Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PLAN
For Training Purposes Only
M/V “LISCR”
In Accordance with Part A & Part B of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (I.S.P.S.) Code
June 2008
SHIP SHIP
SECURITY SECURITY
PLAN PLAN
M/V “LISCR ”
M/V “LISCR ”
CONTENTS
Sections marked in pink are confidential, they have been printed in pink paper and should be
protected from unauthorized access and use.
HISTORY OF REVISIONS
All changes and revisions to this plan should be recorded in the following table. Authorized person
to insert changes is the CSO. Removed pages or sections should be destroyed accordingly.
HISTORY OF REVISIONS
All changes and revisions to this plan should be recorded in the following table. Authorized person
to insert changes is the CSO. Removed pages or sections should be destroyed accordingly.
SECTION 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.3. Definitions
1.3.1 For the purpose of this manual, unless expressly provided otherwise:
.1 Convention means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as
amended (SOLAS 74).
.2 ISPS Code means International Ship and Port Facility Code for the security of Ships and
of Port Facilities consisting of Part A (with mandatory provisions) and Part B (with
recommendatory provisions).
.3 Ship Security Assessment (SSA) means the security assessment, including an on-scene
security survey to identify security weaknesses regarding the physical and structural
security and the existing procedures of the ship.
.4 Ship Security Plan (SSP) means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures
on board the ship, designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units,
ship's stores or the ship from the risk of a security incident.
.5 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) means a plan developed to ensure the application of
measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport
units and ship's stores within the port facility from the risk of a security incident.
.6 Ship Security Officer (SSO) means the person on board the ship, accountable to the
master, designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the
company security officer and port facility security officers.
.7 Company Security Officer (CSO) means the person designated by the Company for
ensuring that a ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is
developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained and for
liaison with port facility security officers and the ship security officer.
.8 Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) means the person designated as responsible for
the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security
plan and for liaison with the ship security officers and company security officers.
.9 Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security
measures shall be maintained at all times.
.10 Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security
measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a
security incident.
.11 Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures
shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or
imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
.12 International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) means the certificate issued by the
Administration, certifying that this ship is implementing/maintaining an approved
Security Plan and the Security System and any associated security equipment has been
verified and is in all respects satisfactory and in compliance with the applicable
requirements.
.13 Company means the company that manage and operate the ship
SECTION 2:
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
.17 PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER: States the responsibilities of the PFSO.
.18 TRAINING DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON PORT FACILITY SECURITY: States all
relevant requirements for the Port Facilities.
.19 VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION FOR SHIPS: Specifies the inspections,
verifications and issuance of the appropriate certificates concerning maritime security and
their duration and validity.
2.4. Remarks
2.4.1 The above Regulatory Requirements set the spectrum of obligations and responsibilities of
Governments, Shipping companies, Ships and Port facilities and have been taken into account in
preparing this plan.
SECTION 3:
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES
hitherto shall transmit to the Administration as soon as possible after the transfer takes place a copy
of the relevant Continuous Synopsis Record covering the period during which the ship was under
their jurisdiction together with any Continuous Synopsis Records previously issued to the ship by
other States.
3.2.7 When the ship is transferred to the flag of another State, the Administration shall append the
previous Continuous Synopsis Records to the Continuous Synopsis Record the Administration will
issue to the ship so to provide the continuous history record intended by this regulation.
3.2.8 The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be kept on board the ship and shall be available for
inspection at all times.
SECTION 4:
COMPANY’S OBLIGATIONS
4.4.4 The ship has to preserve and maintain the system fully operational.
APPENDIX 4-A:
SECURITY ORGANIZATION
Master /
Ship’s Security Port Facility
Officer (SSO) Security Officer
(PFSO)
Ships ratings
with securities Engine
Deck Officers Officers
duties
SECTION 5:
VESSEL DETAILS
APPENDIX 5-A:
EXTRACTS FROM SHIP’S G.A. PLAN
NAVIGATION BRIDGE DECK
G DECK
F DECK
E DECK
D DECK
C DECK
B DECK
A DECK
ACCOMMODATION LADDERS
FORECASTLE DECK
PROFILE AFT
APPENDIX 5-B:
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN
SECTION 6:
COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
6.1. Designation
6.1.1 The Company Security Officer (CSO) who is responsible for all aspects of security is Capt. A.
Romero. He can be conducted at:
Office Telephone: (+1) 703 251 2490
.11 liaise with PFSO and relevant Administrations (Flag and Port States) and co-ordinate
ship’s action to implement measures and instructions given by the authorities;
.12 ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
.13 ensuring that for each vessel for which he is responsible, a trained and qualified SSO is
appointed;
.14 ensuring that any alternate or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular ship or
group of ships are implemented and maintained.
6.2.2 With respect to the responsibilities of the CSO, a CSO may perform other duties within the
owner or operator's organization, provided he is able to perform the duties and responsibilities
required of a CSO, and may delegate duties required by this section, but remains responsible for the
performance of those duties.
APPENDIX 6-A:
COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER QUALIFICATIONS
SECTION 7:
THE MASTER
SECTION 8:
SHIP’S SECURITY OFFICER
8.1. Designation
8.1.1 The Ship’s Security Officer (SSO) who is responsible for all aspects of security is the Master.
8.1.2 The company has designated an alternate Ship Security Officer, who stands in for the Ship
Security Officer when he cannot carry out his duties. The training requirements for the alternate
SSO are the same with the training requirements for the SSO described in section 20 of this Plan In
case that the SSO leaves the ship, the alternate SSO is responsible for the familiarization of the new
SSO with this Plan and the security policy of the company. The alternate Ship Security Officer is
the Chief Officer. The name of the alternate SSO can be found in the Crew List of the ship.
security information.
8.3.2 While there may be circumstances when the ship may be operating at a higher security level
than the port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when the ship can have a lower
security level than the port facility it is visiting. If the ship has a higher security level than the port
facility it intends to use, the CSO or SSO should advise the PFSO without delay. The PFSO should
undertake an assessment of the particular situation in consultation with the CSO or SSO and agree
on appropriate security measures with the ship, which may include completion and signing of a
Declaration of Security (DoS). Details for completion and signing of the DoS as well as the form of
the document are addressed in Section 19.
