’ 6 A

31 December 189

a = atmospheric u = underground

USA USSR ’ UK France China

India
Year a u a u a u a u e u a
u Total
6 Aug-31 Dec.
1963 0
1964 0
1965 0
1966 0
196.7 0
1968 0
1969 0
1970 V
1971 0
1972 0
1973 O
1974 p
1975 0
1976 0
1977 p
1978 O
1979 O
1980 p
1981 O
1982 0
1983 V
1984 p
1986 O
1986 O
1987 V
1988 V
1989
Total 0

os~ons ugust 1963

Is o 0
38 V 6
36 0
43 0
34 p
45 p
38 0
35 p
17 0
18 0
16 0
14 0
20 p
Is p
19 p
17
15 0
14 p
16 V
18 p
17 p
17 p
17 0
14 0
14 p
14 p
11 0
590 p

17
13
16
17
19
22
14
18
is

17 0
18 0
27 p
29 p
-21 0
22 U
31 O
-7 0
29 0
0
0 0
23 p
17 p
7 0
ass o

0
0
o,
0 0
0 0
0 p
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0
I
0
1
3
 1
I
I
2
1
1
I
0
19

3 1 0
4 1~ 0
1 3 0
3 0 2 V
5 O 1 p
0 0 1 1
s o 1. o
5 O 1 O
3 0 z O
5 O 1 0
7 0 I V
O z 0 I
0 4 3 I
O 8 I V
o s = I
0 9 1 O
0 13 1 C
o~ lz o 0
V 6 0 I
0 9 U 2
O 8 0 2
V 8 O V
O 8 0 0
0 8 o I
o s O I
p 8 p n
-tl 128 :3 11

o I
0 0
0 O
0 O
O O
0 0
O 0
i)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

16
sl
67
56
64
56
61
42
45
36
42
38
44
46
57
s$
52
51
V
57
0 56
o ss
V 35
0 23
f. 4,
u an
.7

Nuclear Test Ban a b c d

530
See note a below
One more test was conducted this year. but it did not cause anv
detonation. -
Five devices used simultaneously in the same test are
one explosion.
Three devices used simultaneously in the same test are counted here
as one explosion.
e Two of these tests may have been conducted in 1975 or 1976
f This explosion may have been conducted underground.

Estimated number of nuclear explosions 16 July 1945-31 Dec.

1989

Total
1818

All British tests from 1962 have been conducted jointly with the United Mates at the
Nevada Test Site. Therefore, the number

actually higher than indicated here.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, 1990

Although some people felt it might be possible to obtain a comprehensive test ban, the
Superpowers seemed unpersuaded that they should go that far. As they edged towards
acceptance that their nuclear weapons should be retained for minimum deterrence, they
also saw the need- to keep a 1111111111u111 level of testing. Furthermore. the
Superpowers were not persuaded that a complete ban would stop threshold nuclear
powers such as Iraq obtaining their own weapons. If a complete test ban

could not be fully verified, it could not halt nuclear proliferation.

Yet the Superpowers were coming to accept that there were less radical limits on testing
which might be useful. Limiting the number of tests would limit the risk of
environmental pollution from the venting of test and would slow the peace of
development of new weapons. Reducing the size of underground tests to the 10-20
kiloton range would also reduce

the risk of venting while still allowing the triggers for themo-nuclear weapons to be
tested and deterrence to be kept robust. By not reducing the limit any lower. to join in an
international accord. With intrusive on-site inspections in such an arms control agreement
an increasing confidence about the intentions of other. sometimes rival, powers, would
occur.

The debate over a comprehensive test ban indicates the extent to

which improvements in technology can be made to serve the cause of peace. as well as
war, through weapons development. Of course, the

counted here as

USA USSR UK France

)2l 6’13 42 177

China India
3:1 1

of US tests is

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531

difficult details and effective verification will require complied egotiations between all
existing nuclear weapons powers. Not a simple task.

Nuclear Proliferation

If you think it is dangerous enough living in a nuclear age, with the five great powers all
brimming over with nuclear
weapons. imagine a world with dozens of nuclear powers. Picture a nuclear confrontation
in the Arab-Israeli or India Pakistan conflict and you can understand the dangers of
nuclear proliferation. It is true that nuclear weapons have proliferated faster vertically
(with in one state’s arsenal) than horizontally (bN-spreading to more countries). But
while there is reasonable confidence that the proliferation by the great powers is roughly
balanced and under control, there is deeper concern about the spread of nuclear weapons
to less reliable states. Such concern is long standing but may be fading as few states show
signs of joining the nuclear club and the most worrying case, Iraq. was hit hard by a UN
sanctioned coalition in 1991.

The dangers of nuclear proliferation have been faced in a variety of ways. In 1956 the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to control the supple of
uranium (the fuel needed to make a nuclear weapon) and especially to monitor the
expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although well meaning, the IAEA is
toothless since it cannot force extensive inspections of nuclear facilities in state though
likely to be about to go nuclear. Apart from the Soviet Union and the United States,
nuclear weapons have spread only to Britain (in 1957). France (in 1960), China (in
196=4) and India (in I97=1). These states all shared the view that genuine political
independence or regional supremacN
-

required an independent nuclear weapons, they had to develop nuclear forces on their
own. But because of the concern that this logic would later extend to a wide varieri of
states. and because the IAEA was obviously ineffective. two types of effort were
undertaken to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

The first focused on the concept of establishing nuclear zones. The oldest treat` to that
effect is the 1919 treaty banning all nuclear weapons in the Antarctic. It was hoped that
such a non-armament measure would be easier to enforce than the withdrawal of
weapons already deployed. The second such pact, signed at Tlatelolco (Mexico) in
February 1967. bound Latin American states not to maintain nuclear forces and to use
nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes. All nuclear plants in the region
were to be placed under IAEA safeguards. But the implementation of the treaty has been
patchy at best. Brazil. Chile. and Trinidad and Tobago said they would only be bound
when all the other Latin American states had ratified it. Argentina signed but did not
ratify. Cuba and Guyana have not.signed. A protocol conunits states to respect the

Nuclear Test Ban

532

denuclearization
of Latin America and not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any party.
All five major nuclear powers have ratified the protocol.

In 1967 an Outer Space Treaty was signed, banning the placement of nuclear weapons in
space, on the model of the Antarctic pact. In 1971 similar arrangements were agreed in
the Seabed Treaty (which covers the sea beyond twelve miles from the coast). Various
other proposals have been made for nuclear free zones, including the Pacific, the Nordic
countries, Africa and the Mediterranean area. Some European anti-nuclear groups have
gone so far as to propose the establishment of nuclear free zones for individual towns and
cities. But the idea of a Pacific zone is the only one to have made any serious progress. In
1975 the United Nations General Assembly approved the plan, but only China among the
nuclear powers accepted it. On 5 August 198>, 8 South Pacific states agreed to a treaty-
along the lines of Tlatelolco. In 1987 the Soviet Union and China agreed to abide by the
treaty, while the United States and France refused.

Despite all the goodwill that lies behind such treaties, the problem with nuclear free
zones is that they usiially cover areas where there is little reason to believe states would
wish to deploy nuclear weapons anyway. To date, there is no case of a nuclear or
potential nuclear power being deterred fro acquiring such weapons by the existence of a
nuclear free zone. Therefore most attention in controlling proliferation has focused on
limiting the spread of the weapons themselves. The main impetus for a non-proliferation
treat’ came from small states in the late 1950s. Progress became easier in 1965, when the
United States abandoned its idea of easier in 1965, when the United States abandoned its
idea of transferring nuclear weapons to allies in the so-called Multilateral Force in
Europe.

The Non-proliferation Treat’ (NPT) was signed in July 1968. Signatories promised not to
transfer nuclear weapons or the means to build them to non-nuclear states and IAEA
safeguards were to be used to inspect nuclear plants designed for peaceful purposes. The
Superpowers agreed to reduce the incentive pursuing arms control. They also agreed to
support non-nuclear signatories of the NPT if they were threatened by a nuclear state. But
the Soviet Union refused to undertake not to threaten non-nuclear states because the
United States stationed nuclear weapons in allied states (e.g. in West Germany). The
treat’ entered into force in March 1970, with ninety seven signatures and forty seven
ratification’s. By 1990 it had one hundred and fom--one adherents. France and China are
the most
notable non-adherents, though both have been careful not to violate the treaty’s
provisions. In 1985 China agreed to IAEA inspections of some civilian nuclear plants.
Other important countries which have not signed are Brazil. India. Israel. Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and South Africa.

International Relations

Argentina has said it will sign, if the Superpowers agree to a comprehensive test bin.
The five-yearly NPT review conference were intended to reassure

the faithful that non-proliferation was working but the treat’ had serious limitations from
the start. The 1980 review conference ended without a joint declaration, largely because
no agreement was possible on criticism of .both Fast and West for failing to halt vertical
proliferation. At the 1985 review conference, a compromise resolution criticized the
nuclear powers for failing to agree a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. With Britain
and the United States reserving their positions, the Soviet Union accepted the declaration.
The 1990 review conference ended without any formal declaration.

Although the NPT has serious gaps, the failure of the Superpowers to halt their own
vertical proliferation has encouraged cynicism that the pact is merely a nose for
Superpowers control of nuclear weapons. The weakness of IAE A safeguards, especially
as different types of nuclear fuel cycle have been developed, inspires little confidence in
`safeguards’. The oil crisis in the 1970s also encouraged the spread of nuclear power
plants for peaceful purposes ends. By 1980, 22 states operated 235 nuclear reactors and in
i98S. 26 countries were running 34=4 plants. It is true that the issue of nuclear power had
become the focus of environmentalists and that this political opposition limited the spread
of these plants. But the use by India of reactor material supplied from a Canadian
produced plant suggested safeguards were woefully out of date. And of course, the Indian
test merely encouraged Pakistan to obtain its own nuclear weapon.

The most acute fears about proliferation have focused on the Middle East. Israel is
generally agreed to have a bomb in the basement in case it should ever face military
defeat at the hands of its Arab neighbours. But Israel does not wish to encourage its
neighbours to obtain their own weapons, so it has made clear that it will not be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons to the area. However. neither would Israel wait to be the
second. A novel, strategic doctrine.

Israel has also taken a more active and dangerous part in keeping the risks of nuclear war
in the Middle East under control. In 1981 it destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in
an attempt to fore-stall having to take its own bomb out of the basement. it was an
extreme but apparently effective short-term of non-proliferation. In 1991, the allied
forces which forced Iraq to withdraw form Kuwait, also made sure that Iraq’s nuclear
potential was destroyed. Less hair-raising support for non-proliferation has been obtain.d
in negotiations between Brazil and Argentina since the latter’s return to democratic rile.

Nuclear Test Ban 534

The essential tool in preventing proliferation is to enhance the security of states who feel
threatened without nuclear weapons. Some states are attracted to the security of
insecurity. otherwise known as nuclear deterrence. Others, such as Libya or Iraq, simply
want the weapon to threatens others. Some, such as South Africa Taiwan or Israel, feel
beleaguered and can trust no one but themselves for their security. But despite all this
international insecurity, it is remarkable how little overt proliferation has taken place. The
NPT’s major success is in helping create a climate hostile to open proliferation. No
doubt, bombs are kept in various basements from Pretoria to Jerusalem. But by refusing
openly to admit the existence of these weapons some stabiliy is maintained. Of course,
Superpowers control of vertical proliferation and a reduction in international insecurity
would make matters even more stable.

CHAPTER ~8

FOREIGN POLICY OF

UeSeAe

The foreign policy of U.S. A in the post World War II period has undergone complete
transformation, and replaced the traditional pattern of U.S. foreign policy by new
assumptions and principles. Even the methods and the techniques for the implementation
of the foreign policy objective have undergone complete change. However, before
making analysis of America’s foreign policy since 1945, it shall be desirable to have an
idea about the basic principles of American foreign policy before 1945. First, America
because of its peculiar geograpyhical location remained completely cut off from the
political conflicts and pursued a policy of isolation.

Secondly, America did not aspire for any economic privileges, or other territorial
benefits. Naturally, there was no cash between the American interests and the interests of
other powers. This accounts for complete absence of hostility towards other states.

Thirdly, the ethical and democratic principles occupied ail important position in
Americas foreign policy. Not only its domestic but even international actions NAere
greatly influenced by values like dislike for exploitation and tyranny, brief in,individual
liberty and equality, dedication to rule of law among nations. peaceful settlement of
internationa disputes,
etc.

With the dawn of the present century it was not feasible for United States to pursue-
policy of isolation and she was involuntarily involved in the two world wars. It may be
observed that America was forced to jump

foreign Policy of U.S-4 into the fray because of the serious conditions created by the
division of world into two hostile camps on the eve of the
compelled U.S.A. to actively participate in it.
Policy After World War II

In the post World War II period U.S.A. was compelled to modify its foriegn policy in
vei`v of the far reaching changes in military technology and the changed international
political scene. The factors which compelled the American leaders to modify their policy
included the following.
1. In the post 1945 period the world came to be domianted by two
Super Power--U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.. while other powers like
Britain. Germany, France, Japan, etc. were rendered greatly weak
due to enormous destruction wrought by the Second World War.
Most of the lesser powers turned supporter

536

Second World War which

of one of these two Superpowers. As a result, these two Superpowers were involved in a
number of conflicts either directly or indirectly. The relations of these two powers were
characterised by mutual fear and distrust., They developed a feeling that they shall not be
able to live in a world where the value and institutions of the other prevailed and that the
other power would ultimately make a bid to crush it.

The development of military technology resulted in remarkable change in the role of the
sea power. air power, etc. In the new context security considerations came to occupy a
prominent role in the foreign policy formulation. The two powers felt that considerable
degree of mobilisation for war must be maintained in peace time since it shall not be
possible to mobilise the military machine overnight. This natnralty involved a change in
the relationship between the militar< establishment and domestic institutions. The
military leadership came to occupy a more prominent position in the two systems.

The ideological differences between the two Super Powers. holding belief in rival social
systems and political ideas, also aggravated the tension between the two and created
mutual distrust in each other’s ideas. Each tried to popularise its own political values and
opposed and suppressed the ideology of the other. Ideological appeals were skilntlly
utilised to mobilise the people.
In view of the changed context the objectives of Artierican foreign policy also underwent
a change. It became one of the chief objectives of American, foreign policy to :.heck the
direct as wel l as indirect thrusts
of the Soviet military power, to reduce if possible, the monopoly of Soviet power where
it prevailed. and where necessary to fill the v-acuuu, left by

International Relations

former great powers who once exercised political or strategic control in areas lying
between the two Superpowers. With a view to check the further spread of Communist
ideas and inctitutios. it extended support to those countries whose freedom was
endangered. Such assistance was to be granted to countries outside the Sov,,-t sphere.
With a view to strenghten the basis of democratic institutions and to check the possible
groAvth of Communism, U.S.A. offered aid in money, goods, technical skills to the
underdeveloped countries and tried to raise the standard of people in these countries so
that they may not fall prey to the communist expansion. U.S.A. also tried to work for a
reasonable, stable, orderly, unified and peaceful community of free nations. For this
purpose it not only took appropriate unilateral actions but also took the help of regional
alliances and the United Nations.

In short, in the post World War II period the foreign policy of U.S.A. was chiefly guided
by rivo considerations, viz., to hold the Soviet Union at a bay and to create those
political, social, economic and psychological condition ~, rich could sustain peaceful and
prosperous human relationships’ .oth at t ~e domestic as well as international levels.

Developments of U __-n Policy

Relations with Soviet Union: As alredy noted, in the post World War II period, U.S.A.
abandoned her traditional policy of isolation and got more deeply involved in Europe,
Asia, Africa and Middle East. It concluded a number of multilateral security
arrangements with more than forty countries. After initial efforts to come to some sort of
understanding with Soviet Union effective manner. The first important step in this
direction was taken in the shape of Truman Doctrine which was propounded by President
Truman of U.S.A. while seeking Congressional approval for money for aiding Greece
and Turkey. He said ”We shall not realise the objective of a free and peaceful world
unless we are willing to help’ free peoples maintain their free institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive movement that seeks to impose on them totalitarian
regimes. This Vs no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes, imposed on
free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundation of international
peace and hence the
security of the United State I believe that it should be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples that are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressure.” It was chiefly
through the assistance extended by U.S.A. to Greece and Turkey that these
two countries esacped falling into the clutches of the Communists.

With a view to check the. Communist threat U.S.A. also provided extensive economic aid
to the countries of Europe under Marshall Plan. . The Marshall Plan like the Truman
Doctrine also sought to check the

Foreign Policy of U.S.Al

communist infiltratio and expansion. U.S. Secretary of State Mashall in the course of his
ddress to the Har<~ard University on 5 June 19-47 said ”The U.S. should do whatever it
is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world without which
there can be no political stabiity and no assured peace”. Though the plan was apparently
meant for all the Eureapon countries it really sought to save Western Europe from
communism. U.S.A. set up an Economic Co-operation Administration and distribute
billions of dollars to the nations of Europe with a view to revitalise their economy. It was
due to American and that Italy and France succeeded in meeting the Communist treat.
U.S.A. also, played an active role in meeting the Communist threat luring the Berlin
blockade. It was chiefly because of the massive airlift carried out by U.S.A. that Western
powers suceeded in thwarting the Soviet plans. In the wake of Soviet atomic balst of
1949 and the Korean War of June, 1950 U.S.A. decided to increase the military strength
of the non-Communist countries by providing the military assistance. U.S.A. signed
collective security treaties with Japan. Philippines. Australia and New Zealand in 1951:
with South Korea in 1913 and Republic of China in 1954. U.S.A. also played an active
role in evolving various military alliances like SEATO. CENTO and NATO to check
communism in various parts of the world.

With the change of leadership in Soviet Union in 1955 it was expected that the hostility
between the two Superpowers may subside. Though much progress could not be achieved
in this direction forthwith and mad race for armaments continued between the powers till
1958 when certain favourable development took place. U.S.A. and Soviet Union
concluded a number of agreements for co-operation in the cultural technical and
educational fields. The leaders of the two countries held meeting and showed greater
understanding of each other. In view of these developments a summit meeting was
arranged at Paris in May 1960, but the same was jeopardised due to a U-2 incident. After
a temporary improvement, the relation between U.S.A. and Soviet Union. reched a
crucial state during the Cuban crisis. The things assumed such serious
dimensions that there was even a possibility of shooting war between the two. However,
due to intervention of the UN secretary General the situation was saved and U.S.A.
agreed to dismantle its missiles in Cuba U.S.A. also gave and assurance that it would not
attack Cuba:

In the subsequent years the relations between U.S.A. and Soviet Union continued to
develop along friendly lines, and they agreed to co-operate in various spheres such as
exploration of outer sapce. problems of environment, medical science, public health,
technology, etc. The trade relations of the two countries also grew. The two superpowers
also agreed to put an end to the armaments race. They tool significant steps in this

538

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direction by concluding the SALTI (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) m 1972 and
SALT 11 in 1979. Though some of the irritants still persisted in the relations of the two
countries, yet by and large a spirit of detente prevailed. This spirit of detente suffered a
setback in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Thereafter America.’s
relations with Soviet Union grew tense and Reagan’s administration embarked on an
ambitious plan to modernise its weapons and army to meet any possible threat from
Soviet Union.

Thus a sort of new cold war started between the two where each srper power determined
to minimise the influence of the other. Soviet Union tried to undermine the influence of
the other. Soviet Union tried to undermine the influence of USA in the middle east by
supplying arms to Syria and extending support to Syria’s policy of disrupting western
programmes in Lebanon. Soviet Union also tried to weaken American hold on Western
Europe by encouraging peace movements through nuclear threats etc. The relations
between Soviet Union and United states touched the lowest ebb following shooting down
of the korean Airlines civilian aircrafts and the Soviet reaction to the upcoming
development of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe. The US invasion of Grenda and
possibility of confrontation in Middle East further rendered the situation serious. The
other important factors which contributed to straining of relations between USA and
Soviet Union were imposition of economic sanctions by USA and her allies against
poland and Soviet Union: the Soviet support for militaw presence in Kampuchea and the
alleged human rights violations by the Soviet Union . In view of these strained relations
Soviet Union did not take part in the XXVIII Olympiad held in Los Angeles (USA) in
july-August, 1948.

Amidst these developments the leaders of the two countries have also indicated their
desire
to improve relations with each other. For example Reagan told the journalists at
Williamsburg on 31 May. 1983 that the Westren countries were ready to join the Soviet
Union on the betterment of life of our people. Likewise, Andropov at a meeting with
Averell Hariman, the former U.S. Ambassador at Moscow on 6 june 1986 expressed deep
concern about the deteriorating Soviet-U.S relations and stressed that the Soviet Union
wanted normal relations with U.S.A.

On 15 june 1984 President Reagan againt declared his readiness to meet president
Cherenko any time without any preconditions. However, the offer was turned down by
Soviet Union on the ground that the U.S.A. and its allies were following a course of
confrontation. In June-July 1984 the two countries explored the possibilities of
commencing talks on space weapons, but nothing came out due to mutual suspicion. The
one good outcome of these exchanges was that the two countries agreed to extend the

Foreign Policy of U. S.A

1974 agreement on economic co-operation for a fiirtlier period of ten years.

e Another welcome change in their relations took place when the foreign
ministers of United States and Soviet Union held a meeting at Geneva on
x 7-8 January 1981 to hold talks on disarmament. The talks were significant in so far as
they broke the stalemate between the two powers, It may be observed the U.S.S.R. had
pledged out to hold any talks unless Cruise and pershing 11 missiles were dismantled. It
relented on this point and agreed for talks at Geneva. Likewise U.S.A. also showed spirit
of accommodation
j and agreed to broaden the scope of new negotiations by including within their purview
the threatened arms race in space as well as existing stockpiles. Further talks on
disarmaments took place in Geneva from 19-21 November 1981. but much headway
could not be made on account of Soviet hostility to president Reagan ’s Strategic Defence
Initative prefect (popularly known as Star Wars). However at the end of talks the two
leaders issued a joint statement emphasising the disirability of intensifying dialogue
between the two so that early progress could be made intensifying dialogue between the
two so that early progress could be made intensifying dialogue between the two so that
early progress could be made in areas where there was common ground. Thereafter the
two powers continued to make efforts to come to some understanding. A significant
meeting in this regard took place in Reykjavik in October 1986 between president
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, where they settled many of the bilateral arms control
issues which had eluded negotiations for years. Thereafter further
efforts were made to come to some sort of understanding between the two to improve
relations. The relations between USA and Soviet Union showed an improvement towards
the close of 1987. In December 1987 at the Washington Summit the two super-powers
reached an understanding on intermediate range missiles. Though this agreement was
quite limited in scope it indicated the intention of the two powers to eliminate nuclear
weapons as far as practicable. It also called for a halt to nuclear proliferation. However,
despite this understanding sharp differences continued to exist between the two powers
on issues like Afghanistan, West Asia, Iran, the Star Wars etc. Despite these differences
the leaders of USA and USSR held fourth Summit at Moscow where they exchanged
documents on ratification of Intermediate range Nuclear (INF) Treat’ and pledged to
strive for a Treat’ of Strategic Arms Reduction (START). They also agreed to give
advance notice about the launching of inter-continental range sea and ground missile tests
and hold joint verification of the testing of nuclear weapons at Nevada and
Semipalatinsk. They also concluded a three-year cultural agreement for exchange of
writers, sportsmen and persons from various other fields. All this clearly confirmed the
desire of tire two countries to improve their relations.

lntemational Relations 541

During the next two years the relations between Soviet Union and USA underwent great
transformation. The policy of confrontation finally gave way to cooperation and the
ideological and social differences lost their divisive force. The Soviet Union also came to
realise that preservation of any kind of closed society was not possible in the present
context when the world economy was becoming a single organism and no state, whatever
its social system or economic status, could normally develop outside it. All this greatly
contributed to reduction of tension between the two super powers. This change was
reflected in the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Afghanistan in April 1988,
cease-fire between Angola and South Africa in Augus, 1988, agreement regarding
independence for Namibia, including return home of Cuban expeditionary forces; cease
fire in the Iran-Iraq war. In the field of arms control also the two powers reached an
agreement. They ratified the 1987 INF Treaty and took preliminary steps in the Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks (START) towards an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear
arsenals by 50 per cent. They also agreed to reduce conventional- forces in Europe. Thus
the two super powers indicated their desire to work together in dealing with regional
conflicts and preferred
to follow policy of cooperiion rather than confrontation.

