Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cia 1984 5 2 17
Cia 1984 5 2 17
Janet M. Fitchen
Ithaca College
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
1. Resources
also obvious among faculty and students. The worldview pertains to many
types of resources valued in the academic economy, only three of which
will be discussed here.
Resource A: Money. Money is the most obvious resource, and is
deemed to be in scarce supply (which at present seems to be an accurate
perception). This scarcity view is exhibited throughout the budget-making
process. For example, there is only so much money allocated to faculty
salaries. If faculty salaries are to be increased across the board to reflect
inflation (or to remain competitive with other universities, or to be even
marginally competitive with non-academic employment), the money "has to
come out of" some other part of the institution^ overall budget—perhaps
library acquisitions, renovation of classroom buildings, or visual aids. But
deliberations and decisions about these allocations are carried on outside of
faculty awareness, lest faculty become aware that the share of the pie
destined for faculty salaries is not absolutely fixed. Within the salaries
budget, too, there is regulated competition between departments for scarce
dollar resources: if a department manages to persuade a dean or provost
to allow a 10% salary raise for that particular department, this raise may
come out of the budget monies that would have been allocated to some oth-
er department—obviously a department with less clout. Similarly, Depart-
ment X may obtain authorization to hire a sabbatic replacement, while De-
partment Y, which is regarded by administration as less central to the
mission of the institution, is denied such funds, and is left to shuffle
teaching loads as best it can. Within a department, where there may be
some discretion over allocation of salary dollars, earmarking funds for
raising entry-level salaries (in hopes of attracting bright young scholars)
will preclude their being spent to improve the salary range for tenured
professors. Department administrators, as well as deans and provosts,
must constantly make such trade-offs in the allocation of finite, limited
monetary resources, knowing always that with a fixed pie, enlargement of
one person1 s or departments serving will proportionately reduce the size
of serving available for someone else.
This competition for scarce dollars must be controlled, however. The
academic community must limit self-aggrandizement and selfishness on the
part of its component parts and individuals. Rife competition, bald grab-
bing for dollars, and flagrant "empire building" or showing-off of wealth
are held in check. Various Fosterian "self-correcting mechanisms" [p. 302]
operate to keep any segment from drawing a disporportionate share of re-
sources. Inequalities that do occur in the allocation of institutional dollars
should not be flaunted, and generally are obscured by the decision-making
process itself. When the dean meets separately with each department chair
in pre-budget discussions, the sense of department autonomy engendered
may be secondary to the promotion of ignorance by each unit concerning
the budget of every other unit and of the institution as a whole. The
questions a chair may ask, the issues s/he may raise with the dean, have
been limited beforehand by preventing her/him from knowing the overall
big picture. Potential intra-faculty conflict over money is also minimized by
a variety of fiscal and management techniques: for example, if all faculty
salaries are allowed gradually to sink together vis a vis the inflationary
21
rise in cost of living, competition for the salary budget may be minimized.
Maintaining such community balance is in large part the job of higher level
administrators, especially provosts, and is the foundation of their deci-
sion-making power.
Another way in which the academic community controls intracommunity
competition over limited dollar resources is by encouraging its members to
seek more of this limited good from outside the system. Thus individual
faculty members seek external contracts, grants, and fellowships, which
augment the institution^ allocations for staff and faculty salary and over-
head. Various officers of the institution seek sponsored research from both
government and the private sector; administrators lobby in the Statehouse
and Congress for student tuition-assistance; and the alumni office and de-
velopment office utilize ever more sophisticated public relations campaigns
to solicit private donations. From whichever source, as long as these dol-
lars come from outside the system, those who secure them are not reducing
anyone's share of the local pie—they are merely nibbling from an external
pie (where they are competing more with outsiders than with colleagues in
the home institution). They may be envied for eating better, but as long
as they consume no more than their share of the local pie, they pose no
threat to the well-being of others in the local institution. Success in such
ventures can therefore be openly proclaimed and mildly praised.