SECTION 9:
SSP DOCUMENTATION
SECTION 10:
SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT
10.1. General
10.1.1 As a prerequisite to prepare this Plan, a Ship Security Assessment (SSA) has been conducted
for this vessel under the provisions and requirements of the ISPS Code and under the responsibility
of the Company Security Officer. A SSA report has been prepared, reviewed and accepted by the
Company Security Officer and it is retained by the Company and onboard.
10.1.2 The SSA includes:
.1 An on-scene Ship Security survey.
.2 An identification and assessment of the following:
− existing security measures, procedures and operations;
− key ship board operations that is important to protect;
− possible threats to the key ship board operations and the likelihood of their
occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures; and
− weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and procedures.
10.1.3 The on board security survey and the assessment report data log are as follows:
.1 On board security survey conducted: .2 SSA report reviewed and accepted:
Place: Singapore Place: Company’s Office
Date: November 07, 2007 Date: November 12, 2007
Duration: From 10:00 to 20:00, local time
10.1.4 The summary of vulnerabilities found and the proposed counter measures are shown in the
tables contained in paragraph 10.2. The complete SSA report consists a separate document and is
retained by the Company and onboard according to the Flag Administration’s requirements.
10.1.5 This plan has addressed all findings of the SSA and provides the procedures to implement
the proposed counter measures.
10.1.6 The SSA has been performed and the SSP has been developed taking into account that the
vessel trades worldwide.
Area of Concern:
Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties.
Vulnerabilities Found:
Since the on-scene security survey and the ship security assessment were carried out when the ship
was not under the management of LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE
REGISTRY performance of all ship security duties were reflecting the security policy of the
previous managers, this item was not possible to be verified.
Proposed Measures:
(a) In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., security duties should
be assigned to the necessary number of crew members taking into account the different security
levels.
(b) In the new SSP, procedures should be established for onboard training and for the
familiarization of personnel joining the ship.
Area of Concern:
Monitoring Restricted Areas, accommodation spaces and cargo holds to ensure that only authorized
persons have access.
Vulnerabilities Found:
(a) No vulnerabilities were found as far as the structural requirements for protection and monitoring
of restricted areas are concerned (lighting of access points, locking devices, appropriate
marking, etc.).
(b) The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to the protection and monitoring of
restricted areas was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security survey and the ship
security assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under the management of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
(a) In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., procedures should be
established, taking into account the different security levels, for guards and roving patrols and
for locking the doors of all the restricted areas and the entrances to the accommodation spaces.
Area of Concern:
Controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems.
Vulnerabilities Found:
(a) No vulnerabilities were found as far as the structural requirements for controlling the access to
the ship are concerned (lighting and identification of access points).
(b) The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to the control of the access to the
ship was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security survey and the ship security
assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under the management of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., the following should be
established:
(a) an effective identification system for people entering the ship and procedures for its control and
updating;
(b) a logbook for recording people entering the ship; and
(c) procedures, taking into account the different security levels, for guards and roving patrols
controlling the access to the ship.
Area of Concern:
Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship.
Vulnerabilities Found:
(a) No vulnerabilities were found as far as the structural requirements for monitoring the deck areas
and the areas surrounding the ship are concerned.
(b) The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to the control of the deck areas and
the areas surrounding the ship was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security
survey and the ship security assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under
the management of LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., the following should be
established, taking into account the different security levels:
(a) procedures for guards and roving patrols controlling the deck areas and the areas surrounding
the ship.
Area of Concern:
Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and unaccompanied baggage
and ship’s personnel personal effects).
Vulnerabilities Found:
The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to the control of the embarkation of
persons and their effects was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security survey and the
ship security assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under the management
of LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., the following should be
established, taking into account the different security levels:
(a) procedures for controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects.
Area of Concern:
Supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores.
Vulnerabilities Found:
The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to the supervision of the handling of
cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security
survey and the ship security assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under the
management of LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., the following should be
established, taking into account the different security levels:
(a) procedures for supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores.
Area of Concern:
Ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available.
Vulnerabilities Found:
(a) No vulnerabilities were found as far as the security related equipment requirements are
concerned.
(b) The effectiveness of the organic security procedures related to security communication and
information was not possible to be verified during the on-scene security survey and the ship
security assessment since they were carried out when the ship was not under the management of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY.
Proposed Measures:
In the new SSP, which will be developed in accordance with the specific security policy of
LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND CORPORATE REGISTRY., the following should be
established, taking into account the different security levels:
(a) procedures for ensuring that ship security communication and information are readily available.
SECTION 11:
SECURITY SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
Type of information
Maker Type PIC for inspection
transmitted
MMSI, Ship’s name, IMO
JRC No., Course Speed, Number
JHS-180 Master
JAPAN RADIO CO. LTD of crew, Nav. Status, E.T.A.,
Draught, Next Port
11.1.3 The system is integrated to the ship’s primary GPS receiver and the gyro compass and
transmits and receives safety related navigational information, such as ship’s name, IMO number,
Call sign, MMSI, position, course and speed, destination & ETA, etc.
11.1.4 The equipment should be maintained in operation at all times, except where international
agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.
11.2.3 In accordance with Regulation 6 of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the Ship Security Alert System,
when activated:
.1 initiates and transmits a ship-to-shore security alert to Flag Administration of the ship to
the following e-mail address: //alarm@liscr.com// and to the CSO, identifying the ship,
its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or it has been
compromised;
.2 does not send the ship security alert to any other ship;
.3 does not raise any alarm on board the ship; and
.4 continues to send the security alert until it is deactivated and/or reset.
11.2.4 The transmission of a security alert should not be included with any other routine reporting
that the ship may conduct. The message transmission should be generated automatically with no
input from the operator other than the activation of the system. The message must include:
.1 the vessel’s name;
.2 the IMO ship Identification Number
.3 the Call Sign
.4 the Maritime Mobile Service Identity
.5 date and time;
.6 position;
.7 course and speed;
.8 the name and phone number of the CSO
.9 a message stating that the SSAS has been activated and indicating the ship is under threat
or it has been compromised.