The attitude of understanding adopted by the two countries was further evident at the
Washington Summit of June 1990 when President Bush and President Gorbachev worked
out agreement on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms. They also reached agreement
on set of principles to govern the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. At this Summit a
trade agreement was also signed with a view to restore normal trading relations between
the two countries. The other agreements concluded at this summit included agreement for
purchase of 10 million tonnes of grain by Soviet Union from USA, co-operations
between the two super-powers got strained in the wake of excessive use of force by
Soviet Union against the rebellious Baltic States of Latvia and Lithuania and US
announcement that, it would provide multi-faceted assistance to the Baltic secessionists.
This evoked strong reaction from Soviet Union. Thus we can say that despite the end of
second cold war and ushering in of a new detente, certain irritants still exist in the
relations between two super powers.

Policy towards Far East

U.S.A. took keen interest in the Far East in the post World War 11 years. But despite
U.S.A.’s best support the Chiang Kai Sheik government could not retain control over
China and the Communist took control of the country. However, U.S.A. continued to
extend full support to the Chiang Kai-Sheik government which was set up at Formosa. It
was chiefly due to efforts of U.S.A that for long time Red China could not get a

foreign Policy of U.SA

permanent seat in the Securay Council. It was only after a rapproachment between U.S.A.
and People’s Republic of China that she could succeed in

America’s involvement in the Far East grew deeper during the Korean war. After
prolonged holstilities au agreement was reached under which Korea parallel as the
dividing line. U.S.A. hoped that with the withdrawal of occupation forces Korea would
emerge as a United Nation. However, these plans were foiled due to Chinese involvement
in the war. After prolonged hostilities an armistice was signed in July, 1953 by the two
governments of Korea and the U.S. managed to pull out.

On the questions of capture of islands of Pescadores, Quemoy (Matsu) and Formosa by

China, America was once again deeply involved
~e Far Eastern affairs. realising that the acquisition of these islands Ld strengthen the
Communist forces in the region U.S.A. decided to Formosa. ’the Americans were so
much invoh ,W in the issue that even threatened to go to war on the issue of Formosa.
However, :Britain succeeded in persuading USA to avoid
such an adventure and the ~~crisis was averted. America’s relations with the Communist
Government of China continued to be hostile till a rapproachment between the two
powers was effected in the seventies.

In December 1978 the two countries concluded an agreement which led to withdrawal of
all U.S. forces from Taiwan and formal recognition of the Beijing Government as the
legitimate government of China and U.S.A. following approval by President Carter of the
Taiwan Relations Act which recognised the need for self-defence capability for Taiwan
with U.S. support. The relations continued to be tense till 1982 when President Reagan
signed an accord with China asserting that U.S. would eventually and gradually reduce
and end all arms sales to taiwan. It furihur asserted that the sale would not exceed the
level of 1979 (viz. $600 million). In the subsequent years also efforts were continued to
improve relations and the top leaders of two countries exchanged a number of visits. But
Beijing continued to have reservations about the U.S. attitude and repeatedly pressed
United States to end the arms sale to Taiwan at an early date. At the same time Beijing
adopted critical attitude towards United States on various issues Oz. U.S. intervention in
Grenada, and U.S. attitude towards `arm race.’

Despite the above irritants in the Sino-American relations, their relations in the economic
sphere have considerable grown and United States has emerged as the third largest
trading partner of China, after Japan and Hongkong. The two countries also signed
several joint-venture agreements extending from soft drinks to hightcch electronics. In
April 198-1 United States agreed to sell to China civilian nuclear power

International Relations 5.13

technologies. In November 1985 the U.S. Senate approved the nuclear co-operation
agreement concluded by China. United States agreed to supply technology and equipment
to China to modernise her capaciy for the production of artillery munitions. Despite these
developments the relations between the two countries remained strained due to issues of
Taiwan and U.S. restrictions on textile imports. There were also sharp differences
between the two on the attitude of United States towards PLO, deployment of Pershing II
missiles .in Western Europe, American policy in Central America etc.

The process of normalisation of relations between USA and Soviet Union gave rise to a
feeling among certain quarters that this would adversely affect America’s relations with
China. But President George Bush during his visit to Beijing in February 1989 assured
the Chinese leaders that the Sino-U.S.
ties would not be weakened by the new turn in Sino-Soviet relations. However Sino-
American relations again took a turn for the worse when President Bush imposed military
sanctions against China following crackdown on democratic protesters. It even threatened
to apply economic sanctions unless the Chinese leaders ended repression of students
seeking democracy. The Chinese leaders strongly- protested against the US utternaces
and actions and described it as an interference in their internal matter. No wonder the
relations between the two were strained on this account.

However. the commercial interests of United States obliged President Bush to

recommend extension of most favoured nation trade status to China in May 1990. China
ryas given lowest tariffs on 12 billion in direct exports to United States. This was
obviously done to prevent China from going elsewhere for its purchases of grain,
fertilisers, aircraft, cotton and machinery etc. In November 1990 most of the sanctions
against china were removed. This was made possible by a series of conciliatory moves by
China. During the Gulf War. China (a permanent member of Security Council) endorsed
the US sponsored UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force to make
Saddam Hussein pull out his forces from Kuwait.

As regards the other power in the Far East, Oz., Japan. U.S.A. was able to acquire full
control over the administration of the countn- after the war, even though the formal
responsibility for administration was entrusted to the Allied Council consisting of
representatives of U.S.A.. Soviet Union, China and United Kingdom. It drew a
constitution for Japan on the pattern of the American Constitution and enacted number of
laws to tackle the problem of absentee Landlordism. ownership of land by farmers. etc.
U.S.A. also acquired certain military bases and airfields. in the countw. It provided
billions of dollars as aid to Japan to enable the countr<

Foreign Policy of U.S.A

to resettle its economy. In fact for first few years Japan was virtually a satellite of U.S.
and did not maintain any consular or commerical relations with the Communist countries
viz.,. influence and established formal relations with countries of the Communist bloc
too.

All these developments certainly undermined U.S. influence in Japan, but still her
relations with Japan continued to be very cordial. But the efforts by Japan in recent years
to penetrate the U.S. market and compete with United States firms in high technology on
the one hand and adoption of protectionist policies which made it difficult for United
States to penetrate the Japanese markets, produced tension ’in
the relations between two countries. During the year 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone of
Japan made bid to placate US by indication Japan’s willingness to increase co-operation
with U.S.A. in security matters, and opening certain specialised markets for Americans
goods. Japan also agreed to make major chances in its regulations which hampered the
sale of U.S. telecomm-unication products. All these actions were taken by Japan to
reduce the growing trade gap between United States and Japan. Thus, we find that though
there are no political issues between United States and Japan, the economic issues have
greatly contrbitued to the straining of their relations. During the past few years persistent
efforts have been made by the leaders of the two countries to resolve these differences. In
August 1987 the two reached an agreement on the importation of U.S. supercomputers
and agreed that the relationship between the US and Japanese supercomputer
manufacturers should be based on `honest competition’. Through another agreement
concluded in August 1987 Japan agreed to allow greater access to Japanese domestic
market for foriegn motor part suppliers. On the other hand in November 1987 USA also
eased economic sanctions which it had earlier imposed on Japanese electronic goods.
They also reached an agreement over the access for foriegn construction companies to the
100.000 million yen Kansai Airport Development Project at Osaka and agreed to put out
for international tender a greater share of the consulting contracts far the airport. Thus,
gradually the two countries tried to amicably resovle various outstanding economic
issues.

Despite this certain irritants continued in the US-Japanese relations. These included an
on-going dispute concerning the FSX fighter project; dumping of semi-conductor chips in
the US market at-bctow cost prices; Japan’s failure to honour its commitment to allocate
20% of its domestic semi-conductor market to the foreign suppliers by the year 1991;
Japan’s policy on rice imports and Japans insufficient commitment. in financial teens, to
the defence of the Pacific region. Above all the continuing trade surplus with USA was
viewed by the Americans with great concern. In February 1989 tire US Government
Advisory Commitee

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on Trade and Policy and Negotiations recommended that tt Bush administration should
threaten to implement within one year the pr isions of the 1988 Trade Bill (which granted
US Administration right to retaliate against countries in case of abuse of free trade)
unless Japan started rectifying its trade balances with USA. Anit-Japanese sentiments
were boosted by the reports that Japanese companies had helpd Libya in the construction
of chemical plants for chemical weapons manufacture. The Japanese Prime Minister
(Takeshita) made bid to improve the worsening bilateral relations and paid a visit to USA
in February 1989. He expressed his commitment to maintain links with USA and
announced decision to raise Japan’s foreign aid spending.

Policy Towards South-East Asia

For the first few years after World War 1;I, USA followed a policy of neutrality towards
the countries of South East Asia. But after the emergence of the Red Government in
China in 1950, America felt more keenly interested in the region. In 1954, U.S.A.
assumed direct responsibility and the general direction of policy in Vietnam fell in the
American hands. With a view to check the Communist threat U.S.A. took a lead in the
formation of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) a military alliance on the
pattern of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) consisting of Britain, New
Zealand. This alliance was primarily concluded with a view to encircle China. America
tried to build up another anti-Communist bastion in Laos by extending enormous
financial and military aid to that country. Through these efforts America succeeded in
keeping a pro-West Government in the country till 1960. In 1960-61 a civil war broke
out,in Laos in which Soviet Union also got involved. As U.S.A. wanted to avoid an open
clash with Soviet Union a negotiated settlement was arrived at the Geneva Conference
and neutrality of Laos was accepted.

But probably the deepest involvement of U.S.A. in the South-East Asia was in Vietnam.
As already pointed out that during the initial period of Vietnam war, U.S.A. simply
supported the French but subsequently it got more deeply and directly involved in the
conflict. Some sort of solution was found at the Geneva Conference in 195.1 which
proposed the partition of country- as a provisonal arrangement. After two years a general
election under the supervision of An International Commission was to beheld to decide
about the re-unification of the country. However, the Diem Government of South
Vietnam with the support of U.S.A., refused to abide by the condition of elections
because it feared that the decision may go against it. U.S.A. offered full support to Diem
government because it «anted to use it as a bulwark against the Communist expansion.
But the Diem government could not maintain itself in office because of its growing

Foreign Policy of U.S.A

546

unpopularity with the people. Thereafter, U.S.A. got more and more deeply involved in
the Vietnamese war. It was only under pressure
from public opinion at home that USA ultimately withdrew from Vietnam in terms of an
agreement concluded at Paris in January. 1973. Thereafter the U.S. influence in the
region considerably declined. As a result of the unification of two Vietnams and its
passing under Soviet influence the American position in the region was considerably
weakened. In fact some scholars have asserted that American foreign policy in South-
East Asia has been a great failure.

Policy Towards South Asia

United States has taken keen interest in South Asia in the post World War II period. It
tried to rope in India in military alliances to counter the threat of communism. However,
in view of reluctance shown by India to join military alliances, it started wooing Pakistan.
It drew closer to Pakistan and projected itself as the defender of Pakistan’s position on
Kashmir, which naturally strained its relations with India. It has been argued that had
United States adopted a netural position on Kashmir, leaving the issue to be sorted out by
the parties directly concerned, Indo-American relations might have got off to an entirely
new start. Despite

these differences United States provided financial and economic assistance to India.

In 1962 when China attacked India, United States promptly provided military aid to India
to meet the Communist threat. This naturally strained U.S. relations with Pakistan. From
1965-70 United States did not take any interest in South Asia due to her involvement in
Vietnamese War. In 1971 United States once again intervened in South Asia on behalf of
Pakistan. She moved her nuclear aircraft carrier the Enterprise close to the Indian shores
in the Bay of Bengal and threatened to intervene on behalf of Pakistan if India carried the
war into West Pakistan. However, India was to resist the U.S. threat due to Soviet
support.

During the seventies United States did not play am- significant role in South Asia and its
relations with Pakistan as well as India suffered a setback. However, with the collapse of
the Shah of Iran and installation of an anti-U.S. Islamic fundamental regime in Tehran,
United States felt greatly perturbed and began to take keen interest in the region. The
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 also made United States take keen
interest in this region. Therefore, United States stepped up its military presence in the
ocean adjacent to the region, upgraded its base in Diego

Garcia, acquired new bases in Oman and Somalia. It once again tried to rope in Pakistan
within the ambit of its global strategy and supplied large quantities of sophisticated U.S.
arms to Pakistan. It also extended
help to the Afghans to overthrow the Soviet backed Marxist regime and built up

International Relations

547

pressure on Soviet Union to pull out its troops from Afghanistan. To counter the growing
Soviet influence in the region, United States encourgaed Pakistan to improve relations
with India and tried to promote regional cooperation in South Asia. United States also
tried to improve relations with India arid sought India’s help in finding out apolitical
settlement of the Afghanistan problem. U.S.A. also shoed willingness to contribute
towards the modernisation drive of Rajiv Gandhi and cleared the way for India’s
purchase of hitherto banned high-technology electronic equipment. In 1981-8G U.S.A.
extended unequivocal support to South Asian Regional Cooperation.

USA also tried to cultivate friendly relations with Bangladesh and

extended necessary aid and assistance to it during the past few years. In April 1987 the
two countries signed a three years agreement under which US would provide Bangladesh
a credit of US $ 182.000,00(1 for importing foodgrain and other agricultural products.

Thus, we find that United States did not pursue ant’ fixed policy• towards South Asia. Its
policy was alrgely influenced by its cold-war relations with Soviet Union. With the end
of the cold war in recent years, interest of USA in South Asia is bound to decline because
of the disappernce of the Soviet threat.

Policy towards Middle-East

U.S.A. took keen interest in the middle-east not only because the region was strategically
important and possessed rich oil reserves, but also because the people of this region were
very poor and could easily fall a prey to the Communist propaganda. U.S.A. not only
extended every possible financial assistance to the countries of middle east but also
sponsored the Baghdad Pact roping in countries like Britain. Turkey, Iraq. Iran and
Pakistan. U.S.A: also cultivated ver< intimate relations with Israel and strengthened it by
providing most sophisticated weapons. With a view to check the growing inflluence of
the Soviet Union in Egypt in 1956 U.S.A. supported the UN resolution asking the
Anglo.French forces to withdraw from Egypt. With a view to guard the countries of
Middle-East against Communist danger USA advocated the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under
this doctrine U.S.A. asserted that its military assistance also included employment of U.S.
armed forces to secure the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations
requesting such aid against armed aggression from any nation controlled by international
Communism. According to Richard this doctrine was ”intended to assist the states in the
general
area of the Middle East to protect their national independence and territorial integrity
against International Communism.”

U.S.A. also inter`enedin other countries of Middle East either to replace Pro-Soviet
Government or to keep the pro-Western governments in

Foreign Policy of U.S.A

Power. U.S. intervention in Jordan in 1958 and Iraq can be cited as examples. U.S.A. was
very keen that the area of Middle-East should be free from tension so that Soviet Union
may not be able to exploit the same to its advantage. it was with this objective in mind
that US leaders tried to bring about a settlement between the Israelis and the Arabs.
Though America’s
relations with Egypt were strained for some time but after 1971 these relations continued
to grow along friendly lines and ultimately enabled ,U.S.A. to play a leading role in
arranging a negotiated settlement of the

Arab-Israel conflict in 1979, which has been discussed in detail in one of the earlier
chapters. In fact since 1972 the Soviet influence in the region as been steadily declining
and U.S.A has been playing more effective role. In the wake of Israeli Lebanon war of
1982. U.S.A. involvement in the region greatly increased. 1t felt greatly concerned about
the development in

the region on account of rise of Soviet global power. the other factors which prompted
USA to take keen interest in the region were the wave to recent instability; the Iranian.
Revolution, the regional tide of Islamic fundamentalism, the Iran-Iraq war .and Isreal’s
invasion of Lebanon. The U.S. involvement in the region reached its highest mark with
the

introduction of U.S. troops into Lebanon.

U.S. influence in Middle East suffered a decline on account of success of. Syria and U.S.
decision to withdraw its contingents from the multinational force. Following use of U.S.
veto on a U.N. Security Council Resolution demanding Israeli withdrawal from South
Lebanon, the Arab countries got annoyed with U.S.A. Some of the Arab states like
Jordan and Kuwait which were hither to pro-American, turned towards Soviet Union. s a
result, American influence in Middle East somewhat declined. owever, America knew it
fully well that it had deep interest in the region nd tried to retain its control over this
region through supply of arms and efnece equpment to the Gulf states, avoiding direct
intervention to avoid pen confrontation with the Soviet Union. The declining influence of
merica in this region was further evident from the fact that it could not ring about peace
in this region through negotiations between Israel and e moderate Arab states. But a
quick shift in US policy towards Middle ast took place often the assumption of office by
President
Bush. he scribed the goals of US policy in West Asia as (a) an end to Israel’s cupation of
the West Bank and Gaza; and (b) fulfilment of political ghts for the 1.2 million
Palestinian Arabs who live in these territories. bile reiterating these principles of US
policy in West Asia. President ush reaffirmed the US commitment to Israel’s security.
This change in S policy was welcomed by PLO which felt that it would give a real push
peace efforts in the Middle East.

548

international Relations

US got deeply involved in Middle East following Kuwait’s lccupation by Iraq in August
1990. Immediately United States despatched is troops to Sauid Arabia not only defend
the country against possible raqi invasion but also to protect vital US interests in the
region. President 3ush demanded `immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of
all raqi forces from Kuwait’ and restoration of Kuwait’s legitiamte ,overnment. It is
noteworthy that United States took this firm stand in ’ .liddle East not only to protect the
territorial integrity of a nation but also o protect American oil interest in the region. The
American economy, d hich was undergoing a period of recession, would have been
further ;trained if there had been further rise in oil prices. Though- USA was ictermined
to take action. it did not want to go all alone. Therefore it took lie issue to the Security
Council which passed in all 12 resolutions ~orresolving the dispute in the Persian Gulf.
One of the resolutions of ,ccurity Council (No. 678) even authorised the use of `all
necessan-neans,’ including military, to ensure liberation of Kuwait unless the Iraqi roops
unconditionally withdrew from Kuwait by midnight of 15 January x)91. As Iraq failed to
comply with the Security Council ultimatum, a :oalition of forces of 28 nations under the
leadership of United States, ;lunched massive air attacks against Iraq on 16 January,
1991. After ntense bombardments lasting for over 40 days Iraq surrendered. the lecisive
role played by US during the Persian Gulf war greatly enhanced American influence in
the oil rich countries of the region.

Policy Towards Europe .

With Europe, America tried to cultivate most intimate relations. It ried to help the
European countries in resorting their war devastated :conomics by extending them aid
under Marshall Plan. America also ,ponsored the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to
meet the possible hreat of communist expansion in Europe. For the first few years after
19=45 J.S.A. exercised to much influence on the policies of some of the European
countries that they carne to be regarded as American satellites. lowever, gradually the
European countries freed themselves from
the American influence. The American support to the UN resolution asking -rance and
Britain to withdraw their forces from Egypt, greatly iisillusioned these two powers, and
provided an impetus for the movement ’”or European integration. The countries of
Western Europe formed a slumber of organisations. like European Coal and Steel
Communit, ECSC). European Economic Community, European Free Trade Association,
etc. and moved towards greater integration with the years. Fven Britain, which had been a
close ally of U.S.A. became a member of ~he European Economic Community. The
European movement has _,crtainlv weakened the American hold on the area. However,
sonic

549

Foreign Policy of U.S.A

scholars believe that the re-emergence of Europe is a testimonial to the success of

American policy in this region. According to Profs. Thompson and Black: ”The
reemergence of Europe and its reassertion of freedom of action are traceable,
paradoxically, to the success of American policies in Europe. For nearly a decade the
post-war ’grand alliance’ between Europe and America tested on two roundation stones
of mutually identical interests. Europe’s recovery and its military security were
under`yritten and guarnateedby America power., Its recovery was due to the immense
vitarity and vigour of the Europeans, stimulated by the most creative single act of
Western statesmanship--the Marshall Plan. Despite the fact that USA played a
tremendous role in the recovery of Europe in the post World War II period and formed
the pivot around which various military alliances were built up for the security of Europe
(and the regions against communist threat) the U.S. relations with Europe grew less
intense during the 1970’s. In recent 3 ears these relations were further weakened due to
differences in the approach of USA and West European countries on number of issues.
The following factors contributed towards these differences.

In the first place, the West European countries resented the high U. S. interest rates which
posed a threat to productive investment. Their appeals to U.S. administration for lowering
of these rates did not evoke favourable response.

Secondly, the erratic fluctuations in the rate of U.S. dollar, adversely effected the
European currencies, and the European nations

tended to blame the U.S. Government for its failure to prevent these fluctuations.

Thirdly, there is difference of opinion between the two regarding the value of `North-
South’ global negotiations on a new international economic order as recommended by the
Cancun Summit Conference in October 1984.

Fourthly, the terms of export credit facilities granted by the industrialised countries
of Europe and the related issue of export of strategic items to Soviet block countries, has
not found favour :with the U.S.A. The United States administration has bitterly criticised
the excessively favourlycredit terms offered by the West European countries to finance
trade wish East European countries. It has also voiced concern about the existing
procedure for monitoring of strategically sensitive items to the communist block
countries.

On the other hand the imposition of economic sanctions against Soviet Union by the U.S.
administration in the wake of developments in Poland did not find favour with most of
the countries of Europe. In view of this the Foreign Ministers of the EEC in their meeting
of 4 January 1982

550

International Relations 551

demanded close and positive consulations with the U.S. Government and other western
states to find out what decision would best sewe their common object.