Resource B: Students. Students, particularly undergraduate stu-
dents, have increasingly come to be defined as a resource in the academic
community—and a limited, finite one at that. With one eye on the demo-
graphics of the post-baby boom decades, and another on the institutions
limited monetary resources, the academic community nowadays actively so-
licits, recruits, woos, entices, and enrolls as many students as possible.
Before the period of fat years grinds to a halt, the institution wants to
store up reserves (tuition dollars) for the prophesied lean years ahead.
And so freshmen are "tripled" in double dorm rooms; courses are
scheduled at odd hours and places; class size is increased; and students
are thrown into competition with each other for registration in popular
courses, for space in libraries and study carrels, and for time on playing
fields or ice rinks. This crowding results from the fact that the institu-
tion, through the arm of its admissions office, is pushing to increase its
"yield" or "take"—hoping to harvest the largest possible number of
paid-up entrants from the yearTs total accepted applicants. These phenome-
na seem to result from the application of the Image of Limited Good to the
student-as-resource.
Even after they are safely harvested, students continue to be viewed
as a limited resource, competed for as course enrollees and department ma-
jors. With a finite total number of students, the number available to any
single professor or department can be expanded only by taking them away
from enrollment and majors elsewhere on campus. Administrators play a
"numbers game" that rewards professors and departments with large course
enrollments and penalizes those having fewer students—with both the car-
rot and the club being allocation of dollars for faculty lines in depart-
mental budgets. Department competes with department, individual professor
with professor, to come out "looking good in the numbers game." With a
22
limited pool of students, each one who majors in Department A will thereby
reduce the number available to major in Department B; a pre-med student
who takes an elective history course is unlikely to also enroll in a political
science course. If a sociology course is taken to satisfy a business stu-
dents distribution or core requirement, s/he probably will not sign up for
an anthropology course. Somewhere in the administration, computers regu-
larly compile records on how many majors each department has and how
many students each faculty member teaches per term. These statistical
"body counts" are used by administration decision-makers in allocating dol-
lar resources (including merit raises), often with no apparent weight as-
signed to the quality of teaching. (If this is so, then faculty members who
give in to the temptations of popularized lectures and easy grades as a
way to attract more students are correct when they claim to be doing so
"for the benefit of the department.") In faculty perception, the "numbers
game" confirms the belief that the administration defines undergraduate
students mainly as bodies with tuition dollars attached—and as a finite,
limited resource.
Resource C: Power. Power, as in decision-making power, is another
resources that is perceived by each constituency or segment of the institu-
tion as a Limited Good. Power may be centralized and closely guarded at
the top levels of the academy, lest lower-level administrators and common
faculty usurp and retain for themselves too much of it. However, even up-
per-level administrators complain that they have no power to get anything
done. 6 Power appears to be closely entwined with money: it is demonstrat-
ed through decisions in the allocation of scarce funds; and it is often de-
rived from control over money. Power also derives from having control
over or attracting a large share of that other scarce resource, students.
Schools, units, programs, or departments with greater student appeal may
gain both more money and more power because of it.
On paper, power is represented by the flow charts of institutional
governance that depict faculty council, standing committees, ad hoc com-
mittees, and student senate. But the impotence of such bodies is widely
recognized by most constituencies: although they may busy themselves with
the affairs of campus life, the parameters of their decisions are already
determined from above. The frustrations of their personnel, and the diffi-
culty in obtaining new recruits to serve on these bodies (often mislabelled
as apathy), may result from the fact that people perceive "power" as a
limited, finite resource on campus, and that relatively little of it comes
within the grasp of such formal bodies.