11.2.5 One of the two activation points of the SSAS is located in the Navigating Bridge. The
location of the second activation point is in the Ship’s Office on the Upper Deck.
11.2.6 The ship security alert system should be activated by the Master/ SSO or by other officer as
authorized by the Master in case that the Master/ SSO is unable by the circumstances to activate
the system. Deactivation and reset should be conducted by the Master.
11.2.7 Upon receipt of the alert from the ship, and in order for possible false alerts to be limited, the
CSO should:
.1 contact the ship urgently;
.2 inform the Master/ SSO or the Watch Officer that the Security Alert System of the ship
has been activated and ask whether the security of the ship has been compromised or not;
.3 in case that the ship is safe, the Master/ SSO or the Watch Officer should use the
following password in order to confirm that the alert was fault:
“LISCR ; LISCR ; LISCR ”
.4 the above actions 11.2.7.2 and 11.2.7.3 should be repeated for a second time;
.5 in case of a false alert, the CSO should ask from the SSO to further investigate the
situation and to check the Ship Security Alert System in order to determine the reason of
the false alert, if this is possible;
.6 in case that the alert is true, the CSO must inform the officials designated by the Flag
administration to receive and act upon the ship-to-shore security alert and to coordinate
with them all the necessary action.
SECTION 11 REVISION NO: 00 / DATE: 19/05/2008 PAGE 2 OF 8
M/V “LISCR” (IMO NO: 9876543) SHIP SECURITY PLAN
11.2.8 The Master/ SSO is responsible to inform all the deck officers assigned the duty of Watch
Officer on the procedure described in §11.2.7 above and especially on the password mentioned in
§11.2.7.3.
11.2.9 The SSAS should be operated in accordance with its instruction manual.
.3 the ability of the AIS to receive ships dynamic information from the appropriate
sensors;
.1 up to 3 months before the due date of the passenger ship renewal survey or the cargo
ship safety equipment renewal survey; and
.2 3 months before or after the due date of the cargo ship safety equipment
periodical/annual survey (the maximum period between subsequent test is governed
by the time window associated to the subsequent surveys, unless either certificate
has been extended as permitted by SOLAS regulation 1/14, in which case a similar
extension may be granted by the Administration).
11.4.2.3 The annual testing should be recorded in the form of the model test report given in
the appendix 11-B. If the language used is neither English, nor French, nor Spanish, the text
should include a translation into one of these languages, as appropriate. A copy of the test
report should be retained on board the ship.
11.4.3 The AIS does not require any particular calibration.
11.4.4 According to the manufacturer’s instructions, the SSAS does not need any kind of preventive
maintenance. After 10 years of operation, an internal battery has to be replaced and the transceiver
must be sent ashore for service.
11.4.5 The SSAS does not require any particular calibration.
11.4.6 The SSAS should be tested for proper operation by the SSO every 6 months according to the
manufacturer’s instruction. To this end, the following procedure should be followed:
.1 Prior to sending the test alert, the test should be arranged and notified on a working hours
day agreed in advanced between the Master/ SSO and the CSO.
.2 The Ship Security Alert should be activated from the primary activation point. The SSO
must confirm by return that the security alert has been received.
.3 The other activation point on board should then be tested in accordance with the above
procedure.
.4 When all SSAS activation points have been tested and the Ship Security Alert has been
reset, it shall be agreed between the Master/ SSO and the CSO that testing is successfully
completed and all future alerts are to be treated as “real”.
.5 Each test must be properly logged in the ship’s Official Log.
11.4.7 In case that the SSAS is found to be in bad working condition, it should be repaired
immediately. If the necessary repairs cannot be carried out immediately, the SSO must inform the
CSO who must in turn inform the Flag Administration of the ship and ask their permission for the
ship to continue sailing until repairs will be carried out.
11.4.8 Responsible for ensuring that all the above maintenance and testing instructions are complied
with is the SSO. Relevant records should be kept in the “SECURITY EQUIPMENT LOG BOOK”
contained in Appendix 11-A. In case of more extensive repairs, a report containing a detailed
description of the repair work should always be acquired from the repair team and should be kept
together with the “SECURITY EQUIPMENT LOG BOOK”. The details which should be entered
in the log book are shown below:
.1 Date;
.2 Type of job (check, repair, replacement, etc);
.3 Date for next check, if applicable; and
.4 Details of faults if any.
11.4.9 Apart from the above equipment, the ship is equipped with the portable security equipment
described in §11.5, which do not need any particular maintenance. In case that a particular piece of
equipment is found to be in bad working condition, it should be replaced immediately.
Security Lighting:
APPENDIX 11-A:
SECURITY EQUIPMENT LOG BOOK
Type of job
Date of next
Equipment Date (check, repair, Details of faults
check
replacement, etc)
Signature_______________
APPENDIX 11-B:
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS) TEST REPORT
Remarks:
The AIS has been tested according to IMO SN/Circ.227 and resolution MSC.74(69), annex 3
Name of Radio Inspector Date and place Name of Radio Inspector
Company
SECTION 12:
COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING
12.1. General
12.1.1 VHF radios shall be employed as the primary means of communication, with ship
intercom/phone used as a backup.
12.1.2 Distress and Duress: Procedures for indicating that the ship is in distress, or is
communicating under duress are the responsibility of the SSO. Appropriate ship's personnel are to
be trained in these procedures.
12.1.3 Communications with terminal operator's personnel will be coordinated through the ship's
agent with preference given to VHF radio and/or telephone. For security purposes, direct
communication links will be established between ship security personnel and the security personnel
in the port facility. Those links will be subject to periodic testing and failure to maintain
communication will be reported immediately to the SSO.
12.1.4The SSO is required to communicate directly with the CSO, via telephone, fax, or e-mail as
necessary to co-ordinate shipboard security operations and support requirements, and provide
updated port contact information.
12.1.5The Master and all Radio Operators should be aware that potential attackers might be
monitoring ship to shore communications and using intercepted information to select targets.
Caution is required when transmitting information on cargo, valuables and even status of ship’s
stores.
12.5.2 When the master has concluded that the safety of the ship is threatened, he shall:
.1 Activate the Security Alert System.