Another important factor which greatly contributed to tension between U.S.A. and West
European countries is the question concerning the participation of several West European
countries in the construction of Jarnial natural gas pipeline. The West European countires
supplied half of the pipe as well as most of the turbine parts to West European countries,
which they intended to qse in connection with the pipline. This resulted in loss of export
orders to these countires and they naturally blamed U.S. for the same.

The strong peace movement of Europe and America’s policy of arms build up also added
to tension between the two. It is well-known that spectacular peace marches were
organised in almost alt the West European countires except Italy (which conveyed
acceptance of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles). In view of the growing demand from
Europe on 18 November 1981 President Reagan accepted Willy Brandt’s ”Zero--Option”
Proposal that both the sides remove their nuclear weapons from Europe. On 30
November 1981, Reagan announced the start of talks on intermediate nuclear forces
(INF). The basic issue involved is that whereas the West European governments regard
the economic strains as a serioius threat to security, the U.S. administration attached top
priority to defence.

Another factor which contributed to American’s strained relations w?th European

countries was the basic differences on their appraoch towards Soviet Union. While
United States favoured increase of military strength and adoption of tough diplomatic
postures towards Soviet Union, most of the European countries saw the Soviet threat as
gradual, diplomatic and subversive and insisted that America should not unnecessarily
provoke the Russians. The Western Powers also criticised
U.S.A.’s policies in Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa.

America’s technological superiority over West European countries also caused tension in
their relations. Most of the countries of :western Europe are reluctant to borrow the
American high technology due to the fear that it would increase their dependence on the
U.S.A. therefore some of the western states like France and Germany have quietly
explored modes of collaboration on military strategy and military technology so that
ultimately they should be able to defend Western Europe independent of United Slates.

Reagan’s Star Wars Programme which he announced without consulting the European
leaders, also generated tension in relations Or U.S.A. with Western European countries.
Reagan insisted on complete adherence to the Star Wars Programme (SDI-Strategic
Defence Initiv atiwe)

Foreign Policy of U.S.A

552

as a condition for providing technological benefits of programme to European counties.

The West European countries were reluctant to fully endorse U.S.A.’s Star Wars
Programme because it was not only likely to

deepen conflict of strategic perspectives. but also adversely affect their basic national
interest. For example the British and the French felt that this would render their national
nuclear deterrent systems technologically obsolete and politically worthless. Likewise
Germany Celt that it would lead to new arms and further step up new cold war. In short,
the relations between U.S.A. and Europe in recent years have not been as cordial as they
were in the fifties and sixties. In view of its impowed relations with Soviet Union.
America’s policy towards Europe also underwent a change. President Bush offered 20%
cut in the combat troops in Europe as part of new NATO offer in negotiations on
conventional weapons with the Warsaw Pact. America felt that acceptance of this, offer
would dramaticallw

increase stability on the European continent. United States also stepped up its efforts to
reunite the divided ciy of Berlin and reunite Germanw. the division of which led to the
cold war. This attitude of un(.,eistanding shown by United States towads Europe led to
the demolition of Berlin Wall and reunification of two German states. United States also
stepped up efforts to reach an understanding with USSR for reduction of arms in Europe
and succeeded in_concluding a number of agreements with Soviet Union for destruction
of chemical :weapons and reduction of conventional :weapons.

Under the Treaty- of Paris singed in September 191,”U the NATO and Warsaw Pace
countries agreed on nip.ximum limits of tacks. armoured

personnel carriers. artillery pieces. aircrafts and helicopters etc. All

these developments went a long way in improving US relations vwith European
countries.

Policy Towards Latin America

America developed very intimate relations :with the countries of Latin America in the
post World War II period because these countries, provided avalua ble marketforits
products.U .S.A. toak lead in initiating the inter American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance in 1947 N%-ith a wic~N to unite the countries of the region. Under this treari-
the signaton states agreed to treat an attack against any one of the American states as an
attack against all the states. They also agreed to settle their diffcrcnccs through
negotiations. America also extended assistance to these countries to expedite the process
of development in Latin America During ’the first few years America did not see any
Communist threat in tile region. But as the years rolled by and the Communist influence
in (hc rcgaon increased. America was forced to inter\~ene in a number of Latin American
filiriguecl to bring down the pro-Comments! government in Guatemala and installed a
pro-American government. Similarly. America did not favour the

International Relations

_5S3

policies of Fidel Castro in Cuba and tried to exert necessary pressure on him to pursue
pro-American policy. On the refusal of Fidel Castro to do so, America stopped all its
sugar imports from Cuba. In the face of these developments Cuba proceeded to conclude
trade agreements with Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Thus, Cuba slipped
out of American influence. In other countries of Latin America like Brazil, Argentina,
Peru, etc. also the democratic governments suffered a setback and America could not do
much. In view of these developments American leadership decided to pay greater
attention to Latin America and made available enormous funds to effect improvement in
the economy of these countries and raise the living standards of the people of the
hemisphere. Most of this assistance was channelised through multinational organisation
like inter-American Development Bank; the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Programmes, etc. In fact throughout America°s policy towards Latin
America has rested on two principles, viz., restoration of order and democracy in the
region and to press the governments of the hemisphere to join the family of free nations.

In 1979 President Carter instituted a policy of extensive military assistance which aimed
at averting indiscriminate repression and creating a clear counter-insurgency forces there.
This policy was also continued by Reagan. However, he tried to internatiionalise the
problmes of El Salvador and Nicaragua by projecting that Soviet Union was engaged
in aggression in Central America. America’s policy was put to severe test when
Argentina deployed its forces to occupy the disputed Falkand islands, which involved her
in a war with Britain. Reagan sided with Britain arid thus gave the impression that he had
abandoned the traditional American policy towards Latin America.

American policy towards Latin America assumed aggressive postures in October 1983
when Reagan decided to take military against Grenada on the plea of protection of
American lives and restoration of democaracy. Though this action was condemned by
countries like Cuba. Guyana and Nicaragua, six of the eastern Caribbean states supported
the U. S. action in Grenada. Despite this support, it cannot be denied that the American
action aroused fear in the minds of Latin American countries as well as her European
Allies.

Another factor which caused much tension between America and Latin American
countries was decision of reagan administration to increase prime interest by half per
cent, which led to increase in the debt burden of the Latin American countries and
rendered their debt problem more acute. To meet the, threat to the debt Latin American
countries organised themselves into a debtor’s cartel to carry on collective negotiations
with American administra?ion. The situation was defused as a

foreign Po/icy of U.S.A 554

result of offer by the syndicate of American bankers to defer payment of loan instalments
and interest due to major Latin American countries. Thus, we find that relations of United
States with Latin American countries are now being conducted along more mature lines.

United States and UNO: United States has always had special relationship with United
Nations. It was one of the main arhcitects of its

predecessor the League of Nations, even though United States could not become its
member. During the initial years of UNO’s formation United States treated UN with great
respect and virtually treated it as a part of is

own state department. However, gradually United States began to lose faith in the U.N.
and began to talk of tyranny of the majority. This displeasure grew with the passage of
time. The American displeasure with U.N. has been on account of three reasons--the
declining American dominance in international affairs; a similar decline in the United
Nations itself; and resuragence of rugged individualism under President Reagan.

The setback to U.S. dominance at the U.N.O. made her turn away from U.N. as centre for
diplomacy and concentrate on direct bilateral diplomacy. On the other hand the
increasing role which the countries of Third World started playing in the U.N. also
obliged U.S.A.
to withdraw from UNESCO. Justifying this action Reagan administration asserted ”it no
longer wished to go on paying the piper for a tune it did not like.” Earlier. United States
withdrew from international Labour Organisation in

1977 on the plea of increasing politicisation of this body and the tendency of the majority
of the member states to condemn other members (Israel). However, on 15 February 1980
United States rejoined I.L.O.

During Subsequent years the attitude of United States towards U.N.O. grew very hostile.
This attitude of United States was brought out by William Mayne thus:

’ .”The Administration has withdrawn from UNESCO and declared

it will no longer follow a policy of automatic compliance with the decisions of the
International Court of Justice. It has threatened to withdraw from the Food and
Agricultural Organisation and International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development. It has repudiated the earlier understanding
among major donors that the seventh, replenishment of funds for the World Bank’s
International Development

Association would be at a level at least equal in real terms to that of the last
replenishment. By limiting the U.S. contribution to no more than $

2.2> billion over ’three years, the Administration forced a 40% cut in real terms in the
banks funds for sofa loans. The Administration has refused to
sign the Law of the Sea Treaty laboriously negotiated on a bipartisan basis over the
course of four administration. It has refused to continue contributions to the U.N. Fund
for Population Activities, and it cast the

lntemational Relations 555

lone vote against a World Health Organisation code of conduct regarding
the manufacture and distribution of infant milk formula .............. ” Thus we find
that during the Reagan administration the attitude of United States t07ards
UNO was quite hostile. However, towards the closing years of his regime
this hostility some what died and he praised UN. On 26 September 1988 he
called for a larger role for international institutions. This changed attitude
of USA is further evident from the fact that it made partial payments of
arrears and promised to pay up its assessed contribution. Reagan
administration also indicated interest in ~ larger role for the International
Court of Justice in certain specified areas of international law.
In the wake of Iraq’s atack on Kuwait in August 1990, United States played active role to mobilise United
Nations to get the aggression vacated. It was alrgely instrumental in getting a resolution adopted which authorised
use of all necessary measures to make Iraq pull out its forces from illegally occupied
territory. However, subsequently US went beyond the limits of the Security Council resolution and threatened the use
of force to starve the people of food and looked upon the resolution as a mandate for mounting full-scale offensive
against Iraq. USA also mounted naval blockade and deployed ships to physically prevent import or export of
commodities. In short, USA played leading role during the Gulf War and after the ceasefire. In fact USA treated UN
as a subordinate body of USA. The disdain with which USA looked upon UN is evident from the fact that President
Bush told four Arab newspapers in March 1991 that US troops would have anyway gone to Iraq if the Security
Council had not authorised use of force against Iraq. Further, he did not accept the contention of France, a
permanent member of Security Council, that the UN mandate had terminated with the liberation of Kuwait and did
not extend to internal affairs of Iraq. Instead United States continued to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq and
even pressurise Security Council to pass a resolution directing Iraq to accord human treatment to the harassed Kurds.
The disrespect of US for UN was further evident from the fact that it opposed the proposed conference on peace in
West Asia, which was favoured by most of the members of UN. Instead US favoured sponsoring of pace conference
by USA and Soviet Union alone. It i:
thus evident from the
preceedtngaccount that United States is treating UN as a sttbnsenient organisation and seeks to make use of it for the
promotion of the interest of supreme powers rather than the humanity in general.
United States and Disarmament The study of American foreign policy since 1945 shall be incomplete
without examining the attitude and role of U.S A. cowards the problem of disarmament. Soon after the war U.S.A.
showed keen interest in disarmament. It not only dcntobilisedits armed forces but also offered to place all its atomic
weapons under
Foreign Policy of U.S-A
international control. The proposals did not receive a favourable response from Soviet Union because it was
opposed to international inspection, which resulted in violation of the sovereign rights of the states. With a view to
achieve complete disarmament in 1950 U.S.A. suggested to the General Assembly the merger of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission. In the subsequent year also U.S.A. continued to make
frantic efforts to effect disarmament and submitted proposal like Atoms for Peace Plan (195.x) and the Seven Point
Plan (196(>). It also participated in various conferences and concluded treaties like Test Ban treaty of 1963.
Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968, Nulcear Non-Proliferation Treat’ (1970). But probably the most important steps
taken by the United States in the direction of disarmament .were the conclusions of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat’
and the SALT Agreements of 1972 and 1979. A detailed stu4y of the efforts at disarmament has been made in an
earlier chapter. As a result of these efforts at disarmament has been made in an earlier bhaptct’. As a result of these
efforts U.S.A. succeeded in greatly reducing the tension between various countries and strengthened the cause of
world peace. However, in view of aggressive designs of Soviet Union in Afghansitan, Persian Gulf and Horn of
Africa, the administration of U.S.A. adopted a tough stand and devoted greater share of its budget to development of
more sophisticated weapons. But simultaneously it was also involved in negotiations with Soviet Union for arms
control. President Reagan held several meetings with the leaders of Soviet Union to come to some understanding on
arms control and disarmament. These meetings were held at Geneva arid Reykjavik. Though some progress was
made in the right direction nothing concrete emerged out of these negotiations. Thereafter also United States
continued to make efforts at disarmament. In December 1987 at the Washington Summit, it reached an
understanding with Moscow on intermediate range missiles. It also called for a halt to nuclear proliferation. The treat’
on intermediate range missiles was ratified by the two countries and they exchanged the documents at the fourth
Summit held at Moscow. They also pledged to strive for treaty of Strategic Arms Reduction (START). After a gap of
seven months USA and Soviet Union resumed talks in 19$9 for Strategic Arms Reduction (START) with a,view to
cut by half their arsenals of nulcear arms, but the talks revealed that differences exist between the two on some of the
issues. Further progress in this regard was made at the Washington Summit between President bush and president
Gorbachev held in June 1990. The two leaders concluded agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms.
They agreed to destroy thousands of tonnes of chemical weapons and to stop their production. They also agreed on
principles concerning the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The two leaders also reiterated
556
lnternatldnal Relations 557
their commitment to complete the negotiations on the conventional force reductions in Europe (GFE Treaty) before
the end of the year. In September 1990 president Bush appended signatures to the treaty on Arms Cut, which seeks
to cut conventional forces in Europe. Thus
we find that in recent years United States has stepped up its efforts to achieve disarmament.
A survey of America’s foreign policy from 1945 show that it has acted as the champion of democracy and
played a dominant role in checking the expansion of Communists. U.S.A. not only extended enormous financial help
to the countries in different regions of the world in their rehabilitation and development, but also .strengthened them
militarily to meet the challenge of Communism. It sponsored a number of pacts, specially with the countries
bordering on the Communist countries. this policy of U.S.A. received condemnation at the hands of several scholars.
They alive argued that U.S.A. made a colossal wastage of money in military preparation, which could have been
fruitfully utilised for improving the lot of the people in the underdeveloped countries. These activities of U.S.A. were
in on way conducive to world peace.
However, the above contention is not acceptable to other scholars. They argue that United States rendered
a great service to the cause of world peace by raising a military organisation which could keep the ambitions of Russia
under check. In support of their contention they point out that during the interwar period Japan and Italy could
resort to aggression with impunity in the absence of any strong military power. America prevented Soviet Union
from behaving the way Italy and Japan did during the interwar period. The American policy has not been all hostility
towards the Communist countries and it made necessary modification in its attitude in the light of he subsequtnt
developments. The Detente with Soviet Union and rapproachment with China are a clear proof of the same. In the
wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the detente suffered a set back and there was revival of cold war bchveen
U.S.A. also responded favourably and made valuable contribution to the elimination of cold war. In short, we can say
that in contrast to the traditional policy of isolation which U.S.A. pursued till the dawn of the present century, the
American foriegn policy since 1945 has been quite dynamic and pragmatic. It had adjusted itself according to the
requirements of the changed international conditions.