Thus, whether we consider dollars, students, or power, it appears
that behavior in the academic community is based on a perception that re-
sources are limited. 7 It should be added that in recent years the actuality
and the perception have been closely correlated, both moving further in
the direction of the Limited Good. The halcyon days of unlimited resources
are over. With resources becoming more scarce, decisions must often be
made among several compelling alternatives. To minimize competition and
hard feelings among the contenders for diminishing resources, administra-
tors pull in the reins of power even tighter. In their best hydraulic
hyperbole, administrators marshall frightening figures to emphasize that
23
3. Well-being
4. Personal Honors
colleges and universities, seems to fit better than one might at first have
expected. Foster's analysis appears to be applicable as both description
and model; able both to integrate and to explain the behavior of the
component parts of the system: administration, faculty, and students. The
model might well have applicability, with some alterations, to American
academia in general. Though it may not be the only fitting model, and the
fit may not everywhere be perfect, its application promises heuristic
benefits in helping to explain one segment of U.S. society to itself.
If this exercise in analytical imagination strikes some readers as
far-fetched, they are urged to consider what Foster said about the very
village in which his model was developed:
At no point has an informant even remotely suggested that this is his vision
of his universe....
[However]...the model of Limited Good, when "fed back" to behavior in
Tzintzuntzan, proved remarkably productive in revealing hitherto unsuspected
structural regularities.... [p. 297].
NOTES
1. This paper Is an expanded and revised version of one read at the Annual Meeting of the
American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., December 1982. I gratefully ac-
knowledge the thoughtful commentary of George M. Foster in response to earlier versions
of this paper.
2. The strategy of analysis by analogy has been used by several anthropologists to yield
insight and analytical leverage for understanding U.S. culture. Burnett [1969] and Fiske
28
[1972] effectively interpret football and associated activities in American high schools
and colleges in terms of Van Gennep's model of rites of passage. In a popular-audience
article, Kottak [1978] uses a model of religious activity to describe McDonald's restau-
rants; while Dubisch [1981] uses the model of religion to analyze participation in the
health food movement. But none of these analyses of U.S. culture utilizes a specific
model derived from a particular non-U.S. society in the analysis of a U.S. institution.
3. George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good." AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST, 67(2):293-315, April 1965. All page references in this paper are to this
source. Parenthetically, it was Foster himself who suggested that the Image of Limited
Good might also be characteristic of other non-peasant societies [see Note 5, p. 311].
Concerning the particular Mexican peasant community on which Foster's model was built, a
more complete and updated study is Foster's TZINTZUNTZAN: MEXICAN PEASANTS IN A CHANGING
WORLD [1979 edition].
4. "Research" for this paper received no financial support from either the U.S. government
or its agencies, private foundations, or the institutions under study.
5. I thank those individuals whose comments after hearing the original version of this pa-
per gave additional support to the thesis. I am indebted to Daniela Weinberg for her
questions and reflections.
6. See Warren Bennis' article on academia: "Why Leaders Can't Lead" [1979].
7. Foster has suggested (personal communication) that time may also be a recognized good on
campus—and is clearly perceived as a resource that is limited and finite.
8. That research hypotheses and findings may be considered by graduate students as a Limit-
ed Good is a suggestion made by Foster (personal communication).
9. I'm grateful to George Foster for making this point (personal communication).
REFERENCES CITED
Bennis, Warren
1979 "Why Leaders Can't Lead." In LIFE IN ORGANIZATIONS. Rosabeth Moss Ranter and Barry
A. Stein, eds. New York: Basic Books.
Burnett, Jacquetta Hill
1969 "Ceremony, Rites, and Economy in the Student System of an American High School."
HUMAN ORGANIZATION 28(1):1-10.
Dubisch, Jill
1981 "You Are What You Eat: Religious Aspects of the Health Food Movement." In THE AMER-
ICAN DIMENSION. W. Arens and Susan P. Montague, eds. Sherman Oaks, CA: ""Alfred Pub-
lishing Co.
Fiske, Shirley
1972 "Pigskin Review: an American Initiation." In SPORT IN THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PROCESS.
M. Marie Hart, ed. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown.
29
Foster, George M.
1965 "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good." AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
67(2):293-315.
Foster, George M.
1979 TZINTZUNTZAN: MEXICAN PEASANTS IN A CHANGING WORLD. Rev. ed. New York: Elsevier.
Kottak, Conrad P.
1978 "Rituals at McDonald's." NATURAL HISTORY 87(1):75-82.