.2 Notify the cognizant Rescue Centre or other designated security centre and if considered
appropriate authorize a broadcast of an “All Stations” “Urgency Message” on VHF
channel 16, 2182 kHz or any other radio communications he considers appropriate
(e.g. INMARSAT). Such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency
Signal (PAN PAN) and or a DSC call on VHF channel 70 and/or 2187,5 kHz.
12.5.3 When an attack has occurred and in the opinion of the Master the crew and ship are in great
danger requiring immediate assistance, the Master shall authorize the broadcast of a “Distress”
message be preceded by the appropriate Distress alerts (Mayday, SOS, DSC, etc.) using the radio
equipment most appropriate for the area taking into account the GMDDS Designation. The
appropriate RCC or other designated centres shall acknowledge receipt of the message and attempt
to establish communications.
12.8.3 In case of equipment failure breakdown, CSO should be informed and corrective actions
should be urgently taken.
APPENDIX 12-A:
VESSEL’S COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
Availability
System Use Location Maker Type
Onboard
Ship to shore and ship to ship NERA
MINI M Nav. Bridge NERA 1 set
worldwide communication via telex. RS232B
Ship to shore and ship to ship SAILOR /
H2095C
INMARSAT C worldwide communication via telex. Nav. Bridge THRANE & 2 sets
TT-3606A
THRANE
VHF radio Ship to shore and ship to ship local COMPACT VHF-
SAILOR;
installation area communication. Nav. Bridge RT2047 / TRP 3012/24 3 sets
SKANTY
Ship to shore and ship to ship local
MF/HF/DSC THRANE & 3420 A
area communication. Nav. Bridge 1 set
encoder THRANE SN:921573/921574
Ship to shore and ship to ship local
MF Radio
area communication. Nav. Bridge SKANTI TRP 8750D SN:8734 1set
Telephony
Ship to shore and ship to ship local
2-way portable
area communication for safety Nav. Bridge JOTRON TRON VHF 5GF 3 sets
VHF
reasons.
Ship to shore. Ship to ship. On Nav. Bridge,
Walkie-Talkie Local area on hand of Various Makers Various Types 6 sets
officers
Internal announcements Nav. Bridge &
Public Address
Various locations STENTO VMP-430 1 set
System
onboard
Internal communication within the Various locations
Ship’s telephone STENTO VMP-430 1 set
ship. onboard
APPENDIX 12-B:
CONTACT INFORMATION
Layberth Operator
Pilots
Tugs
Others
APPENDIX 12-C:
REPORT ON A BREACH OF SECURITY
Vessel:
Date:
(1) Date & description of the incident:
(signature) (signature)
APPENDIX 12-D:
REPORT OF UNLAWFUL ACT
The Master/SSO is responsible for filling out and submitting to the CSO this report within 24 hours
of the discovery of any unlawful act.
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Name: Injury:
Explosives:
Other:
_____________________________
Upon receipt of the report, the CSO shall file a written report of said accident, to the appropriate
authorities.
APPENDIX 12-E:
INITIAL AND FOLLOW UP MESSAGE FOR PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY
SECTION 13:
ENSURING THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL SECURITY DUTIES
.8 Ensure you are aware of the current Security Level and the security measures that
have been implemented.
.9 Tour ship randomly and check all restricted areas, mooring lines, rat guards, possible
hazards (i.e. fires, leaks, electrical, etc.), lounge areas and all berthing areas.
.10 Be aware of immediate recall procedures in case of an emergency.
.11 Carry a portable walkie- talkie and a flashlight.
13.2.3 Roving Patrols.
.1 Whether the ship is pier-side, at anchor, or in route in narrow waters, it is vulnerable to
pirate or terrorist acts. The implementation and degree to which the patrols are used will
be determined by the Master in accordance with the current Security Level and the
instructions contained in Sections 14 and 15.
.2 All patrols should be in the proper uniform of the day and they should be equipped with a
walkie-talkie and a high range portable flashlight.
.3 Roving patrols will be used to:
.1 Monitor the Upper Deck of the vessel, the access points to the ship (gangway ladder,
pilot ladder, mooring lines and anchor chains) and the areas surrounding the ship
(dock side and sea side).
.2 Check whether the hatch covers of all cargo holds are closed (if not in use) and the
hatchway openings of all cargo holds are secured.
.3 Check whether the doors and other access points to restricted areas and the access
points to the accommodation spaces are properly secured.
.4 Check whether the Fresh Water supply points are properly secured.
.4 The frequency and the manning of the patrol is determined by the current Security Level,
as specified in Sections 14 and 15.
.5 The roving patrol starts from the bow of the ship, then moves across the Main Deck, up to
the stern of the ship, and finally through the Accommodation Decks it ends on the Nav.
Bridge Deck.
.6 The roving patrol should report every 5 min to the OOW via the walkie-talkie that no
irregularities were found.
.7 All roving patrols will check in with the gangway watch at intervals which should not
exceed 1 or 2 hours according to the current security level.
.8 All irregularities noted during the patrol may represent a cause for a security alert and
should immediately be reported to the Watch Officer and the SSO. Once reported to the
Watch Officer and SSO, it will be recorded in the gangway log.
.9 If it is considered necessary, the Watch Officer or Ship Security Officer should ensure
that noted security violations are recorded in detail. If the incident may result in news
inquiries of an unusual intensity or receive national attention, the home office will be
notified immediately.
13.2.4 Gangway Watch.
.1 The Gangway watch will be stood at or near the head of the entrance ways. The watch is
mandatory whenever the access is actively being used.
.2 Uniform and Equipment:
Notes:
(1) In level 3 the Emergency/Contingency team may be activated as required or additional security
duties may be assigned after the order of the Government of the Port or of the Flag
APPENDIX 13-A:
FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING FORM
Check as
Topics Date Remarks
applicable
Current security threats and patterns.
Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous
substances and devices.
Recognition of characteristics and behavioural
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten
security.
Techniques used to circumvent security measures.
Crowd management and control techniques.
Security-related communications.
Emergency procedures and contingency plans.
Operation of the security equipment and systems of
the ship.
Testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of
the security equipment and systems of the ship.
Inspection, control and monitoring techniques.
Methods of physical searches of persons, personal
effects, baggage, cargo, and ship's stores.
