a. US v.

Ah chong

G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Carson, J.:

Facts:

The defendant was employed as a cook together with Pascual Gualberto, a house boy
in the same working environment. On August 14, 1908 around 10pm, the defendant
was awakened because he heard someone who is trying to force open the door of his
respective room. The latter repeatedly said, “Who is there?” but no one replied. He
believed that the person who is trying to open the door is a thief and said, “If you enter
the room, I will kill you!” He was injured right above the knee by the edge of the chair
that had been put against the door at that precise instant.

Afterwards, he immediately took a kitchen knife from his pillow, swung his arms fiercely
at the intruder. After seeing the said thief, it turned out that the person who is trying to
open the door was his co-worker, Pascual, who has the intention only to trick him. The
injury of Pascual resulted to his death.

Issue:

Whether one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act.

Ruling:

No. Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the
mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always that there is no
fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell
into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at
the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is

sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of
the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes
intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he
intended to commit.

Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that
the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Ignorantia facti excusat is a Latin maxim means ignorance of a fact or mistake of a fact
is an excuse provided that he acted in good faith.

b. People v. Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943

Moran, J.:

Facts:

Captain Monsod was instructed to arrest Balagtas immediately, who is known to be

hard criminal and if by necessary means dead or alive. The same task was given to
Chief of Police Oanis that has knowledge of whereabouts of Irene, the partner of the
said criminal. When the company of Oanis arrived at Irene’s house, Oanis approached
an individual named, Mallare, who pointed the place of Irene and informed Oanis that
Balagtas and Irene were sleeping together at that time.

Afterwards Oanis and Galantra took their firearms and shot the person beside Irene
(they are both sleeping) and assumed that the person being shot by them was Balagtas.
However, it turned out that the said person was an innocent man named, Tecson.
Issue:

Whether the appellants upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson.

Ruling:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice. And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is willfully done,
a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

c. People V. Flora

G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000

Quisumbing, J.:

Facts:

Before the incident took happened, Hermogenes Flora a.k.a “Bodoy,” had a
misunderstanding with Oscar Villanueva. Oscar’s uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the
two.

A dance party was held for the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago on the evening of
January 9, 1993. Bodoy, allegedly suitor of the birthday celebrant together with his
brother, Edwin Flora attended the birthday party. Rosalie Roma; her mother, Emerita
Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas together with the neighbor of the Romas were there
also to celebrate the said event.

At 1:30am violence occurred. On the signal of Edwin, Bodoy fired his .38 caliber
revolver twice. The first shot graze at the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, the eventually,
hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte. Due to the
incidents, Rosalie was shocked and said “si Bodoy, si Bodoy”. Edwin approach
threatened her with a knife poking at her neck before he and his brother fled away.

Issue:

Whether the Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes.

Ruling:

No. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there is an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused and co-accused had the same purpose and
were united in execution. Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his conduct
indicated cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably
gave encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a co-
conspirator. To hold an accused guilty as a co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it
must be shown that he had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy.

For acts done outside the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators
are liable.

d. People v. Benedecio

G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020

Lazaro-Xavier, J.:

Facts:

On December 24, 2011, around midnight a friend of Gerry Marasigan invited him to a
drinking spree at his house. He joined the said invitation until his wife came to fetch him.
On their way out, he bumped the appellant whom he is familiar with. Appellant asked
him, “Anong problema?” he replied “Kuya Nestor, asawa ko 'to, hindi mo na ba ako
nakikilala?" Appellant rebuffed "Hindi, bastos ka eh."

Gerry no longer paid attention. When the time Gerry and his wife got home; closing the
door he noticed that the appellant was standing outside the doorway. When Gerry is
being approached by the appellant he fired a shot at Gerry, but instead of hitting him,
the bullet struck Jonabel in the chest and Princess in the leg. As a result, Jonabel died.

Issue:

Whether the appellant is criminally liable of murder.

Ruling:

Yes. Under the doctrine of aberratio ictus, as embodied in Article 4 of the RPC, criminal
liability is imposed for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom.

e. People v. Salvador

G.R. No. 101215, July 30, 1993

Bidin, J.:

Facts:

Around 9:30pm of Oct. 14, 1984, Joel Duran together with Alberto Villablanca saw
Orlando Grepo being mauled by five persons. Joel recognized the said five person
whom are beating Orlando namely, Joey Adap, Alfredo Salvador, Jimmy Agustin,
Augusto Alimurong and Armin Aladdin.

Joel and Alberto decide not to assist their friend Orlando because they are afraid of
being interfered with. They observed how the five assailants boxed and kicked their
friend, how Joey Adap used a "Dos por dos" to strike the victim, and how Alfredo
Salvador slammed a hollow block into Orlando's back. When Joel and Alberto saw the
possibilities, they yelled for aid, and the five perpetrators ran.

Suddenly, Orlando passed away on Nov. 5. 1984 at Manila Medical Center.

Issue:

Whether the absence of intent to kill makes the appellant criminally liable.
Ruling:

Yes. Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred
"by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended." The essential requisites of Art. 4 are: (a) that an
international felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender (People v. Iligan, citing People v. Mananquil,). All these requisites are present
in this case. The intentional felony was the mauling of Grepo and, in the case of
appellant, his dropping of the hollow block on the fallen and hapless victim. The latter’s
death had been the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony as shown by
the evidence provided by the doctors who testified for the prosecution.