CHAPTER9_

FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET

UNION”.-,/
The Foreign Policy of Soviet Union has been a subject of controversy among scholars. While some hold that the
real basis of Russian Foreign Policy since 1945 has been’real politick’, the others are of the view that
Soviet Foreign Policy has a political purpose, viz., establishment of Communism all over the world. the holders of
the first view say that since 1945 Russia has been parsuing the time honored
policies of all states-- the pursuit of power and national interest. The latter view points to the political purpose of
Soviet Policy and asserts that Marxirris-Leninism have formed the basis of Russian policy and all its actions have
been guided by this consideration alone. Thus, they find something new about the Soviet
Foreign Policy. It is indeed very difficult to find out the final motives behind Russian Policy and we can agree with
Geoffrey Stern’s observation that in the Soviet Foreign Policy ”the two are inextricably bound up.”
Development of Soviet Foreign Policy:
After the Second World War, Soviet Union emerged as one of the strongest powers and assumed the
leadership of the Communist countries.
She successfully extended her influence to Poland. East Germany Hungary, Rom,rnia. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuter Mongolia,
North Korea. etc. by establishing Communist governments in these countries. 1n fact the whole of Eastern Europe
with the exception of inland and Greece came under Soviet influence. The Communist government in
the various countries pursued policies subservient to the Soviet Policy and
soon :anic to be known as Soviet satellites. -
International Relations 5;o
The remarkable speed Nvith which Soviet Union ext,:ndcd hLr influence over Eastern Europe and,East
Germany greatl\ alarmed the Western countries and they decided to take necessary measure to check the further spread
of Communist influence. They succeeded in saving SiNeden. Austria and West Germany from the Communists and
N\cre able to establish their influence in a number of countries like Turkey. Greece. Iran. etc. With a view to check the
further in filtration of conlmun(snl in Europe, America launched the Marshall Plan. Though ostensibly this plan was
designed with a view to restore normal economic health in the world so that there could be political stability and peace,
in reality it aimed at checking the growing influence of Communism in Europe.
In. the face of these developments Soviet Union also decided to revive the Communist International by
forging together all the antiimperialist forces. In September 19=17 it set up the Communist lnlormation. Bureau, also
known as °,OMINFORM. to coordinate the \N-ork of the Communist parties of various countries. This organization
was to take necessary steps to popularize Communist ideology through periodicals. etc. Soviet Union also proceeded to
conclude treaties with countries like Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. under which the signatories agreed to
help each other in case of an attack by Germany or states allied to her. Russia also concluded a Mutual Assistance
treaty
with China bN which the two agreed to help each other in case of an attack by- Japan or states allied to Japan. Soviet
Union tried to consolidate her position in Eastern Europe through Molotov Plan (a counterpart of Marshall Plan) for
economic reconstruction and industrialization of the region. With a \ iew to promote greater economic co-operation
among the Communist countries in January 1949 a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COME(’ ON) Vies
formed consisting of representatives of U.S.S.R., Czechoslo\akia. Bulgaria, Hungary. Poland and Romania.
The close relations among the communist countries encouraged the Western powers to increase their
economic and militan collaboration. In 1949 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) consisting of U.S.A. Canada.
Great Britain, France. Belgium. Italy and Portugal was created. Though it was announced that the alliance was one of
purely defensive nature, but with the roping in of West Germany it became amply clear that it was directed against the.
Soviet bloc. In other parts also a number of economic and military pacts were concluded. These included ANZUZ.
Peace Treaty with Japan (1951). SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation), MEDO (Middle East Defences
Orgainisation). etc. In short. U.S.A. concluded defnece treaties with almost all the countries bordering on the Soviet
territory and thus tried to encircle her.
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union 560
The Russians tried to counter the western moves by forming the WARSAW PACT for friendship. co-operation and
mutual assistance with Albania. Hungary, East Germany. Poland and Czecholovakia. Soviet Union also gave every
possible encouragement.to the Communsist forces in other parts of the world. Thus it assisted the Communists in
Greece. Iran and Italy, although its attempts were failed by the Western powers. Russia’s attempts to increase its
influence in the Far East were also foiled by U.S.A. In Asia, the position of Soviet Union was somewhat strengthened
with the establishment of Communist regime in China. Soviet Union fully backed up the Communist Regime and
concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Military Aid, under which the two countries agreed to assist each other
in case of aggression by japan or other power assisted by Japan. The two countries agreed to strengthen their economic
and cultural ties and to cooperate in the international sphere Giving a sum up of the Soviet Foreign Policy for the first
eight wars (19-1>-1953 Prof. Palmer and Perkins say that it was ”characterised by growing hostility to the West, by
increasing tendencies towards non-cooperation and isolation by consolidation of Soviet orbit, and
by general intransignence. These tendencies were encouraged by Soviet re-interpretation of national interests,
especially the means to security- and by the strong reaction of the leading states of the non-Communist world to
Russian moves and techniques. They were undoubtedly also influenced by the remphasis and intellectual activity to the
interests of the Communist Party.
Policy in Post-Stalin Period:
A change in Soviet Foreign policy took place after the death of Stalin in 1953. The new leadership laid emphasis on
greater friendship and peace. Explaining the new Policy of Soviet Union. Malenkov said, ”Our policy is to
further peace and friendship with all peoples. Our policy is one of co-operation between the two different
systems, capitalism and socialism. Our chief concern is to prevent another war and to live in peace in all
countries. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government hold that the most correct,
the most necessary and just foriegn policy of peace among all nations founded upon mutual confidence and
eflicaeous policy based upon facts and corroborated by facts. The new leadership gave a proof of their
intention to pursue this policy by concluding an armistice in Korea and arriving at a settlement in Vietnam,
which resulted in the paration of the territory between the Communists (North) and non-Communists
(Sourth). It also concluded treaties with Austria and Germany to bring the war to a formal conclusion. In the
Far East Soviet Union transferred all her rights in Manchuria to People’s Repbulic of China to reduce
tension. Soviet Union released Porkkala to Finaland forty years before the date of expin, of lease. In short, in
the post
lntemational Relations >61
Stalin period Russia followed a bold policy of moderation and tried to relax tension in almost all the spheres.
Policy under Bulganin an”hruschev:
After Malenkov’s resig`n4tion in Februry 1955 Bulganin and Khruschev guided the foreign policy’-of
Russia. They also tried to follow policy of peaceful co-exeistence and settle, all outstanding differences. In the
Summit Conference at Geneva in 1955 an effort was made to arrive at some understanding on the outstanding issues
like Germany, disarmament. etc. However, much success could not be achieved. As a result both the power blocs
continued to increase their military strength and expand their spheres of influence. Soviet Union tried to enhance its
influence in the East by assisting countires like India, Egypt, etc. Russia helped India to set up steel plant at Bhilai
and offered to help Egypt in the construction of the Aswan Dam. It increased its trade with the countries of east and
tried to acquire greater influence
by making available loans and grants on most favourable terms. Russia provided arms to Egypt and encouraged
Egypt to go ahead with the nationalisation of Suez Canal. Subsequently, when Britain, France and Israel took military
action against Egypt, Soviet Union extended support to Egypt and played a leading role in getting a resolutionpassed
through the Security Council asking these powers to withdraw. It is noteworthy that even U.S.A. co-operated with
Soviet Union on this issue.
The period also witnessed efforts by Soviet Union to improve relations with U.S.A. In 1956 Russia
proposed a treaty of friendship and co-opeation, but the same was turned down by U.S.A. In 1957 the General
Assembly adopted a Declaration of Peaceful Co-existence of States at the instance of Soviet Union. In 1957 Soviet
Union made several proposals for reduction of international tension. It suggested conclusion of nonaggression pact
between members of NATO and WARSAW Treaty countries. In 1958 Soviet Union took an important step in the
direction of reducing tension by announcing unilateral cessation of Atom and Hydrogen tests. However, these
proposals of Soviet Union did not receive ready response from the Western Powers. because doubted the sincerly of
Soviet Union. In 1959 Khruschev visited U.S. to promote friendly relations between the two countries. This was
followed by a Summit Conference at Paris in whcih four big powers (U.S.A.,. U.S.S.R., Britain and France) were to
participate. But this Conference was wrecked by the U-2 incident which gave a great setback to improvement of
relations between the two countries.
In 1962 Soviet Union’s relations with U.S.A. were greatly strained due to Cuban crisis and there was every
possibility that two grants may clash However, due to efforts of the U.N. Secretary General (U thant)
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union the crisis was averted. Russia agreed to dismantle its missile bases in Cuba
under international supervision. This stand of Soviet Union was hailed throughout the world as a significant
contribution of Russia towards promotion of world peace.
Another important feature of Soviet Foreign Policy during this period was the mounting tension with
China. The policy of de-Stalinisation launched by Khruschev in Russia was greatly criticised by the Chinese leaders
which produced a great schism in Communist camp. In reality apart from the ideological difference there were
certain other important factors which contributed to tension between Soviet Union and China, viz., the desire of
China to assert its independence and assume leadership of the Communist countries in South-East Asia, adoption of
new
economic policy by China against the advice of Soviet experts, the pro-Indian-stands of the Russian leaders during
the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962,~and criticism of pull out from Cuba as surrender, etc.
It has been opined by certain scholars that the Soviet Foreign Policy under Bulganin and Khurshchev did
not fundamentally differ from the policy pursued by Stalin and only the method of its conduct changed. For instance.
Fainshon syas: ”The Khrushchev-Bulganin arsenal of intensive industrialisation diplomacy, trade, technical assistance,
cultural penetration arid subversion is no less formidable than the cruder threats, pressure and bluster which Stalin
employed in the period of Berlin blockade and the Korean adventure.”
Policy under Kosygin arid Brezhnev:
With the overthrow of Khusrhchev in October 196=1 the era of collective leadership set in Soviet Union which
resulted in some modications in the foreign policy pursued by Khrshchev. The new leadership (Kosygin and
Brezhnev) reasserted that it ”considers supports of international revolutionary forces as an indivisible part of its
activity because only Communism can solve the fundamental problems of social development deliver mankind from
oppression and exploitation from hunger and poverty, from militarism and wars and establish on our planet
democracy, peace. friendship among peoples and a life inkeeping with dignity of man.” However, the new leaders
also continued the policy of peaceful co-operation with the capitalist countries.
The new leadership also tried to imponre relations with the Communist countries by undertaking personal
visits to China and North Vietnam. But as these Chinese leaders could not reconcile with the Soviet policy of
coexistence of states with different sociarsystems, much progress could not be made in normalisation of rleations
with China. The Cultural Revolution in China further stood in the way of improvement of relations between Soviet
Union and People’s Republic of China. Taking advantage
562
I~temational Relations
563
.,; the liberal policy of Moscow some of the Communsit countries like
!:o mania, Cuba, Czechoslovakia etc. asserted their independence.
An effort was also made to improve relations with U.S.A. and
ctlrer Western countries. A Consular Treaty was concluded with U.S.A. by •,3Irich the two countries granted
immunity to the consular staff. They also
:~reed on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which was subsequntly ;adopted by the General Assembly. Despite
efforts to reach understanding u ith U.S.A., there continued to be certain irritants like Vietnam, Germany Mid Israel
problems whcih strained continued efforts to imporve relations °,~ ith U.S.A. and concluded a number
or agreements for co-operation in the °ommercial and cultural spheres.
Policy After Kosygin and Brezhnev
The foreign policy of Soviet Union in the post Kosygin-Brezhnev
;Lriod was not fundamentally different from the policy pursued during the f:osygin-Brezhnew period and kept on
fluctuating according to the Jianging international conditions.
The new Soviet leaders tried to improve relations with United
States and succeeded in concluding agreements for cooperation in the fields of exploration of outer space, problems
of environment, medical science, public health, technology etc. The trade relations between the two amntries also
showed an improvement. The leaders of two countries event showed their keenness to end armament race and
concluded SALT-I 4 ”trategic Arms Limitation Treaty) in 1972 and SALT II in 1979. The riders of the two countries
paid courtesy visits to the capitals of each other
~~!id thus displayed unprecedented armity towards each other.
This process of improvement of relations with USA suffered a set-
b:ick following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. During the i,,-xt few years relations between the two
super powers continued to <?cteriorate and a sort of new cold war set in. United States did not send its -ontingned
to the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980 and Soviet Union rclatiated by abstaining from the Olympic Games in
Los Angeles in 1984.
’:oViet Union tried to undermine influence of USA in Middle East by
ipplying arms to Syria. It also encouraged peace movements in Europe
-.ith a view to seaken American hold on Western Europe. Soviet leaders
.>iso condemned US bid to overthrow constitutional regime in Grenada, a
anbbean Island. The shooting down of the South Korean Boeing 747
irliner by Soviet Union was likewise condemned by United States. The
ther factors which contributed to straining of relations between the two
ountries were imposition of economic sanctions by USA against Poland
”oviet Union. In short the relations bcm-cen the two super powers grc~ rite tense.
be
Foreign Policy of Sovfet Union
56-1
;o as
„,~ relations with
ooh. President Reagan of USA also responded favourably and in 1984 the
tw’o countries agreed to extend treaty, of economic cooperation concluded in
1974 for a further period of ten years. They also initiated talks on
disarmament at Geneva in January 1985. After some initial difficulties
President Reagan of USA and Mikhail Gorbachev of Soviet Union arrived
at some understanding on bilateral arms control issues at Reykjavik
meeting in October 1986. This was followed by a number of summit
meetings between the leader of two countries paving the way .for the INF
Treaty. Thus gradually
the policy, of confrontation gave way to policy of
cooperation. This change was reflected in Soviet decision to withdraw its occupation forces from Afghanistan.
The United State also responded with full warmth and soon the new cold war was replaced by a fresh detente.
After a general review of Soviet foreign policy since 19-45. it shall
desirable to make detailed study of its foreign policy- with regard to various regions and powers.
Policy Towards United States
Soviet policy towards United States in the years after Second World war was characterised by fear and hostility.
This fear and hostility
was the logical outcome of the moves of United States to create alliances with countries bordering on the Soviet
territory, which was looked by the Soviet Union as a clever move to encircle her. Soviet Union tried to meet the
possible threat by forming WARSAW Pact and consolidating her orbit. This policy of Soviet Union underwent great
change in the post Stalia period when the new leaders asserted that the two systems--capitalism and socialism--could
co-exist. They asserted that their main was to prevent
another war and live in peace. This change in Soviet policy was reflected in her settlement with USA over Korea and
Vietnam. Soviet Union also
concluded treaties with Austria and Germany to bring the Second World War formally to an end. In 1956 Soviet
Union proposed a treat- of friendship and co-operation to United States but the same was turned down by United
States. Soviet Union made further bids to reduce tension with America and Western countries and suggested a non-
aggression pact between the members of NATO and WARSAW treat- countries. In 19>9 Khruschev paid a visit to
United States to promote friendly relations between two countries.
The process of improvement of relations with setback in 1962 due to Cuban crisis and
USA suffered a there was a possibility of opw
clash between the two. However, the situation was defused due to intervention of UN Secretary General and spirit of
accommodation shown hw Soviet leaders. In the subsequent years efforts were continued to
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565
improve relations with USA. A
Consular Treaty was concluded with
USA by which the two countries
granted immunity to the consular staff.
The two also reached ,an agreement
on non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. However, the relations
continued to be strained due of
differences on problems of Vietnam,
Germany and Israel. In 1972 and 1973
President Nixon and Secretary
Brezhnev paid visits to Moscow and
Washington respectively which
resulted in conclusion of number of
agreements between the two-countries
for co-operation in commercial and
cultural spheres.
The process of normalisation of relations between USSR and USA was seriously hampered following Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. United States embarked upon plans to modernise its weapons and army to meet
by possible threat from Soviet Union. The other factors which contributed to strained relations between the two
were imposition of sanctions by USA and its allies against Poland and Soviet support of military presence in
Kampuchea. As a result the two countries decided to boycott the Olympic games held in Moscow and Los Angeles.
In the midst of these developments the leaders of the two countries decided to improve their relations and
held a number of summit meetings. to come to . some sort of understanding on disarmament. As important summit
meeting was held at Geneva in November 1985 between President Reagan and Gorbachev. Though this meeting
failed to produce any tangible results, it led to six bilateral agreements between the two superpowers. These
agreements related to cooperation on cultural and scientific exchanges; resumption of civil aviation ties; improvement
in air safet`• in the North Pacific region; the establishment of consulates in Kiew and New York; and co-operation in
magnetic fusion research and environmental protection. The conclusion of these agreements reflected the desire of
the two countries to improve their relations.
In March 1986 once again the relation between Soviet Union and USA were strained following U.S. air
strikes against Libyan ships and Soviet condemnation of the US action. Soviet Union also criticised US for its
interference in the affairs of other countries particularly the supply of military aid to anti-government rebels in
Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua etc. The detention of US journalist Nicholas Daniolf on suspicion of espionage in
Moscow on 30 August, 1986 also contributed to deterioration of relation between the two countries. Despite these
set backs the leaders of tile two countries held a summit meeting at Geneva to come to an agreement on
disarmament. The two countries also concluded various agreement to cooperation in different fields. Thus on 22
August 1986 the atomic energy officials of the two countries agreed to revive the formal exchanges on nuclear energy
including the question of nuclear safety. In November 1986 the two agreed to coordinate projects and exchange data
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union 566
on the unmanned exploration of Mars, other planets and deep space. On 1 5 January 1987 US administration
announced the lifting of an embargo on the export of oil and gas drilling equipment to Soviet Union (which had
been imposed during the administration
of President Carter). All this clearly indicated that both the powers were keen to place their relations on normal
footings.
During the subsequent years dialogue continued between Reagan
and Gorbachev and the two powers reached substantive agreements in the areas of arms control, regional policy and
bilateral cooperation. They also ratified the 1987 INF Treaty, which had been focal point of controversy
between the two for nearly a decade, and moved towards an agreement for reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by
SO%. They also held talks for reduction of conventional forces in Europe. In short the policy of confrontation gave
way to cooperation between the two and the ideological and social differences which had divided the two powers
tended to disappear. ’
At the Malta Summit held in December 1989 President Bush and
President Gorbachev made a hid to reduce tension and check growing threats of conflicts in various parts of the
world. The process of understanding was carried forward at the Washington Summit held in June 1990 when the two
leaders worked out agreements on nuclear chemical
and conventional army. They also concluded agreements to restore normal trading relations. However the critical
attitude of United States towards
Soviet Government’s handling of the secessionist Baltic Republics proved a major irritant in relations between two
super powers.
Soviet Policy towards West Europe
The basic principles of Soviet Foreign policy towards Europe in the past World War II period continued
to be some which had guided its foreign policy since 1917. these included (i) to restore and maintain territorial
integrity of the Russian Empire; (ii) to acquire control over Eastern Europe with a view to prevent its alliance with
West (iii) to neturalise and to acquire control over whole or part of Germany. For the attainment of these objectives
Stalin tried to push United States. U.K. and
France out of West Berlin even though he did not quite succeed in this. Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin also tried
to pursue this policy. Simultaneously he also tried to woo Britain and cultivate Gaullist France with a view to increase
Soviet influence in Western Europe.
Soviet Union also tried to increase its influence in West Europe
through success in this regard. However, in the wake of Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 the West European Communist Parties became
distrustful of Soviet leadership and began to act in an autonomous n Tanner.
,.,