Security measures which must be implemented
according to the current Security Level as described
in the SSP.
Specific security duties.
__________________________
(signature)
APPENDIX 13-B:
Gangway LOG BOOK
Port: Date:
Notes:
SECTION 14:
CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE SHIP
14.1. General
14.1.1 This section identifies the Access points to the ship and establishes the security measures
covering all means of access to the ship identified in the SSA according to the declared Security
level.
Security Level
Protective Measure
1 2 3
Continuously manning of the Gangway with one guard when the
Yes Yes Yes(1)
vessel is in port (in accordance with the daily watch lists issued)
Raise the Gangway ladder (when the vessel is in port) No No Yes
Monitoring deck areas, mooring lines and anchor chains by roving
Yes(2) Yes(3) No*
patrols when the vessel is in port
Securing the covers of the hawse pipe(s) which is (are) in use. Yes Yes Yes
Fitting of rat guards on the mooring lines which are in use. Yes Yes Yes
Sufficient lighting of access points Yes Yes Yes
Coordinate with the port facility to extend access control beyond the
Optional Yes Yes
immediate area of the vessel, by using barriers at ship’s dock
Access to the ship is prohibited to everyone. Access is only
permitted to those person/officials who are responsible for No No Yes
responding to security incidents or threats.
(1) Place one guard + one officer.
(2) One Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 2 hours.
(3) One Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 1 hours.
* In Security Level 3, roving patrols monitoring the deck areas are not necessary because guards
have been placed at the fore and aft part of the Upper Deck.
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag. In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3)
This response may include:
• Setting up additional restricted areas on the ship in the vicinity of the security incident
or threat
• Searching the restricted areas, as part of a search of the ship (Sec. 22.3)
SECTION 15:
MONITORING OF RESTRICTED AREAS AND OF
ACCOMMODATION SPACES
15.1.2 All restricted areas should be marked outside of the entrance with the following sign painted
red:
ACCESS IS RESTRICTED
UNAUTHORIZED PRESENCE WITHIN THE AREA
CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF SECURITY
15.1.3 Above sign indicates that access to the area is restricted and that unauthorized
presence within the area constitutes a breach of security.
.2 Document the description of the area/room and assign a number to each one.
.3 Ensure that each door has two keys and each key has a key tag with the specific number
of the area/room to which it corresponds.
.4 Establish and maintain a safe key locker where keys are maintained. Distribute the one set
of keys as appropriate and collect it when persons disembark.
.5 Ensure that crew members receiving and returning keys sign in the key control form.
.6 Keep always the second set of keys and any master keys in the key locker.
15.5.2 Key control organization and maintenance shall be recorded in the key control form. A
template of the form can be found in Appendix 15-A.
Security Level
Protective Measure
1 2 3
Locking or securing access points to all restricted
Yes(1),(2),(3) Yes(1),(2),(3) Yes(1),(2),(3)
areas.
The accommodation lift is set out of operation. No Yes Yes
Locking of access points to the accommodation
Yes(1),(2) Yes(1),(2) Yes(1),(2)
spaces when the vessel is at sea.
Locking of access points to the accommodation
spaces except of the door which is near the gangway Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1)
ladder in use when the vessel is in port.
Monitoring the access points to restricted areas and
Yes(4) Yes(5) Yes(6)
accommodation spaces by roving patrols
Sufficient lighting of entrances to R.A. Yes Yes Yes
(1) Doors in escape routes must be capable of being opened without keys from the direction
for which escape is required.
(2) Locking of a restricted area is not required if a member of the crew is present in the
corresponding area.
(3) The access doors of Engine Room must always be locked in security level 2 or 3
(4) Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 2 hours.
(5) Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 1 hour.
(6) Roving patrol consisting of one rating that will patrol the internal and external part of the
accommodation deckhouse continuously. In Security Level 3, it is not required from the
roving patrol to check the Upper Deck (Aft & Fore) areas of the vessel because these areas
are controlled by guards.
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag. In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3)
This response may include:
• Setting up additional restricted areas on the ship in the vicinity of the security incident
or threat
• Searching the restricted areas, as part of a search of the ship (Sec. 22.3)
APPENDIX 15-A:
KEY CONTROL FORM
Key Number
Relevant area or department Received by: / date Returned by: / date
Code of keys
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
15
16
17
18
Reviewed by SSO
__________________
date:
SECTION 16:
CONTROLLING THE EMBARKATION OF PERSONS AND
THEIR EFFECTS
Officer for appropriate action, i.e. to change the shape and the serial number.
.7 Abuse of the above procedures shall be reported to CSO and relevant port authorities and
is subject to disciplinary action.
16.2.4 Firearms.
.1 Unless approval is granted by the Master, weapons are strictly forbidden onboard the
vessel.
.2 Exception to this policy is law enforcement agency personnel acting in official capacity
and with full permission of the Master.
16.2.5 Liaison with law enforcement agencies.
.1 The SSO will establish and maintain liaison with local law enforcement agencies to
ensure that their full protective capabilities are deployed in the protection of the ship
when operating under heightened Security Levels.
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag. In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3)
This response may include:
• Setting up additional restricted areas on the ship in the vicinity of the security incident
or threat
• Searching the restricted areas, as part of a search of the ship (Sec. 22.3)
SECTION 17:
SUPERVISING THE HANDLING OF CARGO, SHIP’S STORES
AND UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE’S
Security Level
Protective Measure
1 2 3
Routine checking of cargo transport units and
cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo handling Yes(1) Yes(2) Yes(3)
operations (ref. 17.1.2)
Check to ensure that cargo being loaded matches
Yes(1) Yes(2) Yes(4)
the cargo documentation. (17.1.2)
Ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that
vehicles to be loaded on board car carries, Ro-
N/A N/A N/A
Ro, and passenger ships are subjected to search
prior to loading.
Checking of seals or other methods to prevent
N/A N/A N/A
tampering
Visual and/or physical examination and checking
(as appropriate) of cargo, cargo transport units
and cargo spaces, prior to, and during, cargo Yes(1) Yes(2) Yes(3)
handling operations (ref. 17.1.2)
Using scanning/ detection equipment,
mechanical devices or dogs. N/A N/A N/A
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag, In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3).
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag, In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3).
SECTION 18:
MONITORING THE SHIP AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS
18.2. Lighting
18.2.1 The ability of a perpetrator to gain access to a ship has a higher degree of success during the
hours of darkness. Adequate lighting lessens the degree of success by increasing the effectiveness
of security personnel, acting as a deterrent and by making the perpetrators job more difficult.
18.2.2 Lighting means are:
− Ship’s installed deck lights
− Additional security lighting, (fixed searchlights)
18.2.3 Lighting requirements:
.1 Access points to the restricted areas should be always lighted in order to monitor access
by patrols.
.2 All deck lighting should be activated during hours of darkness by OOW.
.3 Additional security lighting (fixed or portable searchlights) may be used as required to
supplement deck lighting.
.4 Lighting will be such that it will not cause a glare that hinders vision of security
personnel or navigability of water traffic.
.5 In order to achieve complete light coverage coordination with port facility shall be aimed
for.
.6 Security lighting will be activated during all hours of darkness.
.7 All deficiencies or needed repairs will be logged in and reported to the Watch Officer
immediately. Temporary lighting will be established as soon as possible.
18.2.4 The OOW is responsible to activate the ship’s lighting and assure that searchlights (fixed or
portable) are operated by one of the Oiler
18.2.5 The Second Engineer is responsible for the proper operation and the maintenance of the
ship’s lighting equipment. In case of inclement weather conditions and power disruptions
(blackout), the emergency generator will be activated. The required lighting will be connected and
activated through the main power switchboard which is receiving power either from a shore source,
or from one of the ships main generators.
Security Level
Protective Measure
1 2 3
Use of guards. No No Yes(1)
Use of roving patrols Yes(2) Yes(3) No*
Lighting of deck areas and shipside during hours of
Yes Yes Yes
darkness when the vessel is in port or at anchor.
Lighting of deck areas and shipside during hours of
No Yes(4) Yes(4)
darkness when the vessel is at sea.
Use of the additional security lights described in §11.5. No Yes Yes
Use of additional cargo lights. No Yes Yes
Use divers to inspect ship’s underwater part and pier’s
No Optional (5) Yes (5)
underwater structure
Slow revolution of ship’s propeller if practicable to
No Optional(6) Yes(6)
deter underwater access to ship’s hull
Waterside boat patrols and pier watches should be
Optional(5) Optional(5) Yes(5)
requested from port authorities.
(1) Guards should be placed at the Aft part of the Upper Deck and at the Forecastle Deck during
the whole day.
(2) One Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 2 hours.
(3) One Roving patrol consisting of one rating every 1 hour.
(4) The lighting arrangements that will be used should be consistent with safe navigation.
(5) To be requested from the port facility, if deemed necessary.
(6) Inform the PFSO accordingly.
* In Security Level 3, roving patrols monitoring the deck areas are not necessary because
guards have been placed at the fore and aft part of the Upper Deck.
In level 3 additional security measures may be directed by the Government of the Port or of
the Flag. In this case the Master will cooperate with the relevant Authorities and will respond
accordingly (under the provisions of Sec 7.3)
This response may include:
• Setting up additional restricted areas on the ship in the vicinity of the security incident
or threat
• Searching the restricted areas, as part of a search of the ship (Sec. 22.3)
SECTION 19:
SHIP/PORT FACILITY INTERFACE
APPENDIX 19-A:
INFORMATION ABOUT VISITING PORTS
PFSO Security
Date & Level while Extra Measures
Port / Country at port Remarks
PFSP /DoS signed
Arr Dep exist? Ship Port
Reviewed by SSO:
________________
Date:
APPENDIX 19-B:
DECLARATION OF SECURITY
Name of Ship:
Port of Registry:
IMO Number:
Name of Port Facility or
interfacing vessel:
This Declaration of Security is valid from _______________ until _____________ for the
following activities (list the activities with relevant details):
The signatories to this agreement certify that security measures and arrangements for both the ship
and the port facility or the interfacing vessel, during the specified activities meet the provisions of
chapter XI-2 and Part A of Code that will be implemented in accordance with the provisions already
stipulated in their approved plan or in the specific arrangements agreed to and set out in this DoS.
(Signature of Port Facility Security Officer or (Signature of Master or Ship Security Officer)
Master/SSO of interfacing vessel)
Contact Details
(to be completed as appropriate)
(indicate the telephone numbers or the radio channels or frequencies to be used)
for the port facility (or the interfacing vessel): for the ship:
Port facility: Master
PFSO (or SSO/ Master): SSO
Company (for the interfacing vessel): Company
CSO
SECTION 20:
ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLEMENTATION
20.1.3 The CSO is responsible to arrange for the above training and should assured that there are
documented evidence (relevant certificates, records) to verify compliance.
20.1.4 In addition, the SSO should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all
of the following, as appropriate:
.1 the layout of the ship;
.2 the ship security plan and related procedures (including scenario-based training on how to
respond);
.3 operation of the security equipment and systems of the ship as described in Section 11 of
this Plan; and
.4 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of the security equipment and systems
of the ship.
20.1.5 Training for the items 20.1.4.1 to 20.1.4.4.4 above is based on the provisions of this Plan and
therefore the first ever Ship Security Officer of the ship will be trained by the Company Security
Officer who will visit the ship for that purpose. When the Ship Security Officer leaves the ship, he
must train the incoming Ship Security Officer on the items 20.1.4.1 to 20.1.4.4.4 above. For that
purpose the off-signer must stay onboard for one trip or at least 2 days in order to familiarize the
on-signer.