567
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created further wedge betwe’e’n Soviet Union and West European
Communist parties.
Despite hostile attitude displayed by the West European
countries towards Soviet Union on account of their close alliance with United States Soviet Union continued to make
efforts to improve relation with these countries because she badly needed their technology. Soviet Union indicated its
readiness to supply raw materials, specially petroleum and natural gas, which were needed by the West European
countries. Soviet leadership realised that relations with West European countries could not improve unless a wedge
was created between United States and West European countries. It therefore extended full support to the peace
movements in Europe to win over the public opinion. It may be observed that the Soviet Union did not start or
control the West European Peace Movements. It merely exploited these movements and extended them necessary
financial support. In this way Soviet Union tried to project the impression that United States posed a greater danger
to world peace than Soviet Union.
Despite political difference with West European countries. Soviet Union tried to develop very intimate
trade relations with these countries. Soviet Union first of all concluded trade and commercial agreements with Italy in
1969 and agreed to supply ever 100,000 million cubic metres of Soviet natural gas during the next 20 years.
Subsequently through another agreement it promised to supply Italy additional 21,000 million cubic metres of Soviet
natural gas during 1978-2000 A.D. The two countries concluded a number of other agreements for economic,
industrial and technical cooperation. Likewise Soviet Union tried to increase co-operation with Britain during the
Premiership of Wilson (1964-70), even though these relations some what cooled down under the Conservatives.
After the return of Labour to power. Soviet Union once again tried to normalise relations with Britain. In 1975 the
two concluded an agreement for cooperation in economic and industrial sphere for a period of ten years. this
agreement was replaced by an Anglo Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation Programme for 1986-1990 in
1986. On 2 February 1987 Soviet Union concluded a new long-term credit and trade financing agreement with U.K.
which provides for financial support for U.K. exports and capital goods and equipments upto 1990. Hopes were
expressed that the agreement would help revive UK exports to Soviet Union which had been steadily declining
during the past few years. In March April, 1987 Mrs. That other paid a visit to Moscow and signed several
agreements. These agreements provided for (i) upgrading of the hotline communication links between London and
Moscow; (ii) increased cooperation in civilian space research; (iii)
new sites for embassies of two countries in Moscow and
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Foreign Policy of Soviet
Union 568
London. the two counties also endorsed a memorandum on cultural information and education exchanges.
Soviet .Union tried to develop even more intimate relations with France because its leadership showed
clear sings of pursuing a foreign policy independent of.United States and announced in 1966 its decision to
withdraw from NATO military organisation. The leader of France and U.S.S.R. exchanged visits and concluded
agreements for closer relations. Between 1975-1979 the two countries concluded a number of agreements under
which Soviet Union made large purchases from France which helped that country to tide over the conditions of
recession prevailing in the
economy of the country.
Soviet Union’s relations with France further improved as a result of two day summit talks held between
President Gorbachov and Mitterrand
in July 1989, they signed a declaration on the principles of developing and upgrading economic, industrial, scientific
and technical cooperation.
But probably the most important change in Soviet Union’s policy towards West Europe was reflected in
its plan of 6 March 1989 which proposed major east-west reduction of troops and armour in Europe, along with
negotiations to eliminate all battlefield nuclear weapons from the continent. The fall of the communist regimes in
most of the East European
countries was welcomed by Soviet Union, which is a clear indication that the present Soviet leaders are following a
policy of co-existence context.
The basic principles on which the present Soviet policy towards Europe rests are (i) encouragement of
socio-economic reforms in the countries of East Europe; (ii) non-interference in the affairs of each other; (iii)
Common European Home and abandonment of confrontationist policy; (iv) conduct of relations with individual
countries on non-bloc on the basis of mutual interests. This change in the policy of Soviet Union is evident from the
fact that it supported unification of the two German states and even agreed to the United Germany continuing as a
member of NATO. Further, it contributed to the winding up of the Warsaw Pact by withdrawing Soviet troops from
countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia etc. In short, the current European policy of Soviet Union rests on the
principles of distancing itself from the ideology-based political, economic and military division itself from the
ideology-based political, economic and military division, of Europe and to pursue the aim of common European
home.
Relations with Communist Countries
After World War II, Soviet Union emerged as the leader of the
Communist countries not only in Eastern Europe but in other parts of the world too. It tired to unify the
Communist forces by establishing the
international Relations
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) with Poland; Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romainia as its members. Subsequently, it brought the Communist countries together through the Warwaw Pact
1955 to ensure their greater co-operation in the military field. Soviet Union, as leader of the Communist countries
came to the rescue of other Communist countries whenever their existence was threatened. Thus, she took armed
action in East Berlin in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Soviet Union also tried to maintain its hold on the Communist
countries through the instruments of economic and military assistance. However, with the emergence of people’s
Republic of China as a leading Communists power in the late fifties, a challenge to Soviet leadership of the
Communist world was posed. Some of the Communist countries like Albania moved closer to China while others,
like Yugoslavia and Poland, asserted their independence from the Soviet Union without joining the Chinese camp.
The growing intimacy between U.S.A. and China in the seventies also contributed to further straining of Soviet
relations with China. these relations continued to be quite hostile till the dawn of the eighties when President
brezhve made a bid to bring about some sort of approachment with China. As a result talks took place between the
delegations of China and Soviet Union in Beijing in October 1982, in Moscow in March 1983 and again in Beijing in
October 1983. Though these talks did not produce any concrete results, they certainly led to an improvement in
the relations between the two countries. there was increased trade and more exchanges in cultural, academic and
sports fields. The improved relations between the two countries is evident from the fact that on the death of
Brezhnev on 10 November 1982 Chinese Foreign Minister represented his country at his funeral. Yury Andropove,
who Succeeded Brezhncy as President of Soviet Union asserted that Soviet Union wanted’ to improve relations with
all socialist nations including our great neighbour the Poeple’s republic of China.
However, no improvement in the relations between two countries could take place on account of growing
military co-operation between China and U.S.A. and the Chinese provocations against Vietnam. Supply of larger
quantities of arms to guerrillas in Afghanistan by China also contributed to straining of relations. Despite these
setbacks the leaders of the two countries made efforts, to settle their long-pending border issues and to
promote trade. A success in this direction was achieved in December 1984 when the two countries concluded three
agreements on economic, technical and scientific co-operation. Despite this development, there were numerous
obstacles in the way of developing normal relations between two countries. the Chinese leaders asserted that their
relations with Soviet Union could not improve unless it stopped supporting Vietnam’s military presence in
Kampu(hca, reduced forces along Chinese
569
570
Foreign policy of Soviet Union
border and withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was, however, not inclined to concede these
demands. Further Soviet Union viewed with great concern the growing political and military contacts between China
and USA.
Despite this China continued her policy of gradually improving
trade and government relations with Soviet Union. In 1985 the two signed a trade agreement which provided for a
total trade turn over of 14 billion U.S. dollars by 1990. Soviet Union also agreed to refurbish some 155 industrial
plants in China built during the heydays of Sino-Soviet cooperation and abandoned by Soviet Union in 1980
following its pull out from China. the two countries also agreed to hold regular rounds of talks for normalisation of
relations. In ,luly 1986 President Gorbachev offered a -unilateral concession on a river dispute between China and
Soviet Union by accepting the Chinese claim that border ran down the middle of the
river channel. He even indicated his intention to withdraw substantial part of Soviet troops from Mongolia. This was
followed by decision to withdraw Soviet army from Afghanistan. Thus at least two major hurdles in the way of
normalisation of relations between Soviet Union and China were removed. In October 1988 the two countries agreed
on permanent arrangement for adjusting boundary disputes. The last thaw in Sino-Soviet relations was removed with
the announcement regarding the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from kampuchea by 30 September 1989.
The process of improvement of relations with China culminated in the Beijing Summit in May 1989 which
ended quarter century of discords and contributed to normalistion of Sino-Soviet relations. At this Summit China
and Soviet Union (a) agreed to gradually reduce arid end ail military aid to Kampuchean factions following
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops (b) agreed to develop relations on, the basis of universal principles guding state-to-
state ties vii. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other’s internal
hairs; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful existence;
(c) expressed their resolve to settle their disputes through peaceful negotiations; (d) ;;greed to take measures to cut
down the military forces in the areas along the Sino-Soviet boundary to minimum level (d) agreed to settle the
SinoSoviet boundary question on the basis of treaties concerning the present boundary and generally recognised
principles of international law; (f) agreed to work for the development of economic trade, scientific, technological,
cultural and other relations on the basis of equally and mutual benefit to deepen mutual understanding; (g) Soviet
Union expressed support to the Chinese stand that Taiwan was an inalienable
part of People’s republic of China and expressed opposition to all attempts to. create two Chinas; (h) asserted that
neither would ,yrek hegemony in
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any other parts of the world and agreed to denounce the attempts by other countries to impose their will on
others; (i) favoured enhancement of the prestige of the United Nations and envisaged greater role for it in the
international affairs.
The Beijing summit thus marked the culmination of the process of Sin-Soviet rapprochement which
began as far back as 1982 when Brezhnev made a series f gestures to improve relations between the two countries.
The friendly, attitude of Soviet Union towards Chinese government was evident from the fact that in the wake of
tiananmen massacre, whereas other major powers like USA Britain condemned the Chinese government the Soviet
Union expressed cautious support to the Chinese government. It not only described the unrest as an internal affair
of China but also condemned outside intervention. In short, Soviet Union’s relations with China which were
highly strained during the past three decades have considerably improved and the hostility which characterised the
relations between the two countries is Conspicuously, absent.
Soviet Policy in Middle East
Soviet Union has deep interest in Middle East. In fact even before the counmencement of Secord World war
Soviet Union showed keen interest in the region and concluded a treaty, of friendshop with Turkey. After the war
Soviet Unin pleaded with Britain and United States to revise the status of the turkish straits. As this was of
disadvantage to turkey, she naturally resisted it and preferred to co-operate with the western powers. Turkey joined
CENTO (Baghdad Pact) to defeat the Soviet designs.
Soviet Union also showed keen interest in Iran and demanded oil concessions. But this demand of Soviet
Union was firmly turned down by Iran. Thereupon Soviet Union .stirred a revolution in the province of Azerbaijan.
Iran sent forces to
suppress the revolt. Ultimately Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops at the intervention of Security Council and
a joint Soviet Iranian Oil Comapany was formed. However, after about a year Iran refused to ratify the oil agreement.
After Iran joined th Baghdad Pact in 1955 the Soviet Influence further declined in the country. thereupon Soviet
Union tried to befriend Iraq and concluded a treaty of friendship with that country. Thereafter Soviet Union
maintained friendly relations with Iraq and its relations with Iran became somewhat strained.
Another issue of Middle-East in which Soviet Union was deeply involved was the question of creation of
Israel. In fact Soviet Union espoused the cause of Arabs during the Second World War. But after the creation of
Israel Soviet Union established freindly relations with that country. However, these relations could not grow along
friendly lines showed a deterioration. The relation between Soviet Union and Israel reached their lowest ebb in 1967
when Soviet Union cut-off diplomatic
’Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
relations with Israel as a protest against the occupation of Arab lands
during the six day war between Arab and Israel. thereafter all offers for
improvement. of relatons made by Israel were spurned by Soviet Union.
s Soviet Union has consistently insisted on israel’s withdrawal from the
territory as a condition for normalisation of relations between the two
countries. On the other hand Soviet Union maintained best of relatiions
with the Arab countries. On the other hand Soviet Union maintained best
of relations with the Arab countries and consistenlty supported them
against Israel. it provided assistance of egypt in the construction of Aswan
Dam, after the western powers refused to give her the promised aid. Soviet
Union supported Egypt following combined attack by Israel, U.K. and
France in the wake of nationalisation of Suez Cana. In the Arab Israel War
of 1967 also Soviet Union supported the Arabs even though the Arabs were
not happy with the quantum of the support and assistance provided by
Soviet Union. Therefter Soviet influence with the Arabs suffered a decline.
This provided an opporutnity to United States Treaty of Friendship in
March 1976 unilaterally by Egypt. However, Soviet Union retraced their
position successfully in Iraq. Libya and Syria. It also provided arms, ammunition and training to the Palestine
Liberation Organisation.
settlement between the Arabs and Israel in the wake of 1979 conflict gave
a further setback to Soviet Union in Middle East. However certain states
like Jordan, Kuwait etc. were unhappy with USA and moved closer to
Soviet
Union. This automatically enhanced Soviet influence in the region .
Soviet Union’s involvement in the Middle East grew deeper in the 1980s
due to out-break of Iran-Iraq war. Soviet Union greatly contributed to the
superiority of Iraq’s air power, which was naturally disliked by Iran and
greatly contributed to the freezing of relations between Soviet Union and
Iran. the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was also a source of
irritation of Iran. But the growing tension between Iran and USA helped
Soviet Union to imporve relations with Iran. It played a positive role in
defreezing the situation after the Iran-Iraq peace talks ran into troubled
waters in August 1988 following insistence by Iran that Iraq should
withdraw all its troops from 1000 sq. km. of Iranian territory and Iraq’s
insistence that Shatt-al-Arab water way should belong to Iraq. Soviet
Union also made a bid to improve relations with Iran by supporting the
stand that Iraq should withdraw from the Iranian territory. On 23 June
1989 Soviet President signed a pact with Ali Akbar Hoshemi rafsanjani
and pledged to cooperate in strenghtening the defence capacity of Iran. The
tw o leaders pledged to strive for a broad acquintance with each other’s life,
culture convictions, customs and traditions. It may 1.~: observed that this
imponement of relations became possible due to the political and
economic compul%ions on both the sides. the end of Iran-Iraq war and
572
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withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghansitan also grea improvement of relations between the two countries. On
th’. the desire to overcome its prolonged international isolation s, contributed to the desire for imporvement of ties
with Soviet Un,
573
facilitated ’rt of Iran to have
During the Persian Gulf War bf 1991 Soviet Union preferred to keep out of the armed conflict due to
internal problems and complexities. Instead of supporting Iraq, one of its friends in Middle East and a major
purchaser of Soviet arms. President Gorbachev supported all the resolutions of the UN Security Council on Iraq.
This attitude of Soviet Union towards the Middle East should not be interpreted as loss of Soviet interest in this
region. It would be tog much to say that Soviet Union has given up the long term interests which it gained in the
Middle East over the past several decades. In fact the Soviet Policy towards Middle East has been consistently based
on the principle that it has no permanent friends or adversaries in the region and is always willing to make necessary
adjustments to preserve its permanent interests.
Soviet Policy in South Asia
On account of the proximity of South
the Soviet Un’
Asia to the Soviet territory, ion has taken keen interest in the region. It tried to
develop very intimate relations with India, the largest country in the region. Though her relations with India started
on a note of caution in intimate. These intimate relations manifested themselves in the form of Treaty of Peace and
Friendship between the two in 1971. It may be noted that friendly relations between Soviet Union and India greatly
helped India, specially in its disputes with Pakistan. On a number of occasions Soviet Union supported India on the
kashmir issue. She also helped India to :modernise her forces after the border war with China. Again it was Soviet
military intervention in Bangladesh which kept the United States at bay during the Indo-Pak Conflict of 1971. In her
own interest Soviet Union has laid great emphasis on settlement of regional conflicts in South Asia through bilateral
negotiations and insisted on keeping the region free from external interference.
Soviet Union also tried to cultivate friendly relations with Pakistan and offered her economic assistance.
Knowing fully well Pakistan’s close links with United States. Soviet leaders generally under played the anti-Soviet
activities and pronouncements of Pakistan government. It has been making offers to successive Pakistan
governments for more closer co-operations but the Pakistan authorities did not respond to these offers due to
domestic compulsion as well as pressure from United States. Following.-Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979
and the induction of sophisticated weapons by U.S.A in Pakistan, Soviet interest in the region further inereasad and it
tried to strengthen its relations with
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
574
India to counter the possible threats. Soviet attitude towards Pakistan somewhat softened following an accord .
between the two Super Powers with regard to Afghanistan, whereby they agreed not to supply arms to either party
and tried to treat the controversial issues as closed. The end of cold war also greatly facilitated improvement of
relations with Pakistan.
Soviet Union also tried to maintain cordial relations with Bangladesh and provided enormous assistant to
that county for its reconstruction. However, these relations got strained in late 1983 when Bangladesh closed two
Soviet Cultural Centres and expelled 14 Soviet diplomats. The relations between the two countries showed some
improvement in 1987 and in June, 1987 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister paid a visit to Bangladesh. In the course of
this visit the two countries concluded a three year cultural and scientific agreement. Thus Soviet Union has made
consistent efforts to maintain influence in South Asia. In this respect it has banked heavily on India and tried to
cultivate intimate relations with that country.
Soviet Policy in South East Asia
Soviet Union has been deeply involved in South-East Asia ever since the conclusion of the Second World War. It
greatly benefited from the power vacuum which was created in the region duty to defeat of Japan, and inability of
Britain, China and other powers to play any effective role due to their weakened position. Russia was able to
establish vet’ intimate relations with China and concluded a Treaty of Friendship. Alliance and mutual help with her
in 1950. As a result of this treaty Soviet Union provided financial assistance, technical know how and other h®lp to
China in her construction. These relations continued to grow during the subsequent years. However, following
denunciation of Stalin by the new Soviet leaders in 1956, a sort of rift appeared in the Sino-Soviet relations. The rift
grew so serious that in 1960, Soviet Union decided to suspend all financial aid and withdraw her technicians from
China. The rift reached its peak in 1962 when the Soviet leaders disapproved to Chinese action against India.
Thereafter tension continued to grow between Soviet Union and China. The breach was further widened with
Soviet Union signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treat’ with USA and UK in 1963. As a result of Chinese Cultural
Revolution (1966-69) the tension further increased. In 1969 open clashes took place between Soviet Union and
China on the borders. In 1970’s with China drawing closer to USA the gap between the two was further widened. In
1978 Soviet support for entry of Vietnamese troops into neighbouring Kampuchea and the dispatch of Soviet
troops in Afghanistan in December 1979 Soviet leaders made a bid to resolve disputes and normal relations with
China. In the subsequent years also Soviet Union continued to make efforts to improve relations with China. It
conceded
lnteMatlonal Relations
validity
of China’s border claims, withdreis from Mongolia and Afghanistan reduced troops along Sino-Soviet
border and pressurized Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. In 1989 a. meeting was held between
President Gorbachev and Den China and Soviet Union agreed to renovate the plants which
i -
summit Xio Ping of it had set up n China m 190 s. In short, the tension which once characterised the Sino-
Soviet relations has gradually, died out and their relations are developing along normal lines.
Russia also took keen interest in Korea, which was divided into two parts- North and South which
continued to be under the
influence of Soviet Union and United States respective(-. 1n 1950 a war broke out between two Koreas and Soviet.
Union continued to support North Korea. while U.S.A. supported South Korea. The war was brought to an end
through a truce concluded in 1953. Subsequently, however, Chinese influence in North Korea increased while that of
Soviet Union declined. Of late the process of improvement of relations between North Korea and Soviet Union has
started. This is evident from the fact that the leaders of Soviet Union and North Korea exchanged visits during the
year 1984 and 1986 respectively. As a result of these visits Soviet Union agreed to sell and advanced MIG 23 Soviet
fighter air-craft to North Korea. Despite
intimate relations with North Korea. Soviet Union tried to improve ’ established formal relations with South
Korea which was not liked by North Korea. Soviet Union tried to improve
relations with South Korea. It established formal relations with South
Korea which was not liked by North Korea. However, it cannot be denied
that this change in attitude towards South Korea provided a fillip to the
movement for unity, of two Koreas. This process of unity, was further
facilitated by the end of cold war between two Super powers.
Soviet Union has also taken keen interest in Indo-China and tried to counter-balance the American
influence in the region, by extending every possible assistance to North Vietnam. Later on Soviet Union played vital
tote in bringing about peace in Vietnam. Subsequently the two parts of Vietnam united and formed the unified state
of Vietnam which is under the influence of Soviet Union. In Cambodia also the Soviets have gained ascendancy over
the Chinese. In Cambodia (Kampuchea) which was earlier under the influence of China, the Heng Samarin
government (under the influence of Vietnam) captured the capital and adjoining territories and the Pol Pot regime
(under the influence of China) had to flee. Thus Soviet Union came to exercise indirect control over Kampuchea as
well. This naturally caused resentment amongst the Chinese and they continued to insist on the withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. In 1989. following bid by Soviet Union leaders to improve relations with
China. the
rely
dons with South Korea. It
foreign Policy of Soviet Union
Soviet Union pressurized the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea. Subsequently Soviet Union
played a leading role in evolving a plan for the resolution of complex political problem of Cambodia. The plan
envisages a cease-fire between various factions and assigns significant role to the United Nations in the conduct of
free and fair elections as well as administration
of the country. The plan provides for establishment of a Supreme National Council, a body, with symbolic
administrative responsibilities (because the entire administration would be run by UN). It also provides for
regrouping of forces and re-location of cantonment areas and their arms stores under the supervision of UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). All the states participating in the Paris Conference are required to
respect independence sovereignty, territorial integrity, neutrality and national unit’ of Cambodia.
Soviet Union’s relations with Japan, another power of South East Asia, however could not develop along
intimate lines because the responsibility for the administrative of the counter (though formally given to the Allied
Council consisting of representatives of U.S.A. U.S.S.R., China, and U.K.) virtually, rested with the representatives
of United States. This enabled United States to draw a constitution for Japan on the pattern of American
constitution and acquire military bases and airfields in that county. In fact for first few years Japan was virtually a
satellite of United States and did not maintain any relations with Soviet Union. It was only gradually that Japan freed
itself from the control of United States and established relations with Soviet Union. During the period of detente
between Soviet Union and United States relations between Soviet Union and Japan showed improvement. But the
question of disputed Northern territories proved to be the main stumbling block in the way of improvement of
relations between the two countries. The relations between Soviet Union and Japan again took a turn for the worse
following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Japan’s decision to join the western boycott and embargo against
Soviet Union. Japans close militay ties with United States and deployment of U.S. F. 1>s in Misawa in northern
Japan, further added to tension between the two countries. But in 1985 these relations showed an improvement
following lifting of economic sanctions against Soviet Union Japan also agreed to participate in the joint ptojects to
develop natural gas of Sakhalin and invested U.S.S.R 180 million in the projects. The Japanese government indicated
its intentions to normalise relations with Soviet Union and extended an invitation to Mikhail Gorbachev towards the
close of 1987 to visit Tokyo but the same was declined by the Soviet leader. In fact during the year 1987 the
relations between two countries were damaged on account of restrictions imposed by Japan on bilateral trade after
the discovery of scandal involving illegal export of Western technology by Toshiba Machine Co. A series of spy-
International
Relations
577
scandals involving the two countries also strained the relations. In November 1987 a Soviet delegation under Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister visited Japan and held discussions on bilateral and international issues. In the course of
these discussions Japan showed its unwillingness to support Soviet demand for membership of General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), unless it carried out wholesale reform of Soviet domestic economic system. The
Soviet delegation . also felt unhappy over Japan’s determination to strengthen its defensive alliance with USA. Thus,
all the efforts to effect improvement in the bilateral relations between the two countries proved futile. In fact the
question of northern territories still continues to be a major stumbling block in the way of improvement of relations
between the two countries.
Thus, we find that contrary to the general expectations that the region of South East Asia would gradually
pass under the influence of China, the Soviet Union has succeeded in establishing its dominance over the region.
Soviet Union and the Third World
Soviet Union did not develop any systematic policy towards the third world countries during the regime of
Stalin because he castigated the
national leaders of India (Nehru) and Indonesia (Sukarno) for their collaboration with the western colonial powers. A
change in Soviet attitude took place under Khruschev. He began to court the national bourgeoisie in the third world
countries with a view to weaken the western influence in these states.
Thereafter, Soviet Union adopted a very helpful attitude towards the countries of the world and made
consistent efforts to win them over to its side by offering them economic and military, assistance. Soviet Union
offered loans and aid to these countries on most favourable terms. The most common feature of these loans was that
the period of repayment
stretched over a long period and the repayment was accepted in the shape of traditional exports of the recipient
countries even if Soviet Union did not aced these goods. Further, often Soviet Union came to the rescue of countries
of third world when they were disappointed with the western powers. For example Soviet Union provided assistance
to Egypt in the completion of Aswan Dam after United States and other western powers declined to help her. Like
wise she rendered assistance to countries like India, Indonesia. Egypt, Algeria and Ghana etc. at the most crucial
stages.
Soviet Union always projected itself as an enemy of imperialism and extended support to people of various
colonies in their struggle against the imperialist powers. It strongly espoused their cause at the forums
of United Nations and pleaded for abolition of colonialism. It would not be
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union 578
wrong to say that it was chiefly due to support extended by Soviet Union that the process of decolonisation was
greatly expedited.
Military also Soviet Union extended every possible help to the third world countries. In 1959 the American
military power in Cuba was undermined chiefly due to efforts of Soviet Union. In 1958 Soviet Union supported Iraqi
revolution and thus neutralised the Baghdad Pact/CENTO, Alliance System. It provided sustained military assistance
to North Vietnam which resulted in replacement of America with Soviet military power in Indo-China. In 1979
Soviet Union made first direct intervention in third world in Afghanistan and sent Soviet military forces on a massive
scale.
However, Soviet policy in the third world has not been uniformly successful and a number of countries like
Ghana, Indonesia, Malta, Argentina, Egypt, and Somalia which were once close to Soviet Union have moved away
from her. In this regard the western states which have close historical and cultural ties with the ruling elites in the
third world countries have been at an advantage and wield considerable influence in the third world countries. The
position of Soviet Union in the third world was further undermined due to its inability to play an effective role during
the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Soviet Union not only failed to stand by its ally Iraq, but actually we, it along with
United States in supporting the various resolutions adopted by the Security Council.
Soviet Union and United Nations
Soviet Union showed keen interest in the establishment of the United Nations and has by and large
emerged as the staunch supporter of the world body. However, this contention has been refuted by certain scholars.
They have argued .that Soviet Union used U.N. form only to promote its national interests. This is fully borne out by
the fact that it made use of maximum number of vetoes in the Security Council to block decisions which tended to
go against it. While it cannot be denied that Soviet Union has made more liberal use of veto powers than the other
permanent members of the Security Council, and refused to co-operate with the United Nations on issues like Congo
and Korea. However, it is also true that Soviet Union has by and large supported the decisions and actions of the
United Nations. It has used UN forum to resolve various international conflicts viz. Arab-Israel conflicts of 1967,
and was instrumental in getting a resolution adopted by the General Assembly which called the British, French and
Israeli forces to withdraw
from the Suez Canal. It is true that Soviet Union made more liberal use of its veto powers, but this became inevitable
in view of the United Nations to be used as a tool for the furtherance of American and western interests. Further,
Soviet Union has done commendable job in advocating disarmament and
International Relations
579
colonisation through the forums of United-Nations. In short. we can say that despite Soviet opposition to United
Nations on some issues. it by and large expressed full faith and support to this world bode. In recent years Soviet
Union has shown greater faith in the United Nations. The growing faith of Soviet Union in United Nations is evident
from the fact that President Gorbachev has suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council
should accept the binding jurisdiction of tile International Court of Justice in mutually agreed areas of international
law.
Soviet Union and Disarmament
Soviet Union has been a leading advocate of disarmament and arms control. It consistently advocated the
prohibition of the nuclear and other tees of weapons of mass destruction. Soviet Union took a lead in demanding a
ban on atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy before insisting on international control. It argued that
international control could be instituted after an unequivocal agreement banning atomic weapons was signed by the
powers. It is true that during the first few years much progress could not be made in the direction of arms control
and disarmament due to rigid stand taken by the two superpowers. In this respect Soviet Union deserves the blame
for the failure of these attempts, but America is no less to be blamed for the same. After the death of Stalin more
sincere efforts were made by the Soviet leaders to achieve disarmament and such progress was made through the
conclusion of Test Ban , Treat (1963), Non Proliferation Treat- (1968). Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (1970), the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treat (1972), and host of other agreements. As a result of these treaties an agreement was
reached regarding the limitation of armaments of various tees and their restricted use. But probably the most
significant success was achieved in the shape of SALT I (1972) and SALT 11 (1979) which limited the use of
strategic arms by the two superpowers. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the disarmament efforts suffered
a setback.
In view of the persistent tension between U.S.A. and Soviet Union no further progress could be made in
the direction of disarmament. Soviet Uion refused to resume Disarmament talks at Geneva unless United States
reversed its policy of deployment of Perishing II and Cruise missiles in
Western Europe. A welcome development in this direction took’ place in January 1985 when the foreign ministers of
Soviet Union and United States met a Geneva. These talks were significant because the two countries agreed to
widen the scope of their talks by including space weapons and intermediate range nuclear missiles to the field of
strategic nuclear missiles. The talks were important in so far as Soviet Union agreed to relent its stand that it would
not hold any talk till .Cruise and Perishing II missiles was dismantled. Event U.S.A. showed spirit of accommodation
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
and agreed to broaden the scope of negotiations. The two powers reiterated their stand to work out effective
agreements to prevent arms race in space and terminate on earth. The nest round of talks was concrete in Geneva in
March 1985 despite the death of Soviet President. But no concrete results emerged on account of US refusal to lint:
controls on offensive missiles with the termination of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In November 1985
Gorhachov held a summit meeting with Reagan at Geneva and the two must not be waged. In January 1986 Soviet
Union 111111atC1’alh’ declared a moratorium on nuclear explosions for three months and invited United States to
join it. She offered to open all space research laboratories for inspection and suggested a step-by-step programme to
rid the earth of all nuclear weapons before the end of century. But much could not be accomplished on account of
reluctance of U.S.A. to negotiate a comprehensive Test Ban Treat or join the moratorium.
In 1986 and 1987 fresh Summit meetings took place at Geneva and Reykjavik between Soviet leaders and
President Reagan of United States. Though some progress was made at the meetings in concrete agreement on
disarmament could be reached. The main stumbling block was the adamant attitude of President Reagan on the Star
Wars Programme. Despite this Soviet Union continued in make frantic efforts to come to some sort of
understanding with United States on disarmament. 1n December 1987 at the Washington Intermediate Range
Missiles. At the Moscow Summit of 1988 the Treat on Intermediate Range Missiles was ratified and duly exchanged.
Soviet Union stepped up efforts to achieve disarmament during the next few years and succeeded in working out
certain agreements with USA. In June 1990 the two countries concluded agreements on nuclear. chemicals and
conventional arms. The two countries agreed to destroy thousands of tonnes of chemical weapons from 1992
onward and to stop further production of these weapons forth with. They also reached an agreement with regard to
the verification
protocols for the implementation of the earlier treaties restricting the sire of underground nuclear explosions. In
September 1990 President Gorbachev signed with other European leaders a treat for the reduction of conventional
weapons in Europe. It is evident from the preceding account that Soviet Union has consistently supported
disarmament.
A surrey of the Soviet Foreign Policy since 19:15 shows that Soviet Union have been quite pragmatic in
their approach. Tile Soviet leaders did not permit the ideology of Marxism-Leninism to filly colour their foreign
policy, decisions and tried to shape the foreign policy of the country keeping in view the national interests. But
ideology was also a prominent factors in the Soviet foreign policy. In short, we can say that foreign policy of Soviet
Union has been based on twin principle of real
580
International Relations >81
politick and ideology. However, in recent years the ideological aspect of the foreign policy of Soviet Union has been
overshadowed by the.realities of the situation both domestic and international. In view of this change certain scholars
have asserted that at present the Soviet foreign policy is based on pragmatism.
SOVIET DIPLOMACY, 1945-53
The areas in which the Soviet Union is most interested and in which she can most effectively bring
her diplomacy to bear are naturally those contiguous to her. Here she must erect her defense barriers
or launch her threatened conquests, as the case may be. There are three or possibly four such areas.
One is the Middle East, another the Far East, and another Gemian;. A ’fourth area, comprising the
satellite states of Eastern ”Europe. is in a somewhat anomalous position, being neither in the Soviet
Union nor apart from her. In the early postwar years all of these areas were the objects of intensive
Soviet diplomatic activity- and political pressures.
Pressures in the Middle East
For the fist decade after World War II the Russians gained no major victories in the Middle East and in
fact suffered some serious rebuffs: but they established contacts with various discontented groups and established the
basis for the exploitation of grievances and frictions. Subsequently they scored some obvious successes in the Arab
World, through arms deals, economic assistance, and propaganda campaigns.
The Turkish Straits. In 1946 the Soviet Union demanded a ”new regime” for the Straits, one to be
controlled by ”Turkey and other Black Sea Powers.” Turkey and the Soviet, Union, she proposed should ”organize
joint means of defense of the Straits.” Well aware of the implications of the demands. the Turkish government, with
the strong encouragement of Great
Britain and the United States, rejected them. Instead, it joined the two Western powers in proposing a conference to
revise the Montreux Convention. The Russians did not respond favouarbly to this suggestion. but they were unable
to obtain a ”new regime” for the Straits.
The Turks have shown a sturdy independence and a determination to resist Soviet pressures, and they are
aware of the seriousness of the Soviet threat. Turkey was quite willing to associate with Western and other states in
measures for collective self-defense, and was proud of the role that her troops played in resisting Communist
aggression in Korea.
Iran. As the end of the war approached, the Soviet Union revealed her aims in Iran by three major moves.
First, she revived the demand for an oil concession. In 194:1 an Assistant Commissar went to Teheran to negotiate
such a concession, but he returned to Moscow empty-handed. Second. she tried to stir up a revolt in the Iranian
province of Azerbajin
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
and to set up a puppet regime there. Late in 1945, when the province proclaimed itself an autonomous state, Russian
forces prevented the Iranian government from sending troops to suppress the revolt. Iran appealed to the Security
Council of the United Nations. In April, 19:15, the Soviet.Union promised to withdraw her troops from all of Iran in
return for the formation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company. With the departure of the Soviet troops the puppet
regime in Azerbaijan collapsed, and the Iranian government re-established its authority. To Russia’s deep chagrin the
Majlis, after a delay of nearly a year and a half, refused to ratify the oil agreement.
With the assassination of Premier,Alil Razmara in March. i951. and the formation of a government headed
by Mohammed Mossadegh, Iranian nationalism reached new heights of fanaticism. The chief object of attack was the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose vast properties in Iran were expropriated. This situation gave the Russian
communists an excellent gave the Russian Communists an excellent opportunity for their third move: to pose as
champions of Iranian independence from Western imperialism. The Soviet Union officially remained aloof from the
imbroglio, but her propaganda agencies gave full attention to the events in Iran.
Israel. The Soviet Union. at least until World War Il. had posed as a friend and protector of the Arab
world. She showed little syanpath; for Zionism, holding that it was ”a theocratic bourgeois doctrine. unworthy of
support.” With the emergence of the new Jewish state of Israel a ud its successful resistance to the Arab armies,
however, the Soy iet Union showed
a willingness to abandon the Arabs and to embrace. the anise of Israel. But Russian solicitude for Israel was short-
lived. Soviet pi:rges of early 1953 seemed to have a definite anti-Jewish cast: and in Febroan, tile Kremlin severed
diplomatic relations after the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Jerusalem. In more recent years Soviet anti-Scmitism
has icd to attacks on Jews in ”iron curtain” countries and to denunciations of lsracl
and Zionism as instruments of Anglo-American imperialism.
dispu stropkey in the Baghdad Pact. She was no longer a gaping hole in the
n tier” of states that forms the Middle Eastern frontier of the
Union.
582
After the fall of Mossdegh in 1953 and the settlement of the oil
te. the political and economic situation in Iran greatly improved. The
g anti-Western feeling subsided, and the Tudeh (Communist) Party
was outlawed In 1955 Iran associated herself with Britain Iraq Pakistan
and Tur ”norther Soviet
Involvement in East AsiaThe Soviet Union, with almost no effort or cost. scored rxP;uendous gains in
East Asia in 19-15. These came chiellv as a result of