20.1.6 Shipboard personnel having specific security duties according to Section 13, §13.7 and §13.8
of this plan should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, including,
as appropriate:
.1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
.2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
.3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to
threaten security;
.4 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
.5 security-related communications;
.6 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans as described in Section
22 of this Plan;
.7 operation of the security equipment and systems of the ship as described in Section 11 of
this Plan;
.8 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of the security equipment and systems
of the ship;
.9 inspection, control and monitoring techniques;
.10 methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ship's
stores;
.11 their specific duties as defined in Section 13 of this Plan;
20.1.7 All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with
relevant provisions of the SSP, including:
.1 the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;
.2 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans as described in Section
22 of this Plan;
.3 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
APPENDIX 20-A:
DRILL EVALUATION FORM
VESSEL: DATE:
TITLE DESCRIPTION:
DRILL SUMMARY
PARTICIPANTS LIST
MASTER ________________
APPENDIX 20-B:
INTERNAL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT
Vessel:
Date:
SECTION A – AUDIT RESULTS:
Item
Item Description Rating
No
1 Availability of internal and external communication systems
2 Availability of security systems and equipment
3 Performance of all security duties
4 Control of access points to the ship
5 Monitoring of restricted areas and accommodation spaces
6 Control of the embarkation of persons and their effects
7 Supervision of cargo handling and store receiving operations
8 Monitoring of open weather decks and ship’s sides
9 Onboard security training
10 Onboard drills and exercises
11 SSP review
12 Record keeping
13 Overall rating
Ratings:
1-4 Acceptable
5 Minimum acceptable standard
6-9 Not acceptable
Note:
Ratings go from 1 to 9 with 5 being the bare minimum, 1 being the highest standard and 6 to 9
being various ranges of not acceptable. The overall rating should be the auditor’s own perception of
the overall standard of the vessel and not simply calculated from the arithmetic mean.
SECTION B – CONCLUSION:
APPENDIX 20-C:
SECURITY NON-CONFORMANCE REPORT
Vessel:
Date:
APPENDIX 20-D:
MASTER’S SECURITY REVIEW REPORT
Vessel:
Date:
(1) Effectiveness of the existing security measures, procedures and operations.
Findings:
Proposals:
(2) Internal and external communication systems and security systems and equipment.
Findings:
Proposals:
(3) Interface with port authorities, the Flag Administration authorities and other ships.
Findings:
Proposals:
(4) Conflicts between safety and security measures and between shipboard duties and security
assignments.
Findings:
Proposals:
Proposals:
(6) Effectiveness of contingency and emergency plans and evaluation of security drills.
Findings:
Proposals:
Proposals:
Proposals:
Proposals:
APPENDIX 20-E:
DRILLS JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.
BOMB THREAT RESPONSE AND
REPORT
SEARCH PROCEDURES
VESSEL EVACUATION
ANTI-SWIMMER ATTACK BILL
ANTI SMALL CRAFT/ PIRACY
BILL IN PORT/ BERTH
ANTI SMALL CRAFT/ PIRACY
BILL AT SEA
HIJACK ATTACK BILL
RESPONSE TO STOWAWAYS
SECTION 21:
VERIFICATION CERTIFICATION AND CONTROLS
with the relevant provisions of the ship security plan placed on board;
21.4.3 An Interim International Ship Security Certificate may be issued by the Administration or by
a recognized security organization authorized to act on its behalf. A form of such certificate is
shown in Appendix ‘A’ of this section.
21.4.4 An Interim International Ship Security Certificate shall be valid for 6 months, or until the
certificate required by section 21.2 is issued, whichever comes first, and may not be extended.
APPENDIX 21-A:
FORM OF INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE
SECTION 22:
CONTINGENCY PLANS AND STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (SOPs)
22.1. Introduction
22.1.1 The preparation of contingency plans and standard operating procedures in response to
security incidents is an essential part of security. This section increases the awareness for security
incidents and establishes the responsibilities and procedures to be implemented.
22.1.2 The contingencies that are addressed in this section are:
.1 bomb threat response and report;
.2 search procedures;
.3 vessel evacuation;
.4 anti-swimmer attack bill;
.5 anti-small craft/piracy bill in port/berth;
.6 anti-small craft/piracy bill at sea;
.7 hijack attack bill; and
.8 response to stowaways;
22.1.3 Following procedures for above contingencies should be considered as an initial guidance to
Master and crew and might be supplemented/amended by the Master or the CSO or the Authorities,
in accordance with the situation in place.
22.1.4 In all cases the security of the crew and passengers is of a paramount importance and priority
and actions should be considered with great caution. One of the first actions the ship should take, is
to activate the alert system, as appropriate, and inform all relevant authorities and the company with
any other means.
.2 The Master will base his analysis of the seriousness of the threat on the “bomb threat
evaluation check list” contained in Appendix 22-B and on the following:
.1 Any unidentified or unescorted intruders onboard prior to the threat.
.2 Stores, mail, spare parts, new equipment taken onboard prior to the threat.
.3 The security status in the last port of call.
.4 Did the threat call or note appear to be authentic?
.5 Any recent dissensions or unrest among the crew?
22.2.4 Bomb Threat Notification. When a Master is made aware of a bomb threat against his ship,
he shall immediately contact local law enforcement and the CSO.
22.2.5 Altering ship operations during the period of the incident, when a threat is received, the
Master shall take the following actions as appropriate.
.1 In Port:
.1 Cease operations.
.2 Secure tanks and watertight compartments.
.3 Prepare to activate fire-fighting systems.
.4 Prepare to search the ship.
.5 Prepare vessel for evacuation.
.6 Prepare vessel for departure (if appropriate).
.2 At Sea:
.1 Cease any special operations in progress.
.2 Secure tanks and watertight compartments.
.3 Prepare to activate fire-fighting systems.
.4 If possible, move the vessel to shallow water and anchor to facilitate evacuation.
22.6.1 When moored or anchored, ships are extremely vulnerable to attack by swimmers and divers.
The most advantageous time for such occurrences is during low visibility or limited light. This
procedure will assist in the defence against swimmer attacks. However, the ultimate defence is that
of a security minded crewmember.
22.6.2 Depending on the threat assessment, one or more of the following may be implemented:
.1 Shipboard lighting implemented in accordance with section 18.
.2 If available, searchlights will be manned.
.3 Roving patrols will be implemented.
.4 Implement emergency response teams.
.5 Have fire hoses laid out and charged.
.6 Lock as many weather deck doors as possible to control access.
.7 If the threat is of sufficient credibility, get underway.
on the threat assessment of the area one or more of the following will be implemented:
.1 Reaction force teams implemented.
.2 Have flare gun ready for firing from bridge.
.3 Ensure that gangways are in fully stowed position.
.4 Use anything (i.e. lights, flares, ships whistle, etc.) to let pirates know you are aware of
their approach.