International Relations 583

the Yalta Agreement, the occupation of Manchuria by Russian troops, the Sino Soviet
Treaty of August 1:4, 1945, and the power vacuum created bNJapan’s defeat. China’s
weakness and division, Britain’s inability to resume her former position. and the speedy
withdrawal and demobilization of the United States. Russia was not slow to profit from
the virtual removal of the once formidable counterweights to her ambitions in East Asia.
She Obtained the concessions in the Far East which had been promised to her at Yalta
and in the Sino Soviet Treaty, but she soon violated many of the pledges she had made in
return. In Manchuria she stripped the industrial plants and withdrew her forces in such a
way as to aid the Chinese Communists and frustrate the efforts of the Nationalists to
occupy this vital area. Although she remained officially aloof from the civil war which
began in China in 1946, at no time did she give aid and support solely and ”entirely” to
the Nationalist Government. as she had promised. When the People’s Republic of China
was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, Russia Abandoned all pretense at immortality and
recognized the new regime with great fanfare on the following day.
In December, 1949. Mao Tse tung visited Moscow. presumable zor the first time. At the
end of his visit, ill February. 1950. the Soviet Union and China announced the signing of
a Treaty of Friendship. Alliance and Mutual Aid, with two supplementary agreements,
one confirming Russian rights in Manchurian railways and in Port
Arthur ;ind Dairen, with a pledge by the USSR to abandon these areas by 1952, the other
promising a Soviet credit of $300.000,000 to China. As later modified, these agreements
provided for Soviet withdrawal from the ’hangchun Railway in Manchuria. in accordance
with the pledge of 1950. nit they also stipulated that Soviet troops could remain in Port
Arthur. _ontrary to the 1950 commitment, ’until such time as peace treaties !>etween the
Chinese People’s Republic and Japan and between the Soviet union and Japan are
concluded:”
At the end of the war Korea was divided at the thirty eighth ;rirallel into a northern zone
occupied by the Russians and a southern zone 1cciipied by the Americans. Because the
two occupy ing powers could not igree on the unification of the country. the division was
formalized bN tile stablishment in 19 48 of two rival regimes. the Democratic Peoples
republic in he north and the Republic of Korea in the south. By mid 19 19 ;il occupation
troops had been withdrawn. The attack a year later on South ,:orea from north of the
parallel precipitated the gravest cri•is of the 0171) Postwar period.
The precise roles of the Soviet Union and Communist China iii :orca_ and their relations
tvith the Communist govcrnincnt of NOrtli )t be determined. Pre mablv the Comiuunist
le:idc ;•i hotli
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
countries participated in planning the attack of June, 1950, the Chinese intervention in
November, and the general direction of the campaign against the United Nations forces.
In Korea itself. after 1949, the Russians kept in the background.
The conclusion of a peace treaty for Japan was delayed until 1951 because of the inability
of the Soviet Union and the United. States to agree on either methods of procedure or
treaty terms. The American position was generally supported by most of the non
Communist nations directly concerned. After the problem of Chinese representation had
been ”resolved” by deciding to invite no delegation from China. the United States issued
invitations to no less than fifty nations still theoretically at war with Japan to attend a
conference at Sail Franciso oil September 1. 1951, for the purpose of concluding a peace
treaty with Japan. Russia caused a mild diplomatic surprise by accepting the imitation
and sending a delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko; but lie delegates
refused to sign the treaty.
When the Japanese peace treat officially became effective. oil April 28, 1952, the Soviet
Government repeated its strong protests against the whole proceeding. It also obiected to
tile seciirit’N treaty between the United States and Japan. to the abolition of tile Far
Eastern Commission. and to all other logical corollaries of the new status of Japan.
Rtissia and the Soviet bloc long refused to acquiesce in Japan’s re entrN into the fainilv
of nations: iii September, 1952. Malik cast the Soviet Union’s fifty first veto to keep
Japan out of the UN.

East West Competition in Germany

During the period of ”the str,inge alliance” representatives of Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States held socl al disctissions on
questions relating to Germany. Many important decisions ~\crc made at Yalta and a
comprehensive agrccincnt on Geriiianv vas negotiated at Potsdam. The decisions at Yalt,i
included tli,, procedure for reparations pavnients_ arrangements for the occupation of
Gerinan.\ _ with each state to control a particular zone with a French zone to be created
out of tile areas assigned to Britain and the United State and an agreement in
principle that Poland should get territories in East Prussia ;rod Uppci Silesia. Both
Churchill and Roosevelt inadc it vcrv clear at Y;,;ta th;it in their opinion the final
delimitation of tlic \icstcrii frontier of !’ot;;nd should be iwide :at (lie peace conference.
and thc.fot•,daiu A,,c,_ineiu contains a cle~ir statement to this same effect. Yet t11e
Rti5S1(1iiS Have insisted th;it Brit;t:n and tile United States did accept tile present
western botindarv of Poland
The Postdam Agreement covered the political and economic princiWs which were to
govern tile trcatnicnt of Gcrniam. reparations

IMren rational Relations 585

claims and procedures, the disposal of the German merchant marine, territorial changes in
Eastern Germany, the trial of war criminals, and the orderly transfer of German
populations (which actually became the forced uprooting and transportation of some
eight million people). Disputes of cr the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement began
almost at once, and so did violations. The procedure for joint occupation and four power
collaboration in Germany,. with the Allied Control Council as tile coordinating body for
the four zones and with the Kommandatura serving,,, similar function in the government
of Berlin, proved to be unsatisfactor<from the outset. No solution except the division of
the defeated county) . powers were faced from the beginning with the necessity of trying
to make the best of a bad situation.
Basing their claim upon the secret understanding reached at the Yalta Conference by
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin that the figure of twenty billion dollars in reparations
should be taken ”as a basis for discussion,” Soviet representatives insisted on this figure,
particularly the amount of ten billions which they demanded
for the USSR. In the absence of agreement the Soviet Union went ahead with heavy
executions, nominally at least for repartation, in the eastern part of Germany. The
experiment with wholesale dismantling of plants and their removal to the Soviet Union
proved to be so unsatisfactory and caused such hostile repercussions that after the
summer of 1946 the Russians transferred to themselves the title to many German plants
and operated them in Germany ”as Soviet properties for the reparations account.”
Efforts of the occupying powers to agree on unified policies toward Germany in
implementation of the Potsdam Agreement proved generally futile almost from the
beginning. By the summer or fall of 1946 further attempts at coordinated action had been
largely abandoned, and each side began to concentrate on consolidation and development
of its area and on attempts to coin the support of the German people against the other.
Since 1947 the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers over
Germany have been so great and so fundamental that no appreciable progress has been
made in one of the most crucial sectors of the cold war. In former chapter 15 we
described Allied policies in Western Germany. notably the steps to bring into existence a
Western German state and to associate it with Western Europe. Russia protested bitterly
against every one of them and denounced the Western powers for the open violations of
the Potsdam Agreement. Two of the Soviet measures of relations, or of unilateral action,
were particularly significant. These were the Berlin blockade and the establishment of the
”German Democratic
Republic*’ ire the Soviet zone.
Foreign Po/icy of Soviet Union
Eastern Europe and the Satellite System
In the Declaration of Liberated Europe, agreed upon at the Yalta Conference in February,
1945, Stalin joined, with Roosevelt and Churchill in the following pledge: ” .... the three
Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state of former Axis
satellite state in Europe .... to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative
of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible
establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.’
A special Declaration on Poland promised that ”the Provisional Government .... should
.... be reorganized on a broader democratic basis.”
Within a few weeks after the Yalta Conference, the Soy Union had violated the pledges
regarding the ”liberated” former Axis s: tellite
states in Eastern Europe and had begun the process of creating a Soviet orbit virtually
sealed off from the outside world. There were owious
geographic,
historic, and security reasons for the Soviet interest in this part of the world. Moreover,
by their wartime policies the A lies had inadvertently facilitated Soviet designs there
through the decision to launch a second front from Western Europe and through
acquiescence in Russian demands that Soviet troops should occupy such key centers as
Berlin and Prague. The ”iron curtain” soon divided Eastern from Western Europe. Behind
that curtain Soviet political influence was supreme.
Soviet Objectives in Eastern Europe

Among the many reasons for Soviet efforts to bring the states of Eastern Europe under
complete domination, the following, at least, should be emphasized: (1) to dominate the
buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West, to establish ”friendly” governments
in the states in that area, and to indoctrinate and regiment the people so that they would
be faithful satellite and dependable allies of the Soviet Union in the event of war; (2) to
orient the countries of Eastern Europe toward the Soviet Union; instead of toward the
Western World politically, economically, culturally, and in ,,cry other respect, and to
eliminate Western influences and ties; and (3) to make use of the economic resources of
the area for rebuilding the Soviet
economy and developing the economic strength which would be essential for the
successful prosecution of another war.
It should be noted that the policies followed by Russia in Eastern Europe could be
interpreted either as security measures or as vital first steps for further Soviet expansion,
Certainly the Soviet leaders did not regard this area as a bridge between East and West;
they did everything in their power to destroy the bridge that already, existed. The
unanswered question was whether they regarded Eastern Europe as a security buffer zone
or as a bridgehead.
586

International Relations 587

The Pattern of Control.
Between 1945 and 1948 local Communist organizations, with the direct and indirect
assistance of the USSR and especially with the visible presence and occasionally the
active inten~ention of the Red Army gained complete control in Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland. Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In all of Easter and
Southern Europe onh Finland, Greece, and Turkey escaped the Communist shackles.
The pattern of control was strikingly uniform, varying only with local conditions such as
the strength of opposing parties and of democratic institutions, the extent of popular
resistance, and the popularity or unpopularity of native Communist leaders. It made little
difference whether a state had been associated with the Axis or had fought on the side of
the
United Nations, or whether the political parties and their leaders had collaborated with or
had opposed the Russians. In the end their fate was the same.
At first the Communist participated in ”Popular Front” governments, but they joined with
the ”bourgeois” parties only to destroy them. With the assistance of the Red Army and
Soviet political ”advisers.” native Communist leaders who had usually been trained in
Moscow came into power through clever propaganda, economic and social reforms, and
terrorism and intimidation. They secured key ministries. such as the ministry of interior
and the ministry of information or propaganda. TheN saw to it that persons loyal to them
occupied most of the important posts in the armed forces and in the police. With these
two instruments in hand they, moved swiftly to take over the press, the radio, and other
organs of information, industry. and the labor unions. Thus firmly entrenched, they were
in a position to undermine other parties and to take over the machinery of the state.
In the establishment of the ”people’s democracies” the Communists: Russian and native,
won considerable popular support. TheN were adroit in their propaganda appeals
especially in exploiting the weaknesses of other parties and institutions: in disguising
their own roll motives. and in posing as champions of needed economic and political
reforms and as enemies of exploitation, whether by favored groups withil? the countries
or by foreign groups within the countries or by forcigll nations. They ended all surviving
monarchies in that area. and identified their most fdrmidable political rivals, the peasant
or Social Democratic: parties. with collaboration with the Axis. with corrupt and
consenatiN

groups. and faithless leadership. They attempted to woo the peasants ,>!F,,lstcrn Europe
by sponsoring land reforms. the nationalizatiol: illdustrics, and agricultural cooperatives.
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
Along with persuasion went ruthless terrorism. The opposition was intimidated and
gradually liquidated, and opposition leaders were imprisoned or executed unless they had
fled for their lives. War crime and treason trials became vehicles for public
”confessions,” extracted by methods which combined medieval tortures with the
diabolical application of modern techniques for breaking the human mind and spirit.
Even Communist parties in the satellite states were frequently ”purged,’ especially after
the Yugoslav defection in the summer of 1948. The peasant parties were greatly
weakened by the arrest, exile, or defection of their leaders, and by their inabiliy to resist
those who controlled all the effective organs of power.
After the Communists had been defeated in relatively free elections in Hungary, in 194,
they saw to it that no more elections were held until the campaign of indoctrination and
intimidation had made deeper inroads and until the peasant parties had been weakened. or
destroyed.
After the destruction or corruption of the peasant and ”bourgeois” parties, the most
formidable org<:ruzed opposition to Communist rule in the satellite states came from
religious groups, especially from those with ties with the West. ”The Orthodox churches,
by tradition and organization linked to the state authorities, were brought under control
without great difficult’ in Rumania and Bulgaria through the appointment of subservient
church officials.”
In every one of these East European countries the Communists in control sought _ to
dissolve Catholic organizations, to take over Catholic schools. and to destroy the
influence of Catholicism. Hungary was the great test case. There the Communists struck
at Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary. In December.
1948, Mindszenl was arrested on charges of treatson against the state and of espionage
and lesser crimes. and. after a farcical trial. was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Coup in Czechoslovakia and the Tito ”Split.”

By 19 48 the only state in Eastern Europe which had managed to escape Soviet
domination was Czechoslovakia. democracy’s ”show window” to the East, whose
economic and political ties bound .her closely with the West. She had made a treaty with
the Soviet Union in 1943, and in the postwar period had followed a conciliatory policy
toward her powerful neighbour, hoping and apparently believing that cooperation might
be an alternative to Communist domin;ltion. Her hopes were in vain. and in February.
19.18. in a coup which reverberated throughout the world. Czechoslovakia too passed
into the CUmllttllllSt camp. For a few months the ”iron curtain” revealed no rifts from
s(ettin on the Baltic to Trieste on
the Adriatic.
i88

International Relations
589
Not long afterward, however, a minor rift (lid appear in the apparently monolithic
structure of communism. It ~\as caused by the Kremlin’s denunciation of the policies or
”!~.resies” of the Communist leaders of Yugoslavia, first announced to a startled world
by the Cominform announcement, the break had been in the making for some time.
Instead of recanting abjectly. as erring Communists were expected to do, Tito and his
associates complained of Soviet aucmpts to interfere in Yugoslav affairs and denied the
”unjust fabrications” of the Russian Communist Party; at the same tinnc they declared
their loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union, and defended their policies as completehin
accord with Marist Leninist doctrine. Furthermore, their position was endorsed by the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia. although it was denounced without exception elsewhere
in the Communist ~\ orld.
Although the economic situation in their country became increasingly serious, the
Yugoslav leaders showed no signs of weakening. Under these conditions they took a
more conciliatory attitude toward the non Communist states, but they continued to
proclaim their allegiance to Communist principles.

The Coordination of Policies

The Tito ”split” in 1948, and the increasingly effective measures of the nations of the
North Atlantic Community to counteract Soviet threats and pressures, caused the leaders
of Soviet Russia to renew their efforts to strengthen their hold over the satellite states.
These efforts have been pressed as vigorously during the period of the ”new look” as they
were before 1953. In fact, in some respects they have been intensified. If the Soviet
leaders had any thought of relaxing their hold. they must have abandoned it as a result of
the great uprising in Berlin in June, 1953. The Soviet reaction to the Paris agreements of
1954 regarding Germany was the Warsaw Conference, which established a more
elaborate kind of regional organization east of the ”iron curtain”. Three mainagencies or
instruments in addition to the national Communist parties and Soviet representatives and
”advisers,” were utilized: (1) a network of treaties of mutual assistance and cooperation;
(2) the Cominform; and (3) the socalled Molotov Plan and its Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.
1. the Soviet Treaty System. On December 12. 194_,, a .”T’re;it~
of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post War Cooperation
between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was signed in
Moscow. This pact inaugurated a series of treaties bet«ccn
Russia and the states of Eastern Europe with Yugasla\is
(April 11, 1945), Poland (April 21, 1945)_ Rumaili;’ (February 4, 1988), Hungary
(February 18. 1948). Bulgari:~
(March 18, 19481, and Finland (April 6. 19 18). The treat
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
590
system w is further extended by nearly twenty similar treaties among ’he Soviet
dominated European states themselves, beginnm~ with the Yugoslav Polish Treat’ of
March 18, 1946.
The Owrinfornr. In September, 1947, Communist leaders fro n nine European countries
held an important meeting in Wars;w. Anion them were two influential members of the
Russian Politburo, Zhdanov and Malenkov. Zdanbov proclaimed the Soviet position on
the Marshall Plan by declaring flatly that
the Soviet Union would ”bend every effort in order that this plan be doomed to failure.”
The principal decision of the conference was a establish a Communist Information
Bureau, with headquarters in Bcl rade. Yugoslavia. After the Tito ”heresy.” in July 1948,
these were hastily removed to Bucharest, Rumania.
The Cominform was nominally an organization of the Communist parties in the Soviet
Union, in the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, in France, and in Italy: but it
seemed to be in many ways a revived Comintern, a kind of coordinating agency for the
worldwide Communist movement. Its official organ, which bore the intriguing title For a
Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy! vas full of news of Communist activities all
over the world. Many, major pronouncements of Communist policy first appeared in its
pages.

After 1948 the Cominform headed the attacks on Tito as well as other campaigns of
opposition to the heretic state. Its efforts were for the most part singularly ineffective, and
it soon fell into disuse. As far as is known, it held no meetings after 1949. When the new
leaders of the Soviet Union decided to court Tito instead of casting him into the outer
darkness, the Cominform was deprived of its chief propaganda objective. In April, 1916,
it was officially dissolved on the ground that it had ”eahaue2ed its uses” owing to the
emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and to the ”strengthening of
many Communist parties in the capitalist, dependent and colonial countries.”
East West Trade anal the ”Molotov Plan. ” Historically, the chief markets of the states of
Eastern Europe. particularly of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have been in Germane and to
a lesser extent in Western Europe. Among the most significant early postwar agreements
which were negotiated by countries on either side of the ”iron curtain” were the trade
agreements which Poland signed with France in December, 1948, and with Great Britain
in January, 1949.

International Relations 59
But the obstacles to a revival of East West trade were man),. The chief of these was
undoubtedly the policy and outlook of the Soviet Union which attempted and with
considerable success to isolate the East European states from the West and to make
them economic as well as political satellites of the USSR. By her trade pacts. her priority
system, and her general policies the Soviet Union sought ”to expand the trade of East
European countries with one another and with the USSR at the expense of trade with the
West. Apparently she hoped to integrate the economic systems of the orbit states and to
develop a balanced regional
economic unit under the leadership of an industrialized Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The term ”Mclotiv Plan” came into general use after the countries of Eastern Europe had
been directed not to participate in the Marshall Plan. Heralded as the Soviet answer to the
Marshall Plan, it was designed to tighten the economic ties of the East European states
with each other and with the Soviet Union. Actually it was hardly a plan at all; and since
all of the states had adopted generally similar economic plans in the postwar period and
had become oriented toward the Russian economy. a kind of ”Molotov Plan” had been in
existence for some time. The plan was given more definite form in JanuarN , 1949. by the
creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). .

Stalin’s Last Statement

On the eve of the August. 1952. meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the
first since 1939 Stalin issued a 25,000 word statement of views on basic economic and
political questions. This statement, on Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.
was ”Stalin’s last and most significant theoretical work.” It was described by Pravda as
”the greatest event in the ideological life of the Party and the Soviet people.” It heralded
what is now commonly spoken .of as the ”new look” i» Soviet Russia. In it Stalin laid
down some propositions on the prerequisites for the transformation of the Soviet Union
from the existing ”socialistsystem to one of ”complete communism,” and others on the
nature of international conflicts. While he reaffirmed manv basic Communist theories, he
did not hesitate to repudiate or to revise many concepts and propositions enunciated by
Marx. Engels. Lenin and himself. Rejecting the familiar interpretation of the inevitability
of conflict between the ”capitalist” and ”socialist” worlds, he argued that in the existing
situation. with the capitalist states virtually cut off from trade with Russia. China and the
Communist states, conflict among capitalist countries over markets was a stronger force
than the ”contradictions between the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism.” He
reaffirmed the socialist theory of international relations: ”In order to destroy the
inevitability of wars, it is necessary to destroy imperialism.” Later. N%hilc reasserting
his belief that
Foreign Policy of Soviet Union
war between ”capitalist” and ”socialist” countries was not imminent, Stalin discussed
ways to promote wars between ”capitalise” states and to encourage ”struggle for
liberation” and for the ”overthrow of capitalism.”

The ”New Look” in the Post Stalin Era

Development and rumors in the fall of 1952 and the spring of 1953 convinced
observers that the stage was being set for momentous changes in the Soviet Union. In the
weeks following the Party Congress, reports of scandals, exposures. arrests, and purges
filled the newspapers and created an air of tense expectancy in Moscow and else where in
Russia. ”It was apparent to all in Moscow in February,” reported Harrison Salisbury,
”that great and sinister events were in the making”: there were ”increasingly plain signs
that something akin to dementia was taking hold of Stalin and that the country stood on
the brink of a reign of terror ....” But on March 5, 1953, the death of Stalin was
announced. Whatever, lot had been hatched for his removal if any at all now
evaporated, and the transfer of power was made in an outwardly peaceful way.

Change in Leadership
Immediately after the announcement of Stalin’s death the new leaders of the Soviet
Union took their posts. Without exception, they had all been prominently identified with.
Soviet and party politics. They were either old associates of Stalin, like Beria, Molotov,
Bulgarian, and Voroshilov, or portages of Stalin and products of the new Russian
bureaucracy. like Malenkov and Khrushchev. Many observers concluded that Malenkov
and Beria were the two top leaders. Some believed that the new leaders would inevitably
be drawn into a power struggle from which would again emerge a single leader.
The two men whom the ”experts” generally rated as the strong men in the new rife
whether new leadership would portend any significant changes in Russia’s domestic or
foreign policy. Apparently Khrushchev was overthrown primarily because the internal
power struggles and dissatisfaction with some of his domestic policies, although after his
fall he was also criticized for inept and ”undignified” diplomacy. for exacerbating the
Sino Soviet dispute, for alienating some influential Communist leaders in Eastern
Europe, for blunders in dealings with under developed nations. and for ”softness” in his
relations with the United States.
For a few weeks the new Soviet leadership, with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan in the
top positions, seemed to be tying to reverse the trend in Sino Soviet relations. Premier
Chou En alt came to Moscow with a large delegation some three weeks after
Khrushchev’s downfall to participate in the first top level talks between Russian and
Chinese leaders in many months. Apparently, however, these talks led nowhere, and
592

International Relations
shortly afterward the Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union were resumed. The new Soviet
leaders were charged with following a policy of ”Khurshchevism without Khurshchev.”
Within a few weeks, also, the
new Soviet leadership seemed to abandon a conciliatory tone and revert to a much harder
line in its dealings with the United States and most Western countries. It tried to play off
Paris against Washington, and it welcomed De Gaulle’s suggestion for a settlement of the
German question ”among Europeans.” In general the neo leadership was more
”opportunist” than Khurshchev was. It sought to weaken the Western alliance, to regain
Russia’s influence in the Third World, and to reassert her position in the Communist
World.
Whether these were difference in basic policy or in approach would become clear only
with the passage of time. Six months after Khrushchev’s fall, a distinguished German
authority on Communist affairs wrote:
In fact, there has been a marked shift both in the immediate priorities and in the style of
Soviet relations with the outside world. It has not been announced or explained: on the
contrary, the new men hay c reacted against the Khrushchevian style of basing Soviet
diplomacy on grandiose, comprehensive concepts, and have preferred to make their
adjustments quietly and with a minimum of verbal fuss. But in substance, they have
shifted the emphasis of their relations with Communist China from direct opposition, in
terms of ideology and power politics, to indirect competition for influence on the anti
Western, revolutionary nationalise government and movements of the underdeveloped
world. At the sane time, in their relations with the West, they have transferred their main
effort from direct approaches to the United States aiming at a major detent6 to indirect
maneuvers for exploiting the disagreements within the Wester:i alliance.
Clearly, as this authority noted, ”the new tactics of Khrushchevs successors have been
much more successful against the West than against Communist China.” In style they
indicated a hardening of the Soviet line and in priorities they suggested that the struggle
against imperialism anti the promotion of national liberation would be placed ahead of
effort toward peace. Whatever the situation within the Communist world, the Soviet
Union under the new leadership was obviously still dedicated to th;, achievement of its
long proclaimed world objectives, which boded no good for those who stood in the way.
CHAPTER 30’
FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA
Before the emergence of the People’s Republic of China the country did not have a
systematic foreign policy partly because for about a century China did not actively
participate in the interna tional relations, partly because there was no strong central
authority, Whatever foreign policy, the country had was decided by the powerful local
warlords. However these Chinese
were always conscious of the fact that they had been a great power and would once again
play a dominant role in the world politics in general and East Asia in particular. With the
assumption of power by the Communists an effort was made to provide systematic
foreign policy to the country. No doubt, for the first few years even the Communists were
Illalnly concerned with their domestic problems and considered the foreign affairs as
subsidiary to the domestic affairs. As a result, naturally the conduct of the foreign policy
was greatly influenced by the domestic factors. According to Schwarz ”in the Communist
China the conduct of foreign affairs has been influenced more by domestic factors than in
other major countries.”
Soon after the emergence of People’s Republic of China the leaders were confronted with
the problem of deciding whether they wanted to join one of the two blocs. in which the
world become divided at that time, or to remain neutral. The Chinese leaders were
certainly against neutrality or non alignment which they described as a camouflage.
Hence they were left with the choice to choose between the Western and the Soviet blocs.
The hostility displayed by the Western powers towards the

lntemational Relations 595

new regime convinced the Chinese leaders that the only alternative was to join the Soviet
bloc. Another consideration which weighed with them in joining the Soviet bloc was that
China badly needed material and mililansupport for progress. The policy of China was
outlined by Mao in his essay On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship thus: ”to unite in a
common struggle with those nations of the world who treat us on a basis of equality , and
peoples of all countries. This is to ally with Soviet Union to ally with the new democratic
countries of Europe and to ally with the proletariat and masses of the people in all
countries.” He asserted that in order to win victory and consolidate victory China had to
lean on Soviet Union.
A further elaboration of People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy was made at the
session of the People’s Political Consultative Conference held in September 19.19 when
it was declared that the principle of the foreign policy territory and sovereignty of the
country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co operation between the
people of all countries and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war. But
the most elaborate exposition of the Chinese Foreign Policy was made by Liu Thao Chi
in July 1961. He said; ”Since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China, the basic
policy of our international relations has been
to develop relations of friendship, m~jtual assistance and co operation with the Soviet
Union and other fraternal socialists systems on the basis of the Five Principles and to
oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war; to support the revolutionary
struggle of all oppressed peoples and nations against imperialism and colonialism. This is
the general line of our foreign policy.
A perusal of the various policy pronouncements of Chinese foreign policy shows that it
laid emphasis on development closer relations with Soviet Union and other Socialist
countries and strong opposition to the imperialist power of the West. However.
subsequently its relations with Soviet Union cooled down and China began to assert its
leadership in Asia. After the Korean War. China drew closer to non Communist countries
of Asia and adopted policy of Panchsheel based on mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty. non aggression. non interference in internal affairs, equality, and
peaceful coexistence. In view of its deteriorating relations with Soviet Union. China
adopted a policy of reconciliation with the west and developed intimate relations with the
western countries. Thus China aligned itself first with Moscow against Washington in
1950s, and then with Washington against Soviet Union since 1972 in an attempt to
counterbalance the threat to Chinese interest. However, in the eighties China once again
started improving it relations with Soviet Union and entered into number of agreements
for grcatel cooperation in the field of trade, culture and other matters. The Soviet
Foreign Policy of China
relations. Thus we find that China tried to promote and protect her interests by aligning
with Washington and Moscow according to exigencies of time. This point shall be fully
borne out from the following discussion.
59y
Relations with.Soviet Union
From the very beginning China tried to cultivate friendly relations with Soviet Union. In
1950 PRC concluded with Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and Mutual
Aid, under which the two countries agreed to cooperate and help each other in case of
aggression. They also agreed to cooperate in the economic and cultural spheres. Soviet
Union agreed to hand over to China, in course of time, the Chinese Eastern Railway and
the base of Port Arthur. Soviet Union provided financial credit of $300,00,000 and
military advisers to modernise the Chinese army. The Russians also agreed to transfer to
China their share in four SinoSoviet mixed companies dealing with mailing of non
ferrous and rare metals in Sinkiang, old procurement and refining, the building and repair
of ships in Dairen and organisation
and operation of civil airport. During the first ten years Soviet Union provided to China
over ten thousand experts to help in various fields. The Chinese leaders acknowledged
the valuable service rendered by Soviet Union in the growth and development of their
country. The Chinese Premier Chou En lai said in 1960 ”Our achievements are
inseparably linked with the enormous aid given by the people of the fraternal countries.
The Chinese people will never forget their love and friendship.”
However, these intimate relations between China and Soviet Union could not last long
and a schism developed towards the close of the fifties, This conflict was mainly a clash
for leadership of the Communist Movement,. which was given the colour of a doctrinal
struggle over the correct inerpretion of Marxism Leninism. The tension was further
aggravated due to boundary conflicts between the two countries. However, it cannot be
denied that as a result of this South Asia and Russian influence in the region suffered a
setback. However, Soviet Union continued to exercise considerable influence in Vietnam
as well as Cambodia.
Sino Soviet differences were further sharpened due to the Soviet stand during Sino Indian
conflict of 1962: Soviet Union’s signing of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with USA and UK
in 1963; etc. The Cultural Revolution of 1966 69 in China also greatly contributed to the
widening of gulf and in 1969 there were open clashes between the guards on the
SinoSoviet border. In 1970s China drew closer to United States and adopted openly
hostile attitude towards Soviet Union. On the other hand Soviet Union’s support for the
entry of .Vietnamese troops into neighbouring

International Relations 597

Kampuchea greatly irritated the Chinese. As a result in December 1979 when Soviet
Union sent troops to Afghanistan China bitterly criticised the Soviet action. In the
meanwhile China’s relations with USA also got strained on the question of supply of
American arms to Taiwan. As a result the Sino Soviet leaders started thinking of
improving their relations. In March 1982 Brezhnev expressed his willingness to
normalise relations between the two countries and stopped all propaganda against
Beijing. The same year China also announced the adoption of an independent foreign
policy, which stood for equidistant course between U.S. and USSR. This was followed by
a number of high level meetings between the leaders of USSR and China at Beijing and
Moscow alternately. These meetings led to the conclusion of a number of agreements for
economic, technical and scientific cooperation in December 198 4. The two countries
also agreed to set up a Joint Commission
to oversee the developing economic trade, scientific and technological relations between
the two countries. As a result the tension between the two countries somewhat eased.
However still shaper differences existed between the two over the removal of Soviet
forces from Chinese borders; withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and stoppage
of Soviet support for Vietnam’s aggression against Cambodia, which hampered the
development of closer relations between the two.
Despite the above differences certain positive steps were taken by the two countries to
improve relations. In January 1986 the two signed a trade pact which provided for the
barter of Chinese metals, grain meat, fruit, textiles, consumer items etc. in exchange for
Soviet steel, fertilizers, automobiles, lumber and aircraft. On 21 March 1986 they signed
a protocol covering exchange of engineers and technicians. In terms of this protocol
Soviet Union agreed to increase technological assistance to China in respect of industrial
plants and projects built with Soviet aid prior to deterioration of Sino Soviet relations in
the 1960’s. In May 1986 through another accord the two agreed to increase co operation
in the areas of science, culture, health and sports.
In July 1986 Soviet Union made another bid to normalise relations with China and
offered to withdraw 6000 troops from Afghanistan arid indicated its intention. to
withdraw substantial parts of Soviet troops from Mongolia. It also announced that Soviet
Union=was prepared at any time and at any level to discuss with China the question of
additional measures
for creating a good neighbourly atmosphere. However, the Chinese were not willing to
hold any, summit meeting with Soviet leaders unless it stopped all aid to Vietnams in
Kampuchea and some real adN7ance o” Kampuchean question was made.
Foreign Policy of China ._, . , m .. 598
In the subsequent months further improvements took place in Sino Soviet relations. In
September 1986 the two concluded treaty for mutual contract and cooperation. As a result
of this agreement Soviet Union was permitted to open its Consulate General in Shanghai
after a gap of more than 20 years. The two countries also agreed to resume border
negotiations for the first time since June 1978. In subsequent months the delegations of
two countries held meetings at Beijing and Moscow to thrash out border issue. Though
no immediate agreement could be possible, these talks certainly payed the aye for better
relations between the two countries. Thereafter the relations between Soviet Union and
China began to grow along normal lines and there was steady expansion of trade between
the two countries. In August 1987 the two reached an agreement on the eastern part of
their border and decided that the same should be delimited along the middle of the main
shipping channel in navigable rivers or their main tributaries. They also agreed to set up a
working group of experts to carry out actual delimitation of the eastern part of the border.
In December 1987, for the first time a Soviet Minister briefed China on the result of the
US Summit. In Januan° 1988 General Secretary Gorbadev made an offer for a summit
meeting bemcen China and USSR, but the same was rejected by China. _
The Chinese leaders insisted on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Chinese borders;
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and withdrawal of Soviet support for the
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea as pre conditions for any Summit Meeting. Despite
this it cannot be denied that considerable progress was made in the relations between the
countries in the economic as well as cultural spheres after 1982.
After 1986 when the Sino U.S. relations showed an improvement. China also adopted
more constructive attitude and tried to improve political ties with Soviet Union and other
countries of socialist bloc. In July 1986 Soviet Union unilaterally accepted the Chinese
claim that border ran down the middle of rival channels and even indicated it intention to
withdraw part of its troops stationed in Mongolia as well as its units from Afghanistan. In
accordance with this declaration Soviet Union actually proceeded to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan and Mongolia. In October 1988 China and Soviet Union reached
settlement of permanent arrangements for adjusting boundary disputes. The last thaw in
Sino Soviet relations was removed with the announcement regarding a ithdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea by September 30, 1989.
The improvement of relations paved the path for the Summit meetings between the
leaders of Soviet Union and China in May. 1989. At the end of the meeting the two
countries agreed to establish party to party relations, take .measures to cut down the
militan, forces in areas along the

intemationai Relations 599

Chinese Soviet boundary to minimum level: good neighbourly relations between two
countries, not to seek gradually reduce and end all militar,: aid to Cambodian factions
after the withdrawal of Vietnamese support; an international conference on Cambodia as
soon as possible and to continue efforts to thrash marked the culmination of the process
of Sino Soviet rapprochement which began in 1982.

Relations with U.S.A.

The relations of Red China with U.S.A. got strained from the N,er,beginning because the
Americans openly supported Chiang Kai Shek against the Communist. Even after the
Communist captured power America continued to extend support to the Kuomintang
Government which had been set up at the Island of Formosa. On the top of it the
American leaders continued to say in public that the Communist regime in Peking was a
temporary one and would soon be replaced by the Nationalist Forces from the Taiwan.
U.S.A. tried to build up a network of military bases around China, extending from Japan
to Pakistan, to cut her off from the rest of the world. America refused to extend
diplomatic recognition to the new regime and continued to consistently oppose the
proposal for a permanent seat for People’s Republic of China. According to Coral bell the
chief cause for American hostility towards China was her participation in the Korean
War. He says that upto June 1950 there were good prospects that America would soon
reconcile itself to the change of government aiid accord recognition to the Communist
regime, but the Chinese participatioii in Korea ended those possibilities. The Korean war
deflected the main force of U.S. hostility vis a vis the Communist world from the SoOct
Union to Communist China. This hostility between the two countries persisted for over
twenty, years.
An improvement in China’s relations with USA started after the Cultural Revolution of
1966 69. Following the realisation of her hollowness China started looking for outside
help. At this juncture Pakistan, who had intimate relations both with USA and China
made an effort to bring her two allies to some sort of understanding. In Februar, 1972
Nixon paid a visit to Beijing which marked the beginning of detente between China and
the United States, and a number of trade and cultural agreements were concluded. In the
wake of improvement of relations with China. USA agreed to extend support to the
Chinese demand for a permanent seat in the Security Council. USA formally extended
recognition to China on 1 January 1979 and on I March 1979 the countries formally
exchanged ambassadors. In his State of the Union Massage to the Congress on 2 January
1980 President Carter of USA not only justified the improvement of relations with China
but also indicated the possibilities of greater co operation in future. He said: ”Over the
last year ~\c haNc
Foreign Policy of China
expanded our new relationship with the People’s Republic of China to ensure that where
our interests coincide. our separate actions will be mutually reinforcing. To that end we
have enhanced our consultative relationship. We have also sought an enduring
institutional framework in the economic, cultural. scientific
and trade areas. In 1980, I look forward to passage by Congress early in the year of the
China trade agreement and of authorisation of OPIC operations in China; we plan to
conclude civil aviation, maritime and textile agreements and continue to expand our
commercial and scientific relations, particularly through Exim Bank credits to the PRC.”
It may be observed that the improvement in relations between the two countries was
made possible largely by the growing tension between Soviet Union and China and
partly by the spirit of detente which has gained popularity during those years. However,
relations between China and USA began to deteriorate due to USA start on Taiwan.
While improving relations with China, USA had assured the Chinese leaders that it would
severe relations. USA also promised not to upgrade Taiwan’s military technology so long
as there was no risk of China Taiwan war: As a result of this understanding China
withdrew most of its armed forces on its border with Taiwan. However, on assumption of
power President Reagan of USA proposed to upgrade the Taiwan air force. This evoked
strong reaction from China which argued that arms sales can no longer be tolerated as
they violated Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and constituted interference in China’s
internal affairs. The Chinese leaders alleged that
the US Government by supplying arms to Taiwan was strengthening their determination
to avoid negotiations with China. The other sources of irritations to China were
permission granted to Taiwan to open another office in USA and the presence of US
Security Adviser. Clark at the National Day celebration of Taiwan. The Chinese
leadership even expressed disappointment over the economic benefits of their nevw
relationship with West. The grant of political asylum to the Chinese star Hu Na also
contributed to bitterness. The other factors which proved irritants in relations between the
two countries included China’s demand for expulsion of Taiwan from the Asian
Development Bank and US insistence on dual membership.
But the realisation by the US leadership that cooperative relations with China were vital
of US worldwide security interests prompted them to make all possible efforts to improve
relations with China. As a result in 1983 the two ,countries concluded a five year
agreement by which China accepted the growth rate of textile exports of USA of 2 3 per
cent per year. which is somewhat higher than the rates allocated to other East Asian
exporters. The two countries strengthened their economic tics and a
600

lntemational mefations
GOl
number of major US oil companies signed off share oil explorat on contracts. The
eagerness of China to come closer to USA on account of Soviet Union’s policy of
military encriclement of China, also greatly contributed to the desire on the part of China
to improve relations with each other was indicated in the communique signed in August
1982 in which USA pledged to ”reduce gradually” its arms sales to Taiwan. In 1983 USA
announced its decision to loosen its rules for export of technology to China. A further bid
to improve relations was made by the two countries when President Reagan of USA paid
a fourteen days visit to China in April May 1984 and concluded a number of agreements
for greater cooperation in the economic and scientific fields. In the military sphere also
the cooperation between the two grew. USA agreed in principle to sell TOW antitank and
Hawk anti aircraft missiles to China. It also agreed to provide AVOINICS to upgrade
China’s F 8 interceptor. Despite these development, China was unhappy with USA on
account of its decision to supply arms to Taiwan and imposition of restrictions on import
of textiles which adversely affected China. Above all the delay in ratification of nuclear
co operation agreement also produced some irritation in the relations between two
countries, till the agreement was finally cleared by the US Senate in December 1985.
In the subsequent years the relation between the two countries continued to be cordial and
their cooperation in political economic. cultural and military fields increased. But certain
minor irritants also appeared which caused resentment among the Chinese. The open
support extended by some American legislators to Dalai Lama’s Five Point Plan, which
aimed at separating Tibet from China, was greatly resented by China and described as an
interference in her internal affairs. Again, certain references to ’two Chinas’ in their
speeches by American leaders was greatly resented by the Chinese leaders. Similarly, the
policy of protectionism adopted by United States and .action against dumpting of Chinese
products into American market was interpteted by the Chinese as a deliberate hindrance
in the way of development of smooth trade relations between the two countries.
Groundless accusations against Chinese on the question of situation in Persian Gulf also
evoked strong Chinese resentment. Above all United States imposed certain restrictions
on the sale of new high technology to China with a view to check missile sales by China
to Iran in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution calling for an arms embargo
against Iran. However, subsequently on 8 March 1988 Reagan administration announced
the lifting of this ban and asserted that it was satisfied that
China was not selling Silk worm antiship missiles to Iran. This certainly contributed to
easin, of relations benveen the
countries.
Foreign Policy of China
The improvements of Sino Soviet relations during the years 198889 gave rise to a feeling
amongst certain quarters that Sino US relations would suffer a setback. However.
President George Bush of USA during his visit to Beijing in February 1988 assured the
Chinese leaders that SinoUS ties would not be weakened by the new turn in the Sino
Soviet relations. But a few months later in the wake of Tiananmen massacre in China,
President Bush announced suspension of all government to government sales and
commercial exports to weapons to China. Ge not only suspended the visit between senior
US and Chinese military officials but also threatened the visit between senior US and
Chinese military officials but also threatened to ask the international institution to
postpone the new loans to China. This was strongly resented by the Chinese leaders.
They pointed out that efforts of USA to influence China’s internal affairs could have
serious consequences. The reluctance of the US government to abandon aid to Taiwan
was another irritant in the Sino American relations. However, China’s relation with USA
showed some improvement in 1990 when the Chinese Foreign Minister was invited to
Washington and Chinese officials held trade talks with their American counterpart. In
November 1990 most of the sanctions against China were withdrawn by USA. This
improvement of relations became possible because China endorsed the US sponsored UN
Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force to make Iraq pull out its forces
from Kuwait.