.5 Provide reaction force teams with equipment to cut grappling lines (i.e. hatchets, wire
cutter etc.).
.6 Lock as many weather deck doors as possible to control access.
.7 Place main deck off limits to crew except watches.
.8 If reaction forces are not assigned, roving patrols may be implemented.
.9 Implement shipboard security lighting.
.10 If possible, request Coast Guard or Navy assistance.
.11 Have fire-hoses laid out and charged.
.12 If pier-side, contact local authorities, Embassy or others as deemed appropriate to
determine if additional resources can be made available.
.2 Do not try to resist armed terrorists unless as a last resort in a clear life threatening
situation.
.3 Ensure the safety of the ship in accordance with maritime practice.
.4 Broadcast a distress message if possible.
.5 Offer reasonable co-operation.
.6 Abuse or aggression should not be returned.
.7 Be aware that hijackers are unlikely to understand fully how a particular ship works, her
capabilities and limitations and may be suspicious about routine operations. They are also
unlikely to be familiar in detail with the safety requirements associated with the cargo.
.8 Try to establish what group of terrorists is involved.
.9 Try, without risk, to increase the number of access points to the vessel.
.10 Without suggesting what they may be, seek to establish the hijackers’ demands and what
deadlines have been set for meeting them.
.11 Assume that the incident will be prolonged. The longer incidents drag on, the more likely
they are to end without injury to the hostages.
.12 Recognize that hostages will feel isolated during the incident, as they will be unaware of
steps being taken by the company and/or government authorities on their behalf. This can
lead to antagonism against the authorities and sympathy for the terrorists. Every effort
will be being made to end the incident with the utmost emphasis on the preservation of
life and personal safety of all innocent parties involved.
.13 Understand that establishment of a reasonable rapport between hostages and captors is
likely to reduce the chances of the terrorists acting violently against their hostages.
.14 Be aware that at some stage in the incident a confrontation between the terrorists and
outside authorities may occur. Before this confrontation, an opportunity may arise or may
be created to pass information about the hijackers, such as their number, descriptions, sex,
how they are armed, how they deploy themselves, how they communicate with each
other, their cause, nationality, language(s) spoken and understood, their standard of
competence and their level of vigilance, and whether any of the hostages have been
separately identified as to nationality, religion or occupation (e.g. forces personnel).
.15 Encourage the establishment of a secure, direct negotiation channel with the authorities.
.16 Avoid crew members becoming directly involved in the negotiations. If crew members
are forced to take part they should simply relate the dialogue back and forth.
.17 Wherever and whenever possible, the hijackers should be encouraged to surrender
peacefully and should be discouraged from mistreating either passengers or crew.
.18 Military action may, in the last resort, be taken in order to save life and recapture the
vessel.
22.9.2 In the event or in anticipation of military action:
.1 Do not react to strangely dressed newcomers.
.2 Do not attract attention to any unusual activity.
.3 If shooting or the loud command “GET DOWN”, is heard immediately lie face down,
cover ears, close eyes, and slightly open mouth. Do not move until an “ALL CLEAR’’ is
given.
.2 According to the previous paragraph, divide the ship in zones and begin search
simultaneously and systematically. After the completion of the search of each zone
report it to the OOW.
.3 Upon completion of the search make an entry in the log book by recording, time date,
names of the persons who have conducted the search.
22.10.2 Treatment of stowaways:
.1 If despite all the precautions and preventive measures the ship have taken, a stowaway
has boarded the vessel then Master shall report the incident immediately to the ship-
owner or operator (who in his turn will contact with the P&I club and the diplomatic
representative of the flag in the Port of Call), the agent of the shipping company in the
Port of Call, the Port Authority of the Port of Call and by all means follow the company’s
standard directives and instructions.
.2 The Master cannot oblige the stowaway to work on board and in all cases should be dealt
with humanitarian principles and protected from degrading treatment, keeping always in
mind the safety of the ship. In the high seas the Law of the flag State prevails, but in
port the Law of the port comes in force.
.3 Master must always keep in mind that no deviation from the planned course to the next
port of call for disembarkation is allowed unless very specific circumstances demand this
which are the following:
.1 Permission to disembark the stowaway has been granted by the public authorities of
the State to whose port the ship deviates.
.2 Repatriation has been arranged elsewhere with sufficient documentation and
permission for disembarkation.
.3 There are extenuating security or health reasons.
.4 The Master upon the discovery of a stowaway shall report the incident to the CSO. The
attached Appendix 22-C contains the form for this report.
APPENDIX 22-A:
BOMB THREAT ACTION CHECK LIST
APPENDIX 22-B:
BOMB THREAT EVALUATION CHECK LIST
4) Background Noises:
Street Music
Factory Animal
Office House
Party Atmosphere PA System
Quiet Vehicles
Voices Crockery
ALWAYS REMEMBER: REMAIN CALM AND TRY TO KEEP THE CALLER TALKING AS
LONG AS POSSIBLE.
APPENDIX 22-C:
STOWAWAY QUESTIONNAIRE
• CHILDREN …………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
b) NUMBER ………………………………………………………………………………………..
e) VISA ………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
SECTION 3-FACTS
SET OUT IN DETAIL ALL RELEVANT EVENTS. AS A MINIMUM THIS SHOULD INCLUDE DETAILS OF
THE PORT WHERE THE STOWAWAY GAINED ACCESS TO THE VESSEL, WHEN AND HOW; DETAILS OF
HOW THE STOWAWAY WAS DISCOVERED. THE STOWAWAY MUST BE QUESTIONED TO ASCERTAIN
IF WHETHER HAD RECEIVED ANY ASSISTANCE FROM ANYBODY OFFSHORE OR ABOARD.
(CONTINUE ON SEPARATE SHEET IF NECESSARY).
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………… ……………………………….
SECTION 23:
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACTING
GOVERNMENTS
APPENDIX 23-A:
CONTACT DETAILS
For contact details of the Company Security Officer please see section 06 of this manual.
SECTION 24:
COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. MARITIME SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
APPENDIX 24-A:
NOTIFICATION DIAGRAM FOR SECURITY INCIDENT WITHIN U.S.
WATERS
SSO