Relations with Non aligned Countries

Though China in the beginning opposed the idea of nonalignment and described it as
policy of ”leaning to one side.” But subsequently it decided to exploit the different bases
of non alignment to strengthen its own position. The Chinese leaders often posed as
enemies of colonialism and showed their solidarity with the underdeveloped countries of
Asia and Africa, even though they did not give up their hostility towards the non aligned
nations. However, in the wake of the Korean war, in view of the constructive role played
by the non aligned countries during the war, China’s attitude underwent a change and it
decided to develop closer relations with the non aligned countries China concluded
treaties of mutual friendship and non aggression with countries like Burma, Nepal,
Afghanistan, Guinea. Cambodia, Indonesia, etc. It also took part in the Bandung
Conference held in Indonesia from April 18 to 24, 1955 and tried
to project the image of being a moderate nation willing to discuss all issues with all
parties and anxious to live in peace abiding by the Five Principles.
During the next few years China developed intimate cultural and economic relations with
the non aligned countries. A large number of
cultural delegates from these countries were invited to China and a number of Chinese
delegations were sent to these countries. China also offered to

international Relations 60 _;
co operate in the economic and technological fields with the countries of Asia and Africa.
However. China could not succeed in winning over the non aligned states to its side. and
they continued to dread China. According to Robert A Scalpino ”This was a natural
product of an era when new nations were emerging everywhere with nationalist current
fanning strong, and when the confrontation of these nations was in some cases occurring
for the first time. The rising power of a nation of 650 million people would naturally
create apprehensions among the other nations in its vicinity. But China did little to allay
those fears in the years immediately after Bandung”. On the other hand certain incidents
involving China took place which greatly tamushed the Bandung image of China. These
included the occupation of Tibet dispute over overseas Chinese question with Indonesia,
border dispute with India, and border disputes with Burma, Nepal, etc.
Relations with Japan
China and Japan have been traditional rivals. This rivalry continued under People’s
Republic of China. China concluded an alliance with the Soviet Union chiefly with a
view to meet the possible threat from Japan. China’s distrust of Japan was further
strengthened by its being a satellite of the United States of America and its open support
for the theory of ’two Chinas’. China wanted Japan to be neutral and not to maintain any
relations with Kuomintang Government. The Chinese leaders tried to foster a feeling
among the Japanese people that the US imperialism was the chief cause of their
sufferings and provoked them to free themselves from US influence. Slowly Japan freed
herself from the American influence and established trade relations with China. The trade
between the two countries continued to show a steady increase till 1958 when China all
of a sudden curtailed the same. Thereafter, China continued trade only with the friendly
Japanese firms. A number of cultural delegations were exchanged by China with Japan,
with a view to patronise those politicians and intellectuals who could condemn the
policies of government and take proPeking postures. These activities of China naturally
caused much bitterness to the
Japanese.
In early 1970’s the relations between the two countries started improving. The Japanese
Prime Minister. Tanaka.. paid a visit to Peking and soon after diplomatic relations were
established between the two in September, 1972 Japan also de recognised Taiwan. In
view of flue serious hostility which had persisted between the two countries for all these
years. it was indeed starting. The chief factors which contributed to this change were
Chinese anxiety over confrontation with Soviet Union, withdrawal of American military
forces from the continent. etc. Bat probably the moss important consideration which
compelled China to improve relations with
foreign Policy of China
Japan was the Soviet move to come closer to Japan by offering to cooperate in the
development of the oil and natural gas resources of Siberia. As this would have carried
the possibility to Soviet Union acquiring a hold in this area, China decided to improve
relations with Japan. On the other hand Japan was also eager to come closer to China
because it provided a market of 800 million Chines;, customers. The Sino American
rapprochement made’it easy for Japan to move swiftly for better and more intimate
relations with China. Thereafter the relations between the two steadily grew. Between
1977 79 they concluded a number of agreements and the trade between China and Japan
considerably increased. Japan also got more deeply involved in the programme of
Chinese economic modernization. In August 1978 China and Japan concluded a Treat’ of
Peace and Friendship which contained an anti hegemony clause and bound the two
countries to present a united front against USSR. Thus the antiSoviet stand of two
countries brought them closer.
The relations between China and Japan began to deteriorate following adoption of free
foreign policy by China which stood for equidistant relations with USA and USSR.
Further, the question of historical portrayal of Japanese military occupation of China,
Lorea and other Asian countries between 1910 19 I5 also produced tension in the Sino
Japanese strongly protested against this and demanded revision of textbooks. Despite
these irritants, in 1983 Prime Minister Nakassone of Japan established a Sino Japanese
Friendship Committee for the 21st century and to follow four basic principles viz.
growing relations with China; peace and friendship; equalities and mutual benefits; long
term stabilitv and mutual trust. In March 1984 Japan announced a 470 billion yen special
development loan for the period 198=4 89 and promised extra credits from Export Import
Bank of Japan for development of petroleum and coal resources. However, these good
relations proved shortlived and in 1985 China faced large trade deficit with Japan. The
Chinese leaders expressed great concern over the growing deficit of China and warned
that such a situation would not be tolerated.
In 1985 the Sino Japanese relations were further disturbed on account of Nakasone’s
official visit to the Yusukni shrine (a Shinto War Memorial) to mark the 40th anniversary
of the end of the Second World War. This led to anti Japanese demonstrations by students
in several cities of China between September October 1985. The situation was somewhat
defused by Nakasone’s decision to cancel his planned second visit to the shrine in
October 1985. In October 1985 the Foreign Minister of Japan paid an official visit to
China and gave an assurance that all suspicions of nascent Japanese militarism were
entirely unfounded. Japan considerably eased controls on technology exports to China in
the wake of political and
G04

International Relations
60>
economic reforms and the policy of liberation adopted China during the past few years.
Despite improvement of these relations some tension was generated in their mutual
relations by the Koknrio case (concerning China’s ownership of a student building in
Kyoto, Japan). The Chinese leadership holds that this question does not involve the issue
of financial transactions rather it involves the issue of ’one China or two Chinas’. China
charged that it was wrong to say that Japanese Government could do nothing about it.
Due to constant pressure from USA in December 1986 Japan increased its defence
budget by 5.2 per cent, which was bitterly criticised by China. On 2 January 1987 a
Chinese Foreign Office spokesman called on Japan to limit the growth of Japanese
defence forces to defence needs so as not make its neighbours feel uneasy. The existing
tics between Japan and Taiwan were another major pint of friction in the Sino Japanese
relations. Despite the fact that Japan had snapped diplomatic relation with Taipei in 1972.
Japan’s investments in Taiwan continued to grow and Taiwan emerged as a major trading
partner of Japan. This was certainly not to the liking of China and gave rise to lot of
friction between the two. Thus we can say that despite periodical efforts by the Japanese
leaders to improve relations with China the relations between the two have remained
strained.

Relations with neighbouring countries

Soon after its birth the People’s Republic of China tried to develop very close relations
with the neighbouring countries with a view to project itself as the major power of the
region.
Tibet
In October. 1950 China dispatched an army to Tibet to
assert her full sovereign rights over the territory which had been enjoying complete
autonomy since 1911. Though India and other powers of the region protested against the
Chinese aggression but in view of her adamant attitude they ultimately accepted Tibet as
an art of the metropolitan territory. However, Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet
continued to plead for independence for Tibet which natural yampered improvement of
relations. But recently Balai Lama withdrew the Strasbourg proposals which envisaged
limited autonomy, for Tibet, while remaining under the Chinese sovereignty . This
resulted in softening of the attitude of the Chinese leaders. On 5 April 1991 the Chinese
Vice Minister of Nationalities said that Beijing was willing to hold dialogue with, Dalai
Bhutan
China could not develop very intimate relations with Bhutan on account of a special
treaty between India and Bhutan which obliged tile
Foreign Po/icy of China
latter to conduct foreign relations through India. Naturally Bhutan’s relations with China
could not grow along friendly lines and they’ grew quite tense in the wake of Chinese
occupation of Tibet and Sino Indian conflict of 1962. Boundary dispute between two
countries persisted till the two countries entered into negotiations to arrive at a settlement.
These negotiations culminated in an agreement in May 1988 on the principles for
settlement of boundary disputes. The two countries agreed to observe. five principles of
peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non
aggression. mutual benefit, noninterference in the internal affairs, equally and hold
friendly consultations in the spirit of mutual accommodation. They also agreed to
maintain tranquillity on the borders and refrain from unilateral action or use of force to
change the status quo of the boundary as before March 1959. It is note worthy that this
was first independent diplomatic move of Bhutan to resolve its border problem with
China.

Burma and Nepal

China tried to cultivate very friendly and intimate relations with small neighbours like
Burma and Nepal chiefly because she wanted to demonstrate to the world her reasonable
approach. The People’s Republic of China signed the Treat’ of Friendship and Mutual
Non aggression with Burma and settle some of the border differences through
negotiation. These cordial relations did not last long because the China leaders started
exploiting the problem of ethnic minorities and used White Flag faction of the
Communist Party of Burma to create problem for the Burmese Government. However,
the Chinese backed Communist Party of Burma failed to unite the
ethnic rebel forces or achieve much success against Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council.
Thereafter. the Chinese tried to establish good relations with Burma by extending
economic and technical aid. Sh;, even offered to construct hydroelectric plant in Northern
Shan state and a bridge in Southern Shan state. All this aid was given with a view to
acquire a foothold in area. Throughout the period China continued to profess friendship
with Burma and also continued to support the proChinese Burmese Communist Party
insurgents.
In Nepal, China was eager to check the growing Indian influence. China. therefore, tried
to reach as amicable settlement with Nepal, about certain territories under dispute. It also
extended economic assistance to Nepal for reconstruction, and made available a large
number of technical experts to cart’ out various projects. It may be noted that China
extended assistance to Nepal not out of any humanitarian consideration but chiefly with a
view to increase her influence in the country and to checkmate the possible Indian
influence. The Nepal’s leaders are also fully conscious of this fact and are trying to dispel
misgivings of China about Nepal’s balance
606

International Relations 607

between China and India. In September 1987 King Birendra of Nepal paid a visit to
China along with his wife. During this visit an agreement was signed for grant of 5 l
million Yuan by China of finance the constriction of an International Convention Centre
in Kathmandu as Nvell as additional work on Chinese abided irrigation and water
conservation project of Pokhara in West Nepal.
In view of the deterioration of Indo Nepalese relations in 1989 due to failure of the two
countries to renew the trade and transit treaties. it teas feared that China would exploit the
situation. However. the Chinese leaders acted with restraint and urged the two countries
to resolve their problems through friendly negotiations. But China airlifted large
quantities of oil and other essential quantities to Nepal which has certainly increased her
influence in the country. With the improvement of relations between India and Nepal.
doubts were expressed in certain quarters. that China’s relations kith Nepal would suffer
a set back. But the Nepalese leaders have indicated that this would not adversely affect
Nepal’s relations with China. In short. China’ relations «vith Nepal have grown along
friendly lines over all these years.

Indonesia
China’s relations with Indonesia have also been far from cordial. Because of the presence
of a large number of Chinese in Indonesia (who often display extra territorial loyalties).
the Peoples Republic of China tried
to acquire influence in Indonesia through the PKI (Communist PartN of Indonesia) in the
early sixties. Though China succeeded in her mission for some time because of Sukarno’s
dependence on tile PKI for his continuance in office, but following the exposure of tire
conspiracy to subvert the Indonesian regime in 1965 and the counter coup. the PKI \Nas
totally annihilated. This naturally strained relations between the two. The Chinese claims
over certain islands in South China Sea. which formed part of Indonesia, and its military
action to capture the Parcel Islands in 197.1. also contributed to the straining of relations
between China and Indonesia. As a part of China’s general policy to improve relations
Nvith its neighbours in 1989. an improvement of relations Nvith Indonesia also took
place and the two countries exchanged ambassadors after a gap of 20 years.
Korea
In 1950 China irtten erred in Korea because it could not reconcile Nvith the presence of
Western powers. Though this intervention cost PRC heavily in men and money, it greatly
boosted its international image. It demonstrated PRC’s abilit to withstand concerted
Western effort. and wo» for it the administration of the countries of the Third World PRC
rendered great financial. scientific and technical assistance to North Korea. It
concluded a treaty of friendship. Co operation and Mutual Assistance will’
foreign Policy of china
Korea. Under the treat the two countries agreed to put up mutual defence in case of an
attack upon either of them, were to co operate in the economic and technological field
and to hold mutual consultations on all important international questions.
China did not establish am official contact with the Government of South Korea despite
repeated attempts by the latter. on account of pressure from North Korea. However,
following hijaking of a Chinese civilian airliner to South Korea. China established
official contacts with South Korea. It sent a large delegation to Seoul to deal with the
hijacking. An agreement was concluded under which China agreed to grant more visas to
South Korean participants in the U.N. meetings held by China. China also indicated that
it would not participated in the 1986 Asian Games (it did actually take part in these
games) and the 1988 Olympics to be held in Seoul. Even these relative minor Sino
Korean contacts caused difficulties in China’s relations «vith North Korea. The chief
interest of China in Korea is to keep the Korean situation under control with the help of
USA.
Vietnam
Soon after the Korean armistice of July 1953, China was involved in Vietnam. China
extended help to Dine Bien Phu. It was mainly with the help of the
Chinese equipment arid artillery that he succeeded in reducing
the French camp. This setLack made the French think seriously of withdrawing from
Indo China, However. USA did not favour the French withdrawal from the area and
favoured continuation of war. In actual practice hereafter the policy of control in Vietnam
stepped out of French hands into the American hands. The war was brought to an end by
the Geneva Conference of April 1955, in which People’s Republic of China participated
on equal terms with other major powers like USA, USSR and Britain. As per agreement
two states of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Saigon were set up. The design
regarding the unions of the two states n as to take place after two years. But this provision
could not be given practical shape because the’twa states of Vietnam were backed by
USA and China respectively. As a result prolonged war ensured, which was brought to a
close only in Januaw 1970. As a result of the new agreement the
people of Vietnam were given right of self determination. The elections were to be held
under international supervision. After these elections the
National Assembly announced the unification of the two states of Vietnam under the
name Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It may be nosed that China 151aved a key role in
the Vietnams war and extended enormous militaw and technical help to North Vietnam in
her struggle.
In 1978 China’s relation with Vietnam grew tense due to persecution of ethnic Chinese.
China denounced Hanoi for its failure to

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provide refuge to some hundred and fifty thousand Chinese from Vietnam. In July 1978
China unilaterally terminated its economic assistance to Hanoi and recalled its
technicians. Hanoi reacted by concluding treaty of friendship with USSR in November
1978 and sent troops into Combodia to sweep Pol Pot from power. In retiation China
launched a punitive war against Vietnam and followed a policy, of confrontation towards
Vietnam. China fed the guerilla resistance to Heng Samrin government and supported
tribal insurgents in northern Laos. On the borders the Chinese and Vietnamese forces
faced each other and there were occasional skirmishes between the two. Though
outwardly China opposed Vietnam on the plea that it was a client of Soviet Union,
actually its opposition to Vietnam was due to the fact that it could not reconcile with the
idea of having on its southern borders a neighbour which was not willing to bend before
her.

Relations with West European Countries

China tried to develop intimate relations with West European countries like Britain.
Germany, etc.
even though they happened to be camped followers of USA China’s relations with these
countries were primarily in the cultural and economic field. After China’s schism with
Soviet Union, she attached greater importance to the development of closer trade
relations with these countries. These countries on their part were also keen to improve
and extend their trade with China and provided liberal credit facilities to China in their
markets. As a result Chinas trade with the West European countries showed tremendous
increase. But the one major factor which strained China’s relations with Britain was the
issue of Hong Kong. Towards the close of 198 1 Britain and China reached an agreement
on the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 as autonomous capitalist
enclave. This decision of China was solely motivated by national interest. China derives
immense benefits from Hong Kong’s economy, which supplies it with one third of its
foreign exchange as AN ell as managerial and technical know so vital for the
modernisation of China. Further. China wanted to shoNy to Tahyan that Hong Kong
settlement is a mutually beneficial precedent for reunification.
Of late China has stepped up efforts to develop more intimate relations with the West
European countries. In June 1986 Mr. Hua of China paid visit to UK. France. Italy and
West Germany to strengthen relations with these countries. He discussed matters relating
to bilateral trade and East West relations with them. As a result of these visits China
agreed to permit the British Companies to repatriate profit from China and afford
protection to their investment. U.K.. agreed to low interest loan of $300.000,000 for
promotion of special capital investment projects involving the purchase of U.K. goods
and services. In October 1996 Quccll
’Foreign Policy of China
Elisabeth of U.K, paid a visit to China and thus became the first British monarch to visit
China. Likewise, China concluded an agreement with France which provided for the
provision of French technology for construction of Chinese nuclear power plant in Days
Bay. Thus, China’s relations with West European countries have shown consistent
improvement during the past few years.

Relations with India

At the time of the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China. the leader had
expressed strong dislike for non alignment and. therefore. looked on Nehru (who was one
of the chief architects of non alignment) as ”a rebler against the movement of national
independence” and ”a loyal slave of imperialism.” However. India was keen to cultivate
friendly relations with China and therefore quickly accorded recognition to the new
regime. In the United Nations also India consistently supported the PRC’s claim to the
seat in the security Council. In 1950 China’s relations with India were embittered because
of her armed action in Tibet. India did not approve of this action and suggested that
efforts should be made to settle the matter through peaceful negotiation. The Chinese
badly rebuked India and warned that no foreign interference in the mater shall be
tolerated. But as India was keen to maintain friendly relations with China, she acquiesced
in the Chinese occupation of Tibet. even though it had been a British protectorate since
1911 and this right automatically shifted to India after independence.
Due to changes in >the political leadership in the late seventies China indicated its
intention to improve relations with India. In 1976 the two countries decided to exchange
ambassadors. Thereafter. the process of normalisation of relations continued: even though
at a slow pace. The main obstacle in the way of complete normalisation of relations
between the two was border problem Ultimately towards the close of 198 1 the

International Relations
Chinese and Indian teams decided to set aside the procedural aspects which had blocked
further progress in the direction of normalisation of relations, and agreed to discuss the
substantive aspects of the dispute which clearly indicated that the two countries had come
a long way in their efforts to solve the problem between them. However. much progress
could not be made in improving relations on account of Chinese reported assistance to
Pakistan in developing, nuclear weapon capability. 1n subsequent months tension
between India and China once again began to built up due to intrusion of Chinese troops
and herdsmen into the territory of Aruncachal Pradesh and the protests of China against
conferment of statehood on the territorv of Anmchal Pradesh. India strongly protested
against this and described it as an interfer;nce in here internal affairs. Even in the midst of
all these tensions the leaders of the two countries showed their keenness to resolve
outstanding disputes and establish amicable relations. They held regular meetings to find
out a solution for the border dispute but without much success. The main stumbling block
in the way has been that China has been reluctant to withdraw from its present line .of
control in Ladakh unless India made certain concessions in the Macmohan line. In
November 1987 the two countries held detailed talks and agreed to maintain tranquillity
along the borders till a mutually acceptable settlement was worked out. A serious bid to
resolve the 26 year old border
dispute was made in December 1988 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit`to
Beijing. As a result of this meeting the two countries agreed to develop their relations
actively in various fields and to work hard to create a favourable climate for a fair and
reasonable settlement of boundary questions. They agreed to set up a Joint Working
Group on Bounday Question and a Joint Group on Economic Relations. Trade. Science
and Technology. They reiterated their desire to develop good neighbourly and friendly
relations on the basis of five principles of Panchsheel enunciated by them earlier. This
change was reflected in China’s stand on Kasluuir. Contrary to the earlier stand China
took the stand that Kashmir is bilateral problem left over by history. which has to be
resolved through ’peaceful 171111L1a1 consultations’. Considerable improvement in
economic relations also took place during the last two years. As a result of efforts made
by the India China Joint Group on Economic Relations. Trade and Science &
Technology. setup in 1988. several deals for joint ventures were signed. In Februaw 1991
the Chinese Vice Premier Wu Ewequian indicated the intention of his countw to settle the
border issue. All this clearly indicates that the two countries are making sincere efforts to
settle their outstanding problems and normalise their relations.
Foreign Policy of China
Relations with Pakistan
612
People’s Republic of China’s relations with Pakistan started on low ebb because of
tatter’s membership of the western sponsored militanalliances and occasional support of
USA in the United Nations against PRC. Pakistan’s attitude on the issue of Korean war
and Muomintang Government was also quite distasteful to the Chinese leaders However,
the Pakistan leaders continued to assure tile Chinese leaders that they had no enmity
against Communist China and had joined the various alliances with a view to guard
against threat from India. At the Bandung Conference the Pakistan delegate openly
criticised the expansionist policies of Soviet Union and showed appreciation for the
Chinese policies. As a result, tile Chinese leadership showed some inclination to improve
relations with Pakistan. They conceded Pakistan’s right to conclude military alliances
with the Western countries in self defence. But probably the greatest consideration which
brought China closer to Pakistan was the tatter’s consistent hostility towards India. The
open condemnation of India by Pakistan as an aggressor during the Sino Indian conflict
of 1962, greatly helped in placating China and encouraged it to come closer to Pakistan.
China showed great accomn>9dation towards` Pakistan in economic and cultural
sphere. China also openly declared that the question of Kashmir should be settled by the
people of the state.
China’s relations with Pakistan continued to grow intimate during the nest few years. It
fully supported Pakistan during the two Indo pak wars of 1963 and 1971. and even
threatened to intervene in the dispute on its behalf However, it was prevented front doing
so by the other powers who insisted that the matter should be settled by two countries.
Thus. the two countries were drawn close by the common enmity towards India. In view
of its closer relations with China. Pakistan played an important role in patching up the
differences between China and USA which culminated in establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries. In the UN also Pakistan supported China for
permanent scat. Pakistan has been receiving regular supplies of arms from China and the
cooperation beW een the two countries has been growing steadily. China even extended
help to Pakistan in developing nuclear weapbn capability. In fact relations between China
and Pakistan have been very amicable for the last two decades and China provided
enormous military and economic assistance to Pakistan. The presence of Soviet Union
brought them still closer and China promised to supply missiles of strong power and long
range to Pakistan. Another factor which encouraged China to come closer to Pakistan in
recent vicars has been her desire to have more intimate relations with the Islamic
countries in West Asia. and the possibility of Pakistan sewing as a link in this regard.
Thus we can say plat China’s relations with Pakistan

lntemational Relations
since 1960 have been steadily growing. In the wake of recent announcement of China
that Kashmir was a bilateral problem left over by history. which could be resolved
through ’peaceful mutual consultations’. some .scholars saw a change in the attitude of
China towards Pakistan. In fact China still continues to have intimate relations with
Pakistan and its above noted pronouncement was merely a part of its wider policy of
improving relations with neighbouring countries as well as the major powers.

Policy towards Nuclear Weapons

The study of PRC’s foreign policy shall be incomplete without reference to its attitude
towards the nuclear weapon. From the very beginning PRC has been itching to acquire a
dominant position in the world politics. With this objective in mind it conducted a
number of nuclear tests and ultimately succeeded in joining the ranks of nuclear powers.
However, China opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. particularly in the
imperialist countries, because its possession could pose a threat
to world peace. On the other hand China was not averse to the idea of Socialist countries
possessing the nuclear weapons because, according to China, these countries possessing
the nuclear weapolts becauise, according to China, these countries shall use these
weapons purely as a defence against the nuclear blackmail. China considered the
possession of nuclear weapons by the Socialist significant point about China’s attitude
towards nuclear weapons is that it publicly declared hot to sue them first. Turiher, though
China has pot appended signatures to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). on 21 March
1986 it announced that it does trot intend to test nuclear n eapons in the atmosphere. Of
late. China has been urging United States as well as USSR to take lead in drastically
reducing and destroying nuclear weapons so that positive conditions could be creased for
the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament. On 16 December
1987 a Chinese spokesman said: ”On the question of intermediate range missiles China
believes that these missiles deployed in Europe and in Asia should be destroyed
simultaneously because the security of Europe and that of Asia was equally important. He
said that China would, as always snake its own contribution to genuine disarmament.
Despite the above profession. China has continued to build nuclear and conventional
weapons. Thus there is clearly an inconsistgno in China policy in this regard. This
inconsistency is inexplicable party as a leftover of the days of early ideological fervour
against nuclear armed capitalist west or revisionist Soviet Union . and partly because
China. like other arms exporting countries, promotes exports of lethal equipment to
balance budget. earn foreign exchange to gain access to advanced defence
technology and enhance national prestige.
61,
Foreign Policy of China
Policy towards Third World
China has tried to develop very intimate relations with the countries of the Third World
on the basis of shared common experiences of colonialism and underdevelopment. In fact
in the 19>0’s China tried to identify herself more with the Third World countries than the
socialist states of Eastern Europe. The Chinese revolution provided an impetus to the
nationalist struggles in several countries of Asia and Africa. The new Chinese
government also continued to extend every possible help and support to the countries of
the Third World in their struggle against the imperialist powers. China’s role became
more vocal in the 1960’s when it encouraged the Third World countries to reject the
overtures of the two super powers and tried to minimise the role of the two super powers
in the
international relations. It is well known that China extended every possible financial
assistance to Viet Minh fords against France as well as United States. China has also
strongly supported the demand for New International Economic Order and favoured
regional cooperation for the rapid development of the Third World countries. In short.
China has always tried to project itself as the champion of the cause of Third World
countries. However this image of China suffered a setback on account of its role during
the Persian Gulf War. It not only supported the use of force against Iraq but also failed to
condemn the highhanded approach of United States during the war. Despite, this
limitation it cannot be denied that the People’s Republic of China has by and large
projected itself as the champion of the Third World countries. It has , consistently
opposed military alliances and overseas bases; and advocated non interference in the
internal affairs of the sovereign states: and condemned intervention by the super powers
in the affairs of other nations.
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